After Action Reports 7

The cover page has the unit patches of the "Charger Knight on a horse" and the "Burning Worm" for a decorative effect.

Transcribed by Leslie Hines ADVA historian, Vietnam era for the year 2001. Thank You Leslie

(charger) GADSDEN (196th LIB Patch)

----CHARGERS--------

196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

APO San Francisco 96256

AVBFSC 15 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

THRU: Commanding General

25th Infantry Division

US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

1. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Operation GADSDEN was a Search

and Destroy operation.

2.(U) DATES OF OPERATION: 1 February 1967 - 21 February 1967.

3.(U) LOCATION: TAY NINH Province.

4.(U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

5.(U) REPORTING OFFICER: Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles.

6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry

b. 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry

c. 1st Battalion (M), 5th Infantry (Attached)

d. F Troop, 17th Cav

e. 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery

f. 196th Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

7. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Supporting Forces during Operation GADSDEN:

(1) USAF: During Operation GADSDEN air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers.

1. 196th Bde Avn Detachment

(b) Helicopter assets were utilized for command and control, airmobile assaults, extractions and repositions, reconnaissance, resupply and medical evacuation.

(3) Artillery Support: 3/82 Artillery was in direct support during the entire operation.

(4) 8th Support Battalion: Provided continuous resupply of all classes.

(5) 175th Engineer Co: Provided direct support during the entire operation.

(a) 196th Brigade Communications Platoon.

(b) 156th Signal Platoon.

(7) 48th Scout Dog Platoon: Utilized on patrols and ambushes.

b. Performance of Supporting Arms and Services.

(1) Artillery Support: Artillery fires from a series of fire support bases were used throughout the entire operation in offensive and defensive roles. Artillery elements were moved by CH-47 (Chinook)

helicopters or convoys simultaneously with movement of the forward defense bases.

(a) Utilization of Artillery:

1. Fires in support of ground troops in contact.

2. Artillery preparations created a diversion for airmobile assaults when false preparations were fired on likely landing areas adjacent to actual landing zones.

3. An extensive H&I program was conducted throughout the operation on known VC locations, used trails and suspected VC mortar firing positions.

4. Landing zone preparations and suppressive fires during airmobile assaults and extractions.

5. Areas in front of advancing maneuver elements on search and destroy operations were softened by Artillery fires.

6. High air bursts with white phosphorous were employed to assist patrols navigating through dense terrain, both during daylight and during the hours of darkness when map inspection was not practical.

7. Defensive concentrations, integrated with mortar fires, were fired in and around the forward defense bases.

(b) Enemy Losses from Artillery:

Secondary Explosions 5

Foxholes Destroyed 3

H&I Missions 1925 missions 4472 rds

Support Missions 394 missions 9880 rds

(d) Artillery Ammunition Expenditures:

HE: 13,797 WP: 606 ILL: 49

BATTERY GRID DATE OCCUPIED MEANS

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT129638 1 Feb 67 Convoy

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT033718 2 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT033718 3 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT039647 12 Feb 67 CH-47

BATTERY GRID DATE OCCUPIED MEANS

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT039478 12 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT127609 15 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT055590 15 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT313583 16 Feb 67 Convoy

(a) Utilization of Army Aviation:

1. Command and control for airmobile assaults and extractions.

2. Aerial reconnaissance.

3. Combat airmobile assaults, repositions and extractions.

4. Adjust Artillery fires.

5. Resupply into operation objective areas.

6. Assist DUST OFF aircraft in emergency MEDEVAC situations.

(b) Results of Army Aviation: Aviation support was an important factor in accomplishing the assigned missions in the operational area. This support provided the Brigade with a high degree of flexibility and mobility. Helicopters enabled the Brigade to spend maximum time in the objective area and, when considered advantageous, expeditiously to dis-place to other targets of opportunity. Through the maximum utilization of helicopter assets the Brigade was able to continually harass the VC throughout the Brigade's AO. helicopter assaults varied from rifle platoon to battalion size airmobile operations. Gun ships were invaluable in providing suppressive fires against VC ground fire.

(a) During Operation GADSDEN the Air Force flew twenty-eight (28) immediate air strikes. The majority of these immediate strikes were flown in close support of units that had little experience

with close bombing. After two missions were completed the ground commanders had nothing but praise for close air support.

(b) For the first time the Brigade used air strikes to prep an area where a bridge was to be implaced to span a river. Tactical bombing of this area was able to not only to bomb bunkers and trenches near the crossing, but also to burn heavy elephant grass and bamboo at the approaches to the site.

Preplans Requested 154

Number of Sorties 328

(d) Results of Tactical Air Strikes:

Bunkers Destroyed 80

Structures Damaged 74

Supply Caches Destroyed 4

Trench Destroyed 365 meters

Trench Uncovered 795 meters

Foxholes Uncovered 37

Foxholes Destroyed 50

Tunnel Entrances Uncovered 20

Boat Docks Destroyed 1

(e) There were 5 B-52 strikes flown in the Brigade's AO during the period 1-21 February. They were :

MISSION NO DATE STRUCK AREA COVERED

TROPIC 3 2 February 67 XT0369

TROPIC 4 2 February 67 XT0373

TROPIC 6 3 February 67 WT9871

TROPIC 7 3 February 67 WT9868

LIGHTNING 9 6 February 67 WT8863

(4) Engineer Support: During Operation GADSDEN the 175th Engineer Company provided continuous support to the Brigade. The company's primary mission was to construct tactical bridging as required in the Brigade's AO. Engineer support during Operation GADSDEN:

DATE LOCATION MISSION

2 February 67 XT064663 Constructed a bridge utilizing Light Tactical Raft components. All personnel and bridging were lifted into the area and extracted by CH-47 (Chinook) helicopters.

DATE LOCATION MISSION

3 February 67 WT976698 Constructed a M4T6 dry span bridge. All personnel 4 February 67 and bridging were lifted into the area and extracted by CH-47 Chinook.

15 February 67 XT054594 Constructed a bridge utilizing Light Tactical Raft components. All personnel and bridging were lifted into the area and extracted by CH-47 Chinook.

(5) 8th Support Battalion: (For a more detailed summary See ANNEX D)

a. The 8th Support Battalion provided the Brigade continuous support during Operation GADSDEN.

(b) The Forward Logistical Operation Center was established in the Bn Hqs and was operational at 020700 hrs February 67. During the period 2-16 February the resupply by both air and ground transportation was accomplished:

Class II and IV 68,821 lbs

Class III 95,815 lbs

(c) There was a total of 462 tons of supplies moved during the operation in support of Brigade units and attachments. Twentyeight (28) tons of supplies were moved overland to the Brigade Forward CP

by ground transportation.

(d) Units in the field received at least one hot A ration meal per day. Ice was sent to the field units through normal unit resupply missions. During the "TET" truce period units were issued three A ration meals per day.

(e) There were 859 Huey sorties and 85 CH-47 (Chinook) sorties utilized for resupply during the operation. No tactical missions were delayed or cancelled for lack of logistical support.

(a) An area communications center was established at the Brigade Forward Command Post. Initially this was strictly a terminus

for the Division system, but as the operation went on this center became a radio relay switching point servicing non-brigade units as well as terminating the 196th Command Communications. The FM command radio nets

..NND 909608...secure facilitating the passing of tactical information. High frequency radio teletype service was effectively employed between Division and Brigade.

(b) Activities of Subordinate Units:

1. 196th Brigade Communications Platoon:

a. Provided a tactical message center at the Bde Fwd CP.

b. Established and operated the high frequency radio teletype network.

c. The FM command nets in the tactical operation center were installed with voice

2. 156th Signal Platoon (Forward Area):

a. Installed a VHF terminal at the Brigade Forward Command Post and maintained a

terminal at TAY NINH.

b. Operated the Brigade switchboard.

c. As a training vehicle established a radio relay system between Division Artillery and

the 3rd Brigade, 4th Division. This provided lateral communication between major

units and developed operator proficiency with an eye toward more mobile situations.

3. Provisional Platoon, B Co 36 Signal:

a. Continued the improvement of base camp communications at TAY NINH.

b. Terminated the local distribution of tactical circuits in the TAY NINH complex.

(7) 48th Scout Dog Platoon: Scout dog teams were effective-ly used with ambush patrols and

with point squads during movement.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: See ANNEX A.

9. (C) MISSION: The 25th Infantry Division directed the 196th Light Infantry Brigade to attack in zone to

find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations and to block infiltration routes across the

Cambodian Border during the TET truce period.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: For the purpose of this report Operation GADSDEN has been

broken into five phases. (See ANNEX B) for the extracts of the OPORD and FRAGO's governing this

a. Phase I (1 February). Bde HQ, Btry B, 3/82 Arty and F Troop, 17th Cav moved overland from TAY NINH base camp and established a FWD CP at XT128635.

b. Phase II (2 February). Co A, 4/31 Inf conducted a combat assault and secured a bridge crossing site at XT055684. The 175th Engineers with bridging material were then airlifted to the site where

they constructed the bridge. 1/5 (M) Inf attacked along Axis APPLE, crossed the bridge built by the Engineers, and proceeded to secure Obj 2 at XT0372. After Obj 2 had been secured Co B, 4/31 and Btry A, 3/82 Arty were airlifted to that location and established a FSB. Co C, 4/31 Inf was airlifted to the Bde Fwd CP where it was utilized as the Brigade RRF.

c. Phase III (3 February). Co A, 4/31 Inf was airlifted from the bridge site to Obj 2 where it joined the Bn (-). 1/5 (M) Inf attacked from Obj 2 and secured Obj 4 vic WT9869 After Obj 4 was secured, 2/1

Inf was airlifted from TAY NINH base camp to an LZ at coordinates WT975696. Btry C, 3/82 Arty was airlifted from TAY NINH to Obj 2 where it joined Btry A.

d. Phase IV (4 February - 14 February). Bde units and attach-ments conducted extensive S&D operations in zone and established blocking positions to prevent VC exfiltration to Cambodia during the TET truce period. Artillery batteries were airlifted to new FSB's when the maneuver of ground troops necessitated the move.

e. Phase V (15 February - 17 February) Bde units and attach-ments returned to TAY NINH.

f. Phase VI (18 February - 21 February) The 3d Bn, 21st Inf conducted a combat assault vic WT9954 to search for VC grave sites. The Bn was extracted and returned to TAY NINH on 19 February. The 25th Infantry Division terminated Operation GADSDEN 212400H February 1967.

(1) Summary of Operation GADSDEN.

(a) Operation GADSDEN confirmed the location of elements of the 271st Regt, 680th Training Regt, 70th Security Regt and COS II rear services in the Brigades AO. These elements have been carried

by the order of battle agencies as being located in northern War Zone C, but had not been previously confirmed.

(b) The VC reaction to major US operations continued to be very evasive. It is believed the majority of the 271st Regiment moved across the Cambodian Border following the initial logistical build-

up and air strikes. The VC continued to display a negative desire to engage US or Free World Forces in strength. The VC encountered were either

..NND909608..ng forces, reconnaissance elements or misoriented exfiltration

(c) Although no major enemy units were believed to have been destroyed by Brigade units, the fact remains that the VC were forced to abandon a major base area and exfiltrate to another safe area.

The reorganization phase for a guerilla unit that has been forced to resort to this tactic is usually length. Many soldiers will never rejoin the unit. Key installations that were destroyed will be difficult to rebuild to their prior status.

(2) Prominent locations and areas occupied by the Brigade and attachment during Operation GADSDEN or mentioned in this report:

Axis APPLE XT1359 - XT0372

Axis PEACH XT0372 - WT9869

(3) For extracts of OPORD and FRAGO's see ANNEX B.

(4) For a list of unit commanders see ANNEX C.

(5) For areas cleared by the Brigade during Operation GADSDEN see ANNEX E.

b. Phase I (1 February). For period 1-3 February see APPENDIX 1 (OPORD 2-67 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(1) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp escorted Bde HQ elements and Btry B, 3/82 Arty by convoy to XT128635 where a Bde Fwd CP was established. Elements remained at the CP as a security force during the entire operation.

(2) 3/82 Arty: At 1240 hrs Btry B departed TAY NINH escorted by F Trp to the Bde Fwd CP. Btry B was laid and ready to fire at 1430 hrs.

c. Phase II (2 February).

(1) 1/5 (M) Inf: The Bn departed TAY NINH at 0632 hrs and attacked along Axis APPLE to the bridge site vic XT055684. Lead elements linked up with Co A, 4/31 Inf at the site at 1050 hrs. After

the bridge was airlifted to the site and constructed, the Bn continued its attack and secured Obj 2 and an LZ for the helilift of 4/31 Inf (-). Lead elements arrived at Obj 2 at 1550 hrs, all elements closed that location

(2) 4/31 Inf: Co A conducted a combat assault at 07?7 hrs and secured a bridge site along Axis APPLE vic XT055684. At 1617 hrs Co B was airlifted from TAY NINH to Obj 2 which was secured by the 1/5 (M) Inf. At 1645 hrs Co C less one platoon was airlifted to the Bde Fwd CP to act as the Bde RRF. Co A remained at the bridge site and established a perimeter securing the East side of the stream from XT053681 to XT056685. Co B with the Recon plat attached, secured Obj with the 1/5 (M) Inf. Co B's perimeter extended from XT???728 to XT033720. The Bn CP was located at XT034719.

(3) 3/82 Arty; Btry B remained in support at the Bde Fwd CP. Btry A was airlifted to Obj 2 at 1625 hrs.

(4) 175th Engrs: One platoon was airlifted to the bridge site vic XT055684 at 0810 hrs. Bridging material was airlifted to the site at 1010 hrs. The first track from 1/5 (M) Inf crossed the bridge at 1231 hrs. At 1927 hrs the platoon extracted from the site.

d. Phase III (3 February).

(1) 2/1 Inf: At 1249 hrs the Bn (-) was airlifted to an LZ at Obj 4 vic WT975696. All lifts were completed at 1515 hrs. the

LZ was secured by the 1/5 (M) Inf. A perimeter was established and the CP was located at WT978698. The Bn was responsible for the area north of the road in Obj 4 and 1/5 (M) Inf was responsible for the area to the south. The Fire Coordination Line was the road through the center of Obj 4 WT 976698 to WT982698). AT 1330 hrs two helicopters received hits from the SW side of the LZ, fire was AW. Elements searched the area with negative results.

(2) 4/31 Inf: At 0812 hrs Co A was airlifted from the bridge site to Obj 2, closing that location at 0841 hrs. Co B provided security for Btry A, 3/82 Arty. Co A conducted S&D operations vic XT033744. At 1155 hrs Co A vic XT032746 discovered a fence, four wires high, 300 meters long with punji stakes around the fence. At 1655 hrs the Bde S3 notified the Bn to have Co A return to the Bn CP.

(3) 1/5 (M) Inf: The Bn commenced an attack from Obj 2 to Obj 4 at 0818 hrs. At 0900 hrs the Scout Platoon was dispatched to sweep the flank of the Bn. At 0906 hrs vic XT014707 the lead APC of the platoon hit an AT mine with negative casualties. While repairing the damaged

NND9907608..platoon observed and engaged 4 VC with negative results. At ............WT995699 Co A found a TA/312 telephone and engaged 1 VC with negative results. At 1330 hrs Co B vic WT999698 received fire from a 57 RR while repairing a track which had broken down; results were 2 US WHA.

At 1221 hrs the Scout Platoon was dispatched to assist Co B and while enroute vic XT999698 received RR fire resulting in 2 US WHA. Fire was returned and the platoon proceeded to link-up with Co B. Co C at 1459 hrs vic WT999701 had an APC hit an AT mine resulting in 13 US WHA. At 1510 hrs the Scout Platoon received heavy SA fire from an estimated 15-20 VC vic XT000697. At this time the Scout platoon had elms Co B, Co A and the Security Platoon under its control. At 1520 hrs the Scout Platoon had an APC hit by a RR round and the APC was surrounded by the VC who were temporarily able to occupy the vehicle. The APC was recovered at 1655 hrs. Contact was broken at 1550 hrs. During this period the Bn sustained 4 US KHA and 24 US WHA. Enemy losses were 4 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).

Co A secured an LZ for 2/1 Inf at 1201 hrs vic Obj 4. Elements of the Bn closed the new Bn CP vic WT977698 at 1750 hrs.

(4) 3/82 Arty: Btry C was airlifted to Obj 2. Btry A also was located at Obj 2 and Btry B at the Bde FWD CP.

c. Phase IV (4 February - 14 February).

(1) 4 February. See APPENDIX 2 (FRAGO 1 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn commenced S&D operations at 0859 hrs with Co A and Co C in zone vic Obj 4 - west to the Cambodian Border, north to the 72 grid line and south to the 68 grid line. At 0548 hrs the Bn

perimeter received approximately 50 rds of 82mm mortar from vic WT973703 following stand-to. Mortar Plat, Co B returned fire with 71 rds of 81 mm mortars. Friendly casualties were 4 US KHA and 22 US WHA; results of friendly fire unknown. S&D operations by Co A and Co C uncovered VC base camps, bunkers, structures and trenches.

(b) 4/31 Inf: assumed responsibility for the security of the FSB at Obj 2. At 0805 hrs 4/31 Inf commenced an overland move from Obj 2 to Obj 5. Prior to the move Co C was airlifted from the Bde

Fwd CP to join the Bn. The Bn closed into their new location at Obj 5 vic XT813684 at 1422 hrs. Co A at 1430 hrs received SA fire from a bunker at XT015682. The fire was returned but the company had to pull back when artillery and airstrikes were called on the area. At 1530 hrs a squad from Co B was engaged by a VC force of unknown size resulting in 1 US KHA and 3 US WHA. TAC air was again called in on the area at 1545 hrs. At 1850 hrs Co C at XT016683 received sporadic SA fire resulting in 2 US WHA. After DUST OFF of casualties a claymore was detonated against friendly position,s fire was returned with unknown results. Total casualties for hte days operation were 1 US KHA and 12 US WHA.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf; The Bn conducted S&D operations in zone bounded by the following coordinates: WT987704 to XT005710 to XT 005670 to WT986670 to WT983687 to WT989696. At 0910 hrs Co B uncovered

NND909608..d base camp at coordinates WT976706. At 1520 hrs Co C ...........engaged 2 VC at 5 meters resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). Among the items captured were 1 Chicom rifle, 7 rds 57 HEAT ammo and a tripod for an AK-47.

(2) 5 February. See APPENDIX 3 (FRAGO 2 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn commenced S&D operations in zone at 0920 hrs from WT978698 to WT973691. Co A and Co C conducted S&D operations enroute with negative contact. Co C discovered one vacant base camp vic WT976688.

(b) 4/31 Inf: Bn commenced S&D operations in zone vic Obj. At 0920 hrs the Bn assumed OPCON of Co C, 1/5 (M) Inf which attacked south from Obj 4 to link-up with 4/31 Inf. Co C was later diverted of its mission to link-up with the Bn when the 1/5 (M) Inf made contact. At 2035 hrs an ambush patrol of Co C vic XT017679 engaged an estimated VC patrol resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC and 5 VC KIA (POSS).

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf; The Bn (-) attacked from Obj 4 to Obj 5 along Axis PLUM commencing at 1025 hrs. Co C attacked along Axis GRAPE enroute to link-up with 4/31 Inf. Co C was later diverted from this

mission when the Bn (-) made contact. At 0812 hrs Co A ambush at XT969696 received fire from across the river in Cambodia. The ambush returned fire and the action resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC). One body fell in the river and the other was hanging in a tree, neither body could be recovered. The ambush continued receiving fire until 0830 hrs then they were retrieved by Co A. Co A departed the Bn CP at 1005 hrs behind Co B enroute to Obj 6. At 1033 hrs vic WT969680 the company received small arms fire from their left flank; fire was returned with negative results. At 1244 hrs Co A passed through Co B and assumed the lead vic WT979622. At 1335 hrs vic WT983666 Co A engaged a VC force of unknown size and began receiving RPG-2 fire, rifle grenades and SA. Two APC's were hit by RPG-2 fire and one by a mine. Contact was broken at 1735 hrs with the following results; 1 US APC destroyed, 2 US KHA, 18 US WHA. VC losses were 15 VC KIA (BC). Captured were 1-M-79 grenade launcher, 1 - 7.62 heavy MG w/mount,

2 carbines, 2 Chicom assault rifles, 50 lbs of documents and 30 lbs of clothing. Elements closed the Bn CP vic WT996665 at 1937 hrs.

(3) 6 February. See APPENDIX 4 (FRAGO w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf; Bn moved from vic WT972691 at 0800 hrs and established blocking positions from WT976689 to WT981697. Co C arrived at their blocking position vic WT981695 at 1037 hrs, Co D arrived