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After Action Reports 9
Back To After Action Reports

 Operation Ahina
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO                                                  
AGAM-P  (M)  (15 Aug 67)  FOR  OT 67X003                              23 August 1967

SUBJECT:     Combat After Action Report - Operation Ahina, conducted by the
          25th Infantry Division

TO:          SEE DISTRIBUTION:


     Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Ahina.  Operation Ahina was conducted by the 25thInfantry division during the period 13-18 May 1967.  Information contained in this reportis provided to insure appropriate
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations,and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

          BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

                              /s/ Kenneth G. Wickham
                              KENNETH G. WICKHAM
                              Major General, USA
1 Incl                              The Adjutant General
      as

DISTRIBUTION:
     Commanding General
          US Army Combat Development Command
     Commandants
          US Army Command and General Staff College
          US Army War College
          US Army Defense School
          US Army Armor School
          US Army Artillery and Missile School
          US Army Chemical Corps School
          US Army Engineer School
          US Army Military Police School
          US Army Infantry School
          US Army Intelligence School
          US Army Medical Field Service School
          US Army Ordnance School
          US Army Quartermaster School
          US Army Security Agency School
          US Army Signal School
          US Army Transportation School
DISTRIBUTION (Continued)
     Commandants
          US Army Special Warfare School
          US Army Civil Affairs School
          US Army Aviation School

Copies furnished:
     Office, Secretary of Defense
          ATTN:  Dr. Martin J. Bailey, Southeast Asia Forces
     Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
     Deputy Chiefs of Staff
     Chief of Research and Development
     Assistant Chiefs of Staff
     Chief of engineers
     The Surgeon General
     Chief of Communications-Electronics
     The Provost Marshal General
     Commanding Generals
          US Army Weapons command
          25th Infantry Division
          101st Airborne Division
     Commanding Officers
          11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
          198th Infantry Brigade
     Army Attache, London, England
     Director, Weapons System Evaluation Group
     Joint Action Control Office
     Security Officers
          Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, ATTN:  Dr. Agnew
          Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, ATTN:  R. W. Freyman
          Sandia Corporation
     Research Analysis Corporation
     National Aeronautics and Space Administration


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO  SAN FRANCISCON  96225

AVDOMHD                                                                                                                  16  JULY  1967

SUBJECT:   Combat Operations After Action Report    (RCS:  MACV  J3=32)

THRU:         Commanding General
            IIFFORCEV
            ATTN:   G-3  (D&T)
            APO  69227

To:              Commander
            U.S. Military Assistance Command,  Vietnam
            ATTN:   MACJ  343
            APO  96243


     1.    ( C )  NAME  AND  TYPE  OF  OPERATION:   Operation AHINA was a search and destroyoperation conducted in the east central portion of War Zone “C”. bounded by XT6440, XT6450,XT5450, and XT6440.  Its purpose was to engage and destroy VC/NVA forces known to be operating in the Area of Operations (AO), and to destroy VC/NVA base camps and facilities throughout the area.

     2.   ( C )   DATE OF OPERATION:   13 - 18  May  1967.

     3.   ( C )   LOCATION:    East central portion of War Zone “C”, TAY NINH and BINH DUONG Provinces, Republic of Vietnam.

     4.  ( C )    CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS:   25TH  Infantry  Division

     5.  ( C )    REPORTING OFFICER:   MG  John C.F. Tillson III

     6.  ( C )    TASK ORGANIZATION:

           1st  Bde,  9th  Inf  Div                                          3d  Bde,  4thl  Inf  Div

             2d  Bn,  47th  Inf                                                 2d  Bn  (Mech),  22d  Inf
             4rh  Bn,  39th  Inf                                                3d  Bn,  22d  Inf
             2d  Bn,  12th  Inf  (detch from 3d)                     2d  Bn,  77th  Arty  (DS)
             Bde,  4th  Inf  Div)                                              Co  C,  4th  Engr  Bn  (DS)
             Co  A,  15th  Engr Bn                                        Btry  B,  1st  Bn,  11th  Arty
             Co  C,  709th  Maint  Bn                                         (OPCON to 2/77  Arty)          
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD  DIR  5200.10

1


          1st  Bde,  9th  Inf  Div  (con't)          3d  Bde,  4th  Inf  Div  (con't)

               IPW  Team,  9th  MID                            Btry  D  (-),  5th Bn,
               PLT,  9TH  mp  Co                                 2d  Arty  (atch to 2/77   Arty)  (GSR)
               Plt,  9th  Sig  Bn
               Det,  9th  S&T  Bn

( C )  SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Air Support,

(1) Close air support was provided throughout the operation by United States Air Force (USAF) fighters.

(2) Results of close air support were as follows:  2 VC killed by Air Force (KBAF) possible (poss);  16 bunkers destroyed and 10 secondary fires ignited.

(3) There were 31 missions flown in close air support.  USAF fighters flew a total of 77 sorties.  Fifty-seven and a half tons of bombs and 59 ¼ tons of napalm were expended.  

b. Army Aviation Support.

(1)      Army Aviation support was provided by the 25th Aviation Battalion, by the organic brigade aviation sections, and by the following units under the control of the 25th Aviation Battalion:

(a) 187th Aviation Company (-)
(b) 116th Aviation Company (-)

(2)     Army Aviation support flew numerous airmobile assaults, resupply,  command and control,evacuation and gunship support missions.  The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Aviation section flew 219 sorties completed 125 missions alone.

c. Artillery Support,

(1)     Artillery direct support was provided by 2d Bn, 77th Arty from its position at Fire Support Base
(FSB FANG)  (XT388624).  Second Bn, 77th Arty was reinforced by Btry B, 1st Bn, 11th Arty at FSB FANG and by four M42 guns (self propelled twin 40mm cannon, commonly called :Dusters”) fromBtry D, 5th Bn, 2d Arty.

(2)     Total mission and ammunition expended:

(a)   Mission:   136 missions in support and 674 mission in harassment and interdiction (H&I)

(b)   Ammunition expended:   4261 rounds of high explosive (HE) land 154 rounds of white phosphorous  (WP) ammunition were expended

2

 throughout Operation AHINA.
(3)   Results of artillery support in causing enemy casualties were unknown.

8. (C)  INTELLIGENCE:

a.         General:  The area of operation for AHINA was the east central portion of War Zone “C” bounded by the 40 grid line on the west, the 50 grid line of the east, the 54th grid line on the south and 64th grid line on the north. The area west of the NUI ONG mountain complex to the SUOI BAHA stream and north of DAU TIENG City has been a VC base area for an unknown period of time.  The area is ideally suited for this purpose because
       of the natural obstacles formed by the upper Saigon River and NUI ONG Mountain complex to the east and south, and the SUOI BA HAO stream to the west and south.  Enemy forces believed to have been located within the area of operations prior to AHINA were unidentified elements of the 7th NVA Division vic XT4375, elements of the 101st NVA Regt vic XT4365, elements of Group 82, Rear Services (OOSVN) vic XT4359, elements of one local force company (unidentified) vic XT4456, and local guerrillas.  Analysis by Order of Battle personnel indicated that contacts could be expected with elements of Group 82, Rear Services, the unidentified local force company, and local guerrillas.  Although a number of VC base camps were located and destroyed during the period 1 to 5 April during Operation JUNCTION CITY I,  there existed indications that a number of VC base camps remained unlocated.  The region was considered to be a VC supply base area for Group 82, Rear Services elements of one of the main junctions of north-south and east-west supply infiltration routes.  Operation AHINA included a sweep along axis SNAKE to the north by elements of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.  During the operation there were no large scale contacts with enemy forces.  Small unit contacts were made on numerous occasions and captured documents identified elements of L35 Bn 69th VC Arty Regt as combatants.  The VC did not engage in decisive combat actions at any time.  A large number of base camps, supply caches and operating facilities were destroyed.  Included were over 130 underground fortifications and VC military structures. Significant among materiel captured or destroyed during the five day operational time frame of AHINA were supply caches totaling over 70 tons of rice and other foodstuffs.

b.        Terrain:   The terrain varied from low flat terrain with scrub brush or elephant grass along the waterways to forested areas with double and triple canopy within the control portion of the area of operations.   The jungle canopy greatly limited aerial observation and provided excellent concealment for the VC.  Fields of fire for both direct and indirect fire weapons were limited in the heavy forested areas.   Avenues of approach for tracked vehicles were more prevalent in the eastern portion of the area of operations.  Mechanized forces experienced difficulty in traversing the (p3) central portion of the area of operations which was heavily forested.  Movement of foot troops was hampered only in the densely forested jungle areas, since much of the terrain was dry during this period of the year.  Obstacles included streams characterized by steep banks, silt bottoms, and in some areas, heavy mud. only one all-weather road (LTL 13) existed in the area of operations, running east-west and serving as a northern entry into the area of operations.

c.    Weather Summary:   The weather during AHINA was mostly cloudy during the day and partly cloudy during the night.  Ceilings were reported below 1000 feet on the morning of 14 May, and patchy low clouds were reported on 16 and 18 May.  Visibility was 3 - 6 miles in haze and ground fog during the morning hours, but good for the remainder of the day.  Surface winds were light and variable with a few gusts to 15 - 20 knots near the shower areas.  Light precipitation occurred in the area in the form of widely scattered showers on 15 - 18 May.  Temperature maximums were in the low 90's and the minimums were in the mid 70's.

9.   (C)  MISSION:   The 25th Infantry Division conducts offensive operations to the northwest of DAU TIENG (XT4946) to destroyed C/NVA forces and installations.

10.  (C)  CONCEPT OF OPERATION:   On 13 May 1967, 25th Infantry Division crosses the SAIGON RIVER in zone with one brigade (3d Bde, 4th Inf Div)  and on order, conducts search and destroy operations to the northwest to exploit ARCLIGHT and destroy VC/NVA forces, and installations.  Another brigade (1st Bde,  9th Inf Div), on order, establishes blocking positions south of Route 13 to deny VC/NVA exfiltration routes to the north.

11. (C)  EXECUTION:

a.           On D-Day, 13 May, 3d Bn, 22d Inf, and Co Co, 4th Engr Bn of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div were airlifted to XT59562 and emplaced a bridge there over the SAIGON RIVER.  The 2d Bn (Mech), 22d Inf moved by land and crossed its elements over the bridge by 1820 hours.  There was no enemy contact at the crossing site.  Meanwhile, 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div moved Task Force (TF) 2-47, its major maneuver element on Operation AHINA, to blocking position JAGUAR vicinity XT425615 to prevent VC exfiltration from the AO.  From there they moved to FSB  FANG (vic XT384624).  A sweep was made of Route 13 through the AO.  The only enemy contact occurred when a TF 2-47  APC detonated an AT mine vic XT388628 resulting in 3 US WIA.

b.         On 14 May, Co's A&B; of 2d Bn, 22d Inf conducted search and destroy (S&D) operations.  A base camp was located at XT463571, containing 10 bunkers and 100 meters of trenches.  Sniper fire was received there without any effect.  Fourteen huts contained documents and two bicycles were located at XT465567.  The huts were destroyed.  At 1440 hours, 3 trucks were located, one of which had been destroyed by an airstrike.  Nearby six bunkers, seven huts and a mess hall were located at XT458575.  All were destroyed,.  TF 2-47 destroyed 3- AT

4

      mines vic XT398663 and two CHICOM booby traps.  An unknown VC force detonated a claymore and fired small arms weapons at XT397663.  Fire was returned without results.  Later an APC struck an AT mine at XT588628, sustaining one WIA.

c.       On 15 May, S&D operations continued.  Co A, 2/22 Inf found extensive rice, foodstuffs, documents, clothing, a classroom and SA ammo at XT450580 and more foodstuffs at XT454584.  More food stuffs and structures were found at XT455602 by Co C, 2/22 Inf.  Co A, 3/22d Inf made contact with 4 VC at XT425573, resulting in  1 VC KIA (BC).  TF 2-47 continued S&D operations in zone.  Ten bunkers were destroyed at XT401625, 18 more at XT423606.  Two AT mines were destroyed at XT397682.

d.          On 16 May, S&D operations continued.  While there was no contact throughout the day, 2d Bn, 22d Inf found extensive enemy fortified positions, weapons equipment and foodstuffs vic XT450590 (See Tab “A” OOAAR 3d Bde, 4th Div for full details).  TF 2-47 moved from FSB FANG to blocking position JAGUAR.  There was no enemy contact in this area.

e.          On 17 May, 2d Bn, 22d Inf made contact with a VC squad at XT454637 at 1610 hours.  Results were 6 US KHA, 11 US WHA.  Six more US were WHA when an APC detonated an AT mine at XT454636.  Third Bn, 22d Inf destroyed bunkers at XT419611 and XT41527.  Contact with a VC squad was made at 1545 hours.  Results were 5 VC KIA (BC), and 3 US WHA.  Four VC weapons were captured.  TF 2-47 continued blocking from position JAGUAR.  The only contact there occurred when a 5 ton truck detonated an AT mine at XT305540, resulting in 1 US WIA.

f.        Operation AHINA  concluded on 18 May 1967.  Second Bn, 22d Inf detonated an AT mine at XT422634 resulting in moderate damage to an APC.  Contact with an unknown VC force at XT413633 resulted in 1 US KHA and 2 US WHA.  The VC were driven off by two immediate airstrikes and gunships.  VC casualties were unknown.  Second Bn, 22d Inf returned to FSB FANG.  Third Bn, 22d Inf was airlifted to PREK KIOK (XT277787) minus Co A, 3/22 and the Recon Platoon which moved to secure an FSB  at XT232771.  TF 2-47 closed at SUOI DA at XT344577, and prepared to return to BEAR CAT, to their own TAOR.
12. (C)  RESULTS:

          a.  Enemy Losses:

           1. Personnel:

         VC Killed in Action (KIA)  Body Count (BC)  =  9
         VC Killed by Air Force (KBAF)  Possible (poss)  =  2

           2. Equipment losses:  See para 12b of COAAR AHINA of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.  Enemy equipment losses reported by the 1st Bde, 9th

5

 Inf Div were negligible, and were reported as part of their totals of peration
JUNCTION CITY.

b. US Losses:

(1) Personnel:

Killed by Hostile Action (KHA)   =   14
Killed in Hostile Action  (WHA)  =   38
Died of Wounds  (DOW)            =      1

(2) Equipment Losses:  2 - Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) destroyed;  4 APC's,  1,  5 ton truck, and one Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge (AVLB) damaged.

13.   (C)   ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:   Logistical support for this operations was provided by the 1st Logistical Command directly to the units through supply facilities at DAU TIENG base camp.  Extensive use was made of aerial resupply for units participating in Operation AHINA.

14.  (C)  SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:   A light tactical raft (LTR) was emplaced on an unprepared site across the SAIGON RIVER on 13 May 1967.  After securing the raft, infantry was airlifted into the area.  The far side of the river (no LZ) was secured by infantry troops crossing with rubber boats.  The bridging and engineer personnel were lifted into the site by CH-47.  The bridge was emplaced with no difficulty and an entire mechanized infantry battalion was across the river in less than eight hours from the landing of the bridging platoon.  The only reconnaissance made of the area was made by air.  The detailed and accurate analysis of the terrain and careful preloading of the bridging elements proved to be the best method of quickly emplacing a bridge.  The bridge was then extracted by CH-47 making it unnecessary to secure the area of crossing.  All troops then participated in the attack into enemy areas.

15.  (C)   COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:   Operation  AHINA was successful because of the vast quantities of enemy materiel and equipment captured and destroyed.  Intelligence had indicated that the area had long been an area of VC supply for units in War Zone “C”.  By disrupting the means of transport (sampans and trucks) and capturing much of the stores, future VC operations will be hindered.  The large quantities of good CHICOM weapons and munitions found indicates that the VC continued to be well supplied in this respect, probably from northern War Zone “C” and Cambodia.  All evidence indicated that only rice and foodstuffs, as opposed to weapons and munitions, are being transported from the SAIGON RIVER and adjacent areas.
                                                                                           6


AVDCMHD
SUBJECT:    Combat Operations After Report  (RCS:  MACV  J3-320

             FOR THE COMMANDER:

                                   F.M. CROCETTI
                                   1 Lt.,  AGC
                                   Asst.  AG

Incl.
1.   Tab A;  3d  Bde,  4th  Inf Div
                  2.  Tab B,  25th  Avn Bn
NOTE:  COAAR  AHINA  from 1st Bde,  9th  Inf Div was included as part of their COAAR  JUNCITY CITY.  This report has already been distributed.


DISTRIBUTION:

     1 - ACSFOR - DA
     2 - CG,  USARPAC,  ATTN:  GPOP - MH
     3- MACV,  ATTN:  MACJ  343

1 - CG.  USARV,  ATTN:  AVHGC - DH
3- CG,  IIFFORCEV,  ATTN:  G - 3  (D&T)
1 - CG,  USA  Inf. Sch:  Ft. Benning, Ga.
1 - CG,  USA Arm Sch,  Ft. Knox, Ky. 40120
1 - CG,  USA Arty & Missile Sch,  Ft. Sill, Okla.
1 - CG,  USA  CGSC,  Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
1 -  US Military Academy,  West Point,  NY  10996
     ATTN:   Librarian


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE,  4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco,   96268

                     Retyped from Actual Document, JK Finch
June 1967

SUBJECT:     Combat Operations After Action Report,  Operation AHINA.
TO     Commanding General
          25th Infantry Division
          ATTN:  AC  of S.  G3
          APO  US  FORCES  96225

     1.   (U)   NAME OF OPERATION:   AHINA

     2.   (U)   DATES OF OPERATION:   130600H  May 19687 to 182400H  May 1967

     3.   (U)   LOCATION:  Western Binh Duong and Eastern Tay Ninh Province.

     4.   (U)   COMMAND HEADQUARTERS:   25th Infantry Division

     5.   (C)   COMMANDERS:

          3d  Bde,  4th Inf Div          COL  KENNETH E. BUELL
          2d  Bn,  22d  Inf  (M)          LTC  RALPH W. JULIAN
          3d  Bn,  22d  Inf               LTC  JAMES E. HILMAR
          2d  Bn,  77th  Arty          LTC  FRED J. MERRITT
          3d  Support  Bn  (Prov)          MAJ  RICHARD W. HOOVER
          Co  C,  4th  Engr  Bn          CAPT  CARL B. SCIPLE
          44th  IPSD               1LT  ROBERT T. FENNER

     6.   (C)   TASK ORGANIZATION:

          2/22  Inf  (M)
            3 Tms  44th  IPSD
            3 Tms  Co C,  4th  Engr Bn

3/22  Inf
3 Tms  44th  IPSD
3 Tms  Co C,  4th  Engr  Bn

Bde  Control
     2d  Bn,  77th  Arty
     Co  C,  4th  Engr  Bn
7.   (C)   SUPPORTING  FORCES:

a. Artillery:

(1) The 2d Bn,  77th  Arty supported the 3d  Bde for the duration of the operation.

(2) Positions Occupied:


BTRY     COORD          DATES OCCUPIED       MEANS OCCUPIED   SORTIES  DISTANCE

A/2/77    Base Camp    12 May - 14 May 67       N/A                                 N/A             N/A
B/2/77    Base Camp    12 May - 15 May 67       N/A                                 N/A             N/A
C/2/77    Tay Ninh          12 May - 19 May 67       Convoy                           N/A           15 mi
A/2/77    XT388624       14 May - 19 May 67      Convoy                           N/A           28 mi
B/2/77    XT388624       15 May - 19 May 67      CH47                              9               1600 mtrs
HQ/2/77 XT388624        15 May - 19 May 67      CH47                             3               1600

1

Artillery Statistical Data:

(a)   105 mm     A/2/77       B/2/77          C/2/77

        (1)  HE          1483         1230         1548
        (2)  WP            53              39            62
        (3)  111              0                0              0
(4)  Behive        0                0              0
(b)   Fuses:                    
                                                     (1)  PD          1479          1221         1544
                                                     (2)   Ti               52              47             36       
                                                     (3)   VT               5                 1             30

(c)     Missions by type:          

   (1)   H & I         148           197            329     
   (2)    Support     58             62              16

USAF:

(1) Tactical air was used in support of immediate requests and preplanned missions.  
      Standard air request channels were used.

(2)   Statistical Data:

(a)    Missions:

Preplanned missions requested           30
Preplanned missions flown                    26
Preplanned sorties                                  63
Immediate missions requested               1
Immediate missions flown                        1
Immediate sorties                                     3
Combat proof missions requested         3
Combat proof missions flown                  2
Combat proof sorties flown                      3

 (b) Results of Tactical Air:
VC  KBA  (EST)                                      2
Structures destroyed                              4
Bunkers destroyed                               21
Trench destroyed (meters)                  75
Secondary fires                                      9               
c. Engineer Support:

(1) Three engineer teams and one senior NCO were attached to each of the3d Brigade's infantry battalions.  On D-Day, the 3/22 Inf air assaulted an area west of the Saigon River.  The 3/22 Inf secured a bridgehead (XT459562) across the river.  At 1100H, a CH47 took off from Dau Tieng and initiated the air delivery of engineer troops (1 sortie) and LTR bridging (6 sorties).  These sorties were completed by 1150H.  After site reconnaissance and bank preparation (this stretch of the river had never been bridged), construction was initiated (1330H).  The bridge required 10 pontoons and the gap was 125 feet.  The first vehicle, an M-113 from the 2/22 Inf (M), to reach the bridge crossed at 1617H.  The bridge was extracted the next morning.  Between 1050 and 1150H the engineers and bridge were flown out of the bridgehead.
2

(2)    The 1st Bde, 9th Div planned to place 2 AVLB's across the Rach Sanh Doi (XT390628) and Suoi May Tau (XT397632).  They were unable to accomplish this due to high water and enemy mines encountered.  On D+1 the LTR used by C/4th Engrs was flown in for A/15 Engrs, reinforced by 1 platoon of C/4th Engrs.  The LTR was placed across the Rach Sanh Doi on the evening of D+1.  On D+2 a trestle and 2 dry spans, airlifted to A/15 Engrs, were used to cross Suoi May Tau.  The LTR and the trestle and dry spans were extracted by 1st plt, C/4th Engr and A/15 Engrs on 18 May, and were flown by CH47 (12 sorties) back to Camp Rainier.

d. Army Aviation:            

(1) Initially on 13 May, the 3/22 Inf was airlifted to XT4656 using 4 sorties from the 187th CAH Co and Co A, s5th Aviation Bn.  A total of 489 personnel, combat loaded, were lifted in less than two hours.

(2) The second lift was conducted on 13 May bytwo CH47's from the 213th CASH Co.  In seven sorties (one of personnel, six of bridge) they lifted one LTR (Light Tactical Raft) and one platoon of engineers to XT458562.

 (3) On 14 May the LTR was extracted.  The 162d CSH Co. lifted the bridge out and carried it to a crossing site being used by the 1st Bde, 9th Div.  The 3/22 Inf used the same CH47 with hoist to extract wounded from an area where there was no landing zone for a UH1D.  The battalion was resupplied by dropping C-rations from a UH1D

(4)  On 15 May the 213th CSH Co lifted one battery of artillery from Dau Tieng (XT492473).  Ten sorties were used for the lift and an additional seven sorties were used for supply.
3
(5) On 16 May, 2 HU1D's were used to resupply the 3/22 Inf and six sorties by CH47 were used to resupply the 2/22 Inf (M).  On the backhaul from 2/22 Inf (M), 270 bags of rice and seven cows were evacuated to Camp Rainier (Dau Tieng).

(6) On 17 May routine resupply was conducted for the 3/22 Inf by UH1D.

(7) The 2d Bde Aviation Section supported Operation AHINA flying 210 sorties to complete 125 missions and carried 167 passengers.  There are 13 medical evacuation missions using 33 sorties in the above totals.

8.   (C)   INTELLIGENCE:
a.     Intelligence concerning the Brigade TAOR for Operation AHINA was obtained from 25th Division G2, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division S2, 4th MI Detachment, Tay Ninh Sub-sector, VR sightings and past operations.

b.      Information received indicated that there were a number of base camps unlocated during Operation JUNCTION CITY, and this area is considered to be one of the main junctions of north-south and east-west supply infiltration routes in War Zone C.  Enemy units believed to be operating within the area were some unidentified elements of the 7th NVA Division (XT4365), unidentified elements of one local force company (XT4456) and a local guerrilla unit securing the supply routes and caches.

c.       As the operation began, forces were unopposed as they started their search and destroy mission.  Large amounts of foodstuff, particularly rice, were located along with livestock.  Also located were a great number of well constructed bunkers, trench systems and many huts, all of which were destroyed.  The polished rice was evacuated.  Captured documents confirmed elements of Group 82 Rear Service operated in the area.
3



d.      There were many modes of transportation discovered during the operation.  One sampan with USAID motor, (Briggs and Straton), was located vic XT463559.  Three trucks were discovered, one burned by a previous airstrike, the other two were evacuated to base camp.  The truck demolished by a previous airstrike is cons8idered to have been in use recently.  The remaining two probably were in use 6 to 8 months ago.  Also located were four bicycles and 20 lbs of parts.  Two of the bicycles were rigged for heavy loads.

e.     On 16 May 1967 forces located a weapons factory at XT459598.  Munitions found were 16,000 mine parts, 48 rifle grenades, 38 hand grenades and equipment to manufacture small arms.  Documents dated 1967 indicated that the site was subordinate to military region  IV.

f.        The following are the VC contacts made during Operation AHINA:  On 14 May 1967 the 3/22 Inf vic XT443567 made contact with VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 WIA (Poss), and 1 light machine gun captured.  On 15 May 1967 3/22 Inf vic XT425573 made contact with a small VC force employing SA and B40's, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), and 1 AK47 captured.  Later the same day A/2/22 Inf (M) vic XT454588 made contact with an estimated squad employing SA and claymore mines, with unknown results.  On 17 May 1967 contact was made by both 3/22 Inf and 2/22 Inf (M).  Initial contact was made by 3/22 Inf vic XT417628 with an unknown number of VC resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC), 3 AK47 rifles and 1 B40 AT weapon.  2/22 Inf (N) vic XT454636 encountered an estimated reinforced squad in well fortified trenches employing SA and B40's resulting in destruction of 2 APC's. VC casualties were unknown.  In all of the engagements no unit identification could be determined.

9.    (C)     MISSION:  3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in conjunction 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was to conduct offensive operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in War Zone C.

10.  (C)  CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

 The 3d Bde, 4th  Inf Div was to conduct offensive operations employing two battalions in conjunction with 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div.  The operation was to be conducted in five phases:

a.   Phase I:   D-1, One battery 2/77 Arty moves overland to Tay Ninh.

b.   Phase II:  D-Day, H-Hour (130630H May 67)  2/22 Inf (M) was to attack along AXIS SNAKE to engineer bridge site, cross Saigon River and relieve 3/22 Inf of security of bridge site.  3/22 Inf was to conduct airmobile assault from Camp Rainier to LZ HOOD (XT465565), secure the LZ and engineer crossing site.  C/4th Engr was to airlift one platoon and LTR into position, remove the bridge upon completion of 2/22 Inf (M) crossing.

c.   Phase III:  D+l, 2/22 Inf (M) and 3/22 Inf were to conduct S&D operations in zone toward PL BUSHMASTER.  One btry 2/77 Arty was to move by air to FSB FANG (See overlay).

d.   Phase IV:  D+2, 2/22 Inf (M) and 3/22 Inf were to continue S&D operations in zone to PL BUSHMASTER.  One btry 2/77 Arty was to helilift from Camp Rainier to FSB FANG.

e.   Phase V:  2/22 Inf (M) and 3/22 Inf were to cross PL BUSHMASTER continue S&D in zone toward PL RATTLER, link up with elements of 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div south of Hwy 13.

f.     Fire Support:  Tactical air was on call.  Direct support artillery was provided by 2/77 Arty.

g.   References:

OPORD  7-67,  Hq 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, dtd 10 May 1967
FRAGO  1 to OPORD  7-67,  dtd 12 May 1967
FRAGO  2 to OPORD  7/67,   dtd 16 May 1967

  4
10.   (C)  Concept of Operation:  25th Aviation Battalion with 187th Aviation Company (-) and 116th Aviation Company (-) attached, was to conduct airmobile assaults for:  3/22 Infantry Battalion from Dau Tieng Airfield to LZ Knox (XT468567):  A Company, 115th Engineer Battalion from PZ (XT269691) to LZ Fang (XT455620):  36th ARVN Ranger Battalion from PZ (XT269691) to  LZ Campbell (XT385618) on 13 May 1967.  After completion of airmobile assaults, 25th Aviation Battalion was to furnish direct support of Operation Ahina as required.  This included resupply, command and control, med evac, firefly, and gunship support.  The overall controlling headquarters for the aviation support during Operation Ahina was the 25th Aviation Battalion.
11.     (C)    EXECUTION:

a.    The 25th Aviation Battalion and supporting units lifted 3/22 Infantry Battalion into LZ Knox and A Co, 115th Engineers, and the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion into LZ Fang on 13 May 1967.  First lift started at 0735H, last lift completed at 1340H.

b.    B Company 25th Aviation Battalion provided “Firefly” support for the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division for the duration of Operation Ahina.  Firefly operations were planned to interdict enemy LOC's.  However, due to poor weather all but one mission was aborted.  B Company 25th Aviation Battalion also provided one UH-1C Light Fire Team in support of the 1st Brigade 9th Infantry Division throughout Operation Ahina.

12,   (C)  Results:

a.No friendly aviation personnel were wounded in action.

b. No VC were killed or captured by aviation elements.

13. (C)  Administrative Matters:

a. Supply:  Adequate

b. Maintenance:  Adequate

c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation and hospitalization:  N/A

d. Transportation:  N/A

e. Communications:  Adequate

f. Medical evacuation:  N/A

14. (U)  Special Equipment and Techniques:  UH-10 Light Fire Team was successfully used to screen an open flank.  Although this involved considerable flying time and netted no VC casualties, this technique was successful in preventing an enemy attack on one exposed flank.

5


15. (C)  Commanders Analysis and Recommendations:

a.    Tactical operation:   No difficulty was encountered with any phase of combat airmobile operations during Operation Ahina.

b. Aerial resupply:  Adequate


WILLIAM A. BEARDEN
LTC                            INF
Commanding

 6



(C)Execution


                                         Chronological Summary:

a.     D-Day, 13 May 1967:  2/22 Inf (M) moved overland to crossing site of Saigon River.  3/22 Inf and C/4th Engr airlifted to crossing site, emplaced LTR and all elements of the 2/22 Inf (M) crossed the Saigon River by 1820H.  There was no enemy contact, however 3/22 Inf found 300 lbs cordite and one sampan with tools, gasoline, and motor in the vicinity of crossing site.

b.      D+1,  14 May 1967:

(1)       2/22  Inf (M):  Companies A&B conducted S&D operations in zone and Co C, along with Recon Platoon, provided CP security.  At 0850H, Co B found a base camp at coord XT463571 containing 10 bunkers and 100 meters of trench.  At 0948H at XT55567, Co A received SA fire from the west from an estimated one VC.  Fire was returned with neg results.  At 1026H, Co B found a small base camp with five bunkers 6'x 8' at coord XT463571.  At 1237H, the Bn CP displaced to a new site vic XT471577.   At 1345H Bn CP closed XT471577.  At 1420H Co B found 14 huts with bunkers under them, two bicycles and a few documents at coord XT471567. The huts and bunkers were destroyed.  At 1440H Co A found 3 VC trucks, one of which had been destroyed by an airstrike.  The other two trucks were evacuated.  At 1457H at XT458575, Co A found 450-500 meters pf trench with some overhead cover, six bunkers, seven huts and one small mess hall.  All structures were destroyed.

(3)       2/22 Inf Arty:  A/2/77  moved by convoy to FSB FANG.

c.       D+2,  15 May 1967:

(1)       2/22 Inf (M):  Units conducted S&D operations in their respective areas.  At 0844H Co A found three graves which appeared to be one month old at XT456578.  At 1116H at XT450580 Co A found 3000 lbs of bagged rice, 330 lbs bagged beans, two oxcarts and one empty 55 gal drum.  At 1202H Co A at XT450580 found documents, two bicycles, one classroom, one rifle grenade, misc. clothing, 300 rds 7.62 ammo, one box of plasma and 50 lbs of polished rice.  At 1500H Co A at XT454584 found a large building which contained 12 five gallon cans of coconut oil, 30 two and one- half gal cans of beans and 20 lbs of polished rice.  The rice was mildewed and was destroyed.  At 1625H at XT 456598 Co B found a VC body in a foxhole which was estimated to be 3-4 months old.  At 1300H Co C had a training patrol depart the perimeter   At 1705H Co C at XT455602 found one mess hall 15'X10', five huts 8'X10', 600 lbs of polished rice, one AT mine, booby traps throughout the area.  All items were destroyed except the rice which was evacuated.

(2)       3/22 Inf:  Bn continued S&D operations in assigned zone and at 1100H Co A made contact with 4 VC, with following results:  1 VC KIA, and 1 AK47 captured vic XT425573.  At 1630H the Bn established a night defensive perimeter vic  coord. XT409573.

(3)       2/77 Arty:  Hq 2/77 and B/2/77 airlifted to FSB FANG

d.              D+3,  16 May 1967:

(1)       2/22 Inf (M):  Units conducted S&D in zone.  At 0730H at XT453590 Co A found seven cows which were evacuated to the Bde S5.  At 0945H Co A at coord XT451590 found 9 huts, 1 US hand grenade, and 1 US set of fatigues, 1-81mm mtr rd that was booby trapped, 2 bicycles, 20 lbs of clothing, 5 lbs of documents, 15 lbs of batteries, 50 lbs of peanuts, 9 lbs of peas and 200 lbs of rice.  At 1130H Co A found two bicycles rigged for carrying equipment at coord XT450590.  At 1151H Co B at coord XT459595 found 7 bags of rice, some misc clothing, soap and misc pots and pans.  At 0905H Co C found 30 lbs of clothing, 150 M-16 rds, 100-.30 cal rds, one grenade and various bicycle parts.  At 1230H Co C found a booby trapped trench system, 8 cases (550rds ea) of AK-47 ammunition coordXT452584.  At 1445H Co C at coord XT464657 - XT466602 found a large base camp area.  Items found were three RPG II rds, 15 rifle stocks, 7 AK-47 magazines, one 12 gauge shotgun, 84 rifle grenades,  18 lbs gunpowder, 1 M-1 rifle barrel, 38 frag grenades,

5

        3 Chicom hand grenades, 4 M-79 grenades (US), one smoke grenade (US), one trip flare (US), one claymore mine, one DDT spreader, SKF manufactured gears, one metal lathe (table size), misc machine parts, weapons parts molds, 20 lbs of clothing, 10 lbs of documents, 10 lbs dried fish, 10 lbs of polished rice, 8000 mine adapters, 200 pistol barrels, 200 rds SA ammo, 100 ft electrical cord, 45 ft steel cables, 20 coiled springs and one sigle cylinder engine.

(2)       3/22 Inf:  Bn continued S&D operations until 1613H when a bn night defensive perimeter was established vic coord XT423603.

e.         D+4,  17 May 1967:

(1)          2/22 Inf (M):  Units conducted S&D in zone.  At 1610H a second platoon of Co B at XT454637 made contact with an estimated VC reinforced squad.  The enemy was well dug in and employed RPG II small arms and automatic weapons fire.  The action resulted in 2 APCs destroyed, 1 APC damaged, 6 US KIA and 11 US WHA.  At 1728H at XT454636 Co A's maintenance APC detonated an AT mine resulting in 6 US WHA.

(2)          3/22 Inf:  Bn continued S&D operations and at 0915H Co A found 12 old bunkers vic coord. XT419611.  At 1330H Co B had two heat casualties.  Casualties were sling-loaded from LZ at 1410H by helicopter. Co A located and destroyed 4 bunkers with overhead cover vic coord XT415627 at 1500H. XT415627 at 1500H.  At 1545H the bn was halted when Co B made contact with approximately one squad of VC.  Contact was broken at 1710H with following results:  5 VC KIA (BC),  1 RPG rocket launcher, 3 rifles captured, 3 US WIA (walking wounded),  The bn swept north and reached LTL 13 at 1730H, then moved west along LTL 13 and established a night defensive perimeter vic coord XT391628.

f.           D+5,  18 May 1967:

(1)           2/22 Inf (M):  At 0758H Co C departed perimeter to start clearing route to FSB FANG coord XT388627.   At 1045H at coord XT422634 an APC from Co A detonated an AT mine causing moderate damage to the APC at XT413633.  Two immediate airstrikes, and a light fire team were employed and contact was broken.  Action resulted in 1 US KIA and 2 US WHA.  At 1315H all elements of the bn had closed FSB FANG at XT388627 and had assumed security for the entire base.

(2)           3/22 Inf:  At 0645H the bn moved by foot to FSB FANG vic XT387623 and was helilifted from FSB FANG to Prek Klok vic coord XT277787.  The 1st lift abegan at 0730H and the 13th (final lift) was completed at 0930H.  Upon landing, Co A and the Recon platoon moved to vic coord XT232771 to assure a possible FSB.  Companies B and C remained vic coord XT277787.

12.    RESULTS:

a.   US Losses:

Personnel:  21 WHA,  7  KIA,  1  DOW

Equipment:  2 APC's destroyed,  2 APC's damaged.

b. Enemy Losses:

     (1)     Personnel:  7 KBGF (BC),  2  KBA  (Poss.)  In addition 6 graves were located in three separate locations.  Three were dug up and appeared to have been one to four months old or badly burned from an airstrike, probably napalm.

6

Enemy Equipment Evacuated:

WEAPONS & AMMUNITION:                                 FOODSTUFFS:

3 AK-47                                                                     7650 lbs polished rice
1 SKB carbine                                                          330 bags unpolished rice
1 RPG II rocket launcher                                          (200 lb bag)
1 Chicom IMG, type 56 w/magazine                         7 cows
    and 100 rds ammunition
1 M-1 rifle barrel, receiver group                             MEDICINE
8000 brass mine adapters
8000 detonator components                                    1 roll gauze
100 ft electrical cord                                                  6 btls toothache pills
200 smooth metal cylinders, believed                    1 bottle aspirin
        to be pistol barrels                                            3 btls misc pills & medicine, typeunknown
OTHER                                                                      1 box powdered plasma, US type

1 truck, Willys panel
1 truck, Landrover type
70 lbs cloth;ing
Misc machine parts, weapons molds
1 fire extinguisher w/DDT spray
1 single cylinder gas engine
20 springs, 3” diameter, 10” long
1 outboard engine, 9 HP Briggs & Stratton,
    w/misc tools and spare parts          
(3) Enemy Equipment Destroyed:

STRUCTURES                                            ORDNANCE & MUNITIONS

54 huts (includes 5 kitchens & 4               90 rifle grenades
      classrooms                                            63 frag grenades
42 bunkers w/overhead cover                   11 anti-tank mines
1200 meters trench w/foxholes                    1 RPG II rd w/2 fuzes
                                                                      18 howitzer rds, believed to be  Japanese pack-howitzer rds 81mm
FOODSTUFFS  

Bin unpolished rice 5'X5'X5'                         100 rds .30 cal
Bin unpolished rice 10'X5'X5'                        150 rds. 5.56mm
Bin unpolished rice 6'X4'X2'                        4600 7.62 rds (short) for AK-47
2300 lbs polished rice                                  1400 7.62 rds misc size
9 lbs peas                                                           15 rifle stocks
50 lbs peanuts                                                    12 magazines, 30 rd “banana” clip  for AK 47
1 hog (killed by airstrike)                         
3 quarts cooking oil                                              1 shotgun
12 cans (5 gal ea) coconut oil                             8 lbs black powder
30 cans (2 gal ea) beans                                    4 M-79 rd
                                                                                1 trip flare (US)
OTHER                                                                   1 anti-personnel mine 8” diameter
                                6 CBU bomblets
1 truck 3/4T Dodge, WWII type                       300 lbs cordite
   (damaged from previous airstrike)                  5 casings for shape charge
Numerous pots & pans, cooking utinsils          9 60mm mtr rds
2 fish nets                                                            1 shape charge, 10 lb
8 bicycles w/misc repair parts                        15 lbs batteries
2 sampans                                                          1 metal lathe
1 winch w/30' cable                                            1 drum, 55 gal.
2hammocks
2gal. gasoline
1gal. Kerosene            

7


13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a.    Personnel:   The S1 Section operated from Camp Rainier with reports being sent directly to Camp Rainier.

b. Supply:  Operation AHINA was supported from Dau Tieng without any significant difficulties encountered.  Aerial resupply was the primary method used and continues to be suitable for operations of this nature.

c. Maintenance:  There were no serious maintenance problems during this operation.

d. Status of Each Class of Supply:

(1) A ten day stockage of C Rations and one day of A Rations were maintained at the FSE (Spt. Bn)

(2) Class III:

MOGAS           5 days
JP-4                  5 days
AVGAS          10 days
Diesel               5 days

(3) Class V:  Battalions and separate units maintain their basic load plus ASR items in accordance with current directives.

e. Medical:  Casualties were evacuated by helicopter to Dau Tieng or Tay Ninh.

14.   SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES:

     A light tactical raft (LTR) was emplaced on an unprepared site after securing it with infantry airlifted into the area.  The far side of the river (no LZ) was secured by infantry troops crossing with rubber boats.  The bridging and engineer personnel were lifted into the site by CH-47.  The bridge was emplaced with no difficulty and an entire mechanized infantry battalion was across the river in less than eight hours from the landing of the bridging platoon.  The only reconnaissance made of the area was made by air.  The detailed and accurate analysis of the terrain and careful preloading of the bridging elements proved to be the solution.to quickly emplacing a bridge.  The bridge was then dismantled and extracted by CH-47 making it unnecessary to secure the area of crossing.  All troops then participated in the attack into enemy areas.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a.      Operation AHINA is considered a success primarily as a result of the vast quantities of enemy material and equipment captured and destroyed.  Intelligence had indicated that the area had long been an area of VC supply activity and a major route of supply for units in War Zone C.  By disrupting the means of transport (sampans and trucks) and capturing much of the stores, future VC operations will be hindered.  The large quantities of good Chicom weapons and munitions found indicates that the VC continue to be well supplied in this respect, probably from northern War Zone C and Cambodia.  All evidence indicated that only rice and foodstuffs, as opposed to weapons and munitions, are being transported from the Saigon River and adjacent areas.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1)   Item:  Dissemination of Intelligence.

Discussion:  During the operation a mechanized platoon on a reconnaissance mission was ambushed with RPG II and automatic weapons resulting in 7 US KIA, 22 US WHA, 2 APC's destroyed, and 1 APC damaged.   The following day the S2 received an intelligence document dated four days earlier giving enemy unit locations and including an enemy regimental size force located approximately two kilometers north of a proposed larger site.  Had this  information been received earlier, a dismounted rifle Co would have been given the reconnaissance mission, thereby possibly avoiding or reducing the effect of the successful enemy action.

8


Observation:  Immediate dissemination of intelligence information is vital to successful exploitation.

(2)   Item:   Heat Exhaustion.

Discussion:  The combination of rough terrain and steady movement during Operation AHINA caused several cases of heat exhaustion, particularly among men carrying the PRC  25 radio.

Observation:  In addition to the usual precautions against heat exhaustion, it is advisable to alternate personnel carrying radios and other heavy loads.

(3)   Item:    Radio Communications.

Discussion:   Range of the PRC 25 radio is reduced considerably when used with short antenna under heavy jungle canopy.  This is especially critical for artillery forward observers moving with ground units.

Observation:   A continuous airborne radio relay is the best way to insure reliable communications with direct support artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

                         GILBERT M. REESE
                         Major, Infantry
                         Adjutant
          DISTRIBUTION:

1 CG, USARV, ATTN:  AVC-DH
2 CG,  25TH Inf Div
2 CG,  4th Inf Div
30 CO 18th Mil Hist  Det
1 S1
1 S2
3 S3
1 S4
1 S5
2 CO  2/12 Inf
2 CO  2/22 Inf  (M)
2 CO  3/22 Inf
2 CO  2/77 Arty
2 CO  3d Spt Bn (Prov)
1 CO  C/1/10 Cav
1 CO  C/4th Engr
1 CO  C/588th Engr
1 Radio Research Unit
1 Bde Signal Officer          
9





HEADQUARTERS
25th AVIATION BATTALION (INF DIV)
APO SF  96225
AVDCAVB-C                                                                            5 June 1967

SUBJECT:     Combat Operations After Action Report (U)

          TO:          Commanding General
                          25th Infantry Division
                          ATTN:  AVDCMHD
                          APO     96225     

1.   (U)   Identity of Operation:     Operations AHINA

2.   (U)      Dates of Operation:     13-18  May  1967

          3.   (U)   Location:     Binh Duong and Tay Ninh Provinces

          4.   (U)   Control or Command Headquarters:   25th Infantry Division

          5.   (U)   Reporting Officer:     LTC William A. Beardon, Commanding Officer  25th  Aviation Battalion

          6.   (C)   Task Organization:

               a.   Control Headquarters:   Headquarters 25th Aviation Battalion.

b.   Assigned:

Co A, 25th Aviation Battalion

Co B.  25th Aviation Battalion

Other Units Under 25th Aviation Battalion Control for Portions of the Operation:

187th Aviation Company (-)  APO  96216

116TH  Aviation Company (-)  APO  96353


7.  (U)  Supporting Forces:   N/A

8.   (U)  Intelligence:   N/A

9.   (U)  Mission:   The 25th Aviation Battalion (+) provided aviation support to the 25th Infantry Division during the conduct of Operation Ahina to include airmobile combat assaults, aerial resupply, command and control aircraft, aerial reconnaissance, med evac, firefly, and armed helicopter support.


 Operation Wahaiwa

 HEADQUARTERS
25th  INFANTRY DIVISION
APO  US  FORCES  96225
 retyped from Actual Document
 by JK Finch
     AVTLMHD                                                                                                                            17  July  1966

SUBJECT:   Combat Operations After Action Report  (RCS  J3/32)

THRU:         Commanding General
                      II  Field Force Vietnam
                      APO,  San Francisco  96227

TO:            Commander
                      US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
                      ATTN:  J343
                      APO,  San Francisco  96243


Name   WAHIAWA

2.    Date      160700-271700

3,    Location:  Northeast portion of HAU  NGHIA  Province in an area bounded by XT4836,  XT6236,  XT4826,  XT6624,  XT6022,  XT6317,  and XT7116, known as the BOI LOI WOODS,  HOBO WOODS, and FILHOL PLANTATION.

                  Control Headquarters: Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.

     4.   Reporting Officer:   Major General Fred C. Weyand,  US Army.

Task Organization:  

1st  Brigade  (Colonel Sandlin,  Commanding)

HHC,  1st  Bde
Troop  A,  3d  Sqdn,  4th  Cav  (-)
Platoon,  Co  A,  65th  Eng  (-)
1st  FASC  Plat,  Co  B,  125th  Signal Bn
1st  Plat,  25th  MP  Co  (-)
Elm  25  MID

2d  Bn  14th  Inf  (-)  (Lt.Col  Shultz,  Commanding)
1st  Plat  Trp  A,  3d  Sqdn,  4th  Cav
Sqd,  Co  A,  65th  Eng  Bn


                    Downgraded at 3 year intervals
                    Declassified after 12 years     


                                   1

(3) (Lt.Col  Barszcz, Commanding)           
2d Plat, Trp A,  3d Sqdn,  4th  Cav Sqd.
Co. A,  65th Eng  Bn

(4) 4th Bn,  9th  Inf  (Lt.Col  Booth,  Commanding)

b. 2d  Brigade

(1) HHC,  2d  Bde  (Colonel Tarpley,  Commanding)
Recon Plat  1/5  (M)
Plat, Trp  A,  3d  Sqdn,  4th Cav
Plat (+),  Co. B,  65th  Eng. Bn
2d  FASC  Plat,  125th Signal Bn
2d  Plt,  25th  MP  Co.
4  man Psy Op Team,  49th  (ARVN)  Regt

(2) 1st Bn  (Mech),  5th Inf  (Lt.Col  Greer, Commanding)
Helicopter

(3) 1st  Bn,  27th  Inf  (-)  (Lt.Col.  Mooney,  Commanding)
Helicopter

(4) 2d  Bn,  27th  Inf  (-)  (Lt.Col.  Bashore,  Commanding)

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery  Support:

(1) Organization for combat:

(a) 1st Bn,  8th Artillery  (-)  DS  2d  Bde

(b) 7th  Bn,  11th Artillery (-)  DS  1st  Bde

(c) 3d  Bn,  13th  Artillery

1.   3d  Bn,  13th  Artillery  (-)  GS  25th  Inf  Div

2.    Btry  A,  3d  Bn  13t;h  Artillery  (-)  GSR  1/8  Arty

3  . Btry  C,  3d  Bn  13th  Artillery  (-)  GSR  7/11  Arty

4.   Plat  (8” How)  D  3/13  Arty  GSR  1/8  Arty

(2) How and when artillery was employed:

(a) The artillery in support of the 1st Brigade moved to  TRUNG LAP
(XT5821)  on 17 May.  The artillery in support of the 2d Brigade moved on 15 May to a position vicinity XT483263 and on 22 May displaced to vicinity XT536285.  The 4.2” mortar platoons of the 2/14 Inf and 4/23 Inf were placed under the operational control of the CO 7/11 Arty.  In the 1st Brigade the time                                   and fire was hampered by the lack of the new family of radios.  Fire missions had to be relayed from the FO to the FDC by the battalion liaison officers.  This problem has since been alleviated by the receipt of new radios.

                                                  2

(b) Artillery fire was used primarily to suppress enemy fires, to soften
Suspected enemy positions in front of advancing manuever elements and preparation for airmobile assaults.

(c) Total missions and rounds fired were as follows:

1,  7/11  Arty  (105)         670  missions        13081  rounds

2.  1/8  Arty  (105)         1606  missions      10349  rounds

3.  3/13  Arty  (155 & 8”)  725  missions         3848   rounds

4.   Totals                        3219   missions       27677   rounds

b. Tactical Air:

(1) Seventy air strikes were flown in support of the Division,  29 for the 1st Bde
And 41 for the 2d Bde.

(a)   Of the 70 strikes, 40 were by the US Air Force, 18 by the US Navy,                                                        and 12 by VNAF.

        (b)   All preplanned strikes were requested by telephone (hot line)  through 25th Inf Div G3.  Immediate strikes were requested by radio.

  (c)  Average reaction time for the immediate strikes was 20 minutes.
(2) Results.  10 VC KBA  (BC),  29 VC KBA  (poss),  79 buildings  destroyed, 69 buildings damaged, 12 trenches destroyed, 7,100 lbs of rice destroyed, 3 sampans sunk, 4 bunkers destroyed and 3 secondary explosions.

c. Army Aviation.

(1)1st Brigade

(a) Five different Airmobile Co.'s supported the 1st Brigade.  The average number of aircraft availible each day, except for the four major airmobile operations, were nine UHID's and two fire teams.  These were utilized for resupply, command and control, combat surveillance, medical evacuation and assault missions. A total of 1182 sorties were flown in support of the 1st Brigade.

(b)   A total of four battalion and four platoon airmobile lifts were conducted by 4th  
        Bn,  9th Inf, and 2d Bn, 14th Inf.

               (2)   2d  Brigade


                         3            

(a)   Airmobile Co. flew 645 sorties and airlifted 37.2.tons of supplies.  They also supplied UHIB gunships and UHID Command and Conrol ships throughtout the operation.

      (b) The brigade provided each manuever battalion an OH 23G helicopter
      daily.  Also brigade maintained the artillery advisory radio net and the helipad control net throughout the operation.

      (c)  On 16 May the 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Inf  were helilifted into the AO by  Co. A,  25th Aviation Battalion,  Co. A  501st Avn Bn and the 118th Airmobile Co.

      (d)  On 22 May the 2d Bn, 27th Inf (-) conducted an airmobile assault Within the area of operations  (AO).

      (e)  On 27 May, 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) abd 2d  Bn, 27th Inf (-) were airlifted
      From the AO.
       (f) During the conduct of the operation, company size elements from the 1st Bn, 27th Inf and 2d Bn, 27th Inf were repositioned and rotated into the AO by the 118th Airmobile Co. which was DS to the 2d Brigade.

(3) Ground fire was intense throughout the operation with 10 helicopters being hit during the operation.  Two helicopters sustained four hits, however, they were not disabled.  

8. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Situation Prior to Operation.

(1) 165  A Regimental Headquarters was believed to be located vicinity of XT6031, XT6431,  XT6728,  XT5827.  This unit was reported to be armed with one .50 Cal MG,one12.7mm MG,  six 20mm MG and thirty-four automatic rifles.

(2) 1st  Battalion  165  A  Regiment:

(a)   Strength:   200.

(b)  Area of Operations:  XT6030m  XT7030,  XT7016,  XT6016.

(c)   Armament:  Two  .50 Cal MG's,  One  12.7mm MG, and various individual weapons.

                          (3)   The BOI LOI WOODS  was known to contain supply bases and believed to be the  base area for the 320th Local Force Bn.  The BOI LOI WOODS area was a known VC stronghold and important commo-liaison base linking the Delta with MR 8 and in particular, War Zones C and D.  A VC captive revealed that the TAY NINH Provincial Committee was located in the BOI LOI.  On 7 May, 66,  B1/5 contacted elements of C403 Company, 320th LF Bn as substantiated by documents found action was characterized by heavy, accurate and well-disciplined SA and AW fires.  Visual reconnaissance indicated extensive trench network in the southern edge of the BOI LOI and numerous well-used trails extending south from the SAIGON River into the BOI LOI.  During operation MASTIF in Feb 66, the 1st Div. Discovered large rice caches and numerous base areas in the BOI LOI.  Post engagments with VC


                               4

in this area revealed that the enemy displayed good control of his units, executed action rapidly and violently,  and delivered accurate SA and  AW fires.  Maximum use of mines, booby traps and harassing fires was effected throughout the operational area.

b. Enemy Situation During the Operation.

(1) Although all information prior to Operation WAHIAWA indicated probable contact would be made with one or more of the Main Force units, this in fact, did not occur.  On numerous occasions all participating units encountered sporadic to heavy sniper fire in respective areas of operation, but at no time was definite contact attained with VC Main Force units.  The VC employed to the utmost the principles of camouflage, concealment and defense in depth as evidenced by the extensive use of land mines and booby traps during defensive and delaying activities.  When operating in independent groups the VC effectively used sniper fire in conjuction with excellent camouflage discipline and extensive tunnel systems to engage friendly units.  On occasion, the VC effectively employed command detonated mines and Claymore type weapons against friendly maneuver elements when close physical contact was imminent.  As a result of the vast amounts of material (especially rice) captured and/or destroyed during Operation WAHIAWA, it was apparent the FILHOL PLANTATION  and HO BO WOODS had long been used as a local storage and resupply haven for VC forces either operating within or in transit through the area of operations.  It is felt the aggressive response and positive action under-taken by maneuver elements against these supply/storage areas and fortifications will seriously hamper and curtail VC activities in the immediate future and hinder any large scale operations perviously planned for execution.

(2) Elements found on 17 May 66 vic XT518337 indicated the TAY NINH Provincial Committee had been located in the area.  The locations of four sections subordinate to the TAY NINH Provincial Committee were discovered as follows:  TAY NINH Military Intelligence Sub-sections XT500316, TAY NINH Provincial Armament Sub-sections XT511339), Workers Proselyting Sections, TAY NINH Provincial Committee (XT527338).  Enormous infrastructure activities associated with COSVN Rear Service staff were located in the BOI LOI.  Documents discovered in vic XT500313 indicated the presence of the 320th Bn Hq (D14).  On 20 May 66, vic XT520308, a VC carried a messaage from 320th Bn CO to the 403d Co inquiring into the location and condition of the company.  The major enemy contact was made by B/2/27 at 191400 May 66 vic XT533333.  An estimated VC platoon was engaged by B/2/27 which resulted in 16 VC KIA (BC), and 12 VC KIA (poss).  A total of 46 caches of rice, ammunition, medicine, cloth, fish, tin and wax were located and evacuated or destroyed during the operation.  The most significant caches were located as follows:

                         5


          Rice                               --9321,  565325,  572315,  574311,  529338

          Ammunition:  -  XT529333

          Medicine  -  XT554307,  529311,  516343,  523340

Cloth,  POL, Dried Fish, Tin, Salt, Sugar, Peanuts -  XT564325,  524352,  565323,  580309,  551312,  599324,  586308,  516434,  516313,  523339, 578308.

Additionally, Division units located and destroyed 9 VC base camps, 2 arms repair shops and 1 medical aid station as follows:

     Base Camp - XT496322,  525337,  540318,  582305,  528343, 525337, 496323, 500131,  575298.

     Arms repair shops - 500316,  511334.

     Medical aid station - XT538320.

The numerous caches, base camps and captured documents substantiate that the BOI LOI
was a major COSVN Rear Service Supply area.

c. Terrain and Weather.

(1) The terrain ;of the FILHOL PLANTATION was found to be generally flat to gently rolling.  The vegetation consisted primarily of rubber trees interspersed with heavy jungles and underbrush which made foot movement restrictive in certain areas.  Observation was greatly restricted in areas of heavy jungle and underbrush;  conversely, camouflage and concealment in these same areas was more than adequate.  The terrain traversed in the HOBO WOODS is very similar to that of the FILHOL PLANTATION;  however, numerous hedgerow type formations, dry and flooded rice paddies and occasional abandoned villages were encountered.  In areas of dense growth, overland movement was hindered until accessible routes could be found through or around the vegetation obstacle.

(2)  Early morning fog delayed resupply to the maneuver units in several Instances, however, this is not an uncommon occurrence during this period of the year.  Although some rainfall did occur during Operation WAHIAWA, it did not materially affect or hinder any troop movement or operations.   

     (3)  The terrain was generally flat with open areas north and south of the  BOI LOI WOODS.  Open areas consisted of rice paddies and cultivated fields.  The dense            undergrowth, trees and B-52 bomb craters restricted movement of tracked vehicles on existing trails and low brush areas.  Foot movement was slow and tedious.  The vegetation provided excellent concealment for the VC in their harassing type tactics and limited friendly observation.Trenches, bunkers and spider holes provided cover to the VC fromn Inasmuch as the trench network was generally oriented to the south,  LZ's were selected to the north of the BOI LOI.  Weather conditions delayed the initial air strike and heliborne lift for two hours on 16 May 66.  Low ceilings during the morning hours delayed use of command and control helicopters.  The afternoon monsoon rains experienced had little effect on operations, however, protracted rains would seriously restrict movement of tracked vehicles in the area of operations.
                        6     


9.  Mission:   The 25th Infantry Division conducts search and destroy operations
beginning                   160700 May 66 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and
bases in BOI LOI WOODS - HO BO WOODS - FILHOL PLANTATION area (Appendix 1
(Annex C to OPORD))   

10. Concept ;of Operations:  Division conducts airmobile and ground Operations with two brigades during the period 16-26 May 66 to destroy VC forces, supplies and bases in the area of operations.

a. 1st Brigade

(1) Conduct search and destroy operations in objective areas 1 and 2 beginning 160700 May 66.
(2) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in objective area 3.
(3) Be prepared to establish Bde fwd base area vic TRONG LAP (XT590220) as required to support operations north of objective area 2.
(4) On 30 minutes notice, provide one company as div reaction force.  Company released to brigade upon request.

b. 2d  Brigade

(1) Established Bde fwd area vic XT510260 NLT  151500H  May 66. Provide security for SUPCOM Forward Support Operations Center (FSOC).
(2) Conduct search and destroy operations in objective area 4 and 5 beginning 160700 May 66.
(3) Conduct search and destroy operations in objective area 6 on order.
(4) On 30 minutes notice, provide one company as Div reaction force.  Company released to brigade upon request.

11. Execution.   OPORD  10-66,  Hq 25th Infantry Division was published on
101200 May 66. into LZ Fang on 13 May 1967.  First lift started at 0735H, last lift completed at 1340H.

b.    B Company 25th Aviation Battalion provided “Firefly” support for the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division for the duration of Operation Ahina.  Firefly operations were planned to interdict enemy LOC's.  However, due to poor weather all but one mission was aborted.  B Company 25th Aviation Battalion also provided one UH-1C Light Fire Team in support of the 1st Brigade 9th Infantry Division throughout Operation Ahina.

12.   (C)  Results:

a. No friendly aviation personnel were wounded in action.
b. No VC were killed or captured by aviation elements.

13. (C)  Administrative Matters:

a. Supply:  Adequate
b. Maintenance:  Adequate
c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation and hospitalization:  N/A
d. Transportation:  N/A
e. Communications:  Adequate
f. Medical evacuation:  N/A

14. (U)  Special Equipment and Techniques:  UH-10 Light Fire Team was successfully used to screen an open flank.  Although this involved considerable flying time and netted no VC casualties, this technique was successful in preventing an enemy attack on one exposed flank.   
(p5)
15. (C)  Commanders Analysis and Recommendations:

a.    Tactical operation:   No difficulty was encountered with any phase of combat airmobile operations during Operation Ahina.

b. Aerial resupply:  Adequate


WILLIAM A. BEARDEN
LTC                            INF
Commanding


Chronological Summary:
a.    to crossing site of Saigon River.  3/22 Inf and C/4th Engr airlifted to crossing site, emplaced LTR and all elements of the 2/22 Inf (M) crossed the D-Day, 13 May 1967:  2/22 Inf (M) moved overland Saigon River by 1820H.  There was no enemy contact, however 3/22 Inf found 300 lbs cordite and one sampan with tools, gasoline, and motor in the vicinity of crossing site.

b.     D+1,  14 May 1967:

(1)   2/22  Inf (M):  Companies A&B conducted S&D operations in zone and Co C, along with Recon Platoon, provided CP security.  At 0850H, Co B found a base camp at coord XT463571 containing 10 bunkers and 100 meters of trench.  At 0948H at XT55567, Co A received SA fire from the west from an estimated one VC.  Fire was returned with neg results.  At 1026H, Co B found a small base camp with five bunkers 6'x 8' at coord XT463571.  At 1237H, the Bn CP displaced to a new site vic XT471577.   At 1345H Bn CP closed XT471577.  At 1420H Co B found 14 huts with bunkers under them, two bicycles and a few documents at coord XT471567. The huts and bunkers were destroyed.  At 1440H Co A found 3 VC trucks, one of which had been destroyed by an airstrike.  The other two trucks were evacuated.  At 1457H at XT458575, Co A found 450-500 meters pf trench with some overhead cover, six bunkers, seven huts and one small mess hall.  All structures were destroyed.

(2)  2/22 Inf Arty:  A/2/77  moved by convoy to FSB FANG.

c.    D+2,  15 May 1967:

(1) 2/22 Inf (M):  Units conducted S&D operations in their respective areas.  At 0844H Co A found three graves which appeared to be one month old at XT456578.  At 1116H at XT450580 Co A found 3000 lbs of bagged rice, 330 lbs bagged beans, two oxcarts and one empty 55 gal drum.  At 1202H Co A at XT450580 found documents, two bicycles, one classroom, one rifle grenade, misc. clothing, 300 rds 7.62 ammo, one box of plasma and 50 lbs of polished rice.  At 1500H Co A at XT454584 found a large building which contained 12 five gallon cans of coconut oil, 30 two and one- half gal cans of beans and 20 lbs of polished rice.  The rice was mildewed and was destroyed.  At 1625H at XT 456598 Co B found a VC body in a foxhole which was estimated to be 3-4 months old.  At 1300H Co C had a training patrol depart the perimeter   At 1705H Co C at XT455602 found one mess hall 15'X10', five huts 8'X10', 600 lbs of polished rice, one AT mine, booby traps throughout the area.  All items were destroyed except the rice which was evacuated.

(2) 3/22 Inf:  Bn continued S&D operations in assigned zone and at 1100H Co A made contact with 4 VC, with following results:  1 VC KIA, and 1 AK47 captured vic XT425573.  At 1630H the Bn established a night defensive perimeter vic  coord. XT409573.

(3) 2/77 Arty:  Hq 2/77 and B/2/77 airlifted to FSB FANG

d. D+3,  16 May 1967:

(1)     2/22 Inf (M):  Units conducted S&D in zone.  At 0730H at XT453590 Co A found seven cows which were evacuated to the Bde S5.  At 0945H Co A at coord XT451590 found 9 huts, 1 US hand grenade, and 1 US set of fatigues, 1-81mm mtr rd that was booby trapped, 2 bicycles, 20 lbs of clothing, 5 lbs of documents, 15 lbs of batteries, 50 lbs of peanuts, 9 lbs of peas and 200 lbs of rice.  At 1130H Co A found two bicycles rigged for carrying equipment at coord XT450590.  At 1151H Co B at coord XT459595 found 7 bags of rice, some misc clothing, soap and misc pots and pans.  At 0905H Co C found 30 lbs of clothing, 150 M-16 rds, 100-.30 cal rds, one grenade and various bicycle parts.  At 1230H Co C found a booby trapped trench system, 8 cases (550rds ea) of AK-47 ammunition coordXT452584.  At 1445H Co C at coord XT464657 - XT466602 found a large base camp area.  Items found were three RPG II rds, 15 rifle stocks, 7 AK-47 magazines, one 12 gauge shotgun, 84 rifle grenades,  18 lbs gunpowder, 1 M-1 rifle barrel, 38 frag grenades, 3 Chicom hand grenades, 4 M-79 grenades (US), one smoke grenade (US), one trip flare (US), one claymore mine, one DDT spreader, SKF manufactured gears, one metal lathe (table size), misc machine parts, weapons parts molds, 20 lbs of clothing, 10 lbs of documents, 10 lbs dried fish, 10 lbs of polished rice, 8000 mine adapters, 200 pistol barrels, 200 rds SA ammo, 100 ft electrical cord, 45 ft steel cables, 20 coiled springs and one sigle cylinder engine.

(p6)

(2)     3/22 Inf:  Bn continued S&D operations until 1613H when a bn night defensive perimeter was established vic coord XT423603.

e. D+4,  17 May 1967:

(1)     2/22 Inf (M):  Units conducted S&D in zone.  At 1610H a second platoon of Co B at XT454637 made contact with an estimated VC reinforced squad.  The enemy was well dug in and employed RPG II small arms and automatic weapons fire.  The action resulted in 2 APCs destroyed, 1 APC damaged, 6 US KIA and 11 US WHA.  At 1728H at XT454636 Co A's maintenance APC detonated an AT mine resulting in 6 US WHA.

(2)     3/22 Inf:  Bn continued S&D operations and at 0915H Co A found 12 old bunkers vic coord. XT419611.  At 1330H Co B had two heat casualties.  Casualties were sling-loaded from LZ at 1410H by helicopter. Co A located and destroyed 4 bunkers with overhead cover vic coord XT415627 at 1500H. XT415627 at 1500H.  At 1545H the bn was halted when Co B made contact with approximately one squad of VC.  Contact was broken at 1710H with following results:  5 VC KIA (BC),  1 RPG rocket launcher, 3 rifles captured, 3 US WIA (walking wounded),  The bn swept north and reached LTL 13 at 1730H, then moved west along LTL 13 and established a night defensive perimeter vic coord XT391628.

f. D+5,  18 May 1967:
6
(1)     2/22 Inf (M):  At 0758H Co C departed perimeter to start clearing route to FSB FANG coord XT388627.   At 1045H at coord XT422634 an APC from Co A detonated an AT mine causing moderate damage to the APC at XT413633.  Two immediate airstrikes, and a light fire team were employed and contact was broken.  Action resulted in 1 US KIA and 2 US WHA.  At 1315H all elements of the bn had closed FSB FANG at XT388627 and had assumed security for the entire base.

(2)     3/22 Inf:  At 0645H the bn moved by foot to FSB FANG vic XT387623 and was helilifted from FSB FANG to Prek Klok vic coord XT277787.  The 1st lift abegan at 0730H and the 13th (final lift) was completed at 0930H.  Upon landing, Co A and the Recon platoon moved to vic coord XT232771 to assure a possible FSB.  Companies B and C remained vic coord XT277787.

12.  RESULTS:

a. US Losses:

(1) Personnel:  21 WHA,  7  KIA,  1  DOW
(2) Equipment:  2 APC's destroyed,  2 APC's damaged.

b. Enemy Losses:

     (1)     Personnel:  7 KBGF (BC),  2  KBA  (Poss.)  In addition 6 graves were located in three separate locations.  Three were dug up and appeared to have been one to four months old or badly burned from an airstrike, probably napalm.

(3) Enemy Equipment Evacuated:

WEAPONS & AMMUNITION:                                 FOODSTUFFS:

3 AK-47                              7650 lbs polished rice
1 SKB carbine                           330 bags unpolished rice
1 RPG II rocket launcher                         (200 lb bag)
1 Chicom IMG, type 56 w/magazine                 7 cows
    and 100 rds ammunition
1 M-1 rifle barrel, receiver group               MEDICINE
8000 brass mine adapters
8000 detonator components               1 roll gauze
100 ft electrical cord                    6 btls toothache pills
200 smooth metal cylinders, believed          1 bottle aspirin
        to be pistol barrels                    3 btls misc pills & medicine, type                                       unknown
OTHER                              1 box powdered plasma, US type

1 truck, Willys panel
1 truck, landrover type
70 lbs cloth;ing
Misc machine parts, weapons molds
1 fire extinguisher w/DDT spray
1 single cylinder gas engine
20 springs, 3” diameter, 10” long
1 outboard engine, 9 HP Briggs & Stratton,
    w/misc tools and spare parts          7               

(4)  Enemy Equipment Destroyed:

STRUCTURES                         ORDNANCE & MUNITIONS

54 huts (includes 5 kitchens & 4               90 rifle grenades
      classrooms                         63 frag grenades
42 bunkers w/overhead cover               11 anti-tank mines
1200 meters trench w/foxholes               1 RPG II rd w/2 fuzes
18 howitzer rds, believed to be
FOODSTUFFS                             Japanese pack-howitzer rds
81mm rd
Bin unpolished rice 5'X5'X5'               100 rds .30 cal
Bin unpolished rice 10'X5'X5'               150 rds. 5.56mm
Bin unpolished rice 6'X4'X2'               4600 7.62 rds (short) for AK-47
2300 lbs polished rice                    1400 7.62 rds misc size
9 lbs peas                         15 rifle stocks
50 lbs peanuts                         12 magazines, 30 rd “banana” clip
1 hog (killed by airstrike)                          for AK 47
3 quarts cooking oil                    1 shotgun
12 cans (5 gal ea) coconut oil               8 lbs black powder
30 cans (2 gal ea) beans                    4 M-79 rds
trip flare (US)
OTHER                              1 anti-personnel mine 8” diameter
                       6 CBU bomblets
1 truck 3/4T Dodge, WWII type               300 lbs cordite
   (damaged from previous airstrike)          5 casings for shape charge
Numerous pots & pans, cooking utinsils          9 60mm mtr rds
2 fish nets                         1 shape charge, 10 lb
8 bicycles w/misc repair parts               15 lbs batteries
2 sampans                         1 metal lathe
1 winch w/30' cable                    1 drum, 55 gal.
2hammocks
2gal. gasoline
1gal. Kerosene   

            (p7)

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a.    Personnel:   The S1 Section operated from Camp Rainier with reports being sent directly to Camp Rainier.

b.    Supply:  Operation AHINA was supported from Dau Tieng without any significant difficulties encountered.  Aerial resupply was the primary method used and continues to be suitable for operations of this nature.

c.    Maintenance:  There were no serious maintenance problems during this operation.

d.   Status of Each Class of Supply:

(1)  A ten day stockage of C Rations and one day of A Rations were maintained at the FSE (Spt. Bn)

(2)  Class III:

MOGAS          5 days
JP-4          5 days
AVGAS          10 days
Diesel          5 days

(3)  Class V:  Battalions and separate units maintain their basic load plus ASR items in accordance with current directives.

e. Medical:  Casualties were evacuated by helicopter to Dau Tieng or Tay Ninh.

14.   SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES:

     A light tactical raft (LTR) was emplaced on an unprepared site after securing it with infantry airlifted into the area.  The far side of the river (no LZ) was secured by infantry troops crossing with rubber boats.  The bridging and engineer personnel were lifted into the site by CH-47.  The bridge was emplaced with no difficulty and an entire mechanized infantry battalion was across the river in less than eight hours from the landing of the bridging platoon.  The only reconnaissance made of the area was made by air.  The detailed and accurate analysis of the terrain and careful preloading of the bridging elements proved to be the solution.to quickly emplacing a bridge.  The bridge was then dismantled and extracted by CH-47 making it unnecessary to secure the area of crossing.  All troops then participated in the attack into enemy areas.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a.    Operation AHINA is considered a success primarily as a result of the vast quantities of enemy material and equipment captured and destroyed.  Intelligence had indicated that the area had long been an area of VC supply activity and a major route of supply for units in War Zone C.  By disrupting the means of transport (sampans and trucks) and capturing much of the stores, future VC operations will be hindered.  The large quantities of good Chicom weapons and munitions found indicates that the VC continue to be well supplied in this respect, probably from northern War Zone C and Cambodia.  All evidence indicated that only rice and foodstuffs, as opposed to weapons and munitions, are being transported from the Saigon River and adjacent areas.

b.    Lessons Learned:

(1)   Item:  Dissemination of Intelligence.

Discussion:  During the operation a mechanized platoon on a reconnaissance mission was ambushed with RPG II and automatic weapons resulting in 7 US KIA, 22 US WHA, 2 APC's destroyed, and 1 APC damaged.   The following day the S2 received an intelligence document dated four days earlier giving enemy unit locations and including an enemy regimental size force located
                    (p8)

approximately two kilometers north of a proposed larger site.  Had this  information been received earlier, a dismounted rifle Co would have been given the reconnaissance mission, thereby possibly avoiding or reducing the effect of the successful enemy action.

Observation:  Immediate dissemination of intelligence information is vital to successful exploitation.

(2)   Item:   Heat Exhaustion.

Discussion:  The combination of rough terrain and steady movement during Operation AHINA caused several cases of heat exhaustion, particularly among men carrying the PRC  25 radio.

Observation:  In addition to the usual precautions against heat exhaustion, it is advisable to alternate personnel carrying radios and other heavy loads.

(3)   Item:    Radio Communications.

Discussion:   Range of the PRC 25 radio is reduced considerably when used with short antenna under heavy jungle canopy.  This is especially critical for artillery forward observers moving with ground units.

Observation:   A continuous airborne radio relay is the best way to insure reliable communications with direct support artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

                         GILBERT M. REESE
                         Major, Infantry
                         Adjutant
          DISTRIBUTION:

1 CG, USARV, ATTN:  AVC-DH
CG,  25TH Inf Div
CG,  4th Inf Div
CO 18th Mil Hist  Det
1 S1
1 S2
3 S3
1 S4
1 S5
2 CO  2/12 Inf
2 CO  2/22 Inf  (M)
2 CO  3/22 Inf
2 CO  2/77 Arty
2 CO  3d Spt Bn (Prov)
1 CO  C/1/10 Cav
1 CO  C/4th Engr
1 CO  C/588th Engr
1 Radio Research Unit
1 Bde Signal Officer          


                         (p9)


15 May 66
 2d Brigade


1st Bn  (Mech),  5th Inf:  At 1000, Co A departed base camp escorting the 2d Bde quartering party.  Upon closing into the fwd CP area, several personnel were observed fleeing the area.   Elements of A/1/5 pursued and apprehended 16 VC suspects.  At 1200 Co B and the Bn CP departed base camp escorting the 2d Bde CP and elements comprising the 2d Bde forward support base.  Co A arrived at the Bn CP at 1800.  Co C remained in the vic of Bde CP to secure wheeled vehicles which had encountered difficulty traversing the terrain along the route to the CP.

                                                  D  Day  (16  May  66)

2d  Bn,  14th  Inf:  Crossed the LD,  (Bn bunker line) at 0700 with A/3/4  Cav screening to the front.  Bn moved generally north into FILHOL PLANTATION with no enemy contact by the main body.  At 1000 the Cav Platoon received SA fire vic XT682197.  The platoon immediately returned fire and continued to its assigned area.  At 1130 the Cav Platoon encountered 5 VC including one woman vic XT679215 and brought them under fire, killing one and wounding one.  Attempts to recover the wounded VC were unsuccessful.  Several documents and items of personal equipment were found on the body recovered and in the area where the VC dropped them as they fled.  No friendly casualties were sustained.  The Bn closed XT670205 at 1500, and secured a perimeter for the night.  Preparation and securing of the LZ was completed at 1600.  Resupply was effected immediately.  During the night three ambushes were employed.

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  Crossed LD (Bn bunker line) at 0735.  Recon Platoon found tunnel complex vic XT650175.  Also located in the same area were three (3) 21mm mortar duds and one (1) booby trap.  All were destroyed at 0945 hrs.  Recon Plt received sniper fire at XT648184 at 0950.  Fire was returned with no casualties on either side.  At 1151 Recon Plt  again received sniper fire from VC vic XT635210.  Arty was used and VC withdrew.  No casualties were sustained.  Recon Plt located house, XT648208, with warm rice on a table.  Building was destroyed.  Recon Plt and 3/4 Cav Plat received sniper fire, XT649209 at 1845 hrs.  One (1) WIA in Recon Plt.  Sniper fire suppressed.
2d  Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:      At 0835, A and B Co's commenced their attack into the objective area vic XT5230.  C  Co, released at 0800 from Bde control, moved to rendezvous with the other attacking elements.  A Co reached the SW edge of Obj 4, vic XT494308 and commenced S&D operations to the NW at 0922.  B Co continued to attack due east to reach their initial objective vic XT5130.  C  Co moved to establish blocking positions vic XT500320,  504324, and 512327.  B  Co continued to attack to the east and arrived vic XT5330 at 1005 with no significant contact and commenced a thorough search of the area.    C Co now attacked  vic XT12327,  and A Co attacking NE vic XT5031, linked up to conduct a thorough search of the area.  At 1405, vic XT513326,  C Co  located a major supply cache consisting of sheet metal, tin, wax, medical supplies, buttons and cloth.  All units continued to search the SW portion of Obj 4 throughout the afternoon without contact.  A & B Co's established their bases around the Bn CP vic XT4830 and C Co remained in the area XT516313.  1/5th (Mech) units established 12 night ambushes with no significant contact.

1st Bn,  27th Inf:   At 0955, 1/27th Inf (-) completed an airmobile assault into LZ WHITE vic XT5433 with negative contact.  Upon securing the CP area, XT547324, B and C Co commenced S&D operations into the NE side of Obj 4 (vic XT5432 and 5433).  C Co. located and

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destroyed a heavily booby trapped area vic XT54332.  B Co continued to sweep vic XT54320 with negative contact.  1/27 Inf (-) elements established four night ambushes.  Throughout the night the ambushes and Bn CP received sporadic ineffective sniper fire from the heavily wooded area to their west.

2d Bn,  27th Inf:   At 1050 the battalion (-) completed an airmobile assault into LZ RED.  On the first lift, elements received SA and AW fire with 3 WIA, and one (1) crew chief killed.  Gunships silenced the fire with undetermined results.  At 1143 A & C  Co's commenced a sweep along the edge of heavy woods to the SE and SW.  A Co located a package of documents vic XT543342 which indicated that C Co  402  LF Bn had been in the area.  A & C Co made no significant contact but they did receive some sporadic sniper fire from several locations inside the thick woods.   Arty fire was continually placed on the flank of both elements and succeeded in silencing the sniper fire.  The Bn 4.2 mortars were airlifted into the Bn CP from the Bde fwd base a 1350.  C Co located a small base area vic XT528434 at 1400.  The area had been used recently and was not destroyed due to the desirability of placing ambushes in the area.  Recon Plt captured 1000 lbs of rice at XT527347.  All elements closed Bn  CP  at 1800.  A total of six (6) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

D+1 (17  May  66)

1st  Brigade

2d  Bn,  14th  Inf:   Continued S&D operations toward obj TOM.  (XT668235)  A 2/14,  Cav Plat and Recon Plat moved at 0700 hours to occupy blocking positions at XT657227 (A Co),  XT664226  (Recon), and XT668232  (3/4 Cav) in conjunction with a preplanned airstrike on obj TOM.  At 0930 hours the airstrike was aborted and the Cav Plat was ordered to move through obj TOM and link up with A Co.  No enemy contact was encountered during the move through obj TOM.  Cav Plat and the mechanized flame thrower of the engineer squad were detached,.  A Co then searched northeast to obj TOM arriving at 1400 hours.  B Co with CP group departed at 0830 hours and searched directly north towards obj TOM discovering a large cache of rice at 1400 hours vic XT670230 (estimated 50 tons).  One platoon was left to guard the rice supply area and Co (-) continued on to obj TOM arriving at 1600 hours.  At 1700 hours the platoon from B Co was withdrawn from the rice area and rejoined the Bn.  A Co                 captured approx 150 lbs of rice vic XT663224 at 1330 hours.  Bn secured a perimeter around obj TOM by 1700 hours.  The 4.2” Mort Plat displaced at 1300 hours from Bn base camp to the Bde TAC  CP, XT593215.  Two ambush patrols were sent out from obj TOM.  No enemy contact was made throughout the night.  No casualties were sustained during the days operations.

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   APC from Cav Plat detonated a mine, XT638203, at 0825 hours.  No casualties sustained.  B Co received sniper fire, XT645204, at 0825 hours.  No casualties sustained.  B Co received sniper fire, XT645204, at 0915 hrs.  Three (3) men wounded and evacuated at 1010 hrs.  Carbine and various written material was captured vic XT64221 at 1230 hrs.  At approx 1400 hrs lead elements of battalion moved into a mined and booby trapped area at XT643227.  Three (3) KIA's and nine (9) WIA's were evacuated by “DUST OFF”.  Bn withdrew and established forward base at XT640212.

4th  Bn,  9th  Inf:   Bde reaction force, Cu Chi.

Bde tactical CP with DS fire support elements  (7th Bn,  11th Arty reinf) departed Cu Chi and closed Trung Lap 1600 hrs.


                                                                     9

                                                           2d  Brigade

1st  Bn  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   1/5 (M) elements continued to conduct S&D opns in the SW sector of Obj 4 vic XT4931 and XT5031.  C Co continued to search the cache area found on 16 May.  B Co found and destroyed base camp vic XT496322 which contained living quarters, mess hall, training area and a small firing range.  The area appeared to have been used the day before.  A Co surprised four VC in a base camp vix XT500313, wounding two (2) VC.  Following the blood trails, A Co elements found one (1) VC body and a M1 rifle in a tunnel vic XT499317.  At 1625, Co A found a small CP vic XT500316 and surprised four (4) VC who immediately ran when fired upon.  Two VC KIA (poss) resulted and several books and a portable typewriter were found in the area.  At the same time other elements of A Co found another CP area at XT505320 and captured a TA-312 telephone and a PRC-10 Radio.  Three company bases were established and a total of twelve (12) night ambushed were positioned.

1st  Bn,  27th  Inf:   1/27 Inf (-) commenced thorough S&D opns in their sector of Obj 4.  At 1150 B Co captured 6,600 lbs of rice at XT54313.  No significant contact was made throughout the day and all elements closed the Bn  CP at 1600.  A total of four (4) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

2d Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0615 A & C Co's conducted local sweeps of the area forward of their perimeters.  A Co located and destroyed a large tunnel with an 8 ft roomn at XT523347.  A & C Co commenced their S&D opns while Security and Recon Plats secured the CP area.  At 0915 the Security Plat received sniper fire.  C Co destroyed five (5) bunkers at XT519336.  At 1313 C Co received heavy AW and SA fire from XT513336.  While C Co was maneuvering against the fire, 4 WIA were sustained and in the final assault on the position six (6) more WIA were sustained.  The VC position was a small village.  Two (2) VC were and 300 lbs of cloth were captured.  A Co located and destroyed a tunnel complex at XT523340, capturing 60 lbs of medical supplies and documents.  A & C Co's returned to the Bn perimeter and B Co was airlifted from base camp into the area at 1630.  Three (3) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

 D+2  (18  May  66)

1st  Brigade

2d Bn,  14th  Inf:   Continued S&D operations around its perimeter.  B Co returned to the area of rice supply discovered on the previous day at XT670230 to assist in its removal.  Recon Plat established two OP's on the Saigon River vic XT663242 and XT667243.  A cache of rice was found at 1030 hours by B Co vic XT663225.  Numerous tunnels and spider holes were found and destroyed.  B 3/4 Cav assisted B Co in the removal of rice stores, transporting it by helicopter.  A total of 20 tons of rice were removed and an estimated 10 tons were destroyed by dumping and scattering.  All elements returned to Bn area by 1500 hrs.  Ambush sites were occupied at XT664241, XT667241, XT671235 and XT659238 with negative contact.  Two claymore mines were detonated by VC near the Bn perimeter, but no casualties were sustained.

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:   At approximately 1022  A Co  received sniper fire from XT637210.  Fire was returned with no known VC casualties.  B  Co  received fire from friendly helicopters at XT637216 at 1116 hrs with two (2) WIA and one (1) KIA.  At 1347 hrs  B Co received sniper fire at XT637222.  Two (2) WIA's were evacuated by resupply chopper.  No known VC casualties.  At approximately 1417 hrs the Bn  S2  recovered one (1) AT mine, 2000 rds 7.62 ammo clip, 200 rds 7.62  link, four (4) grenades, and ten (10) unidentified tube shaped objects.  All items were evacuated to Bde S2.  Bn  TF  stopped at XT637227 at 1500 hrs for the night.

10


4th Bn,  9th  Inf:   At 0630 a platoon from 3d Sqdn;  4th Cav departed TRUNG LAP  to secure LZ  B  which was accomplished by 0915 hrs.  The original LZ time of 0930 hrs was delayed because of weather to 1100 and at this time the first flight elements landed on the LZ.  The lift consisted of 7 flight elements with 6-10 UHID  aircraft per element.  A total of 446 personnel were lifted into LZ. The lift was completed at 1131 hrs.  No enemy fire was encountered in the LZ.  At 1220 the Bn crossed the LD in a search and destroy operation toward objective  BILL  XT634253 with Co C and the Cav Plat leading, followed by the Bn command group and A Co.  At 1420 the lead elements of the Bn were on obj BILL (XT643254) having destroyed 5 tunnels and 15 buildings enroute.  Many documents and papers, one tractor with ditch digger attachment and 4 bicycles were captured.  Resupply by air was effected and the Bn secured a perimeter for the night.  A Co had two minor WIA from booby trap fragments during the afternoon.  During the night the Bn received 8-10  60mm rounds or rifle grenades in the perimeter with no casualties.

1st  Bn  (Mech),  5th Inf:   1/5 (M) units continued to search and destroy in the SW sector of Obj 4.  At 0950 A Co discovered a typewriter at XT500316 and an arms room containing MG spare parts and an armorer school graduation certificate.  At 1257 A Co was ordered to search an area west of Obj 4 vic XT486330.  At 1632 A Co surprised two VC attempting to emplace a claymore mine resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC), one (1) carbine and one (1) claymore mine captured.  Night defensive positions were established in the vic of the Bn CP XT4930.  Six (6) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

1st Bn,  27th Inf:   1/27 Inf conducted S&D opns in the SE portion of Obj 4.  C Co found one (1) claymore, a medical aid station with two cans of US and Chinese medical supplies, assorted clothing and a bag of documents at XT538420.  At 1110  B Co  located a supply point at XT533314 with canned goods, WD-1/T wire, clothes,  600 rds of small arms ammo, and 6,300 lbs of rice.  C and B Co returned to the Bn base at 1600.  A total of four night ambushes were established with negative contact.

2d Bn,  27th  Inf:    At  0815, A, B and C Co's commenced S&D opns into the heavy woods south of the Bn CP.  Throughout the day there was no enemy contact which allowed 2/27 Inf to conduct a thorough search of the area, locating the following significant items:  150 bags of rice, XT529340;  100 bags of rice XT529341;  five (5) tunnels XT523334;  three (3) VC bodies in fresh graves XT523340;  15,000 rds 7.92mm, four (4) 81mm mortar rds XT529333; 25 gallons of oil, 15 pints of paint, 3 lbs TNT, XT529333;  VC base camp XT525337.  The Bn established nine (9) night ambushes.

D+3  (19  May  66)

1st  Brigade

2d  Bn,  14th   Inf:    Continued S&D operations vic base area.  A search of the area where the enemy claymore mines were detonated on the preceding night revealed no significant findings.  Numerous tunnels and mines were found and destroyed by each platoon within their sectors.  There was little enemy contact during the day; occasional sightings of the VC across the Saigon River vic XT657241 and several rounds of sniper fire were directed toward the searching platoons.  By 1530 hrs all elements had returned to Bn base area.  Ambush sites were occupied around the perimeter but no contact was made.  At 2030 hours one enemy claymore mine was detonated against the Bn perimeter resulting in 5 US casualties:  1 KIA,  4 WIA.  The casualties were evacuated the following morning.

11
4th  Bn,  23d  Inf:   Began movement at 0735 hrs.  Just prior to moving, C Co sustained a WIA from sniper fire.  Individual was evacuated by air and DOA at Cu Chi base.  Mines, booby traps and punji pit (XT637228) were reported at 0911 hrs.  Bn also had four (4) WIA's at this location.  At 1031 hrs  Bn received 2 WIA's  at XT639228.   3/4Cav Plat had 2 WIA's,  XT634230 at 1440 hrs.  Fire was returned with .50 Cal MG, small arms and flame track.   One (1) VC was had another WIA  at same location at approx 1520 hrs.  Bn TF stopped for the night at XT639232 at 1740 hrs.  Several booby traps and tunnels with connecting shelters were reported by Co C at XT639229.  Sniper fire was received,  XT638228, by the Cav Plat at 1925 hrs.

4th  Bn,  9th  Inf:   AT 0730 hrs the perimeter received sniper fire resulting in one friendly KIA and 2 WIA.  At  0830  resupply was completed and the units moved out on S&D.  One Em was KIA by sniper fire at XT638252 at 1040 hrs.  During the S&D operation the units destroyed 6000 lbs of rice, 40 lbs salt,  8 rifle grenades,  one tunnel 80 ft long, one tunnel 120 ft long,  8 newly constructed bunkers and numerous dwellings.  Units returned to the Bn forward base at 1530.

 2d  Brigade

1st  Bm  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   At  0743 the Bn moved to conduct S&D opns in AO “C”  vic XT5634.  An APC from Co C hit a large AT mine causing extensive damage to the vehicle and two (2) WIA's at XT531306.  A  Co  found a large cache vic XT564235 which contained 34,000 lbs of rice, 150 ea 5 gal cans of kerosene and 500 sheets of tin, all stored on pallets, rolls of black cloth, sewing machines, dried fish.  A  Co  also killed one (1) VC  (BC)  in the area and captured one 9mm SMG.  All units returned to the Bn base at 1605 and a total of nine (9) night ambushes were established.

1st  Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0735 a plat from A CO, 1/27th was airlifted into the operational area from base camp as a Bn reaction force.  The Bn continued to search the heavily wooded area to the west of their CP.  C  Co  located 1,600 lbs of rice at XT535323.  Three (3) VC were observed moving in an area where Recon Plat had received sniper fire.  Mortar fire was adjusted on the VC resulting in three (3) VC KIA (poss).  A small base camp was located in vic XT540318.  C  Co  located 1,600 ea 100 kilo bags of rice stored in bins along with sheet tin, assorted clothing and some food at XT537324.  B and D  Co  closed into the Bn base at 1615.  Three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0900  2/27 Inf units commenced their S&D opns with A  Co moving into the SW,  C Co moving to the south and B Co moving to XT520334 to extract a rice cache and complete searching in that area.  During these sweeps A and C  Co's were to penetrate deep into the wooded area for it was believed that earlier contact with the VC and small caches were only the outposts of larger fortifications hidden in the dense woods.  A and C  Co's made contact almost simultaneously at approximately 0925.  A  Co  received intensive SA and AW fire from vic XT523339 and the area south.  On three occasions they were engaged by fire and booby traps and each time the VC broke contact when the fire was returned and arty was placed on their suspected positions.  A command detonated mine wounded five (5) US soldiers and a total of nine (9) were wounded by the SA fire.  Dense woods and heavy fire caused one “dustoff” aircraft to depart the area and abort its mission at which time carrying parties were dispatched from the Bn  CP  under the control of the Bn  S2.  A  Co  continuing its mission located a well camouflaged fortified village with thick underbrush and was heavily booby trapped.  As  A  Co  fired into the village, eleven (11) VC were observed being hit by fire.  In maneuvering towards the village A  Co  received six (6) casualties at which time the unit backed off and placed a heavy volume of artillery fire on the area.  The Co moved back to the Bn base and an airstrike was

12


placed on the area at 1700.  During the entire time A  Co  was in contact,  C  Co was also engaged while moving through dense woods.  C  Co  began to receive SA and AW fire vic XT535334 but each time the VC broke contact.  At 1710  C  Co  reached a fortified village (XT533333) and immediately brought in arty fire killing 12 VC.  C  Co  sustained 3 WIA.  B  Co  was diverted from the rice cache and ordered to pass thru C  Co,  which had secured the village, and to continue the attack to the south.  B Co  received heavy fire from another fortified position vic XT533331 and sustained four casualties.  Heavy artillery fire was shifted and B Co  elements continued to maneuver.  They received 10 more casualties.  The VC having broken contact, the company commenced evacuation of the wounded while continuous artillery fire was placed on the VC position.  All elements closed the Bn  CP  at 1830.  1/8 th  Arty continued to saturate the VC positions and the suspected escape routes.

D + 4   (20  May  66)

 1st  Brigade

     2d  Bn,  14tih  Inf:   Continued operations with the entire battalion being airlifted from obj TOM to LZ  “C”  XT634310, commencing 1030 hrs.  LZ “C” was secured by B  Co with no enemy contact.  Last elements closed in LZ at 1130 hrs and Bn proceeded to search and destroy towards obj  TED  (XT654283).  A  Co  received enemy sniper fire as it moved towards its assigned area vic XT632307.  The Bn occupied a defensive perimeter vic XT632314.  There were no significant actions during the night.

     4th  Bn,  23d  Inf:   Bn  TF  remained at XT639232 until approx 1430 hrs due to weather which prevented resupply.  After equipment was extracted, Bn TF continued S&D mission to  XT623238, arriving at 1615 hrs.  An ambush was left at CP location for 19 May 1966, and engaged approx  (21) VC at 1721 hrs.  Results were (7) VC KIA by BC and  (5) VC  KIA (poss).  There were no US losses.  Destruction for the day,  (2) Claymore mines, (25) lbs of salt, wire and batteries, (600) lbs potash, (200) lbs peanuts, and (400) lbs rice.

     4th  Bn,  9th  Inf:   The Bn was unable to move as planned due to nonavailability of aircraft for extraction of night kits.  Co  A  moved to the east on a search and destroy mission, and Co  C  remained at Bn base until extraction and resupply was completed.  Extraction and resupply was completed at 1400 and the Bn was ordered to move to objective BOB  (XT658258).  From 1430 - 1530  A  Co  suffered 6 WIA including the Co Commander from AP mines.  Objective BOB was secured at 1735 hrs.
2d  Brigade

1st  Bn  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   At 0700 the Bn moved to establish blocking positions and   
the northern, western and southern boundary of the 1/17 Inf to preclude VC enfiltration from the area.  The concept included A  Co screening and blocking to the north vic XT503347 and XT535345 then conducting S&D opns to the Saigon River.  B  Co  would screen and block to the west vic XT505347 and XT510330.  C  Co  established squad size ambushes vic XT513329 to XT581312.  A  Co  located 2500 lbs of rice, 27 new bicycles and 20 hand grenades vic XT530350 and B  Co  located 1500 lbs of rice vic XT513344.  At 1257,  A  Co  killed one (1) VC (BC) and captured one (1) rifle at XT527359.  At 1700 the units had completed their missions and commenced movement to Bn base area.  At 1743, C  Co  wounded and captured one VC with his rifle at XT520308.  Initial interrogation and a letter the VC was carrying indicated that he was on a recon mission from the 320th Bn to the 403d company inquiring as to the situation in the area.  The 320th Bn had not heard from the company in five days.  A total of three (3) night ambushes were established.

13

1st  Bn,  27th  Inf:   The Bn continued to S&D in their sector on the western side of Obj 4.  Recon Plat killed one (1) VC (BC) at XT552316.  At 1540, C Co located 356,8000 lbs of rice and 3,400 lbs of peanuts vic XT542328.  At 1543, the Bn CO spotted two (2) VC in the open.  Gunships were called and engaged the VC resulting in two VC KIA  (BC).  The units returned to the Bn base at 1600 and three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d  Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0900 air strikes were placed on both fortified villages where the units made contact on 19 May.  A, B. and C Co's conducted local sweeps while the Recon Plat was dispatched to thoroughly search the fortified village, XT533333, and assess the damage from the artillery and air strikes.  A  Co found two (2) fresh graves and five VC bodies vic XT525339.  Recon Plat reported the village at XT533333 was 70% destroyed, as was the village at XT535334 which was checked by A Co.  There was no significant enemy contact throughout the day.  The Recon Plat established an ambush at the hospital complex vic XT525340 at 1916.  At 2040 the A Co sector was probed from the northwest by an estimated 2 VC squads. L heavy arty fire, mortars and small arms were placed in the area with illumination, resulting in seven (7) VC KIA (poss).  There were no friendly casualties.

D+5  (21  May  66)

                        1st  Brigade

2d  Bn,  14th  Inf:   At 1000 the Bn commenced moving toward obj TED along the route XT634307  to  XT645290  to  XT655287.  At XT634307  A  Co  received fire and began advancing towards XT628304.  The fire fight intensified and A Co sustained 2 KIA, 3 WIA, and 1 MIA.  Artillery fires and gunships were used to suppress enemy fire.  Enemy casualties were not determined, however, the size of the VC force was estimated at one platoon entrenched inside a woodline approximately 40 to 80 meters forward of A Co.  One body was not recovered due to the intense enemy fire and suspension of operations in the area due to darkness.  At 1400 hours one dustoff helicopter attempting to evacuate A Co as a result of enemy fire.  The ship was rapidly secured and was evacuated at 1625 hours.  B Co conducted S&D operations to the left of A Co.  The Bn returned to XT635310 with all elements closing in perimeter by 1900 hrs.  No further enemy contact was made during the night.

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:   The Bn TF started moving at 1030 hrs.  By 1210 hrs the TF had moved approx 1500 meters north at XT620254.  While enroute, several tunnels and villages were investigated then destroyed.  300 lbs of rice and 100 lbs of beans were destroyed.  Sniper fire was received by B Co  XT613251, at 1320 hrs.  Small arms fire was returned.  B Co  sustained two (2) WIA in the action which were evacuated.  Enemy lost one (1) VC KIA by BC.  Bn TF secured perimeter at XT606264 at 1530 hrs.

4th  Bn,  9th  Inf:   At 0100  A Co successfully executed an ambush resulting in 2 VC KIA (poss) and 1 US  WIA.  At  0745 hrs the Bn sustained one WIA from friendly artillery in the Bn base.  The Bn continued to search and destroy moving north to obj BUD (XT647279).  During the movement the Bn encountered many booby traps and at least 4 mines.  Mines were wooden and of CHICOM manufacture.  One APC hit a mine which damaged the track.  Light sniper fire was also encountered during the move.  Several tunnels, a quantity of rice and other items were destroyed during the move.  The Bn closed into obj BUD at 1630 hrs and immediately effected resupply.  Nine ambush patrols were dispatched at dark to return at 0600.


14
2d  Brigade

1st Bn  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   Throughout the day the entire Bn conducted maintenance of vehicles and equipment in preparation for the next phase of operation WAHIAWA.  The Bn established twelve night ambushes, eleven of which were to remain in position until 221500  May 66.

1st Bn,  27th  Inf:   The Bn conducted maintenance of equipment and finalized plans for the next phase of operation WAHIAWA.  At 0900, an air strike was placed in the area where the rice cache was discovered, XT536235, to destroy buildings and small structures comprising the storage base.  A Co (-) was airlifted into the AO from base camp at 0820.  Three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d  Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 7000,  A Co  commenced a sweep forward of their area to police the battlefield where they had been probed the night before.  Expended brass, canteens, ammo pouches, clothing, one VC body and several drag marks were found.  B  Co  was airlifted from the area back to base camp at 0915.  Local sweeps were conducted in the Bn area along with maintenance of equipment in preparation for the next phase of Operation WAHIAWA.  Air strikes were placed on both fortified villages encountered on 19 May 66.  Six (6) night ambushes were established.
D+6  (22  May  66)

1st  Brigade

2d  Bn,  14th Inf:   The Bn moved from its perimeter,  XT635310, south towards the road and continued S&D operations to vic XT643300 where the new perimeter was to be established.  A  Co, in the lead, encountered sporadic sniper fire and maneuvered to the left.  B Co  was ordered to pass A Co  and take the lead.  B Co sustained seven casualties which were evacuated by dust off.  At approximately 1500 hours an OH-23 helicopter was downed vic the old Bn base camp area, XT635304, and was secured overnight by the Recon Plat.  The helicopter was evacuated the following morning.  There was no further enemy contact and no casualties during the night.  Resupply was not effected at the close of the day due to poor weather conditions.

4th  Bn,  23d  Inf:   Bn  TF  moved from XT612264 to XT590258 with little resistance, closing at 1750 hrs.  The following items were destroyed:  17 houses,  19 tunnels,  2700 lbs rice,  75 lbs tobacco,  100 lbs cotton,  200 lbs wheat and 3 bags phosphorus.  Resupply was not effected due to weather  (rain and low ceiling).

4th Bn,  9th  Inf:   The Bn started resupply and the exchange of Co's  A & B at 0900.  C Co and the Recon Plat moved to the northwest to conduct S&D mission.  At 1335 B Co had closed into the LZ and moved to the southwest to conduct S&D mission.  B Co  found a tunnel at XT657276 containing a ton of rice and sustained two WIA from a VC booby trap in a house nearby.  The rice, tunnel and house were destroyed.  B Co returned to Bn base at 1655.  C Co encountered heavy sniper fire at XT656286 resulting in VC sniper KIA (BC).  C Co destroyed 2500 lbs rice and several tunnels and dwellings, returning to the Bn base at 1630.  The Bn secured for the night and was resupplied.  Ten ambush patrols were dispatched at dark to return prior to 0730.  At 2030 hrs one ambush patrol from B Co received 4 or 5 hand grenades resulting in one friendly KIA.  At 220750 May, while returning to the Bn base, one patrol from C Co was hit by sniper fire resulting in one friendly KIA and one friendly WIA.


15
 2d  Brigade

2d  Bde  FSOC:   At 0730 the artillery fire support base and the Bde CP displaced  to XT534285 to support the next phase of the operation.  All elements closed at 1430.

1st  Bn  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   At 0704,  A Co (-) moved to secure the LZ (XT542296) for 2/27 Inf (-) and at 0715 the Bn CP displaced to XT554276.  At 0930 an ambush from C Co at XT488296 wounded and captured one (1) VC armed with two CHICOM grenades.  At 0945 B Co ambush at XT517308 killed one (1) VC at 0945, killed one (1) VC (BC) and three VC (poss).  One Russian  7.62mm SMG, three magazines of  7.62mm and two grenades were captured.  All units moved to bases vic XT555277 and three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d  Bn,  27th  Inf:   At  0955 the Bn commenced displacement to their new base area, XT549301.  Security elements and supplies were airlifted and the remainder of the Bn conducted a tactical march closing the new area at 1350 with negative contact.  The Bn established six (6) night ambushes.

D+7  (23  May  66)

1st Brigade

2d  Bn  14th  Inf:   An airstrike was requested and flown in vic XT629304 at 1000 hrs.  Bn did not enter the area after the airstrike.  Bn commenced movement after being resupplied.  The plan was to move from present location to vicinity of obj  TEX (XT628299).  Upon reaching vic XT639299,  A Co encountered sniper fire from a trench line.  A Co suppressed the enemy fires.  The Bn base was established vicinity XT639299 at 2000 hrs.  No resupply was received due to poor weather conditions.  However, the most seriously wounded were evacuated at midnight after an improvement in the weather conditions.  There was no enemy contact during the night.

4th  Bn,  23d  Inf:   Resupply was initiated at 0830 hrs.  A Co captured 12,000 lbs of rice at XT590264.  Rice was destroyed.  At 1115 hrs, B Co received sniper fire at XT598262 sustaining 1 WIA.  Fire was returned, results unknown.  TF moved to XT582252 for the night.

4th  Bn,  9th  Inf:   Orders for local S&D were changed and at 1405 hrs, the Bn departed for objective B (XT616287) conducting S&D enroute.  An  estimated 10-15 snipers were encountered enroute resulting in 2 VC KIA  (BC)  and 2 VC  KIA (poss).  The Bn closed into obj B at 1610, was resupplied by air and secured a perimeter for the night.  6 ambush patrols were dispatched at 1910 to return at 0720 the next morning.  Two ambushes were successfully executed during the night resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).

16

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       2d  Brigade

1st  Bn  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   The commander's concept for the next phase consisted of a full Bn atack into an objective area bounded by XT5831, XT6033, XT6230.  The plan called for rapid movement to seize objectivesto the north and NE and then commence slow, detailed search and destroy operations in zone.  Artillery and air preparation were placed in the obj area prior to the attack.  There was only one (1) significant enemy contact throughout the attack which commenced at 0730.   At 1104, A Co engaged three VC in a group, killing one (1) VC (BC) and two (2) VC (poss).  The entire objective area was heavily mined both with AT and large command detonated mines.  A total ;of six (6) APC's  hit mines resulting in 11 WIA and extensive damage to three of the vehicles.  Several small caches were found in the area including rice, kerosese, documents, ledgers and 3000 empty rice bags.  The Bn CP displ XT582305.  A and C Co established a consolidated base vic XT608318.  The Bn employed eleven (11)  night ambushes.

1st Bn,  27th  Inf:   1/27 Inf (-) conducted S&D opns in the northern sector of Obj 5 with Co's B and C and 3 / 4 Cab Plat attacking SE along the Saigon River and A Co moving south into the dense woods vic XT560320 commencing at 0730.  Throughout the day there was no enemy contact.  Several tunnels and small bunkers were destroyed in the area.  A cache consisting of 60,000 lbs of rice and 4000 lbs of peanuts was discovered vic XT572315.  All units moved back to the Bn base, closing at 1710.  Three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0730 the Bn commenced S&D opns in the southern sector of Obj 5 (XT5630).  At 0828 a Chinese claymore was detonated against C Co, wounding seven (7) men.  The element from C Co also received heavy SA and MG fire from an undetermined size force.  Artillery and mortar fires were placed on the VC position at XT599303, and when elements from C Co attacked, the VC broke contact.  2/27 Inf (-) elements made no further enemy contact throughout the day.  C Co located a large cache vic XT551212 consisting of cloth, batteries, bundles of plastic, kerosene, rolls of wire and levels.  A and C Co's closed the Bn base by 1628 and six (6) night ambushes were established.

D + 8  (24  May  66)

 1st  Brigade

                          2d  Bn,  14th  Inf:   Bn commenced movement at 1200 hrs.  B Co moved through A Co and         
                           immediately began receiving sniper fire from vic XT636298.  B Co maneuvered and suppressed the fire, sustaining six casualties, two KIA and four WIA.  The enemy was enclosed in three bunkers that controlled the area.  Estimated strength of the enemy was seven personnel.  Grenades and direct fire anti-tank weapons were used to silence and destroy the bunkers.  The unit continued to obj B (XT627286), closing at 1700 hours.  Two ambush patrols were employed during the night with no enemy contact.

4th  Bn,  23d  Inf:   Bn TF began movement north on S&D mission.  At approx 1045 hrs, B Co received friendly artillery rounds in their location at XT 584225.  Two (2) WIA were sustained, one (1) of which DOW.  At 1500 hrs Bn TF halted at XT585272 for the night.  During the days operation numerous houses and 2800 lbs of rice were destroyed.

4th  Bn, 9th  Inf:   Bn conducted local S&D operations with C Co moving to the NW, B Co moving SW, and the Recon Plat moving  SE.  During the day 1700 lbs rice, 5 dwellings, numerous mines and booby traps, 7 tunnels, VC flags, VC uniforms and numerous other
17
items were destroyed.  B Co sustained 8 WIA from 2 booby trapped hand grenades at XT624281.  The 2/14th Infantry moved into area of operations arriving at 1710 hours, and occupied the north-eastern side of the perimeter for the night.  The Bn dispatched 4 ambush patrols for the night.

 2nd Brigade

1st Bn  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   AT 0700 all units of the Bn commenced to conduct thorough S&D opns in their respective sectors.  1/5 (M) elements continued to find several caches in the area which appeared to have been used recently as a VC unit base and rest camp.  AT 1345 A Co received a new mission to attack NW along the Saigon River to link up with elements of 1/27 Inf (-).  Elements of C Co sunk several sampans and located small caches of food supplies while searching along the Saigon River vic XT599324.  All units moved to a Bn base vic XT583205 at 1730.  Nine (9) night ambushes were established.

1st  Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0730, the Bn continued to conduct S&D opns in their sector of Obj 5 with negative enemy contact.  At 1323, B Co located a bunker containing fifty 5 gal cans of medical supplies at XT554307.  The units completed their sweeps and returned to the Bn base at 1620.  Three (3) night ambushes were established.  At 2020, while moving into position, one ambush called in artillery fire on five (5) VC resulting in 5 VC KIA (poss).

2d  Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0730, after screening the area to the front of their positions, A and C Co's commenced S&D opns in their sectors of Obj 5.  A Co received sniper fire resulting in two minor WIA's.  Artillery fire was placed on the suspected VC position but they had broken contact.  A and C Co's completed their missions and by 1800 had closed the Bn base.  Six (6) night ambushes were established.

 D + 9  (25  May  66)

 1st  Brigade

2d  Bn,  14th  Inf:   Bn moved out at 1230 hours from objective B southeast for 600 meters, south for 400 meters then south-west to obj F (XT619263).  B Co was lead element for movement and encountered no VC enroute.  Rear elements, however, did encounter sniper fire from vic XT625285 prior to departing the old Bn base.  All elements closed base area vic (XT619263) at 1730 hours and secured in area with 4/9 Inf.  Four ambush patrols were employed during the night with no enemy contact.

4th  Bn,  23d  Inf:   Bn TF moved to XT583199 with no enemy activity or action reported.  One (1) casualty from snake bite was evacuated.  Bn TF continued operation with only activity being wo (2) VC apprehended that were evacuated to Bde.

4th  Bn,  9th  Inf:   Bn moved out at 0900 in S&D toward objective F (XT619263).  Enroute C Co encountered light sniper fire resulting in two friendly WIA.  The Bn destroyed 20 dwellings, 6 of which were booby trapped, 5200 lbs rice, 4 tunnels, 6 bunkers and numerous other items.  The Bn arrived at obj F at 1630 hours, was resupplied and secured a perimeter for the night.  Four ambush patrols were dispatched at 1845 and returned at 0630 the following morning.  The patrols had no contact.

18


 2d  Brigade

1st  Bn  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   The battalion dispatched elements to occupy platoon size ambushes along the southern edge of Obj 4 and 5.  One platoon from C Co completed operations in the 1/5 (M) AO by screening east from XT586308 to XT590308.  At 1005 B Co ambush vic XT578296 killed two (2) VC (BC) and captured four CHICOM grenades and miscellaneous documents.  At 1305 the Bn CP displaced to XT555275.  At 1420 C Co ambush (XT311105) killed one VC (BC) and captured one (1) CHICOM rifle, two (2) hand grenades and web equipment.  The platoon size ambushes remained in position at night and three (3) more ambushes were established in the vicinity of the battalion CP.

1st Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0825 the battalion commenced a tactical march to the new base vic 2d Bde CP XT530280.  At 1215 a VC Claymore was detonated along the route, wounding six (6) personnel vic XT542210.  A thorough search of the area was made with negative contact.  The battalion closed the new area at 1400 and prepared defensive positions.  Six (6) night ambushes were established.  At 2220 the ambush vic XT527257 killed one (1) VC (BC).

2d  Bn,  27th  Inf:   The battalion commenced displacement to new base vic XT493246 at 0630.  A security force was airlifted to the new CP location at 0950.  All elements closed the new location at 1246, and defensive positions were immediately prepared.  A total of six (6) night ambushes were established.  

 D + 10  (26  May  66)

1st  Brigade

2d  Bn,  14th  Inf:   Bn commenced movement 0830 hrs from obj F to Bde forward base vic XT593216.  There was no enemy contact enroute.  Unit passed thru elements of 4/9th Inf vic XT617224 enroute to Bde base.  Listening posts were employed outside the Bn perimeter during the night, and there was no enemy contact.

4th  Bn,  23d  Inf:   Bn moved south of TRUNG LAP to secure road from TRUNG LAP  to Highway 1.

4th  Bn,  9th  Inf:   Bn moved south to obj M (XT618225) at 1030.  The Bn left a seven man element from the Recon Plat behind to establish an ambush at the old position.  A VC force of 8 or 9 men made a reconnaissance by fire of the position at 1230 hrs, then moved in and started to police the area for ammo cans, trash, etc.  The recon element sprung the ambush at a distance of 30 meters and got 3 VC (BC) and 3 VC KIA (poss).  As the patrol moved out of position to search the bodies they were fired on by a superior force and withdrew under cover of small arms and artillery fire.  They joined the remainder of the Bn on obj M at 1435.  The Bn occupied perimeter positions for the night and was resupplied.  At approximately 1710 the Bn perimeter received 4 rounds of 8 inch artillery.   This artillery was base camp.  The Bn sustained 2 KIA and 18 WIA from the friendly artillery fire and one of the wounded later died.  VC snipers were engaged resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 KIA (poss).  Seven ambush patrols were dispatched at 1830.  An ambush patrol from B Co detonated a claymore mine against a VC force with unknown results at 2105.

19
 2d  Brigade

1st  Bn  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   At 0730 the A Co ambush located vic XT553313 killed 2 VC (BC) and captured a CHICOM assault rifle, seven ammo magazines and two CHICOM grenades.  At 0810 all ambushes were ordered to return to the Bn base, closing at 0910.  The Recon Plat called in artillery fire on four (4) VC in the open resulting in four (4) VC KIA (poss).  At 1800 B Co was ordered to secure the 2/27th Inf (-) CP.  B Co arrived at 1920 and was placed under OPCON Co 2/27th Inf.

1st Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0755  C Co commenced S&D opns in AO “B” vic XT5127.  C Co returned to the Bn base at 1140 with negative enemy contact.  A Co commenced S&Dl opns vic XT5227 and XT5327 at 1030, returning at 1420 with negative contact.  Six (6) night ambushes were established.

2d  Bn,  27th  Inf:   At 0900, A Co Recon Plat and the MEDCAP team initiated searching opns vic XT5124.  Several rounds of ineffective sniper fire were received by advancing elements but exact VC positions could not be determined.  The Recon Plat captured one (1) VC at 1045 vic XT588329.  The VC gave information about the location of members of his squad and that he knew where 50 VC were hiding in a tunnel.  Based on this information, A Co, C Co and Recon Plat were diverted from their mission to exploit the intelligence information.  At 1500, the tunnel (XT503210) was located and encircled.  While investigating the tunnel, one man from A Co was wounded three times in the legs.  Certain that there were VC in the tunnel, the unit set up a defensive  perimeter around the tunnel for the night.  The battalion CP was augmented by B Co, 1/5th (Mech) Inf.  Continuing to search the area, two 45 cal pistols, 1 carbine and several assorted documents were found in one of the adjacent tunnels

D + 11  (27  May  66)

1st  Brigade

2d,  Bn,  14th  Inf:   Bn was extracted from the area by CH47 and UHID helicopters.  Extraction was begun at 0800.  All elements closed Div base camp at 1030 hrs.  There was no contact en route or during the day.

4th  Bn,  9th  Inf:   At 0743 all patrols returned to Bn base without making contact.  At 0800 the Bn moved out for the ARVN Ranger Camp at TRUNG LAP closing there at 0910 without incident.  The first elements departed by helicopter for Cu Chi base camp at 0920 and the last elements closed in the Cu Chi base area at 1100 hrs.  

4th Bn,  23rd Inf: convoy security for Bde returning to Cu Chi from TRUNG LAP.  Co. A received one (1) WIA at XT58200.  Evacuated by “Dust Off”.  Bn started movement to Cu Chi with first elements arriving at 1250 hrs.  Entire Bn closed base camp area at 1310 hrs.

20
 2d  Brigade

1st  Bno  (Mech),  5th  Inf:   At 0730 B Co returned to 1/5 (M) control and the Bn commenced its mission of clearing and securing the road from XT508259 to XT488205 for the overland extraction of the Bde CP.  At 1107 the Bn  CP  commenced its move along the route to vic XT492212.  At 1515, all elements had passed through the Bn security forces at which time 1/5 (M) commenced their overland move closing base camp at 1855.

1st  Bn,  27th  Inf:   At  0625 the Bn cleared the road from 2d Bde  CP to XT504257.  The 3 / 4 Cav Plt and elements from the 65th Engr remained to secure the road while 1/27th Inf elements moved back to their base.  At 1000 the Bn commenced an airmobile extraction from the AO to base camp.  Airlifted elements closed Cu Chi at 1120.  The 4.2 mortar plt which was attached to the 1/ 8th    Arty returned with the FSOC elements at 1600.

2d  Bn,  27th  Inf:   During the night elements at the location of the tunnel received intermittent SA and rifle grenade fire into their positions.  C Co killed one (1) VC (BC) attempting to escape the encirclement.  Elements conducting a sweep at 0630 found the VC body, a pistol and a rifle.  Personnel went back into the numerous tunnel entrances to continue the search.  Several noises were heard inside and the decision was made to extract the personnel and commence complete destruction of the entire tunnel complex.  A special tunnel team was flown into the area from Saigon and by 1112 the complete distruction had been accomplished.  The Bn returned to its CP area and at 1254 commenced an airmobile extraction from the AO, all elements closing base camp by 1342.

Results:

VC  KIA  (BC)      144     Dried Beef          100  lbs
VC  KBA          13     Beans               4.18  tons
VC  KBA  (poss)     30     Sugar               1.8  tons
VC  KIA   (poss)     205     Paraffin               4000  lbs
VCC          10     Tar               500  gals
VCS          9     Medical Supplies           4000 lbs
Small arms          32     Cloth               98,698  yds
Heavy weapon     1     Tin               550  sheets
Ammo          23,524     Steel               30  sheets
Mines / demolition       174     Steel               10  bars
Base camps          9     Heavy wire          30  rolls
Supply  Points     3     Motorcycle          1
Fortifications       41     Bicycle               54
Tunnels          140     Sewing Machines           8
Building          234     Duplicating Machines      1
_____________difficulties were experienced by the 1st Bde primarily due to the lack of authorized radios.  This problem has since been alleviated.

14.   Special Equipment and Techniques:   None

                    21

15.   Commander's Analysis:                                      
The use of stay behind ambushes again proved effective.  As a unit departed and area where they had been for any length of time, well concealed ambush forces were able to surprise VC moving into the area.

When VC units in well camouflaged fortified positions are encountered in dense woods such as the BOI LOI, maximum artillery and air must be brought to bear on the VC positions prior to an infantry assault.

Searching a known VC area is not sufficient.  Slow, detailed and often repetitive searching is necessary to locate caches and VC installations.

Gunships must enter the command net of the unit they support and must know the unit scheme of maneuver.  If necessary, the gunship commander should land and be briefed by the commanding officer or the S3.

Battalion CP's must be capable of rapid displacement by air.  Units must program early lift of excess equipment such as night kits, demolition, etc., by normal resupply ships.

The firing of the center tube, artillery or mortars, on the axis of advances is effective both as a means of maintaining direction in dense vegetation and for expediting support fires when enemy contact is made.

The establishment of a Forward Support Operations Center (FSOC) along with a Fire Support Base and Brigade CP is not advisable when cross country movement or repetitive travel on roads subject to heavy mining is necessary.  Maximum use of aerial resupply, and hence, minimum essential equipment in the Brigade Forward CP remains as the most practical approach to operations of Brigade size in the present Division TAOR.


FOR  THE  COMMANDER:         .   
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