|   home
After Action Reports 1   |   After Action Reports 2   |   After Action Report 3   |   After Action Reports 4   |   After Action Reports 5   |   After Action Reports 6   |   After Action Reports 7   |   After Action Reports 8   |   After Action Reports 9   |   After Action Reports 10   |   After Action Reports 11   |   After Action Reports 12   |   After Action Reports 13   |   After Action Reports 14   |   After Action Reports 15   |   After Action Reports 16   |   After Action Reports 17   |   After Action Report 18   |   After Action Report 19   |   After Action Report 20   |   After Action Report 21   |   After Action Reports 22   |   After Action Reports 23   |   After Action Reports 24   |   After Action Reports 25   |   After Action Report 26   |   After Action Report 27   |   After Action Reports 28   |   After Action Reports 29   |   After Action Report 30   |   After Action Reports 31   |   After Action Reports 32   |   After Action Reports 33   |   After Action Reports 34   |   After Action Reports 35   |   After Action Reports 36   |   After Action Reports 37   |   After Action Reports 38   |   After Action Reports 39   |   After Action Reports 40   |   After Action Report 41   |   After Action Report 42   |   Afer Action 43   |   After Action Report 44   |   After Action Reports 45   |   After Action Reports 46   |   After Action Reports 47   |   After Action Reports 48   |   After Action Report 49   |   After Action Reports 50   |   After Action Report 51   |   After Action Report 52   |   After Action Report 53   |   After Action Report 54   |   After Action Report 55   |   After Action Report 56   |   After Action Report 57   |   After Action Report 58   |   After Action Report 59   |   After Action Report 60   |   After Action Report 61   |   After Action Report 62   |   After Action Report 63   |   After Action Report 64   |   After Action Report 65   |   After Action Report 65   |   After Action Report 66
After Action Reports 10
Back To After Action Reports

 Operation Barking Sands

SUBJECT:  Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS MACV J3/32)     1st Ind (U)

DA,  HEADQUARTERS,  25th INFANTRY DIVISION,  APO  96225   4 JAN 68

TO:   COMMANDER,  US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND,  ATTN: J343, APO 96243

     Forwarded,

     FOR THE COMMANDER:


1- Incl Combat Ops After Action Report                                                        W.C.  LENDERMON
                                                                                                                       Maj.  AGC
                                                                                                                        Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - AcofS for Force Dev,  DA
2-   3 MAC-J343
3-   3USARV,  ATTN:  AVH CS-MH
4-   4II FORCEV,  ATTN:  G-3
1 - OG,   USA Inf Sch,  Ft Benning, Ga  31029
1 - OG,   USA  Arm Sch,  Ft Knox, Ky  40120
1 - OG,   USA  Inf Human Rsch Unit,  Ft Benning, Ga  31029
1 - CO,   USA Arty & Missile Sch,  Ft Sill, Okla.
1 -  CO,   USA  OGSC,  Ft. Leavenworth, Kan
1 - USMA,  ATTN:  Librarian,  West Point, NY  10996




                              REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
                              WHEN SEPARATED FROM
                              CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE




                    US DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
          HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE,  25TH  INFANTRY DIVISION
                           APO San Francisco  96225

28 December  1967

  DCFB-C

SUBJECT:       Combat Operations After Action Report

TO:    Commanding General
          25th  Infantry Division
          ATTNL   AVDCOP
          APO  San Francisco 96225

1.      (U)   Name:  Operation BARKING SANDS (Operations KAWELA, AKUMU, WAIMEA, KUNIA)

2.     (U)   Dates:  190001H  May - 071800H  Dec 67

3.     (U)   Location:  TAY NINH Province,  BINH DUONG Province, NAU NGHIA Province,  Republic of Vietnam
4.     (U)   Control  HQ:  1st   Bde,  25th  Infantry Division

5.     (C)   Reporting Officer:  Colonel Edwin H. Marks Jr.

6.     (C)    Task Organization:

Headquarters,  1st  Bde                             CU CHI PH's
Headquarters,  7th  ARVN  Regt.          TAN HOA  PF's
1 - 5  Inf (M)                                       KHIEM HANH  PF's
2 - 14  Inf                                         TRANG BANG,  PF's
2 - 27  Inf                                                  PHU DUC  PF's
3 - 22  Inf                                                  PHU HOA  PF's
4 - 9   Inf                                      TAN PHU TRUNG  PF's
4 - 12  Inf                                                    GIA LOC  PF's
4 - 23  Inf  (M)                                        AP CHANH PF's
2 - 7  Inf  ARVN                                             494  RF  Co
1 - 7  Inf  ARVN                                             495  RF  Co
3 - 7  Inf  ARVN                          34th ARVN  Ranger Co
4 - 7  Inf  ARVN                     Sector Special Co (Cu Chi)
2 - 8  Inf  ARVN                                   A Co 2 - 34  Armor
3 - 1  Cav Trp  ARVN                            3d  Sqd,  4th Cav
34th  ARVN Rangers                                      1 - 27  Arty
5th  Recon Co ARVN                        B Btry,  2 - 40  Arty
5th  Armor  Car  Co  ARVN                             3-13  Arty


                    DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
                    DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
                    DOD  DIR  5200.10

     7-11  Arty                    25th  M1  Det
     65th  Engr  Bn                    187th   Assault  Helicopter Co
     168th  Engr Co (27th LCD)               178th   Assault  Helicopter Co
     Scout Dog Tm., 38th Scout Dog Plat     116th   Assault  Helicopter Co
     1 plat,  25th  MP Co               25th  Aviation Co, 25th Div
     Sig Spt Plat,  125th  Sig Bn               II  Field Force Aviation

7,      (C  Supporting Forces:

   a. Artillery:  Artillery support for Operation BARKING SANDS envisioned many new concepts which proved to be highly successful in a jungle war against guerilla forces.  BARKING SANDS, as never before utilized the concept of airlift of light artillery batteries to exploit important intelligence data.  Further, it was in Operations BARKING SANDS that the concept of a minimum of one artillery battalion equivalent would be used to support any maneuver force larger than a platoon.  The results of these new ideas were a greater kill ratio per artillery round fired and most certainly added a confusion factor to the enemy as to the size force which was opposing him.  In many cases the weight of artillery power served to accomplish the mission with fewer friendly casualties.  The additional artillery provided a greater volume of fire which could be used in preparation fires which saved many lives and reduced the loss of equipment in Rome Plow operations.  For statistical data for Operation  BARKING SANDS refer to Artillery after action reports for the sub-operations undertaken during the operation.

   b. Tactical Air:  Tactical air support was provided by the 7th USAF.  The missions were controlled by the 1st Bde TACP.  Statistics listed below are missions flown in support of Operation BARKING SANDS only and not the sub-operations that made up the overall operation.  Each sub-operation statistics are provided in respective After Action Reports.

(1)   Missions flown:          624

      (2)   Fighter sorties        1,390

(a)   Preplanned:          679

      (b)   Immediate:          279

      (c)   Diverts:                432

(3) Results:  bunkers destroyed:  1,568;  bunkers damaged - 132;  bunkers exposed 168;  fighting psns destroyed (fox and spider holes) - 118;  fighting psns exposed - 167; structures destroyed - 212;  structures damaged - 38;  docking sites destroyed - 4;  trails & roads cut - 5;  VC KBA (BC) - 47;  VC KBA (possible) - 131;  sampans destroyed - 27;  sampans damaged - 3;  tunnels destroyed -50 meters;  trench destroyed 2,845 meters;  trench exposed - 1,965;  caches destroyed - 34;  caches damaged / exposed - 2;  secondary fires - 131;  secondary explosions - 59;  observation tower destroyed - 1;  oxcarts destroyed - 2;  livestock destroyed 3;  bicycles destroyed - 5;  foot bridges damaged / destroyed -5.

2



(4) Tactical air support throughout the operation was outstanding.  Preplanned and immediate strikes were both timely and accurate.  Operation WAIMEA was the 1st operation conducted by the 1st Bde  where extensive airstrikes were followed by massed arty preps on LZ's.  The use of the two support wpns caused a perfection of the timely delivery techniques required.  The success of the operation has influenced the increased use of their tactical employment.

c. Army Aviation:  See Operational After Action Reports - KAWELA, ARUMU, WAIMEA, KUNIA.

8.   (C)    Intelligence:

a. Intelligence studies prior to Operation BARKING SANDS indicated that elements of the 1st Bn, MR4, 7th Bn/CU CHI District and 2d Bn, GO MON District were operating in the AO.  Strength of each of these units was between 200-300 men.  The CU CHI  “QUYET CHIEN II”. Local force platoon w/strength of approx 25 men, was known to be operating in the PHU HOA DONG-BEN CO area (XT705196).  

     Generally these units will disperse their subordinate companies throughout the area and mass only for offensive action.  2d  Bn/Go Mon generally operates to the south and east of PHU HOA DONG Village while the 1st Bn/MR4 and 7th Bn/CU CHI District operates to the north west and southwest of the village.  Agent reports indicated considerable VC activity in the vic of the FILHOL, middle BOI  LOI and HO BO Woods.  VC irregulars and the above mentioned bn's are supposed to have considerable control over activities in the villages and surrounding areas.  
     Also was reported that the BOI LOI and HO BO WOODS had long been a major VC base area for elements of the D14, 1st Bn MR4 and 7th Bn/MR4  (CU CHI).  The 1st Bn MR4 located in the north central HO BO WOODS with elements dispersed throughout the area and in the villages to the west.  D14 Bn was reported dispersed throughout the BOI LOI WOODS.  The 7th Bn/ CU CHI was reported dispersed with 1 company in the northern FILHOL, 1 company in the THAI MY area, and 1 company in the TRUNG LAP area.  Their pattern of activity throughout the monsoon season was to avoid decisive contact with US operations, to continue the resupply and proselytizing activities, and harassment of RF/PF outpost and small unit operations of US forces.   

     During the course of the operation 917 tunnels, 5,421 bunkers, 680 structures, 537 foxholes and spider holes were destroyed.  Numerous trench systems were located on the periphery of cleared areas and in the vic of possible LZ's.  Significant VC losses:

a.  200800-201400  Sep 67 - A 4-9 Inf destroyed 1 large tunnel complex booby trapped with claymore mine and Chicom grenade.  1 tunnel complex 30'x4'x4' with 4” thick concrete trap door on both entrances vic (XT613304).

b.  221100 Sep 67 - B 4-23 Inf. (M) vic XT570311 loc & evac 12 printing sorting trays, 18x24 inches with 20 lbs print, 1 tool box w/assorted printers tools, 1-9mm, 49 SMG folding stock, 2 printing presses layout book, 9-.50 cal ammo boxes of type (270 lbs), 80 lbs of loose type, 5 strips paper, 2 ink rollers and 1  VC kerosene lantern vic XT569312.

(p3)

c.  031315 Oct 67 - B  4-9 Inf. vic XT598258, loc arms cache consisting of 34 Chicom rifles.

d.  041134  Oct 67 - B 4-23 Inf (M) vic XT613293 rec'd SA fire from est 3 VC.  Returned fire W/SA & AW.  Results:  2 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC WIA.  1 RPG-7 RL and booster, 1 US M1 carbine loc & evac.

e.  061012  Oct 67 - A 2-14 Inf vic XT613304 loc & evac a large wpns cache consisting 1 Chicom MG, 3-.30 cal MG's, 2 BAR's, 2 Japanese MG's, 1 Chicom Assault rifle, 4 French Commando rifles, 1-60mm mortar, 1-81mm mortar tube, 1 Chicom carbine, 43  75mm RR rds, 41 boxes of .50 cal ammo (100 rds per box), 10 Chicom claymore mines, 15 lbs C4 explosives and approx 400 lbs assorted clothing.

f.  141126 Oct 67 - D 4-9 Inf vic XT636261 engaged an est 20 VC in a base camp (hosp area for 1st Bn MR4) w/SA, shotgun, AW.  Results:  12 VC KIA (BC),  1 VC PW WIA, 5 US KIA, 7 US WIA.

Weather did not hamper or prohibit friendly troop movement.  Terrain was primarily jungle in varying degrees of density ranging from light to heavy.  Roads throughout the area were generally poor but were passable to tracked vehicles.  There was one major river, the SONG SAIGON, within the area.  All maneuver elements found the maps of the area quite accurate, corresponding closely to the terrain in terms of concealment, critical features and available avenues of approach.  Generally, in the areas of dense vegetation, foot movement was restricted and observation was hampered, however, camouflage was more than adequate.  Foot and oxcart trails and primitive roads used for logging activities abound throughout the area.       

The overall evaluation of the intelligence information gained from local ARVN Hqs and other local sources is considered B-3 (usually reliable, possibly true).  The overall operation security of Opn BARKING SANDS was considered excellent.


9. ( C)  Mission:

a.  Operation KAWELA - 1st Bde (-) conducted combat assault in the Iron Triangle with the mission to destroy VC/NVA field fortifications and forces and to deny the area as a safe haven for future enemy attacks in the TAY NINH-BINH DUONG Provinces.

b.  Operation AKUMU - 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div and 7th Regt, 5th ARVN Div conducted cordon and search and pacification operations in PHU HOA DONG village.

c.  Operation WAIMEA -  1st Bde conducted offensive operations in RACH TRA Stream area to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations.

d.  Operation KUNIA - 1st Bde conducted operations to eliminate the HO BO WOODS as a VC base area by 31 Oct 67 through:  Tactical operations to destroy known and suspected VC forces in the area, jungle clearing with Rome Plows in accordance with directed priorities, and destruction of VC field fortifications.

(p4)

10.  ( C)   Concept of Operation:

a.   Operation KAWELA - Bns conducted search and destroy missions employing airmobile combat assaults into the Iron Triangle and along the west side of the SAIGON river south of the Iron Triangle.  A river crossing was conducted by the 4-9 Inf and 4-23 Inf (M) to exploit intelligence reports in the Iron Triangle.  One Bn from 3d Bde served as a blocking force for the river crossing mission.  

b.  Operation AKUMU - conducted in three phases:

(1)   Phase I (D-1 thru D+2)  On D-1 CORDON forces generally located around PHU HOA DONG.  1st Bde and 7th ARVN Regt, both with 3 battalions reinforced conducted cordon and search operations.  Village festival began on D+1.

(2)  Phase II  (D+3 thru D+16)  1st Bde and 7th ARVN Regt continued cordon and search each with 2 bns (+) and conducted S&D operations in assigned AO.  7th ARVN Regt conducted clearing, relocation, RD and construction operations in PHU HOA DONG Village.

(3)  Phase III - 7th ARVN Regt establishes population and resource control and continues clearing, relocation and construction operations.

c.  Operation WAIMEA -  conducted in three phases:

(1) Phase I - 2-7 (ARVN) conducted S&D ops and saturation night ambush patrolling in zone between two phase lines through D+1.  On D+2 Bn conducted S&D ops; and saturation night ambush patrolling in zone between phase line PERCH and SAIGON River.  

(2) Phase II - 2-7  (ARVN) continued S&D ops and saturation night ambush patrolling between PL PERCH and SAIGON River.  4-12 Inf conducted CA on LZ 3.  Conducted S&D ops and saturation night ambush patrolling within assigned obj area.  D Trp 3-4 Cav screened along road from vic XT796124 to vic XT754073.  2-14 Inf conducted simultaneous mock CA's on LZ's;  occupied obj KING; conducted resupply and made preparations to establish a patrol base;  moved to and occupied ambush sites within obj areas.  4-7 (ARVN) occupied obj area; made preparations to establish a Bn patrol base; moved to and occupied ambush sites within obj area.

(3) Phase III - 2-7  (ARVN)  withdrew across PL PERCH and conducted S*D ops between PL PERCH  and PL BASS.  2-14 Inf (-) conducted CA on LZ and S&D ops within obj areas.  4-7 (ARVN) conducted CA on LZ and S &D ops within obj area.  4-12 Inf conducted CA on LZ and S&D ops within obj area.  D Trp 3-4 Cav screened along road from XT796124 to vic  XT754073.    

d.  Operation KUNIA -  1st Bde conducted combat operations with 4-9, 2-14 and TF 4-23 operating in the HO BO WOODS and 3-22 operating north of the SAIGON River, to eliminate the HO BO WOODS as a VC base.  Combat operations were designed to destroy known and suspected VC forces.

(p5)

10.  Near the HO BO WOODS with  clearing operations and to   destroy VC field fortifications.  

11. (C)  Execution :  Execution of Operation BARKING SANDS is broken down by units rather than daily sequences.

4th Bn, 9th Inf - (19 May to 11 June 67)
Bn continued operation BARKING SANDS with company size operations ranging from cordon and search, BUSHMASTER, search and destroy, saturation day and night ambush patrolling, and Eagle Flights to react to current intelligence.  The pacification program was followed through the MEDCAPS.  Missions with the local RF/PF units on combined operations proved effective.

     (12 June - 16  July  67)    Operation KAWEIA

     (17 July - 14 Sep  67)   Bn continued Operation BARKING SANDS as a pacification operation in the CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts of HAU NGHIA Province and PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province.  Numerous small unit actions which included BUSHMASTER, CORDON & SEARCH, ROAD RUNNER and CHECKMATES were conducted within the 1st Bde AO.  In addition, search and destroy missions employing airmobile combat assaults were conducted.  During the period 17 - 20 June 67, the bn was  OPCON  to 199th Lt Inf Bde.  From 1 Sep until 7 Sep            occupied scatter positions and conducted saturation patrolling          the RVN National elections.  The entire Bn conducted required refresher training during the period.   

15 Sep -18  Nov  67)  Operation  KUNIA

( 19  Nov - 7  Dec  67)   Bn conducted Operation BARKING SANDS by conducting S&D operations in the east and south of the HO BO WOODS and moving into the northern FILHOL to complete clearing of the SAIGON River.  Combined operations were conducted with the RAG Units and 1st Bn, 47th Regt from PHU HOA DONG.  Bn began preparation for and moved to TAY NINH to establish a permanent base camp.  

     4th  Bn.  23d  Inf  (M)

19 May - 6 Jun  67)  Operation  MANHATTAN

(7 Jun - 11 Jun  67)  Bn conducted daily S*D operations in AO and prepared for Operation KAWELA.

12 Jun - 16 July)  Operation KAWELA

8 July -  24  July)  Operation  AKUMU

(25  July - 14  Sep  67)   Bn conducted S&D operations in the FILHOL Plantation area and Eagle Flights within the 1st Bde AO.  The main effort was concentrated on ROME PLOW operations in the THAI MY area.  In conjunction with the 65th Engr Bn, Co A cleared the Cu Chi Base Camp perimeter near Xom Moi.  Daily ROAD RUNNER  missions were conducted downTRANG BANG to CU CHI continued were held at irregular intervals.
                              (p6)
15 Sep - 15  Nov  67)  Operation KUNIA

(19  Nov - 7  Dec  67)   OPCON 2d Bde.

     2d  Bn,  14th  Inf

(19  May - July)  25  July - 21  Aug)  (27  Aug - 14  Sep  67)  Bn moved into AO SCARLET and established a FSPB to support operations east of Camp Cu Chi.  An additional mission was to provide security for a laterite pit opened by the 65th Engr Bn at FSPS SCARLET and the engr effort to open Rt 7 from Cu Chi to Phu Cong as a main service road.  Operations were conducted within the AO at company and platoon level.  Airmobile and RAG insertions of units into areas along the SAIGON RIVER proved effective in establishing contact with VC forces.  Cordon and search operations were conducted on selected villages within the AO and CHECKMATE and CHECKPOINT operations were held daily.  Saturation patrolling conducted throughout the operation areas also proved effective.  MEDCAPS were held on a weekly basis by the Bn Surgeon.  During the period 30 July to 2 Aug the bn participated in Operations CORONADO II in the Delta area.  

(8  Jul  -  Jul  67)   Operation AKUMU
22 Aug  -  26  Aug)  Operation WAIMEA
15 Sep  -  31  Dec  67)   Operation  KUNIA
(1  Nov  -  18  Nov  67)    Operation UNIONTOWN

19 Nov  -  7  Dec  67)  Bn moved to CU CHI from Operation UNIONTOWN and began preparation for and movement to a permanent base at TAY NINH.  Bn conducted refresher tng during the period.

12. (C)  Results:  (Figures are inclusive of four sub-operations)

a. Personnel

(1)   Friendly     KHA     KBA     NIA     DOW     TOTAL
          4 - 9          36     270        0         9        315
          2 - 14        42     396        0         9        447
          4 - 23        32     476        0         5        513
          HHC            0         2        0         0            2

(2) Enemy  (Figures are inclusive of four sub-operations)

KIA  (BC)           -    323
KBA  (BC)         -      47
KIA  (POSS)     -     715
KBA (POSS)    -     131
VC   PW  -         -       85
HOI CHANH       -      10
Civil Defendants  -  229                 
                                   (p7)

          (3)    Kill Ratio               Friendly / Enemy
                    1st Bde                      1 / 2,77

b. Combat Equipment Losses:  The following is a list of combat losses that occurred during Operation BARKING SANDS:

(1)   Friendly:  Carrier, Personnel, full tracked M113A1 - 27:  Carrier, full tracked M125A1 - 1;  machine gun, 7.62mm, M60 - 2:  rifle, 5.56mm, M16 - 5;  recoilless rifle, 90mm - 1;  launcher, grenade, 40mm, M79 - 4;  radio, set, AN/PRC-25 - 6;  radio, set AN/PRC-46 - 2;  radio, set AN/VRC-53 - 2;  metascope assembly - 1;  starlight, scope, hand held - 1;  detector, set, mine - 1;  binoculars, M3, 6x30 - 3;  binoculars, M17A1, 7x50 - 2;  compass, lensatic - 5;  compass, M2 - 1;  armor, body, fragmentation, protective - 6;  mask, protective, field, M17 - 21;  helmet, combat, vehicle, crewman's - 7;  watch, wrist - 2;  tool kit, automotive mechanic's, light weight, general - 1; surgical instrument and supply set - 1; TA 50-901, set -1.
(2)   Enemy:  SA ammo - 103,565 rds assorted;  HE ammo - 2,863 rds assorted;  mines      & booby traps - 1,183;  structures - 680;  fortifications - 5,421;  tunnels - 917;  sampans - 124;  530 foxholes and spider-holes;  bicycles - 12;  clothing - 529 lbs;  explosives - 56 lbs;  trench - 1,650 meters;  punji pits - 118..

Enemy Equipment Captured:  229 assorted SA wpns;  21 assorted heavy wpns;  543  lbs documents;  240 lbs medical supplies;  950 tons of rice.

13,  (C)    Administrative Matters:

        a.    Supply:   All classes of supply were drawn through normal supply channels at Camp CU CHI.  Each battalion was allocated  UH1D and CH47 aircraft as needed to transport Class I, ice, and high priority repair parts.  Battalions operated supply convoys on a daily basis.  Battalions maintained a basic load of ammunition, one day supply of “C” rations and carried a fifteen day supply of spare parts.

(1) Class I:  A total of 1,901,834 lbs of class I and ice was delivered to the forward areas by CH47 and UH1D aircraft.

(2) Class II and IV:  A total of 250 tons was used in support of the operations, which included primarily barrier and bunker material,  TO&E equipment and TA 50-901.

(3) Class III:  Approximately 178,313 gallons of diesel and MOGAS was used.

(4) Class V:  Brigade units expended 795 tons of ammunition during the operation.

                b.    Maintenance:  Direct support maintenance of vehicles and weapons was
accomplished by maintenance contact teams of the 725th Maintenance Battalion.

                              (p8)

c.     Treatment of casualties:   Evacuation and hospitalization;  Dust-Off support was provided MEDEVAC units at CU CHI and TAY NINH base camps.  Battalion aid stations treated patients for minor ailments.               

d.    Transportation:  was provided by organic vehicles, UH1D and CH47 aircraft.  A total of 718 CH47 and 302 UH1D sorties was flown in support of the operation.

e.     Communication:  was provided by organic FM and RTT.   UHF for telephone service was provided by the 125th Signal Battalion.

f.      Medical evaluation:  Personal health was good throughout operation.

14,    (C)   CA/PSYOPS:  See Operational After Action Reports - KAWELA,  AKUMU,  WAIMEA,  KUNIA.

15.     (C)   Special Equipment and Techniques:  See Operational After Action Reports - KAWELA,  AKUMUY,  WAIMEA,  KUNIA.

16.     (C)   Commanders Analysis:  See Operational After Action Reports - KAWELA,  AKUMU,  WAIMEA,  KUNIA.

17.     (C)   Recommendations and Lessons Learned:

a. CH47 Chinook Operations:  During the reporting period this Bde has had its first experience with total resupply by CH-47 aircraft.  Many new problems have been identified which were not previously experienced.  Some of the lessons learned are as follows:

(1) Additional personnel must be trained to conduct daily resupply operations.

(2) Strict loading plans are required by class and weight, and these must be closely followed.

(3) Detailed coordination between forward and rear supply personnel is mandatory as well as is coordination between company echelons, both forward and rear.

(4) Detailed instructions must be provided to pilots and aircraft crew members.  If possible, a unit representative should fly with the load.

(5) Communication between CH-47 aircraft and the S-4 representative on the LZ must be on the battalion's Logistical Net allowing all supply personnel to be continuously aware of the resupply situation.

b. Interception of VC Radio Transmissions:          
   (p9)

(1)  We have found that the prc-25 radio frequently picks up a great deal of Vietnamese transmissions to include commercial radio stations. ARVN and National Police units, as well as VC.  In order to distinguish the source of these transmissions, it is absolutely essential to have a skilled interpreter readily available in the CP Group to begin immediate monitoring.

(2)  It is essential that information concerning the intercepted transmissions be immediately and accurately relayed to higher headquarters and ultimately to Division Operations so that they may alert the radio research unit to begin monitoring the frequency.

(3)  When relaying this information to higher headquarters, the enemy is able to intercept any transmissions that you make on the same frequency.  Therefore, this information must be relayed by secure means or, if not available, over another frequency such as the Battalion Logistics net.

(4)  It has been our experience that most enemy transmissions take place at night when he can afford to emerge from his hiding place to go to a position or  location suitable for transmissions.

(5)  Vietnamese transmissions are not necessarily picked up by all stations on a particular net.  Therefore, all stations must be alert for such transmissions.

c.   Stay Behind Patrols:  Patrols left in any area of operations achieve highest percentage of body count or contact of any type of patrol activity conducted.  Stay behind patrols offer the most positive method of inserting a patrol in an area known to contain VC without compromise.  Stay behind patrols were found to gain their contacts between 1500-2100 hours, and between 0400 - 0700 hours.

d.   Tunnel Complexes and Base Camps:  Once a significant tunnel complex is located, it must be immediately and continuously occupied until destruction is complete.  This will result in a larger body count and captured weapons and equipment.  It was found that the VC immediately entered a tunnel complex or base camp area after US forces departed to move items not located and destroyed.  Operations in the FILHOL proved this system to be highly effective and well worth the company days expended.

e.   Gaining and Maintaining Contact:  Considerable experience gained in the HO BO and the FILHOL show that the greatest VC body count is achieved when the force making initial contact retains the contact despite casualties initially suffered in the first burst of fire, and the balance of the company maneuvers to fight and finish the fixed force.  This technique of “holding on to the contact” resulted in 10 VC killed by body count in a four day period.

f.    Use of Tanks:  Operations in the FILHOL proved that the use of Tank-Infantry teams in heavily vegetated areas (which will allow passage of tanks) produces highly desirable results.  Two main points were proven:       (p10)

(1)    Maintenance becomes a major problem.  Tank units must insure tanks are in a                 high state of maintenance prior to commitment to difficult terrain.

 (2)   Rapid attachment or shift of attachment from one company to another to place tanks at point of decision was instrumental in defeating firmly entrenched VC employing small arms against US elements.  

g. It is recommended that in future operations involving movement of troops across a major river, night river crossing techniques such as those used on Operations KAWELA be strongly considered to increase opportunities of gaining tactical surprise.

h. It is recommended that night river crossings by 15 man rubber rafts, alone be considered to increase preservation of secrecy.

i. It is recommended that an aggressive attack be initiated well beyond the crossing site immediately upon completion of the troop crossing in order that maximum advantage be taken of the temporary tactical surprise gained.

.      
FOR THE COMMANDER:



                                   THOMAS E. DEVERETTE
                                   CPT.  Inf.
                                   Asst.  Adjutant


                         (p11)



 Sunset Beach



               DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
     HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE  25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
                      APO  US  FORCES  96225

AVDCSB-T                                                                                                                              7 November 1966

SUBJECT     Combat After Action Report  (RCS /J3 /32):

TO:   Commanding General
          25th Infantry Division
          ATTN:    AVDCOP
          APO  US  FORCES  96225

1. Operation SUNSET BEACH (OPORD  37-66)

2. 020001  Sep - 112400  Oct  66.

3. 2d Bde,  25th Inf Div conducted search and destroy operations in HAU NGHIA Province

4. Control Headquarters:   2d  Bde,  25th  Inf  Div.

5. Reporting Officer:   Colonel Thomas M. Tarpley.

6. Teak Organization and commanders:

1/5 (M)  (LTC Victor F. Diaz.  Cmdg)

1/5  (M)
Helicopter

1/27  infl (Maj Guy S. Meloy III. Cmdg)

1/27  Inf
Trp A (-),  3 / 4  Cav  (9 Sep - 12 Sep)
Helicopter

2/27  Inf  (LTC  William C. Barrett,  Cmdg.)

2/27  Inf
Helicopter

1/8  Arty  (LTC  James M. Cannon, Cmdg)

1/8  Arty
Cl  2/13  Arty  (16  Sep - 4 Oct)
7. Supporting Forces:

a. Air Support:

(1)   General:   A total of 200 missions with 520 sorties were flown in support of the operation, 7 of which were “immediate” close support missions.  The preplanned missions were based on current intelligence of VC unit locations and suspected storage areas.  All airstrikes were extremely accurate and very effective.  Reaction time of the “immediate” strikes was 20-30 minutes after the  request was made, which is a satisfactory time.   The “immediate” strikes were 100% effective.                  (p1)

(2)  All air strikes were controlled by FAC's assigned to the 2d Bde.  Ordnance      was delivered by the following:

      (a)   VNAV  fighter bombers:   51 preplanned  strikes

  (b)    USAF fighter bombers:     7 immediate strikes and 142 preplanned     strikes

(3)    Results:     6 KIA (BC),  7 KBA  (Poss),  63 bldgs,  35 bldgs damaged,  9 secondary fires, 1 AW pen destroyed,  13 bunkers damaged,  9 secondary fires,  16 AW pen destroyed, 1 sampan destroyed,  2 trenches destroyed,  2 trenches damaged,  1 secondary explosion,  1 bridge destroyed.  

b. Aviation:

(1)  The 25th AVN Bn,  25th Inf Div provided airmobile support including resupply and gunships, and liaison and coordination with other AVN units providing airmobile support.  Normally only one airmobile company was available to support the operation and this was inadequate to provide all the support required due to the inability of land vehicles to move in the area.

(2)  2d Bde AVN section provided OH23 helicopter for command and control, reconnaissance, and adjustment of artillery fire.  

c. Artillery Support:

(1)  General:  The extensive area of operations necessitated wide dispersal of firing batteries and frequent relocation to provide continuous artillery support to the maneuver elements of the brigade.  Throughout the operation the positioning of batteries was such that if a situation developed away from the initial objective, the new objective could easily be supported.  Outstanding cooperation on the part of the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery, and their ability to relocate batteries by air lift and / or motor movement was very instrumental in the success enjoyed
 by this brigade during operation  SUNSET BEACH.

(2)  Organization for Combat:

1/8 Arty with C 2/13 Arty attached, D3  2d  Bde.

(3)  Battery firing positions and missions:

a.    Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th artillery remained in direct support of the 1st Battalion.  27th Infantry at AT62681854, from 2 September 1966 to 14 September 1966.  During this period it also supported ARVN and RF/PF elements stationed at Trang Bang.  On 14 September it returned to base camp where it supported 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry opns near the base camp.  On 7 October 1966, Battery A displaced by road convoy to Trang Bang vicinity XT48195 to support 1st Battalion 27th Infantry operations.  It remained there throughout the remainder of the operation.  

b.    Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was in base camp from 2 Sept 1966 until 7 October when it displaced by road convoy to XT60361102 in order to support 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry / RVN operations.  It returned the same day.  Battery B moved again from base on 16 September 1966 by displacing to Bao Trad, vicinity XT541046.  This was in support of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry operations.  It returned to base camp by road convoy on 29 September 1966.  On 30 September Battery B moved by road convoy to XT605111 to support the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, and returned the same day.  On 1 October, it displaced to Trang Bang along with Battery C in response to a report of 2 VC Battalions near Trang Bang.  It returned to camp on 2 October.  On 8 October it displaced by road convoy to Duc Bap,  XT55250520, in support of 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.  On 4 October 1966, Battery B was airlifted from XT552052 to vicinity XT472987 in support of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.  Battery B, returned to Duc Lap that afternoon.  It remained there for the duration of the operation.

                (p2)

c.    Battery C, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was at XT437500710 from 2 September 1966 to 8 September 1966.  Supporting 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry operations.  On 9 September, Battery C displaced to XT446170 in preparation for support of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry opns.  On 12 September, Battery C returned by CH47 to base camp.  On 19 September Battery C displaced by air to XT59132166 in order to support 1st Battalion (Mech.) 5th Infantry.  On 23 September Battery C displaced by air to XT483275, still in support of 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry.  On 29 September, Battery C moved by air to Bao Don, XT440348, still in support of 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry.  It remained there until 30 September when it was airlifted back to base camp.  On 1 October it left again with Battery B to Trang Bang, vicinity XT485195.  This time Battery C was in support of 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.  On 5 October Battery C displaced from Trang Bang, and moved by road convoy to XT558049.  This move was made in support of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry.  On 5 October, Battery C displaced from Trang Bang, and moved by road convoy to XT558049.  This move was made in support of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry operations.  On 9 October 1966, Battery C returned by road convoy to base camp.  On 10 October one howitzer platoon displaced to XT6597187 to support operations of the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry southeast of Cu Chi.  Battery C remained thus disposed for the duration of the SUNSET BEACH operation.  

(d)  Battery C, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery became attached to the battalion on 16       September 1966.  On 17 September it displaced by road convoy to XT40351933 to support the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.  On 23 September, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 13 Artillery displaced by air to XT481276 in order to take a position for support of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry in the  Boi Loi Woods.  It remained there until 4 October when it was detached from the battalion.

(4)  Artillery in this operation was used for:
(a)    Suppression of sniper fire.
(b)    Softening of areas in front of advancing infantry elements on search and destroy operations.
(c)   Firing false preparations in area intended to mislead the VC as to possible landing zones.
(d)  Locating areas on the ground during the hours of darkness.  White phosphorus with time fuze and a 260 meter height burst was used extensively in this.
(e)  H & I fires
(f)   To assist the infantry elements in breaking contact with the enemy during helicopter extractions.
(g)  Landing zone preparation and suppressive fires during the introduction and extraction phases of airmobile operations.
(h)  Marking air targets

(5) Total missions and rounds fired by type:

(a) Mission:  69 Registrations, 1365 H & I, 541 close support, Total 1975
(b) Ammo expended 10032 HE, 590 WP, 105 ILL.

(6) Results:  4 VC KIA(BC),  75 VC KIA (POSS), 1 MG destroyed, 4 VC structures destroyed, 9 secondary explosions, 6 sampans destroyed, 2 bunkers destroyed, 1 ox-cart destroyed.

(p3)

(7) Friendly losses (Artillery), 2 KIA, 19 WIA, 2105mm How damaged.

d. Fire Coordination:

(1) Daily coordination meetings enabled TAC air, Army Avn and Artillery to deliver timely and effective fire support throughout the operation.

(2) Closely coordinated flight corridors allowed uninterrupted air, armed helicopter, and artillery fire during airmobile operations.

(3) Coordination with 1st Bde was outstanding and it facilitated continuous fire support while maneuver units of each brigade were operating within 199 meters of each other.

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy Situation Prior to Operation:

(1)  A relatively low rate of VC contact and VC initiated incidents were reported during the 30 days prior to initiation of operation SUNSET BEACH.  The number of anti-aircraft incidents decreased 25% and the number of road obstacles decreased 65% compared to the month of July 1966.  No significant RED HAZE and SLAR reports were obtained in AO prior to operation.  There were no SPARS reported in the operational area.

(2) Intelligence reports indicated that the VC would implement an all-encompassing program of harassment, terrorism, assassination, attacks on out-posts and other types of actions to increase VC prestige, discredit the  GUN, and disrupt and/or discredit the Vietnamese election of 11 Sep 66.

b. Enemy Situation During Operation:

(1)  Prior to 11 Sep 66, VC initiated activity in the AO  consisted primarily of sporadic small scale attacks, ambushes and harassing actions against ARVN forces and outposts with the purpose of undermining and disrupting the Vietnamese election.

(2)  VC offensive activities in AO that were not politically oriented included road blocks, sniper fire, laying AT mines, and establishing booby traps and command-detonated mines.  The VC employed booby traps, AT mines and command-detonated mines extensively in the Boi Loi Woods area against Brigade elements during period 20 Sep 66 to 4 Oct 66.

(3)  At 0700H, 01 Sep 66, 1/27 ambush patrol engaged approximately 10 oxcarts vic XT535165 with 4.2 mortars and small arms fire.  Results:  4 VC KIA (DC) and 3 VC KIA (POSS).  Two oxcarts were captured which contained 2,400 blasting caps (German make), 552 one-half pound blocks of TNT, 8 rounds of 81mm mortar, 150 rounds 12.7mm ammo (armor piercing of CHICOM origin).

(4)  On 11 Sep 66, 2/27 Inf captured VC psywar equipment at XT432172 consisting of three 8mm movie cameras, two 35mm cameras, 2 microphones, 1 amplifier, 1 speaker, 7 cans of 16mm film, 24 rolls of 35mm negatives, 1 power pack for electronic flash, 2 lenses, 2 enlarger condensers, 2 unprocessed rolls of 35mm film, 15 pounds of photographic print paper, 5 pounds of photo chemicals, and assorted psywar photographs.

(5)  Significant increases in (1) reliability and timeliness of agent reports, (2) the influx of Chieu Hoi's, (3) Prompt and efficient interrogation of captured VC, and (4) reliable on the spot civilian reports, greatly contributed to the success of 2d Brigade elements during Operation SUNSET BEACH.

             (p4)

(a)   On 14 Sep 66, 1/5 (M) exploited 1700 meter tunnel complex
Vic XT695117 pointed out by two Chieu Hoi's who had participated in the construction of the complex during 1959-61.  According to one Chieu Hoi, the VC dig their tunnel system to suit the tactical situation and did not use any uniform pattern for digging tunnel routes or camouflaging entrances.  Tunnel diggers worked in teams of four:  1.  A digger,  2.  A person behind the digger to push dirt to the rear,  3.  A third person to put the dirt in a  container, and 4.  A fourth person to lift the container of dirt out of the hole.  Utilizing this method 100 personnel can dig approximately 50 meters of tunnel in a day.

(b)    At 270945 Sep. an agent reported an estimated VC platoon vic XT463143.  At 1330 hours a joint US/PF airmobile operation was initiated.  As the helicopters moved into objective area, the VC scattered into vegetated areas. Pursuing US Forces were greatly aided in locating the VC by a villager who pointed out where VC were hiding.  Results:  15      VC KIA (BC), 8 VC KIA (POSS), 10 VCC, 15 VCS and 3  wpns captured.

(c)   Based on an early morning agent report to the BAO TRAI Joint Operation Center on 5 Oct 66, Co A 2/27 Inf conducted a heliborne assault operation vic XT480048 - XT495055 to make contact with a VC squad.  Operation netted 3 VC KIA (BC), 10 VC KIA (POSS), and 1Thompson SMG.


(d)   On 24 Sep 66, utilizing intelligence provided by the BAO TRAI Sector S2 and MSS, together with the on the spot assistance of two Chieu Hoi, the 2/27 Inf located a VC aid station with 143 pounds of various medical supplies, 1 VC KIA (BC), 10 VC KIA (POSS),  and 1 captured during operation.

(e)  In addition to the above, 5 other operations during SUNSET BEACH based on 4 agent reports and information gained from a Cheui Hoi netted 8 VC KIA (BC)m 3 VC KIA (POSS), 12 VCC captured, 26 VC's Apprehended, 7 wpns captured.

9.  Mission:  2d Bde conducts operation in MAU MGHIA Province to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and bases, interdict VC LOC's.

10.   Concept of Operation:   Operations conducted during SUNSET BEACH were aimed at maintaining constant pressure on Viet Cong Forces in HAU NGHIA Province.  Airmobile delivery of troops into objective areas was used almost exclusively throughout this monsoon period.  Search and destroy, eagle flights, roadrunner and bush-master techniques were emphasized.  Buddy operations were conducted at an increased frequency.  Pacification measures were highlighted by two events: the Vietnamese National Election (11 Sep 66) and deep incursions into the Boi Loi Woods by the mech. Battalions (20 Sep 66 to 4 Oct 66).  

a.   During the period 2 Sep 66 - 6 Sep 66, 2d Bde conducted airmobile and ground assaults, search and destroy operations, Eagle Flights, combat patrol, ambushes and “Buddy” operations with local ARVN forces in areas contiguous to population centers and election polling places.  1st Bn 27th Inf and 2d Bn, 27th Inf conducted operations from forward combat bases.  During this period, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf was under opcon of 1st Bde.

(1)    Forward combat base:    1/27th  Inf (XT523185)    2 - 14 Sep 66

(2)    Forward combat base:    2/27th Inf (XT501117)     2 - 7 Sep 66
                                      (XT445171)     8 - 12 Sep 66

b.   During the period 7 - 14 Sep 66, 2d Bde conducted airmobile and ground assaults, search and destroy operations.  Eagle flights, combat patrols, ambushes, and “Buddy” operations with local ARVN forces in areas removed from election polling places and population centers.  1st Bn, 27th Inf and 2d Bn, 27th Inf continued to conduct operations from forward combat bases.  C    C and 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf conducted operations from a forward combat base (XT39349) 9 - 12 Sep 66,

     (p5)   
c.   During the period 20 Sep - 11 Oct 66, 2d Bde conducted Eagle Flight operations and mechanized reconnaissance, raids, and assaults from a Bde forward combat base (XT483273).  Mechanized raids and reconnaissance south of the Boi Loi  / Ho Bo Woods screened the northern boundary of the TAOR while Eagle Flights and search and destroy operations were conducted to the south,  Mechanized reconnaissance in force of the periphery of the Boi Loi Woods confirmed location of VC base areas and fortifications which were then attacked and destroyed by mechanized forces.

11.   Execution:   Div. OPORD  29 - 65 was received 313.700 Aug 66.  
a. Daily Narrative                               02 September 1966

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

           The Bn commenced opr SUNSET BEACH by conducting search and destroy opns in a reported VC base camp area (XT516208).  In the objective area between 0800 and 1730, Co B located and destroyed nineteen tunnel complexes, eight VC structures, three punji pits and seven 105mm duds.  At 0910H, one M-60 MG barrel with bipod was found (XT520207).  At 1233H a carrying case with leather strap for a 60mm mortar rd was found at (XT517207).

2d  Bn  27th  Infantry

     The Bn conducted an airmobile (Buddy) opn (XT501115) with the CIDG from Duc Hae Sugar Mill.  Co A conducted a combat assault into (XT501115) as two companies of CIDG conducted S&D in (XT475115).  The Bn utilized two jump teams to eliminate enemy exfiltration of the objective area.  Two sampans and one tunnel were destroyed by Co A (XT501115).  Four VC's were captured in the objective area (X501115).

                                   3 September  1966

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry
The Bn continued S&D opns in the VC base camp area (XT516308).  Co C destroyed four tunnels, one AT mine, and one booby trap (XT516208) between 0800H and 1330H.  Co B destroyed two 81mm duds, seven 105mm duds, five tunnels, two foxholes, and one AP mine between 0900H and 1600H (XT519213).  Co B engaged two snipers at (XT519213) 1600H resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).  A Roadrunner opn  was conducted between Cu Chi base camp and Trang Bang(XT489191).


 2nd  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Co C conducted an airmobile assault into (XT507045) at 0800H.  Five VOC and two VC's were captured, three booby traps were destroyed, and one ton of rice, misc. equipment and documents were captured (XT507045) between 0935H and 1521H.  At 1540H, Co A secured AP Rung Dan (XT459095) for Medcap which treated 103 patients.  All units closed into the forward base camp (XT501117) at 1540H.

                     4 September  1966

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

The bn continued S&D operations in (XT517211).  Seven tunnels, seven bunkers, four trenches, and forty-nine foxholes were destroyed by Co A between 1254H and 1450H at (XT517211).  A Roadrunner operation was conducted from Cu Chi (XT6415) to Trang Bang (XT4919).  All units closed into the forward base camp (XT528187) at 1710H.  Medcap was conducted at (XT4821) treating 205 patients.  

2nd  Bn.  27th Infantry

The Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling southwest of the forward base camp (XT14811).  Co C ;captured 10 VCs at 1535H (XT481115).  All units closed into the forward base at 1600H.     (p6)

                          5 September 1966

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry                    

Co B commenced S&D operations in Iam Vo (1)  (XT535218) at 0730H in response to Chiou Hoi and agent reports which indicated that a VC base camp and supply area were located in the area.  One bunker and two tunnels were destroyed (XT535218) by Co B between 0905H and 1245H.  Co B closed into the forward base camp (XT528157) at 1245H.  Medcap  was conducted at (XT467198) treating 198 patients.

     2nd Bn.l  27th  Infantry

Co B conducted an airmobile assault into Ap Ban Long (XT525100) at 0800H.  The Security Plat provided airmobile jump teams to prevent VC infiltration of the objective area.  In the objective area between 0930H and 1433H, four VC and three weapons were captured.  Five booby traps, one tunnel and a VC classroom were destroyed at (XT529105).  Two AT mines and 400 meters of wire were destroyed at (XT507063).  All units closed into the forward base at 1433H  (XT501117).  Medcap was conducted at Duc Banh (XT575075), treating 75 patients.

                       6 September  1966

1st  Bn  27th  Infantry

     The Bn conducted an airmobile “Buddy” operation north of Trang Bang (XT495225) with the ARVN 2/49 Inf and the Trang Bang PF Co in response to a reported VC plat located at (XT505215).  Between 0839H and 1850 H, Co A destroyed one VC structure and one tunnel complex 300 meters in length.  A VC map hidden in the structure was confiscated.  At 1520H Co A captured 4 VCs (XT502213).  Co B destroyed 2 VC structures and one 105 dud.  At 1430H, Co B captured 1 VC (XT508217).  2/49 Inf (ARVN) captured 2 VCC and 6 VCS (XT501209).  At 0829H the PF Co captured 1 VCC (XT503209).  2/19 Inf (ARVN) sustained 1 WIA during the operation.  All US personnel closed into the forward base camp at 1800H.  The recon platoon conducted Roadrunner opns between Trang Bang and Cu Chi.

2nd Bn,  27th  Infantry

     The Bn conducted a County Fair in Bang Dau (xt499095) at 0735H.  Co C secured the village at 0755H.  Medcap personnel and supplies were transported by motor convoy and arrived at 0850H.  Co C returned to the Bn forward base camp at 1355H (XT501117).  Co B conducted reconnaissance patrolling in the forward base area.  

                                                7   September   1966

1st Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Boson Plat ambushed 2 VC oxcarts (XT535165) at 0001 hrs, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (POS), and 2400 blasting caps, 276 lbs TNT, eight B1 mortar rds, 150 rds SA ammo, and 2 oxcarts captured.  The Bn commenced X&D opns at 0743H in Yom Thap and Ap Cap Diz (XT543165).  At 0750H, Recon Plat captured 3 VCs (XT535157).  At 0820H Co's A & B captured 1 VCS, destroyed 2 tunnels, one 4.2 mortar rd, and one booby trap (XT540167).  Roadrunner opn was conducted between Trang Bang (XT4879) and Cu Chi (XT6415).  All elements closed into the forward base at 1458H.  Medcap was conducted at (XT537157) treating 201 patients.

                    (p7)



2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co A and Co B conducted an airmobile combast assault (XT560020) in response to agent reports of two VC platoons with sixteen automatic weapons.  In the objective area (XT580020) between 0720 hrs and 1600 hrs, Co A located and destroyed 2 booby traps and 17 foxholes.  At 1047 hrs, Co A found a grenade factory (XT583015), miscellaneous explosives and small arms ammo.  Two WIA were sustained from booby traps in the objective area.  All elements closed into the forward base at 1650 hrs (XT501117).

                            8 September  1966

1st Bn.  27th  Infantry

     Co A conducted a local reconnaissance opn in the vicinity of the Bn forward base (XT527187).  At 0733 hrs, gunships supporting ARVN 2/48 Inf engaged 3 VC (XT485173) resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).  Medcap was conducted at An Hoa (XT453198).

2d Bn,  27th  Infantry

     A & B Co conducted an airmobile combat assault (XT445171) to secure a new forward combat base (XT445171).  At 1040 hrs. Co A located and destroyed 7 booby traps in the objective area (XT442162).  Co B destroyed 6 booby traps and captured 1599 lbs of rice (XT437174) at 1130 hrs.

                                                           9    September   1966

Co C,  1st Bn (M),  5th  Infantry

     Co C came under Opcon 2nd Bde 081900 Sep 66.  Co C established a forward combat base at (XT439349).

1st Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn conducted a “Buddy” S&D opns (XT512208) with the Trang Bang  PT company.  Five VC structures, one tunnel, and a 300 meter trench were destroyed at (XT533198).  Three VC were engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC's captured, and 2 US WIA.  All elements closed into the forward combat base at 1030 hrs.  Roadrunner opns were conducted between Trang Bang (XT489192) and Cu Chi (XT650159).

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bd conducted an airmobile assault       the forward combat base (XT424158)               
                    Into (XT425159).  One sampan sunk, thirty-one foxholes, one tunnel, and one AT mine were destroyed at (XT425159).  Co B left one stay behind ambush patrol (XT435171) then the Bn was extracted.  The ambush made contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1VCC,  All elements including the stay behind ambush closed into fwd base camp at 1730 hrs.


                                                                      10  September 1966

Co C  1st  Bn  (M)  25th Infantry



     The company conducted reconnaissance in force opns north of Bao Doa (XT442365) with negative contact.

1st Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn conducted S&D opns (XT546200) with Co A and Co B.  Three VC's were captured (XT544203) by Co A.  At 1030hrs, Co A destroyed a double layer storage tunnel (XT525214).  A VC flag and two propaganda banners were captured at )XY552152).
                    (p8)
2nd Bn  27th  Infantry

     Co A conducted an airmobile assault (XT418152) to locate a suspected VC arms cache.  In the objective area, Co A destroyed 2 huts, 8 tunnels, 16 booby traps, and 4 CBU bombs (XT415146).  Co A sustained 1 KIA and 2 WIA from booby traps at (XT415146).

                     11  September   1966

Co C,  1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Co C received 9 rds of VC mortar fire 102310 Sep. 66 resulting in negative casualties.  The company conducted reconnaissance in force opns north ;of Bao Don (XT4536) with negative contact.

1st Bn,  27th  Infantry

     An ambush patrol from Co B (XT535214) captured 3 VC's at 0646 hrs.  Bn conducted reconnaissance in fore opns (XT534150) south of the forward base resulting in negative contact.

2nd Bn,  27th  Infantry

     The forward combat base received 6 rds of VC mortar fire at 0820 hrs resulting in negative casualties.  Bn (-) conducted an airmobile assault into (XT424179).  Seven tunnels, 1 rifle grenade, and a 55 gal drum were found at (XT432172).  Inside the drum were camera film, 1 loudspeaker, and film processing equipment.  All Bn elements closed into forward base camp at 1345 hrs.

                                                           12   September   1966

Co C,  1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     The company established a blocking position (XT540205) and was attached to 1/27th  Infantry.

1st  Bn.  27th  Infantry

     Bn conducted an airmobile assault into (XT540200).  Co C 1/5 (M) established a blocking position at (XT450205) and 1/27 Inf. conducted S&D opns toward the blocking position.  Eleven VC were captured by the Bn.   One booby trap was destroyed (XT546237) by Co A.  Three bunkers were destroyed (XT545233) by Co C 1/5 (M) and one APC destroyed by an AT mine (XT552223) resulting in 5 WIA.


2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn conducted an airmobile extraction from the forward combat base and closed Cu Chi base camp at 1240 hrs.  Medcap was conducted at (XT440174) treating 195 patients.

                   13 September  1966

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry:

     Bn (-) detached from 1st Bde 121600 Sep 66.  Third plat, Co C attached to 1/27 Infantry.  Bn (-) conducted maintenance of tracked vehicles.  

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry       

        (p9)
     Bn conducted Roadrunner opns from (XT525186) to Cu Chi (XT652140).  Attached Mech platoon conducted local reconnaissance opns north of the forward combat base with negative contact.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Ambush patrol from Co C observed 7 VC at (XT609157) 121846 Sep 66.  Arty fire was directed on the target by an aerial observer resulting in 5 VC KIA (POSS).  At 0834 hrs, the ambush observed 3 VC at (ZT621155).  Arty and mortar fire resulted in 2 VC KIA (POSS).  Recon plat conducted a Roadrunner opn from Cu Chi (XT652140) to Ap So Do (XT515073).  Bn (-) inspected and maintained equipment for future operations.  Medcap was conducted at Ap So Do (XT514073) treating 67 patients.  

                 14 September 1966     

1st  Bn (M),  5th  Infantry

     Recon plat conducted S&D opns (XT695117) in response to Chieu Hoi information that a new tunnel had been constructed in the area.  The tunnel was located at 0910 hrs.  By 1645 hrs, 625 meters of tunnel had been destroyed, miscellaneous documents and 1 bayonet scabbard were captured.  Recon plat closed base camp at 1915 hrs.

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn commenced extraction by motor convoy from forward base (XT525185) at 0800 hrs.  Extraction was completed at 1535 hrs.  Roadrunner opns were conducted between (XT525186) and Cu Chi (XT652140).  One VC was captured by Co C (XT625143).

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn continued the defense of Cu Chi base camp,  conducted night ambush patrolling, and training.

                                                                            15  September  1966

     1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Recon plat continued destruction of the tunnel complex (XT691117) located on 14 Sep 66.  A second level was found in the tunnel containing the following items:  one pair boots, several bags of documents, and one pound of medicine.  The Recon plat destroyed 200 meters of the tunnel and returned to base camp at 1743 hrs.  Medcap was conducted at Ap Don Do (XT685055), treating 26 patients.

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co C conducted a platoon reconnaissance patrol to locate and destroy VC foxholes and tunnels (XT610150).  At 1205 hrs. the plat located and destroyed 6 foxholes (XT616135).  The plat closed base camp at 1302 hrs.

2d  Bn,  27  Infantry

     Bn (-) conducted an airmobile assault with multiple LZ's.  Co C was airlifted into the objective area while two airborne jump teams from the Security plat orbited the objective.  At 1325 hrs, Co C found 300 pounds of rice, 800 pounds of peanuts, and 400 pounds of tobacco (XT601061).  At 1600 hrs, Co C captured 4 VCC with 1 Bar, 1 US carbine, and 1 hand grenade in a tunnel (XT621062).  A further search yielded medical supplies, 3 rolls of commo wire, 7 blasting caps, and 6 batteries.  All elements were air-lifted back to Cu Chi at 1755 hrs.  Medcap was conducted at Duc Hanh (XT571071) treating 83 patients.  

                              (p10)

                          16  September  1966

1st Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Recon plat continued destruction of the tunnel complex (XT695117) located on 14 Sep 66.  415 meters were destroyed for a total of 1270 meters destroyed to date.

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn continued to defend Cu Chi base camp, conducted night ambush patrolling and refresher training.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co A conducted an airmobile assault (XT5202) in response to intelligence reports of 3 VC squads in the area.  Recon and Security plat were attached to Co A.  Recon captured 2 VCS  (XT523015) at 1145 hrs.  Co A located 5 pounds of documents, 1 flashlight, and 3 M-79 rds (XT521998).  Co A sustained 1 KIA from a booby trapped hand grenade at (XT520998).  Co C was positioned at Bao Troi airstrip (XT543050) to provide a security for B 1/8 Arty and reaction force for Co A.  All elements except Co C (-) returned to base camp at 1650 hrs.

                      17  September  1966

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Bn (-) conducted maintenance in preparation for operation commencing on 20 Sept 66.  Co B conducted a Roadrunner opn with C 2/13 Arty from Cu Chi to Trang Bang (XT484195).  All elements closed Cu Chi base camp at 1255 hrs.  Medcap was conducted in Ap Ban Do (XT685095), treating 77 patients.

1st Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn continued defense of Cu Chi base camp secter, conducted night ambush patrolling, and refresher training.  Preparations were made for operation commencing on 18 Sept. 66.

2d Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co B conducted an airmobile assault on Ba Conh Ma (XT560008).  Co B, Recon and security plats were airlifted into the LZ while Co C maintained security at the prepositioned B 1/8 Arty fire support base (XT540049).  Co B located 3 VC banners (XT560008),  Airmobile extraction commenced at 1427 hrs.  and all units closed Cu Chi base camp at 1502 hrs.

                       18 September  1966

1st  Bn  (M)  5th  Infantry

     Bn (-) conducted maintenance of tracked vehicles in preparation for opn commencing 20 Sep 66.

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co B conducted an airmobile assault into (XT443233) at 0550 hrs.  At 1053 hrs, Co B apprehended 2 VCS (XT441234).  Five VCS were captured at 1509 hrs (XT428225),  Co B was extracted back to Cu Chi base camp at 1616 hrs.
                         (p11)
2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn conducted a “Buddy” opn with Arvn 1/49 Inf.  Co C 2/27 Inf. provided the reaction force for the airmobile assault  (XT470045) conducted by 1/49 Inf (ARVN).  B 1/8 Arty and Tac Air provided fire support.  The 1/49 ARVN accounted for 4 VC KIA (BC), 1 Chicom rifle, and 2 M-26 grenades.  One ARVN soldier was KIA.  The Joint Operations Center (JOC) at Bao Trai received an agent report at 1230 hrs that a VC squad was observed at (XT564063).  An airmobile assault was immediately conducted using two jump teams from Co C, 2/27 Inf and two jump teams of Counter Terrorists to react to the intelligence.  Between 1400 hrs and 1500 hrs, 8 VCS were captured (XT564063) by the reaction force.  The jump teams returned to Bao Trai airstrip (XT43050) at 1500 hrs.

               19  September  1966

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Bn (-) conducted maintenance of tracked vehicles and prepared for opn commencing 20 Sep 66.

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Co C conducted an airmobile assault at 0855 hrs into (XT530240).  At 0928 hrs supporting gunships placed effective fire on 5 VC at (XT523235) resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (POSS).  The 5 VC wore camouflaged hats and blue sashes.  Co C captured 1 VCS, 3 VCS, and destroyed 1 VC structure, 23 foxholes, 10 tunnels, and one AP mine (XT530240).



2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Ambush patrol from Co B sustained 4 WIA from booby traps (XT615162) 181940 Sep 66.  Co A conducted an airmobile assault into LZ's (XT607031 and XT 623027) supported by the airborne             from  the security plat.  Fire support was provided by 3 1/8 Arty secured by Coi C (M) at the Bao Trad airbase (XT543050).  Six VCS were captured at (XT646024).  At 0945 hrs supporting gunships engaged a VC position (XT608034)  resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).  At 1005 hrs arty was directed  on a VC position (XT        )                                resulting in 6 VC KIA(BC).
          Of Co A and the security plat commenced at 1545 hrs.  All elements closed Cu Chi base camp at 1610 hrs.

                     20   September  1966    

1st  Bn (M)  5th  Infantry          (Incl Operations Overlay)

     Bn commenced reconnaissance in force and S&D opns between (XT665171) and (XT609240) supported by Co 1/8 arty at Trong Dap (XT594215)  Between 0800 hrs and 0900 hrs Co C destroyed 2 - 105mm rds at (XT659192) and (XT      ).  Between 1000 hrs and 1430 hrs Co B destroyed 1- 105mm rds, 3 - 155mm rds,          75mm rds,  5 CP    bombs,  3 - 8 rds, 1 20mm rd, and 5 VC structures.  At 1138 hts,        captured 3VCS (XT606228),  Co B had one APC hit an AT mine           (XT625218) at 1204  hrs  resulting in  negative casualties.  One APC from Co C hit an AT mine at 1230 hrs (XT      ) resulting in 2 WIA which were evacuated by “DUSTOFF”.  Recon  plat destroyed 1 20lb AT mine (XT628187) at 1420 hrs.

1st Bn  27th  Infantry

     Bn conducted Eagle Flight opns northeast of Trang Bang to locate reported VC and VC supplies and equipment.  At 0903 hrs, VC were observed at (XT      ).  Co B landed and conducted a search of the area. Two wallets with VC documents, 1 VC flag, and a black shirt were found in a hedgerow (XT7556221).  Co B left a stay behind ambush (XT555223) when the Co was airlifted out of the objective  At 1056 hrs the Co B ambush engaged 2 VC (XT555222) resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and  1 VC Captured.  At 1105 hrs, the ambush captured another VC (XT555223).  The ambush was extracted at 1117 hrs.  All elements closed Cu Chi at 1210 hrs.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry  
   (p12)

     Co C (-) and B 1/8 Arty at the Bao Trai airstrip (XT543050) came under a VC mortar attack at 0122 hrs, receiving approximately 12 - 60mm mortar rds.  The perimeter received SA and rifle grenade fire.  B 1/8 Arty sustained 1 KIA and 11 WIA.  At 1000 hrs, an element of Co C conducted a search of the suspected VC mortar positions.  One VCS and 6 rds of 60mm mortar ammo were captured (XT546044).  At 1400 hrs Bn conducted a Roadrunner opn from Cu Chi (XT650140) to Bao Trai (XT543050).  Co A reinforced by a tank section from 3 / 4 Cav replaced Co C as security for B 1/8 Arty at Bao Trai airstrip (XT543050).

                      21 September 1966            (Incl 2 - Overlay for 21 Sep)

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry              

     Bn reacted to intelligence reports of the VC 165A Regt Hq location with an attach into (XT580306 and XT628302).  Co B destroyed a VC rest camp consisting of 5 buildings (XT576289) which appeared to have recently been used.  At (XT578293) Co B found 5 - 55 gal drums of oil, 21 - 5 gal drums of animal fat, and 8 rolls of tin at 1341 hrs.  Co C located and destroyed 3 tons of rice, 2 bunkers, and 3 VC bicycles at (XT586276 and XT578254).  A tunnel was located by Co C (XT578294) which contained aid supplies, clothing, and 1 VC ID card.  All elements commenced movement toward the battalion combat base (XT566277) at 1650 hrs.

1st  Bn  27th Infantry

     Co C conducted airmobile assaults into three objectives (XT439227, XT85250, XT465252) to locate and destroy VC supplies and installations.  The Trang Bang, PF Co established a blocking position at (XT509260) in support of the assault on obj (XT465252).  Four VCS were captured at (XT439277) and 22 VCS were captured at (XT517258) by Co C.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co C and Recon plat conducted an airmobile assault into (XT525995) utilizing two seven men jump teams from the security platoon.  Co A remained at the Bao Trai airstrip (XT543050) as security for 1 / 8 Arty and as the Bn reaction force.  The opn commenced at 1300 hrs.  At 1315 hrs, Co C received small arms fire (XT532985) resulting in 1 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (BC), and 1 Thompson  sub-machine gun with eight magazines of ammunition captured.  At 1350 hrs, 2 VC were engaged by gunships at (XT529995) resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).  A VC messenger was captured at 1430 hrs.  After questioning, the VC led Co C to a small foxhole where 3 lbs of documents, 10 lbs of clothing and 5 M79 wps were found (XT532992).  Co C apprehended 6 VCS (XT527798) who were taken to Bac Trai for interrogation.  All elements closed Cu Chi (XT650140) at 1715 hrs.

                               22  September  1966

1st  Bn (M),  9th  Infantry            (Incl.  3 Overlay for 22 Sept)          

(p13)

     Bn conducted S&D / Reconnaissance in force opns in the Ho Bo Woods (XT565286,  XT580302,  XT5726),  One VCS was captured outside the Bn forward combat base at 211830 Sep 66.  At 0415 hts The Bn received 15 rds of 66mm mortar fire, resulting in 5 WIA.  One platoon from Co A with a platoon from Co B commenced X&D opns in (XT576264) at 1030 hrs.  At 1105 hrs, one APC was damaged by an AT mine (XT576264) and 1 WIA was sustained.  Two additional AT mines were located and  destroyed in the same area (XT576264).  Co C commenced S&D opns in (XT565286) and (XT580307) at 0915 hrs.  At 1000 hrs, Co C located the area from which the Bn was mortared during the night (XT567283).  Located and destroyed in the area were 9 - 60mm canisters, 1 - 81mm firing dtat chart, 1 mortar position, 1 - 25lb bag of rice, 1 - 100 lb bag of fertilizer, 4 bunkers, and 5 structures.  One carbine was found and a 250 lb bomb destroyed (XT563288) at 1115 hrs.  One APC from Co C hit an AP mine with negative damage (XT576289) at 1216 hrs.  A search of the area resulted in one bayonet, and 17 rds of 7.62 ammo.  An APC received extensive damage and 1 WIA from an AT mine at 1322 hrs (XT578295).  At the completion of the day's operations all elements closed into the Bn combat base (XT567276).

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co A conducted airmobile assaults into four objectives (XT528273,  XT537269,  XT530264,  XT537262).  At 1032 hrs, 5 VCS were captured at (XT528273).  All elements were extracted from (XT528273) simultaneously at 1215 hrs and then landed (XT523232).  At 1239 hrs, 4 VC were engaged by supporting gunships at (XT518224).  Co A Reaction Force was immediately landed (XT518224) to engage the trapped VC.  At 1330 hrs, 8 VC with automatic weapons and rifle grenades engaged the reaction force from (XT511226), resulting in 2 WIA.  Fire was immediately returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (POSS).  At 1356 hrs, “DUSTOFF” received SA fire from (XT513226).  Fire was returned by gunships resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC KIA (POSS).  Extracting of all elements commenced at 1600 hrs.  At 1551 hrs, SA fire from (XT510215) wounded 2 helicopter crewmen and 2 personnel from Co A.  All elements closed base camp at 1630 hrs.

2d  Bn.  27th  Infantry

     Co B conducted an airmobile assault into (XT577035).  Co A established a blocking position at (XT572040).  Security platoon provided a 14 man jump team as an immediate airmobile reaction force.  Five VCS were captured by Co A (XT564064) at 0945 hrs.  At 1106 hrs, 6 booby traps were destroyed and  5 notebooks captured (XT581033).  Co A and Co C moved to the Bao Trai airstrip (XT543050) at 1630 hrs.  Co C was airlifted back to Cu Chi (XT650140) at 1800 hrs.

                       23 September  1966

2d Bde, Forward Combat         and Protocol OP was established at XT483273.

     1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry            (Incl. 4     Overlay for 23 Sep 66)

          Bn conducted S&D / Reconnaissance in force opns at 0820 hrs.  Co A secured a stream crossing site at (XT541304) and conducted S&D opns in that area.  Two CBU bombs, 1 AT mine, and one eight foot tunnel were destroyed by Co A (XT541304) between 1030 hrs and 1430 hrs.  At 1334 hrs, Co A completed the destruction of one APC which was severely damaged by an AT mine  23 Sep 66.  One VC claymore mine, and one 105mm rd was destroyed by Co A at 1705 hrs (XT523305).  Co B, with the heavy mortar plat attached, conducted S&D / Reconnaissance in force opns at (XT543312).  Co C conducted S&D / Reconnaissance in force opns at (XT568288).  At 1231 hrs, Co C destroyed one 500 lb bomb (XT568288).  Bn established a forward combat base at (XT505307).

1st Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn (-) commenced an airmobile assault at 0700 hrs to secure the Bde forward combat base (XT483273).  At 1500 hrs, a two company reconnaissance in force opn was initiated to secure the area around the Bde forward combat area.  At 1630 hrs, Co A discovered a 300 meter trench system (XT473562).  Two VCS were captured at 1654 hrs by Co A (XT493254).  All units closed into their forward combat base at 1810 hrs.  

                    (p14)

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co C and security plat conducted an Airmobile assault at 1145 hrs (XT608057).  Fifteen VCS were captured by Co C (XT608057) between 1200 and 1500 hrs.  A bunker containing a pack of documents and 3 flashlights was discovered by Co C (XT605047) at 1312 hrs.  The bunker, 2 secret holes, and 1 booby trap were destroyed at 1300 hrs.   At 1417 hrs, contact was made with an undetermined number of VC (XT613060).  Fire was immediately returned resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC),  3 VC KIA (POSS), 20 hand grenades, 1 Chicom carbine, 1 Thompson SMG, and 1 M-1 rifle, captured.  A small arms cache consisting of 420 rds of SA ammo was found in foxholes, (XT613060) at 1500 hrs.  Extraction was completed at 1640 hrs.  A Medcap was conducted at (XT554052) treating 58 patients.  (2d Bde forward combat base and tactical CP is located at XT463273).
                     24  September  1966

     1st  Bn  (M),  27th  Infantry

At 231800 hrs, one APC,           Co A, hit an AT mine at (XT527307).  Co A closed into the Bn forward combat base (XZT504306) at 1800 hrs.  One camouflaged bunker (XT504306) was discovered and destroyed by Co a at 1810 hrs.

     1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Bn conducted S&D opns in the Bde forward combat base area (XT483273).  8 VCS were captured by Co C (XT451251) at 1800 hrs.  One booby trap was destroyed (XT486254) and 1 VCS captured at 1618 hrs.  Co C closed into Bde forward combat base at 1700 hrs.

     2nd  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Co B conducted combat assault into (XT549571) at 1100 hrs.  Bn reaction force Co A, remained at the Bao Trai airstrip (XT543050).  Co B engaged 2 VC (XT5497992), resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (POSS), and 1 rifle captured.   Co B found a VC ;hospital containing 9 pounds of documents, 143 pounds of bandages, penicillin, and misc aid supplies.  One sampan was destroyed at 1246 hrs (XT497972).  At 1325 hrs, Co B was taken under AW and rifle grenade fire from (XT507970).  Artillery was fired in which positions resulting in 9 VC KIA (Poss).  100 pounds of rice and a cache of SA ammo was found at (XT500975).  All elements closed base camp at 1510 hrs.      

                         25 September  1966

2d  Bde, forward combat base and tactical CP is located at (XT483273)

1st  Bn  (M)  5th  Infantry

Bn (-) conducted S&D operations in (XT493310,  XT516323, XT512304) and secured the south from (XT493310) east to (XT526311).  Co A commenced S&D missions (XT516323) at 0742 hrs.  At 0842 ;hrs, Co A destroyed one AW position (XT492315).  One APC hit an AT mine (XT493316) resulting in  8 KIA, and 3 WIA.  The APC was totally destroyed.  Co A located and destroyed 1-105mm dud, 1 claymore mine, and 1 timing fuse for a 500 lb bomb at (XT517321).  One APC, Co A hit an AT mine at 0804 hrs.  An APC hit an AT mine resulting in extensive damage.  Co B conducted S&D opns in (XT512304) with negative contact.  Co C conducted S&D opns in (XT493310).  Recon plat APC hit an AT mine in the Bde forward combat base area resulting in extensive vehicle damage.  All elements closed into the Bn forward combat base (XT509308) at 1700 hrs.

                         (p15)

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Bn (-) conducted airmobile assaults into (XT510220, XT555248, XT465250, XT470249).   At 1120 hrs, Co C engaged an unknown number of VC (XT507226) resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC), 7 KIA (POSS), and 2 weapons captured.  At 1430 hrs, Co C sustained 1 WIA       from rifle grenade (XT517238).  Co A, the Bn reaction force, was committed at 1250 hrs into (XT524230).  Co A found and destroyed 1 tunnel and captured 5 lbs of tobacco at (XT519239).  All elements closed into the forward combat base (XT483273) at 1618 hrs.



2nd  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co A conducted an airmobile assault into (XT520120) at 0710 hrs.  Three VCS were captured and 1 tunnel, 7 booby traps, and 10 foxholes destroyed at (XT551119).  One WIA was sustained from sniper fire (XT547110) at 1216.  Six VC were engaged at (XT532106) resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).  All elements closed into Bao Trai at 1645 hrs.

                     26 September  1966

                       2d Bde forward combat base and tactical CP is located at (XT483273)

                      1st   Bn  (M)  5th  Infantry         (Incl 6 - overlay for 26 Sep)

Bn forward combat base (XT509305) came under a VC mortar attack at 2150 hrs.  During the ten minute attack, 35-60 MM mortar rds were received resulting in 4 WIA.  Bn (-) conducted S&D / reconnaissance in force operations in the Boi Loi Woods. (XT5232).  Co B conducted S&D opns in (XT538324 and XT544329).  At 0830 hrs 1-M-79 rd was located at (XT539317).  At 1330 hrs a VC rest camp, capable of accommodating one platoon was discovered at (XT544332).  The camp and one tunnel was destroyed.  Co C conducted S&D opns in (XT543322).  Co B and Co C closed ;into the Bn base at 1600 hrs.  Co A conducted perimeter security and daylight ambushes.  At 1710 hrs, the Bn forward combat base received 8-60MM mortar rds with negative casualties.  

     1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

At 0420 hrs, 2 VC claymore mines were detonated forward of the Bn perimeter resulting in 2 KIA and 5 WIA.  At 0431 hrs ambush patrol from Co A engaged 6 VC (XT472269) resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC KIA (Poss).  One 7.62 Chicom rifle and misc documents were captured.  One claymore mine and one rifle grenade were destroyed.  The patrol closed into the Bde forward base at 0805 hrs.  One plat Co C conducted a sweep of the perimeter at 0821 hrs.  One grenade dud was destroyed at (XT481271).  At 0505 hrs Co C destroyed 2  81MM duds at (XT487271).  Co C. conducted S&D opns in (XT4723, XT4823) at 1503 hrs.   Co C captured 6 VCS (XT45257).  Co C closed into forward base at 1630 hrs.  Co A commenced  reconnaissance in force north of the forward base at 1500 hrs.  Reconnaissance was completed at 1800 hrs with negative contact.

     2d  Bn  27th  Infantry

Bn commenced roadrunner opns from Cu Chi (XT651140) to Bao Trai (XT547053).  Co B escorted by 3 / 4 Cav tank section, replaced Co A at Bao Trai Airstrip (XT543050) as security for B 1 / 8 Arty.  Co C ambush patrol spotted 5 VC at 0635 (XT613188) and engaged with artyfire resulting in 7VC KIA (POSS).  Patrol returned to Cu Chi base camp at 1305 hrs.  Medcap was conducted at Due Hanh  A          (XT575075) treating 70 patients.  

                                                                                     27th September  1966

          2d  Bde forward combat base and tactical CP is located at (XT483273)

          1st Bn  (M)  5th  Infantry                     (Incl 7 - overlay for 27 Sep  66)          

     (p16)

Bn forward combat base (XT508306) received 2 rds of VC mortar fire at 2205 with negative casualties.  Mortar fire was directed on the VC mortar position by a Co C ambush patrol resulting in 3 VC KIA (Poss).  At 2230 hrs, a Co C LP received 1 VC  hand grenade resulting in 1 WIA.  The Co C ambush patrol engaged 3 VC (XT504322) at 0015 hrs. resulting in 1 VC KIA (Poss).  At  0752 hrs, Co A commenced S&D opns in (XT497315).  One VC claymore and 2 - 20 lb bombs were destroyed (XT502316) at 1210 hrs.  One plat of Co B commenced S&D opns in (XT515305) at 0730 hrs.  One bunker was destroyed (XT511298) at 1431 hrs.  Co B plat returned to the Bn forward base at 1515 hrs.  One plat from Co C commenced S&D opns (XT512314) at 0730 hrs.  Three tons of rice were discovered at 0836 hrs (XT508315).  The Co C plat returned at 1546 hrs

       1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Bn Conducted an airmobile buddy opn in response to agent reports of a VC plat in the objective area.  Co C conducted combat assaults with LZ (XT463253) at 1354 hrs.  Co A established blocking positions to the south with 2 Inf plats and 1 attacked plat 1/5 (M), and provided one plat airmobile reaction force.  The Trang Bang PF company established a blocking position to the south of the LZ.  The PF Co captured 20 VCS (XT463243) at 1423 hrs.  At 1430 hrs the PF Co engaged 4 VC (XT4632245).  At 1432 hrs, the Co A reaction force was committed (XT465244) and engaged 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (Poss).  PF Co reported 2 VC KIA (BC) (XT460252) at 1455 hrs.  At 1555 hrs, Co C reported 9 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC VCC, and 1 carbine captured (XT460254).  At 1635 hrs Co C reported 1 VC KIA (Poss) and 1 VCC captured (XT460261).  At 1610 hrs, supporting gunships reported 2 VC KIA (BC), (XT458268).  By 1800 hrs elements had closed into the Bn perimeter.

     2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Bn commenced a two day S&D opn in Xom Moi (XT612170) with Co A and Co C at 0830 hrs.  At 1100 hrs, 100 rds SA ammo were located at (XT605165).  Two tunnels were destroyed (XT612109, XT607165) at 1148 hrs.  Co C received sniper fire from (XT607169) and Co A received AW fire from (XT607171) at 1750 hrs. Arty fire neutralized the enemy fire.   A booby trapped grenade was destroyed by Co C (XT607169) at 1310 hrs.  Co A sustained 2 WIA from a booby trap (XT619169) at 1312 hrs.  Co C destroyed 6 tunnels (XT612169) at 1315 hrs.  Co A destroyed a 105 dud and 2-81 duds (XT612169) at 1330 hrs.  Co A destroyed 1 WP grenade, 3 booby traps, 10 punji pits (XT616170) and discovered 1 M-79 stock and 3 lbs of documents (XT616172).  Co B continued to provide security for B 1 / 8 arty at Bao Trai airstrip (XT545050).  Recon and security continued to provide security for C 3/13 arty at Bao Trai (XT439355).

28 September  1966
2d Bde forward combat base and tactical CP is located at (XT483273)

    1st  Bn  (M)  5th  Infantry             (incl. 8-overlay for 28 Sep)

Bn conducted S&D / Reconnaissance in force in the Boi Loi Woods.  At 0700 hrs Bn attacked objectives at (XT514345) and (XT535348).
(XT498323) resulting in 4 WIA.  Co A destroyed 1 AT mine (XT491308) at 0759 hrs.  At 0910 hrs, one Co A APC hit an AT mine (XT498323) resulting in 4 WIA .  Co A destroyed 1 AT mine (XT498323) at 1010 hrs.  One KIA was sustained by Co A 1215 hrs.  (XT498333) from sniper fire.  Co B destroyed a booby trap (XT489314)  at 0752 hrs.  At 1056 hrs,  Co B engaged an unknown number of VC with SA fire.  A search of the area resulted in - 1 - 57 RR casing found.  At 1250 hrs, Co B received AW fire from (XT493339), resulting in 2 US KIA and 2 WIA.  Fire was immediately returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (Poss).  Co C had 1 APC hit an AT mine (XT513343) at 1220 hrs.   At 1242 hrs. Co C engaged one VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).  At the close of the reporting period, all elements were closing into the Bn forward combat base (XT532347).     
(p 17)

1st Bn,  27th  Infantry:

     Co A conducted airmobile combat assaults into (XT558240, XT555250, XT515275).  Co A engaged 4 VC at (XT564236) resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (Poss) at 1045 hrs.  AT 1049 hrs, Co A engaged 1 VC at (XT558230) resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).  Co A captured 1 VCS (XT553246) at 1300 hrs.  All elements closed into the Bde forward combat base at 1627 hrs.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co A and Co C continued S&D opns in Xom Moi (XT612168).  Co C destroyed 8 booby traps and 3 tunnels (XT612174) between 0850 and 1150 hrs.  Co A destroyed 2 tunnels, 1 bunker, 1 VC structure and captured 6 lbs of clothing and 3 lbs of documents between 0930 and 1000 hrs.  From 1050 hrs to 1200 hrs, Co A destroyed 1 shelter, 1-155 dud, 1 bunker, and 1 CBU bomb (XT616171).  At 1135 hrs Co C destroyed 3 shelters (XT616166).  Co A destroyed one foxhole at 1233 hrs (XT619167).  All elements closed into Cu Chi base camp at 1415 hrs.  Medcap was conducted at (XT515074) treating 85 patients.  

29 September  1966
2d Bde forward combat base and tactical CP is located at (XT483273)
     1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry          (Incl 9 - Overlay for 29 and 30 Sep)

     Bn conducted S&D / Reconnaissance in force opns in the Boi Loi Woods (XT503308).  Co B and Co C departed the Bn forward combat base at 0700 hrs.  One hut, 1 tunnel, 3 sampans, and 1- 250 lb bomb were destroyed (XT533357) between 0800 hrs and 1200 hrs. by Co C.  All elements returned to the Bn forward combat base at 1650 hrs (XT532347).

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co C conducted an airmobile combat assault into (XT548158,  XT528245,  XT483245) at 0930 hrs.  Co A provided 1 plat reaction force.  At 1225 hrs, Co C sustained 1 WIA from SA fire (XT549194).  Co A captured 20 lbs of TNT (XT548188) at 1314 hrs.  Co C captured 3 VCS (XT548196) at 1510 hrs.  At 1531 hrs, Co C captured 1 VCS (XT483239).  All elements closed into the Bde forward combat base at 1729 hrs.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co B conducted Roadrunner opns and escorted B 1 / 8 Arty to Cu Chi (XT651140) from Bao Trai (XT545050) at 0900 hrs.  All elements closed into Cu Chi base camp at 1246 hrs.

                                                    30  September  1966
     2d Bde forward combat base and tactical CP is located at (XT483273)     

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry          (Incl 9 - Overlay for 29 and 30 Sep)

     Bn continued S&D / Reconnaissance in force operations in the Boi Loi Woods (XT4936) with a two company attack at 0700 hrs on objectives at (XT490380,  XT483324,  XT508238,  XT488324).  At 1215 hrs, 1 APC from Co C hit an AT mine resulting in 1 KIA and 3 WIA (XT510347).  Co C and the Bn CP closed into the Bde forward combat base at 1800 hrs.  Co A remained at (XT482324).  Co B remained at (XT478354).

                    (p18)

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co C commenced S&D opns (XT465247) at 1400 hrs supported by three air-borne jump teams and two gunships.  The jump teams landed at four locations when VCS were spotted.  At 1453 hrs, 2 VCS were captured (XT460250).  At 1506 hrs, 3 VCS were captured (XT460287).  At 1552 hrs, 4 VCS were captured (XT535288 and XT529282).  All elements returned to the Bde forward combat base at 1700 hrs.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Ambush patrol sustained 3 WIA from a booby trap (XT610102) at 2042 hrs.  Patrol returned to base camp at 2130 hrs.  Co B conducted an airmobile combat assault into (XT564100) at 0720 hrs.  Two underground storage rooms were destroyed (XT558098) at 1156 hrs.  All elements closed into Cu Chi base camp at 1355 hrs.

                                                        1   October   1966

     2d  Bde forward combat base and tactical CP is located at (XT483273).

1st Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Bn conducted S&D / Reconnaissance in force opns in the Boi Loi Woods (XT4936) and moved into the Bde forward base.  One plat, Co C was attached to 1/27 Inf.  One plat Co C secured the Arty fire support base at Trang Bang (XT4819).

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn conducted reconnaissance in force (XT470255) with one plat, C 1/5 (M) attached. All elements returned 1522 hrs with negative contact.  At 1300 hrs, the Bn was alerted to be prepared to provide a reaction force for the 2/27 Inf.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co C conducted two plat Bushmaster opns (XT613173 and XT614127) at 2130 hrs.  At 0930 hrs, Co A conducted an airmobile assault into (XT594187) with platoon.  At 1007 hrs, Co A sustained 1 WIA from a booby trap (XT593188).  Co A sustained 2 WIA from a booby trap (XT596187) at 1255 hrs.  At 1349 hrs all elements of Co  A and Co C had been extracted.  At 1400 hrs, the Bn was alerted to conduct an airmobile assault with three companies into (XT4316) and conduct S&D opns in objectives (XT425155,  XT412158,  XT420148).  The assault commenced a 1535 hrs.  A combat base was established at (XT445171) at 1800 hrs.

                                                        2   October   1966

     2d  Bde forward combat base and tactical CP is located at (XT483273).

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Bn (-) defended the Bde forward combat base and conducted maintenance of tracked vehicles.  One platoon, Co A conducted Roadrunner opns and escorted 2/27 Inf truck convoy from Trang Bang (XT4819) to Cu Chi (XT6514).

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co B conducted Eagle Flights south of Trang Bang (XT4819).  Co C provided a ready reaction force at the Bde forward combat base.  The opn commenced at 0830 hrs with Co B landing at (XT483130).  Eight VC were observed by gunship pilots at (XT475135).  Co B directed Arty fire on the VC resulting in 8 VC KIA (POSS) at 0845 hrs.  At 0957 hrs, Co B located one US cartridge belt, 1 bayonet, 1 US hand grenade, 1 Chicom hand grenade, and a flashlight at (XT477133).  Co B was extracted at 1014 hrs and closed Cu Chi at 1032 hrs.

                    (p19)

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Operating from a forward combat base at (XT445171), Bn continued S&D opns along the Oriental River (XT4117,  XT4217,  XT4317,  XT4116).  At 0955 hrs. Co B sustained 2 WIA from a booby trap (XT437173).  Co C destroyed one tunnel at 1010 hrs (XT438174).  Co C found misc documents at 1100 hrs (XT435178).  Co A destroyed 2 booby traps (XT430178) at 1143 hrs.  At 1405 hrs, all elements moved to Trang Bang (XT4819) for return to Cu Chi (XT6415).  At 1800 hrs all elements were closing into Cu Chi base camp.  

                             3 October  1966

2d  Bde forward combat base and tactical CP is located at (XT483273).

                                    1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance opns and defended the Bde forward base.  Co A(-) conducted reconnaissance at (XT465562).  A thorough reconnaissance was conducted with negative enemy contact.  Co A (-) returned to Bde combat base at 1210 hrs.  Co B(-) conducted a thorough reconnaissance of (XT4825) with negative enemy contact.

     1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Co C conducted Eagle Flight operations in the Trang Bang District (XT4819).  Jump teams landed at five locations (XT515259,  XT503248,  XT527178,  XT542155,  and XT534187) and captured 12 VCS.  One VC KIA (POSS) resulted when gunships fired on a VC sniper position (XT504141).  All elements returned to the Bds forward combat base at 1320 hrs.

    2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Bn defended the Cu Chi base camp sector and conducted ambush patrolling forward of the perimeter.

                          4 October  1966

        2d Bde forward  combat base and tactical CP was airlifted back to Cu Chi base camp

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

Bn provided security during the extraction of the Bde CP and 1/27 Inf from the Bde forward combat base (XT483273).  At 1700 hrs, the Bn commenced movement back to Cu Chi (XT6415).  All elements closed into base camp by 2100 hrs.   

     1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Bn was extracted back to Cu Chi from the Bde forward combat base at 1330 hrs.  All elements closed base camp by 1600 hrs.




            2d  Bn.  27th  Infantry

Bn defended the base camp sector and conducted ambush patrolling.  One ambush plat conducted S&D opns in Xom Moi (XT607160) at 0730 hrs.  The plat destroyed 1 dud 4.2 inch rd, and 2 tunnels (XT613162) at 1025 hrs.  A booby trap at (XT613162) caused 1 KIA, 2 WIA, and a scout dog casualty at 1040 hrs.  At 1226 hrs, one booby trap was destroyed (XT621162).  The plat closed into base camp at 1355 hrs.

     (p20)

5  October  1966

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

                         Bn conducted maintenance of tracked vehicles in preparation for future operations

     1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

          Bn defended the Cu Chi base camp sector and conducted ambush patrolling.

     2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Co A conducted an airmobile assault into two LZ's (XT495051 and XT495055).  Co A engaged 1 VC at 1138 hrs (XT495051), resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).  Between 1138 hrs and 1455 hrs, 6 VCC and 3 VCS were captured at (XT495051).  Supporting gunships engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) (XT495055).  One booby trapped 105 rd was destroyed (XT496053).  Extraction of all elements was complete at 1455 hrs.  Medcap was conducted at (XT489193) treating 212 patients.

                                     6 October  1966

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Co C commenced dismounted S&D opns from (XT704097) to (XT673133) at 0710 hrs.  The company had negative contact and returned to base camp at 1615 hrs.

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co B and Co C commenced S&D operations southwest of the Bn perimeter (XT610140) at 0815 hrs.  Co C destroyed 15 foxholes (XT627137) and (XT625151) between 0940 hrs and 1100 hrs.  At 1138 hrs, Co C destroyed one 4.2 inch dud (XT625151).  Co B destroyed 1 foxhole (XT623144) at 1039 hrs and one 105mm dud (XT617156) at 1135 hrs.  Both units returned to base camp at 1452 hrs.
.
2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

Recon plat ambush patrol sustained 2 WIA from punji pits (XT628179) at 1855 hrs.  Co B conducted an airmobile assault at (XT5407) in response to agent reports of a VC sqd in the area, and at (XT583023) in response to reports of a weapons cache in the area.  The operation commenced at 1030 hrs in objective (XT543007).  Two Scout dog/handler teams were attached for the opn.  At 1039 hrs, two punji pits were destroyed (XT540073).  Fresh footprints were discovered                    when one scout dog alerted (XT539075).  One bunker was destroyed and 5 lbs of documents were captured at 1315 hrs. (XT543073).  Co B completed the mission and returned to the Bao Trai airstrip (XT545050) at 1600 hrs.  At 1611 hrs, Co B commenced another airmobile assault into (XT583023).  Gunships accounted for 1 KIA (BC) at 1612 hrs (XT583023).  Co B returned to Bao Trai airstrip with negative contact and was extracted back to Cu Chi at 1800 hrs.  Medcap was conducted at Ap Reng Dau (XT4909) treating 100 patients.

                          7 October  1966

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Bn commenced opns in Xan Phu Trung (XT6811) at 1300 hrs to eliminate all VC movement in and through the village area.  Co A established a combat base at (XT690119) and a reinforced plat from Co B established a combat base at (XT675085).  Medcap was conducted at (XT6811) treating 78 patients.

                         (p21)

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co B commenced airmobile “Buddy” opns north of Trang Bang (XT5224,  XT4019) at 0900 hrs.  ARVN 2/43 Inf conducted a combat assault inot (XT502225) and (XT12227).  The Trang Bang PF Co was airlifted into a blocking psn at (XT490225).  At 1000 hrs.                     a combat assault into (XT528248).  Between 1045 hrs and 1500 hrs,        destroyed 225 meters of trench system and captured 3 VCS, (XT528248).  All elements closed base camp at 1513 hrs.  The 2/49 ARVN had negative contact and closed into Trang Bang at 1510 hrs.  

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co A conducted an airmobile assault into (XT585192 and XT545196) at 0646 hrs.  Co A captured 3 VCS (XT595184) at 0700 hrs.  35 booby traps, 3 foxholes, 1 AP mine, 1 M79 rd, and 1-105mm dud were destroyed by Co A (XT595184).  Five lbs of documents were found at (XT595184).  At 1400 hrs, Co C conducted an airmobile assault into (XT4900,  XT4905).  4 VCC, 3 VCS, 5 lbs of aid supplies, 1 VC ID Card, and a VC letter of commendation were captured at (XT489067).  All elements closed Cu Chi base camp 1755 hrs.

                        8 October  1966

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Co A combat base is located at (XT702099).  The company commenced S&D opns (XT692116) at 0945 hrs.  Two 105mm duds were destroyed (XT692716).  All elements closed into the company base at 1321 hrs.  Co B (-) departed base camp at 1230 hrs enroute to (XT676086) where a combat base was established.  The plat (+) located at (XT665096) displaced to (XT676086) to rejoin Co B.  All elements closed the company combat base at 1330 hrs.  Co C conducted “Roadrunner” opns between Cu Chi (XT651140) and Bao Trai (XT539046).  One Plat (+) Co C, escorted B 1 / 8  Arty to Duc Lap (XT553053) and will secure that unit.
1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Bn was alerted at 0755 for an airmobile assault into (XS553973, XS548982, and XS569975).  The operation commenced at 1049 hrs when one element from Co C was airlifted into a blocking position at (XS548982).  Co C (-) conducted a combat assault into (XS553973).  At 1124 hrs, Co B conducted a combat assault into (XS569975).  Helicopters conducting the lift received AW fire from (XS5589966).  Arty and gunships returned fire, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VCC (WIA).  Co C apprehended 5 VCS (XS548982) between 1151 hrs and 1300 hrs.  Co B joined Co C (XS556985) at 1356 hrs, and a forward combat base was established.  Recon Plat was airlifted to the forward base at 1657 hrs.  

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry               (p22)


     A ten man security force from Co C departed the Bao Trai airstrip at 1930 hrs enroute to position at XT544038.  A communication check was made by the patrol at 2400 hrs.  At 0146 hrs, the patrol was attacked by an estimated reinforced VC platoon.,   Communication was lost immediately in the ensuing fire fight.  When all efforts to regain communications failed, the 18 man stand-by reaction force was committed (0212 hrs.)  A lightning bug was requested and commenced searching (XT5403 and XT5404) at 0414 hrs.  At 0335 hrs the reaction force located one belt of 7.62 MBB and one North Vietnamese helmet (XT543045).  Co A and Co B were alerted at 0411 hrs to assist in the search operation.  Aircraft were requested for airmobile assaults to be conducted by Co A and Co B southeast of the security force position.  Both companies were to search west as Co C moved south from the Bao Trai airstrip toward the security force position.  Co C began the search at first light (0550 hrs).  The nine US KIA were located (XT563032) at 0720 hrs.  Co B was helilifted into the objective area (XT559034) at 0659 hrs and immediately began movement to the west.   Co A assaulted LZ (XT      ).                Co B discovered a blood trail and fresh footprints which indicated       barefoot persons, one bicycle, and one person with jungle boots had used the trail (XT556030).  At 0735 hrs, Co A picked up the same blood trail (XT556030).  Footprints now indicated that an additional 6 to 8 persons had joined the group.  Co A and Co B continued to search to the southwest along the trail.  A US first aid packet was found (XT557025) where the footprints appeared to leave the trail.  At 0831 hrs a villager along the trail (XT558018) was questioned and disclosed that 30 VC and a Negro US soldier passed through the village moving southwest.  At 0856 hrs. Co B found a C-Ration sugar pack (XT544018) which appeared to have been dropped by the MIA.  At 0930 hrs, 1/27 Inf was airlifted into blocking position (XT560980).  Co A 2/27 Inf located 1 pair of black pajamas, 1 transistor radio, and 1 VC poncho (XT564007) at 1000 hrs.  Villagers vicinity (XT562011) reported 30 VC moving through their village at 0400 hrs.  A search of the area revealed bloodstains, and 16 pairs of black pajamas in a house (XT562011).  At 1145 hrs Co A 2/27 Inf located 2 lbs of documents and misc aid supplies (XT566066).  At 1200 hrs, villagers of Ap Tho Mo (2) (XS567986) reported that 30 VC had passed through the village with 3 VC KIA and several WIA.  At 1330 hrs Co A and Co B linked up with the 1/27 Inf.  Co B was airlifted back to the Bao Trai airstrip at 1451 hrs.   Co A conducted an airmobile assault (XS552950) at 1434 hrs.  Co C was airlifted from Bao Trai to (XS627950) at 1405 hrs.  Co C received AW fire from (XS539954) at 1529 hrs resulting in 1 WIA.  At 1611 hrs, Co C received 60mm mortar fire (XS532954) resulting in 3 WIA.  At 1640 hrs, Co A sustained 1 KIA  from SA fire.  At the close of the reporting period, Co A and Co C were moving to a forward combat base established by 1/27 at (XS556966).

                  9 October  1966

1ST  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Co A and Co B continued pacification opns in Ton Phu Trang with saturation ambushes and local reconnaissance opns.  Negative contact was made.  Co A closed into the fwd combat base (XT702099) at 1800 hrs.  Co B closed into the fwd combat base (XT676086) at 1800 hrs.

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co B and Co C conducted Eagle Flight opns at 0900 hrs (XS5095).  Co C engaged 2 VC (XS495940) resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).  1 VCC was captured by Co C (XS495955) at 1210 hrs.  At 1215 hrs, Co C engaged a VC force with SA and Arty fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KIA (POSS), and 3 VCC captured (XS498942).  All elements closed Cu Chi at 1711 hrs.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co B conducted an airmobile assault (XS472475) to secure a fire support base for B 1 / 8 Arty.  Co B and Co C conducted Eagle Flight opns (XS5095) with negative contact.  All elements closed Cu Chi base camp at 1500 hrs.  AT 1902 hrs, Recon plat ambush (XT626182) was engaged by VC small arms and grenades resulting in 2 US KIA.

                                    10 October  1966

1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Infantry

     Co A and Co B continued to conduct saturation ambushing and security opns in Tan Phu Trung (XT6809).  All elements returned to fwd base camps with negative contact at 1800 hrs.  Security plat established a combat base at (XT68095).

                         (p23)

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co A conducted an airmobile assault into (XT539227) at 1030 hrs.  At 1155 hrs, Co A apprehended 1 VCS (XT534233).  25 foxholes were destroyed at (XT534233).  Co A closed base camp at 1655 hrs.

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co A supported 1/49 ARVN opn (XT5503) with airborne jump teams and a reaction force at Duc Lap (XT545050).  The 1/49th assaulted their objective  at 0835 hrs and engaged a VC sqd resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 captured weapon.  At 1030 hrs, 2 VCC were captured with 2 weapons, 2 hand grenades, 10 rifle magazines, and misc documents.  All elements were extracted at 1245 hrs.

                                       11 October  1966

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co A and Co B operations continued in Tan Phu Trung with negative contact.  Co A is located at (XT699103).  Co B is located at (XT676086).

1st  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     Co C  commenced S&D opns (XT609113) at 0831 hrs.  Co C destroyed 3 foxholes at (XT626135).  All elements returned to base camp at 1230 hrs.  Recon plat conducted a Roadrunner opn from Cu Chi (XT638149) to (XT610114).

2d  Bn,  27th  Infantry

     A Plat patrol from Co C engaged 4 VC at Xom Moi (XT610175) at 0920 hrs resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 US WIA.  The patrol closed into base camp at 1146 hrs.  Co B conducted an airmobile “Buddy” opn with ARVN 1/49th Inf at (XT596036 and XT520000).  B 1 / 8 Arty provided fire support from a fwd base at Duc Lap (XT551051).  Co B destroyed 1 tunnel and 2 AP mines.  Three VCS were captured (XT595037) at 0835 hrs by a jump team from the 2/27 Recon plat.  All elements closed base camp at 1240 hrs.

b. Civil Affairs / Psy Ops     

(1)  Accomplishments:

(a) Approximately 3,158 Vietnamese Nationals were treated by Brigade and Battalion Surgeons while conducting 28  MEDCAPS.  At these MEDCAPS, toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap was distributed to needy persons.  MEDCAP leaflets were also distributed.

(b) The following Helping Hand items were distributed during this period, assisting approximately  4,140 persons:

(1)  Clothing:   Approximately 7,500 lbs.
(2)  Food:         Approximately 3,000 lbs
(3)  Pencils:         Approximately 200
(4)  Tablets:      Approximately 575
(5)   Crayons:    Approximately 24 boxes

(c) On 6 September 1966 a “County Fair” was conducted by the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, in Ap Rung Dau, in which approximately 500 villagers participated.  The Battalion S-5 distributed the following Helping Hand materials:

                 (p24)

One “B” box canned goods
250 boxes powdered milk
250 bags rice (10 lb bags)
(d) Mid Autumn Children's Festival:

1 Brigade XO, S-5 and P10 attended the Mid Autumn Children's Festival at Tao Phu Trung.  At this festival, the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, presented the children 12 “C” boxes of clothing, 45 lbs of American candy.  25 lbs of Vietnamese candy, 13 baseball bats, 8 baseballs, 5 ball gloves, and 2 volleyballs.  Approximately 1500 children benefited from the Brigade's and 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry's participation in this festival.

(e) A total of 28 leaflet air drops, dropping approximately 256,500 leaflets were made during this period.  Approximately 6000 leaflets were handed out by the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry in their area of operation.  In addition, approximately 9700 III Corps and 25th Division News-letters were distributed.

(f)  During this period, 17 Vietnamese detainees were furnished transportation back to area of evacuation.  Each detainee was issued a “solatium” box.  In addition, the S-5, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, presented 7 “solatium” boxes to the family of a Vietnamese casualty in Tan Phu Trung, and Brigade S-5 presented “solatium” boxes to 3 ARVN and their dependents that were wounded in 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry's area of operations, 7 boxes to woman wounded by artillery fire near Tram Lac, 6 boxes to family of hamlet chief who was killed on 29 September in Tan Phu Trung IX, and 3 boxes to the family of a boy wounded near Xom Bao Don.

(g) Miscellaneous Projects and /or assistance:

1   The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, delivered five 5-ton truck loads of scrap lumber to the PF/RF outpost in Trung Lap to build PF/RF quarters.

2   Brigade S-5 delivered 20 sheets of metal roofing material to the PF/RF outpost at Ap Bao Tro and 10 sheets of metal roofing material to the PF/RF outpost at Cay Trom.

3   The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, delivered concertina wire, 50 rolls barbed wire, 3,400 sandbags, and 208 steel fence stakes for reinforcement of PF/RF compounds and hamlets of Tan Tong I, III and IV and Tan Trung I and II.

4   Brigade S-5 delivered 102 five foot metal stakes to SF Camp at Xhiem Hanh.

5   The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, delivered 50 bags of cement (50 Kilo each) and 200 steel stakes to Tan Phu Trung for use in market place.  The stakes will completely surround the market place.

6   The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, delivered two litters to the Trang Bang Dispensary to alleviate an acute shortage.

7   The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, delivered 3,850 sandbags to Tan Phu Trung for use in PF compound bunker complex.

8   The 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, delivered 5000 sandbags and 400 pickets to Bao Trai for construction of Duc Manh outpost.

9   Brigade S-5 delivered one USAID water pump to the 1st Sgt of ARVN Ranger Camp at Duc Lap to replace water pump taken by US Forces in January or February.
          (p25)

10  The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, delivered a brick making machine and 40 bags of cement (50 kilo each) to Tan Phu Trung to be utilized by people of the village to make bricks for their houses.

(2)  Conclusion:  Operation SUNSET BEACH was highly successful in its assistance to the VN revolutionary development program.  The MEDCAP program, distribution of Helping Hand materials, the conducting of `County Fair” type programs, active participation in local village official / social functions, and continuous renovation / construction projects on the local level have elicited the friendship and trust of the local populace.  As noted in paragraph 2g, above this Brigade gave extensive material support to PF/RF outposts in our areas of operation.  It is anticipated that continuation of present projects and the initiation of additional projects beneficial to the populace will further enhance this Brigade's accomplishment of it's mission of assistance to the VN revolutionary development program.

(p 26)


    12  Results:

Combat operations directed against the VC during Operation SUNSET BEACH resulted in the following VC losses:

VC KIA   (BC)                    80                                                   Bayonets               4
VC KBA  (BC)                     6                                                   Bunkers                36
VC KIA   (Poss)              128                                                    Tunnels                 95
VC KBA  (Poss)                 7                                                     Spiderholes         71
VCC                                  49                                                     Foxholes               77
VCS                                189                                                     Trenches               17
Rice                          17 tons                                                    Punji Pits               20
Salt                200 lbs                                                     Storage Rooms                 2
Peanuts               830 lbs                                                     Base Camps               1
Small Arms            18                                                                    Oil            605 gals
Grenades               45                                                Tin                               32 Sheets
Mortar Rds             28                                                 Medical Supplies         160 lbs
Arty Rds                  36                                                      8mm Movie Cameras      3
12.7mm Rds           150                                35mm Movie Cameras                       2
Explosives (TNT)                             305 lbs          Microphone                                  2
AT Mines            7                                                              Amplifier                           1
AP Mines          11                                                         Speaker                                1
Claymore Mines            6                                               Movie Film                           7 cans
SA Ammo               2046 Rds                             Photo Chemicals                           5 lbs
Blasting Caps               2409                         Photo Print Paper                              15 lbs
Booby Traps                 113                                   Photo Negatives                         24 rolls
Homemade Bombs              2                                               Film                              21 rolls

b.       Friendly Losses:

KIA -                   29
MIA -                     1
WIA -                194               
APC  Combat Loss -           9

13. Administrative Matters:

a.   Supply:   Initial supply and resupply was conducted by motor convoy and air.  No delays or problem areas were encountered during the operation.  All classes remain in good supply.

b.   Maintenance:  Replacement and repair of damaged armored personnel carriers remain slow.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a.  Tunnel Kit:

(1) In normal tunnel search operations, the tunnel kit has proven to be too bulky and inefficient to be of value.  Specific problem areas are as follows:

(a) The silencer for the .38 caliber pistol is bulky and does not muffle the blast.
(b) The miner's lamp hinders movement to such an extent as to make it ineffective in small tunnels.
(c) The throat strap for the microphone is unnecessarily restrictive.

                  (2)   The aiming light, communications system, and the wire dispenser have proven to  
              be of value and can be used effectively during tunnel search operations.

b. Scout Dogs:  Scout dogs have been extremely effective in locating VC tunnels, supplies, and booby traps.  Used on ambush patrols, they invariably alert to VC movement before the patrol members are able to either see or hear enemy forces.

        15.   Commander's Analysis:               

a. Valid and timely intelligence is necessary for the successful employment of Eagle Flights.  Conversely, Eagle Flights give the unit the capability of responding immediately in perishable intelligence.  A minimum of one airmobile Co (10 UH-10 A/C) is required.

b.  Operation of the JOC's resulted in increased cooperation and coordination between the district chiefs and units of the 2d Bde.  Much of the success of these organizations is attributed to the personal relationship which has developed between district chiefs and the commanders / staffs of brigade units.

c.  Except for minor harassment by sporadic small arms and occasional light mortar fire, the VC continue to avoid engagement with the mechanized infantry battalion.  When hard pressed, they use delaying tactics and break contact as soon as possible.

d.  Extensive VC employment of anti-tank mines is the major threat to the operations of the mechanized infantry battalion.  An increase in the size of the anti-tank mines has been noted during this operation.  The result is a significantly higher percentage of APC's declared total losses after hitting mines.  Personnel casualties incurred from AT mines remain relatively light except in cases where aggravating factors occur, e.g., secondary explosions or fires resulting from the mine detonation.

e.  Terrain trafficability during the peak of the rainy season restricts and channelizes tracked vehicle movement.  However, mechanized operations are still possible and effective.

       16.   Recommendations:    None

FOR THE COMMANDER:


WHIT L. COATS
Major,  Infantry
Adjutant
                         (p28)