After Action Reports 9

1. ( C ) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation AHINA was a search and destroyoperation conducted in the east central portion of War Zone “C”. bounded by XT6440, XT6450,XT5450, and XT6440. Its purpose was to engage and destroy VC/NVA forces known to be operating in the Area of Operations (AO), and to destroy VC/NVA base camps and facilities throughout the area.

a. General: The area of operation for AHINA was the east central portion of War Zone “C” bounded by the 40 grid line on the west, the 50 grid line of the east, the 54th grid line on the south and 64th grid line on the north. The area west of the NUI ONG mountain complex to the SUOI BAHA stream and north of DAU TIENG City has been a VC base area for an unknown period of time. The area is ideally suited for this purpose because

of the natural obstacles formed by the upper Saigon River and NUI ONG Mountain complex to the east and south, and the SUOI BA HAO stream to the west and south. Enemy forces believed to have been located within the area of operations prior to AHINA were unidentified elements of the 7th NVA Division vic XT4375, elements of the 101st NVA Regt vic XT4365, elements of Group 82, Rear Services (OOSVN) vic XT4359, elements of one local force company (unidentified) vic XT4456, and local guerrillas. Analysis by Order of Battle personnel indicated that contacts could be expected with elements of Group 82, Rear Services, the unidentified local force company, and local guerrillas. Although a number of VC base camps were located and destroyed during the period 1 to 5 April during Operation JUNCTION CITY I, there existed indications that a number of VC base camps remained unlocated. The region was considered to be a VC supply base area for Group 82, Rear Services elements of one of the main junctions of north-south and east-west supply infiltration routes. Operation AHINA included a sweep along axis SNAKE to the north by elements of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. During the operation there were no large scale contacts with enemy forces. Small unit contacts were made on numerous occasions and captured documents identified elements of L35 Bn 69th VC Arty Regt as combatants. The VC did not engage in decisive combat actions at any time. A large number of base camps, supply caches and operating facilities were destroyed. Included were over 130 underground fortifications and VC military structures. Significant among materiel captured or destroyed during the five day operational time frame of AHINA were supply caches totaling over 70 tons of rice and other foodstuffs.

b. Terrain: The terrain varied from low flat terrain with scrub brush or elephant grass along the waterways to forested areas with double and triple canopy within the control portion of the area of operations. The jungle canopy greatly limited aerial observation and provided excellent concealment for the VC. Fields of fire for both direct and indirect fire weapons were limited in the heavy forested areas. Avenues of approach for tracked vehicles were more prevalent in the eastern portion of the area of operations. Mechanized forces experienced difficulty in traversing the (p3) central portion of the area of operations which was heavily forested. Movement of foot troops was hampered only in the densely forested jungle areas, since much of the terrain was dry during this period of the year. Obstacles included streams characterized by steep banks, silt bottoms, and in some areas, heavy mud. only one all-weather road (LTL 13) existed in the area of operations, running east-west and serving as a northern entry into the area of operations.

c. Weather Summary: The weather during AHINA was mostly cloudy during the day and partly cloudy during the night. Ceilings were reported below 1000 feet on the morning of 14 May, and patchy low clouds were reported on 16 and 18 May. Visibility was 3 - 6 miles in haze and ground fog during the morning hours, but good for the remainder of the day. Surface winds were light and variable with a few gusts to 15 - 20 knots near the shower areas. Light precipitation occurred in the area in the form of widely scattered showers on 15 - 18 May. Temperature maximums were in the low 90's and the minimums were in the mid 70's.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: On 13 May 1967, 25th Infantry Division crosses the SAIGON RIVER in zone with one brigade (3d Bde, 4th Inf Div) and on order, conducts search and destroy operations to the northwest to exploit ARCLIGHT and destroy VC/NVA forces, and installations. Another brigade (1st Bde, 9th Inf Div), on order, establishes blocking positions south of Route 13 to deny VC/NVA exfiltration routes to the north.

a. On D-Day, 13 May, 3d Bn, 22d Inf, and Co Co, 4th Engr Bn of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div were airlifted to XT59562 and emplaced a bridge there over the SAIGON RIVER. The 2d Bn (Mech), 22d Inf moved by land and crossed its elements over the bridge by 1820 hours. There was no enemy contact at the crossing site. Meanwhile, 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div moved Task Force (TF) 2-47, its major maneuver element on Operation AHINA, to blocking position JAGUAR vicinity XT425615 to prevent VC exfiltration from the AO. From there they moved to FSB FANG (vic XT384624). A sweep was made of Route 13 through the AO. The only enemy contact occurred when a TF 2-47 APC detonated an AT mine vic XT388628 resulting in 3 US WIA.

b. On 14 May, Co's A&B; of 2d Bn, 22d Inf conducted search and destroy (S&D) operations. A base camp was located at XT463571, containing 10 bunkers and 100 meters of trenches. Sniper fire was received there without any effect. Fourteen huts contained documents and two bicycles were located at XT465567. The huts were destroyed. At 1440 hours, 3 trucks were located, one of which had been destroyed by an airstrike. Nearby six bunkers, seven huts and a mess hall were located at XT458575. All were destroyed,. TF 2-47 destroyed 3- AT

c. On 15 May, S&D operations continued. Co A, 2/22 Inf found extensive rice, foodstuffs, documents, clothing, a classroom and SA ammo at XT450580 and more foodstuffs at XT454584. More food stuffs and structures were found at XT455602 by Co C, 2/22 Inf. Co A, 3/22d Inf made contact with 4 VC at XT425573, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). TF 2-47 continued S&D operations in zone. Ten bunkers were destroyed at XT401625, 18 more at XT423606. Two AT mines were destroyed at XT397682.

e. On 17 May, 2d Bn, 22d Inf made contact with a VC squad at XT454637 at 1610 hours. Results were 6 US KHA, 11 US WHA. Six more US were WHA when an APC detonated an AT mine at XT454636. Third Bn, 22d Inf destroyed bunkers at XT419611 and XT41527. Contact with a VC squad was made at 1545 hours. Results were 5 VC KIA (BC), and 3 US WHA. Four VC weapons were captured. TF 2-47 continued blocking from position JAGUAR. The only contact there occurred when a 5 ton truck detonated an AT mine at XT305540, resulting in 1 US WIA.

f. Operation AHINA concluded on 18 May 1967. Second Bn, 22d Inf detonated an AT mine at XT422634 resulting in moderate damage to an APC. Contact with an unknown VC force at XT413633 resulted in 1 US KHA and 2 US WHA. The VC were driven off by two immediate airstrikes and gunships. VC casualties were unknown. Second Bn, 22d Inf returned to FSB FANG. Third Bn, 22d Inf was airlifted to PREK KIOK (XT277787) minus Co A, 3/22 and the Recon Platoon which moved to secure an FSB at XT232771. TF 2-47 closed at SUOI DA at XT344577, and prepared to return to BEAR CAT, to their own TAOR.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: A light tactical raft (LTR) was emplaced on an unprepared site across the SAIGON RIVER on 13 May 1967. After securing the raft, infantry was airlifted into the area. The far side of the river (no LZ) was secured by infantry troops crossing with rubber boats. The bridging and engineer personnel were lifted into the site by CH-47. The bridge was emplaced with no difficulty and an entire mechanized infantry battalion was across the river in less than eight hours from the landing of the bridging platoon. The only reconnaissance made of the area was made by air. The detailed and accurate analysis of the terrain and careful preloading of the bridging elements proved to be the best method of quickly emplacing a bridge. The bridge was then extracted by CH-47 making it unnecessary to secure the area of crossing. All troops then participated in the attack into enemy areas.

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Operation AHINA was successful because of the vast quantities of enemy materiel and equipment captured and destroyed. Intelligence had indicated that the area had long been an area of VC supply for units in War Zone “C”. By disrupting the means of transport (sampans and trucks) and capturing much of the stores, future VC operations will be hindered. The large quantities of good CHICOM weapons and munitions found indicates that the VC continued to be well supplied in this respect, probably from northern War Zone “C” and Cambodia. All evidence indicated that only rice and foodstuffs, as opposed to weapons and munitions, are being transported from the SAIGON RIVER and adjacent areas.

(1) Three engineer teams and one senior NCO were attached to each of the3d Brigade's infantry battalions. On D-Day, the 3/22 Inf air assaulted an area west of the Saigon River. The 3/22 Inf secured a bridgehead (XT459562) across the river. At 1100H, a CH47 took off from Dau Tieng and initiated the air delivery of engineer troops (1 sortie) and LTR bridging (6 sorties). These sorties were completed by 1150H. After site reconnaissance and bank preparation (this stretch of the river had never been bridged), construction was initiated (1330H). The bridge required 10 pontoons and the gap was 125 feet. The first vehicle, an M-113 from the 2/22 Inf (M), to reach the bridge crossed at 1617H. The bridge was extracted the next morning. Between 1050 and 1150H the engineers and bridge were flown out of the bridgehead.

(2) The 1st Bde, 9th Div planned to place 2 AVLB's across the Rach Sanh Doi (XT390628) and Suoi May Tau (XT397632). They were unable to accomplish this due to high water and enemy mines encountered. On D+1 the LTR used by C/4th Engrs was flown in for A/15 Engrs, reinforced by 1 platoon of C/4th Engrs. The LTR was placed across the Rach Sanh Doi on the evening of D+1. On D+2 a trestle and 2 dry spans, airlifted to A/15 Engrs, were used to cross Suoi May Tau. The LTR and the trestle and dry spans were extracted by 1st plt, C/4th Engr and A/15 Engrs on 18 May, and were flown by CH47 (12 sorties) back to Camp Rainier.

b. Information received indicated that there were a number of base camps unlocated during Operation JUNCTION CITY, and this area is considered to be one of the main junctions of north-south and east-west supply infiltration routes in War Zone C. Enemy units believed to be operating within the area were some unidentified elements of the 7th NVA Division (XT4365), unidentified elements of one local force company (XT4456) and a local guerrilla unit securing the supply routes and caches.

c. As the operation began, forces were unopposed as they started their search and destroy mission. Large amounts of foodstuff, particularly rice, were located along with livestock. Also located were a great number of well constructed bunkers, trench systems and many huts, all of which were destroyed. The polished rice was evacuated. Captured documents confirmed elements of Group 82 Rear Service operated in the area.

d. There were many modes of transportation discovered during the operation. One sampan with USAID motor, (Briggs and Straton), was located vic XT463559. Three trucks were discovered, one burned by a previous airstrike, the other two were evacuated to base camp. The truck demolished by a previous airstrike is cons8idered to have been in use recently. The remaining two probably were in use 6 to 8 months ago. Also located were four bicycles and 20 lbs of parts. Two of the bicycles were rigged for heavy loads.

f. The following are the VC contacts made during Operation AHINA: On 14 May 1967 the 3/22 Inf vic XT443567 made contact with VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 WIA (Poss), and 1 light machine gun captured. On 15 May 1967 3/22 Inf vic XT425573 made contact with a small VC force employing SA and B40's, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), and 1 AK47 captured. Later the same day A/2/22 Inf (M) vic XT454588 made contact with an estimated squad employing SA and claymore mines, with unknown results. On 17 May 1967 contact was made by both 3/22 Inf and 2/22 Inf (M). Initial contact was made by 3/22 Inf vic XT417628 with an unknown number of VC resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC), 3 AK47 rifles and 1 B40 AT weapon. 2/22 Inf (N) vic XT454636 encountered an estimated reinforced squad in well fortified trenches employing SA and B40's resulting in destruction of 2 APC's. VC casualties were unknown. In all of the engagements no unit identification could be determined.

b. Phase II: D-Day, H-Hour (130630H May 67) 2/22 Inf (M) was to attack along AXIS SNAKE to engineer bridge site, cross Saigon River and relieve 3/22 Inf of security of bridge site. 3/22 Inf was to conduct airmobile assault from Camp Rainier to LZ HOOD (XT465565), secure the LZ and engineer crossing site. C/4th Engr was to airlift one platoon and LTR into position, remove the bridge upon completion of 2/22 Inf (M) crossing.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: 25th Aviation Battalion with 187th Aviation Company (-) and 116th Aviation Company (-) attached, was to conduct airmobile assaults for: 3/22 Infantry Battalion from Dau Tieng Airfield to LZ Knox (XT468567): A Company, 115th Engineer Battalion from PZ (XT269691) to LZ Fang (XT455620): 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion from PZ (XT269691) to LZ Campbell (XT385618) on 13 May 1967. After completion of airmobile assaults, 25th Aviation Battalion was to furnish direct support of Operation Ahina as required. This included resupply, command and control, med evac, firefly, and gunship support. The overall controlling headquarters for the aviation support during Operation Ahina was the 25th Aviation Battalion.

b. B Company 25th Aviation Battalion provided “Firefly” support for the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division for the duration of Operation Ahina. Firefly operations were planned to interdict enemy LOC's. However, due to poor weather all but one mission was aborted. B Company 25th Aviation Battalion also provided one UH-1C Light Fire Team in support of the 1st Brigade 9th Infantry Division throughout Operation Ahina.

a. D-Day, 13 May 1967: 2/22 Inf (M) moved overland to crossing site of Saigon River. 3/22 Inf and C/4th Engr airlifted to crossing site, emplaced LTR and all elements of the 2/22 Inf (M) crossed the Saigon River by 1820H. There was no enemy contact, however 3/22 Inf found 300 lbs cordite and one sampan with tools, gasoline, and motor in the vicinity of crossing site.

(1) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies A&B conducted S&D operations in zone and Co C, along with Recon Platoon, provided CP security. At 0850H, Co B found a base camp at coord XT463571 containing 10 bunkers and 100 meters of trench. At 0948H at XT55567, Co A received SA fire from the west from an estimated one VC. Fire was returned with neg results. At 1026H, Co B found a small base camp with five bunkers 6'x 8' at coord XT463571. At 1237H, the Bn CP displaced to a new site vic XT471577. At 1345H Bn CP closed XT471577. At 1420H Co B found 14 huts with bunkers under them, two bicycles and a few documents at coord XT471567. The huts and bunkers were destroyed. At 1440H Co A found 3 VC trucks, one of which had been destroyed by an airstrike. The other two trucks were evacuated. At 1457H at XT458575, Co A found 450-500 meters pf trench with some overhead cover, six bunkers, seven huts and one small mess hall. All structures were destroyed.

(1) 2/22 Inf (M): Units conducted S&D operations in their respective areas. At 0844H Co A found three graves which appeared to be one month old at XT456578. At 1116H at XT450580 Co A found 3000 lbs of bagged rice, 330 lbs bagged beans, two oxcarts and one empty 55 gal drum. At 1202H Co A at XT450580 found documents, two bicycles, one classroom, one rifle grenade, misc. clothing, 300 rds 7.62 ammo, one box of plasma and 50 lbs of polished rice. At 1500H Co A at XT454584 found a large building which contained 12 five gallon cans of coconut oil, 30 two and one- half gal cans of beans and 20 lbs of polished rice. The rice was mildewed and was destroyed. At 1625H at XT 456598 Co B found a VC body in a foxhole which was estimated to be 3-4 months old. At 1300H Co C had a training patrol depart the perimeter At 1705H Co C at XT455602 found one mess hall 15'X10', five huts 8'X10', 600 lbs of polished rice, one AT mine, booby traps throughout the area. All items were destroyed except the rice which was evacuated.

(1) 2/22 Inf (M): Units conducted S&D in zone. At 0730H at XT453590 Co A found seven cows which were evacuated to the Bde S5. At 0945H Co A at coord XT451590 found 9 huts, 1 US hand grenade, and 1 US set of fatigues, 1-81mm mtr rd that was booby trapped, 2 bicycles, 20 lbs of clothing, 5 lbs of documents, 15 lbs of batteries, 50 lbs of peanuts, 9 lbs of peas and 200 lbs of rice. At 1130H Co A found two bicycles rigged for carrying equipment at coord XT450590. At 1151H Co B at coord XT459595 found 7 bags of rice, some misc clothing, soap and misc pots and pans. At 0905H Co C found 30 lbs of clothing, 150 M-16 rds, 100-.30 cal rds, one grenade and various bicycle parts. At 1230H Co C found a booby trapped trench system, 8 cases (550rds ea) of AK-47 ammunition coordXT452584. At 1445H Co C at coord XT464657 - XT466602 found a large base camp area. Items found were three RPG II rds, 15 rifle stocks, 7 AK-47 magazines, one 12 gauge shotgun, 84 rifle grenades, 18 lbs gunpowder, 1 M-1 rifle barrel, 38 frag grenades,

3 Chicom hand grenades, 4 M-79 grenades (US), one smoke grenade (US), one trip flare (US), one claymore mine, one DDT spreader, SKF manufactured gears, one metal lathe (table size), misc machine parts, weapons parts molds, 20 lbs of clothing, 10 lbs of documents, 10 lbs dried fish, 10 lbs of polished rice, 8000 mine adapters, 200 pistol barrels, 200 rds SA ammo, 100 ft electrical cord, 45 ft steel cables, 20 coiled springs and one sigle cylinder engine.

(1) 2/22 Inf (M): Units conducted S&D in zone. At 1610H a second platoon of Co B at XT454637 made contact with an estimated VC reinforced squad. The enemy was well dug in and employed RPG II small arms and automatic weapons fire. The action resulted in 2 APCs destroyed, 1 APC damaged, 6 US KIA and 11 US WHA. At 1728H at XT454636 Co A's maintenance APC detonated an AT mine resulting in 6 US WHA.

(2) 3/22 Inf: Bn continued S&D operations and at 0915H Co A found 12 old bunkers vic coord. XT419611. At 1330H Co B had two heat casualties. Casualties were sling-loaded from LZ at 1410H by helicopter. Co A located and destroyed 4 bunkers with overhead cover vic coord XT415627 at 1500H. XT415627 at 1500H. At 1545H the bn was halted when Co B made contact with approximately one squad of VC. Contact was broken at 1710H with following results: 5 VC KIA (BC), 1 RPG rocket launcher, 3 rifles captured, 3 US WIA (walking wounded), The bn swept north and reached LTL 13 at 1730H, then moved west along LTL 13 and established a night defensive perimeter vic coord XT391628.

(1) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0758H Co C departed perimeter to start clearing route to FSB FANG coord XT388627. At 1045H at coord XT422634 an APC from Co A detonated an AT mine causing moderate damage to the APC at XT413633. Two immediate airstrikes, and a light fire team were employed and contact was broken. Action resulted in 1 US KIA and 2 US WHA. At 1315H all elements of the bn had closed FSB FANG at XT388627 and had assumed security for the entire base.

(2) 3/22 Inf: At 0645H the bn moved by foot to FSB FANG vic XT387623 and was helilifted from FSB FANG to Prek Klok vic coord XT277787. The 1st lift abegan at 0730H and the 13th (final lift) was completed at 0930H. Upon landing, Co A and the Recon platoon moved to vic coord XT232771 to assure a possible FSB. Companies B and C remained vic coord XT277787.

A light tactical raft (LTR) was emplaced on an unprepared site after securing it with infantry airlifted into the area. The far side of the river (no LZ) was secured by infantry troops crossing with rubber boats. The bridging and engineer personnel were lifted into the site by CH-47. The bridge was emplaced with no difficulty and an entire mechanized infantry battalion was across the river in less than eight hours from the landing of the bridging platoon. The only reconnaissance made of the area was made by air. The detailed and accurate analysis of the terrain and careful preloading of the bridging elements proved to be the