After Action Reports 6

Operation Cliff Dweller I and II

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters, 1st Brigade 25th Infantry Division

APO San Francisco 96385

AVDCFB-C 27 OCTOBER 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: Nui Ba Den protruding 968 meters above the surrounding rice paddies and hamlets has long been an enemy sanctuary. The Black Virgin mountain has served as home for VC commo liaison elements, a rest area for elements passing through, and a staging area for elements intent on attacking Tay Ninh from the north. While the top and the bottom belonged to the US forces, the middle, the steep slopes, caves and crevices, belonged to the enemy. For months elements of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division have been engaged in operations to deny the enemy free access to and from the mountain. Continuous offensive operations were conducted day and night around the base of the mountain by elements of the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor and the 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry (Mech.). Routes to and from the mountain were ambushed at night., artillery constantly rained down on numerous Intel targets detected by sensor devices, and psyops assured the enemy of his doom. As the body count mounted, and the routes became more perilous to negotiate, agent reports began to filter in that the enemy was starving to death on his mountain sanctuary. On 13 October it was learned that an enemy battalion identified as F33, an element known to have been located on the mountain in 1966, had returned in an effort to save the enemy from complete isolation. Armed with his knowledge, plans were formulated to eliminate this reinforcing element and to again make existence on Nui Ba Den a very tenuous one at best.

2. THE PLANNING STAGE: On 17 October, Colonel John E. Tyler, commanding Officer of the 1st Brigade, offered a proposed plan to the Province Chief for his consideration. thereafter, Colonel Tyler with the Province Chief's assurance of support from the sector forces turned over the concept to his staff. On 18 October the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry was issued the warning order and at 1000 hours 20 October a briefing was presented to the participants by Major George F. Mohrmann, S-3 of the 1st brigade on the overall plan for operation "Cliff Dweller".

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Elements of the 1st Brigade under the command of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry conducted reconnaissanced operations on Nui Ba Den during the period 21-23 October to locate and destroy enemy forces located thereon. The 3rd Battalion 22nd Infantry would be augmented with A. co., 2nd battalion, 34th Armor, reinforced with one platoon, C Co., 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry (Mech.); B Co., 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech); 2 PRU teams, and RF Co. from Tay Ninh sector forces. These elements constituting Task Force Jones, would establish blocking positions on Nui Cao, on the southern slopes in the vicinity of the Pagoda, at the base below the Pagoda, and in the east along TL243. Other elements would be lifted to the top of the mountain, and would conduct a detailed reconnaissance down the eastern slopes. Artillery for support to be provided by elements of the 7th battalion 11th Artillery (DS) and 7th Battalion 9th Artillery located at FSB Buell, Rawlins, St. Barbara, and in addition C Battery, 3rd Battalion 13th Artillery would move from Tay Ninh Base Camp to provide direct support for the forces moving down the eastern slope. Equipped with this information LTC Jones, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion 22nd Infantry and Major Carmen Cavessa, S-3, set out to develop detailed plans and effect final coordination. By 1800 hours all details had been worked out, commanders briefed and the operation set to commence on schedule the following morning.

4. EXECUTION: At first light on the morning of 21 October the mountain was clear as elements of the A 2-34 and B 4-23, moved toward their designated locations. By 0910 one platoon A 2-34 with one platoon C 4-23 had secured an LZ at XT 287560 at the base of the mountain in the south. Five minutes later B 4-23 and

C 3-13 were in position vicinity of old FSB Bragg to support the operation on the southern and eastern slopes. At 1010 B co. 3-22 completed its combat assault to XT 287560 and began their ascent to their blocking position. At 1047 one platoon B Co. 3-22 completed their combat assault on top of Nui Cao inserting one ship at a time after the LZ had been prepped by no less than 7 artillery batteries and three airstrikes. By 1100 A. Co. 2-34 Armor was in it's blocking position at XT 301593. Thus by noon on the first day, 1st Brigade forces were all in position awaiting the movement of the elements to the top of the mountain and their subsequent descent in search of the F33 Battalion.

At 1520 hours C. Company 3rd Bn, 22nd Infantry and two PRU teams completed their lift by CH-47 to the top of Nui Ba Den and began their recon mission. This move was followed by the lift of the Reconnaissance platoon and one platoon of A company 3rd Bn, 22nd Infantry to serve as the RRF atop the mountain.

The night of 21 October proved to be the most eventful of the entire operation. D company, laagered in the vicinity of the Pagoda, had an ambush patrol at XT 281572, C Company, laagered at XT285585, and the e platoon of B Company at XT 271605. B Co. 4th Bn 23rd Inf. (Mech.) had ambush patrols at XT 355592, XT 329588 and XT 344567. At 2030 hours A Company, 2nd Bn 34th Armor observed 8 VC moving NW at 500 meters, these were engaged with artillery; at 2045 15 more VC were spotted through a starlight scope and were engaged with organic weapons, artillery, nighthawk (Little Bear 196), and LFT (Centaur 52). The initial report of results included 5 VC KIA, 4 AK47 rifles and 2 RPG launchers. The 160 RF Company on a sweep of the contact area reported an additional 10 VC KIA. One RF soldier was slightly wounded by small arms fire during the conduct of the sweep. At 2215 D company reported engaging 1 VC with organic weapons resulting in 1 VC KIA. During the period 0026 to 0305 A Company 2nd Bn, 34th Armor was supported by Shadow 62 and 64.

On the morning of 22 October friendly forces blessed once again with clear weather commenced to sweep the contact area. A Co. 2-34 wrap up of their contact included 20 VC KIA; 4 RPG-2 launchers, 1 RPG-7 launcher, 20 B-40 rounds, 8 B-41 rounds and 8 chicom hand grenades captured. D Company on their sweep located an additional 5 VC KIA. If the enemy was testing the mettle of 1st Brigade forces it had certainly been a costly lesson. By 0730 all forces commenced to move out in pursuit of the enemy.

B company of 4th Bn, 23rd Infantry in a sweep of the area to the east of the mountain had an APC detonate a mine at XT 302588 resulting in one KIA and 5 WIA. The vehicle was a combat loss. D Company in a recon of the area in the vicinity of the Pagoda at 0840 located 3 VC in a cave and engaged with organic weapons resulting in 3 VC KIA. Again at 1000 hours Centaur 46 VR Team in support of D Company located and engaged 4 VC resulting in 4 VC KBH. At 1030 Delta engaged 2 VC in a cave with small arms, M-79, and hand grenades with unknown results.

By the afternoon of the second day C company had negotiated the eastern slope down to PL Everest. At 1300 D Company located a cave with a plastic pipe leading into tit; and at 1525 Centaur 46 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KBH and 1 weapon destroyed. Delta company at 1620 hours located at XT 292568 began receiving small arms fire from 10-15 VC. Fire was returned with organic, LFT (Diamondhead 50) and FAC (Issue 15). Results of the contact were 1 US KIA who was evacuated from the Pagoda by Yellow Jacket 005, WO Derck; enemy losses were 7 KIA body count with 5 credited to Diamondhead 50 and 2 to Delta company.

The night of 22 October was relatively uneventful. C company had the only sighting, a light 150 meters to their SW, which they engaged with unknown results.

The third day of the operation commenced at 0810 with C company departing their night laager, at 0945 D company located 3 NVA shirts, cooking utensils, and 1 Chicom grenade, a cave 15' X 20' with a bed, and at XT 289573 a cave 20' X 50' with table and chairs. At 1000 hours D Company at XT 289573 received fire from 2 VC located 200 meters to the northwest. The contact was supported by Issue 12, Centaur 41, and Blue Max Delta engaged 3 VC at XT 296579 with unknown results. D Company had 1 US WIA and on a sweep of the area had negative findings.

By 1040 hours Charlie Company had arrived at PL McKinley and was continuing it's move to the bottom.

At noon it was decided that D company and the blocking forces at the base of the mountain would remain in position over night while the other elements would be extracted. C Company at 1610 located 2 VC in a cave, and engaged with flame thrower resulting in 2 VC KIA. by 1855 C Company, the PRU, 1 platoon of B Company, the reconnaissance platoon, and 1 platoon of A Company had all been airlifted from the operational area.

During the night of 23 October heavy movement was detected by the elements remaining in the operational area. D Company at XT 292573 received 10 rounds of AK fire and A Company 2nd Bn, 34th Armor engaged a lighted trip flare. Night hawk aircraft (Little Bear 27) checked the area with negative findings.

D Company 3/22 and A Company 2nd Bn, 34th Armor swept the area at first light on the 24th with negative findings. At 1005 hours D Company was airlifted back to Tay Ninh Base Camp, and the blocking and security forces commenced movement back to their bases thus bringing to a close "Operation Cliff Dweller".

5. RECAPITUALATION: In summary, "Operation Cliff Dweller" resulted in 44 VC KIA: 4 AK-47, 4 RPG-2,

1 RPG-7, 20 B-40 rounds, 8 B-41 rounds, 9 CHICOM grenades captured in action; one weapon destroyed. Friendly casualties totaled 2 US KIA and 6 US WIA. The cliff dweller learned from 1st Brigade forces that his was a tenuous existence. No longer was the Black Virgin a sanctuary for the VC and a psychological obstacle in the path of allied success. The enemy was taught that the mountain was no longer exclusively his.

With enemy forces dealt a sever blow, denial operations commenced again on 25 October to cut off his routes to and from the mountain; persistent CS drops were made, the artillery returned to pound intell targets around the base and on the mountain; and psychological operations fore warned the enemy of his eventual fate.

If the Black Virgin is of such vital importance to the enemy, he is going to have to pay the price of dealing with the forces of 1st Brigade Lancers, in order to retain a foothold on his once impregnable fortress.

1. List of participating units.

2. Operations Map-"Cliff Dweller" Adjutant

3-25th Inf Div historian

LIST OF PARTICIPATING UNITS

1. 3rd Battalion 22nd Infantry

c. Reconnaissance Platoon

2. A Company, 2nd battalion, 34th Armor - 1st Platoon, C Company, 4th Battalion (M), 23rd Infantry.

3. B Company, 4th Battalion (M), 23rd Infantry

4. C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (155)

5. Province Reconnaissance Company

6. 160th Regional Force Company

7. Centaur - D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry

8. Little Bear - 25th Aviation Battalion

9. Issue - 25th Division Forward air Controllers

10. Yellow Jacket - 1st Brigade Aviation Detachment

Operation Bold Lancer-Toan Thang IV

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

APO San Francisco 96225

Commanding General 18 July 70

25th Infantry Division

Attn: Division Historian

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report, BOLD LANCER I (6 May - 14 May 70)

1. (U) Operation BOLD LANCER I (Thoan Thang IV)

2. (U) Dates of Operation - 041200 May 70 to 141925 May 70

3. (C) Location - Base Area 354 (XT1090, XT1060, WT 8080, WT8060)

4. (U) Command Control Headquarters - 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

5. (U) Reporting Officer - Paul J. Mueller Jr, Col Inf Commanding

6.(C ) Task Organization:

2/14 Inf (05 May - 14 May 70) 7/11 Arty (PS) (04 May - 14 May 70)

3/22 Inf (04 May - 14 May 70) A 2/32(-) (GS) (06 May - 14 May 70)

1/5 Inf (M) (04 May - 14 May 70) B 3/13 (R) (05 May - 14 May 70)

2/22 Inf (M) (-) (04 May - 08 May 70) C 3/13 (R) (10 May - 14 May 70)

B 2/22 Inf (M) (04 May - 13 May 70) D 3/13 (R) (08 May - 12 May 70)

D Troop 3/ 4 Cav SQDN (04 May - 08 May 70)

3/17 Air Cav SQDN (06 May - 14 May 70)

1F 75th Inf (Rangers) (04 May - 14 May 70)

A 65th Eng. (BS) (04 May - 14 May 70)

Prov. Co. (Nui Ba Den) (04 May - 14 May 70)

46th Inf Plt Scout Dog (04 May - 14 May 70)

1 Plt. 25th MP Co. (04 May - 14 May 70)

7. (C ) Supporting Forces:

(1) 7/11 Artillery (DS) HQ (041200 - 141925 May 70)

A Btry - (04 May - 14 May 70)

B Btry - (04 May - 14 May 70)

C Btry - (04 May - 14 May 70)

Support by the 7/11 Arty was continuous and extremely timely. The planning and coordination of these fires were also extremely effective.

B 3/13 (155) (Reinf)

D 3/13 (8”) (Reinf)

The indirect fire support provided by the 2/32 was highly effective during the Cambodian operation.

(1) 1st Brigade Aviation Section: This is a section of 5 light observation helicopters. Support provided included both administrative and tactical missions. The close cooperation between brigade and the aviation section was contributed to overcoming many of the control problems inherent with operating in a large area of operations. Troop lift support was provided by the 187 AHC (6-8, 10, 11, 13, 14 May) and 116 AHC (6, 9, 12, 14 May) with both troop transport and armed helicopter escort.

(2) B Troop 2/ 4 Cav and 3/17 Air Cav also provided helicopter, gunship and aerial recon support in the brigade area of operations. This support enabled the brigade to have an immediate strike capability in contact areas, the assets to VR new areas for enemy troop movements and enemy staging and supply areas.

(1) US Air Force - Tactical air support was provided by the USAF Forward Air Controllers

And Fighter aircraft. This support provided the air strikes necessary for destroying enemy bunker, storage complexes, and troop concentrations.

a. Engineer Support - Special use was made of Company E 65th Engineers for installation of a pontoon bridge for the movement of mechanized troops over the Rach Cai Bach River (Rach Beng Co) into Cambodia. Their support was effective, however emplacement of the bridge was delayed due to difficulty of establishing a bridge approach on the west bank of the river.

b. Signal Communications support for this operation was supplied by the organic commo. platoon and elements from the 125th Signal battalion. Brigade commo provided the radio communications. Due to the distance involved during the first part of the operation, the communications was at times difficult. The installation was quick and effective. VHF communications was provided by 125th Signal. This means pf communications was delayed in becoming operational due to the difficulty encountered with equipment seviceability. However, once communication was established, it was very reliable with prompt action and efficient ;operation.

8. (C ) INTELLIGENCE: The general status and disposition of enemy forces in the vicinity of Base Area 352* prior to operation BOLD LANCER I was believed to have been as follows:

UNIT LOCATION STRENGTH INFO.SOURCE

95C Regiment Western War Zone C 570 PW/Contacts

HQ/9th VC/NVA DIV Base Area 354 (Cambodia) 845 PW/Rallier

Base Area 354 (Cambodia) UNK PW

272 VC/NVA Regt NW of Thien Ngon 900 PW/Contacts

Note that Base Area 354 covers an area in W.War Zone C (Viet Nam) and

Cambodia W. of Dogshead.

a. The principal targets of the operation commencing on 6 May were the suspected base area, training and logistical facilities and headquarters units of the 9th VC/NVA Division located in the northern portion of Base Area 706 and Base Area 354 in Cambodia. A secondary, but important consideration was the presence of the 95C Regiment in Western War Zone C and Base Area 354. This unit had been in an offensive posture since late March, and had conducted numerous attacks against the 1st Cav. Division (AM) Fire Support Bases in the area. In addition it was thought that the targeted area in Cambodia contained various support units and replacement organizations. PW's captured in previous operations in War Zone C had indicated the existence of a unit known as Z-31 which supplied replacements to main force units in the area.

b. When combat operations were initiated in Base Area 354, enemy contact was significantly less than anticipated. Initially groups of as many as 30-40 NVA were engaged with gunships, but ground contact was limited to scattered exchanges of fire with small groups. There appeared to be no organized resistance and no significant enemy formations were encountered until 9 May when elements of 1/5 Inf (M) engaged a tenacious enemy force. On 12 May C 1/5 Inf (M) NCP was attacked by an estimated two company force. Although no positive identification was made, the attack was believed to have been conducted by the 95C Regiment. With the exception of this contact, the enemy encountered in the operation were not in an offensive posture, and generally were not organized to conduct coordinated defensive operations. Many of the large base areas discovered had evidently been recently evacuated, with civilians reporting that large numbers of personnel had moved to the west and southwest out of the operational area at the start of the operations.

c. The following units were identified as having operated in the area prior to the operation:

94 Engr Bn PW/Documents

C 20 Sig. Co 95C Regt. Documents

Z-31c Military Hospital Documents

94 Recovery Regt. Documents

C23 Hospital, 82 RSG Documents

Medical Dispensary, 82 RSG Documents

Z-31, 94 Recovery Regiment PW's

9 Bn, 94 Recovery Regiment Documents

Transportation Bn, 82 RSG Documents

3rd Bn, 95C Regiment Documents

K77 Hospital, RS Section COSVN PW's

Property and Training Sect. COSVN Documents

27 Bn, Engr, Office, Mil. Staff Dept. Documents

A total of 58 bunker and hootch complexes, 11 rice storage areas, 6 arms and munitions storage areas, 4 hospital complexes (1 with a capacity of 250 beds) and a complete workshop with arc-welders and machine tools (drill press, lathe) was found in the objective area. The road and trail networks found indicated motor vehicle traffic and numerous motorboats and sampans were captured along the Rach Cai Bach River. Two battalion size training areas were also discovered containing, in addition to living accommodations, bleacher areas and classrooms,, large mess halls and wooden mock-ups of tanks, jets and helicopters. Base Area 354 was in all probability a training, rest and staging area for the 9th VC/NVA Division and numerous supporting elements.

d. The Cambodian portion of Base Area 354 lies in an area roughly 17Km by 13Km and is bounded on the east by the Rach Cai Bach (Rach Beng Go) River and on the south by the Prek Kampong Spean River. Neither of these rivers is fordable. The Rach Cai Bach is approximately 50m wide and the Prek Kampong Spean is slightly larger at 50 -70m. Consequently there are no direct routes of approach into the area from SVN. The eastern half of the area is densely forested and provides few landing zones except in the extreme southern portion. Numerous roads and trails run throughout the area and provide good access to the entire base area. Cross country traffic is largely limited to tracked vehicles as roads and trails soon become very difficult for wheels to travel due to deterioration. To the west of base Area 354 the terrain is sparsely wooded woods, and provided good cross country trafficability. (p3)

It should be noted that the operation was conducted during the latter part of the dry season and only scattered showers fell during the period. As rains increased, trafficability throughout the area was considerably reduced. Weather had little effect on aircraft operations during Bold Lancer I. Good flying weather was predominant and on only one occasion did ground fog delay an airmobile operation until midmorning.

e. During the initial stages of Phase I cover and concealment in Area 354 was of two distinct types. Approximately one third of the area was open and flat providing no cover and very limited concealment. Most open areas were dry rice paddies affording limited concealment behind rice paddy dikes for the infantry, and no concealment for wheeled or track vehicles. The open area afforded free movement to mechanized vehicles and wheeled vehicles towing artillery pieces and few problems were encountered in these areas. The open areas offered unrestricted observation and field of fire. All open areas in Area 354 were usable for both mechanized and to a large extent to wheeled vehicles providing avenues of approach; in any required direction. The other two thirds of the area of operations were densely vegetated varying from double to triple canopy. Mechanized and wheeled vehicles were limited to dirt roads and wide trails. Ground troops were restricted by thick underbrush although there were numerous trails throughout the area. Limited cover was provided by the dense canopy and considerable concealment was provided by the thick undergrowth in the area. Observation and fields of fire were restricted at times to a few feet and at best a few meters in all densely vegetated areas. During the initial assault into Cambodia, two critical terrain features became evident in the successful accomplishment of the mission. The first was the bridge site across the Rach Cai Bach River at Lo Go (vic WT969752). The site was critical in that it provided access through the forest to the west by trails to the village of Tasuos. This bridgehead also provided access by road south to the Prek Kampong Spean River. The second critical terrain feature was the village of Tasuos directly west of the bridge site. The village controlled the junction of several roads, and airmobiling the 3/22 Inf. to secure he village enabled the rapid deployment of a mechanized infantry unit to the west and then south after reaching the village. The road south from the bridgehead and adjacent to the Rach Cai Bach River was utilized by another mechanized infantry battalion providing a suitable avenue of approach to the south.

f. The population in Base Area 354 was largely located west and south of the bridge site at Lo Go (subsequently FSB Minnie WT969752). One population center, Tasous (WT917747) was the focus of much of the initial tactical operations. Nowhere in the TAOI was the population in excess of -800 persons per village. Just to the south of the TAOI was the city of Kampong Trach (WT866615) which had a population in excess of 1000 people.

The attitude of the indigenous was initially one of fear, followed by warmth and cooperation. The 1/5 Inf (M), 2/14 Inf and the 2/22 Inf(M) enjoyed friendly relations with local villagers, though at Tasous the 3/22 Inf encountered ill will because of an artillery incident.

9. (C) MISSION: 1ST Bde, 25th Infantry Division relieved elements of 1st Cav Div(AM) in northwestern War Zone C on 4 May and attacked into Base Area 354 to locate and destroy enemy su0pply staging areas, equipment and personnel.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division conduct Operations Bold Lancer in three phases>

Phase I - Movement of elements of the brigade into northwestern War Zone C, relief of elements of 1st Cav Div (AM) and preparation for the attack (4 and 5 May).

Phase II - Attack and river crossing. ;On 6 May 1970 one Infantry Battalion was air assaulted into Cambodia. One company secured the western bank of the Rach Cai Bach River by air assault, while 2/22 Inf secured the eastern bank. Company E 665th Engineers constructed a float bridge for the passage of 1/5 Inf (M) and2/22 Inf (M) to their objectives in Cambodia.

Phase III - Detailed Search - The insertion of another infantry battalion by air on 8 May 1970 began the detailed searching of the base area. This continued through 14 May 1970 with all elements of the brigade.

11. (C) EXECUTION: (See Overlay) Operation Bold Lancer I was an offensive move into Cambodia on a search and destroy mission to limit the enemy's capability to resupply into S. Vietnam. The order for the operation was issued on 3 May 1970.

Comnmand and Conrol:

The brigade forward CP was moved to Thien Ngen (XT085817) on 6 May 1970. This was to augment the command and control originating from Tay Ninh Base Camp. On 10 May, the movement of the brigade headquarters was completed from TNBC and Thien Ngen to FSB Wood (WT047794).

Movement of ground troops into Cambodia began on 6 May 1970 with the combat assault of three companies of the 3/22 Infantry to the vicinity of the village of Tasuos (WT917747), and one company securing the bridgehead on the western bank of the Rach Cai Bach River (WT968752). The 2/22 Inf (M) attacked to seize the bridgehead on the eastern bank, and Co. E, 65th Engr Bn initiated float bridge construction.

0334 and 0416 hrs. - two Commando Vaults were employed at the bridge site in Cambodia for the insertion of elements of the 3/22 Inf. These were 15,000 lb bombs.

0715 hrs:- C 3/22 Inf spotted 30 individuals moving away from their position at XT046815 at 150m. They were engaging with S/A, gunships and artillery with negative results.

0955 hrs: - C 3/22 received an unknown number of HE rounds, resulting in 2 US KIA and 8 US WIA. Fire was determined to be friendly artillery.

1025 hrs: - A&D Co 3/22 received small arms fire from the vicinity of Tasuos. Engaged with organic weapons and LFT's resulting in 2 US KIA and 3 WIA. Negative enemy losses.

Total enemy losses for the day were 46 NVA KIA or KBA: captured - 13 SKS rifles, 3xCC carbines, 1xUS M-1 carbine; destroyed - 27 bxs, 2x50m trenches, 7xCC HG's, 6 hootches, 1 tunnel uncovered, 1x51 cal position, 1 shack and 2xF/P. (p5)

0605hrs: The engineers completed the bridge. At 0715 B 1/5 Inf(M) crossed the bridge. The rest of the 1/5 Inf(M) finished crossing the bridge 0800. At 0830, 2/22 Inf(M) started across the bridge. Movement across the bridge was completed at 1000 hrs.

0740 hrs: At grids WT920635 and WT938620 Vietnamese PBR's received heavy automatic weapons fire, RPG and 51cal fire. Fire was returned with organic weapons, A/S, LFT, FAC and Black Pony. Engagement was at a distance of 40m. Results were: 2US WIA, 1VN KIA, 10VN WIA. Enemy losses unknown.

1045 hrs: - B 3/17 Air Cav engaged 14 enemy with organic weapons at WT951461. Results, 14 enemy KBA. On a recon of the area, they located and destroyed 1x57RR.

1200 hrs:: B 7/`11 Arty (towed) crossed the river, followed by 1/5 Mech and were in firing position by 071730 May 70.

1300 hrs:: At WT 905670, A 1/5 Inf(M) engaged an unknown sized enemy force with organic weapons. Enemy force returned fire with S/A and A/W fire. Fire ceased at 1310. Results were: 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA; enemy losses were 11NVA KIA, 8 PW's and 6 weapons.

1525 hrs: A 2/22 Inf (M) engaged an unknown size enemy force vicinity WT9672. Engaged with organic weapons and LST with unknown results.

1745 hrs: A 2/22 Inf(M) received S/A and A/W fire from vicinity WT9465. Returned with organic weapons and LFT, 10 enemy in wood-line at 150m. Results 4 enemy were KBA

2050 hrs: - Recon 1/5 Inf(M) AP received 5RPG's and S/A fire. Contact broke at 2100 hrs with one platoon of B Co reacting. Results were: 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA, and 4 NVA KIA.

Support for ground troops was primarily through the use of aerial rocket artillery and

105 artillery supporting on the west side of the river. Enemy losses for the day were: 73 NVA KIA; captured 6 unknown type weapons, 2,25kb mines, 5xrifle grenades, 1xSKS: destroyed 65 hootches, 70m trench destroyed, 4 bxs, 1/57mm RR.

The 8th of May saw the completion of the move into Cambodia with the insertion of the 2/14 Inf into the south of the brigade area of operations. This completed Phase II of the operation. Significant actions for the day were:

0528hrs: - B 1/5 Inf(M) at WT900673 NDP observed and engaged 10 enemy at 300m. Engaged with organic weapons with negative results.

0650 hrs: - VN PBR at WT9560 received 6 rds B-40 and heavy A/W and 51 cal fire from an unknown size enemy force. Returned with organic weapons, FAC, A/S and LFT. Fire ceased immediately. Results: No friendly casualties; enemy results unknown. 2/22 Inf (M) minus Co B relieved OPCON 1st Bde; placed OPCON 2nd bde.

The communication was excellent during the period discussed. Arty support was both DS and general support nature.

Total results of enemy losses were: 28 NVA KIA; captured 1SKS rifle, 55 gal Mogas, 55gal oil, 42 bicycles, 2 AK-47's, 26 hootches, 4 tunnel entrances uncovered, 12 motor scooters, US losses 13 WIA.

Operation 9 May: (p6)

All units were involved in detailed searches of their areas of operation. Enemy activity increased. Significant activities for the day were:

0102 hrs: VN PBR at WT962608 received B-40 and heavy A/W fire from an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned with organic weapons, FAC, LFT and N/H. Distance of engagement was 50m. Fire ceased at 0112 hrs. There were no friendly casualties and negative enemy results.

1010 hrs: C 1/5 Inf(M) at WT890658 engaged 4-5 individuals with organic weapons at 200m. Recon at the contact located an area 400m long by 400m wide, containing a large base camp complex with mess-halls, bunkers, fighting position: They also located 1 RPG launcher, 1 transistor radio, 10 RPG rounds, 51lbs documents, 20x60 satchel charges, 1NVA protective mask and 100 AK rounds. Negative casualties.

1130 hrs: A 1/5 Inf(M) at WT835684 was in contact with an estimated platoon size NVA element. Enemy were engaged with organic weapons and LFT. The enemy reutned with S/A. amd A/W fire. Results were: 1US KIA, 14 US WIA and 9 NVA KIA.

1130 hrs: B 1/5 Inf (M) at XT835705 engaged an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned with S/A, and A/W and RPG sporadically. US forces employed a LFT and A/S. Negative casualties or results.

1630 hrs: C 1/5 Inf(M) at WT840674 received A/W and RPG fire, returned with organic weapons. Support was requested from Artillery, LFT and A/S. Results were: 1US KIA, 14US WIA, unknown enemy results. Artillery support was provided by 7/11 Arty (DS). The artillery fire was accurate and timely.

1923 hrs: FSB Minnie at WT971750 received 25-30 rounds of 82mm Mortar fire from suspected locations of WT971747. Fire was returned by 7/11 Arty, Blue Max and FAC. Results were : 1 US KIA, and 18 US WIA, enemy losses were unknown.

2030 hrs: Recon 1/5 Inf(M) at WT903665, enroute to AP received S/A fire from an unknown sized enemy force. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Fire ceased at 2035. Results: 2 US WIA; enemy losses - 4 NVA KIA, 1011 lbs of documents, 10x60mm mortar rounds, 1 set LNVA web gear, 3xCC HG's, 151 lbs clothing, 51 lbs medical supplies, 3 can teens, 6 ponchos and 1 helmet.

0630 to 1800 hrs: Co B 2/22 Inf(M) found two large caches, one at WT959621 and the other at WT953688. The results of these finds will be reflected in the totals.

The communications for all actions in the Bde AO the 9th of May were good. Some of the minor problems encountered had been solved and commo. was operating in an effective manner. The artillery put down effective indirect fire both on contact areas and intell. targets. Total enemy losses for the day were: 29NVA KIA: captured 1xAK-47, 1xSKS, 30 tons of rice, 3 large boats, 1 large sampan with in-board motor: destroyed 3 hootches, 16 sampans, 100 bxs, 1x 200m trench line, 9 huts, cooking utensils, 3 hammocks, 1 homemade gun, 15 structures, 6 structures damaged, 75m of trench uncovered.

The operations on 10 May were directed toward cache sites. The contacts during the day were limited to hit and run tactics with one to two individuals. The result of the days actions were: 8NVA KIA: captured - 18 SKS, 50 AK-47's, 1 RPD LMG, 80 K-54 pistols, 6x51 cal MG, 100 CC claymores, 1 CC LMG, 1 cc HMG, 1 M-2 carbine, 6 M-16's, 17 AK-50's, 1x7.62 AA/HG, 12x100lb bags of rice, 250 1`1/2 lb blocks of explosives, 1 entrenching tool, 1x25-30lb mine, 1 ½ tons rice, 88 CC Hg, 65x51 lb blocks explosive destroyed - 192 bx's, 6 F/P's, 124 hootches, 3 classrooms, 2 NVA flags, 1x51 cal position, 254 CC Hg's, 6x60mm mortar rounds, 9x8mm mortar rounds, 133 sleeping positions, 1 mess hall with 3CC stoves, 1500 NVA OD uniforms, 200 blue shirts and trousers, 200 brown shirts, 500 -1000 lbs miscellaneous items, 6 pigs, 4 chickens, 4 sewing machines, 150gal MoGas, 50gal Kerosine, 2x122 rockets, 7 rolls of 35mm film, 4x60mm rounds, 5RG's, 2 boxes blasting caps, 15x25lb mines, 6 cases CC HG's, 25lb of C-4. 901lbs of documents were captured.

The operations were a continuation of Phase III of Bold Lancer I. Action was light. Significant actions during the day were:

1005 hrs: C 3/17 Air Cav observed enemy at WT768837 with packs, cooking utensils and ponchos. Engaged three individuals evading the area. Results: 3 NVA KBA.

1010 hrs: D 3/22 Inf at WT933744 located an old enemy base camp containing medical supplies, bicycles, C-4, several mess halls, VIP mess hall and 90 - 100 lbs of documents. The hootches were made of tin. One large classroom was located which was 50' X 200' with 22 large desks and a podium in front.

1040 hrs A 2/14 Inf at WT968740 located and destroyed 2 sampans, 1 with motor and 5 hootches.

1250 hrs: : C 2/14 Inf at WT948648 located a small workshop with 1 arc welder, assorted tools, 1000 lbs miscellaneous parts, 10-15 small generator motors, 1 SKS, 2 RPG launchers and 1 drill press.

Totals for the day were: 7 NVA KIA: captured - medical supplies, bicycles, 90-100 lbs documents, 1 arc welder, 10-15 small generator motors, 1 SKS, 2 RPG launchers, 1 drill press: destroyed - 2 sampans, several mess halls, 1 classroom, 25 tons of rice, US losses were 4 US WIA.

The day was completed with the receipt of the warning order for the 1st Brigade to depart the present AO NLT 141800 May to assume AO in Base Area 353.

Operations on the 12 May were marked by the heaviest contact of the operation with C 1/5 Inf(M). The rest of the action during the day was limited to small contacts with 3 -4 individuals. Caches were generally smaller.

0530 hrs: C 1/5 Inf(M) at WT928682 received S/A, RPG, mortar fire and sniper fire from an unknown sized enemy force. Returned fire with organic weapons, LFT, NH, D&C ship, FAC A/S. A&B Co 1/5 Inf(M) reacted with A Co receiving fire at WT413687. Contact was broken at 0950. Results: 5 US KIA, 44 US WIA, 1 Kit Carson KIA, 6 APC's combat loss. Enemy losses: 13 NVA KIA.

1020 hrs: D 2/14 Inf located and destroyed, at WT931664, 10 hootches, 10'X20' in size.

11:30 hrs: C 3/17 Air Cav at WT8665998 engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons. Results 15 NVA KBA. A/S put in by Issue FAC with an additional 6 XBA. Individuals were carrying SKS's. (p8)

1800 hrs: A 3/22 Inf at XT044840 located and destroyed 4 old F/P's, 30' commo wire, 1 VA protective mask, 1 first aid kit, 23 x82mm mortar rounds, also located 4NVA KB arty 2-3 weeks old.

Results of the day were: US losses - 5 US KIA, 47 US WIA, 1 Kit Carson KIA, 6 APC's Cmbt loss: Enemy losses - 51 NVA KIA, 10 hootches, 4 F/P;s 30' commo. wire, 1 protective mask, first aid kit, 23 c 82mm rounds.

Action of the 13th of May picked up again to include numerous contacts with the enemy. Most of the contacts were with people evading the area. Significant actions during the day were:

0710 hrs: B 3/22 Inf at WT938735 observed and engaged 2 individuals with no return fire. Results were 1NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 and 1CC HG.

0830 hrs: B 3/22 Inf at WT940734 located a cache containing 17 cases of empty vials, 7 gunny sacks of empty plasma, bottles, 1 case of 9mm rounds. Samples of the items were evacuated to FSB Woo.

0945 hrs: C 3/17 Air Cav at WT795228 observed and engaged 3 individuals. Results 3 NVA KBA.

1015 hrs: A 2/14 Inf at WT964724 received S/A fire from USEF. Returned with organic weapons. Results 1 AK-47, 1 NVA uniform and 1 NVA KIA. Engaged at 100m

1045 hrs: D 2/14 Inf. at WT977640 located a bunker complex of bn size. Possibly a training area which would hold approximately 200 individuals.

1150 hrs: D 2/14 Inf at WT975631 engaged 10 individuals at 350m with weapons and resupply. There was no return fire with 1 NVA KIA.

1200 hrs: A 2/14 Inf at WT964725 located a hospital compound of 200-250 bed capacity. Engaged with an A/S resulting in 3 hootches and 36 bunkers destroyed.

1245 hrs: A 2/14 Inf at WT964724 received S/A fire from an USEF 150-200m south of their location. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Results: 1US KIA. Enemy losses unknown

1310 hrs:. D 2/14 Inf at WT973654 located 2 tons of rice, 1 complete 57mm RR and 1 rocket launcher tripod.

1530 hrs: B 2/14 Inf at WT956685 located 12 tons of rice, unknown number of rolls of cloth, 3lbs medical supplies, ammo reloading equipment for US ammo, several sewing machines.

1630 hrs: C 3/22 Inf at WT905766 observed and engaged 5 individuals 150m from their location. Results were: 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA, enemy losses unknown.

Throughout the day the communications system was maintained at a high level of operability. Aerial support by the 3 /4 Cav and 3/17 Air Cav proved invaluable in providing maximum air cover for contracts and also providing a means by which areas inaccessible to ground troops were covered.

The 14th of May saw the withdrawal of the 1st Bde from Base Area 354. The last unit pulled out of the AO at 1925 on 14 May 1970. The move was to relieve the 1st Cav(M) in place for operations in the Fishhook area of Cambodia. (p9)

12. (C) RESULTS: In the 9 day period covered by Operation Bold Lancer I, operational results were:

Enemy Losses: 283 NVA KIA, 12 POW's, 7 Hoi Chanhs, 297 individual weapons, 34 crew served weapons, 1561 round + several tons HE ammo (destroyed) 9 cases 4847 S/A rounds, 222 tons rice, 355 lbs documents, 705 buildings, 1202 bunkers, 701lbs, 56 non-motorized sampans, 12 boats with inboard motors, 8 tons corn, 1 mimeograph machine, 2 boxes of ink, 3 sets of binoculars, 17 wire cutters, 15 picks, 500 pick and shovel heads, 60 garden hose heads, 17 cases glass vials, 17 gunny sacks of empty plasma bottles, 5 cases glass tubing, 1536 lbs explosive. 55 A/T mine, 2 x 10KW generators, 250 bed hospital complex, 30 rolls barbed wire, 100 saw blades, 10 small motors, 5 sewing machines, 2 boxes blasting caps, 100 pistol holsters, 1 drill press, 1 lathe, 2 x55 gal drums fuel oil, 3 arc welders, 30 satchel charges, 1070 lbs clothing, 10 shape charges, 17 sets web gear, 4 rucksacks, 10 detonators, 1 radio, 60 AK magazines, 100 MG barrels, 150 MG drums, 20 canteens, 1800 unknown forms.

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

Class I, limited Class II & IV, Class V, Class VIII and Class IX were available in sufficient quantity at Tay Ninh Base Camp with back up support at Cu Chi Base Camp. The establishment of a Forward Support Element at Thien Ngon commenced on 4 May 1970. Class III products were furnished to the battalions promptly and in adequate amounts from the Forward Support Base. Class I other than C rations was not available except in Tay Ninh. The battalions sent resupply convoys back to Tay Ninh daily to obtain Class “A” rations, ice, and some Class V as well as some repair parts.

The forward Support Base of Thien Ngon was slow in establishing a Class I distribution point and obtaining ice for the units. Units requested ammunition through the DAO who arranged for the ammunition to be drawn from the ASP at Tay Ninh and hauled to Thien Ngon. This was normally delivered 1 to 2 days after the item was requested. Because of a high usage of ammunition during the initial phase of the operation, the battalion supplemented this by going directly to the ASP and picking up ammunition and delivering it the same day.

A contact team from D Co 725 Maint. Bn was established at the Forward Support Base. The first two or three days were oriented on getting the maintenance facilities established and repair parts were in short supply. However, this was quickly remedied and repair parts began to arrive in sufficient quantity.

C. TREATMENT OF CASUALTIES: EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION:

A medical clearing station was established in the FSB for treatment of minor wounds and caring for illnesses not requiring hospitalization. Additionally a Dust-off station was established in the clearing station for calling for and controlling Medevac helicopter. Evacuation was prompt.

D. TRANSPORTATION: (p10)

The initial requirements for supplies and equipment at the Forward Support Base exceeded the whole transportation assets. The distance of the only land line of communication and the security required prohibited more than one convoy to and from the Forward Support Base a day. Additional support was provided by the US Air Force Aircraft to the Forward Support Base where on air strip capable of handling C123's was located. Transportation for resupply to the battalions who assaulted into Cambodia was generally accomplished by CH47 and UHI helicopter. This was accomplished in a superb manner. The responsiveness of the aviation to the battalions needs, enabled the units to continue combat operation with no delays. CH54 aircraft were used for the evacuation of the disabled combat vehicles.

Communications were taxed by movement and the distances moved. During the first portion of the operation, difficulty was experienced in commo with Tay Ninh,. As soon as a retrans unit was installed on Nui Ba Den, the rest of the communications improved to the degree that no major breaks occurred.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT:

Company E 65th Engrs constructed a float bridge to span the Rach Cai Bach River for the rapid movement of the mechanized battalions into Cambodia. Two Commando Vault Air Strikes were employed in preparation of landing zones for the air assault of 3/22 Inf Bn into the bridgehead area in Cambodia. These were employed on 6 May 1970- at 0334hrs and 0416hrs.

15. (C ) PSYOPS ACTIVITIES:

a. Initially the emphasis for PSYOP / Civic Action planning during the operation Bold Lancer I, was on tactical PSYOP aerial broadcasts. Tapes targeted at the populace, however, were developed to inform non-combatants of Allied intentions, to allay fears and to urge them to remain in their homes and stay clear of the battle area. The objectives were three-fold.

(1)To minimize civilian casualties.

(2)To reduce the number of refugees.

(3) To create a favorable psychological climate in which to operate