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After Action Reports 14
HEADQUARTERS
1st BRIGADE
25th INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96225
AVDCFB-A 6 November 1966
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCOP
APO 96225
1. Name: Operation KIPAPA
2. Dates: 310930 August - 121600 September 1966
3. Location: Filhol Plantation
4. Control HQ: 25th Infantry Division
5. Reporting Officer: Colonel William B. Sandlin, Jr.
6. Task Organization:
a. Brigade Control
HHC, 1st Bde (-)
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf (-)
3 Plat, B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
Plat, A Co, 65th Engr (-)
b. 4th Bn, 9th Inf (-)
Sqd, A Co. 65th Engrs
c. 4th Bn, 23d Inf (-)
Sqd, A Co, 65th Engrs
(p1)
7. Support Forces.
a. 7th Bn, 11th Arty was placed in direct support of the 1st Brigade for Operation KIPAPA. Unit remained at Cu Chi in support of the operation. During Operation KIAPA 63 fire support missions were fired for a total of 1,432 rounds. 302 H&I missions were fired for a total of 854 rounds
b. Tactical Air: 46 missions consisting of 134 sorties were flown in support of the 1st Brigade with the following results:
(1.) Structures destroyed: 46
(2.) Structures damaged: 32
(3.) Bunkers destroyed: 8
(4.) Foxholes uncovered: 2
(5.) Tunnels uncovered: 3
(6.) Storage pits destroyed: 2
(7.) Trench line uncovered: 648 meters
(8.) KBA: 1
(9.) KBA (POSS): 3
(10.) Secondary fires: 2
c. Army Aviation:
(1.) Sorties - HU1D Aircraft:
a. Gunships: 21
b. Tactical troop lift: 140
c. Resupply:; 274
d. Air evac, C&C, recon and misc: 51
(2.)Sorties - CH47 Aircraft: None
(3.)Sorties - CH23G Aircraft:
(a)Tactical: 52
(b) Air evac, C&C. recon and misc.: 47
(p2)
(4) Ammunition expended (approx):
(a) Machine gun,. 7.62mm: 18,000 rounds
(b) Rockets, 2.75: 221
(c) Link, 40mm: 191
8. Intelligence:
a. Intelligence produced prior to Operation KIPAPA, indicated that elements of the 7th Bn, 165A Regt were operating in the confines of the Filhol Plantation (XT6720). At the time the operation was undertaken, the last reported location of the 7th Bn, 165A Regt was XT685219. Based on reports from ralliers, the operational area of the 7th Bn was reported as follows: Bau Lach (XT650212), Bau Tran (XT630196), Bao Cap (XT643178), Bao Chien (XT625176), and Bau Trang (XT635217). One rallier reported the headquarters of the 7th Bn in the Bau Lack area where many tunnels are located. The operational area was known to contain guerrilla elements that operated in 1-2 men groups to platoon size units. Intelligence gained from ralliers and experience from past operations indicated that numerous tunnels, bunkers, trenches and other enemy fortifications were located in the area of operations.
b. Contact with VC forces during the operation was with groups of 1 or 2 VC to squad size forces. Engagements usually consisted of sniper fire, however the VC did employ mines, booby traps, rifle grenades, and automatic weapons fire.
c. Captured documents indicated that the brigade had contacted elements of the 2d Company, 7th Bn, 165A Regt and the Cu Chi district “Quyet Chien II” Local Force Platoon. Since the documents were captured in widely scattered and separated areas of the plantation, indications were that the C2 Company and Quyet Chien II Platoon had been deployed in cells and squad size forces to harass and monitor movement of friendly units.
d. Terrain in the AO is flat with no significant high ground. The soil is sandy and provides good trafficability except in low areas. Vegetation ranges from marshy areas to dense jungle and/or heavy undergrowth, rubber trees, bamboo and secondary hedgerows.
e. Overall evaluation and accuracy of intelligence was rated C/2 (fairly reliable and probably true). The overall security of Operation KIPAPA was considered excellent.
9. Mission: 1st Brigade conducts operations in the Filhol Plantation to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and bases and interdict VC LOC.
(P3)
10. Concept of Operation: 1st Brigade conducts S&D operations in the Filhol Plantation commencing 31 Aug 66 by employing 4th Bn, 23d Inf. On 3 Sep 66, 4th Bn, 9th Inf and 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf commence operations. Each battalion established separate bases, systematically searching and destroying VC facilities with emphasis on location and destruction of tunnels and fortifications. Artillery and air preparations wouldl be employed against located VC strong points.
11. Execution: OPORD 28-66, HQ 25th Inf Div received at 0900 hours on 30 August. OPORD 11-66, HQ 1st Bde issued at 1300 hours, 31 August. Operation commenced at 0930 hours 31 August with the following actions:
31 August
4th Bn, 23d Inf: A&B Cos with 3 platoons from B Trp, 3d Sqd, 4th Cav commenced Operation KIPAPA at 0930 hours. Battalion (-) moved from base camp Cu Chi , NE toward objective 1 (XT633190). While enroute a tank struck a mine vic XT628192. There were no casualties and slight damage to the tank which continued on with the battalion. 3d Sqd, 4th Cav platoon sustained 2 WIA from a booby trap, and at the same location XT628192, B Co sustained 5 WIA from an AT mine and approximately 10 hand grenades thrown from a trench. Fire was returned with negative results. All individuals were evacuated by dust off. A Co destroyed a small tunnel and one mortar position vic XT637194. Battalion base was established at XT633190. 3d Sqd, 4th Cav platoon was released at 1500 hours to return to Cu Chi base camp. At 1815 hours the battalion base camp forward received 3 rounds of 60mm mortars resulting in 5 WIA. Again 5 more rounds of 60mm mortar were received into the perimeter. No casualties. WIAs were evacuated by dust-off. Counter mortar artillery was fired into suspected location, results unknown. AT 2025 hours ambush patrol from B Co engaged 3 VC vic XT631188 with SA fire, negative results.
1 September
4th Bn, 23d Inf: At 0755 hours resupply chopper received sniper fire and 4-10 rounds of
60mm mortar as it landed in the battalion base for extraction. No damage was sustained. A FAC was placed airborne and called artillery over the possible mortar positions. Results unknown. At 0915 hours, B Co began S&D operations vic XT628193. Co located an extensive tunnel system, 4 old mortar positions and punji pits vic XT624180. All were destroyed. B Co received sniper fire from XT628188 resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. Fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). An air strike was called into the area from which the sniper fire came. Results unknown. Co returned to base camp at 1445 hours. Battalion base forward received 2-3 rounds of 60mm mortar at 1147 hours, no casualties.
(p4)
2 September
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion was introduced into Operation KIPAPA with A Co moving to vicXT686168 to conduct daylight patrols and ambushes. At 1425 hours a patrol from A Co received 30 rounds of sniper fire vic XT695185. Fire was returned with SA and 60mm mortars. Results unknown. No casualties sustained. Again at 1600 hours same location as previous sniper, the patrol received 5 rounds 60mm mortar fire. Fire was returned, results unknown. 1 US WIA was sustained. At 1700 hours vic XT700190 patrol located a structure containing the following: 2 Chicom grenades, 1 potato masher grenade, 3 clips BAR ammo, misc. clothing, 1 container of M16 ammo, 3 wallets with misc. pictures, all of which were evacuated.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: A Co with 1 platoon from 3d Sqd, 4th Cav attached conducted S&D operations to vic XT625188. Co destroyed 3 tunnels at XT628195. At XT627194, 1 VC was observed jumping into a tunnel, 1 tunnel was destroyed resulting in 1 VC KIA (Poss). At XT628191 a 2 man bunker, and a 3 level tunnel were destroyed. A Co sustained 2 slight WIA's from booby traps vic XT627190. A search was made of the area and 5 more booby traps were destroyed. A Co closed back to base camp at 1610 hours. At 1020 hours vic XT630188 an OP from B Co observed 2 VC. 4.2” mortar and artillery fire called in resulting in 2 VC KIA (Poss). A resupply ship received a burst of AW fire XT627194. Aircraft was able to return to Cu Chi base camp. One pilot was wounded from fragments. Speed of aircraft, 40 knots, altitude 200 feet. A Chieu Hoi loudspeaker mission conducted over 4th Bn, 23d Inf AO by 246th Psywar Co. 20,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were dropped into the AO also.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion was attached to the 1st Brigade for OPCON control. A Co established a base XT691213 where they conducted daylight patrols and night ambushes to interdict traffic along the Saigon River. At 1940 hours A Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf took a sampan under fire with SA and M79 vic XT694216. Results 1 VC KIA (Poss). Again at 0400 hours same location, unit fired on sampan, results unknown.
3 September
4th Bn, 9th Inf:l A Co remained overnight vic XT690173 conducting local patrols and
ambushes. B Co departed to base camp established by A Co at 0755 hours, closing forward base at 1600 hours. A Co (-) moved to area XT69185 where documents and misc. equipment had been located the previous day. At 1300 hours, A Co received AW fire vic XT69185. Fire was returned, results unknown. No casualties sustained. 1 tunnel and bunker were located and destroyed vic XT696185. B Co had one man WIA from a booby trap vic XT695162, individual was evacuated by dust-off. A leaflet drop was conducted vic of 4th Bn, 9th Inf base camp. The leaflet was the #215, 25th Infantry Division.
(p5)
4th Bn, 23d InfL: A Co departed at 0900 hours to conduct S&D operations to vic XT628188. Co had one individual wounded from a booby trap vic XT630190. Individual was evacuated by dust-off. Vic XT628188, A Co located and destroyed 3 tunnels and 2 bunkers which contained the following: 1 new LAW, 3 rounds 57RR, 3 60mm rounds, several booby trapped grenades, misc. equipment for rigging booby traps, 3 Chicom grenades, 3 rifle grenades, assorted clothing and documents. All items were evacuated back to base camp. A Co returned to base camp at 1700 hours. B Co remained in base camp as security for the battalion. C Co and B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf attached, departed base camp Cu Chi to link up with forward base. At XT634177 C Co received AW fire from a bunker, also rifle grenades, booby traps, and a command detonated minefield. B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf moved to assist and 2 tracks struck AT mines in the same area as the AW fire was received. Results 11 WIA and 2 APC's damaged. The results of C Co's encounter, 2 KIA and 9 WIA. All individuals were evacuated by dust-off. C Co continued on to forward base closing at 1830 hours. B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf returned back to base camp Cu Chi. There were 4 VC KIA (Poss).
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Recon and battalion headquarters (-) departed base camp Cu Chi for the forward base XT679211 which was established by A Co. Units closed new base at 1500 hours. A Co's ambush patrol received 2 hand grenades into their position vic XT694211. Fire was returned, results unknown. No casualties sustained.
4 September
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion (-) conducted local S&D operations in vic of their base camp.
At 0900 hours, B Co received approximately 6 rounds SA fire from vic XT693171. No casualties. Unit returned fire, results unknown. At 1400 hours, XT693183, A Co sustained 1 WIA from SA fire. Fire was returned with SA and artillery. Results unknown. Individual was evacuated back to base camp. A Co returned to base camp at 1732 hours. At 2035 hours an ambush patrol from A Co encountered 2 VC at XT690178. Patrol fired upon them with SA fire results unknown. No casualties. 10,000 leaflets were dropped in 4th Bn, 9th Inf AO. Leaflets were the rewards for weapons and mines.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: A Co conducted S&D operation vic XT6317. While enroute, company destroyed 1 structure, 2 bags cement, 1 trench, 1 bunker, 3 105 rounds, 1 75mm round. Continuing search in the area, the company discovered and destroyed 2 105 rounds, 1 tunnel, 2 AT mines, 1 250 lb bomb. Company returned back to base camp at 1827 hours. At 2220 hours a patrol from B Co engaged 3-4 VC XT630191 with SA fire and M79 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: A&B Co's conducted S&D operations to the SE vic XT709023 where a platoon from 1st Bn, 7th ARVN had established a blocking position . At 1019 hours an APC overturned vic XT699280 resulting in 5 WIAs who were evacuated by dust-off. B Co apprehended 3 VCs vic XT705202. Individuals were questioned and turned over to the ARVN. All elements closed the battalion base vic XT709203 at 1630 hours. At 2235 hours, battalion CP vic XT710202 received 3 rounds rifle grenades. 81mm mortar fire and SA were returned, results unknown. No friendly casualties.
(p6)
5 September
4th Bn, 9th Inf: A Co conducted S&D operations north of base camp and back. Unit received SA fire from XT695185. Fire was returned, results unknown. No friendly casualties sustained. B Co conducted S&D operations south of base camp. At 0855 hours 2 booby traps injured 7 US vic XT691176 and at 0920 hours a second booby trap was tripped resulting in 3 WIA's vic XT691176. All individuals were evacuated by dust-off. Negative contact during the day. At 2035 hours one rifle grenade was received into the battalion base, negative casualties.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: A Co secured battalion base forward. B Co conducted S&D operations to XT622190 with negative contact during the day. C Co conducted S&D to XT623180 with negative contact during the day. At 2130 hours vic XT629188 an ambush patrol from B Co detected unknown number of VC attempting to encircle their position. Patrol engaged them with SA and M79 fire. Patrol then withdrew back to base camp. Results of fire unknown. No friendly casualties. One loudspeaker mission was flown over the 4th Bn, 23d Inf AO. Tapes used were the special family tape and the second directed at the 165th Regt. 20,000 special leaflets for the Filhol Plantation and 25,000 Chieu Hoi and 5,000 safe conduct passes were dropped.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: A Co conducted S&D operations vic XT715208. During the day the company located and destroyed 2 grenades and 3 tunnel complexes vic XT7-52-3. 1 VCS was captured at XT709201 and 1 VCS XT705207. Individuals were returned to base camp and then turned over to ARVN. One loudspeaker mission was flown over 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf AO.
6 September
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion conducted local S&D operations vic of the battalion base camp
with A Co moving to vic XT696179 and B Co to XT695173. Both units had negative contact during the day. B Co did destroy 15 booby traps, 9 spider holes, and 1 105 round all in vic XT695173.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: A Co conducted S&D operations to vic XT633209. Unit destroyed the following vic XT633209: 3 tunnels, 1 structure, 900 lbs of rice (loose). Negative contact during the day. C Co conducted S&D operations south to vic XT633178. At 1250 hours, XT625180, unit received 6 WIAs from 2 booby traps. All individuals were evacuated by battalion C&C ship. At 1555 hours, XT624178, 10 WIAs were sustained from a booby trapped 81mm round. Individuals were evacuated by dust-off. The following were destroyed during the day: 1 105 round, 1 hand grenade, 2 bunkers, 500 lbs rice, 2 tunnels, and 1 AT mine.
(p7)
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion conducted S&D operations vic XT710200 with A Co moving to vic XT714203. At 0842 hours, XT704205, an APC struck a mine. No casualties, but extensive damage to the track vehicle. Unit destroyed 10 bunkers, 1 105 round, 2 250 lb bombs and 1 trench all in the vic XT714203. 9 VCSs were apprehended during the day and returned to Div PW compound. B Co conducted S&D operations vic XT715192. At 0800 hours Co received SA fire and 2 rifle grenades vic XT708201. Unit returned fire. Results unknown. Negative friendly casualties. 6 VCS were apprehended during the day and returned to the Div PW compound. 5000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were distributed in Phuo Hoa Dong. 10,000 terror leaflets #153-66 were dropped in the area of 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf AO.
7 September
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion conducted combined operations with elements of the 1st and 4th
Bn, 7th Regt ARVN. C Co was airlifted into LZ Charlie, XT714188 where they linked up with one platoon of 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf. Both units conducted S&D operations north to vic XT713187 to XT694177. ARVN units blocked to the south of LZ Charlie. A&B Cos blocking position A, XT690179 and B, XT693174 respectively. At 0935 hours C Co received 2-3 sniper rounds from vic XT703178. Fire was returned, results unknown. No friendly casualties. At this same location 15 70-80 lb bags of rice were discovered. Rice was evacuated back to base camp At 1015 hours, 2 VCC were captured XT704174 by the 7th Regt ARVN. At 1150 hours XT699177 unit sustained 1 slight WIA from sniper fire. Fire was returned, results unknown. Individual was evacuated back by track vehicle. At 2200 hours, battalion CP received 5 rifle grenades resulting in 1 US WIA. Fire was returned with artillery. Results unknown. Medcap was conducted at Phu Hoa Dong vic XT7118 for 225 patients.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion conducted two separate company size operations with A Co airlifted into LZ vic XT623214. At 0930 hours vic XT628218 A Co received 5 rounds SA fire. Artillery and mortar fire was called on suspected location. Results unknown. During the day A Co destroyed 8,000 lbs of rice, 2 concrete bunkers, and 1 mortar position. C Co moved to vic Bao Cap, XT633177 and back. Negative contact during the day.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: B Co conducted S&D operations southeast into the village of Phu Thuan, XT7218 and back to base camp. During their operation, B Co captured 3 VCSs, 4000 lbs of rice, 1,200 lbs rice evacuated, remainder was distributed to local population. VCSs were turned over to local ARVN authorities. A Co provided 1 platoon for attachment to 4th Bn, 9th Inf on their operation . C Co joined the battalion in the forward area at 1430 hours. 5,000 JUSPAO and Chieu Hoi leaflets #146 were distributed in the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf AO.
(p8)
8 September
4th Bn, 9th Inf: A 2 company S&D operation was conducted with A&B Cos moving to vic XT699178. A Co received AW fire from XT698180 resulting in 3 WIAs. Artillery fire was called in, results unknown. Individuals were evacuated by dust-off. B Co conducted S&D operations in a combined operation with A Co to XT699178. At 0925 hours, vic XT698174 unit had 5 KIAs and 5 WIAs from a command detonated mine. During the day the unit destroyed the following: 3 105 rounds, 2 tunnels, and 2 105 rounds booby trapped.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion conducted 2 separate company size operations with A Co searching north of base camp vic XT638214. Negative contact during the day. A Co destroyed the following: 3 AT mines, 1 105 round, 2 rifle grenades and 1 250 lb bomb. B Co conducted S&D operations vic XT648199 with negative contact during the day. Leaflet drop 10,000 #941, #092, #153-66 was conducted over 4th Bn, 23d Inf AO.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: 3 separate company operations were conducted in vic Ben Co XT710198. A Co moved to vic XT702203. The following items were located during the day: 1 US BAR rifle, 17 Chicom grenades, 1 AT mine, assorted documents, and 8,500 lbs of loose rice. Rifle and documents evacuated, remainder destroyed. B Co conducted combined S&D operations with 1st Co, 1st Bn, 7th Regt ARVN vic XT715204 and XT764197. Negative contact during the day. C Co conducted S&D operations with 3 Co, 1st Bn, 7th Reg ARVN to vic XT711196 and XT707190. Negative contact during the day. 4,960 lbs of rice was turned over to district chief after it was located vic XT711194.
9 September
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion conducted 2 separate S&D operations, company size. A Co moved to XT673187 where the company established a base and dispatched platoon size patrols throughout the day. Negative enemy contact. B Co conducted S&D operations to vic XT678167 and back to base camp. At 1500 hours, XT689168, unit received SA fire. Fire was returned, results unknown. 1 US WIA resulted from this fire. B Co destroyed the following during the day: 2 AT mines, 2 81mm rounds, 1 4.2” round and 1 20lb frag bomb.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: C Co conducted S&D operations to XT648199 where a company base vic XT648199 was established and patrols were dispatched during the day. Negative enemy contact during the day. A Co remained at base camp forward.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion re-established their base camp to XT680211 with A Co moving with battalion (-) to that location. B Co conducted S&D to the new CP. At 1325 hours, XT692203, one APC struck an AT mine resulting in minor damage to the track. Again at 1503 hours, XT692203, another APC struck a mine resulting in slight damage to the vehicle. 11 VCSs were detained during the day and were evacuated back to ARVN district.
(p9)
10 September
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion moved back to base camp Cu Chi closing at 1305 hours. 2 stay
behind patrols were left vic XT680168 and XT678169. At 0030 hours, ambush patrol vic XT678169 made contact with an undetermined number of VC. Results, 2 VC KIA (Poss). Patrol returned to base camp at 1635 hours. B Co patrol observed 3-4 VC vic XT687169. Unit detonated a claymore and fired SA resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (Poss).
4th Bn, 23d Inf: A 2 company separate operation was conducted during the day with A Co moving to vic XT644188. Negative contact during the day. C Co moved to vic XT621193. Negative contact during the day.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion conducted a 2 company operation with A Co moving to
objective area vic XT673232 and B Co moving to objective area vic XT665237. During the day, A Co captured one VC with 1 M-1 rifle vic XT653237. Both units destroyed the following: 3 AT mines, 5 bunkers at XT678224, and 1 classroom at XT675229.
11 September
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion remained in their base camp forward as reaction force for the
brigade.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: 2 separate company operations were conducted during the day with A Co moving to XT647227. At 1135 hours vic XT646229 unit received SA fire. No friendly casualties. Fire was returned, results unknown. At 1208 hours, XT654230, 1 APC was hit with a 50 cal AP round which resulted in 2 US WIA. Individuals were evacuated by dust-off. At 1222 hours, XT646229 1 APC struck an AT mine resulting in 2 WIAs. Individuals were picked up by battalion C&C ship. B Co conducted S&D operations to XT640225. At 1320 hours vic XT643224, 2 APCs were damaged by AT mines. No casualties, minor damage to tracks. At 1645 hours, vic XT641225, company received 9 rifle grenades. Indirect fire was called into suspected VC position, results unknown. During the day the unit destroyed the following: 3 AT mines, 5 105 rounds, 5 structures, and 4 60mm rounds. At 1900 hours, battalion perimeter received 4 rounds 60mm resulting in 1 US KIA. Artillery was called in on the suspected location. Results unknown. At 2005 hours B Co received 15 rounds of friendly artillery causing 1 KIA, and 3 WIAs.
12 September
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion departed from their forward base camp XT644204 at 1100
hours and closed Cu Chi base at 1320 hours. A Co left a stay behind ambush vic XT649189. At 1335 hours, stay behind ambush engaged 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (Poss). One 45 cal pistol was taken from the VC. Patrol returned to Cu Chi at 0953 hours. UH1D aircraft received AW fire vic XT649181 causing moderate damage to the aircraft and 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA..
(P10)
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion departed their forward base camp XT681212 at 0857 hours enroute to Cu Chi base camp and closed at 1218 hours.
12. Results.
a. Personnel.
(1) Friendly:
KIA WIA MIA DOW
5th Bn, 9th Inf 4 32 0 1
4TH Bn, 23d Inf 2 33 0 0
Total 6 65 0 1
(2) Enemy Losses:
VC KIA (BC): 8
VC KIA (POSS) 16
VCC 3
VCS 46
b. Equipment captured:
(1) BAR: 1
(2) M-1 rifle: 2
(3) .45 pistol: 1
(4) M72 LAW: 1
(5) Bayonet: 1
(6) MG ammo: 2000 rounds
(7) Chicom rifle grenades: 2
(8) 82mm mortar rds: 1
(9) 57mm RR rounds 3
(10) AT mine: 1
(11) ½ lb blocks TNT: 3
(12) VC gasmask: 1
(13) Pistol belts: 3
(p11) (page missing?)
(12) 30 cal rounds (carbine): 60
(13) AT mines: 48
(14) AP mines: 7
(15) Booby traps: 35
(16) Rifle grenades: 4
(17) Hand grenades: 44
(18) Claymores: 8
(19) M1 ammo clips: 8
(20) BAR magazines: 9
(21) Punji pits: 5
(22) Rice: 12,180 lbs
(23) Cement: 100 lbs
(24) Pack: 1
(25) C4 blocks: 5
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13. Administrative Matters: All administrative matters were handled routinely from the Division Base Camp and there were no problems involved due to the close proximity of the AO to the base camp.
14. Special Equipment and Techniques: There were none applicable to this operation.
15. Commander's Analysis: Operation KIPAPA was highly successful and served to deny the Filhol Plantation to the Viet Cong. It is extremely important that this area be continually operated in to deny its use to the enemy. Particularly as it is so close to the Cu Chi Base Camp.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
Donald A Hamlin
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
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Back To After Action reports
![]() DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96225
AVTLBDB-T 17 March 1966
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)
THRU: Commanding General
lst Infantry Division
APO US Forces 96345
TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MAC J34
APO US Forces 96243
1. In accordance with MACV directive number 335-8 the following report is submitted:
2D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION OPERATION
KOLCHAK I
During the period 260800-281515 February 1966, the 2d Brigade conducted a search and destroy operation to include maximum destruction of VC tunnels and fortifications in assigned TAOR. The operation was conducted in Hau Nghia Province, Cu Chi District bounded by coordinates X-618157, X-624163, X-627164, X-621155, (OBJ TARO). 2d Bde OPORD 13-66 was issued at 241200 February 1966 outlining plans for the operation. Col L. M. Johnson, Jr. is the reporting officer. Task Force organization and Task Force commander were as follows.
Task Force 1/27 Inf, Lt Col Cawthra, Commanding
lst Bn, 27th Inf (-)
A Troop, 3d Sqad 4th Cav
B Co, 65th Engr
2. Intelligence.
a. An estimated VC Local Force platoon had been operating in the general vicinity of the objective area. Only three to fifteen VC previously had been encountered at any one time. The enemy had limited his actions to sniper fire, squad size actions, booby traps and mines. Several tunnels and trenches had been previously located and destroyed in the objective area. These indicated that the enemy lived in the area as well as infiltrated into and out of the objective area from the West and North.
b. Enemy situation during the operation. In the initial attack, the enemy resistance included sporadic sniper fire and the use of AT mines and booby traps against US Forces. VC strength estimated to be not more than 3 to 7 personnel during the initial attack. Three (3) VC were killed. The VC unit could not be identified.
c. The terrain from the LD to the objective area was typical rubber plantation. In the objective area, the terrain was typified by bamboo and secondary growth hedgerows, concealed trenches and foxholes,
and both open areas and areas containing tall trees surrounded by secondary positions from which he previously defended and operated at will.
Page 1
d. Fortifications. The Engineer Team closed approximately 3,000 meters of trenches leading to and in the objective area. In the objective area numerous small tunnels and spider holes were discovered and closed with demolitions and by bulldozers.
3. Mission. lst Bn 27th Inf TF attacked to secure Objective TARO and to search out and destroy VC personnel and fortifications in the objective area. Implied mission was to continue to secure perimeter in base camp.
4. Concept of Operation. 1/27 Inf attacked along two axes 260800 Feb 66 to secure Objective TARO and destroy VC personnel and fortifications within objective area. A 1/27 attacked along Axis RIBBON to secure the northern half of objective; A 3/4 Cav attacked along Axis QUEEN to secure southern half of objective; Infantry preceded tracks to PL SADDLE (expected area of lst VC contact), then vehicles passed through Infantry and led the attack on both axes using recon by fire. Upon consolidation of objective,
Engineers began systematic destruction to include closing trenches and clearing of trees and brush. Two air strikes and an artillery preparation preceded the ground attack. Two gun ships were on stand by for part of the first day and during the second day. A 1/8 Artillery was in DS for the operation. The 4.2 mortar section (3 tubes) A 3/4 Cav was Op/Con of Mortar Platoon l/27 during the operation. Priority of air support was given to l/27 for the operation.
5. Execution. The attack on both axes commenced at 260800 as planned, preceded by air strikes and an artillery and 4.2 preparation of 132 and 96 rounds, respectively. Tanks led infantry through PL SADDLE. Light enemy fire began when lead APC on axis RIBBON detonated a VC AT mine. Range from suspected VC position to lead element was approximately 100 meters. The VC firing was silenced by heavy machine gun fire. Subsequently 2 APC's under Engineer control hit AT mines and had tracks blown off. No US casualties. The lead elements entered the objective area and secured it by 1035 hrs and
engineers immediately began systematic closing of trenches. Enemy sniper fire was received at 1110 from XT 625155, fire was returned and enemy fire ceased. The Battalion tunnel team investigated tunnels in the area (XT 629161 and XT621159). At 1300 one VC KIA was found in a spider hole. The victim held in his hand a US Claymore plunger and a Russian 7.62 Mossin Nagant, Model 1944. The Engineer work continued throughout the day until 1800 hrs when night defensive positions were manned. During the first night the TF received 12-15 rounds of 60 mm mortar fire and sporadic sniper fire. DS Artillery fired H&I fires during the night to assist in defense of perimeter. 1/27 Inf Recon Plat (+) was tasked to occupy a blocking position along PL BOOT to prevent VC from mining the area during the night. Engineer work commenced 270730. A 1/27 discovered a tunnel (XT 619157) and search of tunnel revealed 2 large bags
of documents and clothing which were turned over to Bde S2. The tunnel ended at a distance of 30 meters. The tunnel was destroyed at 0957. A 3/4 Cav received two (2) WIA as result of booby trap. A 3/4 Cav found a bag of documents at approximately 1000 hrs. Engineers destroyed 7 AT mines, 5 AP mines, one claymore (VC), 2 M79 duds, 1 grenade dud and 2 105 mm duds. A 1/27 found one VC 30 lb claymore. The second night H&I fires continued. A total of 256 HE rounds H&I were fired during the two nights of the operation. Ambushes were established both nights but had no contact. At 280400 2 VC took the second
platoon Co A under fire with small arms. Fire was returned with two VC KIA. During the period 270730 - 281430 Engineers continued to clear the area. At 281430 the TF extracted under 54 rounds of Arty WP. The TF closed Base Camp at 1545.
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6. Supporting Forces:
a. Artillery Support:
(1) A 1/8 DS 1/27.
(2) 1/8 (-) GS 2d Bde.
(3) 2/32 (-) GS, reinf 1/8.
b. How and when Artillery employed:
(1) Arty supported the attack with a preparation between H -hour and H+16 minutes
(132 rds HE).
(2) On call missions 26-28 Feb 66.
(3) H&I fire conducted during night (256 HE rds)
(4) 59 rds of Arty WP used during extraction,
c. Results of Artillery: All artillery fires were well coordinated and effective. H&I fires proved to
be very effective during hours of darkness.
d. US Air Force:
(1) Preplanned strikes were directed on objectve area durinp week preceeding operations.
(2) A preplanned air preparation was directed onto objective H-70 minutes to H-10
minutes.
(3) Fighter bombers on continuous ground alert in III Corps (ARVN) area to be assigned
mission, as cleared by 2d Bde FSCC. Armament mixed loads.
(4) Arty FO's marked air targets with WP as required.
(5) Air strikes were controlled by 2d Bde ALO in coordination with S3, 1/27.
(6) Air strikes were effective in destruction of VC fortifications and emplacements in obj
area.
e. Two gunships here on ground alert during first two days of operations.
7. Results of Operation:
a. US Forces: KIA: 0
WIA: 3
MIA: 0 E
Equipment damaged: 3 APC's had tracks blown.
b. VC Losses: KIA: 5
Equipment Cautured/Dest:
1 7.62 Massin Nagant NATO, Model 194
7 - AT mines
5 - AP mines
1 - Claymore
3 Bags, documents
1200 lbs of rice
3 - Extensive trench
complexes
7 Acres land cleared
8. Administration and Logistics:
Resupply was accomplished by using 2 APC's. Medical APC's were used to evacuate the 3 US WIA's. There were no communication problems.
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9. Special Equipment and Techniques. The tank dozers and flame thrower APC's materially increased the ability of Engineers to accomplish the destruction.
10. Commanders Analysis. Compared to other techniques in operations in which destruction was paramount, the separation of destruction and security missions is the best solution. In this operation, such was the case and maximum advantage was taken in terms of time and equipment to accomplish maximum destruction. No significant changes to the basic plan were made.
11. Conclusions and Lessons Learned.
a. Conclusion: TF 1/27 accomplished their mission.
b. Lessons learned:
(1) Engineer units are best utilized as units in destruction type missions with Infantry providing security.
(2) Personnel must be made aware of the danger of exploding booby traps when burning brush in areas formerly occupied by VC.
(3) Recon by fire can be employed to advantage in areas of hedgerows and undergrowth.
(4) H&I fires around a perimeter assist in night defense.
(5) Cav units just as Infantry should be prepared tooccupy perimeter and employ all available fire power to include claymores and trip flares. In addition, Cav units must be prepared to communicate by wire at night time. Use of vehicular radios at night requires running of vehicle periodically, thus creating a noise blanket which can be used by VC in approaching the perimeter.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
1 Incl A. R.KNIGHT
as Major, Infantry
Adjutant
Distribution:
10 - CG. 1st Inf Div
4 - CG, 25th Tnf Div
Page 4
![]() AVTLFB-C (23 Jul 66) lst Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS MACV JV32) (U)
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISON, APO 96225 29 July 1966
THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: ACofS G3 (D&T)
APO 96266
TO: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, ATTN: J343,
Forwarded.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
PHILLIP U. BONDI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
DISTRIBUTION:
ACofS for Force Dev, DA
CG USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH
MACV, ATTN: J343 (thru IIFFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: J3 (thru IIFFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: MACT (thru IIFFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: Chief, USAF Advisory Group (thru IIFFORCEV)
CG, USARV, ATTN: AVC (D & H)
CG, IIFFORCEV, ATTN: ACofS G3 (D & T)
CG, USA Infantry School, Ft Benning, GA.
CG, USA Armor School, Ft Knox, Ky.
USACDC Ln Off APO 96558
USA Inf H Res Unit, Ft Benning, Ga.
HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225.
AVTLFB-C 23 July 1966.
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS MACV J3-32)
THRU: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTLCG-MH
APO US Forces 96225
TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243
1. Operation FARGO: 1st Brigade Search and Destroy, Operation to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps.
2. Dates of operation: 120420 - 141515 June 1966.
3. Locations Area of operations was in the vicinity of PHUOC-HIEP-AP BAU DIEU Villages bounded by coordinates XT555195 North; XT570175 East;XT550153 South; XT540172 West.
4. Control Headquarters: lst Brigade, 25th Infantiy Division.
5. Reporting Officers Colonel William B. Sandlin, Jr.
6. Task Organization and Commanders:
a. 2d Bn, 14th Inf (-) Lt Col Shultz, Cmdg.
3d Plat, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
Engr Sqd, 65th Engr Bn
VN National Police
b. 4th Bn, 9th Inf, Lt Col Booths Cmdg.
2d Plt, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
Engr Sqd, A Co, 65th Engr Bn
MP Sqd, 25th MP Co
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7. Support Forces:
a. Artillery: 7th Bn, 11th Arty was employed in Direct Support of the lst Brigade.
(1) How and when employed.
(a) 7th Bn, 11th Arty (-) supported from base camp Cu Chi.
(b) B Btry supported from 2d Bn, 14th Inf base camp area XT556168.
(c) Fire was used primarily as H&I fire. 56 H&I missions were fired totalling 224 rounds. 18 support missions were fired totalling 108 rounds.
(2) Results: H&I fires denied VC freedon of movement during hours of darkness.
b. Tactical Air: No suitable air targets were determined during this operation.
c. Army Aviation: Forty (40) UH-1D and sixteen (16) UH-1B to lift an Infantry battalion and one Infantry company simultaneously into three landing zones. During the operational period, 368 sorties were flown which consisted of airmobile assault, command and control, aerial reconnaisance, aerial resupply, and medical evacuation.
8. Intelligence:
a. Intelligence studies conducted prior to operation FARGO indicated VC activity within the operational area has been generally concentrated along Hwy 1 and Hwy 7. Since 1 May, both routes have been the scene of numerous mine incidents. Anti-aircraft incidents in the area have increased in the past month. The C50 Company was reported in the vic XT506171. Reports indicate the C50's mission is to stage attacks along Hwy 1, to collect taxes and capture GVN employees. The C50 Company is reportedlyarmed with 1-60mm mortar, 1-lmg, 4-ARs, 2-M79s and assorted small arms, The C26 Company, strength 100, was reported in the vic XT569168 on 18 May. This is the 2d report of this company in the same area. The company reportedly posesses 1-60mm mortar, 1-.30 cal MG, 5-ARs, 4 grenade launchers and assorted small arms. Due to the large number of mine incidents, it is concluded that VC sapper units are also present and operating with local force guerrilla units. The actual mission and organization of these sapper elements is unknown, however these squads have the mission of mining and interdicting Hwy1 and 7. The operational area is known to contain numerous guerrilla units that operate out of the many villages and hamlets. Three guerrilla squads operate consistently vic PHUOC HIEP (XT569170).
b. Recent significant activities revealed that on 1 Jun 3 National police vehicles traveling from Cu Chi to Trang Bang were ambushed
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by a VC squad with AW's at XT554169. One vehicle was destroyed, 6 ARVN's KIA, 1 WIA, and 20,000 piastres (payroll) stolen. Oh 3 June, elements from Trung Lap Ranger Training Center were ambushed at XT593210 by 20 to 40 VC.
c. During the operation VC contact was limited to occassional sniper fire. The VC employed booby traps within the AO and a road block along Hwy 1. Number of VC guerrillas operating in AP could,not be confirmed.
d. The terrain In the area of operations consisted of thick hedge rows, some heavy brush and wooded areas which offered excellent concealment and cover from direct fire weapons. There are also many clearings and rice fields which offered the VC excellent fields of fire. There were no major obstacles which could affect the movement of track vehicles and dismounted troops. The weather had no effect on the conduct of the operation. The only natural obstacle within the area of operations is the Rach Ba Dap Creek that flows southward across Hwy 1 (XP543177), however, it would be an obstacle only during heavy rains which would make it untrafficable by track vehicles.
e. Summary: Over all evaluation and accuracy of intelligence was rated B/2 (usually reliable and probably true). The overall security of operation FARGO was considered excellent.
9. Mission:
a. lst Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducts search and destroy operations during the period 12 - 14 June 1966 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps vic PHUOC HIEP (XT555170) and to interdict VC movements in area of operation.
b. Conduct airmobile and ground assault 12 June 1966 into obj area to encircle VC forces.
d. Provide wire, pickets and technical advice on installation of RF and PF outposts in Brigade sector.
10. Concept of Operation: lst Brigade conducts airmobile and ground operations in assigned area with two battalions (-) during the period 12-14 June 1966. 2d Bn, 14th Inf established blocking position in the AO as the 4th Bn, 9th Inf conducts S&D operations in area. A Co, 2d Bn, 14th Inf is designated as brigade reaction force. On 12 Jun 66, 2d Bn, 14th Inf moves one (1) rifle company from operational base camp (Operation Fort Smith) over ground to establish blocking positions from coordinates XT553155 to
XT53178 to be completed by 0700 hrs. In order to block VC attempting to move from PHUOC HIEP. One (1) rifle company will be airlifted from Cu Chi base location to LZ 1 by 0630 hrs and will later link up with ground force to help establish blocking positions. On orders, upon completion of blocking mission, 2/14 Inf will continue to conduct S&D operations in Fort Smith AO.
Page 3
4th Bn, 9th Inf airlifted from Cu Chi base camp lands at LZs 2, 3, and 4 and establishes blocking positions from coordinates XT557178 to XT568170 by 0700 hrs; initiates detailed search starting at 0730 hrs East to West from LD to boundary, linking up with 2/14 Inf blocking forces NLT 1500 hrs. Upon link up continue detailed S&D mission with priority to location and destruction of VC caches and facilities in PHUOC HIEP. On the second day of the operation, 13 June, 4/9 Inf will continue S&D operation and civic action activities. Wire pickets, and technical advice on installation to RF and PF outposts will be part of the civic action program. Plan for helilift extraction of 4/9 Inf from AO 141500 June 3.966.
11. Execution: 1st Bde OPORD 8-66 (Operation Fargo) was issued 101400 June 66. Operation commenced 120430 June 66.
a. 2/14 Inf: Co C and the Recon Plt moved from the battalion base camp location vic XT522198 (Operation Fort Smith area of operation) at 0430 hrs to establish blocking positions along PL RED. The Cav Plt attached to the battalion moved from the battalion base camp at 0615 hrs to secure LZ 1 (XT52156) and occupy coordination point at XT551173. B Co was helilifted from the Cu Chi base camp and landed on LZ l at 0630 hrs. At 0630 hrs, C Co and the Recon Plt arrived at coordinates XT548167 on PL RED and immediately established blocking positions from this point to the coordination point at XT55178. B Co linked up with the 3/4 Cav Plt after landing and established blocking positions from XT55155 to XT548167 along PL RED. All blocking positions were maintained without incident until 4/9 Inf completed it's S&D mission in the area of PL RED. At 1400 hrs all elements of 2/14 Inf withdrew from blocking positions and continued Operation Fort Smith.
b. 4/9 Inf: At 0630 hrs the battalion departed from base camp Cu Chi by helicopter for the operational area of Operation Fargo. The first element lifted, A Co, landed at LZ 2 and established contact with 2/14 Inf. One (1) VCS was detained at XT564180 who stated that VC elements, size unknown, were moving south from LZ 2. Co C & B landed at LZ 3 and 4 respectively, crossed LD at 0725 hrs and commenced S&D operations. B Co detained 16 civilians and later released them after interrogation. Elements of both companies discovered and destroyed 1 ton of rice in vic XT557166. As the S&D operation continued B Co apprehended three VCS and 1 draft dodger. Upon interrogation, one of them was determined to be a VCC. At 1620 hrs the battalion closed on 0bj 2 and established a base camp. Resupply was effected immediately. A Co located and destroyed 1 anti-tank mine vic XT553177 at 1645 hrs. Ambush patrols were sent out during the night at locations XT545277, XT548172, and XT554177. Patrols had negative VC contact and returned to base camp at 0600 hrs.
13 June 1966
4/9 Inf: At 0900 hrs, C Co, while conducting a S&D operation encoun tered sniper fire at coord XT655178. Fire was eliminated as a result of friendly small arms fire. 100 rounds of ammunition marked 188 with large star figure were located and destroyed in vic of sniper fire. The rounds
Page 4
were 127 cal and were assumed to be used for anti-aircraft purposes. At 1000 hrs 25 persons were apprehended at XT555192. All persons were questioned by the National Police element attached to the battalion. The interrogation resulted in one of the 25 being held for further questioning by MP authorities. B Co at 0900 hrs located and destroyed 1 booby trapped grenade, 1 tunnel, and 9 houses at coord XT548103 during it's S&D operation. At 1050 hrs, generally at the same coordinates, the company was hit by heavy sniper fire and sustained 2 WIAs. Fire was immediately returned by the company to establish a superiority of fire resulting in one (1) VC killed (BC), 1 VC captured. At 1420 his the battalion conducted a MEDCAP mission in the village of An Due at coord XT536180 and treated 29 individuals. The engineer element attached to the battalion completed a triple strand concertina fence around the PF compound located at XT540276.The last VC engagement took place at 1700 hrs as C Co encountered 2 VC at coord XT553177, which resulted in 1 VC killed (poss). By 1800 hrs all battalion elements had returned to the operational base camp area. Ambush patrols were located at coord XT548185, 549192, 55182 and 559178. All patrols returned by 0600 hrs the following morning. Patrols had negative VC contact.
14 June 1966
4/9 Inf: A Co with the Cav Plt departed the operational base camp at 0730 hrs to investigate a road block on Hwy 1 at XT603140 as reported by a captured VC. The company, enroute, encountered several booby traps and apprehended two VCS in vic XT612163. By 1030 hrs, the road was cleared. The road block consisted of 16 dirt mounds, ranging from 6" to 18" high that covered the entire width of the road. A Co then moved from the highway to a rice cache location pointed out by the same VC the previous day. At this location, coord XT621159, the company uncovered and destroyed 500 lbs of loose rice located in a 5' X 4' hole. Extraction of the battalion commenced at 0800 hrs with B Co helilifted from base area to Cu Chi closing at 0842 hrs. C Co began heliborne extraction at 1300 hrs and completed closing at Cu Chi by 1325 hrs. Prior to extraction, C Co conducted two (2) plt sized S&D operations that commenced at 0615 hrs. At 1005 hrs the company destroyed 1 booby trapped 105mn round in vic XT565184. A Co, after completion of it's mission of clearing road blocks along Hwy 1, moved by road convoy and closed Cu Chi base camp 1515 hrs terminating Operation Fargo.
12. Results:
a. Personnel lossess:
(1.) Friendly.
4th Bn, 9th Inf : 3 WIA
(2) Enemy.
VC(BC) VC (poss) VCC VCs
1 1 1 35
Page 5
b. Enemy Losses.
(1) Captured 2 tons rice,
(2) Destroyed.
(a) AT Mines: 1
(b) Booby trapped grenades: 1
(c) Tunnel complex: 1
(d) Houses: 9
(e) 188 Ammunition: 100 rds
(f) 105 How booby-trapped: 1
(g) Road block 6" X 8": 16
(h) Loose rice: 500 lbs
13. Administrative Matters.
a. Supply.
(1) Resupply was accomplished by UH1Ds and road convoy.
(2) 77 UHlD sorties were flown totaling approximately 48 tons.
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