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Operation Gadsden

The cover page has the unit patches of the "Charger Knight on a horse" and the "Burning Worm" for a decorative effect.

Transcribed by Leslie Hines ADVA historian, Vietnam era for the year 2001. Thank You Leslie

Confidential

OPERATION

(charger) GADSDEN (196th LIB Patch)

----CHARGERS--------

AFTER ACTION REPORT

196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

1 FEB - 21 FEB 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

APO San Francisco 96256

AVBFSC 15 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

THRU: Commanding General

25th Infantry Division

APO US Forces 96225

TO: Commander

US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

ATTN: J332

APO US Forces 96243

1. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Operation GADSDEN was a Search

and Destroy operation.

2.(U) DATES OF OPERATION: 1 February 1967 - 21 February 1967.

3.(U) LOCATION: TAY NINH Province.

4.(U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

5.(U) REPORTING OFFICER: Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles.

6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry

b. 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry

c. 1st Battalion (M), 5th Infantry (Attached)

d. F Troop, 17th Cav

e. 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery

f. 196th Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

7. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Supporting Forces during Operation GADSDEN:

(1) USAF: During Operation GADSDEN air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers.

(2) Army Aviation:

(a) Units:

1. 196th Bde Avn Detachment

2. 25th Avn Bn

3. 10th Avn Bn

4. 145th Avn Bn

5. 11th Avn Bn

(b) Helicopter assets were utilized for command and control, airmobile assaults, extractions and repositions, reconnaissance, resupply and medical evacuation.

(3) Artillery Support: 3/82 Artillery was in direct support during the entire operation.

(4) 8th Support Battalion: Provided continuous resupply of all classes.

(5) 175th Engineer Co: Provided direct support during the entire operation.

(6) Signal:

(a) 196th Brigade Communications Platoon.

(b) 156th Signal Platoon.

(7) 48th Scout Dog Platoon: Utilized on patrols and ambushes.

b. Performance of Supporting Arms and Services.

(1) Artillery Support: Artillery fires from a series of fire support bases were used throughout the entire operation in offensive and defensive roles. Artillery elements were moved by CH-47 (Chinook)

helicopters or convoys simultaneously with movement of the forward defense bases.

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Utilization of Artillery:

1. Fires in support of ground troops in contact.

2. Artillery preparations created a diversion for airmobile assaults when false preparations were fired on likely landing areas adjacent to actual landing zones.

3. An extensive H&I program was conducted throughout the operation on known VC locations, used trails and suspected VC mortar firing positions.

4. Landing zone preparations and suppressive fires during airmobile assaults and extractions.

5. Areas in front of advancing maneuver elements on search and destroy operations were softened by Artillery fires.

6. High air bursts with white phosphorous were employed to assist patrols navigating through dense terrain, both during daylight and during the hours of darkness when map inspection was not practical.

7. Defensive concentrations, integrated with mortar fires, were fired in and around the forward defense bases.

(b) Enemy Losses from Artillery:

VC KIA (BC) 4

VC KIA (POSS) 2

Secondary Explosions 5

Foxholes Destroyed 3

Bunkers Destroyed 3

Sampans Destroyed 6

H&I Missions 1925 missions 4472 rds

Support Missions 394 missions 9880 rds

(d) Artillery Ammunition Expenditures:

HE: 13,797 WP: 606 ILL: 49

BATTERY GRID DATE OCCUPIED MEANS

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT129638 1 Feb 67 Convoy

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT033718 2 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT033718 3 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT039647 12 Feb 67 CH-47

CONFIDENTIAL

BATTERY GRID DATE OCCUPIED MEANS

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT039478 12 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT127609 15 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT055590 15 Feb 67 CH-47

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT313583 16 Feb 67 Convoy

(2) Army Aviation:

(a) Utilization of Army Aviation:

1. Command and control for airmobile assaults and extractions.

2. Aerial reconnaissance.

3. Combat airmobile assaults, repositions and extractions.

4. Adjust Artillery fires.

5. Resupply into operation objective areas.

6. Assist DUST OFF aircraft in emergency MEDEVAC situations.

(b) Results of Army Aviation: Aviation support was an important factor in accomplishing the assigned missions in the operational area. This support provided the Brigade with a high degree of flexibility and mobility. Helicopters enabled the Brigade to spend maximum time in the objective area and, when considered advantageous, expeditiously to dis-place to other targets of opportunity. Through the maximum utilization of helicopter assets the Brigade was able to continually harass the VC throughout the Brigade's AO. helicopter assaults varied from rifle platoon to battalion size airmobile operations. Gun ships were invaluable in providing suppressive fires against VC ground fire.

(3) USAF:

(a) During Operation GADSDEN the Air Force flew twenty-eight (28) immediate air strikes. The majority of these immediate strikes were flown in close support of units that had little experience

with close bombing. After two missions were completed the ground commanders had nothing but praise for close air support.

(b) For the first time the Brigade used air strikes to prep an area where a bridge was to be implaced to span a river. Tactical bombing of this area was able to not only to bomb bunkers and trenches near the crossing, but also to burn heavy elephant grass and bamboo at the approaches to the site.

CONFIDENTIAL

Preplans Requested 154

Combat Proofs 15

Preplans Flown 96

Immediates Flown 28

Number of Sorties 328

Divert Flights 8

(d) Results of Tactical Air Strikes:

VC KBA (BC) 63

VC KBA (POSS) 142

Bunkers Damaged 25

Bunkers Destroyed 80

Structures Damaged 74

Supply Caches Destroyed 4

Oxcarts Destroyed 5

Trench Destroyed 365 meters

Trench Uncovered 795 meters

Sampans Destroyed 5

Secondary Fires 11

Foxholes Uncovered 37

Foxholes Destroyed 50

Tunnel Entrances Uncovered 20

Boat Docks Destroyed 1

AW Positions 8

(e) There were 5 B-52 strikes flown in the Brigade's AO during the period 1-21 February. They were :

MISSION NO DATE STRUCK AREA COVERED

TROPIC 3 2 February 67 XT0369

TROPIC 4 2 February 67 XT0373

TROPIC 6 3 February 67 WT9871

TROPIC 7 3 February 67 WT9868

LIGHTNING 9 6 February 67 WT8863

(4) Engineer Support: During Operation GADSDEN the 175th Engineer Company provided continuous support to the Brigade. The company's primary mission was to construct tactical bridging as required in the Brigade's AO. Engineer support during Operation GADSDEN:

DATE LOCATION MISSION

2 February 67 XT064663 Constructed a bridge utilizing Light Tactical Raft components. All personnel and bridging were lifted into the area and extracted by CH-47 (Chinook) helicopters.

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE LOCATION MISSION

3 February 67 WT976698 Constructed a M4T6 dry span bridge. All personnel 4 February 67 and bridging were lifted into the area and extracted by CH-47 Chinook.

15 February 67 XT054594 Constructed a bridge utilizing Light Tactical Raft components. All personnel and bridging were lifted into the area and extracted by CH-47 Chinook.

(5) 8th Support Battalion: (For a more detailed summary See ANNEX D)

a. The 8th Support Battalion provided the Brigade continuous support during Operation GADSDEN.

(b) The Forward Logistical Operation Center was established in the Bn Hqs and was operational at 020700 hrs February 67. During the period 2-16 February the resupply by both air and ground transportation was accomplished:

Class I 169,124 lbs

Class II and IV 68,821 lbs

Class III 95,815 lbs

Class V 367,145 lbs

Water 285,978 lbs

Misc 22,489 lbs

(c) There was a total of 462 tons of supplies moved during the operation in support of Brigade units and attachments. Twentyeight (28) tons of supplies were moved overland to the Brigade Forward CP

by ground transportation.

(d) Units in the field received at least one hot A ration meal per day. Ice was sent to the field units through normal unit resupply missions. During the "TET" truce period units were issued three A ration meals per day.

(e) There were 859 Huey sorties and 85 CH-47 (Chinook) sorties utilized for resupply during the operation. No tactical missions were delayed or cancelled for lack of logistical support.

(6) Signal Support:

(a) An area communications center was established at the Brigade Forward Command Post. Initially this was strictly a terminus

for the Division system, but as the operation went on this center became a radio relay switching point servicing non-brigade units as well as terminating the 196th Command Communications. The FM command radio nets

CONFIDENTIAL

..NND 909608...secure facilitating the passing of tactical information. High frequency radio teletype service was effectively employed between Division and Brigade.

(b) Activities of Subordinate Units:

1. 196th Brigade Communications Platoon:

a. Provided a tactical message center at the Bde Fwd CP.

b. Established and operated the high frequency radio teletype network.

c. The FM command nets in the tactical operation center were installed with voice

security equipment.

2. 156th Signal Platoon (Forward Area):

a. Installed a VHF terminal at the Brigade Forward Command Post and maintained a

terminal at TAY NINH.

b. Operated the Brigade switchboard.

c. As a training vehicle established a radio relay system between Division Artillery and

the 3rd Brigade, 4th Division. This provided lateral communication between major

units and developed operator proficiency with an eye toward more mobile situations.

3. Provisional Platoon, B Co 36 Signal:

a. Continued the improvement of base camp communications at TAY NINH.

b. Terminated the local distribution of tactical circuits in the TAY NINH complex.

(7) 48th Scout Dog Platoon: Scout dog teams were effective-ly used with ambush patrols and

with point squads during movement.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: See ANNEX A.

9. (C) MISSION: The 25th Infantry Division directed the 196th Light Infantry Brigade to attack in zone to

find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations and to block infiltration routes across the

Cambodian Border during the TET truce period.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: For the purpose of this report Operation GADSDEN has been

broken into five phases. (See ANNEX B) for the extracts of the OPORD and FRAGO's governing this

operation).

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Phase I (1 February). Bde HQ, Btry B, 3/82 Arty and F Troop, 17th Cav moved overland from TAY NINH base camp and established a FWD CP at XT128635.

b. Phase II (2 February). Co A, 4/31 Inf conducted a combat assault and secured a bridge crossing site at XT055684. The 175th Engineers with bridging material were then airlifted to the site where

they constructed the bridge. 1/5 (M) Inf attacked along Axis APPLE, crossed the bridge built by the Engineers, and proceeded to secure Obj 2 at XT0372. After Obj 2 had been secured Co B, 4/31 and Btry A, 3/82 Arty were airlifted to that location and established a FSB. Co C, 4/31 Inf was airlifted to the Bde Fwd CP where it was utilized as the Brigade RRF.

c. Phase III (3 February). Co A, 4/31 Inf was airlifted from the bridge site to Obj 2 where it joined the Bn (-). 1/5 (M) Inf attacked from Obj 2 and secured Obj 4 vic WT9869 After Obj 4 was secured, 2/1

Inf was airlifted from TAY NINH base camp to an LZ at coordinates WT975696. Btry C, 3/82 Arty was airlifted from TAY NINH to Obj 2 where it joined Btry A.

d. Phase IV (4 February - 14 February). Bde units and attach-ments conducted extensive S&D operations in zone and established blocking positions to prevent VC exfiltration to Cambodia during the TET truce period. Artillery batteries were airlifted to new FSB's when the maneuver of ground troops necessitated the move.

e. Phase V (15 February - 17 February) Bde units and attach-ments returned to TAY NINH.

f. Phase VI (18 February - 21 February) The 3d Bn, 21st Inf conducted a combat assault vic WT9954 to search for VC grave sites. The Bn was extracted and returned to TAY NINH on 19 February. The 25th Infantry Division terminated Operation GADSDEN 212400H February 1967.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. General.

(1) Summary of Operation GADSDEN.

(a) Operation GADSDEN confirmed the location of elements of the 271st Regt, 680th Training Regt, 70th Security Regt and COS II rear services in the Brigades AO. These elements have been carried

by the order of battle agencies as being located in northern War Zone C, but had not been previously confirmed.

(b) The VC reaction to major US operations continued to be very evasive. It is believed the majority of the 271st Regiment moved across the Cambodian Border following the initial logistical build-

up and air strikes. The VC continued to display a negative desire to engage US or Free World Forces in strength. The VC encountered were either

CONFIDENTIAL

..NND909608..ng forces, reconnaissance elements or misoriented exfiltration

groups.

(c) Although no major enemy units were believed to have been destroyed by Brigade units, the fact remains that the VC were forced to abandon a major base area and exfiltrate to another safe area.

The reorganization phase for a guerilla unit that has been forced to resort to this tactic is usually length. Many soldiers will never rejoin the unit. Key installations that were destroyed will be difficult to rebuild to their prior status.

(2) Prominent locations and areas occupied by the Brigade and attachment during Operation GADSDEN or mentioned in this report:

AO VICTOR WT9954

AP MO CONG XT1361

Axis APPLE XT1359 - XT0372

Axis PEACH XT0372 - WT9869

Bde Fwd CP XT1263

FSB CHARLIE XT0172

FSB DELTA XT0364

FSB FOXTROT XT1160

LOGO WT9772

NUI BA DEN XT2858

Obj 2 XT0372

Obj 3 WT9774

Obj 4 WT9869

Obj 5 XT0168

Obj 6 WT9966

Obj 7 WT9862

Obj 8 XT0559

TAY NINH XT1651

TRAI BI XT1170

XOM GIUA WT5705

(3) For extracts of OPORD and FRAGO's see ANNEX B.

(4) For a list of unit commanders see ANNEX C.

(5) For areas cleared by the Brigade during Operation GADSDEN see ANNEX E.

b. Phase I (1 February). For period 1-3 February see APPENDIX 1 (OPORD 2-67 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(1) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp escorted Bde HQ elements and Btry B, 3/82 Arty by convoy to XT128635 where a Bde Fwd CP was established. Elements remained at the CP as a security force during the entire operation.

(2) 3/82 Arty: At 1240 hrs Btry B departed TAY NINH escorted by F Trp to the Bde Fwd CP. Btry B was laid and ready to fire at 1430 hrs.

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Phase II (2 February).

(1) 1/5 (M) Inf: The Bn departed TAY NINH at 0632 hrs and attacked along Axis APPLE to the bridge site vic XT055684. Lead elements linked up with Co A, 4/31 Inf at the site at 1050 hrs. After

the bridge was airlifted to the site and constructed, the Bn continued its attack and secured Obj 2 and an LZ for the helilift of 4/31 Inf (-). Lead elements arrived at Obj 2 at 1550 hrs, all elements closed that location

at 1640 hrs.

(2) 4/31 Inf: Co A conducted a combat assault at 07?7 hrs and secured a bridge site along Axis APPLE vic XT055684. At 1617 hrs Co B was airlifted from TAY NINH to Obj 2 which was secured by the 1/5 (M) Inf. At 1645 hrs Co C less one platoon was airlifted to the Bde Fwd CP to act as the Bde RRF. Co A remained at the bridge site and established a perimeter securing the East side of the stream from XT053681 to XT056685. Co B with the Recon plat attached, secured Obj with the 1/5 (M) Inf. Co B's perimeter extended from XT???728 to XT033720. The Bn CP was located at XT034719.

(3) 3/82 Arty; Btry B remained in support at the Bde Fwd CP. Btry A was airlifted to Obj 2 at 1625 hrs.

(4) 175th Engrs: One platoon was airlifted to the bridge site vic XT055684 at 0810 hrs. Bridging material was airlifted to the site at 1010 hrs. The first track from 1/5 (M) Inf crossed the bridge at 1231 hrs. At 1927 hrs the platoon extracted from the site.

d. Phase III (3 February).

(1) 2/1 Inf: At 1249 hrs the Bn (-) was airlifted to an LZ at Obj 4 vic WT975696. All lifts were completed at 1515 hrs. the

LZ was secured by the 1/5 (M) Inf. A perimeter was established and the CP was located at WT978698. The Bn was responsible for the area north of the road in Obj 4 and 1/5 (M) Inf was responsible for the area to the south. The Fire Coordination Line was the road through the center of Obj 4 WT 976698 to WT982698). AT 1330 hrs two helicopters received hits from the SW side of the LZ, fire was AW. Elements searched the area with negative results.

(2) 4/31 Inf: At 0812 hrs Co A was airlifted from the bridge site to Obj 2, closing that location at 0841 hrs. Co B provided security for Btry A, 3/82 Arty. Co A conducted S&D operations vic XT033744. At 1155 hrs Co A vic XT032746 discovered a fence, four wires high, 300 meters long with punji stakes around the fence. At 1655 hrs the Bde S3 notified the Bn to have Co A return to the Bn CP.

(3) 1/5 (M) Inf: The Bn commenced an attack from Obj 2 to Obj 4 at 0818 hrs. At 0900 hrs the Scout Platoon was dispatched to sweep the flank of the Bn. At 0906 hrs vic XT014707 the lead APC of the platoon hit an AT mine with negative casualties. While repairing the damaged

CONFIDENTIAL

NND9907608..platoon observed and engaged 4 VC with negative results. At ............WT995699 Co A found a TA/312 telephone and engaged 1 VC with negative results. At 1330 hrs Co B vic WT999698 received fire from a 57 RR while repairing a track which had broken down; results were 2 US WHA.

At 1221 hrs the Scout Platoon was dispatched to assist Co B and while enroute vic XT999698 received RR fire resulting in 2 US WHA. Fire was returned and the platoon proceeded to link-up with Co B. Co C at 1459 hrs vic WT999701 had an APC hit an AT mine resulting in 13 US WHA. At 1510 hrs the Scout Platoon received heavy SA fire from an estimated 15-20 VC vic XT000697. At this time the Scout platoon had elms Co B, Co A and the Security Platoon under its control. At 1520 hrs the Scout Platoon had an APC hit by a RR round and the APC was surrounded by the VC who were temporarily able to occupy the vehicle. The APC was recovered at 1655 hrs. Contact was broken at 1550 hrs. During this period the Bn sustained 4 US KHA and 24 US WHA. Enemy losses were 4 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).

Co A secured an LZ for 2/1 Inf at 1201 hrs vic Obj 4. Elements of the Bn closed the new Bn CP vic WT977698 at 1750 hrs.

(4) 3/82 Arty: Btry C was airlifted to Obj 2. Btry A also was located at Obj 2 and Btry B at the Bde FWD CP.

c. Phase IV (4 February - 14 February).

(1) 4 February. See APPENDIX 2 (FRAGO 1 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn commenced S&D operations at 0859 hrs with Co A and Co C in zone vic Obj 4 - west to the Cambodian Border, north to the 72 grid line and south to the 68 grid line. At 0548 hrs the Bn

perimeter received approximately 50 rds of 82mm mortar from vic WT973703 following stand-to. Mortar Plat, Co B returned fire with 71 rds of 81 mm mortars. Friendly casualties were 4 US KHA and 22 US WHA; results of friendly fire unknown. S&D operations by Co A and Co C uncovered VC base camps, bunkers, structures and trenches.

(b) 4/31 Inf: assumed responsibility for the security of the FSB at Obj 2. At 0805 hrs 4/31 Inf commenced an overland move from Obj 2 to Obj 5. Prior to the move Co C was airlifted from the Bde

Fwd CP to join the Bn. The Bn closed into their new location at Obj 5 vic XT813684 at 1422 hrs. Co A at 1430 hrs received SA fire from a bunker at XT015682. The fire was returned but the company had to pull back when artillery and airstrikes were called on the area. At 1530 hrs a squad from Co B was engaged by a VC force of unknown size resulting in 1 US KHA and 3 US WHA. TAC air was again called in on the area at 1545 hrs. At 1850 hrs Co C at XT016683 received sporadic SA fire resulting in 2 US WHA. After DUST OFF of casualties a claymore was detonated against friendly position,s fire was returned with unknown results. Total casualties for hte days operation were 1 US KHA and 12 US WHA.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf; The Bn conducted S&D operations in zone bounded by the following coordinates: WT987704 to XT005710 to XT 005670 to WT986670 to WT983687 to WT989696. At 0910 hrs Co B uncovered

CONFIDENTIAL

NND909608..d base camp at coordinates WT976706. At 1520 hrs Co C ...........engaged 2 VC at 5 meters resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). Among the items captured were 1 Chicom rifle, 7 rds 57 HEAT ammo and a tripod for an AK-47.

(2) 5 February. See APPENDIX 3 (FRAGO 2 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn commenced S&D operations in zone at 0920 hrs from WT978698 to WT973691. Co A and Co C conducted S&D operations enroute with negative contact. Co C discovered one vacant base camp vic WT976688.

(b) 4/31 Inf: Bn commenced S&D operations in zone vic Obj. At 0920 hrs the Bn assumed OPCON of Co C, 1/5 (M) Inf which attacked south from Obj 4 to link-up with 4/31 Inf. Co C was later diverted of its mission to link-up with the Bn when the 1/5 (M) Inf made contact. At 2035 hrs an ambush patrol of Co C vic XT017679 engaged an estimated VC patrol resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC and 5 VC KIA (POSS).

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf; The Bn (-) attacked from Obj 4 to Obj 5 along Axis PLUM commencing at 1025 hrs. Co C attacked along Axis GRAPE enroute to link-up with 4/31 Inf. Co C was later diverted from this

mission when the Bn (-) made contact. At 0812 hrs Co A ambush at XT969696 received fire from across the river in Cambodia. The ambush returned fire and the action resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC). One body fell in the river and the other was hanging in a tree, neither body could be recovered. The ambush continued receiving fire until 0830 hrs then they were retrieved by Co A. Co A departed the Bn CP at 1005 hrs behind Co B enroute to Obj 6. At 1033 hrs vic WT969680 the company received small arms fire from their left flank; fire was returned with negative results. At 1244 hrs Co A passed through Co B and assumed the lead vic WT979622. At 1335 hrs vic WT983666 Co A engaged a VC force of unknown size and began receiving RPG-2 fire, rifle grenades and SA. Two APC's were hit by RPG-2 fire and one by a mine. Contact was broken at 1735 hrs with the following results; 1 US APC destroyed, 2 US KHA, 18 US WHA. VC losses were 15 VC KIA (BC). Captured were 1-M-79 grenade launcher, 1 - 7.62 heavy MG w/mount,

2 carbines, 2 Chicom assault rifles, 50 lbs of documents and 30 lbs of clothing. Elements closed the Bn CP vic WT996665 at 1937 hrs.

(3) 6 February. See APPENDIX 4 (FRAGO w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf; Bn moved from vic WT972691 at 0800 hrs and established blocking positions from WT976689 to WT981697. Co C arrived at their blocking position vic WT981695 at 1037 hrs, Co D arrived

vic WT981695 at 1158 hrs. Both elements had negative contact on their move to the blocking positions. One Plat, Co D remained to secure bridge site vic WT976698. At 1325 hrs the bridge was extracted and the platoon moved to link-up with the main body. At 1412 hrs the platoon vic WT979703 engaged 2 VC, contact was broken at 1418 hrs with unknown results. The

CONFIDENTIAL

..ND907608..ed the main 1530 hrs. Co C and Co D linked up at ............ WT980691 and established a two company perimeter for thenight.

(b) 4/31 Inf: Bn moved overland at 0725 hrs and established a blocking position from WT991680 to WT985694. At 2200 hrs Co D vic XT155523 observed 4-5 individuals moving to their front.

The unit fired a hand flare and the individuals disappeared. Bn CP located at WT986686.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn (-) moved overland at 0835 hrs from vic WT995664 and conducted S&D operations in the southern portion of AO VICTOR. Recon Plat screened from the coordinating point to WT

986657. At 1015 hrs Co B vic WT981667 discovered 4 VC bodies resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC). Captured equipment uncovered in the area included 50 lbs of documents, 3 Chicom grenades, 1 PRC-25 radio, 1 PRC-6 radio, 1 US carbine and 1 AK-47 rifle. At 1240 hrs Co C vic WT982657 uncovered one VC body in a freshly dug grave. At 1400 hrs Co B vic WT984670 uncovered 3 dead VC KBA. At 1500 hrs Co B vic WT983668 found 2 dead VC who had been killed by SA. At 2101 hrs the Bn received 2 incoming mortar rounds from the northeast. Fire was returned by mortar and artillery fire with unknown results. Bn CP located at WT995665.

(4) 7 February. See APPENDIX 5 (FRAGO 4 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn commenced S&D operations in zone vic WT975695 at 0845 hrs. At 1000 hrs Co A vic WT969692 uncovered 5 new graves and 30 old graves, cause of death could not be determined. At 1508 hrs Co A received one command detonated claymore resulting in 2 US KHA and 5 US WHA at coordinates WT963688. Company A found claymore legs with a wire hooked to a tree and running down into the river. Claymore was detonated from the Cambodia side of the river vic WT963687. Bn CP located

at WT972691.

(b) 4/31 Inf: Bn improved LZ in OP area and conducted S&D operations in zone. There was negative enemy contact throughout the day. Bn CP located at WT986687.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn (-) - Co A and Co C - commenced S&D operations in zone vic WT9868 at 0915 hrs. Co B departed the Bn base at 0940 hrs to exploit B-52 strike vic WT995685. At 1405 hrs Co A

vic WT972678 received 2 rifle grenades and SA fire from an estimated VC plat vic WT972678 resulting in 1 US WHA. At 1425 hrs Co A again made contact with the VC and began to receive SA and rifle grenades. VC were wearing khaki uniforms. Gunships were requested and on station at 1547 hrs. At 1450 hrs vic WT974685 contact was broken, but later was reestablish-ed at 1501 hrs vic WT964670. Air strikes were placed in the area resulting in 20 VC KBA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (BC). After the strikes Co A moved into the area and found 18 tons of rice which was destroyed. All elements closed the Bn CP vic WT995664 by 1906hrs

CONFIDENTIAL

NND907608.... (5) 8 February. See APPENDIX 6 (FRAGO 5 w/Overlay) to .............

(a) Bde units and attachments began observance of the TET truce period at 0700 hrs. During this period units conducted saturation patrolling in zone, improved defensive positions, conducted training and maintained an increased state of security and surveillance in zone.

(b) 2/1 Inf: Bn commenced operations at 0750 hrs in zone in accordance with rules governing the TET truce period. Bn CP located at WT972691.

(c) 4/31 Inf: Bn commenced operations at 0832 hrs 1310 hrs Co B vic WT982685 received 1 rd SA fire resulting in 1 US WHA. Fire was returned with SA with unknown results.

(d) 1/4 (M) Inf: Bn commenced operations at 0910 hrs. At 1035 hrs Co A at WT982666 found 10 VC bodies, 5 killed by SA, 4 found in a bomb crater and 1 in a covered bunker. At 1200 hrs Co A vic WT982666 found 4 VC bodies killed by SA. At 1335 hrs Co B vic XT010668 received 3 rds SA fire. At 1540 hrs Co B vic XT010688 received AW fire from an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 US KHA. Fire was returned with SA and M-79 fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). VC was wearing a blue and grey uniform. Bn CP located at WT995664.

(6) 9 February. Bde units and attachments continued observ-ance of the TET truce period. No enemy contact was reported.

(7) 10 February. Bde units and attachments continued observance of the TET truce period. During this period there were two incidents of enemy contact. They were:

(a) At 0207 hrs and LP of 1/5 (M) Inf received 1 hand grenade vic WT993664. Fire was returned with 1 rd 81mm illumination and 9 rds 81mm HE with unknown results.

(b) At 1315 hrs Recon Plat, 1/5 (M) Inf received 10 rifle grenades vic WT989650. Fire was returned with SA and MG with unknown results.

(8) 11 February. Bde units and attachments continued observance of the TET truce period. There was one report of enemy contact. At 1331 hrs a CH-47 loading vic WT973693 received 1 rd of SA fire. Gunships were alerted and fired into area vic WT967697 after they received heavy AW fire from that area.

..ANNEX B. GROUP(4) 12 February... SEE APPENDIX 7 (FRAGO 6 w/Overlay to DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS... DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS......

CONFIDENTIAL

...NND909608.. (a) Bde units and attachments terminated observance of the TET truce period at 0700 hrs.

(b) 2/1 Inf: Bn was airlifted to an LZ secured by 1/5 (M) Inf vic XT025648. All lifts were completed by 0929 hrs. Co C and Co D moved overland to secure FSB-D vic XT037649 arriving at that location at 1045 hrs. Co B conducted S&D operations SE of the LZ and joined the Bn (-) at 1647 hrs. Bn CP located at FSB-D vic XT024699.

(c) 4/31 Inf: AT 0800 hrs the Bn commenced operations moving overland enroute to FSB-D which was secured by 2/1 Inf. The movement went without incident and by nightfall the Bn with Co A and Co

C established a CP at XT025684. Co B was located at XT024677.

(d) 1/5 (M) Inf; Bn HQ and Co A departed Bn CP at 0949 hrs and closed Obj 7 at 1547 hrs. Co A and Co C departed the Bn CP at 0730 hrs and secured an LZ vic FSB-D for the airlift of 2/1 Inf. LZ was secured at 0829 hrs. At 1140 hrs both companies departed FSB-D for Obj 7 closing that location at 1620 hrs. At 2300 hrs the Bn received 1 rifle grenade vic WT984616. At 2315 hrs 6 more rifle grenades were

received at the same location.

(e) 3/82 Arty: Btry A and Btry C were airlifted by CH-47 (Chinook) helicopter from Obj 2 to an LZ vic XT039647. LZ was secured by 2/1 Inf.

(10) 13 February.

(a) 2/1 Inf: At 0815 hrs the Bn commenced S&D operations vic FSB-D at XT036649.

(b) 4/31 Inf at 0755 hrs the Bn continued its attack to link-up with 2/1st Inf vic FSB-D. Lead elements arrived at FSB D at 1545 hrs. At 1325 hrs Co A vic XT010688 found 5 lbs of documents. The Bn CP was established at XT038649 with the rifle companies in perimeter around the FSB.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn commenced S&D operations in zone SW of Obj 7 vic WT990620 at 0815 hrs. Bn elements continued to find and destroy VC base camps and cache sites in zone. At 1515 hrs Co D vic WT995624 uncovered a VC base camp. At 2015 hrs the Bn perimeter received 5 rds of 81mm mortar fire.

(11) 14 February: See APPENDIX 8 (FRAGO 7 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf Bn conducted S&D operations from FSB-D south to bridge site vic Obj 8. Bn CP was located 200 meters east of the bridge site at coordinates XT0545?4.

(b) 4/31 Inf; Bn remained at FSB D and conducted S&D operations around the FSB.

CONFIDENTIAL

NND907608..... (c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone and established a new CP at XT027566.

f. Phase V (15 February - 17 February)

(1) 15 February.

(a) Bde HQ: Bde CP and Btry B 3/82 Arty departed Bde Fwd CP and closed TAY NINH base camp at 1445 hrs.

(b) 2/1 Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D operations vic Obj 8. At 1100 hrs Co D was directed to secure the Artillery FSB at XT055588, site was secured at 1200 hrs. At 1650 hrs Co D received 2 rds

of sniper fire. Bn CP remained vic Obj 8.

(d) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued to S&D in zone vic XT 0358.

(e) 3/82 Arty: Btry C was airlifted by CH-47 from FSB-D to FSB vic XT055590, all lifts were completed at 1450 hrs, HQ and Btry A were extracted from FSB D and lifted to FSB F vic XT1260. Btry

B departed Bde Fwd CP and closed TAY NINH at 1445 hrs.

(2) 16 February.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn (-) continued security of the bridge site vic Obj 8. 175th Engr constructed a floating pontoon bridge across the river located at XT054594. 1/5 (M) Inf moved across bridge while

the Bn secured the area. At 1500 hrs the bridge was extracted. At 1200 hrs Bn received a verbal order to S&D along Axis AMBER following extraction of bridge. Co D departed at 1515 hrs and Co C departed at 1407 hrs to conduct S&D opn south to vic XT052565. Bn (-) was moved from bridge site to new location (vic XT052565) with one Chinook. It took six lifts to make the move and it was completed at 1733 hrs. All elements closed new CP location by 1815 hrs.

(b) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn commenced operations at 0730 hrs enroute to cross the bridge site vic Obj 8. Lead elements crossed the bridge site at 0800 hrs. Bn continued its attack along Axis PURPLE and

closed TAY NINH at 1332 hrs.

(c) 3/82 Arty: HQ and A Btry continued support vic FSB F and were secured by plate from F Trp, 17th Cav. Btry C was extracted from FSB vic XT055590 at 1100 hrs and closed TAY NINH at 1230 hrs.

(3) 17 February.

CONFIDENTIAL

NND907608 (a) 2/1 Inf: Bn (-) broke base camp and moved ......... XT065546. Bn was extracted commencing at 1302 hrs and extraction was completed all units closed TAY NINH base camp at 1543 hrs.

(b) 3/82 Arty: HQ and A Btry secured by F Trp, 17th Cav commenced an overland move to TAY NINH at 1558 hrs and closed that location at 1655 hrs.

g. Phase VI (18 February - 21 February). See APPENDIX 9 (FRAGO 17 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(1) 18 February: 3/21 Inf conducted an airmobile assault commencing 0800 hrs to secure objective vicinity WT995547 and conduct search and destroy operations in AO vic WT9853. Commencing 1135 hrs, Co C conducted S&D operations along Axis vic WT9954. Found and destroyed were; 15 sampans, 4500 lbs of unpolished rice and 2 huts vic WT994536. Commencing 1140 hrs, Co A conducted S&D along Axis vic WT9854.

(2) 19 February: 3/21 Inf at 0855 hrs, Co B conducted S&D along Axis vic WT9753. At 1045 hrs contact was made with estimated VC squad vic WT975534. VC brought fire with small arms, automatic

weapons and 60mm mortar. Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons, artillery and air strikes. VC withdrew west into Cambodia, but continued to harass with small arms, as Co B moved along Axis to objective. The fire fight resulted in 3 VC KIA (BC). At 0920 hrs, Co C conducted S&D along Axis vic WT9953 with negative contact. Commencing 1230 hrs, Co A conducted an Eagle Flight to objective vic WT955505. Twenty-four grave sites were found 10 of which appeared to be less than one month old. One grave was uncovered that contained one, old oriental male dressed in black pajamas. 3/21 was airlifted back to base camp closing at 1715 hrs and operation was terminated.

(3) 20 February: Bde units remained at TAY NINH base camp.

(4) 21 February: The 25th Infantry Division terminated Operation GADSDEN effective 2400 hrs.

h. Civil Affairs:

(1) Civic Action: A playground was constructed at MO CONG vic XT130655 on 6 Feb 67.

(2) PSYOPS:

DATE LEAFLETS LOCATION

3 Feb 190,000 XT 7000-7002-7200-7202

4 Feb 20,000 XT 9866-0066-9868-0068

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE LEAFLETS LOCATION

5 Feb 25,000 XT 0364-0564-0366-0566

7 Feb 25,000 XT 0466-0666-0468-0668

7 Feb 20,000 XT 0268-0468-0270-0470

8 Feb 25,000 XT 9962-0162-9964-0164

8 Feb 25,000 XT 9860-0060-9862-0062

9 Feb 30,000 XT 0164-0464-0166-0466

10 Feb 25,000 XT 9964-0164-9966-0166

10 Feb 71,400 XT 9769-9771-9967-9971

(b) There was a total of 4100 newsletters, posters and magazines distributed at MO CONG from 3-12 February.

DATE DISTRIBUTED POSTERS MAGAZINES

3 Feb 1000 200 500

7 Feb 1000 400

12 Feb 1000

12.(C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly:

KHA: 13 196th Bde: 7 KHA, 57 WHA

WHA: 107 1/5 (M) Inf: 6 KHA, 50 WHA

b. Enemy:

VC KIA (BC) 125

VC KIA (POSS) 78

Structures 260

Tunnels 2

Bunkers 266

Trenches 16

Foxholes 103

Boat Docks 16

Bridges 1

Base Camps 11

SA Ammo 320 rds

Rifle Grenades 10

Hand Grenades 7

AP Mines 2

AT Mines 4

Claymores 6

Booby Traps 2

CBU's 50

60mm Mortar Rds 1

CONFIDENTIAL

81mm Mortar Rds 1

105mm Mortar Rds 1

2.75 inch Warheads 35

Bombs 3

Explosives 123 lbs

Punji Pits 7

Telephones 1

Rice 100.75 tons

Salt 8.6 tons

Sewing Machines 2

Radio 3

Sugar 1,100 lbs

Dried Fish 241 lbs

Peanuts 720 lbs

Soy Beans 2 tons

CS Gas 55 Gal

Rifles 4

Automatic Rifles 3

MG 1

57mm Ammo 1 rd

Rocket Launcher 1

Wpns Magazines 14

Chickens 45

Tar 50 gal

Tobacco 1 ton

Bicycles 1

Sampans/boats 22

Oxcarts 2

Soap 2500 lbs

Batteries 1000

Medicine 20 vials

Oil 100 gal

Documents 219 lbs

Gas Masks 1

13. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: See ANNEX D.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Operation GADSDEN was the first battalion size search and destroy operation in which scout dog teams were employed. These dog teams were of great help to the rifle companies both on ambush patrols and when used with point squads during movement.

The dogs often detected enemy presence before any member of the unit did so. These dogs are very well trained and perform efficiently even under the duress of long movement and the intense heat of the day.

15. (C) COMMANDER ANALYSIS: Operation GADSDEN demonstrated the value of extended operations within VC controlled areas. The length of the operation gave the small unit commanders and the troops time enough to become familiar with the terrain, as well as the VC situation. Unlike many other operations where troops go into an area for two or three day search and destroy missions, GADSDEN provided the needed continuity of

CONFIDENTIAL

..NND907608....effectively accomplish the mission.

a. During combat operations in VC controlled areas, a major engineer effort should be put forth to open existing roads and build new ones. This increases the accessibility to the area for future operations

especially to fast moving mechanized and armor units. Effective road clearing operations will allow overland resupply of forward combat units, thereby reducing Army Aviation requirements for extended resupply operations.

b. Mechanized infantry has proven to be highly successful in search and destroy operations. With their capability for rapid reaction and firepower, a mechanized battalion can effectively control twice as much errain as an infantry battalion. Rapid penetrations into VC controlled areas to secure LZ's for airmobile units provides an added security measure for aircraft as well as personnel when introducing units into the combat zone. The constant movement of mech units back and forth through an area keeps the VC moving and creates targets for friendly ambushes and Arty and Air.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Operations be conducted over longer periods of time for maximum effectiveness.

b. Maximum use of available armor and mechanized forces.

c. Maximum engineer effort be exerted to improve existing roads and to build new roads into previously inaccessible areas.

d. Actions prior to an operation such as air reconn, air strikes, and supply buildup which could alert the VC in the projected AO to an oncoming operation must be carefully monitored.

e. Maneuver: Formations used by battalion, company, and smaller size units often determine the amount of terrain searched in a given operation. Due to command and control problems encountered in moving an element through dense jungle, it is judged to be more suitable to send companies over separate axis at least 500 meter, but not more than 1000 meters, apart when conducting a major movement. this allows not only coverage of a greater area, but eliminates the need for a commander to keep his flanks tied in. From an aircraft this configuration is relatively easy to control and allows a unit not engaged in maneuver much more easily to the aid of one which has made contact.

CONFIDENTIAL

..NND0907608... d. Scout dog teams be used on ambush patrols and with point ...............g movement.

FOR THE COMMANDER

(Signed Hl Coon Maj, AGC)

DAVID A. PRADWICZ

CPT AGC

Asst AG

ANNEXES: A - Intelligence

B - FRAGOS to Operation GADSDEN

C - Unit Commanders

D - Administrative Matters

E - Areas Cleared

DISTRIBUTION:

Special

Operation Cedar Falls (196th LIght Infantry)

Transcribed by Leslie Hines ADVA historian, Vietnam era for the year 2001.

Confidential

OPERATION

(charger) CEDAR FALLS (196th LIB Patch)

----CHARGERS--------

AFTER ACTION REPORT

196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

5 JAN - 25 JAN 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

APO San Francisco 96256

AVBFSC 9 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

THRU: Commanding General

25th Infantry Division

APO US Forces 96225

TO: Commander

US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

ATTN: J332

APO US Forces 96243

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a

Search and Destroy operation.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 5 January 1967 - 25 January 1967.

3. (U) LOCATION: TAY NINH Province, HAU NGHIA Province and BINH

DUONG Province.

4. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles.

6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry

b. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry

c. 2d Battalion (M), 22d Infantry (Attached)

d. 1st Battalion (M), 5th Infantry (Attached)

e. B Troop, 3/4 Cav (Attached)

f. F Troop, 17th Cav

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DAAG-AMR-D#19 DOD DIR 5200.10

DATE: 4/22/88

CONFIDENTIAL

g. 3D Battalion, 82d Artillery

h. Battery A, 2/77 Artillery (Attached)

i. Battery A, 2/32 Artillery (GSR)

j. Battery A, 3/13 Artillery (GSR)

7. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. The following is a list of supporting forces during Operation CEDAR FALLS:

(1) USAF: During Operation CEDAR FALLS air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers. A total of 196 sorties were flown in the Brigade's AO from 5 January - 25 January. There were 72 air strikes of which 15 were immediate, 62 preplanned and 5 diverts.

(a) There were B-52 strikes flown in the Brigade's AO during the period 5-25 January. They were as follows:

MISSION NO DATE/TIME STRUCK AREA COVERED

25-27-1 060200 Jan 67 XT626303 - XT634314

XT655295 - XT644287

25-27-2 070240 Jan 67 XT585302 - XT583313

XT612323 - XT615312

25-27-2 070200 Jan 67 XT653270 - XT645290

XT658296 - XT667275

B-69 191200 Jan 67 XT570352 - XT601359

XT574340 - XT604347

(b) Results of tactical air strikes were as follows:

Bunkers Destroyed 114

Bunkers Damaged 39

Structures Destroyed 24

Structures Damaged 10

Sec Fire/Explosions 7

Trench Destroyed 625 meters

Bridges 2

Sampans 18

Foxholes Destroyed 43

Foxholes Damaged 20

Garden Plots 2

AWP 3

Boat Dock 1

Tunnel 30 Meters

VC KBA (BC) 4

VC KBA (POSS) 8

Caves 3

Sampans Damaged 1

(2) Army Aviation:

(a) Units:

1. 196th Bde Avn Detachment

2. 25th Avn Bn

A Co

B Co

3. 11th Avn Bn

116th Avn Bn

4. 145th Avn Bn

68th Avn Co (Lt)

71st Avn Co (Lt)

(b) Helicopter assets were utilized for command and control, airmobile assaults and extractions, reconnaissance, resupply and medical evacuation.

(3) Artillery support: 3/82 Artillery was in direct support during the entire operation Btry A, 2/77 Arty was attached to the Bde from 6-22 January 1967. Btry A, 3/13 Arty and Btry A, 2/32 Arty were in GSR

from 5-25 January 1967.

(4) 8th Support Battalion: Provided continuous resupply of all classes.

(5) 175th Engineer Co: Provided general support during the entire operation.

b. Performance of Supporting Arms and Services.

(1) Artillery Support: Artillery fires from a series of fire support bases were used throughout the operation in offensive and defensive roles. Movement of artillery elements was accomplished by CH-47

(Chinook) helicopters, convoys and occurred simultaneously with movement of the forward defense bases.

(a) Utilization of Artillery:

1. Areas in front of advancing maneuver elements on search and destroy operations were softened by artillery fires.

2. Landing zone preparations and suppressive fires during assault and extraction of airmobile operations.

3. Defensive concentrations, integrated with mortar fires, were fired in and around the forward defense bases.

4. Artillery preparations created a diversion for airmobile assaults when false preparations were fired on likely landing areas adjacent to actual landing zones.

5. High air bursts with white phosphorous rounds were employed to assist patrols navigating through dense terrain and during the hours of darkness when map inspection was not practical.

6. An extensive H&I program was conducted throughout the operation on known VC locations, used trails and suspected VC mortar firing positions.

7. Fires in support of ground troops in contact.

(b) Enemy losses from Artillery:

VC KIA (BC) 8

VC KIA (POSS) 12

Secondary Explosions 6

Bunkers Destroyed 2

Sampans Destroyed 2

1. 105mm:

a. H&I Missions 2154 4246 rds

b. Support Missions 627 8097 rds

2. 155mm:

a. H&I Missions 663 1281 rds

b. Support Missions 85 1195 rds

3. 8":

a. H&I Missions 285 485 rds

b. Support Missions 21 301 rds

4. 175mm:

a. H&I Missions 181 251 rds

b. Support Mission 14 111 rds.

(d) Artillery Ammunition Expenditures:

HE: 15,301 WP: 526 ILL: 140

(e) Artillery Positions Occupied:

BATTERY GRID DATE OCCUPIED MEANS

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT59302688 6 Jan 67 CH-47

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT60702367 6 Jan 67 Convoy

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT60702668 6 Jan 67 Convoy

Btry A, 2/77 Arty XT59302688 6 Jan 67 CH-47

Btry A, 3/13 Arty (GSR) XT58552175 6 Jan 67 Convoy

Btry A, 2/32 Arty (GSR) XT58552175 6 Jan 67 Convoy

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT5821 22 Jan 67 Convoy

(2) Army Aviation:

a. Utilization of Army Aviation.

1. Combat airmobile assaults and extractions.

2. Resupply into operational objective areas.

3. Command and control for airmobile assaults and extractions.

4. Aerial reconnaissance.

5. Assist DUST OFF aircraft in emergency MEDEVAC situation when DUST OFF aircraft are not available.

6. Adjust artillery fires.

b. Results of Army Aviation: Aviation support was an important factor in accomplishing the assigned missions in the operational area. This support provided the Brigade with a high degree of flexibility and mobility. Helicopters enabled the Brigade to spend maximum time in the objective area;

and when considered advantageous expeditiously displace to other targets of opportunity. Through the maximum utilization of helicopter assets the Brigade was able to continually harass the VC throughout the Brigade's AO. Helicopter assaults ranged from rifle platoon to battalion size airmobile operations. Gun ships were invaluable in providing suppressive fires against VC ground fire.

(3) Engineer Support: During Operation CEDAR FALLS the 175th Engineer Company provided continuous support to the Brigade. The following is a summary of missions accomplished by this company during the operation:

(a) Square kilometers of jungle cleared - 1.05 square kilometers.

(b) Linear meters of tunnel destroyed - 50 meters destroyed by company personnel. One (1) platoon assisted 1/5 (M) Inf in searching and destroying a tunnel complex in excess of 1000 meters.

(c) Kilometers of road cleared - During the operation the company was responsible for clearing approximately 4 kilometers of road daily, a total of 80 kilometers for the entire operation. The company constructed 4.2 kilometers of new road and rebuilt 1.5 kilometers of existing roadway.

(d) Bunkers and fortifications destroyed - 50 bunkers, 18 structures, 13 spider holes and 8 punji pits.

(e) Explosives expended - 2,400 lbs of C-4. In the interest of supply economy the company developed a field expedient charge for the destruction of bunkers and tunnels. This expedient charge consisted of large amounts of powder increments - normally burned by the artillery. After attaching detonating cord and placing the powder and C-4 in a metal canister, this expedient proved to be an effective charge.

8.(U) MISSION: The 25th Infantry Division directed the 196th Light Infantry Brigade to Search and Destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in sector, secure the high ground overlooking the SAIGON River and establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Operation CEDAR FALLS was divided into five phases. For the OPORD and FRAGOs governing this operation see ANNEX B.

a. Phase I (5 January). The Bde Fwd CP and FSB-1 were established at TRUNG LAP at XT5921. The 8th Spt Bn established a Fwd Logistical Opera-tional Center at Cu Chi.

b. Phase II (6 January). 1/5 (M) Inf secured LZ's at FSB-2 (XT6023) and FSB-3 (XT5225). Co A, 3/21 Inf was then air lifted to FSB-3, Co B to FSB-2 and Co C to the Bde Fwd CP at TRUNG LAP. With the FSB's secured HQ, B and C Btry, 3/82 Arty moved overland secured by F Trp, 17th Cav from TAY NINH to FSB-2. Btry A was airlifted by CH-47 Chinook from AO BLUE (XT338459) to FSB-3. Btry A, 2/77 Arty was also airlifted by CH-47 from DAU TIENG to FSB-3. 2/22 (M) Inf moved from DAU TIENG (XT495473) and established an overnight position at XT530284.

c. Phase III (7 January) 1/5 (M) Inf attacked from FSB-3 and secured LZ VICTOR (XT655290). 2/1 Inf was then airlifted from the CAU KHOI Plantation vic XT345457. 2/22 (M) Inf continued its attack and moved into their zone of operations vic Obj CHARLIE (XT5534). B Trp, 3/4 Cav attacked along Axis JUDY and established a position in zone to the West of Obj BRAVO (XT6030).

d. Phase IV (8 January - 24 January). Bde units and attachments

conducted S&D operations in zone, established blocking positions along the SAIGON River, utilized RAG boats to search the river line and conducted airmobile assaults in the Bde AO.

e. Phase V (25 January), The Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS and returned to TAY NINH base camp.

11.(C) EXECUTION: The following is a list of prominent locations and areas occupied by the Brigade and attachments during Operation CEDAR FALLS:

Bde Fwd CP (TRUNG LAP) XT5921

FSB-1 XT5921

FSB-2 XT6023

FSB-3 XT5225

Obj ALPHA XT6529

Obj BRAVO XT6030

Obj CHARLIE XT5534

Obj DELTA XT6625

LZ RED XT5425

LZ VICTOR XT6529

BAU DIEU XT5817

BEN SUC XT5833

CAU KHOI Plantation XT3445

CU CHI XT6415

DAU TIENG XT4947

IRON TRIANGLE XT7028

TANH DIEN Forestry Reserve XT6233

TAY NINH XT1652

TRANG BANG XT5226

TRAU NHO XT5415

X GO NOI (1) XT6022

X RANG (1) XT5723

X RANG (2) XT5520

a. Phase I (5 January). For period 5-7 January see Appendix 1 (OPORD 1-67) to ANNEX B.

(1) F Trp, 17th Cav: At 0540 hrs the first serial of the Bde departed TAY NINH for TRUNG LAP. F Trp secured the convoys and all elements of the Bde Fwd CP closed that location at 1120 hrs.

(2) 8th Spt Bn: The Bn departed with the convoys leaving for TRUNG LAP and continued on to CU CHI where a Forward Logistical Center was established.

(3) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn with B Trp, 3/4 Cav became attached to the Bde at 1900 hrs.

(4) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp escorted convoys from TAY NINH to TRUNG LAP and established a base camp at XT589198. At 2200 hrs 3d Plat vic XT587199 received 11 intermittent mortar rounds.

b. Phase II (6 January).

(1) 1/5 (M) Inf: At 0700 hrs the Bn departed CU CHI enroute to secure two LZ's at FSB-2 and FSB-3 for an airlift by 3/21 Inf from TAY NINH. Both LZ's were secured at 1030 hrs and the Bn CP was

established at FSB-3.

(2) 3/21 Inf: At 0858 hrs the Bn commenced its airlift by helicopter to FSB-1, FSB-2 and FSB-3. All units were in position and lifts completed at 1422 hrs. Co A was airlifted to fSB-3, Co B to FSB-2 and

Bn CP and Co C to FSB-1 at TRUNG LAP. LZ's at FSB-2 and FSB-3 were secured by 1/5 (M) Inf.

(3) 3/82 Arty: At 0700 hrs HQ, B and C Btry reved by convoy secured by F Trp, 17th Cav and established positions at FSB-2. Btry A was airlifted by CH-47 from AO BLUE to FSB-3. Btry A, 2/77 Arty was airlifted by CH-47 to FSB-3 from DAU TIENG.

(4) 2/22 (M) Inf: The Bn became attached to 196th Lt Inf Bde effective 060600 Jan 67. At 0715 hours the battalion departed base camp (DAU TIENG) enroute to laager area vic XT530284. While enroute 5 VC were observed running vic XT505297. Company B moved to engage and took the

fleeing VC under fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW, approximately 5 tons of rice, 2 US canteens, 88 rounds of M-1 ammunition and 3 US cartridge belts captured. At 1255 hours 2 VC were observed running vic XT533268. Company C pursued resulting in the capture of 2 VC.

(5) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp moved with 1/5 (M) Inf to secure FSB-2 and FSB-3.

(6) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp cleared roads vic TRUNG LAP from XT594213 to XT617227. Elements secured 3/82 Arty (-) to FSB-2

c. Phase III (7 January).

(1) 1/5 (M) Inf: At 0800 hrs the Bn departed FSB-3 to secure LZ VICTOR for an airmobile lift by 2/1 Inf from AO BLUE. the LZ was secured at 0945 hrs and established a base camp at XT640248. Throughout the day the Bn conducted sweeps through the area around LZ VICTOR. At 1005 hrs Co A vic XT640284 sustained 3 US KIA and 12 US WIA from 2 explosions. One was an 8" or 155 rd rigged for detonation and the other a VC claymore.

(2) 2/1 Inf: At 1247 hrs the Bn was airlifted from the CAU KHOI Plantation to LZ VICTOR which was secured by the 1/5 (M) Inf. After landing the Bn conducted S&D operations and secured a Bn CP at XT

656283. From 1635 hrs to 1846 hrs received 8 rds SA fire at XT655281, 3 rifle grenades at XT658279 and 20 rifle grenades were received at 1846 hrs when Co B engaged an estimated VC squad resulting in 7 US WHA. Fire was returned with unknown results.

(3) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B, Trp commenced S&D operations at

.hrs along Axis JUDY to secure a CP vic Obj BRAVO. From 0745 hrs to .........hrs B Trp had tracks hit 5 mines resulting in 12 US WIA, 3 tanks and 4 APCs damaged. All incidents occurred vic XT6024. At 1715 hrs B Trp vic XT619318 engaged 10-15 VC with 90mm fire resulting in 3 VC KIA

(BC) and 6 VC KIA (POSS). These were the first VC engaged by the Brigade as they attempted to flee south from the IRON TRIANGLE across the SAIGON River.

(4) 2/22 (M) Inf: Following air strikes and artillery preparations the Bn departed its laager enroute to its objective area vic Obj CHARLIE. At 1055 hrs Co A at XT495315 captured 1 VC. Bn CP was located

at XT558287.

(5) 3/21 Inf: The Bn continued to secure and conduct patrols around the Bde CP, FSB-2 and FSB-3.

(6) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued to clear and secure the road from TRUNG LAP to the intersection of Hwy1. This operation was a BUDDY Operation with the ARVN Ranger Bn located at TRUNG LAP. At 1440 hrs F Trp vic XT546195 engaged a re-inforced VC squad resulting in 4 VC KIA

(POSS) and 1 US WIA. 4 Claymore mines were captured. F Trp reacted on information from a Vietnamese that approximately 50 VC were located at the above coordinates and had kidnapped a VN civilian. Aero-rifle platoon was placed OPCON to F Trp and released when contact was broken.

(7) 3/21 Inf; Bn continued to secure and patrol vic of the Bde Fwd CP, FSB-2 and FSB-3.

d. Phase IV (8 January - 24 January)

(1) 8 January.

(a) 2/1 Inf; Bn secured Obj ALPHA and then the high ground in sector overlooking SAIGON River. At 2030 hrs Co B at XT660 279 sprung an ambush against 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn continued to secure Bde Fwd CP, FSB-2 and FSB-3. At 1230 hrs Co C vic XT580230 engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC PW WIA and 1 captured AK-47.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone vic Obj ALPHA. During S&D operations, 3 APCs hit mines resulting in 5 US WIA. At 1110 hrs Co C vic XT651264 engaged 3 VC with unknown

results. At 2000 hrs 1 ambush at XT637284 engaged 3 VC with unknown results.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: Bn continued S&D operations in zone vic OBj BRAVO. During S&D operations 3 APC's hit mines resulting in 1 US KIA and 14 US WIA. At 1420 hrs Co C vic XT594331 captured 1 US 45 Cal grease gun, 2 US 30 Cal carbines, 7-60mm mortar rounds and 100 rds 30 Cal

ammo. A resupply helicopter landing to pick up casualties hit a mine

resulting in 3 US WIA and destruction of the helicopter.

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp continued S&D operations in zone vic Obj BRAVO. At 1555 hrs vic XT598286 destroyed 4 tons of polished rice. At 1841 hrs B Trp engaged 2 VC, 1 riding on a bicycle and

1 walking resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).

(f) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued to clear route 7 for mines and escort convoys to check point 5 and FSB-2. At 2330 hrs F Trp had 1 grenade thrown in their position resulting in 3 US WIA.

(2) 9 January. See Appendix 2 (FRAGO 1 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf Bn Continued to conduct S&D operations and block in zone. At 1240 hrs Co B vic XT661981 found several VC TOP SECRET and SECRET documents in a bunker. The majority of these documents referred to the Postal, Communications and Transportation Section of MR-4. One document provided a key to the new series of letter box numbers used by MR-4.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn (-) continued to secure the Bde Fwd CP, FSB-2 and FSB-3. At 0630 hrs Co C conducted a search and clear operation in A GOI NOI (1) a hamlet with suspected VC dependents in residence. The village was complete screened and the Bn MEDCAP team was able to assist

villagers as required. This operation was repeated again on 15 and 17 Jan-uary.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: The Bn continued to conduct S&D operations in zone and maintain blocking positions along the SAIGON River. Two APCs hit mines during the day resulting in 6 US WIA.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: The Bn continued to conduct S&D operations in zone and maintain blocking positions along the SAIGON River. Contact during the day resulted in 9 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS). The majority of these came at 2200 hrs and 2400 hrs when VC were engaged as they

attempted to cross the SAIGON River.

(e) B Trp 3/4 Cav: Trp continued to conduct S&D operations in zone. At 1446 hrs B Trp at XT603288 destroyed huts, at XT 612298 destroyed 300 meters of main trench and 22 tunnels. At 1800 hrs

B Trp vic XT621326 engaged a VC squad with 90mm HE after airstrikes had been completed in the area resulting in 6 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (POSS).

(f) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued to clear and secure roads vic TRUNG LAP. During the days operations F Trp found and destroyed 18 mines.

(3) 10 January. See Appendix 3 (FRAGO 2/ w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone

Obj ALPHA and established blocking positions to prevent movement on

..... across the SAIGON River. AT 0515 hrs Co A vic XT662297 engaged 4 VC in a sampan resulting in 4 VC KIA (POSS). At 2037 hrs Co B engaged 6 VC on a sampan vic XT669924 resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (POSS) total contact for the day resulted in 8 VC KIA (BC) and 8 VC KIA (POSS).

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn (-) continued security of Bde Fwd CP, FSB-2 and FSB-3. Co C conducted a search of BAU DIEU village a suspected sanctuary. A CHIEU HOI assisted the company in the search along with RVN National Policemen. Co C, 4/23 (M) Inf (-) established a blocking position on the southeastern side of the village as Co C, 3/21 Inf approached the village, 4 VC hiding in a spider hole fired on the company resulting in 2 US WIA. Fire was returned resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). A large ammunition

storage area was uncovered and destroyed.

(d) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued its mission of S&D and blocking in zone. During the day the Bn found and destroyed numerous bunkers and evacuated captured documents. At 2355 hrs Co A at XT640330 engaged 2 VC in a sampan resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).

(e) 2/22 (M) Inf: Bn continued to S&D in zone vic Obj CHARLIE and establish blocking positions along the SAIGON River. Co C at XT593312 engaged 2 VC attempting to cross the SAIGON River resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

(f) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp continued to conduct S&D operations in zone vic Obj BRAVO. During the day the Bn destroyed VC equip-men and fortifications. Contact during this period resulted in 3 VC KIA

(BC)

(g) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued route security and ROADRUNNER mission along Hwy 7, Hwy 1 and route to FSB-2.

(4) 11 January.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn continued its mission to S&D and block in zone. Contact during this period resulted in 11 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS). The majority of these were killed trying to flee

South across the SAIGON River.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn (-) continued to secure the Bde Fwd CP, FSB-2 and FSB-3. Co C conducted an airmobile assault at 0700 hrs to search and clear X RANG (1), a suspected C sanctuary for dependents. Co B blocked on the SW side of the village. The operation resulted in 1400 lbs of polished rice destroyed.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued its mission of S&D and blocking in zone vic Obj ALPHA. Contact during this period resulted in 3 VC KIA (BC). At 1605 hrs Co C vic XT658259 detonated 1 booby trap re-

sulting in 2 US WIA.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: Bn continued its mission to block

and seal in zone vic Obj CHARLIE to prevent movement across the SAIGON River. Contact during the period resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC).

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp continued its mission in zone. Contact during this period resulted in 3 VC KIA (BC). At 1145 hrs B Trp captured 103 homemade VC protective masks. These masks consisted

of a plastic bag and gauze breathing filter.

(f) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued its route clear-ing and security missions vic TRUNG LAP. During the day F Trp destroyed 3 mines. At 1555 hrs 1st Plat at XT58802 detonated a mine resulting in 3

US WIA.

(5) 12 January. See Appendix 4 (FRAGO 3) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn continued its mission to block and S&D in zone vic Obj ALPHA. Co B with a CHIEU HOI searched for a VC hospital complex with negative results. The Bn destroyed numerous VC tunnels and bunkers throughout the period. Contact resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC). Bn CP located at XT656284.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn continued to secure and patrol vic Bde Fwd CP, FSB-2 and FSB-3.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued its mission to block and S&D vic Obj ALPHA. Co A (-) and Co B (-) acted on information received from a CHIEU HOI and conducted S&D operations vic XT613266 and XT625235. At 1300 hrs Co C vic XT624230 destroyed 2 AT mines pointed out by the CHIEU HOI. AT 1400 hrs vic XT618230 Co C located a tunnel complex.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: Bn continued to block and conduct limited S&D missions in zone. All companies continued to block assigned sectors and conduct limited search and destroy missions in respective zones. Elements of Company A moved to sweep area vic XT545335, South to XT545332.

A platoon from Company B moved to sweep an area vic XT565317 Southwest to 545310. Elements from recon platoon moved into a blocking position in conjunction with the days sweep. Company B during their sweep uncovered a small base camp complex, engaged 3 VC, VC were able to break contact. Results were no US casualties, 3 VC KIA (POSS), the capture of one CHICOM rifle 7.62 carbine, 1953, 1 rifle Mauser, 1 pistol German Walther P-38, 9 VC hand grenades, 50 lbs of assorted equipment, and 2 huts. A patrol from Company B fired upon 4 VC XT554307. Patrol attempted to follow fleeing VC but lost trail. Results: 2 VC KIA (POSS). A patrol from C Co received AW and SA fire from an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA. A thorough search of the area produced what appeared to be a small base camp containing 4 reinforced bunkers. All installations destroyed. 4 VC KIA were found during a sweep of the river banks. At 2040 hrs Company B fired upon 1 VC swimming the river resulting in 1 VC KIA.

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp continued its mission vic Obj BRAVO. Contact during this period resulted in 9 VC KIA (BC) and 5 VC KIA (POSS).

(f) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued its route clearing and security missions vic TRUNG LAP. During this period F Trp found and destroyed 3 mines.

(6) 13 January.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn continued its operations in zone vic Obj ALPHA. At 0730 hrs 3 VC rallied to Co B vic XT665275. Contact during this period resulted in 5 VC KIA (BC). At 1200 hrs Co C destroyed

a bunker vic XT651287, captured and evacuated were documents and 1 typewriter.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn (-) continued to secure the Bde CP, FSB-2 and FSB-3. Co C with 1 plat F Trp conducted a combat assault to search TRAU NHO vic XT548190.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued to block and S&D in zone. At 1335 hrs 1 APC hit an AT mine with minor damage. At 2020 hrs Co C vic XT673255 engaged 4 VC in a sampan resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: Bn continued its mission in zone. At 1020 hours, vic XT569306, elements from Company B while on a search south of their blocking positions received heavy AW, SA and AT weapons

fire from an estimated VC platoon. The element maneuvered to engage the op-position but found the VC well dug in. Artillery was immediately employed coupled with 6 sorties of UH1D gun-ship strikes. At 1040 hrs 1 platoon (-) from Company B, vic XT548310, moved to reinforce the platoon in contact. While enroute, the platoon received AW and SA fire from an estimated VC squad well dug in. The VC immediately broke contact. The platoon (-) with-drew and effected link-up with a platoon from Company A. DUST OFF evacuated 5 US WIA: enemy results 3 VC KIA. Company A reported 3 VC KIA's resulting from an attempted river crossing vic XT571330. At 1345 hrs Co C vic XT596 316 captured a VC Major who claimed to be an executive officer from J-13 and other rear service agencies of MR-4.

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp continued its mission in zone vic Obj BRAVO. At 0136 hrs B Trp vic XT619318 engaged 4 sampans resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (POSS) and 3 sampans destroyed. At 1455 hrs B Trp vic XT589288 engaged 2 VC with weapons, steel pots and green clothing. VC disengaged and evaded US forces. Contact during this period resulted in 5 VC KIA (BC) and 4 VC KIA (POSS).

(f) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued route clearing and security missions vic TRUNG LAP. At 0820 hrs F Trp tripped a booby trap-ped grenade resulting in 3 US WIA. During this period F Trp found and des-troyed 11 grenades and mines.

(7) 14 January.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone vic Obj ALPHA and established blocking positions to prevent movement on or across the SAIGON River. At 1335 hrs BACH VAN KIM rallied to Co B vic XT

.........82. Individual was the head of a 4 man tax collection and propaganda cell in XOM BUNG CONG Hamlet vic XT653321.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn (-) continued its security missions. At 0700 hrs the Bn conducted a combat assault vic XT559289 in the same general area where 2/22 (M) Inf made contact on 13 Jan 67. Co A, Co B and Co C swept to the north on 3 separate axis. 2/22 (M) Inf blocked to the west and north. B Trp, 3/4 Cav blocked to the east. Unit was extracted from a PZ vic XT563320 at 1630 hrs. Co C at 1037 hrs vic XT560298 destroyed 715 tons of rice.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued to S&D in zone vic Obj ALPHA. At 0930 hrs a CHIEU HOI indicated a VC hospital was located at XT639305. Area was searched with negative results.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf; Companies A, B and C moved to blocking positions in the Bn AO in conjunction with the 3/21 Inf helicopter assault.

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: Bn continued its mission in zone. Elements blocked to the east for the 3/21 Inf helicopter assault.

(f) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued its route clearing and security missions vic TRUNG LAP.

(8) 15 January.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone vic Obj ALPHA and established blocking positions to prevent movement on or across the SAIGON River. At 0500 hrs Co C engaged 1 log and 1 sampan resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (POSS), documents and papers in the sampan were evacuated. Bn CP located at XT656284. At 1049 hrs Co B vic XT660285 detonated a booby trap resulting in 1 US KHA and 1 US WHA.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn conducted a local patrolling and continued security of Bde Fwd CP, FSB-2 and FSB-3. Bn CP located at XT 595215 (TRUNG LAP).

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued its mission in zone. At 0855 hrs Co C vic XT661242 engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 US WIA, enemy results unknown. During this period 3 tracks detonated AT mines at

XT637241, XT661242 and XT622229. At 1555 hrs Co A vic XT622286 uncovered 4 fresh graves resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).

(d) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp conducted S&D operations in zone vic Obj BRAVO and established blocking positions to prevent movement on or across the SAIGON River. At 2040 hrs Bde's HHC security platoon attached, to B-3-4 Cav, engaged 1 sampan Vic XT620318 resulting in 4 VC KIA.

(e) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued route clearing and security missions vic Trung LAP.

(9) 16 January. See Appendix 5 (FRAGO 4 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1: Inf: Bn moved to zone previously occupied by 1/5 (M) Inf and continued to S&D and block in zone. At 0225 hrs vic XT673287 Co C engaged 12 VC attempting to cross the river in a sampan

resulting in 13 VC KIA (BC). Evacuated were documents found in a bay. At 1800 hrs Co B sustain 1 US WIA vic XT635305. Contact during this period resulted in 15 VC KIA (BC).

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn continued security missions. Co B and C departed at 0630 hrs to search and clear a village vic XT 605235. Co C detained 3 women and children for not having ID cards. Both companies returned to base camp at 1240 hrs with negative contact.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn moved to zone previously occupied by 2/1 Inf and continued to S&D block in zone. At 1245 hrs Co A vic XT 618274 engaged 10 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC PW at 1300 hrs Co C vic XT658242 discovered a 3 level tunnel.Contact during this period re-sulted in 8 VC KIA (BC). Bn CP located vic XT653267.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: Bn continued to block and S&D in zone. At 0715 hours the battalion departed base camp (DAU TIENG) enroute to laager area vic XT530284. While enroute 5 VC were observed running vic XT505297. Company B moved to engage and took the fleeing VC under fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW, approximately 5 tons of rice, 2 US canteens, 88 rounds of M-1 ammunition and 3 US cartridge belts captured. At 1255 hours 2 VC were observed running vic XT533268. Company C pursued

resulting in the capture of 2 VC.

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp conducted S&D operations and continued to block vic Obj BRAVO. At 2215 hrs B Trp vic XT620318 engaged 1 sampan resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).

(f) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued to secure and clear routes vic TRUNG LAP. During this period F Trp destroyed 3 mines and booby traps.

(10) 17 January. See Appendix 6 (FRAGO 5 w/Overlay) see ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone bounded by XT635320 to XT623303 to XT643290 to XT660299. At 1400 hrs Recon plat conducted an airmobile assault from PZ vic XT633313 to an LZ vic XT650315. Recon found 2 VC KIA bodies and at 2335 hrs vic XT 651315 engaged 2 VC attempting to cross the river resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) - captured 1, 9mm Walther Auto Pistol.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn conducted local patrolling and security vic TRUNG LAP, FSB-2 and FSB-3. Co A conducted S&D operations vic XT585285, Co B (-) conducted S&D operations vic XT603240 and Co C

conducted S&D operations in XGO NO (1) vic XT603220.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D operations in zone vic XT640280, Co C commenced S&D operations along right boundary vic XT632230 with elements from the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div. At 0830 hrs

Co C vic XT643248 had 1 APC hit a mine resulting in 3 US WHA. At 2215 ?? Co B vic XT664298 engaged 15 bushes floating up stream resulting in 10 VC KIA (POSS).

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: Bn with B Trp 3/4 Cav conducted a joint operation. Co A and Co B conducted S&D operations from XT583303 to XT609319. Co C blocked to the north vci XT609319. B Trp 3/4 Cav

established a block and screen from XT563302 to XT614310. At 0043 hrs Co A engaged a sampan attempting to cross the river resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). At 1617 hrs Co C vic XT614913 captured 1 VC.

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp continued to block and S&D in zone. B Trp established a block and screen from XT563302 to XT614310 in conjunction with 2/22 (M) Inf's operation. At 1918 hrs vic XT020317, engaged 3 VC with SA resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) - captured were 3 Chicom carbines, 2 grenades and 2 sets of web gear.

(f) F Trp, 17 Cav: Continued its missions around TRUNG LAP.

(11) 18 January.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations and blocked in zone. At 0822 hrs Recon plat was extracted from PZ vic XT650315. Element from Co A and Co C utilized RAG boats commencing at 1320 hrs to search river line in sector. At 1320 hrs Co C vic XT653313 destroyed one sampan and 3

bunkers vic XT653313. At 1450 hrs Co C discovered 1 sampan vic XT648317. From 1505 hrs to 1640 hrs Co C while searching the river line on RAG boats uncovered 12 VC KIA (BC). At 1730 hrs Co A captured 5 detainees vic XT63318? with 1 Chicom carbine. Individuals were evacuated for exploitation.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn Continued local patrolling and security of FSB-1, FSB-2, and FSB-3. Co C (-) conducted a search and clear operation of a village at XT5573. At 2235 hrs Co C vic XT594326 engaged

2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) 1 VC KIA (POSS) - Captured was 1 home made 45 Cal pistol. One plat established a block in conjunction with B Trp, 3/4 Cav's operation.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone vic XT640280. At 1050 hrs Co A departed Bn base camp and re-established a base camp vic XT648243 to conduct operations along the NW side of the RACH SON Creek. Co C at 0800 hrs continued their sweep along the NW side of the RACK SON Creek. At 0700 hrs Co B vic XT671271 engaged 1 VC swimming in the river resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1730 hrs Co A discovered an extensive tunnel complex vic XT650235. 40 lbs of documents were discovered in the tunnel and they included detailed maps of the SAIGON - TAN SON NHUT area; maps showing the schemes of maneuver of friendly operations in the area and VC routes of movement from the IRON TRIANGLE area to the SAIGON River.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: Bn conducted an S&D operation commencing 0700 hrs. At 1635 hrs vic XT567318, 2 APC's M113 from company

.. struck AT mines resulting in 5 US WIA and the destruction of both APC's.

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp continued S&D operations in zone and established blocking positions to prevent movement on or across the SAIGON River. Elements from B Trp swept south vic XT6029 with 1

platoon, 3/21 Inf blocking. At 0830 hrs B Trp vic XT610287, destroyed 1 small hut and evacuated 22 VC steel helmets w/fixed liners, 87 (VC) canteen covers, 1 VC canteen, 1 bundle black cloth, 5 bundles of white cloth and 9 VC trousers.

(f) F Trp, 3/4 Cav: F Trp continued to clear roads from TRUNG LAP to Hwy 1 and to FSB-2.

(12) 19 January. See Appendix 7 (FRAGO 6 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn continued to block and conduct S&D operations in zone. Unit assumed control of zone previously occupied by B Trp, 3/4 Cav. At 1030 hrs Co B uncovered 4 VC KIA (BC) vic XT621316.

Bn CP located at XT631302. During this period Bn operations accounted for 7 VC KIA (BC).

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn continued its security missions at FSB-1, FSB-2 and FSB-3. At 0705 hrs Co C conducted an airmobile assault on LZ RED to search and clear a village at XT592268. The operation was

planned to clear the area of suspected VC small unit concentrations and refugees further north. Armed gunships orbited over the advance of the company but the search produced negative results.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations and blocked in zone vic XT660300 to XT645290 to XT612256 to XT630227 to XT 670243 - northern boundary bounded by southern edge of SAIGON River. Co A continued operation on Bn right flank with the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div. Co B utilized RAG boats to search river bank, commencing at 0920 hrs. During movement along the river 8 VC KIA (BC) bodies were found. At 1450 hrs Co B vic XT671259 engaged 7-10 VC with unknown results. At 1520 hrs Co B captured 3 VC women and accounted for 1 VC KIA (BC).

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: Bn continued to occupy blocking positions along the SAIGON River and evacuate captured rice. Co B found 1 VC body floating in the river. At 1555 hrs and element from Co C vic

XT580296 received heavy RR and SA fire from an unknown size VC force. Element returned fire coupled with artillery and 5 air sorties. Upon termination of artillery and air strikes the element moved into sweep the area of contact and received sniper fire from 2 VC. Artillery was again employed but the VC were able to break contact. Results of the encounter; 2 US WIA, 2 APC's M113 destroyed, unknown VC casualties.

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp continued S&D operations in zone and established blocking positions to prevent movement on or across the SAIGON River. B Trp occupied new AO bounded by coordinates XT620305 to XT645290 to XT613256.

(f) F Trp 17th Cav: F Trp continued road clearing ......security missions to Hwy and FSB-2. Unit destroyed 1 AT mine, 1-105 ...... and 2 booby traps vic XT613225.

(13) January. See Appendix 8 (FRAGO 7 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn continued to S&D in zone. At 1000 hrs Co B apprehended 1 wounded VC in a bunker at XT629319. At 1330 hrs Co A vic XT6230 discovered 2 lbs of documents and 12 VC gas masks

and 900 lbs of polished rice.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn continued its security missions of FSB-1, FSB-2 and FSB-3.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued to S&D in zone. Co A continued to make a search of tunnel complex vic XT649234. At 0855 hrs Co A vic XT650235 sustained 3 US WIA from a booby trap. At 1400 hrs Co B had 1 APC destroyed when it caught on fire from a flare vic XT661281. At 0800 hrs Co C departed Bn base to effect a link up with Co A.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: Co A supported RAG boat convoy and conducted S&D operations on both banks of the SAIGON River from XT596326 to XT596328. During the operation Co A found 3 VC KIA's. Co C continued to occupy blocking positions.

(e) B Trp, 3/4 Cav: B Trp was released from Bde control at 1200 hrs.

(f) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued to clear roads to Hwy 1 and FSB-2.

(14) 21 January.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn continued to S&D and block in zone. At 1135 hrs Co B vic XT634304 when searching an area where 1 UH-23 received AW fire. Co B also received AW fire in the area which

resulting in 1 US KHA and 1 US WHA. At 2015 hrs Co B at XT629299 engaged 2 VC with unknown results. (Note: this is OH-23, not UH-23 type helicopter)

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn continued local patrolling vic XT515261 to XT635295 and security of FSB-1, FSB-2 and FSB-3.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued to conduct S&D operations in zone vic XT640280. Continued to exploit tunnel complex vic XT6523. Co C commenced S&D operations in the NW portion of the RACH

SON CREEK. At 1315 hrs Co C vic XT653238 sustained 4 US WIA from a booby trap. At 1810 hrs Co C vic XT659248 sustained 3 US WIA from an AT mine.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: At 0700 hrs the Battalion departed its blocking position along the SAIGON River enroute to conduct a cordon and search of village LOC HUNG at XT515260. At 1145 hrs the village had

cordoned and the search began. By 1515 hrs the village had been searched with the following results; 309 males interrogated, 8 detainees, 5 evacuated for further interrogation. There was negative contact. By

1600 hrs all elements laagered vic XT543277.

(e) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued route clearing and security missions. At 0705 hrs vic XT593206 a VC turned himself into F Trp. Individual had a French carbine, 2 hand grenades, we gear, transistor radio and papers.

(15) 22 January. See Appendix 9 (FRAGO 8 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B. FRAGO 8 was later changed to be executed on order as the Bde was further extended in the AO. See Appendix 10 (FRAGO 9 w/Overlay) to ANNEX B.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn continued to block and conduct S&D operations in zone vic XT630280. During this period the Bn destroyed 10 bunkers and 9 tunnels.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn continued its security missions. Co A closed out of FSB-3 at 1300 hrs and closed FSB 2 at 1400 hrs.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone vic XT650260 with Co A vic XT650235. At 1110 hrs Co C vic XT665263 found 1 VC KIA (BC), captured were 1 civilian radio, life jacket, medical

kit, documents and a 45 Cal pistol. 1 APC vic XT648250 had 1 APC hit by an AT weapon resulting in 3 US WHA. Bn CP located vic XT653267.

(d) 2/22 (M) Inf: The Bn was detached from the 196th Bde and returned to the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, effective 0800 hrs. The Bn departed laager area vic XT543277 at 0800 hrs along Axis WHISKEY and

closed DAU TIENG.

(e) F Trp, 17th Cav: Road security and clearing missions vic TRUNG LAP continued. Between XT574183 and XT573177 F Trp destroyed 2 AT mines, 3-105 shell mines, 2 booby trapped grenades and

1 AP mine. At 2017 hrs F Trp vic XT575283 sprung an ambush resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 - M1 carbine, 1 pistol belt, 2 M-26 grenades and assorted documents.

(f) 3/82 Arty: Btry A, 2/77 Arty was detached and returned to DAU TIENG effective 0800 hrs.

(16) 23 January.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone vic XT630285 and defended zone from the north and west by utilizing daylight patrols and night ambushes, S&D operations uncovered numerous

bunkers and tunnels. At 0850 hrs Co C vic XT643290 received 4-5 rds of sniper fire. Fire was returned, results were 1 US WHA - enemy casualties unknown.

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn continued security of FSB-1 with Co C and FSB-2 with Cos A and B.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued to conduct S&D operations in zone at search of tunnel complex with Co A. Co A re-established its CP at XT650235. At 1000 hrs Co C vic XT644255 engaged 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

(d) F Trp, 17th Cav: Road security and clearing missions continued.

(17) 24 January.

(a) 2/1 Inf: Bn conducted S&D operations in zone vic XT6224 from the north and west by utilizing daylight patrols and night ambushes. Bn closed new CP location vic XT612258 at 1155 hrs. At

1908 hrs Co A vic XT620254 engaged 3 VC resulting in 2 US WHA. At 1932 hrs Recon Plat vic XT635292 engaged 3 VC resulting in 2 US WHA, 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).

(b) 3/21 Inf: Bn continued security of FSB-1 and FSB-2. At 0930 hrs Co C made a combat assault on BAU DIEU Village with negative results and was extracted at 1525 hrs. At 1129 hrs Co C at XT592172 captured 1 VC gas mask, documents and poncho.

(c) 1/5 (M) Inf: Bn continued to search tunnel complex and defend in zone by utilizing daylight patrols and night ambushes. At 1135 hrs Co C vic XT642249 engaged an unknown number of VC resulting

in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (POSS) and 2 Chicom AK-47 rifles captured. At 1255 hrs Co B vic XT658247 engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 US WIA and 1 - M-14 rifle and 1 Chicom carbine captured.

(d) F Trp, 17th Cav: F Trp continued to clear and secure route from TRUNG LAP to Hwy 1 and FSB-2.

e. Phase V (25 January). See Appendix 9 (FRAGO 8 2/Overlay) to Annex B.

(1) the 196th Lt Inf Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS at 1655 hrs when last elements closed TAY NINH base camp. 2/1 Inf and 3/21 Inf were extracted and returned to TAY NINH and NUI BA DEN respectively. PZ's for extraction were secured by elements of 1/5 (M) Inf. Bde CP, HHC and 3/82 Arty returned to TAY NINH by convoy.

(2) 1/5 (M) Inf was released from the Bde's control at 1107 hrs and commenced there overland move to CU CHI at 1245 hrs.

f. Civil Affairs:

(1) Civic Action:

(a) MEDCAP - During this period 9 MEDCAPS were con-

.ted at TRUNG LAP treating a total of 1240 patients (9 January ...........January)

(b) The following is a list of commodities distributed at TRUNG LAP:

25 spools of barbed wire

2 1/2 tons of rice

(2) PSYOPS:

(a) A Total of 178,000 leaflets were dropped or left by troops in the areas of operation during the period.

(b) Loudspeaker missions were flown for a total of 4 hours over areas of operation.

12.(C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly: For a more detail breakdown see Annex C.

KHA 42

WHA 227

b. Enemy:

VC KIA (BC) 220

VC KIA (POSS) 66

VC POW 21

Detainees 134

Returnees 10

Structures 173

Tunnels 150

Bunkers 344

Trenches 39

Foxholes 15

Boat Docks 1

Base Camps 1

SA Ammo 7,259

Rifle Grenades 29

Hand Grenades 364

AP Mines 29

AT Mines 85

Claymores 11

Booby Traps 34

RR 75mm rds 25

RL 2

Wpn Magazine drums 19

Cement 750 lbs

Tin 1,000 ft

Tar 100 gal

Bicycle 28

Sampans/Boats 86

Oxcarts 5

Outboard Mts 3

Batteries 6

Gas Masks 151

........... CBU's 103

60mm Mortar Rds 86

81mm Mortar Rds 27

105mm HOW rd 19

155mm HOW rd 3

Bombs 8

Explosives 123 lbs

Punji pits 36

12.7mm Ammo 210

Rice 357.1 tons

Salt 2,000 lbs

Fish Sauce 1,500

Pistols 6

AW Rifles 7

MG 2

Medicine 50 lbs

Gasoline 10 gal

Piasters 30,000

Rice Evacuated 73.75 tons

13.(U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: See Annex D.

14.(C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. In searching out large underground complexes, special equipment becomes a necessity. Miners headlamps, pistols w/silencers and land line communications for the tunnel rats are extremely helpful. Fresh air for breathing can be pumped into tunnels with the use of the Mighty Mite or an auxiliary CH-47 (Chinook) engine rigged with a 50-100 ft length of hose.

b. The positioning of Bde CP's in existing ARVN or CIDG camps reduces the CP security and as a result significantly increases the combat troops available for operations.

15.(C) COMMANDER ANALYSIS:

a. Operation CEDAR FALLS demonstrated the value of extended operations within VC controlled areas. The length of the operation gave the small unit commanders and the troops time enough to become familiar with the terrain, as well as the VC situation. Unlike many other operations where troops go into an area for two or three day search and destroy missions, CEDAR FALLS provided the much needed continuity of effort to effectively accomplish the mission.

b. Fwd CP's should be established at ARVN or CIDG training camps whenever possible. When such a situation obtains, less security is needed for CP locations, thus releasing more US troops to participate in the operation itself.

c. Armed helicopters proved to be extremely valuable in search and clear operations of villages. It was observed on CEDAR FALLS that armed helicopters on station would prevent the VC from fleeing the village into the rice paddies. Once armed helicopters would leave the area, it was discovered that the VC would try to make their escape from the village being searched. One technique which proved successful was to have the armed helicopters leave the village area for four to five minutes. the VC, thinking the helicopters had left for good, would then try to make their escape. The helicopters would then return and observe the VC fleeing and take them under fire.

d. Psychological warfare techniques would continue to be exploited to their utmost in large operations. On CEDAR FALLS the extensive use of broadcasts, through interpreters, and leaflet drops resulted in a very successful CHIEU HOI program. MEDCAP operations aided in bringing a large number of VC controlled villages under government control.

e. Tunnel exploration kits should be made readily available to ground troops when large complexes are uncovered. Such kits would expedite considerably a comprehensive search of such tunnels.

f. Joint operations with ARVN troops saved the Brigade much needed time in clearing roads to the Fwd CP and fire support bases. It has been found that ARVN troops are more than willing to work with US

Forces and such operations provide a better understanding of both forces involved, in addition to fostering new friendships and assisting the RVN in winning its war.

g. During combat operations in VC controlled areas, a major engineer effort should be put forth to open existing roads and build new ones. This increases the accessibility to the are for future operations especially to fast moving mechanized and armor units. Effective road clearing operations will allow overland resupply of forward combat units, thereby reducing Army Aviation requirements for extended resupply operations.

h. Mechanized infantry has proven to be highly successful in search and destroy operations. With their capability for rapid reaction and firepower, a mechanized battalion can effectively control twice as much terrain as an infantry battalion. Rapid penetrations into VC controlled areas to secure LZ's for airmobile units provides an added security measure for aircraft as well as personnel when introducing units into the combat zone. The constant movement of mech units back and forth through an area keeps the C moving and creates targets for friendly ambushes and Arty and Air.

16.(C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Operations be conducted over longer periods of time for maximum effectiveness.

b. Maximum use be made of available armor and mechanized forces.

c. CP's and FSB's to be collocated where feasible with permanent ARVN and CIDG camps.

d. Maximum effort to be made to incorporate ARVN and CIDG forces into operations.

e. Maximum engineer effort to be exerted to improve existing roads and to build new roads into previously inaccessible areas.

f. Actions prior to an operation such as air recon, air strikes, and supply buildup which could alert the VC in the projected AO to an oncoming operation must be carefully monitored

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(Signed for Hl Coop, Maj AGC)

DAVID A PRAWDIZK

CPT AGC

Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

Special

.......ANNEX A (Intelligence) to After Action Report Operation CEDAR FALLS

1.(C) Weather and Terrain:

a. The weather during the operation was generally dry and mild, On three occasions heavy late afternoon thunder showers occurred in the AO, however they had no adverse effects on the terrain, troops or equipment. The temperature throughout the operation was mild with temperature ranging generally from the lot 70's to the low 90's. During a five day period from 10-15 January 1967; temperatures at night dropped as low as 60', however without effect on friendly operations.

b. The terrain in the AO was, generally flat and dry. Trafficability was very good resulting in maximum and effective utilization of Armor and Mechanized elements.

c. The major obstacle in the area are the streams; the SOUI GAI BE which runs from northwest to southeast along Hwy 237; the SOUI CAU BAY which runs south to north through the AO; the RACH THAI THAI runs south to north and emptying into the SAIGON river Vic XT634319. These streams presented obstacles to the Mechanized and Armor elements in that they could not be crossed without bridging materials.

d. The weather and the terrain definitely favored the operation and the use of Armor and Mechanized elements.

2.(C) Preliminary Intelligence:

a. The Operation CEDAR FALLS AO encompassed the area of the FILHOL PLANTATION, HO BO WOODS, BOI LOI WOODS; IRON TRIANGLE and the LONG NGUYEN SECRET ZONE OF HAU NGHIA, BINH DUONG and TAY NINH Provinces. These areas were considered to contain the political headquarters for VC Military Region IV. MR IV control the activities of the 165 A

Operation Fitchburg

Confidential

OPERATION

(charger) FITCHBURG (196th LIB Patch)

----CHARGERS--------

AFTER ACTION REPORT

196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

25 NOV - 8 Apr 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDCMHD (23 MAY 67) 1st Ind (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 96225 23 MAY 67

TO, COMMANDER, U.S. Military Assistance Command, ATTN: J343, AP 96243

Forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(Signed James D Delthsen? Ast AGC)

for F. M. CROCETTI

Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl Combat Ops After Action Report

DISTRIBUTION:

1-ACOFS for Force Dev, DA

2-CG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH

3-MACV, ATTN: J343

1-MACV, ATTN: J2

1-MACV, ATTN MACT

1-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH

4-CB, IIFFORCEV, ATTN: G3 (D&T)

1-CG, USA Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga., 31029

1-CG, USA Arm Sch, Ft Knox, Ky., 40120

1-CO, USA Inf Human Rsch Unit, Ft Benning, Ga., 31029

1-CO, USA Arty & Missile Sch, Ft Sill, Okla.

1-CO, USA CGSC, Ft Leavenworth, Kan.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN

SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

APO San Francisco 96256

AVBFSC 11 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

THRU: Commanding General

25th Infantry Division

APO US Forces 96225

TO: Commander

US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

ATTN: J332

APO US Forces 96243

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: Operation FITCHBURG was a Search and Destroy operation and also consisted of the static security missions around the Brigade base camp.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 25 November 1966 - 08 April 1967.

3. (U) LOCATION: TAY NINH Province.

4. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles.

6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry

b. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry

c. 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry

d. 1st Battalion (M), 5th Infantry (Attached)

e. 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (Attached)

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

f. 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery

g. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (Attached)

h. F Troop, 17th Cavalry

i. 196th Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment

j. 48th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Supporting Forces during Operation FITCHBURG.

(1) USAF: The 7th USAF provided air support with fighter

bombers.

(2) Army Aviation: Organic and attached Army Aviation units were utilized on as an required basis to support tactical operations. Operations varied from insertion and extraction of a six man Long Range

Reconnaissance Patrol to battalion level assaults and extractions. Aviation assets were utilized primarily in a rapid reaction role to afford unit com-manders the mobility and flexibility necessary to adjust to the changing intelligence situation.

(a) Units:

1. 196th Bde Avn Detachment

2. 25th Avn Bn

3. 145th Avn Bn

4. 178th AMM Co

(b) Missions performed:

1. Command and control

2. Airmobile combat assaults

3. Aerial reconnaissance

4. Troop repositions

5. Artillery fire adjustment

6. Aerial resupply

7. Reposition of Artillery

8. Medical evacuation

(3) Artillery Support: 3d Bn, 82 Arty provided DS for the Brigade and controlled and cleared indirect fires within the Bde's TAOR. Operation FITCHBURG was a battalion size operation with battalions

rotating consequently, one 105 battery was placed in DS of the maneuver element. This gave the battery commander an excellent opportunity to exercise command and fire control independent of the artillery battalion. The principal mission of the Bde during this period consisted of static security missions, thus limited artillery fire was conducted. Battery security, FDC team drill, cannoneers training, maintenance and field fortifications were the principle learning areas.

(a) Positions occupied:

BATTERY GRID DATE OCCUPIED MEANS

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT338444 25 Nov 66 Convoy

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT345577 27 Nov 66 Convoy

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT117539 1 Dec 66 CH-47

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT115540 1 Dec 66 Convoy

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT053588 2 Dec 66 CH-47

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT257559 7 Dec 66 Convoy

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT257559 7 Dec 66 Convoy

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT166553 7 Dec 66 Convoy

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT337459 8 Dec 66 Convoy

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT449597 11 Dec 66 Convoy

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT087472 15 Dec 66 CH-47

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT089473 15 Dec 66 CH-47

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT447470 18 Dec 66 CH-47

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT133433 19 Dec 66 CH-47

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT358433 26 Dec 66 Convoy

Btry B, 3/82 Arty XT300561 26 Dec 66 Convoy

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT135404 26 Dec 66 CH-47

Btry C, 3/82 Arty XT305481 5 Mar 67 Convoy

Btry A, 3/82 Arty XT305481 9 Mar 67 Convoy

(b) Organization:

1. 3/82 Arty - Provided arty support for the defense of TAY NINH base camp and DS to the Brigade.

2. Btry B, 2/13 Arty - Provided arty support for the defense of TAY NINH base camp.

3. Btry C, 2/13 Arty - Provided arty support for the defense of TAY NINH base camp.

4. Btry B, 3/13 Arty - Attached to 3/82 Arty.

5. Btry C, 2/32 Arty - GSR 3/82 Arty.

6. Btry B, 2/35 Arty - GSR 3/82 Arty.

VC KIA (BC) 24

VC KIA (POSS) 25

Huts Destroyed 41

Bunkers Destroyed 20

Sampans Destroyed 12

Foxholes Destroyed 15

Oxcarts Destroyed 3

Caves Closed 6

Secondary Explosion 11

(d) Missions fired and rounds expended:

1. 105mm

H&I missions 4087 missions 8613 rds

Support missions 761 missions 11196 rds

2. 155mm

H&I missions 1520 missions 3095 rds

Support missions 298 missions 5960 rds

3. 8"

H&I missions 375 missions 755 rds

Support missions 138 missions 799 rds

4. 175mm

H&I missions 379 missions 691 rds

Support missions 116 missions 726 rds

(e) Ammunition expenditures:

HE: 31,532 WP: 917 ILL: 106

(4) 8th Support Battalion: Provided continuous resupply of all classes.

(5) 175th Engineer Co: Provided general engineer support to the Bde, maintained routes of communication and emplaced tactical bridging in support of operations. Engineer personnel attached to the Infantry Battalions were utilized in destruction of mines, booby traps and fortifications. Significant missions performed were:

CONFIDENTIAL

LOCATION MISSION

TRAI BI Improved the existing air strip and dug a well from 29 November - 1 December

XT135619 Repaired a crater in the road on 3 December

XT277514 Removed and M4T6 dry spand bridge and installed a culvert

XT338458 Constructed timber bridge

XT328407 Repaired a bridge abutment on 18 December

XT215546 Repaired a timber bridge on 2 January

(6) Signal:

(a) 196th Brigade Communications Platoon

(b) 156th Signal Platoon

(7) 48th Scout Dog Platoon: Utilized on patrols and ambushes.

(8) 196th Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment: The LRRP was used on reconnaissance missions and ambushes throughout the period.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: See ANNEX A.

9. (U) MISSION: The 196th Lt Inf Bde conducts Search and Destroy operations, conducts security of TAY NINH base camp and fixed installations within the Brigade's TAOR.

10.(C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: For the purpose of this report Operation FITCHBURG will be divided into 25 phases. Each phase will cover the unit and area of operation during the specified period. FITCHBURG consisted of one Brigade size operation. The remainder of the operations were battalion or company size operations within the Brigade's TAOR.

11.(C) EXECUTION:

a. For area of operation see ANNEX B.

b. Operation FITCHBURG has been divided into 25 phases.

(1) Phase I (25 November - 29 November) The 4th Bn, 31st Inf relieved the 2d Bn, 1st Inf of its mission of route security of Hwy 26 in AO BLUE. Enemy contact was made on 2 occasions with unknown results.

(2) Phase II (28 November - 30 November) The 3d Bn, 21st Inf with C Co, 1st Bn 5th Mech attached conducted a Bn (+) S&D operation in the THANH DIEN Forest south of the TAY NINH base camp in AO-2. The operation was in conjunction with the PHILCAG and ARVN for the purpose of clearing the forest prior to the PHILCAG beginning their New Life Hamlet. Contact with the enemy was established twice during the operation with unknown results.

(3) Phase III (1 December - 6 December) The Brigade conducted S&D operations in AO-3 with 3 battalions; 2/1 Inf, 3/21 Inf, and 4/31 Inf. Concurrently 3 CIDG companies under the control of team B 32 USSF conducted S&D operations to the west vic XT0358 in support of the operation. No significant enemy contact was made and the operation was terminated on 6 December.

(4) Phase IV (7 December - 14 December) The 4th Bn, 31st Inf conducted S&D operations vic NUI BA DEN. The operation began with one company conducting an airmobile assault vic XT257555, south west side of NUI BA DEN to secure a Fire Support Base. The battalion (-) followed in convoy to begin search and destroy operations in the areas. The operation ended 14 December when the battalion minus two companies returned to base camp. No significant enemy contact was made.

(5) Phase V (8 December - 11 December) 3/21 Inf conducted a search and destroy operation in AO BLUE and secured Hwy 26 vic XT3445 with Co A, Co C and AT Platoon from Co D. The operation was termin-ated on 11 December. The operation resulted in 11 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (POSS), 3 VC CHA, 1 M-1 rifle, 8 60mm mortar rounds.

(6) Phase VI (7 December - 22 December) The 2d Bn, 34th Armor consisting of two tank companies and a recon troop was attached to the Brigade on 7 December. They conducted search and destroy operations in AO BLUE and secured Hwy 26. One company was attached to reinforce the

battalion. This operation terminated on 22 December when the battalion headquarters, the recon troop and the tank company returned to their base camp vicinity of LONG BINH.

(7) Phase VII (8 December - 12 December) The 2d Bn, 1st Inf was airlifted via HU-1D's in 8 lifts from TAY NINH Base camp to vic XT158608 (AO WHITE) to conduct search and destroy operations vic XT

171610. Initial lift was airborne 080833 December 66 with touchdown of final lift at 081005 December 66. Battalion returned to base camp on 12 December 66. No enemy contact was made during the operation.

(8) Phase VIII (14 December - 23 December) The 3d Bn, 21st Inf with companies A, B, C and D(-) conducted a search and destroy operation along both sides of the Oriental River sweeping southeast from

vic XT1046 to XT1940. The operation was terminated on 23 December. The operation resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (POSS), 1 - 7.92 submachine gun, 1 Chicom claymore mine and 1600 lbs of polished rice.

(9) Phase IX (16 December - 23 December) the 2d Bn 1st Inf conducted search and destroy operations in AO Black vic WT996485. The Battalion (-) conducted an airmobile assault on LZ X-RAY, vic WT996485 and establish a forward CP vic XT010504. Daily search and destroy operations were conducted throughout this period. The Battalion was airlifted and returned to base camp on the 23 of December. No significant enemy contact was made.

(10) Phase X (22 December - 26 December) the 4th Bn, 31st Inf relieved task force Staley in place and assumed the security mission along Hwy 26 in AO BLUE from XT308487 to XT376425. The operation terminated 26 December with limited enemy contact.

(11) Phase XI (26 December - 30 December) The 4th Bn, 31st Inf conducted a search and destroy operation in conjunction with one RF/PF company in the southeastern portion of AO BLUE. The operation ended on 30 December when the battalion returned to TAY NINH base camp. The operation resulted in 3 VC KIA (BC).

(12) Phase XII (1 January - 4 January) the 3rd Bn, 21st Inf conducted S&D operations in AO GREEN, VC XT226572. The battalion CP moved forward with Btry B, 3/82 Arty. Companies A, B, and C conducted local patrolling vic NUI BA DEN. The battalion terminated S&D operations and closed TAY NINH base camp at 041546 hrs. No significant enemy contact was made.

(13) Phase XIII (1 January - 7 January) The 2nd Bn, 1st Inf conducted route security of Hwy 26 in AO BLUE and rock quarry security vic NUI BA DEN. Two rifle companies (B & C), Recon plat and

Mortar plat with elements of Hq Co (CP Group), established forward CP vic XT340423, with mission of securing Hwy 26 from coordinates XT308486 to XT373423. Concurrently, they conducted surveillance patrols in area 4,000 to 5,000 meters North and South of the Highway. Co A, 2/1 Inf, with AT plat attached, located at forward CP vic XT267572 and continued security of quarry (rock crusher site) on NUI BA DEN (Black Virgin) Mountain vic coordinates XT266577/XT263587. Company conducted day and night patrols in sector to insure that continual security was maintained. No significant enemy contact was made.

(14) Phase XIV (7 January - 25 January) The 4th Bn, 31st Inf conducted a route security of Hwy 26 in AO BLUE and rock quarry security vic NUI BA DEN. No significant enemy contact was made.

(15) Phase XV (26 January - 1 February) 4th Bn, 31st Inf moved to AO BLUE, vic XT305483, to secure Hwy 26. The company was dispatched to secure the rock crusher site. This was executed according to FRAGO #15 to OPORD 21-66, 196th Lt Inf Bde, 27 Jan 67, and FRAGO 1-67 to OPORD FITCHBURG, 4/31 Inf, 27 Jan 67. The Battalion conducted route security of Hwy 26 in AO BLUE and rock crusher security vic NUI BA DEN.

(16) Phase XVI (27 January - 31 January) 3rd Bn, 21st Inf conducted OPORD 3-67, a BUDDY operation with PHILCAG's Civic Action program operation RELIEF. Co A and Btry B, 3/82 departed base camp 281235 hrs and closed FSB vic XT160467 at 1340 hrs. Battalion CP, Co B and 2nd plat A Trp, 3/4 Cav, departed base camp 280858 hrs and closed FSB vic XT160467 at 0946 hrs. The battalion conducted S&D operations in zone and supported the engineer effort which operated with PHILCAG. No signific-ant enemy contact was made.

(17) Phase XVII (28 January - 29 January) The 2nd Bn, 1st Inf conducted a BUDDY operation with CIDG and RF forces in AO RED. The operation commenced 0747 hrs with Co C having conducted an airmobile assault to LZ vic XT138403, AO RED. Unit cleared wooded areas NE and SW of LZ and secured artillery FSB. Btry A, 3/82 Arty was airlifted by CH-47 to FSB at 0825 hrs. Co A at 1022 hrs conducted an airmobile assault to LZ 2 vic XT127531. Co B recon and Hqs element at 1049 hrs conducted an airmobile assault to LZ 3 vic XT130369. Units conducted S&D operations vic Obj ALPHA (XT1336). No significant enemy contact was made.

(18) Phase XVIII (1 February - 18 February) The 3d Bn, 21st Inf assumed the local security missions around TAY NINH base camp during this period while the remainder of the Brigade participated in

Operation GADSDEN. Company A was responsible for route security of Hwy 26 in AO BLUE (XT3446), Company B with DUSTERS from 5/2 Artillery attached secured the rock quarry at NUI BA DEN vic XT160467 and Company C secured the 175th Engineer construction vic XT160467. On 3 February, 2/34 Armor (-) was attached to the Brigade for route security in AO BLUE. Company A, 3/21 Inf was attached to the 3/34 Armor until 7 February when 2/34 was released from Brigade control. Company A then assumed the security mission for Hwy 26. On 7 February 4/9 Inf and A Trp, 3/4 Cav were placed OPCON to the Brigade for base camp defense and security of the 25th Infantry Division Fwd CP at TAY NINH. Only 1 incident of significant VC activity took place and that was on 6 February at 0155 hrs, when Company B and the engineers at the rock quarry site vic XT267566 received 5-6 grenades resulting in 5 US KHA and 4 US WHA. Fire was returned with unknown results. Significant results achieved during this period were the destruction of the following items: 6 AT mines, 2 AP mines, 2 base camps, 10 huts, 3 tunnels, 1 booby trap, 1 trench, 2 spider holes, 1-60mm mortar position and 1-155mm round.

(19) Phase XIX (17 February - 20 February) The 4th Bn, 31st Inf conducted a battalion size S&D operation on NUI BA DEN. Company A with the Brigade LRRP attached searched the tunnel entrance vic XT292575, Company C blocked to the NE vic XT280605. The operation succeeded in providing the Brigade with detailed sketches of the tunnel complexes within the mountain and the capture of numerous supplies and documents.

(20) Phase XX (18 February - 21 February) 2nd Bn, 1st Inf relieved 3/21 Inf of rock quarry security at NUI BA DEN, HWY 26 security in AO BLUE and counter mortar radar security at the laterite pit.

On 18 February Company A vic XT268568 engaged 2 VC with unknown results. On 20 February a tank and APC from 2/34 Armor vic XT285507 and XT320475 detonated AT mines with no casualties and minor damage to the tracks.

(21) Phase XXI (21 February - 5 March) On 21 February 2/34 Armor (-) became attached to the Brigade and replaced 2/1 Inf of Hwy 26 security in AO BLUE and placed 1 plat Company A at rock quarry

vic NUI BA DEN. One plat Company D, 3/21 Inf was attached in AO BLUE for Hwy 26 security. One plat F Trp, 17th Cav was attached at the rock quarry site during the hours of darkness. One plat Company D, 3/21 Inf secured the counter mortar radar site vic XT111498 and one plat Company D, 4/31 Inf secured the 25th Infantry Division Fwd CP at TAY NINH base camp. F Trp 17th Cav conducted route clearing, security and convoy escort missions from TAY NINH along route 22 to TRAI BI and route 4 to BAU TAM UNG. In addition

F Trp provided security for the engineer projects in the TAY NINH area and from 17-21 February secured a downed C-130 vic XT215553. On 1 March 2/34 Armored Cav with one platoon from 3/21 Inf conducts route security of Hwy 26 in AO BLUE. At 010025H, Co C 2/34 Armor vic XT414441 was engaged by an unknown number of VC with SA, mortars, and anti-tank weapons. Fire was returned with SA, artillery and four air strikes. Flare ships and gunships also supported the engagement. Results were 2 US KHA, 8 US WHA, 2 tanks destroyed and 13 VC KIA (BC). Captured were PEG-2RR, 20 rds RPG, 4 AK-47 rifles, 1 Chicom rifle and 30 rifle grenades. On platoon from Co A, 2/34 Armor and one platoon from F Trp, 17th Cav secured the rock quarry at the base of NUI BA DEN. These missions continued until 03 March when the Bde was relieved of Hwy 26 security in AO BLUE. It was at this time that the 2/34 Armor was released from Bde control. F Trp, 17th Cav and one platoon from Co D, 3/21 Inf secured the rock quarry at NUI BA DEN from 03 to 04 March. During the month of March elements of the Bde were responsible for securing the 25th Inf Div's Fwd CP at TAY NINH base camp, laterite pit and counter mortar radar site. F Trp, 17th

Cav assisted with these security missions as well as conducting route clearing, security and convoy escort vic TAY NINH base camp.

(22) Phase XXII (05 March - 09 March) The 4th Bn, 31st Inf assumed Hwy 26 security when they relieved 3/4 Cav in AO BLUE. Co A relieved 3/21 Inf at the rock quarry site vic XT270566. Bn Hq, Co B

and Co D were located in AO BLUE. The Bn CP was established at XT306483 with Co B and Co D's CP at XT344449. Co A, 2/34 Armor was attached to the Bn effective 051200H and secured the eastern portion of Hwy 25 and 239. On 06 March at approximately 0045H, the Bn CP vic XT306482 received

approximately 70 rds of 75mm RR fire, negative casualties. Artillery and gunships fired on the area where the fire was suspected to have originated with unknown results. At 060805H a Vietnamese bus hit a land mine vic XT483426. The bus overturned and burned killing 6 and wounding 19. Assist-ance was given by Bn medical personnel in treating and evacuating casualties. At 061210H a tank from Co A, 2/34 Armor hit a mine at XT366427 with light damage to the tank and no casualties. At 061230H, Co A acting on an

agent report searched an area vic XT276576 where 20-30 VC were reported to be hiding in a cave with negative results. The Bn continued its security missions from 07 to 09 March with negative enemy contact.

(23) Phase XXIII (07 March - 09 March) The 2d Bn, 1st Inf, utilizing a company for each mission, secured the new counter mortar radar site (XT112537) and cleared/secured the rte and by pass from XT164549 to XT217550. Co C moved by convoy and foot and established a company base at XT112537. The company then secured the radar site, conducted local S&D operations and a BUSHMASTER operation in AO-3. Co A and Co B were assigned the daily missions of securing by-pass 4. Contact during the period was limited to one isolated incident of sniper fire. The operation was successful in that it denied the VC access to these areas and allowed the construction of By-Pass 4 to continue without incident.

(24) Phase XXIV (09 March - 14 March) The 2d Bn, 1st Inf moved by convoy to AO BLUE and NUI BA DEN. HHC, Co A and Co D were located at the rock quarry site vic XT267567. Local S&D operations and patrolling were conducted utilizing both conventional and WINDMILL methods. On 14 March Co A and HHC (-) returned to TAY NINH while Co D with one platoon from Co C attached remained in AO BLUE. During this period there was negative enemy contact, the roads were kept open, the VC were denied access to the area and convoys were able to travel between DAU TIENG and TAY NINH free from enemy harassment.

(25) Phase XXV (15 March - 08 April) The 3rd Bn, 21st Inf assumed the security missions in the vic of TAY NINH base camp. These missions included the rock quarry site at NUI BA DEN vic XT266567, Hwy 26 security in AO BLUE vic XT3346, security of the laterite pit and old radar site vic XT111498 and night ambush patrols and bunker line defense. On 27 March Co A and Co C conducted a search and clear operation of BEN RONG acting on information received from an informant with negative results. Operation FITCHBURG was officially terminated on 081200H April 1967.

c. Civil Affairs:

(1) Civic Action:

Playgrounds constructed 8

Fences built 4

Clothing distributed 2 tons

Captured rice distributed 69 tons

School kits distributed 708

Notebooks distributed 1000

Pencils distributed 1500

Tennis instruction 30 hours

English instruction 54 hours

MEDCAPS 163 patients

Toys distributed 1 1/2 tons

Chieu Hois' trained to 10

operate heavy equip-

ment at Rock Crusher

Hours of Health and

Sanitation instruction 12 hours

(2) PSYOPS:

Leaflets disseminated 1,187,000

Propaganda pieces distributed 14,200

by hand

hours of loudspeaker time 19 1/2 hours

12.(C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly:

KHA: 22 WHA: 99

b. Enemy:

VC KIA (BC) 55

VC KIA (POSS) 155

Structures 275

Detainees 148

Returnees 4

Hand Grenades 57

Bunkers 169

AP Mines 9

Rice 150.6 tons

Tunnels 45

Fish 93 lbs

Spiderholes 70

Batteries 7

Claymores 12

Bomb Shelters 26

Trenches 11

Kitchens 2

Boat Docks 3

Bicycles 9

Canteens 3

Tables 15

Rice Mills 3

Foxholes 158

Oxcarts 70

Sampans 55

Bombs 5

60mm mtr rds 18

Pistol Belt 7

AT Mines 10

105mm Rd 3

Booby Traps 8

Blasting Caps 3

Punji Pits 200

Base Camps 2

2.75" Warheads 2

Livestock corrals 2

VC Canteen 1

Wallets 5

Pistols 1

Documents 116 lbs

Chickens 7

Salt 58 lbs

Rice Pol Machine 4

Shotguns 15

M-1 Carbines 12

Bolt Action Rifles 5

Carbines 12

SA Ammo 1,142 Rds

Piasters 2500

Grenade Launcher 1

30 cal expended rds 16

Clothing 5 lbs

Foxholes 19

Meters of Trench 975

Stell Helmet 1

M-79 rds 4

Arrows 12

82mm rds 6

Sony Radio 1

SA Fifles 3

Saws 2

55 gal drum of rice 1

13.(C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply: Battalions were responsible for their own resupply. The resupply of units in the field was accomplished either by helicopter or convoy.

b. Medical: Hospitalization was handled by the 45th Surgical Hospital at TAY NINH.

14.(C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Mine detectors were utilized on several phases of Operation FITCHBURG to the utmost and were found to be very effective in discovering metal type mines. It was discovered that the detectors pick up many other small metal objects under ground such as cans and large pieces of shrapnel. This at times slowed down road clearing operations.

15.(C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: Operation FITCHBURG was considered a successful operation for the Brigade in that it deprived the enemy freedom of movement within the area of operation. During the operation numerous base camps, training sites, bunkers, shelters, structures and supply caches were destroyed which should substantially lower the morale of the enemy, reduce the effectiveness of his training, as well as his

operations. The practice of remaining in a stationary FSB or patrol base in semi-pacified areas increases the effectiveness of small unit patrolling. The participating troops become familiar with the ara and adequate time is available for finding and destroying facilities.

16. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(Signed John G Keliher May for)

H.L. COOP

Maj AGC

ANNEXEX: A - Intelligence

B - Areas of Operation

DISTRIBUTION: Special

ANNEX A (Intelligence) to After Action Report Operation Fitchburg

1. (C) Weather and Terrain

a. Operation Fitchburg began during the transitional period between the wet season and the dry season. The weather for the first two months of the operation was characterized by occasional scattered

thundershowers with the mean maximum temperature in the low 90's and the mean minimum temperature in the low 70's. The weather between January and April was very warm and dry, with a few evening showers in March and early April. The mean maximum temperature during this period rose to the mid 90's and the mean minimum temperature to the mid 70's. Very few heat casualties were noted, as a result of high temperatures and the rain had no adverse affect on troops or equipment.

b. The terrain in the AO was generally flat and dry, except for the most prominent terrain feature in Tay Ninh Province, Nui Ba Den mountain. The mountain raises to a height of 987 meters and can be observed

from Saigon on a clear day. Trafficability was generally good throughout the AO.

c. The major obstacles in the area are the streams; Song Vam Co Dong which runs generally northwest-southeast through the AO; The Rac Ben Da which runs north-south in the western portion of the AO; and the Rach Cai Bac which runs towards the Cambodian Border and becomes the terrain feature separating the GVN and Cambodia. The streams presented obstacles to the Mech & Armor elements since they could not cross without bridging materials.

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2. (C) Preliminary Intelligence

a. Local force guerrillas were primarily the major VC forces considered to be operating in the AO. Several reconnaissance intelligence units were reported to be operating near Suoi Da, on Nui Ba Den, and in the vicinity of Trai Bai. Village guerrillas & hamlet security forces were known to be operating in many of the nearby villages, along with 3-4 men guerilla bands who moved throughout the AO.

b. It was felt that operations conducted in the AO would restrict the freedom of movement the VC previously enjoyed and it would weaken his ability to resupply his elements in the AO. Additionally, friendly operations would decrease considerably the possibility of an enemy attack on the Tay Ninh Base Camp or surrounding posts.

3. (C) Development of Intelligence

a. The following significant incidents occurred during the Operation.

(1) On 250410 Nov 65, B 3/21 patrol Nr 33 engaged Unk number of VC with one claymore, SA's and Arty fire Vic XT1604?5. VC returned fire and withdrew to SW. Results, no friendly casualties,

enemy unknown.

(2) On 251640 Nov, C 2/32 Arty engaged approx 25 VC Vic XT130384 with 44 rds 175mm HE. Results, 5 VC KIA (BC); 10 VC KIA (POSS). 1 structure destroyed.

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(3) On 252345 Nov B 2/1 patrol received 6 rds mortar of rifle grenades Vic their ambush site, Vic XT152547; 4rds of 105mm HE were fired at suspected enemy location Vic XT160542. Results, no

friendly casualties; enemy unknown.

(4) On 271320 Nov C 3/21 engaged 3 VC who approached their perimeter Vic XT143480. Individuals fled to the south. Results, 1 US WIA, 1VC KIA (POSS).

(5) On 281435 A 4/31 engaged one VC squad Vic XT353470 with SA and Arty. VC broke contact to the NW at 1445 hrs. Results no friendly casualties, enemy unknown.

(6) On 29 1240 Nov FAC O1G received UNK Nr of SA fire Vic XT041577. B 3/13 Arty engaged target with 27 rds - 155mm HE. Results 2 VC KIA (BC).

(7) On 011645 Dec, C124 received SA fire Vic XT166505. Altitude 400 ft, speed 85 kts, no hits. F/17 checked are with negative results.

(8) On 011430 Dec, C123 aircraft rec-d SA fire Vic XT183512. Altitude 1000 ft, speed 100 kts, no hits.

(9) On 011846 Dec, LRRP from 25th Div rec'd AW fire on LZ Vic XT073548. Fire came from northern tree line. One estimated 40 rd burst received. Helicopters were moving approx 5 ft off ground.

Acft proceeded to alternate LZ and rec'd 3 short bursts of AW fire from Vic XT068556. Flashes were observed Vic XT060550 and XT070544. Acft sustained no hits and returned to 196th Base Camp with LRRP.

(10) On 21330 Dec O1G of 1?4th Avn Co rec'd 4 rds SA fire Vic XT178389. Arty msn called. C 2/32 fired 13 rds 175 HE. Results firing, ceased.

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(11) On 022118 Dec, 3 4/31 had an explosive device detonated against their positions Vic XT056586. No cas.

(12) On 031230 Dec, C 4/31 had command detonated mine exploded against their position Vic XT060574 resulting in 4 US WIA.

(13) On 031445 Dec, A 4/31 engaged 2 VC Vic XT053575 with SA & AW fire. Results 1 VC KIA (POSS).

(14) On 031510 Dec, A 4/31 engaged 2 VC with SA fire in trench complex Vic XT053572. Arty msn called and fired. Results Unk.

(15) On 041100 Dec, A 2/1 found rice polishing machine Vic XT090535. Machine evacuated.

(16) On 041630 Dec. B 2/1 found arms repair shop Vic XT075542. Shop contained 13 shotguns, 5 M-1 Carbines, 1 Bolt Action rifle, 3 type 53 carbines, 3 type 56 carbines, 1 BAR, 1 pistol, 3 60mm

mortar rds, 2 AP mines, spare parts and tools for repair of wpns, and misc documents. AP mines nd shop destroyed. Other materials evac.

(17) On 041740 Dec C 4/31 rec'd one claymore type mine detonated against their position Vic XT060572 resulting in 7 US WHA. Fire returned with M79, 81mm mortars and Arty. Results of friendly

fire unknown.

(18) On 042000 Dec, B 4/31 observed 5 VC Vic XT0515589 trying to cross a river. Vc were engaged with SA and M79. Results 1 VC KIA (POSS).

(19) On 042045 Dec, C 4/31 rec'd SA 1 82mm mortar rd Vic XT061574 resulting in 1 US WHA.

(20) On 042045 Dec, 3 4/31 rec'd SA fire from across river Vic XT051589. Fire returned with SA and 81mm mortar. Results. Unk.

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(21) On 050930 Dec, UH1B from 126th Assault Helicopter Company rec-d hvy fire Vic XT09059. Four hits sustained. Hits in rotary blades, tail boom, and door. Pilot WHA. Arty mission called.

Firing ceased. Further results Unk. Altitude 500 ft, speed 60 kts.

(22) 061006 Dec, A 2/1 discovered a VC base camp Vic XT068560. Base Camp included 20 structures, 6 x 8 ft; one structure 6 x 12 ft; 50 spiderholes; 21 bomb shelters and 10 bunkers; all struc-

tures and positions were destroyed.

(23) On 081400 Dec, USAC FAC attached to 196th Bde engaged two VC on a sampan with 2 rds 155 HE from B 3/12 Arty Vic XT060527. Results 2 VC KIA (BC). 1 sampan destroyed.

(24) On 081710 Dec 4/31 reported that F 17 requested Arty fire on a cave entrance Vic XT278571 after observing unk number of VC. C 3/82 fired 61 rds, HE, B 3/13 fired 9 rds HE (155). Results 1 cave

destroyed, 3 VC KIA (BC).

(25) On 091205 Dec, B 3/21 engaged 4 VC Vic XT159468. VC returned fire with ? rds SA, and withdrew south. Results no friendly casualties; VC Unk.

(26) 091245 Dec, C 3/21 received 1 rd SA Vic XT312486 resulting in 1 US WHA. Sqd size patrol was dispatched to locate VC. At 091319 patrol engaged 12-15 VC with SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA

(BC), 2 VC KIA (POSS); 1 M1 rifle, 83 rds 30 cal ammunition, 1 pistol belt and miscellaneous documents captured.

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(27) On 091515 Dec, C 3/21 discovered a VC Base Camp location Vic XT335503 consisting of 7 structures and 3 bunkers; 1 claymore mine firing device, 2 bundles of paper, 1 wallet, 1 sack of 7.62mm

ammo; 50 sandbags, 8 60mm mortar rds. Structures were destroyed, material evacuated. Bunkers destroyed.

(28) On 110750 Dec, Tank from A 2/34 Armor detonated a pressure type mine Vic XT327397 causing slight damage to the tank.

(29) On 111730 Dec Door gunners and gunships from 71st Assault Helicopter Co engaged 15 VC Vic XT375367. Results 10 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (POSS).

(30) A VC named Nguyen Van Ranh surrendered to B 2/34 Armor Vic XT32235 on 11 Dec 66. Individual was interrogated by an IPW team, 569th MID and provided valuable intelligence information on

the organization of C33 local company and VC infra-structure in the Cau Khoi Planation area.

(31) On 130730 Dec, B 3/13 Arty fired 1 WP rd and 16 rds HE at 3 sampans and 4 VC Vic XT042545. Results VC KIA (POSS), 2 sampans destroyed, 1 secondary explosions, gray smoke.

(32) On 131045 Dec, B 2/1 engaged 4 VC Vic XT192646 with SA and AW. Results 1 VC KIA (POSS) and 1 Chicom Carbine captured.

(33) On 131305 Dec, B 2/1 discovered VC Base Camp Vic XT192647. Camp consisted of 3 bunkers 14' x 10' and a kitchen. Two bunkers had top cover and a third only partially finished. Kitchen

10' x 12'. Bunkers & kitchen destroyed.

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(34) On 160710 Dec 8 helicopters from the 71st Assault Helicopter Company rec'd light ground fire from Vic WT998488 as they departed LZ X-Ray. No hits, gunships placed suppressive fire into the

area and firing ceased.

(35) 170913 Dec, C 2/1 destroyed one structure, 20 foxholes 1000 lbs of loose rice, 5 lbs of salt and undetermined amt of peanuts Vic WT999519.

(36) 171915 B 4/31 received 9 rifle grenades or 60mm mortar rds in their position Vic XT124546, resulting in one US WIA. B 3/13 Arty fired on suspected mortar positions Vic XT115560. Area searched with negative results.

(37) On 210715 Dec, Tank from A 2/34th Armor detonated AT mine Vic XT313483 causing damage to two road wheels, no friendly casualties.

(38) On 210?10 Dec, Tank from 2/34th Armor detonated a mine Vic XT305490 resulting in no casualties and minor damage to the tank.

(39) On 211010 Dec, Dustoff Helicopter from 57th Medical Helicopter Ambulance Detachment received AW fire Vic XT151377 resulting in 6 hits on the aircraft, Alt 150 ft; speed hovering.

(40) On 221000 Dec, B 3/21 engaged 5 VC in base camp Vic XT158465, VC returned fire with SA, AW and M79 then withdrew. Results no friendly casualties, BC Unknown. The following items were captured 500 rds SA ammo, 1 wrist watch, 1 wallet, 300 lbs of rice, 2 small lamps, 2 rifle telescopic sights, miscellaneous clothing and hammocks.

(41) 231?33 Dec B 3/21 received AW and M79 fire from 6 VC Vic XT156455, resulting in 3 US WHA. Fire was returned. VC broke contact and withdrew NE then south. Unit located 2 Base camps in area

A-7

as they swept XT154456. They destroyed one structure and 100 meters of trench. Observed 2 heavy blood trails indicating 2 VC KIA (POSS).

(42) On 232231 Dec, B 3/21 patrol engaged 5 VC Vic XT156495 resulting in 2 VC KIA (POSS).

(43) On 241415 Dec, USAF FAC rec'd 4 rds SA from Vic XT001572, altitude 1500 ft, speed 85 kts, no hits.

(44) On 261636 Dec, A 4/31 received 1 rds 60mm mortar fire Vic XT376376 resulting in 2 US WHA. Arty msn fired Vic XT381375. Suspected enemy location.

(45) On 282030 Dec, ?A 4/31 reported 4 VC tripped a friendly claymore Vic XT373367 resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC) and capture of 3 M1 rifles (US) and 1 ? carbine and other miscellaneous items of equipment.

(46) On 291335 Dec HHC Btry, 3/82 Arty reported 2 1/2 ton ammo trk hit mine Vic XT380414. 2 US WHA. Trk damaged extensively. Mine constructed of 155mm shell with pressure fuze.

(47) On 300130 Dec CP 2/1 Inf rec'd 12 rds 82mm mortar Vic XT341458, resulting in 2 US WHA and 2 ARVN WHA. Counter mortar plan was put into effect. Results of enemy Unknown.

(48) On 312045 Dec, Patrol from D 3/21 was probed by estimated 5 VC in their patrol base Vic XT147486. VC employed 4 rifle grenades, sporadic SA fire. Fire was returned with SA, AW and Arty

fire. Results 1 US WHA, 1 VC KIA (POSS).

(49) On 022005 Jan, B 3/21 received harassing SA & AW fire Vic bunkers 1-7 from estimated 3-6 VC between 2005 and 2300; fire was returned with SA, flares. Negative friendly casualties, 1 VC KIA (POSS).

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(50) On 071300 Jan AO from 569th MID observed 4 VC digging a trench Vic XT000600. Called arty fire on VC. Results 4 VC KIA (POSS).

(51) on 1322040 Jan, 3/21 engaged Unk Nr VC Vic Bunker Nr 9, XT 156509 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (POSS).

(52) On 191045 Jan, O1-G from 14th Avn Co rec'd 10 rds SA Vic XT009553, altitude 1600 ft, speed 85 knots; no hits. Aircraft continued mission.

(53) On 211326 Jan, B 4/31 received 7 rifle grenades and 5 M79 rds Vic XT148473. Returned fire with SA, M79, AW and Arty fire, and searched area with negative results. 1 US WHA.

(54) On 251640 Jan B 3/21 received 2 burst AW fire and M79 rds from Vic XT287567. Returned fire with M16 and M79. Negative US casualties, VC Unk.

(55) On 281015 Jan C 2/1 destroyed 15 tons of loose unpolished rice Vic XT157451.

(56) On 281335 Jan B 3/21 destroyed a VC Base Camp Vic XT154466 consisting of 6 bunkers with connecting tunnels, 1 CBU booby trap.

(57) On 290120 Jan, 196th Lt Inf Bde Base Camp rec'd 88-82mm mortar rds Vic XT170524 and XT172521 resulting in 4 Philcagv WHA; 70 rds fell Vic XT165540. Three mortar positions were discovered

VC XT194548 during investigation on 29 Jan.

(58) On 291335 Jan, 588th Engr Truck hit a min Vic AT127511; results 1 US WHA.

(59) On 291920 Jan, A 4/31 engaged 3 VC Vic XT359505 with Arty. Results 3 VC KIA (POSS).

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(60) On 301415 Jan AO, 196th Lt Inf Bde engaged 8 VC Vic WT991568 with 12 rds 175mm HE resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).

(61) On 302215 Jan Ambush patrol BIRD rec'd SA fire and grenades at XT355436. Fire was returned and estimated 2-3 VC's fled south on the road. Area checked with negative results.

(62) On 311545 Jan F Trp escorting photographers to VC mortar positions XT193542 reported 20 more foxhole positions had been dug, 8 of which were not completed. A total of 63 foxhole positions

were found in the area.

(63) On 100820 Feb, Trk from Hq Co 4/31 hit a mine Vic XT287509 resulting in 5 US WHA.

(64) On 070155 Feb, B 3/21 and B 588th Engr were attacked at their positions Vic XT268568 by estimated 18 VC. VC fired 5-6 rifle grenades and SA. Fire was returned with SA, MG and M79. Results friendly fire unknown. 6 US KHA, 9 WHA.

(65) On 131730 Feb a FAC attached to 196th observed 6 VC Vic XT016565. Arty mission called resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC)

and 2 VC KIA (POSS).

(66) On 171245 Feb, Recon Plt 4/31 had VC turn himself in as a Chieu Hoi Vic XT312586. He had a safe conduct pass, an AK 47 rifle and 2 clips of ammo, and he was dressed in black trousers and

green short sleeve shirt. He said he was a member of the Co B 3/46 Gp/

(67) On 171300 A UH1D from 116th Avn in support of 2/1 rec'd small arms fire Vic XT08?555. The Acft rec'd 1 hit, but continued the mission. Gunships were called in and 81 mm mortars fired into the

area. No friendly casualties; results of friendly fire Unk.

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(68) On 181700 Feb A 4/31 and LRRP searched a tunnel complex on Nui Ba Den Vic XT29155745. The LRRP searched approx 300 meters of the natural tunnel and found five large natural rooms. The tunnel walls were marked with both black and white (chalk) arrows.

(69) 19045 Feb A 4/31 rec'd appro 12 rds of AW fire

at the mouth of the cave. Fire came from Vic XT291574. Fire returned with unknown results.

(70) On 191530 Feb A 4/31 found a new cave entrance Vic XT290572. Inside they found 5 lbs of documents and some cooking utensils. The documents were evacuated.

(71) (200950) A 2 1/2 Ton truck was destroyed when it detonated a AT mine Vic XT277513. 2 US WHA.

(72) On 201 55 Feb, Tank from 2/34 Armor detonated AT mine Vic XT320475 resulting in moderate damage to the vehicle and 1 US WHA.

(73) On 221745 Feb, Tank from 2/34 Armor hit AT mine resulting in 1 US ?HA, XT320475. Slight damage to tank.

(74) On 271300 Feb Charger Acft OH23 taking off at northern end of Tay Ninh Airstrip Vic XT172527 was hit by 1 rd of sniper fire. The rd went through helicopter and into foot of pilot. Altitude 800 ft, speed ?0 kts. Pilot landed helicopter at Tay Ninh Dust Off Pad.

(75) On 201045 Feb B 3/21 was engaged by an estimated VC squad with SA Vic WT975534 at a distance of 300-400 meters. Fire returned and Arty called into area. Arty fire was followed by an Air

A-11

Strike. Contact broken at 1110 hrs, and reestablished at 1115 hrs with more SA fire from VC. FAC spotted 10 VC running toward border WT95?53?. FAC was fired on with 3-8 rds enemy ground fire. Simultan-

eously 3/21 reported receiving fire from same Vic across the border. An Air Strike was called in on the location that SA fire came from VIC WT962540 and WT959540. Contact broken 1315 H. Results 3 US WHA -Enemy 3 VC KIA (BC) and 5 VC KBA (POSS).

(76) On 201110 Feb a dump truck from 175th Engr carrying a load of laterite detonated an AT mine Vic XT112542. Results 1 US KHA and 1 US WHA. Vehicle frontend was badly damaged.

(77) 041040 Mar, An ALO with the 196th Bde sighted 2 huts, 3 sampans and 6 VC vic XT021548. He fired 54 rds 20mm. Results 2 huts and 2 dampans destroyed, 3 VC KBA (POSS).

(78) On 061215 Mar A tank from A 2/34 Armor detonated AT mine XT366427 resulting in minor damage to the tank and no casualties.

(79) 061655 Mar FAC aircraft Vic XT156431 rec'd 11-25 rds AW or SA fire from Vic XT156431. Altitude 1500 ft, speed 75 kts, 1 hit minor damage to acft, no casualties. Acft continued mission.

(80) On 102315 Mar, Co D 4/31 heard an explosion beyond their perimeter. A check at first light revealed that a chicom Claymore had been set up and detonated about 25 meters out from one of their

positions Vic XT106534. No casualties.

3. Checkmate Operations

(1) During Operation FITCHBURG the Counterintelligence Section, 569th Military Intelligence Detachment provided the 196th Lt Inf Bde with Counterintelligence support. Mobile check points with

the National Police were conducted in the morning on Highway 26, near

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Cau Khoi Plantation, on Highways 15, 22 and 4 in the Vic of Tay Ninh District, and Cao Xa. Vehicles were stopped, GVN issued ID cards were checked for validity and compared against blacklists and vehicles

searched for contraband.

(2) Although the mobile checkpoints did not yield any tangible results, it is extremely possible that they interdicted vital VC lines of transportation, liaison, and communications.

4. (C) Conclusions:

a. As a result of Operation FITCHBRUG, most village and hamlet guerrillas were forced to limit their activities to low level harassment and interdiction of allied troops and facilities and the operation definitely hampered VC freedom of movement, especially during daylight.

b. No significant intelligence information was gained during Operation FITCHBURG, because of the Lack of significant engagements with the enemy.

A-13

Overlays to maps.

Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U) 14

_|_ 63

AO-1

--+--49

B-1

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Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U) 17

_|_ 58

AO-1

--+--48

B-2

Overlays to maps.

Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation 1

Fitchburg (U) \ / 4

/ \

AO-2

\ / 1

/ \

1 B-3

Overlays to maps.

Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U) 11

_|_ 64

AO-3

--+--50

B-4

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Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U)

_|_ 62

AO-4

--+--52

B-5

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Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U)

_|_ 64

AO-5

--+--50

B-6

Overlays to maps.

Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U)

_|_ 58

--+--50

B-7

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Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U)

_|_ 65

AO-6

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B-8

Overlays to maps.

Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U)

_|_ 64

AO-5

--+--50

B-9

Overlays to maps.

Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U)

52 _|_

AO Blue

--+--42

B-10

Overlays to maps.

Annex B (Areas of Operation) to Operation

Fitchburg (U)

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AO Blue

46--+--

B-11

The Battle Of Soui Cut-FSB Burt

Thirty years ago - on the night of January 1 - 2, 1968 , the 2-22 Infantry (Mechanized), 3-22 Infantry, and the 2-77Artillery were involved in a massive human wave attack by four battalions of NVA and VC at a place called Fire Support Base Burt in Vietnam. Throughout the night, the 22nd Infantrymen, supported by their artillery brothers and helicopter crewman from the 187th and 188th Assault Helicopter Companies fought back against the determined enemy assault. When the firing stopped between 0530 and 0600 the next morning, The Americans were victorious in repulsing the attack. Over 401 NVA and VC were killed with American losses at 23 killed and 153 wounded.

From : Dennis Atkins, C/3-22, 67 - 68

Dear John, I sit here in awe after reading the accounts of men I have never met but who were beside me and above me the night of January 1, 1968 at FSB Burt.

The dust kicked up by armored personnel carriers hung in the hot, still, humid air like a red veil. Upon arriving at FSB Burt you could feel the uneasiness of the area like some sinister, invisible force trapping you in its cloak. You knew this place was bad.

Charlie Company, 3/22 Infantry had come to join the rest of the battalion , as 3rd platoon leader I was assigned the last five positions on the south edge of the perimeter ending on the east side of the road that led out of the fire support base. The next position on the other side of the road was a platoon of APC's from the 2/22 Infantry.

The foxholes we inherited were poorly dug, lacking depth and overhead cover, due to the extremely hard digging conditions. Entrenching tools seemed to bounce off the cement-like earth yielding only a chip of dirt with each tiring heave of the shovel. The heat of the day increased the men's frustration and grumbling. "This is deep enough, lieutenant." No, it's not. We'll keep digging until dark if it's necessary. Besides, the dirt that comes out of that hole is needed to fill sandbags for your overhead cover." I was not a popular man that afternoon.

Heavy foliage encroached this section of the perimeter and even with brush cutting we were only able to clear a maximum of 15-20 meters field of vision before beginning to lose light at days end. Using the cover of dusk, the men put out a heavy concentration of trip flares and claymore mines in front of our five positions on the perimeter. Darkness would soon be upon us.

One by one, as the men rotated from their foxholes through the chow line several rounds of incoming mortar fire interrupted the evening meal. I remember the secure feeling I had during the massive counter-mortar fire barrage that encircled us for what seemed like more than a half hour. "That kind of firepower ought to settle things down for the night," I said to my platoon sergeant, SSGT Alfred Beebe, as I curled up for the night.

Just as I was about to fall asleep, around 2300 hr.'s, I heard the cries of "Incoming!" and the unmistakable "bloop,bloop, bloop" of incoming mortar rounds. Everyone was diving for cover in their foxholes. This time, instead of just a few harassing rounds of fire, there came a relentless rain of explosions and hot, jagged steel. As the bombardment began, the three man listening post one hundred meters out in front of our perimeter called in a report of massive movement all around them and then silence...this was the last radio contact we would have from them.

Fifteen minutes into the shelling the M-60 machine gun positioned at my left most bunker opened fire with a fury. Before I could check what was going on the radio crackled with a call from the company commander, Cpt. Fishburne, screaming to find out what was happening. As I looked out the ground level firing port of my command post, trip flares began popping to my front like popcorn, washing the jungle in a sea of white light. The foliage transformed into a moving wall of humanity as thick as any mob of shoppers in the mall the day before Christmas. In an instant, my middle bunker immediately in front of me went up in an explosion and the firing enemy soldiers poured through the gap the way a mighty flood races through a failed levee, engulfing everything in its path. As they swarmed over us, screaming and firing wildly into the night, some would stop and try to enter our bunkers from the rear only to be met with a frantic hail of gunfire from the defenders inside.

The radio crackles again, Fishburne screaming for help! "The VC are on the roof of the CP firing down through the sandbags. They're trying to come in the back door! Help! Send somebody to get them off of us!..." The radio went silent.

All defensive integrity of the perimeter in my sector was gone. Each of my remaining four bunkers had become an isolated pocket of American resistance fighting for their lives, firing in every direction. There was no way to approach them. Since I was the only one in my CP who clearly knew the location of the Company command bunker I instructed Sgt. Beebe to take charge. I told my RTO, David "Smitty" Smith, to leave his radio, grab his weapon, bandoleers of ammo and some frags and follow me.

As we crawled out of the safety of the bunker we entered a world of darkness punctuated with bright flashes, red and green trails of tracer bullets zipping and cracking everywhere around us. The acrid smell of cordite singeing our nostrils and choking our every breath. Trying to avoid detection we only fired at the enemy soldiers that trampled over us as their hordes rushed to the interior of the base. In spite of the confusion our gunfire marked our position and the ground around us erupted in a hail of bullets from a nearby Chi-Com assault rifle. Smitty called out "Hey, there's a hole over here!" In the darkness he had recalled crawling through a shallow depression about four inches in depth a few feet to our rear. Oval shaped, it was large enough for us to lay on our stomachs and intertwine our legs. Smitty facing one direction and I facing the other we engaged an unseen enemy that zeroed in on our position. In an instant, with a blinding flash and a thunderous concussion, the night stopped...the only sensation was that of a great fire in my right leg, dirt in my mouth and nose, and the deafening ringing in my ears. Then nothing...

From the depths of nothingness a distant rumble is detected. As though a volume control knob was being turned, the noise becomes closer and louder. As the mind's confusion begins to clear, a new sensation is felt. Something is bouncing off of my leg. Now the noise is hammering my ears and I realize that it is machine-gun fire. Spent cartridges are bouncing off my leg with every burst of fire. The VC are using me for cover like some fallen log! I lay motionless as in death, trying to conceal the beating of my heart, the function of my lungs. My left arm is trapped under my body and has lost all sense of function. Feeling the presence of at least two enemy soldiers my mind searches for a plan of action. The cacophony of the battle rages on. This time a new sound is added, the impact of incoming artillery rounds. We must have had to call in artillery on our own positions. All sense of time is lost. Somewhere in that timeless state, playing dead, wondering if, for the moment, I am the only American alive, I waited to die.

Again the world is rocked by a massive explosion, mere feet away. The force of the blast throws me into the darkness, again filling my airways with dirt and dust. And again, a force like I've never known delivers me into nothingness. The enemy soldiers that once had used me for cover had now shielded me from the deadly shower of shrapnel from an exploding 105mm round which landed ten feet away.

As consciousness came back to me I listened intently for sounds of life and movement around me. Cautiously, I slowly moved my head. Nothing but the raging sounds of war. In the darkness I slowly surveyed my surroundings. Dead enemy, my helmet, my weapon, and Smitty's cold, lifeless body. I crawled in the direction that I hoped would be toward my platoon CP. Although bullets continued to fly everywhere there weren't any NVA in my path. Stopping a short distance from the silhouette I recognized to be my bunker, I watched and listened for clues that might tell me who occupied it. M-16 rifle fire was coming from it but I couldn't be sure if it was coming from GIs or NVA. From a position of cover, rifle ready to lay down fire, I verbally challenged the hole with our pre-determined emergency password. Thank God, I heard Sgt. Beebe's voice in reply, identified myself and scrambled to safety.

Beebe had given me up for dead hours earlier when I failed to make the company command bunker. The enemy trying to take that position earlier had been killed when the artillery had leveled their howitzers and fired bee hive rounds. He had been unable to leave the bunker and check on the other positions but a reinforcement element was on its way from the Battalion Recon platoon. The platoon medic was wounded but stable, Jimmy Pierce, the other RTO was okay and unknown to Beebe at the time, he had taken a fleschette from a bee hive round through the stomach and out his back.

As darkness was beginning to give way to first light, 12 men from the Recon arrived at my CP. Starting with my first bunker position on the left we re-established our defense, leaving a couple of fresh troops at each bunker. The center bunker that had been blown up at the onset of the attack was still occupied by enemy soldiers. I maneuvered the Recon squad from one angle and had them open fire distracting the enemy while I crawled up on their blind side and pitched in a grenade I had let cook. By the time we had covered and re-established all five bunkers I had counted six MIA's including the three men out on the listening post. We had to fight our way out to the LP through the retreating enemy forces and recovered two seriously wounded platoon members and one KIA. During the reorganizing at dawn, the NVA melted back into the jungle. Through the smoke that covered the land in the morning I found ;my three missing men, away from their positions, dead on the battlefield.

Among the many brave men that were there that night, Mike Balser, 2nd platoon leader, Charlie company 3/22 is the lieutenant who made his way back to the perimeter up the road from south. He had lead an ambush patrol out the night before and was overrun by the advancing enemy forces. He too, has a story from Hell, that will be a part of him for the rest of his days.

As the dust off flights were taking men out I remember sitting on a log looking at the six poncho covered bodies of the men I lost that night. My tears streamed down my grimy cheeks at the loss of such fine men. Somewhere a chaplain appeared and placed his arm across my shoulder and assured me it was all right to let it out.

As I made my way to one of the last dustoff birds out, I was eager to lift off and leave that place forever. The night before we had been a platoon of 29 men. That morning there were six KIA, 16 wounded, and seven left in the field to be the 3rd Platoon of Charlie Company, 3/22 infantry.

THE BATTLE OF SOUI TRE

On 19 March 1967, the 145th Combat Avaition Battalion distinguished itself by exceptionally valorous actions in the prelude of what was to become known as the battle of Soui Tre- the most significant one/day battle to date in the III Corps Tactical Area. The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion was operating in direct support of 3rd Brigade, 4th infantry Division, with the mission to conduct a combat assult into a landing zone located approximately five miles north of Suoi Da, Republic of Vietnam. The initial operational plans were made for the assult to take place on 18 March 1967, several miles further north of the actual landing zone: however obstacles prevented the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) and the 22nd Battalion, 34th Armor from securing the landing zone as planned. On the evening of 17 March, the assault was rescheduled for 19 March with the landing zone changed to the new location. The armored and mechanized elements were unable to meet this new schedule. It was then decided that the assault would be conducted into an unsecured landing zone with the armored and mechanized elements scheduled to reinforce the infantry at a later time. The hazards of this unsecured landing zone were known to be many as there were relatively few clearings in the dense jungle which were adequate for airmobile operations. Past experience indicated that when there were few clearings in the area, the Viet Cong either mine or establish ambushes on or near the potential landing zones. Professionalism and esprit de corps prevailed as the aviators of the 68th and 118th Assult Helicopter Companies eagerly awaited the termination of the twenty minute artilly preparation which would mark the beginning of the first lift. The assault was under the control of the Commanding Officer, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion. The lift units were supported by gunships of both assault helicopter companies and those of the 334th Armed Helicopter Company. The first lift encountered little resistence upon entering the landing zone, but received automatic weapons fire upon departure. At the moment the aircraft of the second lift touched down, a command detonated 155mm artillery round was exploded. Two helicopters were completely destroyed and five others seriousy damaged from sharpnel. More mines were detonated and the landing zone became a holocaust of fire and flying steel. The Viet Cong were in well established bunkers and had numeric superiority- it was later learned that major portions of two Viet Cong regiments were engaged in the battle. Heroism became the norm rather then the exception. Realizing the necessity for reinforcing the ground units already in the landing zone, the decision