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Use Of Riot Control Agents
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco, 96225
AVDCCM 6 August 1970
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions 23-70 Employment of Riot Control Agent
1. (U) Riot Control Agent CS is an effective tear agent that can, depending on the way employed, be used to flush the enemy from bunkers and tunnels, reduce his ability to deliver aimed fire while attacking, or deny his use of fighting positions and infiltration routes for extended periods of time. CS is available in two forms for field use: persistent CS and non-persistent (tactical) CS.
a. Persistent CS: Finely-divided CS power normally released from bursting munitions, used to deny areas to enemy use. This power remains active in the target area for a period of weeks. Use of the area by the enemy stirs the powder back into the air, forcing him to withdraw. Examples of persistent CS munitions are: CS drums (dropped from CH-47 helicopters), and field expedient CS bunker bombs. (The M-25A2 grenade is technically a persistent munition, but because of the small amount of CS in each grenade, this munition should not be depended upon for denial).
b. Non-persistent (Tactical) CS: CS dispersed into the air from burning munitions. It is used to incapacitate the enemy present at that time. After the agent cloud is dispersed by surface winds no residual contamination remains. Examples of non-persistent CS munitions are: E-158 canister clusters (dropped from UH-1 aircraft), E-8 tactical CS launchers (ground or vehicular mounted), XM-629 105mm CS rounds, XM-651 40mm CS rounds (fired from M-79 grenade launchers), XM-630 4.2in CS rounds and M-743 grenades.
2. (C) The employment of CS munitions is subject to the same rules of engagement and requires the same clearances as described in 25th Infantry Division Regulation 525-7. In addition, the following restrictions apply:
This LOI supersedes LOI 9-70, same subject, dated 20 February 1970.
a. Persistent CS: Particular care is to be exercised when employing bulk CS (e.g., CS drums) by aerial delivery within 5 KM of the Cambodian border. Bulk CS drops will be conducted with munitions which are fused for impact bursts, and only when surface wind conditions are such that the target is downwind of the border, or no closer than 5 KM upwind of the border. In addition, if the surface winds parallel the border, the target is to be no closer than 2 KM of the border. Surface winds are to be less than 10 knots for all such missions, except those conducted downwind of the border. All bulk CS drops, regardless of distance from the border, will be executed under the control of a Forward Air Controller. Hand-employed persistent CS munitions (e.g., M-2542 grenades and field-expedient CS bunker bombs) may be used throughout the 25th Division Areas of Operations (AO), to include that area within 5 KM of the Cambodian border.
b. Non-persistent CS: All non-persistent CS munitions may be employed throughout the Division AO. However, when employed near the Cambodian border, sufficient care will be exercised to insure that the normal dispersion of the munition does not cause munitions or sub-munitions to cross the border. Although not desired, agent cloud may cross the border if necessary to support a ground operation. CS munitions in the hands of ground troops may be used throughout the Division AO at the discretion of battalion or higher commanders.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
s/Peter H. Walker
t/PETER H. WALKER
2-CG, II FFORCEV, ATTN; AVFBC-P (INFO)
A TRUE COPY
/s/ Carter Morey
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCIN 14 August 1970
SUBJECT: Intelligence Information Report - VC Anti-Tank Mine (U)
1. (U) The attached Intelligence Information Report Number 5/B/DB/0069/70, HQ, 5th Battalion, (Prov), 525th Military Intelligence Group, dated 31 July 1970 is forwarded for information.
2. (U) Request widest dissemination possible, keeping in mind the security classification affixed to the report.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
1 Incl s/Luther E. Milspaw
as t/LUTHER E. MILSPAW
A TRUE COPY
1. (U) COUNTRY: CB 8. (U) REPORT #: 5/B/DB/0069/70
2. (U) SUBJECT: VC ANTI-TANK MINE (U) 9. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 31 Jul 70
3. (U) ISC NUMBER: 10. (U) NUMBER OF PAGES: 3
4. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 24 Jul 7 11. (U) REFERENCES: GUN BOAT
ARVN SICR #0615/CQ14/LST/K
5. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF 31 Jul 70
ACQ BY US PERSONNEL: SAIGON, VS 12. (U) ORIGINATOR: 1612-01
6. (U) EVALUATION: SOURCE F
INFORMATION 6 13. (U) PREPARED BY: HARRY E. STED
7. (U) SOURCE: PS 5311 (12908) 14. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY
ROBERT B. MCCUE
CO, 5TH BN (PROV)
525TH MI GROUP
15. (C) SUMMARY:
a. (U) MAP REFERENCE: UTM, AMS 1501, SHEET NC 4803, 1/250,000
b. (C) SUMMARY: This report contains information concerning an anti-tank mine currently being used to train VC guerillas in Cambodia. Included in this report are details concerning the fuze used, the explosives, and the utilization of the mine as taught by VC instructors at a mine training school held near Phum Toul Trea village (WT890410), Srok Rumdual district, Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia, during the month of July 1970.
c. (C) NARRATIVE:
(1) Fuze: The inner support for the fuze is normally a small bamboo tube, approximately 40 centimeters in length by three centimeters in diameter. The tube has four shallow sections removed in the following manner: Two sections (nfi) opposite each other are cut out near (nfi) one end of the tube. The tube is then revolved 90 degrees (1/4 turn), and two more opposing sections are removed near the other end. A wire is then coiled around each of the remaining sections of the tube (See Inclosure #1). The tube is then inserted in a larger size bamboo tube which serves as a casing, and is placed lengthwise in the ground. Contact is made when the tubes are crushed, completing the electrical circuit. Either a single 4.5 volt battery or three 1.5 volt batteries may be used as the electrical power source.
(2) Explosive Charge: The explosive charge may consist of either C-3 or C-4 explosive compounds, or TNT, or any combination of these explosives with sulphur (nfi). The charge may be shaped, or placed in empty plastic, clay, or glass containers. When sulphur is used, the sulphur is shaped into a sphere and then flattened to varying thicknesses (nfi). Holes are then made in the sulphur and then filled with other explosives such as C-3, C-4, or TNT.
(3) Utilization: The explosive compounds, fuze, and battery are covered by several layers of nylon (nfi) before use, to prevent water damage and to lessen the chances of accidental detonation (nfi). The charge is laid 10 centimeters below the surface and in the center of the target road. The fuze, for a charge of more than 20 kilograms, is composed of two smaller fuzes, which are emplaced on both sides of the road. For charges of less than 20 kilograms, a single lane of the road is selected. When the charge is directed solely against tanks, a sturdier (nfi) type of bamboo is used, so that smaller vehicles will be unable to crush the tube. The mine is usually emplaced on rough roads (nfi) or other places where the speed of the target vehicle must be diminished. No further information is available.
d. (C) COMMENTS: This information was provided by PS 5311, a witting source trained in observation and elicitation, who obtained the above information from an unwitting relative who attended a three week course of instruction in the handling of mines, given in Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia (Reference IIR 5/B/DB/0068/80, dated 31 July 1970, Subject: VC Mine training school (U) ). PS 5311 has been reporting to this unit for three months. An ARVN Intelligence official indicated that ARVN mine detection equipment currently in use is ineffective against this type of mine because of the minimal amount of metal in both the fuze and the explosive charge. The ARVN MI official also indicated that the VC often boobytrap the charge by placing a grenade underneath the explosive charge. VC cadre at the VC mine training school were instructing Cambodians (nfi) in the utilization of the mine described above. Inclosure #1 is a sketch of the fuze described in paragraph 15.c.(1). Inclosure Two is a sketch of the complete mine.