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After Action Reports 4
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Co. B (GS), 25th Aviation Battalion
APO SF 96225
AVDCAN-GS 13 March 1970
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview
TO: S-1, 25th Aviation Battalion
IAW Div Reg 870-3 the following combat after action interview is submitted:
1. Co A, 25th Aviation Battalion. Support Helicopter Company
2. 3 March 1970
a. South Side Nui Ba Den, vicinity of the pagoda.
b. Map reference 6231
4. Control or Command Headquarters-Army Aviation Element, 25th Infantry Division.
5. Persons Interviewed.
a. Horrell, Tim K., WO1, Aircraft commander, Age 20,
Company A., 25th Aviation Battalion.
b. Little, Elbert T., 1LT, Pilot, Age 26,
Company A., 25th Aviation Battalion.
6. Pearson, Robert E., CPT, Operations Officer, Age 26,
Company A., 25th Aviation Battalion.
7. Task Organization- Company A., 25th Aviation Battalion.
8. Supporting Forces-Company B., 25th Aviation Battalion.
9. Background Information - Elements of Company E, 75th Rangers Battalion had
been conducting a reconnaissance mission on the south slope of Nui Ba Den and
had made contact with an undetermined size enemy force and needed to be
a. Enemy of undetermined strength, and unknown unit.
b. Terrain-Rocky slopes of Nui Ba Den Mountain.
11. Mission - To extract the Ranger Team from the side of Nui Ba Den by using
ropes hanging from the sides of a UH-1H.
12. Concept of the operation and execution - Once the need to extract the Ranger
Team was determined, a "Little Bear" aircraft was equipped with eight ropes
attached to floor rings (four on each side) to lift the team out by means of slinging
the team on the ropes. A "Diamondhead" light fire team was called for cover
due to the presence of enemy forces. With the cover of the "Diamondhead" fire
team, the "Littler Bear" made his approach to the PZ, lowered the ropes and
began to pick up the team. While hovering, the aircraft began to take fire and
took two hits, one in the fuselage and the other through a hydraulic line. Despite
the loss of his hydraulics, the "Little Bear" remained on station long enough to
pick up the Ranger Team and then flew to a rice paddy area where he lowered
the team to the ground and continued to Tay Ninh and made a running landing
with no further damage to the aircraft.
13. Results - The Ranger Team from Company E, 75th Ranger Battalion was safely
extracted with no casualties. Little Bear losses were one ship lightly damaged
by ground fire.
14. Analysis - The flexibility of the 25th Aviation Battalion was shown by the safe
extraction of a Ranger Team despite a damaged aircraft.Once again the
aircraft ad crews have proved their value to the men they support and sustain
on the ground.
Robert E. Pearson
14. Maximum utilization and coordination between arty, armor, TAC air and
armed helicopter fire power continues to be most effective in indigenous
Steven D. Hickman
As I remember, there were about 6-8 LRRPs who needed to be extracted from the pagoda on the south side of Nui Ba Den Mountain. Nui Ba Den is about 3000 feet high and the pagoda is about halfway up the side of the mountain. I think we pretty much made a straight-in approach. You don't want to be too fast or too slow. Get in, get out, and stay alive. The closer you get to the mountain, the more magnificence it becomes. There wasn't much left of the pagoda; it looked like it had been pummeled over the years. I tried to find a place to hover over, where the Rangers could climb in. We got real close but, because of obstacles (either rocks or trees or both), I decided to pull up, and the one Ranger on board threw out the ropes. This guy was a Telly Savalas look-alike, and as we were in this high hover facing the mountain, waiting for the rangers to secure themselves to the ropes, this guy was squatting on his knees unloading his M-16 out of each side of the aircraft. That picture was surreal, movie-like. I cannot remember at which point the hydraulics went out, but at about this time, I saw an orange dot of light dancing around in my chin bubble and wondered 'what the hell is that.'
As we pulled away from the mountain, the hydraulics were out and that was not good. On top of that, we were not going to get to pick up the rest of the Rangers. Don't you hate it when that happens? Well, anyway, now I don't have a plan but I know we're going to Tay Ninh for a running landing and that I'll figure out what to do with the Rangers on the rope by the time we get there. So we all head for Tay Ninh at about 40 knots. I felt bad for these guys. They couldn't have had any idea what was going on, and I didn't know how well they were secured and how long they could last. My original plan was to drop them at the bottom of the mountain, pick up the remaining Rangers, then go back to pick up the first group. About 5 miles from Tay Ninh the Ranger on board said they were starting to have problems, something like choking on the ropes. So we made a slow approach to a rice paddy. When we came to a high hover I asked Lt. Little to assist me on the
controls. I knew this could be counterproductive, that we could end up fighting each other, but we were in a high hover and had room to maneuver. The crew talked us down and it worked out ok. We left the guys in the rice paddy and went ahead and made a running landing at Tay Ninh.
I think it was one of the Diamondheads who later told me that another ship had picked up the remaining Rangers without any ropes. Oh, well.
And that orange dot of light dancing around in the chin bubble turned out
to be a tracer casing. I picked it up in the bottom of the chin bubble
after we landed. I never knew who was shooting at whom.
19 Oct 01
1ST BATTALION (MECH) 5TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCSBA-C 10 December 1966
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)
TO: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
APO U.S. Forces 96225
1.NAME OF OPERATION: Operation ATTLEBORO.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 062140NOV66-252400NOV66.
3. LOCATION: Tay Ninh Province, South Viet Nam.
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Victor F. Diaz.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION.
1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, LTC Victor F. Diaz, Commanding.
Scout Plat, 1LT R. A. Szarek
Hvy Mort Plat, 1LT L. H. Wickman
1 Plat, Co B, 65th Engr Bn
Company A, 1LT J. E. McQuinn, Commanding
Company B, CPT R. G. Vanneman, Commanding
Company C, CPT W. A. Blair, Commanding
7. SUPPORTING FORCES.
a. 6th Bn, 8th Arty
b. 2d Bn, 33rd Arty
c. Btry C, 2d Bn, 13th Arty
d. Btry B, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty
e. 1st Bn, 8th Arty
f. Avn Sec, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
a. Intelligence Prior to the Operation: The VC 9th Div continued to avoid contact with U.S. Forces operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Dong Provinces. 2d Brigade elements had encountered very light contact since their commitment on 10 November 1966. The 101st NVN Regt was believed to be withdrawing NE toward Phuoc Long Province. Although the main force regiments of the 9th Div received a severe setback during their engagement with U.S. Forces they still retained the capability of attacking at a time and place of their choosing. Brigade units were also expected to make contact with the three battalions of the 70th Regt, which has the mission of security of COSVN in War Zone "C".
b. Enemy Situation During the Operation: Only sporadic contact was made during the entire operation. Significant contact was made near the Cambodian border with elements of the 70th Regiment. Captured documents indicated that a radio station had been operating in the area. The battalion encountered isolated incidents of small arms fire and AT mining. The mines were emplanted on existing roads and in areas that afforded the easiest access for tracked vehicles. Numerous base camps and cache sites were located just south of the Cambodian border; however, there was a lack of complex fortifications, trenches, or tunnels.
c. Terrain and Weather: Thunder storms were often encountered in the afternoon and evenings. Ground fog on several occasions delayed aircraft in the morning hours.
9. MISSION: 1Bn (Mech) 5th Inf moves by road, 071000NOV66, to vic Soui Da (XT 3458) for attachment to the 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div and provides security for the 3rd bde Hq, forward supply base, and two fire support bases. On 100600NOV66 the battalion, detached from the 1st Div, conducts a reconnaissance in force and search and destroy operations in War Zone "C", attached to 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The operation consisted of two major phases.
a. Phase I - The battalion organized two fixed bases and established perimeter defenses to secure the facilities consisting of four artillery batteries, 3rd Bde Hq forward supply airhead, a Special Forces compound and a Popular Forces compound. Patrols were dispatched throughout the AO to prevent VC infiltration and buildup.
b. Phase II - The battalion conducted reconnaissance in force in an attempt to locate VC forces, bases and cache sites. Successive fire support bases were secured and established to facilitate continuous and mutually supporting artillery fires through the axes of advance.Search and destroy operations were conducted in all areas of probable VC activity.
6 November 1966
The battalion departed Go Dau Ha (XT 3825) at 1005 hours for Soui Da (XT 3458), and was attached to the 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div upon entering the area of operation. The battalion (-) established a base vic XT 340583 and provided a perimeter defense for the 3rd Bde Hq, forward supply airhead, two artillery batteries, a Special Forces compound and a Popular Forces compound. Company A was dispatched to vic XT 394622 to reinforce an infantry battalion which was securing a fire support base consisting of two artillery batteries.
7 November 1966
The battalion (-) continued to secure the base vic XT 340583 and reinforce Co A with the scout platoon to assume responsibility for the fire support base vic XT 394622 due to deployment of the Inf Bn. Patrols were dispatched throughout the AO but no contact was made. Trp B (-), 1/4 Cav and 1st Engr Bn (-), 1st Div Engr was placed under OPCON 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf for perimeter defense.
8 November 1966
Company B was dispatched to fire support base vic XT 394622 to relieve the Scout Platoon and the Bn(-) remained at the base vic XT 340583. Extensive patrolling was conducted throughout the AO but with no significant results. Another fire support base, consisting of one artillery battery, was established vic XT 305535 and the 4th Bn, 31st Inf was placed under OPCON 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf to secure the base. The 4/31st Inf was reinforced by a scout section, 1/5th Mech to secure the base. Night ambushes made no contact and returned at first light.
9 November 1966
Throughout the day all elements remained in their respective positions, conducting local patrols in sector. No contact was made except for Co B. During the morning hours two platoons from Co B were sent on local patrols North and SE of the destroyed bridge vic XT 393628, to locate a crossing point for track vehicles. A crossing site was found; however, eight VC were spotted and engaged vic XT 393628 at 1110 hours. The VC quickly broke contact and fled the area. A search of the area was fruitless. One ambush and two OP/LP's were established during darkness and at 2037 hours two VC were seen approaching the company perimeter. The VC were engaged with mortar and .50 cal MG fire but results could not be determined.
10 November 1966
Trp B 1/4 Cav, 1st Engr Bn and 4/31 Inf reverted to OPCON 1/4 Cav Sqdn. The battalion reverted to OPCON 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div and displaced to vic XT 274686 to secure the Bde base and to conduct reconnaissance in force in zone. At 1314 hours four hooches and three bunkers were destroyed vic XT 248694 and a VC company size overnight base was found vic XT 277703 at 1455 hours. Numerous foxholes and camp fire sites were found and the area appeared to have been used within the last three days. Three OP/LP's were established. None made contact and all returned at 0600 hours, (Incl1).
11 November 1966
Throughout the day the Bn conducted reconnaissance in force north of the base up to the road junction vic XT 271772. Night ambushes made no contact and returned at first light.
Co A departed the area at 0730 hours moving north to check the trails from XT 279280 north to XT 269760. A trail leading east was found at 0755 hours vic XT 274720. At 0819 hours eight ox carts were found and destroyed vic XT 273722. Destroyed at 1005 hours vic XT 269752 were one steel helmet, one poncho, fifteen rice bags and five lean-to huts. A small VC base camp was found at 1200 hours vic XT 269753. Found and destroyed in the area were five Chicom grenades, 200 pounds of rice and 150 gallons of acid-type fluid which was buried in the ground. Three WIA's were sustained from acid burns as a sample was extracted. The area appeared to have been used as recently as 10 November 1966. Five bunkers, with three man capacity, were destroyed vic XT 270755 at 1220 hours. A Chicom claymore, rigged with wires for command detonation, was found and destroyed at 1302 hours vic XT 270755. Between 1359 hours and 1500 hours the company destroyed 9 Chicom grenades, one ton of rice, one concrete bunker and 240 pounds of canned foods vic XT 270756. The company then moved to vic XT 269757 and established its perimeter. One rifle grenade (dud) was fired into the company's perimeter at 1830 hours.
Co B departed the battalion base following Co A to reconnoiter trails leading north. While exploiting a trail vic XT 274729, at 1006 hours, two live pigs, a hut and several signs of recent activity were found. Other trails leading east were found vic XT 280725 and vic XT 273727. The company then established two platoon sized blocking positions in conjunction with Co C's operations on the west. One platoon reconnoitered a trail west from XT 268726 to XT 257729 with negative results. At 1630 hours the company departed the area to return to Bn base camp.
Co C departed the Bn base at 0730 hours to check the trails leading north, east and west between XT 270690 and XT 256760. A well used trail which appeared to have been used on 10 November 1966 was found vic XT 264704. Fresh ox cart tracks were found at 0915 hours vic XT 254715. A large east to west trail was found at 1013 hours vic XT 256723. At 1110 hours a bunker complex was found vic XT 262737. Upon approaching the complex one VC was flushed from the area and escaped to the east. At 1207 hours five more VC were flushed from vic XT 263734 and also fled to the east. At 1435 hours two trails were found vic XT 261722. One of the trails ran from south to north and the other ran from east to west. The east to west trail had been heavily traveled recently. After exploring these trails and finding nothing, Co C returned to the Bn base (-) one platoon which repaired a damaged vehicle and spent the night in Co A's base area.
12 November 1966
During the day the battalion conducted reconnaissance in force in the areas vic XT 286780, XT 279790 and XT 277776. The Bn CP displaced at 1100 hours to secure and establish the Bde Fire Support Base #1 vic XT 273785. Night ambushes were employed but no contact was made, (Incl 2).
Co A departed the company base at 0750 hours to secure the LZ vic XT 286780, for the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. Co A then returned to its base area at 1040 hours and at 1423 hours the company moved to the 2d Bde forward base, vic XT 274686, to provide security in conjunction with two Inf Bn's.
Co B departed the battalion base at 0600 hours to conduct a reconnaissance in force of the area vic XT 279790. Heavy footprints were found on an east to west trail vic XT 265784. A north to south trail, with the grass heavily beaten down, was found vic XT 257784 at 1000 hours. A VC base camp, which could accommodate 50 VC was found at 1015 hours vic XT 253782. A search of the area revealed nothing of importance; however, the camp site appeared to have been used within the last three or four days. Found and destroyed at 1202 hours vic XT 255786 were seven two-man shelters. The company then moved down a small trail leading south where ten foxholes were destroyed at 1300 hours vic XT 255794. One CBU bomblet was destroyed at 1420 hours vic XT 271794. The company departed the area and closed into the base at 1435 hours.
The company departed at 0618 hours on a reconnaissance in force mission in vic XT 277776. No contact was made; however, 12 CBU bomblets were destroyed and several trails were found in the area vic XT 239772. Co C then returned to the battalion base at 1430 hours and prepared its defensive positions.
13 November 1966
During the day Co's A and B exploited the B52 airstrike bordered by XT 1476-XT 1478-XT1576-XT 1578. Co C remained the vicinity the battalion base securing same. An artillery battery was airlifted in to complete the establishment of Fire Support Base #1. No contact was made during darkness.
At 0730 hours Co A departed the Bde base to exploit the B52 airstrike and at 0904 hours arrived vic XT 196768 where it found Co B for a joint movement into the strike area. Numerous bomb craters and destroyed houses were found in the area but there were no signs of recent VC occupancy within the area, before or after the airstrike. Co A completed its check of the area by 1350 hours, and returned to the battalion base. While enroute, at 1520 hours automatic weapons fire was received from XT 230772. No casualties were sustained and fire was returned. At 1527 hours one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 239773. Four minor WIA's were sustained and extensive damage was done to the vehicle. The vehicle was towed into the battalion base and the company closed at 1820 hours.
Co B departed the battalion base at 0820 hours to exploit the B52 airstrike. While enroute, at 0843 hours fresh ox cart tracks were found on a trail vic XT 236771. At 0902 hours a pile of scrap metal was found vic XT 206769. Co B then proceeded to vic XT 191769 where an ox cart track and two sets of fresh footprints were found since the rain during the night of 12 November 1966. The lead element observed a road block consisting of trees placed across the road at 0926 hours vic XT 188767. Upon approaching the area a large claymore was detonated against the vehicle by the VC. One minor WIA was sustained but no damage was done to the vehicle. Arty fire and airstrikes were also placed on the area. A check around the road block site two claymores complete with wire and ready for command detonation. Co B then departed at 1050 hours for its objective area. At 1202 hours one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 175764. No casualties were sustained but extensive damage was done to the vehicle. During the search of its objective area numerous bomb craters and 15 houses were found destroyed by the airstrike vic XT 150770 to XT 153770. Co B also destroyed 15 houses in the same area. A close check revealed that the area was probably a VC way-station. Co B then returned to the battalion base.
14 November 1966
Throughout the day the battalion conducted local patrols in sector and secured Fire Support Base #1 during resupply of the artillery battery by CH-47 helicopter. Three ambushes were established during darkness but none made contact.
Co A (-) departed the battalion base at 0842 hours to reconnoiter the area SE of the battalion base. A company base was established vic XT 256761 at 0955 hours and from this location platoons were dispatched to XT 251762, XT 263764 and XT 267757. One rice milling machine was found and destroyed vic XT 270756 at 1206 hours. By 1342 hours the search was completed and the company (-) returned to the battalion base leaving one platoon SE of the battalion base as a stay behind until the CH-47 resupply was complete.
At 0828 hours Co B made a search of the area north of the battalion base vic XT 265810, XT266815 and XT 273817. Found and destroyed vic XT 270817 at 1035 hours were 1,900 pounds of bagged rice. At 1201 hours vic XT 261809 a VC base camp which could easily accommodate 300 VC was located. The camp was completely ringed with foxholes and early warning positions on a trail leading into the area. The camp site appeared to have been used approximately one week prior. A small way-station, of a 30 VC capacity, was found at 1400 hours vic XT 278828. There were five foxholes around the area. After a thorough search Co B left the area and moved to the battalion base leaving one platoon north of the battalion base as a stay behind until the CH-47 resupply was complete.
At 0842 hours Co C reconnoitered the area west of the battalion base to vic XT 244806, XT 258979 and XT 257805. Found at 0930 hours vic XT 252798 were 300 rounds of ammunition approximately the same diameter of a .50 cal round with four small fins on the tail. The ammunition was evacuated for evaluation. At the same time a three man bunker was found and destroyed vic XT 257801. At 1040 hours 44,200 pounds of rice was found vic XT 255807. The rice was covered from the weather and in good condition. With permission granted from higher headquarters the rice was destroyed. A command detonated claymore was set off against the company at 1212 hours vic XT 252797 but no casualties were sustained. A VC base camp was found vic XT 243800 at 1431 hours. The camp could easily accommodate 100 VC and consisted of bunkers with overhead cover, several fire places and a stream running east to west approximately five feet wide and five feet deep. At the same time the platoon located vic XT 246798 engaged four VC. One VC was observed falling; however, he was assisted by the remaining VC and escaped toward the east. At approximately the same time an element engaged two VC vic XT 251797. They also escaped but to the south. Co C then called for and adjusted Arty fire throughout the area and returned to the battalion base leaving one platoon west of the battalion base as a stay behind until the Arty resupply was complete.
Scout Platoon departed the battalion base at 0959 hours escorting damaged APC's back to 2d Bde forward base vic XT 274686. While enroute, at 1037 hours, one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 278702. Two WIA's were sustained and evacuated. Extensive damage was done to the vehicle. After evacuation of casualties the platoon continued to the Bde forward base and returned without incident.
15 November 1966
The Bn displaced to establish the Bde Fire Support Base #2 vic XT 275863. Co A conducted a reconnaissance in force of objective 2, XT 2585 with negative results and closed into the new base at 1416 hours. Co B conducted a reconnaissance in force of objective 1, XT 2786, then secured a landing zone where an artillery battery was lifted in, to complete the establishment of Fire Support Base #2 without incident. Co C displaced after the Bn Cmd Gp and moved to the new battalion base. While enroute, vic XT 266852, five vehicles became mired and remained in that vicinity during the night. The battalion employed two ambushes and seven OP/LP's during darkness. None made contact and all returned at first light, (Incl 3).
16 November 1966
Throughout the day the Bn conducted local S&D operations in zone and all elements returned to the battalion base by 1605 hours. Co C's element destroyed twelve bunkers at 0904 hours vic XT 283864. Scout platoon made a route reconnaissance for future operations. While on the reconnaissance, at 0915 hours, two VC, dressed in black uniforms, were engaged vic XT 290890 but escaped to the east.
17 November 1966
Throughout the day the Bn conducted patrols in zone. Co A dispatched elements to the area south, southwest and west of the battalion base with negative results. Co C also dispatched elements on local patrols in zone and at 1145 hours they destroyed 29 MG positions with aiming stakes for sectors of fire, vic XT 285841. The area appeared unused for at least three or four days. The Scout Platoon departed the battalion base at 0800 hours to make a reconnaissance of the area vic XT 286900. Found and destroyed at 1046 hours vic XT 285897 were 3 huts, 3 bunkers, 1 khaki uniform and 1 large VC classroom. Several documents were found in the area also. Numerous bunkers were found along the trail. While returning, at 1105 hours, four WIA's were sustained from incoming VC mortar fire. The platoon closed into the battalion base at 1124 hours. At 1351 hours the platoon again departed to make a reconnaissance of the stream vic XT 284870 for trafficability and a crossing site. A log bridge was found vic XT 306850 and one APC was sent across with no difficulty. The platoon then returned to the battalion base. The battalion employed three ambushes and six OP/LP's. None made contact and all returned at first light.
18 November 1966
During the day the battalion conducted reconnaissance in force to vic XT 275925 and established a new base, (Incl 4).
The company departed the area at 0730 hours following Co B and C to the new battalion base. No contact was made while enroute and the company closed at 1700 hours.
Co B departed at 0700 hours and while enroute, engaged an estimated two VC vic XT 302908 at 0956 hours. In the ensuing fire fight one VC was killed (BC). A search of the area disclosed a command detonated claymore, two freshly dug firing positions, one gas mask, one first aid packet and one dozen dry cell 1.5 volt batteries, made by the Cambodian Battery Company, which were connected in series.
Co C departed at 0700 hours and at 0910 hours arrived at a VC base camp vic XT 286896. Upon entering the clearing in the area several firing positions were found on the west side of the clearing. A mess hall to accommodate 40 VC was found and destroyed along with two showers, 300 meters of electrical wire, six bicycles, one pair of legs for a claymore and miscellaneous clothing. Several documents were also taken from the area. The documents were checked by interpreters and one described a large VC base camp that existed in the general area. The document further stated that the base had a radio station, a hospital, was a political training center and was outposted with guards and telephones. Another VC base camp was found at 1106 hours vic XT 283895. This camp site also had a mess hall with the capacity of 40 persons, one large class room, two showers and six buildings. At 1335 hours, several APC's became mired vic XT 278912 which could not be extracted before darkness and the company remained in that vicinity over night.
19 November 1966
The battalion continued its reconnaissance in force and established a new base vic XT 274962, (Incl 4).
The company departed the area at 0706 hours for objective QUEEN (XT 265944). A search of the area revealed nothing and the company then coiled in the vicinity to wait for the battalion. At 1230 hours the company departed the area and, at 1306 hours vic XT 273975, the company engaged an unknown number of VC. The VC delivered automatic, small arms and mortar fires against the company. In the ensuing fire fight 11 VC were killed (BC) and captured, were two Chicom assault rifles, one U.S. BAR, one U.S. M1 rifle, three Chicom grenades, one 60mm mortar, 11 Chicom hand grenades, 4 60mm mortar rounds, fifteen magazines for Chicom assault rifles, seven magazines for a BAR, 7 rifle grenades, 300 rounds SA ammunition and one bag of assorted documents. Co A sustained three WIA during the brief encounter. The company departed the area at 1520 hours and closed into the battalion base at 1610 hours.
Co B departed at 1230 hours and moved to objective JACK (XT 270950). At 1325 hours, a VC base camp was found vic XT 277955 and destroyed were four huts, seven bunkers, fifteen foxholes and miscellaneous clothings and one 500 pound bomb. The company closed into the battalion base at 1600 hours.
By 0948 hours all vehicles were extracted and repaired and at 1230 hours the company joined the Bn (-) vic XT 275925. Co C then maneuvered to the west of Co A, who was in a fire fight vic XT 273957, and remained in this blocking position until 1520 hours. Upon entering the battalion base at 1535 hours three VC suspects were seen running NE from vic XT 274963. The suspects were hailed to stop but refused. Co C then fired a burst over the suspects heads but they continued to run and were engaged. Two of the suspects were captured vic XT 274965 and the other escaped to the NE. One of the captured suspects was armed with a hand grenade.
20 November 1966
The battalion continued the reconnaissance in force at 0745 hours to Fire Support Base #3 (XT 336924). By 1405 hours all elements had closed into the new base area without incident. During darkness three ambushes were established. None made contact and all returned at 0600 hours, (Incl 4).
21 November 1966
During daylight hours elements conducted local patrols in zone and performed maintenance of equipment. Co B remained to secure the LZ for the airlifting of the Arty battery into the base.
Co A departed at 0719 hours to establish a company base vic XT 315923 and from this location foot patrols were dispatched to the north and southeast. At XT 319910 a foot bridge was found which could sustain travel by heavy loaded ox carts and a docking site which could handle ten sampans at one time. A recently used VC base camp was found at 1318 hours vic XT 329919. Destroyed in the camp site were two AT mines and two CBU bomblets. One APC was hit by an AT weapon, believed to be an RPG-2, at 1413 hours. Two WIA's were sustained and evacuated. The company returned .50 cal MG and M79 fires in suspected locations, then called and adjusted artillery fire throughout the area. After this encounter Co A returned to the battalion base closing at 1638 hours.
Co C departed at 0755 hours on a patrol NW of the battalion base. At 0800 hours a 75 foot roll of #4 gage wire and fresh tracks (foot, boots and bicycles) were found on an east to west trail in the area. A search disclosed a VC base area consisting of a bunker/tunnel trench complex which could accommodate 400 to 500 VC. The structures in the area were old but had been recently used. The area was then saturated with artillery fire. Co C then made a deep penetration into the area but nothing of significance was found. A house and two bunkers were destroyed at XT 349040, at 1517 hours. Found within the structures and also destroyed were nine Chicom grenades, 500 pounds of rice, 100 pounds of peas and 100 pounds of salt. Miscellaneous documents were recovered from the area. At 1644 hours small arms fire was received from XT 348948 causing one WIA. Fire was returned but no results were obtained and Co C then returned to the battalion base. During darkness one ambush was established vic XT 343938. At 2140 hours the ambush received three rounds SA fire. 81mm mortar fire was called in on the VC location and a secondary explosion was observed. The ambush returned at 0630 hours.
22 November 1966
The battalion conducted local patrols and performed maintenance during the day.
Co A departed on a local patrol at 1106 hours. At 1125 hours one APC was hit by an AT weapon vic XT 326918. Three WIA's were sustained and evacuated. While in the same area at 1139 hours small arms fire was received which caused one WIA. After adjusting Arty fire throughout the area the company then moved to XT 326918 at 1622 hours where twelve bunkers were destroyed. Co A then returned to the battalion base.
Co B departed at 0800 hours to conduct local patrols in zone. A platoon located vic XT 346922 received small arms fire from the west at 0855 hours. Fire was returned with no results obtained. Three huts were destroyed at 0942 hours vic XT 348925. Found vic XT 347922 was a docking site with heavy ox cart tracks indicating loading and off-loading activities. At 1226 hours the company found miscellaneous documents in a hut, which the company destroyed vic XT 347918. Co B then returned to the battalion base.
Co C departed at 0816 hours on its patrol. Destroyed vic XT 348935 at 0850 hours were one hut and three fish traps. Small arms fire was received at 1027 hours from vic XT 352927 causing one KIA. Fire was returned and while sweeping the area one rifle grenade and small arms fire was received from XT 358938. No casualties were sustained and a heavy volume of fire was returned. Three bunkers were found in the same area at 1148 hours. A check of the area disclosed wires leading out from the bunkers and at the end of one set of wires was a new type mine. All bunkers and the mine were destroyed. Also found and destroyed in the same area were one bunker, 350 feet of blasting wire (Cambodian type), two Cambodian blasting caps and five 7.62mm rounds. Co C then returned to the battalion base.
23 November 1966
The battalion displaced to return to Fire Support Base #1 vic XT 275785, (Incl 4).
Co A departed at 0730 hours and while enroute, at 1315 hours, a command detonated mine was employed against the company vic XT 315868; however, no damage was sustained. Two VC were observed fleeing the area and were engaged but they escaped. Co A then closed into the new battalion base at 1735 hours.
Co B departed at 0825 hours but due to mechanical difficulties and problems encountered navigating the various crossing sites the company did not close into the battalion base until 2225 hours.
Co C departed at 0800 hours and while enroute three VC were engaged vic XT 335897 at 1007 hours. The VC quickly moved into a nearby wooded area and escaped. Co C then moved to the battalion base closing at 1820 hours.
The platoon departed at 0730 hours as lead element of the battalion. At 0746 hours the lead APC hit an AT mine vic XT 329892 resulting in minor damage but no casualties. At 1506 hours another APC hit an AT mine vic XT 308855 and again, no casualties were sustained and minor damage was done to the vehicle. At 1635 hours the platoon was diverted to spend the night at 2d Bde Fire Support Base #2 and closed at 1800 hours.
24 November 1966
Throughout the day Co's A and B remained in base and outposted the local area. Co C departed at 0700 hours to establish Fire Support Base #0, vic XT 185765. At 0812 hours, one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 188768 resulting in minor damage but no casualties. Another APC hit an AT mine at 0822 hours vic XT 183765. Heavy damage was done to the vehicle and five WIA's were sustained and evacuated. Co C then closed into its planned base at 0925 hours and prepared defensive positions. An Arty Btry was airlifted in, completing the fire support base.
25 November 1966
The battalion conducted reconnaissance in force to vic XT 147685 and established a new base. Co A departed at 0800 hours and moved to the new base without incident closing at 1715 hours. Co B departed at 0755 hours as lead element of the battalion and at 0952 hours, one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 234771. Extensive damage was done to the vehicle and three WIA's were sustained and evacuated. Co B then closed into the new battalion base minus three vehicles which were mired on the edge of the base. Co C secured the LZ for the artillery extraction and upon completion departed at 1400 hours for the new battalion base closing at 1700 hours. Heavy Mortar Platoon's Command Post (M577) was extensively damaged by an AT mine at 1410 hours vic XT 160752 and was destroyed in place. Three WIA's were sustained and evacuated, (Incl 5).
Operation ATTLEBORO terminated 252400NOV66.
(1) 471 personnel participated in the operation.
(2) 61 WIA (29 of which were treated and returned to duty) and 1 KIA were sustained (Incl 6, casualty list).
(3) Two APC (M113), one carrier, 81mm mortar (M125A1) and one command post (M577) were damaged beyond repair by AT mines and destroyed in place.
(1) Killed: 12 VC (BC), 1 (est)
(2) Captured: 2 VCS
1 U.S. M1 rifle
1 U.S. BAR
3 Russian carbines
1 60mm mortar
2 Chicom assault rifles
2 VC notebooks
100 NVN "5" Dong notes
2 VC payment books
1 VC flag
Assorted VC ID cards
(3) Destroyed: 34 Chicom grenades
7 rifle grenades
4 Chicom claymores, complete
5 rounds 7.62mm Russian SMG ammunition
4 60mm mortar rounds
15 CBU bomblets
1 500 pound bomb
17 firing positions
2 bunker/tunnel complexes
8 ox carts
150 gallons acid (type unknown)
300 meters electrical wire
350 feet of blasting wire
2 blasting caps
7 magazines (BAR)
PAGE 11 and 12 of the CAAR are missing. Continuing at the top of page 13:
f. Medical Evaluation: Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders and Squad Leaders should insure that their troops always maintain a high state of body cleanliness. Failure to do so, especially in the high heat and humidity found in this area, causes rashes to form on any portion of the body that is covered by clothing.
14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None.
15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: there was no significant contact made which required any change to pre-planned actions.
a. On future operations of this nature the minimum engineer support for a mechanized battalion is one platoon. Due to mobility and spare requirements it is recommended that the engineer platoon be provided with organic M113 APC (4) or sufficient helicopters to transport all personnel and equipment into the work sites as needed.
b. 105mm Howitzer (towed) are too restrictive when placed within the base of a mechanized battalion. Units are restricted to the range of the 105mm Howitzer and the battalion must maintain a stationary base for the artillery. It is therefore recommended that artillery support be provided by 105mm Howitzer (SP) for all mechanized battalions.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
6 Incl KENNETH W. LUCAS
CASUALTIES INCURRED DURING OPERATION ATTLEBORO
NAME RANK UNIT DISPOSITION
PINION, Dock J SP4 E4 Co C KIA
During the period of 6 Nov 66 through 30 Nov 66 there were a total of 61 WIA's of which 29 returned to duty. There was one KIA. 24 Officers and 459 EM started the operation and 22 Officers and 428 EM finished the operation.
Inclosure 6 (Casualty List) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, subj Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32), dtd 10 Dec 66.
Transcribed by Ron Leonard
From Original Documents Oct 2001
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2ND BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SF 96268
AVDCDH 16 March 1971
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned For Period 1 November 1970 to
28 February 1971
Commanding Officer- Colonel Joseph R. Ulstoski
Prepared By- 18th Military History Detachment
Location- Camp Fransell-Jones, Republic of Vietnam
Map Reference- Scale 1:100,000; Sheets 6330 I, II; 6331 II; 6430 I, II, III, IV; 6431 II, III.
1. (C) OPERATIONS: Significant Activities
The quarter from 1 August to 31 October 1970 was marked by a generally low-level of activity as enemy units suffered acute supply shortages. These supply shortages were a direct result of the highly successful Cambodian operations undertaken by Vietnamese and US units in May and June 1970. Continued emphasis was placed on upgrading ARVN/RF/PF forces as units of the 25th Infantry Division emphasized combined operations with those indigenous forces and conducted extensive training programs designed to increase tactics and weapons skills. This intensive training program was conducted to insure the success of the Government of Vietnam (GVM) pacification program by providing local villages and hamlets protection against VC guerrilla activity and to pave the way for the redeployment of US troops as part of the continuing Vietnamization of the war. The Division on 12 October 1970 received keystone message directing redeployment of the 25th Infantry Division and division Operation order 183-70 was published on 15 October 1970. The 1st and 3rd Brigades were to stand down during November while the 2nd Brigade was to remain in Vietnam operating east of Saigon in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. The 2nd Brigade was reorganized as a separate Brigade on 8 November and placed OPCON to II Field force, Vietnam. (For further information on the redeployment of the 25th Infantry Division, see the keystone After Action Report.)
Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations (AO) remained at a low level during the first week of the reporting period (1-7 November) as main force units avoided contact, while supporting local force units in the collection of taxes and the procurement of food and ammunition. No one area was notably active as communist commanders put a temporary freeze on operations in anticipation of a change of posture by Allied forces
near the end of 1970. Ground activity was light and scattered during the week while only two mining incidents were reported resulting in three US soldiers wounded.
The redeployment of the 25th Division was another factor contributing to the generally low level of activity reported during the first week of November. Changes in task organization and a great amount of personnel turbulence hampered combat operations by 25th Infantry Division units. The 1st and 3rd Brigades prepared for redeployment during the week and the maneuver battalions from these two brigades, 2nd Battalion 14th Infantry; 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Troop D); 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd Infantry; 2nd Battalion 34th Armor; 4th Battalion (Mech), 23rd Infantry; 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, and 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry began standing down. However contacts with enemy units did occur as four were reported in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghi and Binh Duong provinces. B/1-27 Inf killed four enemy soldiers at 1855 hours on 2 November with claymore mines 4.5 kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT528445). They evacuated three AK-47 rifles, one RPG launcher, 12 hand grenades, three backpacks, a flag, and a small amount of documents from the contact site. There was no return fire. B/1-27 Inf swept the contact site again at 1100 hours on 3 November and evacuated a small amount of documents, medical supplies, one M-79 round and two M26 hand grenades. D/1-27 Inf killed two enemy at 0850 hours on 2 November with claymore mines 8kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT557430) and evacuated one AK-47 rifle and one M16 rifle. There was no enemy return fire. Later, at 1823 hours, D/1-27 Inf received a small arms fire from an unknown number of enemies 1.8 kms northwest of the 0850 hours contact (XT540439) but suffered no US casualties. Organic weapons with unknown results returned fire. One AK-47 was evacuated. A further sweep of the area at 0900 hours by D/1-27 Inf on 3 November resulted in the destruction of eight bunkers, three cooking positions and one underground oven. They evacuated two hammocks, three uniforms, 20 pounds of rice, two pounds of sugar, two canteens, two helmets, one flashlight, three RPG rounds, 50 x .45 caliber rounds, one M26 hand grenade, two Chi Com hand grenades, 30 feet of time fuse, four blasting caps and miscellaneous cooking utensils. C/1-27 Inf killed one enemy with organic weapons fire 5kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT524438) at 1137 hours on 5 November and evacuated one AK-47 rifle, one rucksack, and a small amount of documents. A night defensive position (NDP) of C/3-4 Cav located 6 kms east of Go Dau Ha (XT456256) received two 82mm mortar rounds, three RPG rounds and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy at 0030 hours on 6 November resulting in two US soldiers killed and five wounded. Two RPG rounds were evacuated from the contact area during a sweep.
The 2nd Brigade, during the first week of November, continued to operate as part of the 25th Infantry Division in Operation Toan Thang IV. The 2nd Brigade's maneuver battalions were the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and 4th Battalion (Mech), 23rd Infantry, which operated in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy provinces. There were three contacts with the enemy during the week resulting in five enemy killed. The most significant contact occurred at 1130 hours on 1 November when a UH-1H helicopter from the 240th Airmobile company received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 7 kms west of Bearcat (YS075987). The aircraft
suffered no hits. C/1-5 Inf (M) reacted and engaged the enemy force with a light fire team (LFT) and artillery resulting in five enemy killed. One RPG launcher, two RPG boosters, one RPG pack, one AK-47 rifle, one K54 pistol, one M-1 carbine, seven RPG rounds, two US rifle grenades, one M26 hand grenade, 330 pounds of rice, two pistol belts and two field packs with miscellaneous clothing were evacuated. There were no US casualties. A/B/D/3-22 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, artillery and LFT 8 kms northwest of Black Horse (YT365032) at 0910 hours on 2 November with unknown results. Enemy small arms fire killed one US soldier, wounded three and wounded one Kit Carson Scout. Four bunkers and one US claymore mine were destroyed on a sweep of the area. C/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms and hand grenades from an estimated 15 enemy 4 kms northwest of Long Thanh (YS118945) at 1830 hours on 6 November resulting in two US soldiers wounded. Organic weapons and artillery with unknown results returned fire.
The 1st and 3rd Brigades continued to disengage from combat during the second week of November (8-14 November) with only one contact reported. A NDP of A/C/3-4 Cav 9 kms south of Dau Tieng (XT463382) received three 60mm mortar rounds., two RPG rounds and small arms fire from six to eight enemy at 2127 hours on 9 November resulting in 11 US soldiers wounded. Organic weapons and artillery with unknown results returned fire.
USARV General Order 10719 established the 2nd Brigade as a separate brigade under the operational control of II Field Force, Vietnam on 8 November. The 2nd brigade continued operating in Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Bien Hoa (Nhon Trach district) Province during the second week of November with three maneuver battalions targeted against the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Artillery Regiment and the 84th Rear Service group. The enemy continued to avoid contact and concentrated on conducting political reindoctrination and training in preparation for renewed combat activity in December. There were nine enemy initiated incidents during the week of which two were attacks by fire and seven were ground attacks. A total of 12 enemy soldiers were killed, one Hoi Chanh received and eight individual and two crew served weapons captured during the week. The most significant contact occurred on 12 November when C/3-22 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 10 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT370033) at 0845 hours resulting in three US soldiers wounded. Organic weapons, artillery, LFT and air strikes with unknown results returned fire. Scattered firing continued and at 1235 hours B/3-22 Inf was inserted 2.5 kms southeast of the R/3-22 Inf contact at (YT383039) for reinforcement. Sniper fire at 1515 hours killed one US soldier and wounded another from R/3-22 Inf. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results. A MEDIVAC Uh-1H helicopter received small arms fire at 1530 hours while attempting to dustoff the wounded. The UH-1H suffered moderate damage and was forced to land 800 meters southwest of C/3-22 Inf's position. The UH-1H was secured by one platoon from A/1-5 Inf (M) until extracted at 1750 hours. At 1600 hours, C/3-22 Inf again received heavy small arms; automatic weapons and RPG fire resulting in two US soldiers wounded. Two LFT's air strikes and organic weapons returned fire. One 7.62 ChiCom machine gun, one RPG launcher and one RPG round were evacuated from the area after contact was broken The area was again swept on 13 November by D/3-22 Inf and they
Located four enemy dead, eight bunkers with overhead cover, six B-40 rounds, a small amount of documents and medical supplies, antenna wire and a small amount of batteries at 1420 hours in the vic YT378032. The documents identified the enemy unit as the D1 Battalion of the 274 NVA Regiment. The enemy base camp was approximately 250 meters in width with 22 bunkers with overhead cover and fighting positions set up.
The 1st and 3rd Brigades continued on stand down during the last two weeks of November. On 25 November, the 25th Infantry Division held its Farewell Ceremony at Cu Chi Base Camp attended by General Creighton Abrams, CONUSMACV, General Do Cao Tri, III CT Commander as well as by 25th Infantry Division and GVN personnel.
The 2nd Brigade continued operating in Bien Hoa (Nhon Trach District), Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Province during the third week of November (15-21 November) with three maneuver battalions. Enemy activity was light in the 2nd Bde's AO with 12 enemy initiated incidents reported of which one was an attack by fire, nine were ground attacks, one was terrorism and one was aircraft receiving ground fire. Five enemy soldiers were killed and 2nd Brigade units captured five individual weapons during the week. Terrorist activities on the periphery of the AO and reports of food gathering activities. Only two mining incidents were reported during the week resulting in one US soldier wounded.
A/3-22 Inf received small arms fire at 0135 hours on 16 November 11.5 kms west of Xuan Loc (YT342069) from four enemy soldiers armed with one RPG launcher and three AK-47's resulting in one US soldier wounded. Scattered firing continued until morning but there were no further US casualties. Enemy losses were unknown. C/2-12 Inf received one hand grenade while sweeping an area 9 kms northeast of Black Horse (YT527003) at 1210 hours on 16 November resulting in three US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results. C/3-22 Inf engaged two to three enemy 9 kms south of Black Horse (YS384885) at 1545 hours on 19 November with organic weapons, forward air controller (FAC), LFT and artillery with unknown results. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier. Contact was lost at 1615 hours,. A mechanical ambush set out by B/3-22 Inf and the 415 RF Company 5 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT415056) detonated at 0645 hours on 20 November resulting in two enemy killed and the location of heavy blood trails heading off to the northwest. One AK-47 rifle, 10 x .45 caliber rounds, several personal pictures, one promotion slip and a small amount of documents were evacuated. The captured documents identified the 21B Recon Section of the 274 NVA Regiment. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 1515 hours on 20 November when Team 1C, Company F (Rgr), 75th Infantry while on patrol received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 19 kms east of Black Horse (YS634936) resulting in two US soldiers wounded. They returned fire with small arms, hand grenades, and LST, killing three of the enemy. They evacuated one AK-50 rifle, two AK-47 rifles, one 5-kilo bag of rice, five pounds of salt, one
civilian radio, one hammock, one pancho liner, two batteries and a small amount of documents. The team was extracted at 1715 hours. The captured documents identified the signal section, Bin Long Province Headquarters. D/3-22 Inf located and destroyed 14 bunkers with overhead cover at 1045 hours on 21 November 2 kms west of the 3-22 Inf contact of 12 November (YT390030). A dead body located in a grave nearby was credited to the 3-22 Inf. Contact on 12 November.
Enemy activity throughout the 2nd Bde's AO remained at a low level during the fourth week of November (22030 November). There were nine ground contacts and two attacks by fire during the week resulting in 10 enemy killed, three prisoners-of-war captured and six individual weapons evacuated. The most significant increase in activity occurred on 25 and 26 November with a series of contacts in Nhon Trach District and an attack on Suoi Tre village (YT2505). Sensor activity south of the Dong Mai River, in northern Trang Bom District (Bien Hoa Province). This movement between War Zone D and the 2nd Bde's AO was a major infiltration and supply route used by the enemy. However, operations along QL (Highway) 1 and War Zone D hindered the flow of supplies and forced the enemy to rely heavily on the local populace for foodstuffs. This reliance was evident by the enemy's increased presence in the Sparrow Valley area (YT5401) where the rice harvest was being gathered by the local villagers and along QL 1 where “shadow supply system” was set up in the vicinity of Bau Ca, Hung Nghai and Hung Loc villages. Those supplies were brought into the area from Saigon, Bien Hoa and Xuan Loc and used to feed the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 274 NVA Regiment which were operating south of the Suzannah and Ong Que Rubber Plantations.
C/2-12 Inf and 231 RF company received small arms fire from an estimated three individuals 8 kms north of Xuan Loc (YT443152) at 0953 hours on 24 November resulting in one US soldier and one RF soldier killed. Fire was returned by organic weapons, LST and FAC resulting in one VC killed. A sweep of the area located one Vietnamese newspaper, one booklet containing names of Local Force personnel, 15 AK-47 rounds and a heavy blood trail. On 25 November at 1705 hours, Sct/Flame/1-5 Inf (M) and the 291/105 RF companies engaged three to four enemy 4 kms south of Long Thanh (YS131880) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed, two prisoners-of-war captured and one K54 pistol evacuated. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no Allied casualties. One of the PW's identified the unit in the Phuoc My village Guerrilla Force that had last been identified on 16 October by a Hoi Chanh. The mission of the unit was to collect taxes and spread propaganda in Phuoc Kien (Phuoc My) and My Phan villages. The taxes collected were used to buy rice. Morale was low because of inadequate food and ammunition. B/3-22 Inf killed one enemy soldier at 1600 hours on 28 November 10 kms west of Xuan Loc (YT355076) with small arms fire. One AK-47 rifle and three magazines were evacuated. A mechanical ambush detonated at 1645 hours on 30 November 10 kms south-southwest of Black Horse (YS395869). D/3-22 Inf engaged the area with 81mm mortars. A sweep located one enemy KIA (BC) and one prisoner-of-war along with one AK-47 rifle, one RPG launcher and two rucksacks containing food, clothing and documents. The documents identified the postal section
of SR-4. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 1755 hours on 30 November when B/3-22 Inf received small arms fire and B40 fire from an unknown number of enemy 500 meters west of the village of Hung Nghai (YT294096). Fire was returned by organic weapons and LFT resulting in seven enemy soldiers killed and four AK-47 rifles and one K54 pistol evacuated. Documents taken from the bodies identified the 74 NVA Artillery Regiment. The group was probably on a rice resupply mission for the regimental base area in the vicinity YT2703 to the Hung Nghai, Hung Loc area where a shadow supply system operated.
The 2nd Bde, 25th Infantry Division forces killed 28 and captured three of the enemy during the month of November, received one Hoi Chanh, accounted for 25 individual weapons and two crew served weapons (captured) and 1.5 tons of rice (captured or destroyed). Bde forces destroyed seven mines and booby traps while detonating five during the month resulting in five US soldiers wounded and one US killed.
The 2nd Bde continued operating in Bien Hoa (Nhon Trach District), Long Khanh (Xuan Loc District) and Phuoc Tuy Provinces during the first week of December (1-7 December) with four maneuver battalions targeted against the 274 NVA Regt, 74 NVA Arty Regt and 84th Rear Service Group and local guerilla forces. Enemy activity remained at a low level as main and local force units avoided contact to engage in resupply activities. Four enemy soldiers were killed, one prisoner-of-war was captured and 2nd Bde forces evacuated seven individual weapons during the week. Only one mining incident was reported resulting in one US soldier killed and one wounded.
The most significant contact of the week occurred at 2130 on 2 December when B/1-27 Inf with the 105 RF and 64 PF Companies ambushed an unknown number of enemy 4 kms southwest of Long Thanh (YS103890) with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed, one prisoner-of-war captured and two M16 rifles and one AK-47 rifle evacuated. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier and RF soldier. The PW identified his unit as the Phuoc Thien Guerilla Force whose mission was to provide village security. C/2-12 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated five enemy soldiers armed with M16 rifles 7 kms north of Xuan Loc (YT437151) at 1100 hours on 4 December resulting in four US soldiers wounded. Organic weapons and LFT returned fire with unknown results. D/2-12 Inf engaged three to four enemy carrying rucksacks with organic weapons and artillery 12.5 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS555013) at 1230 hours on 5 December resulting in one enemy killed and one AK-47 rifle with three full magazines, one RPG round, one pistol belt and a small amount of batteries and documents evacuated. The documents identified the D445 LF Battalion, which normally operated around Nui May Tao (YS7492). This was the first indication of this unit in the area east of the Sparrow Valley (vic YT5201).
The 2nd Bde's four-maneuver battalions continued operating in the three province area during the second week of December (8-14 December). Enemy activities in the 2nd Bde's AO remained relatively light with the most active area being in the vicinity of Hung Nghia and Hung Loc hamlets (YT3209) as enemy unite
Engaged in resupply activities. In Nhon Trach district (Bien Hoa Province), contact with enemy elements was light but several bunker complexes I n southern Nhon Trach and northern Rung Sat Special Zone were destroyed, disrupting enemy rear service activities in these areas. Eleven enemy soldiers were killed, one prisoner-of-war was captured and Brigade forces evacuated 16 individual weapons.
B/3-22 Inf and Long Khanh PRU engaged an estimated 20 enemy one km east of Hung Nghai hamlet (YT310091) at 0855 hours on 9 December with organic weapons resulting in two females with NVA rucksacks filled with rice detained. At 1010 hours, contact was reestablished but broken immediately, resulting ion PRU solider wounded. Later, at 1350 hours, B/3-22 Inf and PRU engaged three enemy 100 meters east of the 0855 hours contact resulting in one enemy killed, one wounded NVA prisoner-of-war captured and two AK-47 rifles evacuated. The PW was a member of the 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, 274 NVA Regiment and had been on a food supply mission for the 2nd Company when captured. This was the normal area of operations of the 2nd Battalion. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 1920 hours on 10 December when a mechanical ambush set out by B/3-22 Inf 1 km east of Hung Loc hamlet (YT331095) detonated. B/3-22 Inf engaged the area with organic weapons and received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. There were no US casualties. The area was swept at 0730 hours on 11 December, resulting in the location of five enemy dead and the evacuation of four AK-47 rifles, 13 Ak-47 magazines with 483 rounds, two US hand grenades, three US pistol belts, 10 pounds of documents. The documents identified the Rear Service Section of the 274 NVA Regiment. Three enemy soldiers were killed by a mechanical ambush at 2145 hours on 12 December 2 kms east of Hung Loc hamlet (YT342085). B/3-22 Inf evacuated one AK-47 rifle from the site.
Enemy activity remained relatively light throughout the 2nd Brigade's AO during the third week of December (15-21 December), however, there was a slight increase over last week. The area with the most activity continued to be south of highway QL 1 and west of highway LTL 2 as small groups of enemy engaging in resupply missions were contacted. Allied operations around Hung Nghai and Hung Loo hamlets on QL 1 have severely disrupted enemy resupply activities and forced the enemy to shift his efforts to procure supplies east of those hamlets. Another area of increased enemy activity was in the Viet Cuong Plantation (vic YS4889). This plantation was used as a rear service area for MR-7 units and as a major east-west commo-liason route linking southwestern Bien Hoa Province to the May Tao Mountain area (YS7491). The 2nd Bde's four-maneuver battalions killed 10 of the enemy, captured one prisoner-of-war, and evacuated nine individual weapons during the week. There were four mining incidents reported resulting in three US soldiers wounded.
Two enemy were killed at 0540 and 1925 hors on 15 December by mechanical ambushes set out by A/3-22 Inf 4 kms south of Hung Loc (YT339058 and YT338057). A/3-22 Inf, in the same area (YT337058), engaged one individual at 1100 hours on 16 December resulting in one AK-47 rifle with one magazine and one rucksack
Containing food captured. A blood trail was also located. A LOH from D/3-4 Cav was downed by enemy small arms fire 7 kms west of Long Thanh (YS070926) at 1245 hours on 16 December. An aerial rifle platoon (ARP) secured the aircraft until it was extracted. One enemy was killed and one wounded prisoner-of-war was captured by C/3-22 Inf after a mechanical ambush 11 kms west of Black Horse (YS330982) at 0835 hours on 17 December. Two rucksacks containing one M26 hand grenade, a knife, 25 pounds of rice, clothing and documents were evacuated. The documents identified west of the Viet Cuong Plantation, vic YS3688. Two enemy were killed by mechanical ambush detonation at 1712 hours on 18 December 5 kms east Phuoc An (YS187783). Sct/Flame/1-5 Inf (M) swept the area and evacuated two AK-47 rifles and one AK-47 magazine. Husky compound, vic YT466093, received eight to twelve 81mm mortar rounds, four of which landed in the compound, at 1905 hours 18 December resulting in 16 US soldiers wounded, one civilian killed and three civilians wounded. Counter mortar fore was returned to the northeast, vic YT48-113, with unknown results. R/3-22 Inf engaged five enemy soldiers 2 kms southeast of Hung Nghai (YT315080
) with organic weapons at 1155 hours on 19 December resulting in two enemy killed. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. One K54 pistol and one AK-50 rifle were evacuated from the contact site. C/1-5 Inf (M) received two Hoi Chanhs 9 kms west of Long Thanh (YS051924) at 1255 hours on 20 December. Both men were members of the rear service team of the 4th Company, 4th Battalion of SR-4 which operated in northern Khan Trach District. R/3-22 Inf engaged 10 enemy with organic weapons 2 kms southeast of Hung Nghai (YT315080) At 17645 hours on 20 December resulting in two enemy killed and twoAK-47 rifles, two rucksacks and a small amount of documents evacuated. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. The documents identified the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, 274 NVA regiment which had been on a resupply mission to Hung Nghai-Hung Loc hamlets.
Enemy activity during the fourth week of December (22-31 December) remained at a low level as enemy main force units avoided contact to engage in resupply activities. The area south of QL 1 in the Hung Nghai area was the most active area in the 2nd Bde's AO during the week. Seventeen enemy were killed, two prisoners-of-war were captured by 2nd Bde forces. There were no significant mining incidents reported.
The most significant contact of the week occurred at 2240 hours on 23 December when a mechanical ambush set out by B/3-22 Inf 1 km south of Hung Loc (YT322085) detonated. The area was engaged with organic weapons and a Nighthawk resulting in five enemy killed. The enemy force returned fire with hand grenades but there were no US casualties. The contact area was swept by B/3-22 Inf at 0630 hours on 24 December and they received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy resulting in one US soldier wounded. Organic weapons and helicopter gunships with unknown results returned fire. Three AK-47 rifles, one carbine, one rucksack with a small amount of clothing and documents were evacuated from the contact site. The documents identified the C22 Transportation company, 274 NVA Regiment and included a
Comprehensive list identifying the 274 Regiment, the three battalions, all regimental support companies except the C19 Engineer Company and the three staff sections of the Regiment. One enemy was killed and another captured after a mechanical ambush set out by D/3-22 Inf 5 ½ kms south of Hung Nghia (YT285042) detonated at 0745 hours on 24 December. Documents taken from the enemy body identified the 3rd Battalion, 74th Artillery Regiment that was providing security for the 74th Arty Regimental Headquarters located near the contact area. A/2-12 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy in bunkers 13 kms northeast of Black Horse (YT569010) at 1055 hours on 24 December with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed. The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons resulting in two US soldiers wounded and one Kit Carson Scout wounded. An LST from D/3-4 Cav received small arm's fire at 1630 hours on 25 December from a sampan carrying one individual and some ammo cases 6.5 kms southwest of Long Thanh (YS088898). The sampan was engaged and the ARP/3-4 Cav was inserted in the area. They destroyed the sampan and evacuated one M26 hand grenade, miscellaneous clothing and documents. A further sweep of the contact area at 0805 hours on 26 December resulted in one enemy body located and one K54 pistol, one transistor radio, one stove, two carbine magazines, one poncho and a small amount of documents evacuated. B/1-5 Inf (M) engaged 13 enemy 5 kms south of Hung Loc (YT316044) at 1115 hours on 26 December with organic weapons, LST, artillery, and FAC resulting in one prisoner-of-war captured and two Hoi Chanh received. One radio, one English/Vietnamese dictionary, clothing and documents were evacuated. The PW identified his unit as the C20 Signal Company, 274 NVA Regiment that has last been identified in the same area on 16 December. The C20 was being used on resupply missions to the Hung Loc-Hung Nghai area. B/3-22 Inf with the 984 RF Company engaged an estimated 30 enemy in the open 1 km southeast of Hung Nghai (YT307087) at 18120 hours on 26 December. Heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged and a LFT flew in support. One US soldier was wounded while enemy losses were unknown. Scattered firing continued until 2045 hours when contact was broken. C/1-11 ACR maneuvered into blocking positions north, east and west of the area in preparation for a sweep the next morning. A sweep by 3-22 Inf and the 984 RF Company at 0855 hours on 27 December located two enemy bodies, three AK47 rifles and six AK47 magazines. An OH-58 helicopter from D/3-17 Air Cav, while supporting 2nd Bde forces, crashed and burned 18 kms northwest of Xuan Loc (YT3824) at 1145 hours on 30 December after hitting power lines due to mechanical problems. Three US soldiers, the crew of the LOH, were killed. A/1-5 Inf (M) and some RF's secured the downed aircraft.
The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division forces killed 42 of the enemy and captured five during the month of December, received five Hoi Chanh, accounted for 55 individual weapons and 490 pounds of rice (captured). Bde forces destroyed 16 mines and booby traps while detonating six during the month resulting in four US wounded and one US killed.
The 2nd Brigade continued operating in the three province area of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy during the first week of January (1-7 January) with four maneuver battalions against the 274 NVA Regt5, 74 NVA Arty Regt,
84th Rear Service Group, elements from SR-4 and MR-7 and local guerilla units. Enemy activity remained at a low level as main and local force units avoided contact to engage in resupply activities. There were eight significant contacts with the enemy resulting in 10 enemy killed and 12 individual weapons evacuated. There was only one mining incident reported but there were no US casualties.
The most significant contact of the week occurred at 0710 hours on 3 January when a mechanical ambush set out by C/1-27 Inf 8kms southwest of Black Horse (YS391899) detonated killing three enemy soldiers. They evacuated two AK-47 rifles, one K54 pistol, three rucksacks, clothing, 20 AK47 armor piercing rounds, 100 AK-47 rounds, 14 K54 rounds and one pound of documents from the site. The documents identified elements of SR-4 Finance and Economy Section and the place of capture was a rear service area for SR-4 and MR-7. B/2-12 Inf located six bunkers and a sapper training area 14 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YS564994) at 1110 hours on 3 January. They destroyed the bunkers and evacuated one typewriter, one sewing machine, some pill bottles, several notebooks and diaries, five .50 caliber ammo cans of documents, medical supplies, one map and one M1 Carbine. The documents identified elements of the Xuan Loc District Headquarters and subordinate units. Two enemy soldiers were killed with artillery and LST by C/1-27 Inf 1.5 KMS northwest of the 0710 hours contact (YS383912) at 1405 hours on 4 January and located two separate bunker complexes with a total of 38 bunkers. They destroyed the bunkers and evacuated papers and documents, miscellaneous cooking utensils and clothing, five shovels, five full AK-47 magazines, two full M16 magazines, 120 AK-47 rounds, 100 M16 rounds, eight NVA ponchos, one six volt battery, five AT tripwire detonators, two CS grenades, nine US canteens and medicine. A/2-12 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 13 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT565012) at 1315 hours on 5 January resulting in two US soldiers killed and three wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed. They evacuated three RPG rounds, three RPG boosters, one RPG launcher, 25 pounds of rice, one hammer and a small amount of documents and clothing from the contact site. A sapper training area with four bunkers and two hootches was located by B/1-5 Inf (M) 14 kms north of Xuan Loc (YT567011) at 1330 hours on 6 January. They destroyed the bunkers and hootches and evacuated one defused 105mm round, five pounds of rice, 1800 M16 rounds, 12 x 7.62 rounds, one ChiCom claymore, one RPG round, 10 full M16 magazines, two full carbine magazines, 300 meters of commo wire, 20 ponchos and several pounds of maps and documents. A/2-12 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons and RPG fire from an estimated 10 enemy 13 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT567011) at 1450 hours on 6 January. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery resulting in one enemy killed and one AK-47 rifle with two full magazines evacuated. There were no US casualties. C/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy 2.5 kms south of Hung Nghia (YT310072) with organic weapons, LST and artillery at 1558 hours on 6 January and killed one. One AK-47 rifle was evacuated. A UH-1H helicopter from 2nd Bde Aviation
Detonated a booby trap with a tripwire 9 kms southeast of Black Horse (YS485895) while taking off at 1235 hours on 7 January and crashed resulting in one US soldier killed and the UH-1H destroyed. Two enemy soldiers were engaged by C/3-22 Inf with small arms 2.75 kms south of Hung Nghia (YT310068) at 1545 hours on 7 January resulting in one enemy killed and one AK-50 rifle evacuated.
Enemy activity during the second week of January (8-14) January) remained at a low level as enemy units generally avoided contact. The 2nd Bde continued operating with four maneuver battalions in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. Thirteen enemy soldiers were killed, three were captured, one Hoi Chanh was received and 2nd Bde forces captured 29 individual weapons during the week. There was one mining incident reported resulting in two US soldiers wounded.
A/3-22 Inf engaged an estimated six enemy soldiers 10 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT368033) with organic weapons at 1150 hours on 8 January resulting in one enemy killed and one M1 carbine with two magazines evacuated. At 1700 hours on 8 January, R/1-27 Inf engaged eight individuals 7 kms south of Black Horse (YS417892) with organic weapons and artillery. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. A sweep of the area revealed numerous trails but no bodies. C/1-27 Inf located a grave containing three enemy bodies 3 kms west of the R/1-27 Inf contact site (YS384896) at 1335 hours on 11 January. The enemy body count (BC) was credited to the R/1-27 Inf contact on 8 January. D/2-12 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons at 1325 hours on 9 January 12.5 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT564023) resulting in one prisoner-of-war captured and one M1 carbine, three rucksacks, and 30 M1 rounds evacuated. One enemy body from this contact was located in a grave 700 meters southeast of the contact at 1130 hours on 13 January by D/2-12 Inf. Later, at 1630 hours on 9 January, D/2-12 Inf engaged five enemy with organic weapons 1 km northwest of the 13425 hours contact (YT558031) resulting in one enemy solider killed and 40 pounds of rice and two M79 grenade launchers evacuated. A cache was located by B/2-12 Inf 14.5 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS576997) at 12730 hours on 10 January. They evacuated 40 pounds of rice, three US claymores, one NVA wallet, one NVA flag, 25 AK-47 rounds, two .50 caliber cans with documents and medical supplies, one SKS rifle, two M1 carbines and four M1 rifles. C/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy with organic weapons 2 kms southwest of Hung Nghia (YT285082) at 1145 hours on 11 January resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-50 rifle, one PPS-43 sub-machinegun, two AK-47 vests with six full magazines, two medical bags with penicillin, quinine and bandages, one bread plant, 25 pounds of rice, one wallet and NVA medals. B/2-12 Inf located two caches on 11 January 14 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS563994) and YS579994). They evacuated from the first site at 1308 hours four M1 rifles, two typewriters, one M1 carbine, five ammo cans of documents, 12 x 82mm mortar rounds, one .38 caliber pistol, one SKS rifle, one Thompson sub-machinegun, one tape recorder, and printing materials. At 1536 hours, they evacuated one M1 carbine, one .38 caliber pistol, two M1 rifles, two SKS rifles, one Thompson machinegun, one tape recorder, one typewriter and one printing press. Six US soldiers were wounded while destroying a bunker in the cache area. A fragmentation grenade concealed in burning clothing exploded, wounding the men. B/1-5 Inf (M) located a food cache in a small base camp consisting of nine bunkers and two hootches 5 kms north of Hung Loc (XT328145) at 1735
hours on 12 January. They evacuated 900 pounds of rice, 800 pounds of corn, tea and tobacco from the area. The base camp was destroyed, B/1-5 Inf (M), at NDP 2.5 kms north of Hung Loc (YT326122), engaged 15-20 enemy after a trip flare activation with organic weapons and Night Hawk resulting in two enemy killed, two prisoners-of-war captured, and the evacuation of one RPG launcher, one RPG round, two AK-47 rifles and one cooking pot. The PW's identified their unit as the 1st Bn, 274 NVA Regt which began operating north of QL1 since December. A/2-12 Inf received automatic weapons and RPG fire from an estimated 10 enemy 19 kms east-southeast of Xuan Loc (YT637017) at 0750 hours on 14 January resulting in nine US soldiers wounded. Organic weapons and 81mm mortars with unknown results returned fire. R/3-22 Inf killed one enemy with mechanical ambush 15 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YS322998) at 1007 hours on 14 January. They evacuated one AK-50 rifle with three full magazines, one rucksack, 126 AK rounds, one AK vest, one US hammock, one US entrenching tool, one claymore bag and miscellaneous clothing. A UH-1H helicopter from the 118th Assault Helicopter Company while supporting elements of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Inf 9 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YS386036), crashed and burned due to mechanical failure at 1255 hours on 14 January. The UH-1H was destroyed and one US soldier, LTC Bartron, CO of the 3-22 Inf was slightly injured.
The 2nd Bde continued operating in the same three province areas during the third week of January (15-21 January) with four maneuver battalions. Enemy resupply activities increased north of QL 1 as operations by Allied units south of Hung Loc/Hung Nghia hamlets disrupted the “shadow supply system”. The Bao Ham area, vic YT328142, lying astride a north-south infiltration route, served as a dispersing point for enemy supplies with the closure of Hung Loc/Hung Nghia hamlets to easy enemy access. There were 16 significant contacts during the week resulting in 23 enemy soldiers killed, two prisoners-of-war captured and 12 individual weapons evacuated.
Two enemy soldiers were killed by R/1-27 Inf at 1025 hours and 1440 hours on 15 January 7 kms southwest of Black Horse (YS409889 and YS401887). Two US soldiers were wounded in the second engagement. One enemy Ak-47 rifle was evacuated while a small bunker complex was destroyed. At 1445 hours on 15 January, C/1-27 Inf engaged an estimated 20 enemy soldiers in a bunker complex 11 kms west of Black Horse (YS321969) with organic weapons and helicopter gunships resulting in two enemy killed. Enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire wounded 14 US soldiers and killed one. A UH-1H MEDEVAC helicopter received small arms ground fire while coming in for a dustoff and crashed. The helicopter was lifted out later. There were no casualties on the aircraft. The moist significant contact of the week occurred at 05330 hours on 17 January when C/3-22 Inf had a mechanical ambush detonate 1.5 kms south of Hung Nghia (YT292081) resulting in five enemy soldiers killed and one AK-47 rifle, 11 rucksacks, two ponchos, toilet articles, two medical bags with penicillin, vitamin C, Vitamin b-1, sodium, bandages, two bags of food, 175 pounds of rice, 12 flashlight batteries, one bag of sugar and an unknown amount of marijuana evacuated. Documents captured identified the 2nd Bn, 74 NVA Regt which was believed to be dispersed in SR-4. The enemy KIA's were on a medical resupply mission when contacted. C/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy soldiers 2 kms southeast of its 17 January contact (YT311072) with
organic weapons and LST resulting in two enemy KIA (BC) and the evacuation of one rucksack, one US canteen, one NVA pistol belt, one poncho, eating utensils and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the 2nd Bn, 274 NVA Regt. The area of capture was the normal AO for the 2nd Battalion. D/2-12 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 6.5 kms north-west of An Loc (YT326164) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle, two US hand grenades, six rucksacks, clothing, one M-16 rifle, a small amount of medical supplies, documents, personnel equipment, 39 x .30 caliber rounds, 33 K54 pistol rounds and one booby trapped 105mm round. B/2-12 Inf located a south-west trail with indications of recent activity 14 kms southeast of Black Horse (YS567922) AT 1350 hours on 20 January. At 1600 hours, they engaged six to eight enemy soldiers with organic weapons with unknown results. The enemy returned fire with small arms, RPG rounds and hand grenades resulting in one US soldier killed and six wounded. D/3-22 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force 5 kms south of An Loc (YT390043) at 1557 hours on 21 January resulting in one US soldier killed and two wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, LST and tactical air strikes with unknown results. They destroyed two bunkers, five fighting positions and three trenches. At 1755 hours on 22 January, d/3-22 Inf located three bodies 600 meters southwest of the 21 January contact (YT389038).
The 2nd Brigade continued operating with four maneuver battalions in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Province during the fourth week of January (22031 January). Enemy activity remained unchanged from the previous week. There were 21 significant contacts reported resulting in 26 enemy killed and 18 weapons captured.
The most significant contact of the week occurred at 0955 hours on 22 January when an LOH from D/3-4 Cav received ground fire 4.5 kms northeast of Binh Son (YS254957) and crashed and burned near an enemy bunker. The enemy soldiers in the bunker engaged the downed LOH with small arms fire. A UH-1H helicopter from the 240th Airmobile Company attempted to insert a security team but hit a branch and crashed. Team 1A, Company C, 75th Inf (Rgr) was inserted at 1010 hours and received small arms fire from the enemy. They engaged the enemy with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one waterproof bag full of clothing, one flashlight, one intravenous tube, one earphone, three US claymores, eight blasting caps, one full AK-47 magazine, one PRC-25 battery and a small amount of documents. At 1155 hours, an aerial rifle platoon from D/3-4 Cav received RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy. US casualties were seven killed (three from the LOH and four from the UH-1H) and eight wounded while the two helicopters were destroyed in place. The captured documents identified the HQ of SR4 and the 74th Arty Rgt. B/2-12 engaged two enemy soldiers that were trailing them 12 kms east of Black Horse (YS559939) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle with two full magazines. Team 2C, Company F, 75th Inf (Rgr) engaged an unknown number of enemy 5 kms southeast of Hung Loc (YT361059) with organic weapons, artillery and LFT resulting in four enemy killed. Enemy small arms fire wounded two US soldiers.
C/2-12 Inf discovered a munitions production area 4 kms south of Nui may Tao Mountain (YS730868) at 1200 hours on 2 February. They evacuated five watches (two of which were electrically booby trapped), 100 finished detonators for ChiCm mines, 200 electrical blasting caps, 200 non-electrical blasting caps, 300 primers for small arms ammunition, 500 unfinished detonators for ChiCom grenades, 50 x 9mm rounds and assorted drills, dies and funnels. Team 2C, company F, 75th Inf (Rgr), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, artillery, LST and aerial rifle platoon 4 kms northeast of Trang Bom (YT223151) at 0905 hours on 5 February resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK-47 rifles, one M1 carbine, 120 pounds of rice and a small amount of documents. The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons but there were no US casualties. The documents indicated that the enemy element belonged to the U-1 Province Provincial force and was returning from a resupply mission in the Trang Bom area with newly purchased supplies. The enemy were wearing new boots and fatigues similar to those worn by ARVN. At 1110 hours on 5 February, 1-5 Inf (M) in the vicinity of old FSB Henderson (YT174129) located and evacuated five 105mm rounds, 67 hand grenades, 20 M79 rounds and a large amount of small arms ammunition. Recon, 1-27 Inf engaged an estimated three enemy with organic weapons 3.5 kms north of An Loc (YT378124) at 1210 hours on 6 February resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one RPG launcher, four B40 rounds, five boxes of M16 ammunition, two M79 rounds, one ChiCom claymore and tripwire, cooking utensils, one 105mm round and a small amount of documents. Eight bunkers in the area were destroyed. The documents identified the D440 battalion and the Cao Su District force normally operated in the area in October 1970. The Cao Su District force normally operated in the area east of the Checkerboard Rubber Plantation (XT3504) although small elements have been identified north of highway QL 1. A mechanical ambush set out by A/1-27 Inf 7 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT273164) detonated at 0650 hours on 7 February resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle, one AK-50 rifle, one M16 rifle, one K54 pistol, two recoilless rifle round, six 60mm mortar rounds, three rucksacks, one compass, pots and pans, a small amount of tobacco, two hammocks and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the C18 Anti-Aircraft company, 2764 NVA Regiment which was operating in the role of a transportation element. Supplies, mainly munitions, were moved south normally from War Zone D by both the C18 and C22 transportation companies, 274 NVA Regiment.
The 2nd Brigade continued operating in the three-province area of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy during the second week in February (3-14 February). Enemy activity increased over the previous week, especially north of QL 1. There were ten significant contacts during the week resulting in 18 enemy killed, two prisoner-of-war captured and 31 individual weapons evacuated. There were two mining incidents reported resulting in three US soldiers killed and one wounded.
Two AK-47 rifles were evacuated. C/3-22 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy initially returned fire with an M-60 machine gun and small arms. At 1235 hours, a platoon size enemy force resulting in one US soldier wounded engaged C/3-22 Inf. One enemy soldier was killed while one M79 grenade launcher, one US bayonet, 200 M60 rounds, one US entrenching tool, one US claymore, several blasting caps, two C-ration cans and 15 AK-47 rounds were evacuated. A mechanical ambush set out by D/2-12 Inf 11 kms west of Dark Horse (YS325967) detonated at 1545 hours on 27 January resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle, one M1 carbine, one machete, two full AK magazines, one full carbine magazine, two rucksacks, two US water bags, and a small amount of documents. D/1-27 Inf killed three enemy soldiers by mechanical ambushes in two actions at 1105 and 1510 hours on 28 January 11 kms west of Black Horse (YS8335956). Three AK-47 rifles, and a small amount of documents were evacuated. A/1-27 Inf engaged five enemy carrying weapons with organic weapons 11 kms south of Black Horse (YS404866) at 1700 hours on 29 January resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two rucksacks, one SKS rifle with nine rounds, one US field jacket, one flashlight, one pistol belt, and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the rear service elements of SR-4, specifically the D10 Sapper Battalion, which operated in the Rung Sat Special Zone. A patrol from C/1-5 Inf (M) detonated a booby-trapped hand grenade 3 kms northwest of Long Thanh (YS113936) at 0923 hours on 30 January resulting in eight US soldiers wounded. C/3-22 Inf killed one enemy 8 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT405030) at 1600 hours on 31 January. One AK-47 rifle was evacuated from the contact.
The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division forces killed 72 of the enemy and captured five prisoners-of-war during the month of January, received three Hoi Chanh and accounted for 71 individual weapons and 949 pounds of rice captured.
The 2nd brigade continued operating in Bien Hoa, southern long Khanh and northern Phuoc Tuy Provinces during the week of February (1-7 February) with four maneuver battalions against the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Artillery Regiment, Rear Service Group MR-7, 3rd Battalion, 33rd Regiment, Sr-4 Headquarters and Rear Service elements and local guerrilla units. Ground activity remained at a low level, characterized by the detonation of a number of mechanical ambushes. The major enemy activity consisted of the emplacement of mines and booby traps to harass 2nd Brigade units. Five mining incidents were reported during the week resulting in one US soldier wounded and three Regional Forces soldiers killed. The enemy economy of force measure was due to their limited resources and low number of personnel. Most enemy units were engaged in the procurement of enough food for survival, which became more and more difficult with increasing allied pressure. There were five significant contacts with the enemy during the week resulting in nine enemy killed and nine individual weapons captured.
Recon/3-22 Inf engaged the area of mechanical ambush detonation 7.5 kms southeast of hung Loc (YT353026) at 1710 hours on 8 february with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle, one full AK magazine, 60 pounds of sweet potatoes, five pounds of cooked rice, three hammocks, clothing, eating utensils and three wallets with papers. The captured documents identified the 274 NVA Regiment Hqs. This Regimental; Hqs was identified again 10 February in the vicinity of YT325013 when snipers from 3-22 Inf engaged two individuals, killing one. The enemy KIA was a member of the military staff sections of the 274 Regiment. Snipers from the 3-22 Inf again engaged four individuals 8 kms south of Hung Loc (YT326014) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle and one K345 pistol. The KIA was identified as a member of theJ83 Transportation Group of MR-7 and the PW as a member of the K15 hospital of MR-7. According to the source, the group was on a resupply mission to Thai Giao, vic YT4301. D/1-27 Inf and the 621 RF Company detonated one unknown type booby trap 7 kms north of Hung Loc (YT324163) at 1130 hours on 9 February resulting in three US soldiers killed, four RF killed, one Kit Carson Scout killed and five RF wounded. At 1140 hours, they received small arms fire and returned fire with artillery, LFT and airstrikes. At 1230 hours, a MEDEVAC UH-1H on a dustoff was hit with eight rounds of small arms fire and was downed. The UH-1H was recovered at 1445 hours. A/1-27 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 5 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT271139) at 1731 hours on 9 February. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK-47 rifles with two full magazines, three rucksacks and a small amount of documents,. There were no US casualties. The documents identified an element of the Bien Hoa Priovince Party Committee and the U-1 Province Party Committee. A/3-22 Inf received automatic weapons fire while moving along a stream bank 8 kms south of Hung Loc (YT340016) at 1000 hours on 11 February. Fire was returned with organic weapons and LST with negative results. At 1255 hours, contact was reestablished with an estimated 50 enemy. A LOH received ground fire but sustained no hits. A command and control helicopter received eight small arms hits but suffered only light damage. Contact was broken at 1335 hours. US casualties were two-wounded while one Kit Carson Scout was killed. There were no enemy losses reported. A/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy with organic weapons and LST at 0710 hours on 12 February 7.5 kms south of Hung Loc (YT335018) resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK-47 rifles, 40 AK rounds and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the 274 NVA Regimental Headquarters, which normally operated in the contact area. An ambush patrol and snipers from A/1-27 Inf engaged three enemy with organic weapons 9 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT276180) at 1900 on 13 February resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK-47 rifles, three rucksacks, three hammocks, $1085 in Vietnamese piasters and a small amount of documents. The captured documents identified elements of the Regimental Headquarters and the 3rd Battalion of the274 NVA Regiment. The 3rd Battalion was dispersed south of the Binh Son Rubber Plantation (YS1893) while the
Regimental Headquarters was located northwest of the Ong Que Plantation (YS3899). The contacted enemy was probably on a resupply mission. A/1-5 Inf (M) located a small arms cache 13 kms east of Black Horse (YS565946) at 1130 hours on 14 February. They evacuated 13 CKC rifles, one M1 carbine, 30 x 60mm mortar rounds and documents. A/1-27 Inf engaged seven enemy 9 kms north of Hung Nghia (YT275185) with organic weapons at 1240 hours on 14 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle and a small amount of documents. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. The documents identified two companies of the 2nd Battalion, 274 NVA Regiment, which was located west of the Checkerboard Rubber Plantation (YT3404). A/1-27 Inf engaged three enemy 500 meters southeast of their 1240 hours contact (YT276180) with organic weapons at 1325 hours resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle and one rucksack with documents.
The 2nd Brigade continued operating in Bien Hoa, southern Long Khanh and northern Phuoc Tuy provinces during the third week of February (15-21 February) with four maneuver battalions. Enemy activity remained at a moderate level with 14 significant contacts resulting in 17 enemy killed and 11 individual weapons captured. Also, 10 enemy bodies from previous contacts were located. There were two mining incidents reported resulting in the destruction of one APC but there were no US casualties.
C/1-27 Inf located five graves south of Binh Loc (YT304132) with five bodies estimated to have been dead for four or five days. The KIA's were credited to Recon 1/27 Inf's contact of 11 February. Also, they destroyed four bunkers, one latrine and one US claymore booby trapped with trip wire. D/3-22 Inf engaged an estimated eight enemy with organic weapons 2 kms southeast of Hung Nghia (YT315084) at 1830 hours on 15 February. The 2nd Platoon, D/3-22 Inf spotted three individuals 700 meters southwest of that contact and engaged with organic weapons resulting in one VC killed. The remaining two fled northwest where one tripped a mechanical ambush resulting in one enemy killed. Two US soldiers were wounded. Two AK-47 rifles, one rucksack and some documents were captured. The documents identified the Headquarters, 274 NVA Regiment and the Recon and Medical companies, 274 NVA Regiment. The place of capture was the normal area of operations for those units. At 1845 hours on 15 February, FSB Heidi (YT515056) received 10-15 x 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire resulting ion one US soldier killed and 11 US wounded. Fire was returned with dusters, 105mm howitzers, beehive and killer rounds and mortars to the vicinity of YT51180483 with unknown results. D/3-22 Inf engaged an estimated three enemy soldiers with organic weapons 1.5 kms southwest of Hung Nghia (YT286093) at 0735 on 16 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of two rucksacks and some documents. The captured documents identified the 74 Nva Artillery Regiment Headquarters and 3rd Battalion, 74th NVA Artillery Regiment. Both units had last been identified ion 17 January by documents in the vicinity of YT290084. C/3-22 Inf located three enemy bodies 6 kms northwest of Black Horse (YT404021) at 1120 hours on 16 February. The enemy dead were killed by Recon/2-12 Inf
In two engagements 100 meters apart 7 kms southeast of xuan Loc (YT517043) at 1710 and 1745 hours on 16 February. Two AK-47 rifles were evacuated from the contacts. C/1-27 Inf, while moving along a stream bank 5 kms northwest of Xuan Loc (YT415127), received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire at 1145 hours on 18 February from an estimated 120-12 enemy resulting in seven US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and LST resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle with three full magazines, one K54 pistol, one ammo vest, two B40 rounds, 100 meters of claymore wire, several bunches of bananas, and a small amount of documents. The enemy unit was believed to have been the D6 Sapper Battalion. At 1400 hours on 19 February, c/1-27 Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force 500 meters southwest of the previous day's contact (YT414122) with a command detonated mine and small arms fire resulting in one US soldier wounded and one Kit Carson Scout wounded. Organic weapons and 4.2-inch mortars with unknown results returned fire. They swept the area and located two enemy bodies in graves, killed in the previous days contact by C/1-27 Inf. Recon/2-12 Inf engaged four enemy 8.5 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT530037) with organic weapons at 1055 hours on 20 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one K54 pistol and one rucksack. One US soldier was wounded on the contact. They swept the contact area and at 1100 hours received small arms and automatic weapons fore from an estimated 20-25 enemy. Organic weapons, LST and artillery with unknown results returned fire. One AK-47 rifle, six rucksacks containing cooking utensils and a small amount of documents were evacuated. The documents identified elements of the J85 Transportation Battalion, Rear Service Group, MR-7, which was formed from the 84th Rear Service Group after it was disbanded. A mechanical ambush set out by C/3-22 Inf 7.5 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT398036) detonated at 1137 hours on 20 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle with three full magazines and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the Mortar Company and Headquarters, 274 NVA Regt. The documents indicated that Hung Nghia (YT300095) continued to be an important supply point.
Enemy activity declined during the fourth week of February (22-28 February) in the 2nds Bde's AO as the enemy avoided contact to engage in resupply operations. The detonation of mechanical ambushes was the predominant form of engagement employed by 2nd Bde forces although small ground contacts did occur. Harassing attacks in the form of indirect fire incidents and the emplacement of mines and booby traps were the enemy's chief tactics throughout the week.
D/3-22 Inf located several bunkers with radio equipment 10 kms east of Black Horse (YS334974) at 0945 hours on 23 February. They evacuated one Chi Com amp meter, one tester, radio wiring, 16 transistor parts, one Japanese radio, two RPG rounds, 283 AK-47 rounds and assorted radio parts. The equipment probably belonged to the C20 Signal Company, 274 NVA Regt D/1-27 Inf engaged 10-12 enemy soldiers 5.5 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT279147) with organic weapons, LST and artillery at 1715 hours on 23 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle, one flashlight, pills of undetermined type and two letters. These letters identified the
1st Bn, 74 NVA Arty Regt, which was usually, located farther northwest than the current contact area, near the Dong Nai River. Later, at 1831 hours, d/1-27 Inf spotted and engaged four enemy with organic weapons 400 meters west of the 1715 hours contact with unknown results. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier. A mechanical ambush set out by C/3-22 Inf 300 meters south of Hung Nghia (YT302091) detonated at 0710 hours on 24 February resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one carbine, two rucksacks with bananas, one rucksack with 40 x .30 caliber rounds, five pounds of rice, one carton of cigarettes, one US ammo pouch, one US pistol belt, one NVAS belt, miscellaneous personnel gear, one SONY transistor radio and 98,600 $VN Piasters. The captured documents identified the C11 Requisitioning and Purchasing Company, J85 Transportation Battalion, Rear Service Group, MR-7 Elements of the J85 Bn were last identified on 20 February at YT530037 by documents. The J85 Bn was responsible for resupplying units in southern MR-7. A mechanical ambush set by A/1-27 Inf 4 kms southwest of Hung Nghia (YT267070) detonated at 1800 hours on 25 February resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle. There were no US casualties. D/3-17 Cav with elements of the 200 RF Company engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons and LFT 3 kms west-northwest of Long Thanh (YS110930) at 1820 hours on 25 February resulting in one enemy killed and one M16 rifle evacuated. Enemy small arms fire wounded one RF soldier. At 0920 hours on 26 February, elements from D/3-17 Cav detonated a grenade booby-trapped on a trail 2 kms west-northwest of Long Thanh (YS120928) resulting in one US soldier killed and three wounded. They swept the area and found one 82mm mortar round which they destroyed. One NVA prisoner-of -war was captured by A/1-27 Inf 3.5 kms southwest of Hung Nghia (YT275066) at 1205 hours on 26 February. One AK-47 rifle, 11,800 $VN Piasters and documents were evacuated. The PW was a member of the Rear Service Section of the 74 NVA Artillery Regiment. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 1350 hours on 27 February when a mechanical ambush set out by C/3-22 Inf 6.5 kms south of Hung Nghia (YT305028) detonated killing six of the enemy. A sweep of the area resulted in the evacuation of three AK-47 rifles, one K54 pistol, six rucksacks, 12” US time fuse, five pounds of sugar, five pounds of salt, 40 pounds of rice, five blasting caps, 173 AK-47 rounds, one electric lamp, one flashlight, one US hand grenade, six M16 rounds, and documents. The documents indicated that the element contacted was from the Rear Service Section, 274 NVA Regiment. Papers included weapons lists, personal letters and expenditure lists. One of the enemy KIA's was suspected of being the Adjutant Headquarters, 274 NVA Regt. A/1-27 Inf killed one enemy 3 kms southwest of Hung Nghai (YT292188) at 1738 hours on 27 February. A mechanical ambush set out by D/1-27 Inf 2.5 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT282120) detonated at 1915 hours on 28 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK-47 rifle with full magazine, one rucksack with pistol belt, canteen and documents.
The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division forces killed 76 of the enemy and captured one prisoner-of-war during the month of February, accounted for 64 individual weapons captured in action and 1483 pounds of rice captured.
The following personnel occupied key positions in the 2nd Brigades staff during the reporting period:
(1) During the month of November, enemy activity throughout the Brigade AO remained generally light. Terrorist activities on the periphery of the AO and reports of food gathering activities in the Hung Loc area indicated that propaganda and proselytizing efforts as well as food procurement had priority over combat activities at that time. Enemy losses were 28 killed, three captured and one rallier received.
(2) During the month of December, enemy activity involving US troops within MR-7 was light. ARVN, RF and PF units were the recipients of most enemy initiated activity in our interests. Within the 2nd Brigade's AO, the area south of QL-1 in the Hung Nghia area remained the most active. North of Xuan Loc there was a slight increase in activity. Enemy losses were 42 killed, five captured and five ralliers received.
(3) During the month of January, enemy activity increased as units of the Brigade engaged elements of the 274 NVA Regiment. Most contacts were friendly initiated and involved only small enemy elements. Allied ambushes, including mechanical, were prevalent. Enemy losses were 72 killed, two captured and two ralliers received.
(4) Interrogations, Prisoners-of-War (IPW): during the first two months of the reporting period, the IPW section, 25th MI Co continued its support to the 25th Infantry Division, up until the Divisions redeployment in December. The formation of the 25th MI Det, also in December, allowed support of an entire TOT/IPW Section to be given to the 2nd Brigade
25th Infantry Division. The following statistics depict the operational activities of the IPW Section while OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division and while in support of the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div.
NOV DEC JAN
Knowledgable detainees processed through
And exploited by 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div 8 11 10
Interrogations completed 20 33 32
Captured enemy document batches exploited 26 38 51
(1) Combined operations with Territorial Forces.
(a) A primary mission of the 2nd Brigade was upgrading of regional and popular forces within the Bde's AO. Combined operations involving a Vietnamese unit, platoon size or greater, with a US element were strongly emphasized, at least three companies of the brigade conducted combined operations daily. US personnel maintained control of the operation while the planning and execution were accomplished jointly. This allowed for the maximum employment of allied firepower. Since 1 November 1970, a total of 764 combined operations were conducted with territorial forces. In both combined and separate operations, territorial forces accounted for 79 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 14 prisoners-of-war, 12 Hoi Chanh and 51 weapons captured in action.
(b). RF/PF training. The 2nd Brigade maintained an active training program in order to upgrade territorial forces within its AO. During the conduct of combined operations, special forces within its AO. During the conduct of combined operations, special emphasis was placed on training. This training included: ambush techniques, mechanical ambush employment, patrolling, artillery and mortar fire adjustment, first aid, and dust-off procedures. In addition to this specialized training, a “dedicated company”, B/1-27 Inf, was given thje mission of training territorial forces in Nhon Trach district, Bien Hoa Province. From25 November 1970 through 15 January 1971, they employed an intensive 18-day training program, a total of two RF companies and nine PT platoons were trained during this period. The district Chief coordinated the training program, designating the units to be trained and the specific training program employed for each unit. Thus, the training conducted was specifically tailored for the needs of each unit. The results of this training have upgraded the territorial forces to a higher state of combat readiness. On16 January 1971, B/1-27 Inf was placed OPCON to the 1st Cav Div (AM) with the mission of training other dedicated” companies and to continue training territorial forces in Bien Hoa and Long An Provinces.
(2) Artillery Operations.
(a) During the reporting period the 1st battalion, 8th Field Artillery
Continued its direct support mission to the 2nd Bde (The Fire Brigade) an Operation TOAN THANG IV. In fulfilling its role, “The Automatic eighth” was headquartered in Xuan Loc and Camp Frensell-Jones.
(b) Significant tactical moves conducted by the 108 Arty commenced on 9 November 1970 when battery A was airlifted from FSB Hazel to Xuan Loc and moved by road to Camp Frenzell-Jones. The following day the battery deployed to Nhon Trach area to support operations of the 1-5 Inf (M), and occupied FSB Stu and FSB Gemini. On 18 November, Battery C moved to FSB Lisa in support of operations of 2-12 Inf. Eighteen days later, it was necessary to split Battery B to support a large airmobile operation of the 3-22 Inf. This operation was completed in seven days at which time the three howitzers returned to FSB Schwartz. On 14 December, Battery C moved to FSB Barbara to support an operation of 2-12 Inf. With the redeployment of the 1st and 3rd Brigades, it was necessary to add a fourth battery to the battalion. Battery D, previously Battery B, 2-77 Artillery, moved from Cu Chi Base Camp to FSB Beverly on 15 December. On 28 December, Battery A established unit integrity again when it moved to FSB Custer. However, the battery split again on 21 January 1971 and occupied FSB Nance and FSB Stu. The following day, the battery moved to its present location, FSB Rivers. On 24 January, Battery C moved to its present location at FSB Heidi and seven days later Battery D occupied FSB Carol where it remained.
(c) Three attacks were made on fire support bases during the period November through January. On 15 November, Battery A received small arms fire but there were no casualties or damage reported. On 19 November, Battery B received one round of unknown origin and, again, there were no casualties or damage. On 23 November, Battery c received 7-10 mortar rounds, which landed outside the berm, causing no casualties or damage.
(d) Ammunition expenditures for the 1-8 Arty during the period November through January totaled 23, 942 rounds.
d. Logistics: None
e. Communications: None
f. Material: None
g. Civic Action
(1)During the reporting period, 1,466 man-days were used to assist the Vietnamese in civic action projects. During the same time, 1,643,339 $VN piasters were expended in the form of money or supplies to support the civic action program. A total of 25,500 $VN piasters was paid in solatium during the period. The 2nd Brigade conducted a total of 148 MEDCAPS during the period.
(2) Psychological Operations
(a) 652 air broadcast missions were conducted during the period.
(b) 130 hours of air broadcast time was conducted.
(c) 11,833,000 leaflets were dropped in the 2nd Brigade's AO during the period.
(d) 106 hours of ground broadcast time was conducted during the period.
2. (C) LESSONS LERARNED: commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations.
(1) Assignment of LNO and FO personnel.
(a) Observation: By TOAE. Artillery liaison officers) LNOs) and assigned to headquarters battery and forward observation (FO) teams to each line battery. In the tactical situation found in Vietnam, FO teams operated at locations quite remote from their battery.
(b) Evaluation: This resulted in burdensome personnel and logistical actions between the battery commander and the FO personnel. Sufficient aircraft were not available for all commanders to pay persons in remote areas, or attend to other administrative requirements. FO members on stand down could seldom return to their unit because of distances involved and the lack of transportation. Decentralized control resulted in some FO members losing identity with parent unit.
(c) Recommendation: That FO personnel be assigned to one battery, under the centralized control of one commander, i.e. headquarters battery.
b. Intelligence. None.
(1) New personnel on outposts.
(a) Observation: During the reporting period, units had daylight outposts observe enemy personnel at close range but fail to engage them.
(b) Evaluation: The personnel on the outposts invariably gave the reason for not engaging that they thought the observed individuals were friendly Vietnamese forces. Upon closer investigation, it was discovered that the personnel at the outposts were new personnel with very limited experience.
(c) Recommendation: It is essential that at least one individual at all outposts be experienced. This will reduce the occurrences of
Complex, the commanders cannot rely solely on medium caliber artillery preparations to suitably neutralize the enemy prior to his entry.
(b) Evaluation: In areas of extensive bunker complexes, the use of medium caliber artillery is not sufficient to completely neutralize the enemy position by the destruction of bunkers or enemy booby traps. Destruction of enemy bunker systems can only be assumed through the use of heavy artillery strikes or tactical air strikes. In cases of artillery preparations that are less than totally destructive, the enemy is pre-warned of a possible impending attack or intrusion of his position, and many additional measures are required.
(c) Recommendation: Prior to the apprioach into an enemy bunker complex which is additionally suspected to be booby trapped, the unit commander should request all available means to attempt to neutralize the suspected enemy position. In addition, the approaching elements need to be instructed to precede their advance by continuous artillery strikes, i.e., “walking” artillery forward along the route of advance.
(5) Deceptive attacks by the enemy.
(a) Observation: The enemy uses deceptive attacks to escape friendly elements.
(b) Evaluation: When the enemy becomes aware that friendly units are deploying to surround his positions, he will initiate probing attacks to cause friendly units to maneuver to an apparent pocket of resistance. As friendly units maneuver, the enemy will escape around the friendly element.
(c) Recommendation: Units must be alert to continually cover all enemy escape routes, even when maneuvering against a known enemy location.
(6) Enemy utilization of dud US/Allied ammunition.
(a)Observation: The enemy used dud US/Allied ammunition in an indirect fire role during the reporting period against a brigade patrol base.
(b) Evaluation: Three rounds landed near the berm, two outside and one inside, but failed to detonate. A patrol, while checking the area after the blast, found a crater and one satchel charge with CS placed upon a projecting charge in a directional trench. Fill dirt had been used to cushion the satchel charge from the propelling blast. The rounds and the satchel charge were fused in the same manner. Two time fuses with pull release fuse igniters and a time pencil were placed in each of the projectiles. These were initiated by means of trip wires which were stretched tight as the [projectiles were propelled toward the target. The propelling charges were double fused with time fuse to allow the enemy party to clear the area prior to detonation.
(c) Recommendation: Units should initiate a program of dud round destruction, when encountered on operations, in order to deny the enemy of a source of indirect fire weapon.
d. Organization: None
(1) Marksmanship training.
(a) Observation: There was a tendency for personnel to incorporate incorrect marksmanship techniques when engaging enemy targets at close-in ranges, i.e. utilizing automatic fire instead of taking well aimed shots.
(b) Evaluation: Personnel needed to be trained in correct marksmanship procedures, weapons maintenance, and proper zeroing procedures.
(c) Recommendation: Fire support bases should establish field expedient marksmanship ranges and quick-reaction firing ranges. Whereby, proper marksmanship can be taught.
(2) Training of Clinical Specialists.
(a) Observation: It has been established that experienced Clinical Specialists are capable of handling all treatment necessary at battalion aid stations thus eliminating the need for surgeons at that level.
(b) Evaluation: Clinical Specialists are arriving in Vietnam directly from their MOS training school without having the practical experience necessary in performing the emergency trauma treatment immediately required of them..
(c) Recommendation: Clinical Specialists should have at least a year of practical experience in a trauma ward prior to arriving in Vietnam.
(1) Maintenance supply support.
(a) Observation: Maintenance supply support subjective management during the deactivation of a division by increments causes problems in projecting anticipated needs.
(b) Evaluation: Separate units, such as signal, engineer or cavalry battalions/squadrons, reduced to company size elements, are assigned a new equipment density. Such units must recompute the authorized initial stockage of repair parts. This unit must consider how long it will remain active and decide either to order the complete initial stockage, less repair parts already on hand, or to order only repair parts for which the unit anticipates a high demand. Possession of the complete initial stockage will cover most contingencies. However, it requires greater accounting, more storage space, and more time to fill and retrograde. The unit may not exist long enough to follow the prescribed procedure to accumulate demand history to turn-in parts for which insufficient demand exists. Possession of only anticipated high demand repair parts will cover less than most contingencies. However, it requires <Line Illegible> The unit
May be confident that responsive supply system could provide an unanticipated but urgently required repair part.
(c) Recommendation: Reorganized units, during a time-phased divisional deactivation, project their life expectancy and determine if it is I n their own interest to order a complete initial stockage of repair parts or to anticipate demand history and to order selectively only high demand items for stockage.
g. Communication: None.
h. Material: None.
i. Other: None.
3.The period 1 March 1971 to 28 April 1071 will be reported in the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie). Addresses listed in distribution below will receive the aforementioned report.
Joseph R. Ulatoski
1. TROOP LIST
MACTR-G3PT (16 mar 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons learned for the Period 1 November 1970
To 28 February 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)
HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96226
THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVRDO-DO,
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT, APO 96538
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington D.C. 20310
1. (U) This headquarters has received the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 28 February 1971 from Headquarters, 2nd Brigade (Prov) (Sep), 25th Infantry Division.
2. (C) Comments follow:
a. Reference item concerning friendly approach into suspected enemy bunker complexes, page 24, para 2c (4): concur. Because of its greater accuracy, the 8-inch howitzer should be used in preference to the 175mm gun.
b. Reference item concerning training of clinical Specialists, page 26, para 2e (2); concur. The clinical specialists eventually destined to replace the battalion surgeons have not yet completed their training. An additional year of training is being given in addition to what has been given to the medical technicians (MOS 91C) currently available for the assignment.
c. Reference item concerning “PLL stockage” page 26, para 2f (1); concur. When a unit can accurately predict its life expectancy to be a short period of time, it is impractical to order a stockage of repair parts that will probably never be used and must be turned back in. However, if the unit cannot accurately predict its life expectancy because of the security classification of plans for future redeployment, the unit must form its PLL in accordance with applicable regulations.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
Kenneth A. Payant
Assistant Adjutant General
2nd Brigade (Provisional) (Separate)
25th Infantry Division
1 Bn: (M), 5th Inf Brigade Troops:
2 Bn: 12th Inf
3 Bn: 22nd Inf 1 Bn, 8th Arty (105)(DS)
1 Bn, 27th Inf Co F (Ranger), 75th Inf
38th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
66th Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
Trp F (Air), 4th Cav (formerly D/3-4 Cav)
HHC, 2d bde (Prov)(Sep), 25th Inf Div
225th Spt bn (formerly 25th CSS Bn)
54th Engr Co (formerly 65th Engr Co)
532nd sig co (formerly 125th Sig Co)
544th MP Plt (formerly 25th MP Plt)
9th chem. Det
18th Mil History Det
20th Public Info Det
584th MI Det (formerly 25th MI Det)
Incl 1 Page 28
Headquarters, 2d Brigade (PROV)(SEP)
25th Infantry Division
AVDCSB_C 4 December 1970
SUBJECT: Employment of mechanical ambushes (U)
1. (U) Purpose. The purpose of this directive is to establish a policy governing the employment of the mechanical ambush (MA).
2. (U) Scope. This directive applies to all units assigned, attached or under the operational control of the 2d Brigade.
3. (C) Definitions. The following definitions apply.
a. Ambush Position (Day/Night). The location of the personnel conducting the ambush.
b. Attended Mechanical Ambush (AMA). A mechanical ambush that is located not less than 100m and not more than 500m from the Ambush Position. The word “attended” implies that friendly personnel are able to observe and/or move immediately to the mechanical ambush.
c. Unattended mechanical ambush (UMA). A mechanical ambush that is located more than 500m from the ambush position and cannot be observed by friendly personnel.
4. (C) Policy.
a. General. It is the brigade Commander's policy that MA's will be fully utilized to assist in the destruction of the enemy. Inherent in this policy is the responsibility of subordinate commanders to impress upon personnel the hazards connected with the MA and the safety precautions required.
b. Unattended Mechanical Ambushes. The brigade commander retains the authority to approve employment of UMA's. Unattended Mechanical ambushes will not be employed in populated areas. Request for permission to employ UMA's in unpopulated areas will be submitted to this HQ, ATTN:AVDCSB_C and include the proposed location, duration, provisions for recovery, and a stat3ement to the effect that the UMA has been coordinated with and approved by district and Province.
c. Attended mechanical Ambushes. Units employing AMA's will adhere to the following measures.
(1) When this device is used in populated areas, it will not be emplaced until after curfew hours and will be detonated in place or removed before the end of curfew.
(2) Commanders will insure that mechanical ambush locations, patterns, and types of triggering mechanisms are precisely recorded and that these records are maintained until the ambush is removed or destroyed.
(3) AMA's should be retrieved within 48 hours of installation. (This duration of emplacement has been judged as the point of diminishing return, i.e. the chances of enemy detection and tampering or removal greatly increases while the probability of producing enemy casualties decreases.) If the AMA is left in place longer than 48 hours, it should be blown in place.
5. (U) Responsibilities.
a. Commanders will insure that the mechanical ambush is only employed by personnel thoroughly trained and knowledgeable of its characteristics, capabilities, safety, and control measures for employment.
b. Commanders will insure that refresher training is conducted monthly for all personnel connected with the use of mechanical ambushes.
c. Commanders are responsible for determining and disseminating the current curfew hours, populated areas, and civilian access areas in their AO.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
a/ DAVID M. MORRIS
t/ DAVID M. MORRIS
A TRUE COPY
GERALD J. MONAGHAN
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 2d Brigade (Prev)(Sep)
25th Infantry Division
AVBMCO 24 December 1970
SUBJECT: security of SQL material (U)
1. (C) Over the past 30 days, Brigade units have lost a total of two SOI's or SOI extracts (including USDKAC codes) and one Key List. Compromise of security information in each case is probable.
2. (C) The foregoing situation is serious on several counts, but primarily it evidences dereliction of duty by personnel of authority, and it can cost American lives. I am very concerned over the fact that all losses resulted from simple negligence or carelessness.
3. (C) Procedures for handling, transporting, storing. Safeguarding, and accounting for this critical material are specified in the 3 series SSI Item. Apparently, this instruction is either not understood or not read. As such, each Commander is directed to institute procedures command-wide whereby the security of SCI or SOI extract data (including USKAC codes) will be kept in a protective booklet that is securely fastened with both parts of a standard ECCO fastener. Booklets will consist of both front and back covers that are thoroughly reinforced at hinged-joint with cloth or plastic tape. When any booklet starts to deteriorate, it will be replaced. The booklet will be secured to holder's person by a cord around the neck and will be kept in uniform or protective vest breast pocket when not in use. A closed loop will be threaded through at least two holes of SOI extract protective booklet and tied so that loop fits securely around holder's neck. The nylon bootlace is adequate for the job. Identification tag chains are not adequate.
4. (C) SOI material will not be left in rooms, barracks, foot lockers, etc. Any time this material is not physically on the person, to whom it has been issued, it will be properly secured in a locked metal container.
5. (C) No holder of an SOI, or SOI extract (including USKAC codes), will pass his assigned document to any other individual prior to verifying that the individual is listed on the unit's authorized holder roster.
6. (C) Commanders will maintain current rosters of authorized SOI extract holders. SOI extracts are to be issued to authorized individuals strictly on a tactically essential basis. A hand receipt will be completed and signed by each recipient for all classified material received in the SOI extract. All SOI holders will be cognizant of all provisions of the SSI item 3 series, and this knowledge will be checked regularly by their commanders to insure that the safeguard measures set forth in para 3 and 4 this letter are being implemented.
7. (C) Individuals transporting SOI material and USKAC Codes will follow the provisions outlined in paragraph 4-3, AR 380-5. the material will be inclosed in two opaque envelopes and contain a receipt for the documents. The inner envelope will be marked “By Safe Hands”. A classified document control receipt, DA Form 1203 will be attached to the outer envelope. The courier in such a manner to preclude loss will carry the material. A suggested means of transporting SOI material is in a briefcase.
8. (U) The instructions contained herein apply at all levels down to and including, the individual SOI user, even though he may be authorized to hold only one extract page.
9. (U) An inspection team will be formed from the brigade Headquarters to insure compliance of the instructions contained in this letter.
s/Joseph R. Ulatoski
t/Joseph R. Ulatoski
A TRUE COPY
GERALD J. MONAGHAN