After Action Reports 10

a. Artillery: Artillery support for Operation BARKING SANDS envisioned many new concepts which proved to be highly successful in a jungle war against guerilla forces. BARKING SANDS, as never before utilized the concept of airlift of light artillery batteries to exploit important intelligence data. Further, it was in Operations BARKING SANDS that the concept of a minimum of one artillery battalion equivalent would be used to support any maneuver force larger than a platoon. The results of these new ideas were a greater kill ratio per artillery round fired and most certainly added a confusion factor to the enemy as to the size force which was opposing him. In many cases the weight of artillery power served to accomplish the mission with fewer friendly casualties. The additional artillery provided a greater volume of fire which could be used in preparation fires which saved many lives and reduced the loss of equipment in Rome Plow operations. For statistical data for Operation BARKING SANDS refer to Artillery after action reports for the sub-operations undertaken during the operation.

b. Tactical Air: Tactical air support was provided by the 7th USAF. The missions were controlled by the 1st Bde TACP. Statistics listed below are missions flown in support of Operation BARKING SANDS only and not the sub-operations that made up the overall operation. Each sub-operation statistics are provided in respective After Action Reports.

(3) Results: bunkers destroyed: 1,568; bunkers damaged - 132; bunkers exposed 168; fighting psns destroyed (fox and spider holes) - 118; fighting psns exposed - 167; structures destroyed - 212; structures damaged - 38; docking sites destroyed - 4; trails & roads cut - 5; VC KBA (BC) - 47; VC KBA (possible) - 131; sampans destroyed - 27; sampans damaged - 3; tunnels destroyed -50 meters; trench destroyed 2,845 meters; trench exposed - 1,965; caches destroyed - 34; caches damaged / exposed - 2; secondary fires - 131; secondary explosions - 59; observation tower destroyed - 1; oxcarts destroyed - 2; livestock destroyed 3; bicycles destroyed - 5; foot bridges damaged / destroyed -5.

(4) Tactical air support throughout the operation was outstanding. Preplanned and immediate strikes were both timely and accurate. Operation WAIMEA was the 1st operation conducted by the 1st Bde where extensive airstrikes were followed by massed arty preps on LZ's. The use of the two support wpns caused a perfection of the timely delivery techniques required. The success of the operation has influenced the increased use of their tactical employment.

a. Intelligence studies prior to Operation BARKING SANDS indicated that elements of the 1st Bn, MR4, 7th Bn/CU CHI District and 2d Bn, GO MON District were operating in the AO. Strength of each of these units was between 200-300 men. The CU CHI “QUYET CHIEN II”. Local force platoon w/strength of approx 25 men, was known to be operating in the PHU HOA DONG-BEN CO area (XT705196).

Generally these units will disperse their subordinate companies throughout the area and mass only for offensive action. 2d Bn/Go Mon generally operates to the south and east of PHU HOA DONG Village while the 1st Bn/MR4 and 7th Bn/CU CHI District operates to the north west and southwest of the village. Agent reports indicated considerable VC activity in the vic of the FILHOL, middle BOI LOI and HO BO Woods. VC irregulars and the above mentioned bn's are supposed to have considerable control over activities in the villages and surrounding areas.

Also was reported that the BOI LOI and HO BO WOODS had long been a major VC base area for elements of the D14, 1st Bn MR4 and 7th Bn/MR4 (CU CHI). The 1st Bn MR4 located in the north central HO BO WOODS with elements dispersed throughout the area and in the villages to the west. D14 Bn was reported dispersed throughout the BOI LOI WOODS. The 7th Bn/ CU CHI was reported dispersed with 1 company in the northern FILHOL, 1 company in the THAI MY area, and 1 company in the TRUNG LAP area. Their pattern of activity throughout the monsoon season was to avoid decisive contact with US operations, to continue the resupply and proselytizing activities, and harassment of RF/PF outpost and small unit operations of US forces.

b. 221100 Sep 67 - B 4-23 Inf. (M) vic XT570311 loc & evac 12 printing sorting trays, 18x24 inches with 20 lbs print, 1 tool box w/assorted printers tools, 1-9mm, 49 SMG folding stock, 2 printing presses layout book, 9-.50 cal ammo boxes of type (270 lbs), 80 lbs of loose type, 5 strips paper, 2 ink rollers and 1 VC kerosene lantern vic XT569312.

e. 061012 Oct 67 - A 2-14 Inf vic XT613304 loc & evac a large wpns cache consisting 1 Chicom MG, 3-.30 cal MG's, 2 BAR's, 2 Japanese MG's, 1 Chicom Assault rifle, 4 French Commando rifles, 1-60mm mortar, 1-81mm mortar tube, 1 Chicom carbine, 43 75mm RR rds, 41 boxes of .50 cal ammo (100 rds per box), 10 Chicom claymore mines, 15 lbs C4 explosives and approx 400 lbs assorted clothing.

Weather did not hamper or prohibit friendly troop movement. Terrain was primarily jungle in varying degrees of density ranging from light to heavy. Roads throughout the area were generally poor but were passable to tracked vehicles. There was one major river, the SONG SAIGON, within the area. All maneuver elements found the maps of the area quite accurate, corresponding closely to the terrain in terms of concealment, critical features and available avenues of approach. Generally, in the areas of dense vegetation, foot movement was restricted and observation was hampered, however, camouflage was more than adequate. Foot and oxcart trails and primitive roads used for logging activities abound throughout the area.

d. Operation KUNIA - 1st Bde conducted operations to eliminate the HO BO WOODS as a VC base area by 31 Oct 67 through: Tactical operations to destroy known and suspected VC forces in the area, jungle clearing with Rome Plows in accordance with directed priorities, and destruction of VC field fortifications.

a. Operation KAWELA - Bns conducted search and destroy missions employing airmobile combat assaults into the Iron Triangle and along the west side of the SAIGON river south of the Iron Triangle. A river crossing was conducted by the 4-9 Inf and 4-23 Inf (M) to exploit intelligence reports in the Iron Triangle. One Bn from 3d Bde served as a blocking force for the river crossing mission.

(2) Phase II - 2-7 (ARVN) continued S&D ops and saturation night ambush patrolling between PL PERCH and SAIGON River. 4-12 Inf conducted CA on LZ 3. Conducted S&D ops and saturation night ambush patrolling within assigned obj area. D Trp 3-4 Cav screened along road from vic XT796124 to vic XT754073. 2-14 Inf conducted simultaneous mock CA's on LZ's; occupied obj KING; conducted resupply and made preparations to establish a patrol base; moved to and occupied ambush sites within obj areas. 4-7 (ARVN) occupied obj area; made preparations to establish a Bn patrol base; moved to and occupied ambush sites within obj area.

(3) Phase III - 2-7 (ARVN) withdrew across PL PERCH and conducted S*D ops between PL PERCH and PL BASS. 2-14 Inf (-) conducted CA on LZ and S&D ops within obj areas. 4-7 (ARVN) conducted CA on LZ and S &D ops within obj area. 4-12 Inf conducted CA on LZ and S&D ops within obj area. D Trp 3-4 Cav screened along road from XT796124 to vic XT754073.

Bn continued operation BARKING SANDS with company size operations ranging from cordon and search, BUSHMASTER, search and destroy, saturation day and night ambush patrolling, and Eagle Flights to react to current intelligence. The pacification program was followed through the MEDCAPS. Missions with the local RF/PF units on combined operations proved effective.

(17 July - 14 Sep 67) Bn continued Operation BARKING SANDS as a pacification operation in the CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts of HAU NGHIA Province and PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province. Numerous small unit actions which included BUSHMASTER, CORDON & SEARCH, ROAD RUNNER and CHECKMATES were conducted within the 1st Bde AO. In addition, search and destroy missions employing airmobile combat assaults were conducted. During the period 17 - 20 June 67, the bn was OPCON to 199th Lt Inf Bde. From 1 Sep until 7 Sep occupied scatter positions and conducted saturation patrolling the RVN National elections. The entire Bn conducted required refresher training during the period.

( 19 Nov - 7 Dec 67) Bn conducted Operation BARKING SANDS by conducting S&D operations in the east and south of the HO BO WOODS and moving into the northern FILHOL to complete clearing of the SAIGON River. Combined operations were conducted with the RAG Units and 1st Bn, 47th Regt from PHU HOA DONG. Bn began preparation for and moved to TAY NINH to establish a permanent base camp.

(25 July - 14 Sep 67) Bn conducted S&D operations in the FILHOL Plantation area and Eagle Flights within the 1st Bde AO. The main effort was concentrated on ROME PLOW operations in the THAI MY area. In conjunction with the 65th Engr Bn, Co A cleared the Cu Chi Base Camp perimeter near Xom Moi. Daily ROAD RUNNER missions were conducted downTRANG BANG to CU CHI continued were held at irregular intervals.

(19 May - July) 25 July - 21 Aug) (27 Aug - 14 Sep 67) Bn moved into AO SCARLET and established a FSPB to support operations east of Camp Cu Chi. An additional mission was to provide security for a laterite pit opened by the 65th Engr Bn at FSPS SCARLET and the engr effort to open Rt 7 from Cu Chi to Phu Cong as a main service road. Operations were conducted within the AO at company and platoon level. Airmobile and RAG insertions of units into areas along the SAIGON RIVER proved effective in establishing contact with VC forces. Cordon and search operations were conducted on selected villages within the AO and CHECKMATE and CHECKPOINT operations were held daily. Saturation patrolling conducted throughout the operation areas also proved effective. MEDCAPS were held on a weekly basis by the Bn Surgeon. During the period 30 July to 2 Aug the bn participated in Operations CORONADO II in the Delta area.

(1) Friendly: Carrier, Personnel, full tracked M113A1 - 27: Carrier, full tracked M125A1 - 1; machine gun, 7.62mm, M60 - 2: rifle, 5.56mm, M16 - 5; recoilless rifle, 90mm - 1; launcher, grenade, 40mm, M79 - 4; radio, set, AN/PRC-25 - 6; radio, set AN/PRC-46 - 2; radio, set AN/VRC-53 - 2; metascope assembly - 1; starlight, scope, hand held - 1; detector, set, mine - 1; binoculars, M3, 6x30 - 3; binoculars, M17A1, 7x50 - 2; compass, lensatic - 5; compass, M2 - 1; armor, body, fragmentation, protective - 6; mask, protective, field, M17 - 21; helmet, combat, vehicle, crewman's - 7; watch, wrist - 2; tool kit, automotive mechanic's, light weight, general - 1; surgical instrument and supply set - 1; TA 50-901, set -1.

(2) Enemy: SA ammo - 103,565 rds assorted; HE ammo - 2,863 rds assorted; mines & booby traps - 1,183; structures - 680; fortifications - 5,421; tunnels - 917; sampans - 124; 530 foxholes and spider-holes; bicycles - 12; clothing - 529 lbs; explosives - 56 lbs; trench - 1,650 meters; punji pits - 118..

a. Supply: All classes of supply were drawn through normal supply channels at Camp CU CHI. Each battalion was allocated UH1D and CH47 aircraft as needed to transport Class I, ice, and high priority repair parts. Battalions operated supply convoys on a daily basis. Battalions maintained a basic load of ammunition, one day supply of “C” rations and carried a fifteen day supply of spare parts.

(1) We have found that the prc-25 radio frequently picks up a great deal of Vietnamese transmissions to include commercial radio stations. ARVN and National Police units, as well as VC. In order to distinguish the source of these transmissions, it is absolutely essential to have a skilled interpreter readily available in the CP Group to begin immediate monitoring.

c. Stay Behind Patrols: Patrols left in any area of operations achieve highest percentage of body count or contact of any type of patrol activity conducted. Stay behind patrols offer the most positive method of inserting a patrol in an area known to contain VC without compromise. Stay behind patrols were found to gain their contacts between 1500-2100 hours, and between 0400 - 0700 hours.

d. Tunnel Complexes and Base Camps: Once a significant tunnel complex is located, it must be immediately and continuously occupied until destruction is complete. This will result in a larger body count and captured weapons and equipment. It was found that the VC immediately entered a tunnel complex or base camp area after US forces departed to move items not located and destroyed. Operations in the FILHOL proved this system to be highly effective and well worth the company days expended.

e. Gaining and Maintaining Contact: Considerable experience gained in the HO BO and the FILHOL show that the greatest VC body count is achieved when the force making initial contact retains the contact despite casualties initially suffered in the first burst of fire, and the balance of the company maneuvers to fight and finish the fixed force. This technique of “holding on to the contact” resulted in 10 VC killed by body count in a four day period.

(1) General: A total of 200 missions with 520 sorties were flown in support of the operation, 7 of which were “immediate” close support missions. The preplanned missions were based on current intelligence of VC unit locations and suspected storage areas. All airstrikes were extremely accurate and very effective. Reaction time of the “immediate” strikes was 20-30 minutes after the request was made, which is a satisfactory time. The “immediate” strikes were 100% effective. (p1)

(1) The 25th AVN Bn, 25th Inf Div provided airmobile support including resupply and gunships, and liaison and coordination with other AVN units providing airmobile support. Normally only one airmobile company was available to support the operation and this was inadequate to provide all the support required due to the inability of land vehicles to move in the area.

(1) General: The extensive area of operations necessitated wide dispersal of firing batteries and frequent relocation to provide continuous artillery support to the maneuver elements of the brigade. Throughout the operation the positioning of batteries was such that if a situation developed away from the initial objective, the new objective could easily be supported. Outstanding cooperation on the part of the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery, and their ability to relocate batteries by air lift and / or motor movement was very instrumental in the success enjoyed

a. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th artillery remained in direct support of the 1st Battalion. 27th Infantry at AT62681854, from 2 September 1966 to 14 September 1966. During this period it also supported ARVN and RF/PF elements stationed at Trang Bang. On 14 September it returned to base camp where it supported 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry opns near the base camp. On 7 October 1966, Battery A displaced by road convoy to Trang Bang vicinity XT48195 to support 1st Battalion 27th Infantry operations. It remained there throughout the remainder of the operation.

b. Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was in base camp from 2 Sept 1966 until 7 October when it displaced by road convoy to XT60361102 in order to support 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry / RVN operations. It returned the same day. Battery B moved again from base on 16 September 1966 by displacing to Bao Trad, vicinity XT541046. This was in support of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry operations. It returned to base camp by road convoy on 29 September 1966. On 30 September Battery B moved by road convoy to XT605111 to support the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, and returned the same day. On 1 October, it displaced to Trang Bang along with Battery C in response to a report of 2 VC Battalions near Trang Bang. It returned to camp on 2 October. On 8 October it displaced by road convoy to Duc Bap, XT55250520, in support of 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. On 4 October 1966, Battery B was airlifted from XT552052 to vicinity XT472987 in support of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. Battery B, returned to Duc Lap that afternoon. It remained there for the duration of the operation.

c. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was at XT437500710 from 2 September 1966 to 8 September 1966. Supporting 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry operations. On 9 September, Battery C displaced to XT446170 in preparation for support of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry opns. On 12 September, Battery C returned by CH47 to base camp. On 19 September Battery C displaced by air to XT59132166 in order to support 1st Battalion (Mech.) 5th Infantry. On 23 September Battery C displaced by air to XT483275, still in support of 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry. On 29 September, Battery C moved by air to Bao Don, XT440348, still in support of 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry. It remained there until 30 September when it was airlifted back to base camp. On 1 October it left again with Battery B to Trang Bang, vicinity XT485195. This time Battery C was in support of 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. On 5 October Battery C displaced from Trang Bang, and moved by road convoy to XT558049. This move was made in support of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry. On 5 October, Battery C displaced from Trang Bang, and moved by road convoy to XT558049. This move was made in support of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry operations. On 9 October 1966, Battery C returned by road convoy to base camp. On 10 October one howitzer platoon displaced to XT6597187 to support operations of the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry southeast of Cu Chi. Battery C remained thus disposed for the duration of the SUNSET BEACH operation.

(d) Battery C, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery became attached to the battalion on 16 September 1966. On 17 September it displaced by road convoy to XT40351933 to support the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. On 23 September, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 13 Artillery displaced by air to XT481276 in order to take a position for support of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry in the Boi Loi Woods. It remained there until 4 October when it was detached from the battalion.

(1) A relatively low rate of VC contact and VC initiated incidents were reported during the 30 days prior to initiation of operation SUNSET BEACH. The number of anti-aircraft incidents decreased 25% and the number of road obstacles decreased 65% compared to the month of July 1966. No significant RED HAZE and SLAR reports were obtained in AO prior to operation. There were no SPARS reported in the operational area.

(2) VC offensive activities in AO that were not politically oriented included road blocks, sniper fire, laying AT mines, and establishing booby traps and command-detonated mines. The VC employed booby traps, AT mines and command-detonated mines extensively in the Boi Loi Woods area against Brigade elements during period 20 Sep 66 to 4 Oct 66.

(3) At 0700H, 01 Sep 66, 1/27 ambush patrol engaged approximately 10 oxcarts vic XT535165 with 4.2 mortars and small arms fire. Results: 4 VC KIA (DC) and 3 VC KIA (POSS). Two oxcarts were captured which contained 2,400 blasting caps (German make), 552 one-half pound blocks of TNT, 8 rounds of 81mm mortar, 150 rounds 12.7mm ammo (armor piercing of CHICOM origin).

(4) On 11 Sep 66, 2/27 Inf captured VC psywar equipment at XT432172 consisting of three 8mm movie cameras, two 35mm cameras, 2 microphones, 1 amplifier, 1 speaker, 7 cans of 16mm film, 24 rolls of 35mm negatives, 1 power pack for electronic flash, 2 lenses, 2 enlarger condensers, 2 unprocessed rolls of 35mm film, 15 pounds of photographic print paper, 5 pounds of photo chemicals, and assorted psywar photographs.

(5) Significant increases in (1) reliability and timeliness of agent reports, (2) the influx of Chieu Hoi's, (3) Prompt and efficient interrogation of captured VC, and (4) reliable on the spot civilian reports, greatly contributed to the success of 2d Brigade elements during Operation SUNSET BEACH.

Vic XT695117 pointed out by two Chieu Hoi's who had participated in the construction of the complex during 1959-61. According to one Chieu Hoi, the VC dig their tunnel system to suit the tactical situation and did not use any uniform pattern for digging tunnel routes or camouflaging entrances. Tunnel diggers worked in teams of four: 1. A digger, 2. A person behind the digger to push dirt to the rear, 3. A third person to put the dirt in a container, and 4. A fourth person to lift the container of dirt out of the hole. Utilizing this method 100 personnel can dig approximately 50 meters of tunnel in a day.

(b) At 270945 Sep. an agent reported an estimated VC platoon vic XT463143. At 1330 hours a joint US/PF airmobile operation was initiated. As the helicopters moved into objective area, the VC scattered into vegetated areas. Pursuing US Forces were greatly aided in locating the VC by a villager who pointed out where VC were hiding. Results: 15 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC KIA (POSS), 10 VCC, 15 VCS and 3 wpns captured.

10. Concept of Operation: Operations conducted during SUNSET BEACH were aimed at maintaining constant pressure on Viet Cong Forces in HAU NGHIA Province. Airmobile delivery of troops into objective areas was used almost exclusively throughout this monsoon period. Search and destroy, eagle flights, roadrunner and bush-master techniques were emphasized. Buddy operations were conducted at an increased frequency. Pacification measures were highlighted by two events: the Vietnamese National Election (11 Sep 66) and deep incursions into the Boi Loi Woods by the mech. Battalions (20 Sep 66 to 4 Oct 66).

a. During the period 2 Sep 66 - 6 Sep 66, 2d Bde conducted airmobile and ground assaults, search and destroy operations, Eagle Flights, combat patrol, ambushes and “Buddy” operations with local ARVN forces in areas contiguous to population centers and election polling places. 1st Bn 27th Inf and 2d Bn, 27th Inf conducted operations from forward combat bases. During this period, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf was under opcon of 1st Bde.

b. During the period 7 - 14 Sep 66, 2d Bde conducted airmobile and ground assaults, search and destroy operations. Eagle flights, combat patrols, ambushes, and “Buddy” operations with local ARVN forces in areas removed from election polling places and population centers. 1st Bn, 27th Inf and 2d Bn, 27th Inf continued to conduct operations from forward combat bases. C C and 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf conducted operations from a forward combat base (XT39349) 9 - 12 Sep 66,

c. During the period 20 Sep - 11 Oct 66, 2d Bde conducted Eagle Flight operations and mechanized reconnaissance, raids, and assaults from a Bde forward combat base (XT483273). Mechanized raids and reconnaissance south of the Boi Loi / Ho Bo Woods screened the northern boundary of the TAOR while Eagle Flights and search and destroy operations were conducted to the south, Mechanized reconnaissance in force of the periphery of the Boi Loi Woods confirmed location of VC base areas and fortifications which were then attacked and destroyed by mechanized forces.

The Bn commenced opr SUNSET BEACH by conducting search and destroy opns in a reported VC base camp area (XT516208). In the objective area between 0800 and 1730, Co B located and destroyed nineteen tunnel complexes, eight VC structures, three punji pits and seven 105mm duds. At 0910H, one M-60 MG barrel with bipod was found (XT520207). At 1233H a carrying case with leather strap for a 60mm mortar rd was found at (XT517207).

The Bn conducted an airmobile (Buddy) opn (XT501115) with the CIDG from Duc Hae Sugar Mill. Co A conducted a combat assault into (XT501115) as two companies of CIDG conducted S&D in (XT475115). The Bn utilized two jump teams to eliminate enemy exfiltration of the objective area. Two sampans and one tunnel were destroyed by Co A (XT501115). Four VC's were captured in the objective area (X501115).

The Bn continued S&D opns in the VC base camp area (XT516308). Co C destroyed four tunnels, one AT mine, and one booby trap (XT516208) between 0800H and 1330H. Co B destroyed two 81mm duds, seven 105mm duds, five tunnels, two foxholes, and one AP mine between 0900H and 1600H (XT519213). Co B engaged two snipers at (XT519213) 1600H resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS). A Roadrunner opn was conducted between Cu Chi base camp and Trang Bang(XT489191).

Co C conducted an airmobile assault into (XT507045) at 0800H. Five VOC and two VC's were captured, three booby traps were destroyed, and one ton of rice, misc. equipment and documents were captured (XT507045) between 0935H and 1521H. At 1540H, Co A secured AP Rung Dan (XT459095) for Medcap which treated 103 patients. All units closed into the forward base camp (XT501117) at 1540H.

The bn continued S&D operations in (XT517211). Seven tunnels, seven bunkers, four trenches, and forty-nine foxholes were destroyed by Co A between 1254H and 1450H at (XT517211). A Roadrunner operation was conducted from Cu Chi (XT6415) to Trang Bang (XT4919). All units closed into the forward base camp (XT528187) at 1710H. Medcap was conducted at (XT4821) treating 205 patients.

Co B commenced S&D operations in Iam Vo (1) (XT535218) at 0730H in response to Chiou Hoi and agent reports which indicated that a VC base camp and supply area were located in the area. One bunker and two tunnels were destroyed (XT535218) by Co B between 0905H and 1245H. Co B closed into the forward base camp (XT528157) at 1245H. Medcap was conducted at (XT467198) treating 198 patients.

Co B conducted an airmobile assault into Ap Ban Long (XT525100) at 0800H. The Security Plat provided airmobile jump teams to prevent VC infiltration of the objective area. In the objective area between 0930H and 1433H, four VC and three weapons were captured. Five booby traps, one tunnel and a VC classroom were destroyed at (XT529105). Two AT mines and 400 meters of wire were destroyed at (XT507063). All units closed into the forward base at 1433H (XT501117). Medcap was conducted at Duc Banh (XT575075), treating 75 patients.

The Bn conducted an airmobile “Buddy” operation north of Trang Bang (XT495225) with the ARVN 2/49 Inf and the Trang Bang PF Co in response to a reported VC plat located at (XT505215). Between 0839H and 1850 H, Co A destroyed one VC structure and one tunnel complex 300 meters in length. A VC map hidden in the structure was confiscated. At 1520H Co A captured 4 VCs (XT502213). Co B destroyed 2 VC structures and one 105 dud. At 1430H, Co B captured 1 VC (XT508217). 2/49 Inf (ARVN) captured 2 VCC and 6 VCS (XT501209). At 0829H the PF Co captured 1 VCC (XT503209). 2/19 Inf (ARVN) sustained 1 WIA during the operation. All US personnel closed into the forward base camp at 1800H. The recon platoon conducted Roadrunner opns between Trang Bang and Cu Chi.

The Bn conducted a County Fair in Bang Dau (xt499095) at 0735H. Co C secured the village at 0755H. Medcap personnel and supplies were transported by motor convoy and arrived at 0850H. Co C returned to the Bn forward base camp at 1355H (XT501117). Co B conducted reconnaissance patrolling in the forward base area.

Boson Plat ambushed 2 VC oxcarts (XT535165) at 0001 hrs, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (POS), and 2400 blasting caps, 276 lbs TNT, eight B1 mortar rds, 150 rds SA ammo, and 2 oxcarts captured. The Bn commenced X&D opns at 0743H in Yom Thap and Ap Cap Diz (XT543165). At 0750H, Recon Plat captured 3 VCs (XT535157). At 0820H Co's A & B captured 1 VCS, destroyed 2 tunnels, one 4.2 mortar rd, and one booby trap (XT540167). Roadrunner opn was conducted between Trang Bang (XT4879) and Cu Chi (XT6415). All elements closed into the forward base at 1458H. Medcap was conducted at (XT537157) treating 201 patients.

Co A and Co B conducted an airmobile combast assault (XT560020) in response to agent reports of two VC platoons with sixteen automatic weapons. In the objective area (XT580020) between 0720 hrs and 1600 hrs, Co A located and destroyed 2 booby traps and 17 foxholes. At 1047 hrs, Co A found a grenade factory (XT583015), miscellaneous explosives and small arms ammo. Two WIA were sustained from booby traps in the objective area. All elements closed into the forward base at 1650 hrs (XT501117).

Bn conducted a “Buddy” S&D opns (XT512208) with the Trang Bang PT company. Five VC structures, one tunnel, and a 300 meter trench were destroyed at (XT533198). Three VC were engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC's captured, and 2 US WIA. All elements closed into the forward combat base at 1030 hrs. Roadrunner opns were conducted between Trang Bang (XT489192) and Cu Chi (XT650159).

Into (XT425159). One sampan sunk, thirty-one foxholes, one tunnel, and one AT mine were destroyed at (XT425159). Co B left one stay behind ambush patrol (XT435171) then the Bn was extracted. The ambush made contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1VCC, All elements including the stay behind ambush closed into fwd base camp at 1730 hrs.

The forward combat base received 6 rds of VC mortar fire at 0820 hrs resulting in negative casualties. Bn (-) conducted an airmobile assault into (XT424179). Seven tunnels, 1 rifle grenade, and a 55 gal drum were found at (XT432172). Inside the drum were camera film, 1 loudspeaker, and film processing equipment. All Bn elements closed into forward base camp at 1345 hrs.

Bn conducted an airmobile assault into (XT540200). Co C 1/5 (M) established a blocking position at (XT450205) and 1/27 Inf. conducted S&D opns toward the blocking position. Eleven VC were captured by the Bn. One booby trap was destroyed (XT546237) by Co A. Three bunkers were destroyed (XT545233) by Co C 1/5 (M) and one APC destroyed by an AT mine (XT552223) resulting in 5 WIA.