After Action Reports 8

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report of the Battle for TAY NINH (U)

1. (U) Name of operation: The Battle for TAY NINH (U).

2. (U) Dates of operation: 17 August to 27 September 1968.

a. Map, CAMBODIA, 1:50,000, Series L7016; Sheets 6132 II,

6131 I and 6131 II: and VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L7014; Sheets 6232 III,

6231 IV, 6231 III, 6232 II, 6231 I and 6231 II (inclosure 1).

b. Pictomap supplement to standard 1:50,000 scale map, VIETNAM,1:25,000, Series L8020;

Sheets 6231 III N, 6231 IV S and 6232 III N (inclosure 2).

c. Map, VIETNAM, 1:100,000, Sheets 6131, 6132, 6231 and 6232, SeriesL607 (inclosure 3).

d. Map, Controlled Mosaic, TAY NINH, Series L001, Sheets 70-76,70-77, 71-75, 71-76,

a. US 25th Infantry Division (Tropic Lightning).

b. Headquarters, TAY NINH Province (ARVN).

c. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (ARVN) (August).

d. Headquarters, Airborne Division (ARVN) (September).

5. (U) Reporting Officer: MG Ellis W. Williamson, Commanding General,25th Infantry

Division, APO San Francisco 96225. This Combat After Action Report was compiled

by the C0, 18th Military History Detachment(Major Richard A. Baun),

APO San Francisco 96225 and the 20th Military History Detachment

(Major Charles C. Pritchett and SP5 George R. Skinner),

APO San Francisco 96375. Contributions were made by C0, 16th Military History

Detachment (Major Paul W. Child, Jr.), C0, 26th Military History

Detachment (1LT Raymond F. Bullock) and C0, 27th Military History Detachment

(Major Donald A. Lacey), APO San Francisco 96375.

6. (U) Personnel interviewed: See inclosure 5.

a. US 25th Infantry Division: See inclosure 6.

b. Teams A-301, A-322 and A-323 subordinate to Team B-32, Company A, 5th Special

(1) All provincial and district Regional Forces, Popular Forces (inclosures 7 and 8),

Census Grievance cadre, Revolutionary Development cadre, Provincial Reconnaissance

units, Self Defense units, Armed Propaganda Teams and one Armored Car platoon

(V-100). Artillery which was deployed by platoons in each district town and the

(2) 2d Troop, 10th Cavalry Squadron (organic to 25th ARVN Division, attached to

(3) 51st Ranger Battalion (19 to 29 August).

(4) Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (ARVN) (Command Element).

(1) All provincial Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Census Grievance cadre,

Revolutionary Development cadre, Provincial Reconnaissance units,Self Defense

units, Armed Propaganda Teams and one Armored Car platoon (V-100). Artillery

deployed by platoons in each district town and the provincial city. The Regional

and Popular Forces units were deployed the same as in August.

(2) Headquarters, Airborne Division; Headquarters, 3d Airborne Brigade; 2d Airborne

Battalion; 4th Marine Battalion; 5th Airborne Battalion; Battery A and Battery B,

1st Airborne Artillery Battalion; and Mortar Platoon (81mm), Headquarters Company,

(3) Headquarters, Task Force B; 2d Marine Battalion; 3d Marine Battalion; 6th

2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm) and 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (175mm/8 inch),

6th and 7th Transportation Battalions, 48th Transportation Group

136th Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-100) (Air National Guard)

188th Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-100) (Air National Guard)

147th Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-100) (Air National Guard)

352nd Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-100) (F-100)

120th Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-100) (Air National Guard)

5th Special Operations Squadron (Spooky) (AC-47)

19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (0-1) (FACs)

a. TAY NINH Province, located northwest of SAIGON, is bordered on the north, west

and south--southwest by CAMBODIA. It shares its southern and eastern borders with

HAU NGHIA, BINH DUONG and BINH LONG Provinces, RVN. TAY NINH, the capital city of

the province, is located approximately 99 kilometers from SAIGON and

approaimately 25 kilometers from the CAMBODIAN border. TAY NINH is not considered

a delta province, but many delta topographical features are prevalent. In the

southwestern half of the province, the countryside is characterized by rice paddy

terrain which is heavily flooded during the rainy season. The southeastern

quadrant of the province is also flat with a mixture of rice paddies, cultivated

rubber plantations and forests. The northern half is characterized by flat jungle

b. The two seasons in the province are the monsoon, which lasts from May to December,

and the dry, which lasts from January until April. The temperature ranges between

c. One of the most prominent mountains in RVN, NUI BA DEN (BLACK LADY or VIRGIN

Mountain), is located approximately 10 kilometers to the northeast of TAY NINH

City. This mountain was a stronghold of the Viet Minh for years and is now

controlled by the Viet Cong with the exception of the summit which was captured

in 1964 and became a US communications site. The area to the north of NUI BA DEN

is considered generally an unpacified area. This area, known as WAR ZONE "C", is

sparsely populated and the suspected location of COSVN Headquarters, the

the Viet Cong. Operations ATTLEBORO, BIRMINGHAM, JUNCTION CITY, YELLOWSTONE and

WILDERNESS have been some of the larger operations which have been conducted in TAY NINH

d. TAY NINH Province is the accepted center of the Cao Dai religion which claims

approximately 200,000 followers out of the province's total estimated 310,000

population. The great temple or Holy See of the Cao Dai is located in LONG HOA

near the provincial capital. This religious sect had a 50,000 man army at one time

and was considered one of the leading political forces in the country. Generally,

the Cao Dai have been pro-government but attempts in the past have been made by

the Viet Cong to enlist their support or at least neutralize their political

beliefs. The province chief for the past few years was a Cao Dai, however, he was

replaced by a Catholic prior to the attack in September 1968.

e. The province has a land area of over 392,500 hectares and is politically divided in

to four districts: HIEU THIEN, KHIEM NANH, PHOUC NINH and PHU KHUONG. A III Corps

CORDS brief which contains additional background information is attached (inclosure 9).

f. Officials of TAY NINH Province were uncertain of the enemy's intentions and

capabilities in March, April and May 1968 as his troop strength was largely unknown.

However, two VC provincial battalions, two VC provincial companies and the local VC

district guerrilla organizations were confirmed to be operating within the

provincial boundary. Infiltration through the province towards SAIGON had increased

to about a battalion a day in preparation for the enemy's next offensive against

the nation's capital. These infiltrating, battalions assisted the local guerrilla

and provincial units as they passed through, in exchange for guides, food, supplies,

g. The enemy infiltrated into the province from CAMBODIA west of the FISH HOOK area

(XT5890) into a staging area south and east of KATUM (XT3390) near the Saigon

River west of the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation (XT5650) and east of SUI DA (XT3357).

Among the several infiltration routes from this stronghold or staging area was one

through the CAU KHOI Rubber (XT3240) west across the VAM CO DONG River through the

RENEGADE WOODS (XT2930) and into the ANGEL'S WING. This is an area in CAMBODIA east

of grid line XT2214 to XT2614 which is used by the enemy for staging attacks

against SAIGON (see inclosure 10). Considering the enemy's main stronghold and

infiltration route outlined above within the province, it was believed that one of

his objectives was to interdict National Route 22 near the CAU KHOI Rubber

Plantation (vic XT3135) and isolate TAY NINH City from SAIGON.

h. ARVN forces successfully defended the city in May against a three-battalion VC attack upon the

between the Cao Dai Temple (XT241496) and TAY NINH City (XT1950-2050)and upon the Special

Forces complex astride Highway 4 (XT204509). Advisor personnel believed this attack was

conducted by one of the infiltrating units. The province experienced more energy

initiated incidents inthe May Offensive than during the entire TET Offensive-Counter

i. An enemy recovery from the setbacks of the May attack began in June with harrassing

activities. In early July, intelligence reports revealed that a major attack upon

the city would be initiated. The 5th NVA and the 9th VC Division's bases had been

located in the province at XT4460 and XT1876 respectively. This is probably the

first time that two division size units were known to be located in the province.

By 20 July indications were clear that a large attack would be conducted against

the city within a few days. On 24 July, the Acting Commanding General, Brigadier

General William T. Gleason dispatched the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, to TAY NINH

Province to reinforce the 25th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade whose area of

operations generally encompassed the province. In addition to this battalion, the

brigade exercised operational control over the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M);

the 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry (M); the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry and the

2d Battalion, 34th armor (-B, C). Direct support artillery for the brigade was

furnished by the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery and general support by elements of

the 23d Artillery Group. With these forces, the brigade established a defensive

arc of artillery fire support bases around the city from which infantry units

could conduct wide ranging operations to interdict and preempt enemy movement on

TAY NINH City. At the same time, the brigade established similar defenses around

DAU TIENG, a major division base camp located in BINH DUONG Province 25 kilometers,

to the east of the city. Province headquarters assembled a battalion size RF

reserve composed of the 161st, 267th, 315th and 688th Rifle Companies which

operated under the supervision of the sector staff (the Province Chief is also

Sector Commander and has a staff of ARVN officers assigned. The staff is comparable

to a US infantry battalion) and had the mission of defending TAY NINH City proper.

The remainder of the outlying hamlets, villages and towns were protected by the

permanently assigned RF/PF forces and other local defense units such as Civilian

Irregular Defense Groups,Revolutionary Development cadre and Census Grievance cadre.

j. When the enemy attack failed to materialize in late July and the battle lull that

had characterized action in the province since mid-May continued, intelligence data

and information were reassessed. The datefor the predicted attack was established

as early August and later moved forward to mid-August. The need to change the

attack dates was believed to be the result or extensive preemptive actions

conducted throughout the province to counter the enemy build-up. Among these

measures was a steady increase of B-52 bomber strikes against suspected enemy base

camps, supply caches and assembly areas. In August, September and October 1968, a

total of 253 missions were flown in the province (inclosures 1.1 and 12).

Generally, each mission contained six aircraft with each averaging 30,000 pounds of

ordnance. Several US advisors believed that the extensive use of the B-52 strikes forced

the enemy to stay above ground at all times and, therefore, be susceptible to artillery

fire which was employed in abundance from the various fire support bases.

k. Intelligence reports later confirmed that two enemy battalions were destroyed by

these B-52 strikes. One of these battalions, located in the STRAIGHT EDGE WOODS

(XT1334), was believed to have had the mission of attacking the city from the

south. The other was located in an advance position north of NUI BA DEN. Sector

personnel believed that the B-52 atrikes probably forced the enemy to delay his

attack upon the city because of his heavy losses and the need to regroup and

l. All allied forces located within the III ARVN Corps Tactical Zone were participating

in Operation TOAN THANG or COMPLETE VICTORY which was initiated by OPORD 5-68,

Headquarters, II FFORCV and III ARVN Corps, dated 5 April 1968. Based on this

order, the 25th Infantry Division (US) prepared and issued OPORD 1-68 to all

organic units (inclosure13). Message AVFBC-OP #050470, Commanding General,

II FFORCV, subject:Operaticn TOAN THANG (U), dated 31 May 1968, redesignated the

campaign as Operation TOAN THANG II effective 312400 May 1968 (inclosure 14).

These forces had been involved in a similar operation entitled RESOLVED TO WIN

which began subsequent to the 1968 TET Offensive and terminated just prior to the

m. Essentially, there were no ARVN units based or operating in the province at the

beginning of August with the exception of artillery platoons (two tubes) deployed

in the province and district towns. The local forces, RF/PF etc., were committed

primarily to the defense of fixed installations, hamlets, bridges, etc., and were

available for only limited daytime operations.

n. TAY NINH Province is generally located within the tactical areas of interest of

the 25th Infantry Division (ARVN) and the. US 25th Infantry Division

(inclosure 15). Elements of the 1st Infantry Division (US) and the 5th Special

Forces Group also operated within the area. Camps operated by the Special Forces

were located at BEN SOI (XT092476), KATUM (XT330898), THIEN NHON (XT087816),

TRANG SUP (XT170555) and TAY NINH (XT 204509).

o. Many consider the entire heavily populated complex to be TAY NINH City; however,

this is a misconception as TAY NINH City proper is generaly the portion of the

complex located in grid squares XT1950, XT1951 and XT2050 (inclosure 16).

a. The enemy concentrated upon two objectives within the III Corps Tactical Zone

after conducting his unsuccessful offensives against SAIGON in May and June. These

"Liberate" the country section by section.

Inflict heavy casualties upon friendly forces especially the 25th Division (US)

and necessitate the redeployment of free world forces away from SAIGON, then

c. For detailed information on the activities of the above enemy units see inclosures

d. Weather: The months of August and September were in the middle of the southwest

monsoon season. The weather was characterized by hot humid days with heavy rain

showers in the late afternoon and early evening hours. There were about 12 hours

of daylight during this period. The sun rose at 0641 hours and set at 1903 hours

in early August. By late September, daylight hours were reduced as sunrise was at

e. Terrain: The northern half of the province is characterized by dense, heavily

vegetated forest/Jungle. The western portion of the southern half is open, flat,

agricultural land with patches of forest; and the southeast has open land, forests

and four large rubber plantations. The rubber Plantations, as well as the central

portion, have a network of relatively good dirt roads. Trafficability for foot,

vehicle and tracks, was good on the roads to extremely poor in the rice paddies.

11. (c) Mission: Allied forces operating in III CTZ had the mission of conducting a

combined offensive over an extended period of time to locate and destroy all

12. (C) Concept of operation and execution:

Colonel Freemont B. Hodson's basic plan for the defense of TAY NINH City was to

deploy his forces beyond the city in blocking positions astride the likely enemy

avenues of approach. From infantry-artillery fire support bases, the 25th Infantry

Division's 1st Brigade commander mounted extensive daylight reconnaissance in force

and helicopter borne combat assault operations designed to detect and destroy the

enemy in his assembly areas and approach marches. These daylight operations were

supplemented by numerous platoon size ambush patrols laying in wait at night for the

enemy along principle roads, trails and waterways.

This concept of operations was executed with the establishment of Fire Support Base

BUELL along route 4 three kilometers northwest of TAY NINH (XT213532) and Fire Support

Base RAWLINS (inclosure 20) installed six kilometers east of the city (XT301502). The

permanent 25th Infantry Division's base camp (brigade sized) seven kilometers west of the

city (center of mass XT165517) was the location of the brigade headquarters and maneuver

elements deployed in outposts to the northwest and west of the city.

Twenty-five kilometers to the east of TAY NINH, another permanent brigade sized

division base camp, Camp RAINIER, at DAU TIENG (XT495475) served as a base of operations

for brigade forces operating in that general area.

Extensive cross-attachment between the infantry and mechanized infantry battalions

was employed. Areas of operations around the city were assigned as follows: 3d Battalion,

22d Infantry, LTC Alexander H. Hunt, Commanding, operated from Fire Support Base BUELL

with a general area of operation north of TAY NINH; 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry (M),

LTC Clifford C. Neilson, Commanding, maneuvered from Fire Support Base RAWLINS throughout

an area of operations to the east of the city; 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, LTC John F. Kenney,

Jr., Commanding, worked out of the TAY NINH Base Camp, outposting and maneuvering to the

west of the base camp and city; with Headquarters and A Company, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor,

commanded by LTC Theodore E. O'Connor located at the TAY NINH Base Camp for a reserve. It

received additional attached units as the situation dictated.

Direct artillery support for these maneuver elements was provided by the 7th Battalion,

11th Artillery, LTC Forest E. Pierce, Commanding,

whose batteries were deployed at Fire Support Base BUELL, Fire Support Base RAWLINS, TAY

NINH Base Camp and DAU TIENG Base Camp. Eight inch/175mm artillery support was provided

by the lst Battalion, 27th Artillery and the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery deployed at the

base camps and Fire Support Base ST. BARBARA at BAU CO (XT275685), 17 kilometers north

of TAY NINH City (inclosure 21). General support artillery was organic to the 23d Group,

The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M), LTC Andrew H. Anderson, Commanding, operated

from the DAU TIENG Base Camp covering a wide arc which encompassed the MICHELIN Rubber

Plantation to the east and the BEN CUI Rubber Plantation to the west.

Within the city of TAY NINH, the 161st, 267th, 315th and 688th Regional Force Rifle

Companies and the 2d Troop, 10th Cavalry Squadron, 25th ARVN Division were organized into

a provisional battalion under the control of the Province Chief. In the outlying hamlets,

villages and towns, permanently assigned Regional Force Companies and Popular Forces

deployed in squads and platoons, assumed a static defense posture to engage any enemy

who might penetrate the heavily populated urban area.

Despite the wide ranging operations of the lst Brigade maneuver elements to seek out

the enemy, contact was rare as the battlefield lull which had characterized operations in

TAY NINH Province since mid-May continued through July and the first two weeks of August.

However, LTC Albert N. Stubbleline, the 25th Infantry Division G-2, continued to predict

a major attack on TAY NINH City. Major General Ellis W. Williamson who assumed command of

the division on 3 August directed a continuation of the operations around the city.

LTC Duquesne A. Wolfe, assumed command of the lst Brigade on 5 August and continued to

pursue the general strategy and tactics established by Colonel Hodson.

To avoid pattern operations, Fire Support Base BUELL was closed and relocated. On 10

August, Fire Support Base BUELL II was established four kilometers north of the old fire

The lull was broken abruptly on the night of 17 August (enclosure 22). At approximately

2110 hours a platoon ambush patrol from D Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry in position

along route 13 approximately six kilometers from the city (XT294520) detected a column of

300 enemy troops moving towards the city. The platoon leader called artillery fire upon

the column and engaged the rear elements of the force with his own organic weapons. After

approximately 120 rounds of artillery fire fell on the enemy and a brief fire fight was

waged between the column and the ambushing

patrol, the enemy formation broke and withdrew to the northeast. This enemy force was

later identified as the 3d Battalion, 275th VC/NVA Regiment.

Although this contact provided the relatively minor results of five enemy killed

(as opposed to 12 US wounded), its significance is measured more in the fact that it

alerted the 1st Brigade and local Vietnamese forces to heavy enemy troop movements around

Meanwhile within the city, a plot was uncovered in which the enemy attempted to steal

armored personnel carriers from the 2d Troop, 10th Cavalry Squadron (ARVN). Two soldiers,

assigned to the troop, were VC agents who had the mission of driving the armored personnel

carriers to a school within the city where they would link up with sappers. This force

would then use the vehicles to attack the USMACV Compound and other key local government

The plan went awry, however, when one of the pair was ordered to DAU TIENG with a

small element from the troop. The second agent then attempted to enlist the assistance of

a third soldier for the plot. This soldier informed the troop commander of the incident,

and the VC agent was promptly taken into custody.

As the evening passed, approximately 20 small scale attacks upon government outposts

throughout the province were reported (inclosures 23, 24, 25, 80 and 81).

At 0115 hours, 18 August, the enemy effort in and around TAY NINH City began as the

TAY NINH Base Camp and 1st Brigade headquarters was struck by five rounds of 82mm mortar

fire and 19 rounds of 107mm rocket fire. As the artillery units at the camp began to fire

the first of 508 rounds of counter mortar fire to be expended during the night, the brigade

Tactical Operations Center received a radio call at 0123 hours that Fire Support Base

BUELL II was under heavy 82mm mortar attack (inclosures 26 and 27).

When the last of approximately 100 mortar rounds fell on BUELL, the perimeter of the

fire base was assaulted by two enemy battalions which charged the position in human wave

attacks. From within the base, the approximately 500 men of Headquarters and D Company,

3rd Battalion, 22d Infantry; C Company, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry (M); 1st Platoon, A

Company, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor; B Battery, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery; and A

Battery, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery responded to the enemy attack with a withering

blanket of small arms, automatic weapon, mortar and artillery "killer junior" fire

To augment his organic fires, LTC Hunt called in supporting fires from helicopter

gunships based at TAY NINH an(: artillery from nearby mutually supporting fire support

bases (RAWLINS and ST. BARBARA). Before the attack was finally repulsed, Air Force

fighter-bombers came on station above Fire Support Base BUELL II to smash at the enemy

Coordinating his fire support so that the air strikes were concentrated on the

southern half of his perimeter and the artillery fires in the north, LTC Hunt was successful

in deterring the enemy in his desperate efforts to reach the perimeter wire. At approximately

0430, the enemy heavily outgunned and badly mauled broke contact and withdrew to the

Moving forward from their bunker line positions to sweep around the fire support base

and pursue the fleeing enemy, Hunt's infantrymen recovered 105 enemy bodies and captured

13 wounded prisoners of war. Littered around the battlefield were 15 AK-47 rifles, 12

RPG rocket launchers, four machine guns, one M-16 rifle, 10 pounds of enemy documents,

4000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 117 RPG rounds, 263 hand grenades, 21 recoilless

rifle rounds, 25 bangalore torpedoes and nine 82mm mortar rounds. Hunt's losses in the

battle were one killed, 26 wounded and one selfpropelled 155mm howitzer and two tanks

damaged, but still operational (enclosures 29 and 83).

Readout of the captured documents and interrogation of the prisoners of war later

identified the attacking force as the 3d Battalion, 273d VC/NVA Regiment and elements of

As the enemy mounted his assault on Fire Support. Base BUELL II the PHOUC NINH District

Headquarters (XT129504) located 10 kilometers west of TAY NINH was struck by a mortar

anti small arms attack at 0140 hours. One kilometer to the south of the city, the BEN KEO

RF/PF Training Center (XT235476) received a 70 round mortar attack at 0150 hours.

The scattered attack by fire, however, soon were replaced by widely executed ground

assaults. At 0230 hours an estimated company of enemy troops were reported to have forced

their way to the central portion of LONG HOA (XT248470) where they were heavily engaged

by a PF platoon. At the same time, the TAY NINH Province Headquarters on the western

outskirts of the city (XT198506) was hit by a concentrated mortar barrage of 15 rounds.

The enemy made a serious attempt to disrupt electronic communications into and out of

TAY NINTH City at 0234 hours when an estimated company assaulted the perimeter of the

of NUI BA DEN mountain (XT281581) to the northeast of TAY NINH. Striking with small arms,

automatic weapons and rockets against the facility's bunker line manned by A Company, 3d

Battalion, 22d Infantry, the enemy was able to breach the line in one location and was

successful in blowing up one generator before he was pushed back out of the site.

All other sectors of the bunker line held fast throughout the night and at approximately

0615 hours, the enemy withdrew down the mountain leaving behind 15 dead, five AK-47 rifles,

three rocket launchers, three pistols, 12 hand grenades, 100 satchel charges and 20 RPG

rocket rounds. Eight defenders of the mountaintop were killed in the fighting, but the

enemy was unable to accomplish his objective of disrupting the flow of vital radio

communications for TAY NINH City and the surrounding area. A photographic study of NUI BA

Meanwhile, in the city itself a strong enemy force assaulted the TRUONG HOA RF Outpost

which guarded the approach to the southeastern edge of the city complex (XT268452). This

ground attack commenced at 0245 hours and by 0300 hours the RF company manning the position

had been overrun and scattered. As the early morning wore on, a PF outpost located five

kilometers north of the city (XT217552) reported itself to be under a heavy ground attack.

The HU KHUONG District Headquarters (XT234476) also reported that it was receiving a ground

attack from an estimated company size enemy force.

Other stand off and harrassing attacks were continuing upon outlying outposts in the

province. Extracts from the daily journals maintained by the Tactical Operations Center,

III Corps (ARVN), reveal the times and locations of these attacks in both August and September

Analysis of information gathered relative to the attacks in the TAY NINH vicinity during

the night of 17-18 August indicated that in addition to the above mentioned enemy units

in action to the north and northeast of the city, the 271st VC/NVA conducted attacks to

the west of TAY NINH making a feint against the TAY NINH Base Camp and assaulting the

CU CHI string of hamlets (vic XT1945-XT1950). Elements of the 275th VC/NVA Regiment and

the D-14 Local Force Battalion moved from the CAU KHOI Rubber Plantation (XT3244) southeast

of TAY NINH to attack the LANG HOA area and penetrate the southeastern section of the city.

In the meantime, the 272d VC/NVA Regiment remained in an area northwest of the city and

was not committed during the night. Both the eastern and southern fingers of LONG HOA had

been occupied by 0730 hours on 18 August and attempts were being made by the enemy to

infiltrate weapons to agents inside the Cao Dai Holy See.

The populace evacuated the occupied area and took refuge in the Holy See as by noon

there was an estimated 7000 refugees in this area. The PHU KHUONG district chief deployed

all available forces and the enemy's drive was actually halted in the LONG HOA area by

these local defense unit consisting of Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre, RF/PF, etc.

On the western flank of the action, the lst Brigade's Combined (US and ARVN) Reconnaissance

and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP) made a stand near the medical dispensary as the line of

resistance formed in the vicinity of XT234467, XT244466 to XT248476. Advisor personnel believed

that the energy intended to hold his position for the remainder of the day then attack

PHU KHUONG District Headquarters on the following day. This was confirmed later by two

Hoi Chanhs who also revealed that three regiments were to attack, occupy and hold the city

Action in the LONG HOA area was contained by the local forces and was considered a

Vietnamese operation up to this point; however, a plan to eject the enemy was developed by

the province chief, his US advisor,LTC Vernon L. Bond, Jr., and the lst Brigade commander.

The plan was to maneuver a US element to block in the vicinity of the outpost which had

been overrun in TRUONG HOA (XT268452) and maneuver another blocking force down Highway 22

to occupy positions on the southwestern edge of the city complex (XT240447). Once these

blocking forces were positioned, Vietnamese troops, utilizing only organic weapons, were

to attack from the center and clear the, LONG HOA area.

In accordance with this plan, A and B Companies, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry (M), moved

into a blocking position in the vicinity of a bridge site (XT270458) on the southeastern

edge of the city and a task force consisting of A Company, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor and

C Company and the Scout Platoon, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry (M) occupied the blocking

positions on the southwestern edge of the city complex (XT240447). The southeastern blocking

positions were later reinforced by D Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry.

The attack to clear the area began at approximately 0900 hours and the RF/PF swept

approximately two blocks past the market area (XT236472); but could not advance further

due to firm resistance. The action became a stalemate and at approximately 1830 hours the

RF/PF returned to the province compound to provide local security after being relieve in

place by a 25th Infantry Division unit, B Troop, 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry reinforced by

the lst Brigade's Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon. This unit established

positions during the night of 18-19 August at the point where the RF/PF action began on

At 1845 hours, B Troop came into contact with the enemy at XT242473, and in the firegfight

that took place one cavalryman was killed and five

wounded. The CRIP platoon made contact at 2015 hours at XT2344167. Meanwhile in the blocking

position the southeast, A and B Companies , 4th Batallion 23d Infantry (M), had made

contact with an estimated enemy company near the bridge site at XT270458 and by 1715 hours,

were heavily engaged with the enemy at XT263463. In this later fight which was supported

by helicopter gunships, four infantrymen were wounded and one armored personnel carrier

The PHU KHUONG District Heasquarters (XT234476) received over 100 rounds of indirect

fire beginning at 2100, and apparently the enemy withdrew from the city under cover of this

As the situation developed during the day in and around TAY NINH City, the 1st Battalion,