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 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
18th Military History Detachment
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCMH
19 November 1969
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report
THRU:
Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: Command Historian
APO San Francisco 96375

TO:
Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: O.C.M.H.
Washington, D.C. 20315
1. NAME AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION: 1st Platoon, Company B, 2nd Battalion,
    27th Infantry—Rifle Platoon.
2. INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION: 12 October - 13 October 1969.
3. LOCATION: Ref Map Series L8020, Sheets 6231 III S and 6230 IV N, vicinity XT333163;
     Hieu Thien District, Tay Ninh Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry.
5. PERSONS BEING INTERVIEWED:
    a. 1LT Terrence M. Rettig, *********, Platoon Leader, 1st Platoon, Company B, 2nd
         Battalion, 27th Infantry.
    b. PFC Albert L. Brown, *********, Rifleman, 1st Platoon, Company B, 2nd Battalion,
        27th, Infantry -- Ammunition Bearer for M60 machine gun positioned for rear security.
    c. PFC Walter Black, *********, Assistant Machine Gunner, 1st Platoon, Company B, 2nd
        Battalion, 27th Infantry - Machine Gunner on M60 machine gun positioned for rear security
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Division Historian.
[1]
7. TASK ORGANIZATION: Nineteen (19) man combat patrol with three (3) Popular Force (PF) members attached. The Command Group consisted of the Platoon Leader, the Platoon Sergeant, and five (5) men. The 1st Section consisted of six (6) men and had the three (3) PF's attached. The 2nd Section consisted of six (6) men. The platoon was armed with two (2) M60 machine guns, two (2) M79 grenade launchers and 14 M-16 rifles. The PF's each carried an M-16 rifle.
8. SUPPORTING FORCES:
   a. Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm), Fire Support Base Jackson, vicinity XT424166.
   b. Mortar Platoon, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (81mm), vicinity XT344179.
   c. 25th Aviation Battalion, one "Night Hawk" helicopter (UH1H).
9. BACKGROUND: The main infiltration route for enemy forces in Sub-Region 2 was the An Ninh Corridor which ran from the "Angel's Wing" in Cambodia into northern Hau Nghia Province. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry was deployed to block the corridor with companies operating out of Fire Support Base Jackson (XT427168), Patrol Base Harris (XT417126), Patrol Base Kotrc (XT358148) and the Ap Bien Hoa Regional Force Outpost north of PB Kotrc (XT344179). (See Figure l)
Patrol Base Kotrc (originally named PB Rittgers) was located in the An Ninh Corridor and was a bothersome obstacle to the enemy. The enemy lost 57 KIA trying to prevent the establishment of the patrol base on 12 August and an additional 17 bodies were left in the wire when the enemy attempted to overrun PB Kotrc on 5 September. Since its establishment the enemy had harassed the base with sporadic shellings.
Though the 2-27 Inf had succeeded in limiting the enemy's use of the An Ninh Corridor, elements at PB Kotrc and the Ap Bien Hoa RF Outpost continued to identify small enemy elements with radar and engage them with artillery. On the night of 11-12 October unusually heavy enemy activity had been detected in the vicinity of PB Kotrc.
Though most of the identified enemy activity was concentrated in the An Ninh Corridor, the enemy also operated north and south of the corridor, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry was operating out of the RF outpost on the southern edge of Ap Bien Hoa. The three rifle platoons had been operating on a three-day cycle for over a month. The platoons were staggered so that when the 1st Platoon was in the first day of the cycle the 2nd Platoon was in the second day and the 3rd Platoon in the third. On the first day of the cycle the platoon performed a daytime ground reconnaissance followed by a night ambush. The second day was set aside for
2
training and preparing for night activities at the RF outpost with another ambush that night. The third day and night were spent on rest, training, details, and helping to secure the outpost. When the reported action took place, the 1st Platoon was in the first night of the cycle.
For the daytime ground reconnaissance, Battalion Headquarters assigned a detailed mission, but night ambush locations were selected by the company commander within an area chosen by Battalion Headquarters.
10. INTELLIGENCE:
   a. Enemy-Due to the heavy radar sightings the night before, some enemy action-against PB Kotrc on the              night of 12-13 October seemed likely.
    b. Terrain-The area was flat with an elevation below five (5) meters and covered with rice paddies and scattered hedgerows. At the time of the action, late in the rainy season, the surface of the rice paddies was either mud or standing water. The Cambodian border was not blocked by any significant obstacles to foot movement.
   c. Weather-At the time of contact, there were scattered clouds which presented no obstacles to operations.
11. MISSION: Company B was directed to set up ambushes between the RF outpost and PB Kotrc to cover the northwestern approaches to the base. The 1st Platoon was directed to establish an ambush in the vicinity of XT333158, The 2nd Platoon was assigned an ambush approximately 1200 meters to the north (XT333170).
12. CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND EXECUTION: When the 1st Platoon finished its ground reconnaissance it returned to the RF outpost for the evening meal, and to prepare for the ambush and await dark. At 1900 hours, they departed the outpost and moved toward their assigned location.
They moved south, paralleling a trail along adjacent rice paddies. The Platoon Leader stated he had little trouble navigating because they had been in the area so long that they could identify and locate many fish traps, sun screens and other similar structures in the area. He set up the ambush north of the planned location when he found a dry area approximately 10 meters wide and 25 meters long and the same height as the rice dikes, near the trail with several rice dikes running into it. (See Figure 2)
After selecting the site, the Platoon Leader established his ambush position in a rough triangle. The Command Group was positioned on the west side facing the trail, the 2nd Section on the north side, and the 1st Section with the PF's on the southeast side. The M60 machine guns were placed on the southern and eastern corners. The M60 machine gun on the eastern corner was located at the junction of two rice dikes coming into the position from the east and north. Following SOP, claymore mines were put out 15 paces from
3
the position and then emplaced on the nearest dry spot. (See Figure 3)
By 2145 hours, the platoon had established its position. At 2239 hours, the Platoon Leader was contacted by the company's Artillery Forward Observer who informed him that the radar at PB Kotrc had detected movement east of the patrol which would be engaged with artillery. The Forward Observer also warned him that enemy elements could be expected to approach his position from the east. The Platoon Leader said that by 2253 hours the artillery was so loud he was no longer concerned that any of his men might fall asleep since the artillery was impacting only 600 meters east of the platoon.
At 2255 hours, the ammunition bearer for the machine gun on the eastern corner, PFC Albert L. Brown, saw six (6) enemy running along the rice dike leading to the position from the east about 25 meters away. The machine gunner, PFC Walter Black, saw the enemy soldiers just after PFC Brown did. The six (6) enemy soldiers were running in a file directly at the machine gun. When the enemy was approximately five (5) meters from the machine gun, PFC Brown fired a burst from his M-16 rifle and PFC Black began firing his M60 immediately afterward. As the two fired, the other members of the platoon who were in a position to do so joined in the firing. The grenadiers began firing M79 illumination rounds behind the kill Zone. PFC Black had fired about 150 rounds through his M60 when the weapon had a stoppage. He found that the ammunition belt was caught on another belt lying beside the weapon and had the weapon operational in a matter of seconds. The maximum rate of fire lasted approximately two (2) minutes. During this time, the claymore mines emplaced on the eastern side of the position were detonated. PFC Brown said that, during the firing, he expended about 15 magazines of M-16 ammunition.
The two men who initiated the firing stated that they saw four of the enemy fall in the initial firing with the fifth running to the north and the sixth running to the south. Apparently, two of those who fell were only wounded since only two bodies were found in front of the machine gun.
When the firing began, the Platoon Leader moved to the eastern corner of the position to control the action. For about eight (8) minutes after the initial two (2) minutes of firing, the remaining enemy were engaged with aimed fire when they could be seen attempting to flee the area. To supplement the M79 illumination, which was now being fired by only one of the grenadier while the other fired high explosive rounds, the platoon used hand-held parachute flares and star clusters.
As soon as the contact was reported, a "Night Hawk" helicopter from the 25th Aviation Battalion which had been operating in the vicinity of PB Kotrc was diverted over the contact. The ship arrived over the ambush at 2258 hours. The flares on the "Night Hawk" were used to replace the M79 illumination and hand-held parachute flares, and the helicopter flares
4
were in turn replaced by 81mm mortar illumination. Finally, fifteen (15) minutes of 105mm artillery illumination was employed. As soon as it arrived, the "Night Hawk" began using its spotlight to find targets for its minigun. The helicopter engaged one of the enemy who had moved north out of the kill zone.

After engaging the target at about 2303 hours, the "Night Hawk" requested that the platoon check their target to see if he was still alive. By this time, the platoon could no longer see any targets from their position and the Platoon Leader had organized a killer group. 1LT Rettig said his main problem in organizing the killer group was that everyone wanted to go. The killer group was sent out to the south to check the area where the machine gunner on the southern corner said he saw two enemy fall after he fired the M60 at them. When the "Night Hawk" radioed that they bad a dead or wounded enemy marked with their spotlight, a second killer group comprised of five men, including the platoon medic and a radio operator, was sent to the north.

When the first group moved out, they first checked the initial kill zone and located two enemy bodies. Then, they swung south and spotted one of the enemy crawling away. They engaged and killed him. They did not find the second enemy who was thought to have evaded south after the original firing.

The second group was guided to the "Night Hawk's" target by the helicopter spotlight which was narrowed as the group approached to pinpoint the target. When the enemy soldier was found, he was suffering from a sucking chest wound which the medic immediately treated. After first aid had been applied, the helicopter landed to evacuate the severely wounded man. There was no sign of the second man who was thought to have evaded to the north. (See Figure 4)

During their search, the killer groups found three (3) AK-47 rifles, a pouch with ten (10) new M26 grenades, a satchel charge, and several portable bamboo tripods.
When the killer groups returned to the ambush position the platoon was ordered to join the 2nd Platoon to their north. At 2330 hours, after collecting their gear, they moved out toward the 2nd Platoon.

As they neared the 2nd Platoon's position, they fired a green star cluster as a recognition symbol and, by 2340 hours, were in place, having taken over a portion of the 2nd Platoon's perimeter.

Although the evacuated prisoner was fatally wounded, he stated before he died that his mission for the night had been to carry ammunition to a village which was close to PB Kotrc. This information was received at the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC) at about 0055 hours. Feeling that this information, coupled with several radar sightings to its west,
5
indicated that an attack on PB Kotrc was imminent, DTOC dispatched a light fire team and a helicopter flare ship to the area. The attack began at 0103 hours, shortly before the helicopters arrived over the area. The enemy shelling during the attack included three (3) 122mm rockets.

The 1st and 2nd Platoon's ambush position had no contact with the enemy. At about 0530 hours, the 1st Platoon left the 2nd Platoon's ambush site to return to the RF outpost where they closed at 0600 hours.
After breakfast, the Company Commander led the 3rd Platoon, augmented by several volunteers from the 1st Platoon, to search the area where the ambush patrol had engaged the enemy. They found the three bodies which had been located the night before and a fourth body, along with another AK-47 rifle and two homemade hand grenades. They also found more of the bamboo tripods, bringing the total to ten.
The tripods were a type the VC/NVA use as a lightweight field launcher for 122mm rockets. The tripods and the prisoner's statement indicated that the six enemy who had been ambushed were part of an element that was to have provided fire support for the attack on PB Kotrc.

1LT Rettig stated that the Platoon had no significant contact for months and had suffered a morale problem from working hard for so long with no results. He estimated that morale improved "ten times" as a result of the ambush.

13. ANALYSIS: By allowing the enemy to close within five (5) meters before engaging them, PFC Brown and PFC Black insured that the ambush would achieve maximum shock even though only two weapons were initially fired. The tactical unity of the enemy group was shattered; they were unable to fire a single shot in return and were reduced to disorganized, fleeing individuals.

This action shows the value of the combination of radar, artillery and aggressive patrolling in preventing organized enemy attacks on U.S. bases. The radar and artillery prevented the enemy from organizing and massing for his attacks as he had planned, and in this case, the ambush changed the disorganization and casualties the artillery had caused into a defeat in detail. When the enemy launched what he could collect of his planned attack, he was short part of his fire support and was headed for an alerted patrol base with aviation support already on the way. The disorganized attack was unable to inflict a single US casualty and cost the enemy seven (7) killed in addition to the five (5) killed by the ambush.
14. RESULTS:
a. Friendly casualties and losses: None.
b. Enemy casualties: 5 KIA (BC).
6
c. Enemy equipment losses:
(1) 4 AK-47 rifles
(2) 10 M26 grenades
(3) 2 homemade grenades
(4) 1 satchel charge
(5} l0 bamboo tripods for 122mm rockets
d. 1/B/2-27 Inf ammunition expenditures (approximate):
(1) 700 rounds M60 ammunition
(2) 540 rounds M-16 ammunition
(3) 30 rounds M79 illumination
(4) 15 rounds M79 HE
(5) 7 Claymore mines
(6) 3 hand grenades
WILLIAM D. WATSON
CPT, FA
Commanding
[7]




 24 Oct 69-Ho Bo- Boi Loi Woods

Date of Action: 24 October 1969
 Location: Hó Bo Woods (XT570303)

 1312 hrs A/2/12 was flown by 4 ships into hot LZ by 116th AH (XT 568305)

 1313 Stingers rec heavy volume of RPG and AK fire neg hits upon lifting  off (XT572303)

 1315 Requested LFT for A Co.

 1320 A Co: PZ 544312 4 ships

 1322 Dustoff 130 ETA 10 min

 1324 A Co: LZ 568305 4 ships
  Prob 116th, but not sure. "As soon as we landed we had contact all  over."-FO "They were in the trees     ...everywhere!"-RTO. One platoon  moved north and one south from this location. The northern platoon came  under fire and their platoon leader was wounded. The two platoons  pulled back.
 1330 Diamond Head 20 LFT on station.

 1337 Dustoff 154 on station

 1410 A Co. platoon leader wounded litter dustoff by C & C
 [Poss. "Menahone 3" or "6". He died on way to Cu Chi. "The battalion  commander came down in his chopper once the firing stopped and picked up  (the platoon leader) who died..."-FO  The company pulled back to some large bomb craters and called in two air  strikes, gunships and artillery. "The air strikes were really close,  the napalm couldn't have been more than just a hundred meters away."-FO  It started to rain really hard. After the rain, Alpha went back in and  hit a machine gun nest. They pulled back again. ]

 1443 Menahone 6 released

 1515 LITTLE BEAR 186 FLAMEBATH ETA 15-20

 1545 Little Bear 22 resupply on station

 1555 C Troop 3/4 CAV spotted 4 VC with RPG launcher Stinger 04 engaged  3 VC Results; 3 VC BC (XT 558305)  [I belive this is the point at which the CAV -"35 Lima" ?? - joined  A/2/12 for what turned out to be the final assault of the day. The Cav  had 2 Sheridans and 3 APCs.]

 1715 "A Co. and 35L in heavy contact. Cannot monitar enough to copy  will catch up on details later"
  [ Verbatum from the BN Jounal]

 1740 Dustoff 153 on station

 1845 Dustoff 153 complete 7 ambulatory 1 litter all wounded. Evac at
 this time
 ["The wounded were moved to a small clearing in our rear."-FO]

 1930 hrs A Co.[2/12] with elements of 3/4 Cav and 2/14 Inf pulled into  night logger position
 ["A/2/14 was flown in to help us and we set up a perimeter and dug in.  We got a supply of claymores...."
 "The battalion XO came down and sat in our hole, the guy was scared  shitless."  "A Puff was called in."-FO  "We pulled back and formed a night defensive position. We were  surroundd. All night long you could see blinking lights out there."-RTO  "We had no contact during the night."-FO

 25 Oct: "We got picked up at 12:30 and went home. ABC/NBC news came  out. I heard today on the radio that we were in one of the largest  battles of the last few months." -FO


Individuals and units involved from the 25th Infantry Division and Air Force:

A, B and D Companies, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry

A Co., 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry

B ,C and D Troops 3/4 CAV

B Battery, 1/8 ARTY

159th Medical Detachment (HA)
[Dustoff 130/Dustoff 151/Dustoff 153]

12th EVAC

Air Force units who may have been involved:
19th TASS
20th TASS
531 TF Sq
3rd Direct Air Support Center (AC-119)
3rd TFW (F-100 A-37)
31st TFW (F-100)
35th TFW (F-100)
8th Attack Squadron (A-37)
269th CAB
[25th INF DIV "Issue" FACs -OV10 Bronco / O-2.]

116th AVN Co.
[Hornet 3/Hornet 23/Stinger 04 et all]

25th AVN BN
[Menahoni 3/Menahoni 6]
Co. A "Little Bears"
[Little Bear 186/Little Bear 22 et all]
Co.B "Diamond Head"
[Diamond Head 20 LFT]

242nd AVN Co.

 Operation Ben Cui


HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECH) 5TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96225
SUBJECT: Report of Combat Action                                                                1 September 1968
TO:           Commanding Officer
                  Second Brigade
                 25th Infantry Division
                 APO San Francisco 96225
1. Submitted herewith is the report of the combat action involving the 1st bn (Mech), 5th Infantry on 21 August 1968 in the Ben Cui Rubber plantation near Dau Tieng, RVN

2. This report was compiled from eyewitness reports taken from the leaders and men of Company C, the Scout Platoon and the Battalion Headquarters of the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry, the members of the 3rd Brigade CRIP and the gun crew of the 40mm self propelled weapon attached to the scout platoon. In Addition, the area of contact has been swept on three occasions in order to confirm the detailed locations of enemy and friendly positions.

3. In compiling this report, every effort has been made to avoid conjecture and to obtain as accurate and clear a report as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:
                                                                               Arthur B. Cook Jr.
                                                                               1LT, Inf
                                                                               Adjutant

COMBAT OPERATIONS REPORT
1. At 210640 August 1968 company C 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry departed Dau Tieng base camp with the mission of sweeping from Dau Tieng to XT 420445, staying approximately 1000 meters to the south of route 239. The scout platoon, with the 3rd brigade CRIP and one twin 40mm self propelled weapon attached departed Dau Tieng at 210658 August 1968 to sweep and outpost the MSR from Dau Tieng to XT 371424. The two units were to move abreast on parallel routes in order to provide additional security for the units.

2.  At 0813 hours the scout platoon was located at XT 463468. Company C had moved to the south and at XT 473456. Both units reported no enemy contact. Company C was moving with two rifle teams abreast. The 1st platoon on the right was led by SSG Lang, while the 3rd platoon on the left was led by 1LT Cook. Each platoon's personnel carriers
followed the dismounted elements of the platoon. The Company commander 1LT Snodgrass, moved on foot, and alternated his position between the lead platoons. Inclosure 2 shows the detailed formation of the unit.

3. At 0831 hours the scout dog with the point element of the company alerted. The handler stated that he thought that there might be a large number of personnel to the southwest. The battalion S-3 in the OH-23 helicopter made a low VR of the area concerned but could locate nothing unusual. It was concluded that the dog had probably alerted to the presence of civilians in the village at XT 464448. The Company commander then adjusted 81mm mortar fire into the rubber plantation to his front, with negative results.

4. Two enemy soldiers were engaged by the security elements of company C at 0906 hours. The enemy soldiers were at a range of 200 meters and withdrew to the south without returning fire.

5. At 0913 hours the scout platoon was located at checkpoint "G" and was conducting a search of the village at XT 464448. This search netted nothing except for the information that the enemy for billets and classrooms had used three buildings in the southern edge of the village.

6. Company C located and destroyed a mine at XT 476454 at 0914 hours. The company then shifted to the west to move out of the open area into the rubber. The company continued moving south until it made a turn to to the west astride the trail leading from XT 470444 to 463444. The company moved to the west with one lead platoon on each side of the trail. The scout dog with its security element was moving ahead of the platoon security by approximately 30 meters. The weapons platoon and the 2nd platoon shifted to the left as shown on Enclosure 3.

7. At 1012 hours, the scout platoon observed a red star cluster in the vicinity of the village at XT 463448. The Scout platoon continued searching the village at XT 463448. At 1035 hours company C called in a negative situation report and gave XT 462440 as the current location of the unit.

8.  At 1110 hours, company C reported receiving sniper fire at XT 462444, and reported 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. The report stated that the fire was coming from the west and southwest. The unit requested gunship support.  At this time the point and security elements were approximately 40 meters west of the road that extends south from route 239 to XT 463440. At this point, the lead platoons were crossing the road. The second platoon and the mortar platoon were following the 3rd platoon, south of the east-west trail.

9. As the enemy increased their volume of fire, the lead elements returned the fire, and remained west of the north-south road for approximately ten minutes. The enemy continued to advance, with the elements attempting to move along the south flank of company C. The enemy advanced from the west on the dismounted elements of company C. Most of the enemy soldiers were wearing green and camouflaged uniforms, and were moving from tree to tree in short rushes, and advancing rapidly toward the north-south road, while some of the enemy were occupying camouflaged positions. The volume of fire initially was low, but soon reach an extremely high rate. During this period SSG Lang, the 1st platoon leader was killed.

10. The company commander, realizing he could not effectively employ his cal. 50 machine guns over his own troops, withdrew his troops to the line of personnel carriers, now dispersed along the east side of the north-south road. Further, since enemy soldiers had been observed while attempting to envelop his right flank, the company commander ordered his reserve, the 2nd platoon to displace to the right rear of his 1st platoon. He then displaced his mortars to the rear to obtain overhead clearance in order that they could be employed. During this period the unit employed all available weapons, to include M-72 laws to break up the enemy attack.

11. At 1135 hours the battalion S-3 urgently requested the gunships, which had been previously requested but had not arrived. The Artillery FO on the ground was attempting to get clearances to employ artillery.  At this time company C marked the unit position with purple smoke, and a few minutes later with yellow smoke. The unit at this time was still defending along the road with the troops deployed with the troops personnel carriers. The company continued to fire in this position for approximately 30 minutes.

12. During this 30-minute period the scout platoon deployed along route 239 with the lead element at XT 461448. The scout platoon leader observed enemy troops moving to the southeast in the vicinity of XT 458446, and took these units under fire with cal. 50 machineguns and small arms.  Shortly he moved a twin-40mm weapon into a firing position and this weapon fired in excess of 300 rounds. The scout platoon was soon engaged in small arms and RPG fire. At 1149 the scout platoon leader observed and reported at least an enemy company moving southeast of the village at XT 450450.

13.  Company C continued to remain in position along the north-south road until approximately 1150 hours, at which time 3 personnel carriers, on the left side of the company position, were hit with RPG weapons. These weapons were apparently fired from extremely short range. The company commander then decided to withdraw approximately 150 meters and to organize another defensive position. The unit withdrew, taking with it the wounded personnel and the body of SSG Lang. During this period, five more men were killed.

14.  Upon order the 1st and the 3rd platoon withdrew. This movement disposed the company with three platoons abreast, since the 2nd platoon held in place. At this time eight personnel carriers were on line, and all cal. 50 machineguns were operating. In addition, the dismounted personnel were firing individual weapons and m-72 laws. At this time 81mm mortars were firing with their rounds impacting near the second platoon. The artillery forward observer, LT Ranney, was adjusting the artillery, which was impacting 200 meters west of the friendly elements. At this time three of the remaining personnel carriers sustained RPG hits. These RPG hits killed the 4.2 mortar forward observer and one of the company radio operators and wounded the company commander, the artillery forward observer and the remaining company radio operator. The last transmission
LT Ranney, the artillery forward observer, made was to the effect that the last artillery rounds had landed 200 meters east of his position. Since the artillery fire direction center knew that if the rounds were landing 200 meters east of LT Ranney, the were landing on the troops of company C, thus the FDC check fired the artillery. Several minutes passed prior to the resuming fire.

15. At 1154 hours the forward air controller reported an estimated time of arrival of 20 to 25 minutes for the first air strike, and the 1st Brigade announced an ETA of 15 minutes for alight fire team, this light fire team arrived at 1201 hours and was immediately employed along the southern flank of the unit.

16. Now Commanded by 1lt Cook, company C reported at 1200 hours that the situation was extremely critical and that he planned to withdraw. All wounded were loaded onto personnel carriers and the unit withdrew over the same route taken on the advance. The last element to withdraw was the 2nd platoon. The company moved and secured a landing zone at XT 473455.

17.  1200 hours the scout platoon was heavily engaged from the south, and observed an estimated enemy platoon maneuvering to block route 239 to the north of the scout platoon.  At this time the scout platoon was ordered to move east through the village at XT 463448 and to link up with company C at the landing zone. This movement resulted in a short advance by the enemy, followed by a halt of his advance. Following the Medical evacuation of casualties, all units were ordered by the commanding officer to return to Dau Tieng to regroup and to prepare to return to the Ben Cui plantation to continue the contact. The scout platoon was subsequently ordered to return to the eastern edge of the rubber. At 1600 hours all elements were ordered to return to Dau Tieng.

INCLOSURES-Note: Use Your Back button for these Inclosures. They are posted on the 1/5th Website, and will not bring you back to here if you use the back link on the Inclosure pages
Map of area of contact, showing routes of company C and the scout platoon
Formation of C Co while moving south
Formation of Co C while moving west
Initial contact and immediate deployment
2nd defensive formation
3rd defensive formation
Routes of withdrawal
Plot of area of engagement
Locations of US KIA
Estimated enemy casualties
Photos of company C personnel taken by PIO on 21 Aug 68