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 Operation Kipapa

                         HEADQUARTERS
                             1st BRIGADE
                           25th INFANTRY DIVISION
                        APO  SAN FRANCISCO  96225

AVDCFB-A                                                                                                                          6  November 1966

SUBJECT:       Combat Operations After Action Report


TO:            Commanding General
          25th  Infantry Division
          ATTN:   AVDCOP
          APO  96225


1. Name:  Operation KIPAPA
2. Dates:  310930  August - 121600  September  1966

3. Location:   Filhol Plantation

4. Control  HQ:  25th  Infantry Division

5. Reporting Officer:  Colonel William B. Sandlin, Jr.

6. Task Organization:

a. Brigade Control

HHC,  1st  Bde (-)
1st  Bn  (Mech),  5th  Inf  (-)
3  Plat,  B Trp,  3d  Sqdn,  4th  Cav
Plat, A Co,  65th  Engr (-)

b.   4th  Bn,  9th  Inf  (-)
Sqd,  A Co.  65th  Engrs


c.   4th  Bn,  23d  Inf  (-)
Sqd,  A Co,  65th  Engrs  

 (p1)

7. Support  Forces.                   

a.  7th  Bn,  11th Arty was placed in direct support of the 1st  Brigade for Operation KIPAPA.  Unit remained at Cu Chi in support of the operation.  During Operation KIAPA 63 fire support missions were fired for a total of 1,432 rounds.  302 H&I missions were fired for a total of 854 rounds

b.  Tactical Air:  46 missions consisting of 134 sorties were flown in support of the 1st Brigade with the following results:

(1.) Structures destroyed:  46

(2.) Structures damaged:  32

(3.) Bunkers destroyed:  8

(4.) Foxholes uncovered: 2

(5.) Tunnels uncovered:  3

(6.) Storage pits destroyed:  2

(7.) Trench line uncovered:  648 meters

(8.) KBA:  1

(9.) KBA  (POSS):  3

                      (10.) Secondary fires:  2

c. Army  Aviation:

(1.)  Sorties - HU1D  Aircraft:

a. Gunships:  21

b. Tactical troop lift:  140

c. Resupply:;   274

d.  Air evac,  C&C, recon and misc:  51

(2.)Sorties - CH47  Aircraft:  None

(3.)Sorties -  CH23G  Aircraft:

(a)Tactical:  52

(b)   Air evac,  C&C.  recon and misc.:  47         

      (p2)

(4)  Ammunition expended (approx):

(a)   Machine gun,.  7.62mm:   18,000 rounds

(b)    Rockets,  2.75:  221

(c)    Link,  40mm:  191

8. Intelligence:

a.   Intelligence produced prior to Operation KIPAPA, indicated that elements of the 7th Bn,  165A Regt were operating in the confines of the Filhol Plantation (XT6720).  At the time the operation was undertaken, the last reported location of the 7th Bn, 165A Regt was XT685219.  Based on reports from ralliers, the operational area of the 7th Bn was reported as follows:  Bau Lach (XT650212),  Bau Tran (XT630196),  Bao Cap (XT643178), Bao Chien (XT625176), and Bau Trang (XT635217).  One rallier reported the headquarters of the 7th Bn in the Bau Lack area where many tunnels are located.  The operational area was known to contain guerrilla elements that operated in 1-2 men groups to platoon size units.  Intelligence gained from ralliers and experience from past operations indicated that numerous tunnels, bunkers, trenches and other enemy fortifications were located in the area of operations.

b.   Contact with VC forces during the operation was with groups of 1 or 2 VC to squad size forces.  Engagements usually consisted of sniper fire, however the VC did employ mines, booby traps, rifle grenades, and automatic weapons fire.  

c.   Captured documents indicated that the brigade had contacted elements of the 2d Company,  7th Bn,  165A Regt and the Cu Chi district “Quyet Chien II” Local Force Platoon.  Since the documents were captured in widely scattered and separated areas of the plantation, indications were that the C2 Company and Quyet Chien II Platoon had been deployed in cells and squad size forces to harass and monitor movement of friendly units.

d.   Terrain in the AO is flat with no significant high ground.   The soil is sandy and provides good trafficability except in low areas.  Vegetation ranges from marshy areas to dense jungle and/or heavy undergrowth, rubber trees, bamboo and secondary hedgerows.

e.   Overall evaluation and accuracy of intelligence was rated C/2 (fairly reliable and probably true).  The overall security of Operation KIPAPA was considered excellent.  

9.   Mission:  1st Brigade conducts operations in the Filhol Plantation to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and bases and interdict VC LOC.
                     (P3)

10. Concept of Operation:  1st Brigade conducts S&D operations in the Filhol Plantation commencing 31 Aug 66 by employing 4th Bn, 23d Inf.  On 3 Sep 66,  4th Bn, 9th Inf and 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf commence operations.  Each battalion established separate bases,  systematically searching and destroying VC facilities with emphasis on location and destruction of tunnels and fortifications.  Artillery and air preparations wouldl be employed against located VC strong points.

11. Execution:  OPORD 28-66,  HQ  25th  Inf Div received at 0900 hours on 30 August.  OPORD  11-66,  HQ 1st Bde issued at 1300 hours,  31 August.  Operation commenced at 0930 hours 31 August with the following actions:

31 August

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  A&B Cos with 3 platoons from B Trp, 3d Sqd, 4th Cav commenced Operation KIPAPA at 0930 hours.  Battalion (-) moved from base camp Cu Chi , NE toward objective 1 (XT633190).  While enroute a tank struck a mine vic XT628192.  There were no casualties and slight damage to the tank which continued on with the battalion.  3d Sqd, 4th Cav platoon sustained 2 WIA from a booby trap, and at the same location XT628192, B Co sustained 5 WIA from an AT mine and approximately 10 hand grenades thrown from a trench.   Fire was returned with negative results.  All individuals were evacuated by dust off.  A Co destroyed a small tunnel and one mortar position vic XT637194.  Battalion base was established at XT633190.  3d Sqd, 4th Cav platoon was released at 1500 hours to return to Cu Chi base camp.  At 1815 hours the battalion base camp forward received 3 rounds of 60mm mortars resulting in 5 WIA.  Again 5 more rounds of 60mm mortar were received into the perimeter.  No casualties.   WIAs were evacuated by dust-off.  Counter mortar artillery was fired into suspected location, results unknown.   AT 2025 hours ambush patrol from B Co engaged 3 VC vic XT631188 with SA fire, negative results.

1 September

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  At 0755 hours resupply chopper received sniper fire and 4-10 rounds of
60mm mortar as it landed in the battalion base for extraction.  No damage was sustained.  A FAC was placed airborne and called artillery over the possible mortar positions.  Results unknown.  At 0915 hours, B Co began S&D operations vic XT628193.  Co located an extensive tunnel system, 4 old mortar positions and punji pits vic XT624180.  All were destroyed.  B Co received sniper fire from XT628188 resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA.  Fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).  An air strike was called into the area from which the sniper fire came.  Results unknown.  Co returned to base camp at 1445 hours.   Battalion base forward received 2-3 rounds of 60mm mortar at 1147 hours, no casualties.

                                                       (p4)

2 September

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  Battalion was introduced into Operation KIPAPA with A Co moving to vicXT686168 to conduct daylight patrols and ambushes.  At 1425 hours a patrol from A Co received 30 rounds of sniper fire vic XT695185.  Fire was returned with SA and 60mm mortars.  Results unknown.  No casualties sustained.  Again at 1600 hours same location as previous sniper, the patrol received 5 rounds 60mm mortar fire.  Fire was returned, results unknown.  1 US WIA was sustained.  At 1700 hours vic XT700190 patrol located a structure containing the following:  2 Chicom grenades, 1 potato masher grenade, 3 clips BAR ammo, misc. clothing, 1 container of M16 ammo, 3 wallets with misc. pictures, all of which were evacuated.

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  A Co with 1 platoon from 3d Sqd, 4th Cav attached conducted S&D operations to vic XT625188.  Co destroyed 3 tunnels at XT628195.  At XT627194, 1 VC was observed jumping into a tunnel, 1 tunnel was destroyed resulting in 1 VC KIA (Poss).  At XT628191 a 2 man bunker, and a 3 level tunnel were destroyed.  A Co sustained 2 slight WIA's from booby traps vic XT627190.  A search was made of the area and 5 more booby traps were destroyed.  A Co closed back to base camp at 1610 hours.  At 1020 hours vic XT630188 an OP from B Co observed 2 VC.  4.2” mortar and artillery fire called in resulting in 2 VC KIA (Poss).  A resupply ship received a burst of AW fire XT627194.  Aircraft was able to return to Cu Chi base camp.  One pilot was wounded from fragments.   Speed of aircraft, 40 knots, altitude 200 feet.  A Chieu Hoi loudspeaker mission conducted over 4th Bn, 23d Inf AO by 246th Psywar Co.  20,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were dropped into the AO also.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion was attached to the 1st Brigade for OPCON control.  A Co established a base XT691213 where they conducted daylight patrols and night ambushes to interdict traffic along the Saigon River.  At 1940 hours A Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf took a sampan under fire with SA and M79 vic XT694216.  Results 1 VC KIA (Poss).  Again at 0400 hours same location, unit fired on sampan, results unknown.

3 September

4th Bn,  9th Inf:l  A Co remained overnight vic XT690173 conducting local patrols and
ambushes.  B Co departed to base camp established by A Co at 0755 hours, closing forward base at 1600 hours.  A Co (-) moved to area XT69185 where documents and misc. equipment had been located the previous day.  At 1300 hours, A Co received AW fire vic XT69185.  Fire was returned, results unknown.  No casualties sustained.  1 tunnel and bunker were located and destroyed vic XT696185.  B Co had one man WIA from a booby trap vic XT695162, individual was evacuated by dust-off.  A leaflet drop was conducted vic of 4th Bn, 9th Inf base camp.  The leaflet was the #215, 25th Infantry Division.
                                                  (p5)

     4th Bn,  23d InfL:  A Co departed at 0900 hours to conduct S&D operations to vic XT628188.  Co had one individual wounded from a booby trap vic XT630190.  Individual was evacuated by dust-off.  Vic XT628188, A Co located and destroyed 3 tunnels and 2 bunkers which contained the following:   1 new LAW, 3 rounds 57RR, 3  60mm rounds, several booby trapped grenades, misc. equipment for rigging booby traps, 3 Chicom grenades, 3 rifle grenades, assorted clothing and documents.  All items were evacuated back to base camp.  A Co returned to base camp at 1700 hours.  B Co remained in base camp as security for the battalion.  C Co and B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf attached, departed base camp Cu Chi to link up with forward base.  At XT634177 C Co received AW fire from a bunker, also rifle grenades, booby traps, and a command detonated minefield.  B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf moved to assist and 2 tracks struck AT mines in the same area as the AW fire was received.  Results 11 WIA and 2 APC's damaged.  The results of C Co's encounter, 2     KIA and 9 WIA.  All individuals were evacuated by dust-off.  C Co continued on to forward base closing at 1830 hours.  B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf returned back to base camp Cu Chi.  There were 4 VC KIA (Poss).

     1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  Recon and battalion headquarters (-) departed base camp Cu Chi for the forward base XT679211 which was established by A Co.  Units closed new base at 1500 hours.  A Co's ambush patrol received 2 hand grenades into their position vic XT694211.  Fire was returned, results unknown.  No casualties sustained.  

4 September

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  Battalion (-) conducted local S&D operations in vic of their base camp.
  At 0900 hours, B Co received approximately 6 rounds SA fire from vic XT693171.  No casualties.  Unit returned fire, results unknown.  At 1400 hours, XT693183, A Co sustained 1 WIA from SA fire.  Fire was returned with SA and artillery.  Results unknown.  Individual was evacuated back to base camp.  A Co returned to base camp at 1732 hours.  At 2035 hours an ambush patrol from A Co encountered 2 VC at XT690178.  Patrol fired upon them with SA fire results unknown.  No casualties.  10,000 leaflets were dropped in 4th Bn, 9th Inf AO.  Leaflets were the rewards for weapons and mines.  

     4th Bn,  23d Inf:  A Co conducted S&D operation vic XT6317.  While enroute, company destroyed 1 structure, 2 bags cement, 1 trench, 1 bunker, 3  105 rounds, 1  75mm round.   Continuing search in the area, the company discovered and destroyed 2  105 rounds, 1 tunnel, 2 AT mines, 1  250 lb bomb.  Company returned back to base camp at 1827 hours.   At 2220 hours a patrol from B Co engaged 3-4 VC XT630191 with SA fire and M79 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

     1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  A&B Co's conducted S&D operations to the SE vic XT709023 where a platoon from 1st  Bn, 7th ARVN had established a blocking position .  At 1019 hours an APC overturned vic XT699280 resulting in 5 WIAs  who were evacuated by dust-off.  B Co apprehended 3 VCs vic XT705202.  Individuals were questioned and turned over to the ARVN.  All elements closed the battalion base vic XT709203 at 1630 hours.  At 2235 hours, battalion CP vic XT710202 received 3 rounds rifle grenades.  81mm mortar fire and SA were returned, results unknown.  No friendly casualties.
                                             (p6)

5 September

     4th Bn,  9th Inf:  A Co conducted S&D operations north of base camp and back.  Unit received SA fire from XT695185.  Fire was returned, results unknown.  No friendly casualties sustained.  B Co conducted S&D operations south of base camp.  At 0855 hours 2 booby traps injured 7 US vic XT691176 and at 0920 hours a second booby trap was tripped resulting in 3 WIA's  vic XT691176.  All individuals were evacuated by dust-off.  Negative contact during the day.  At 2035 hours one rifle grenade was received into the battalion base, negative casualties.

     4th Bn,  23d Inf:  A Co secured battalion base forward.  B Co conducted S&D operations to XT622190 with negative contact during the day.  C Co conducted S&D to XT623180 with negative contact during the day.  At 2130 hours vic XT629188 an ambush patrol from B Co detected unknown number of VC attempting to encircle their position.  Patrol engaged them with SA and M79 fire.  Patrol then withdrew back to base camp.  Results of fire unknown.   No friendly casualties.  One loudspeaker mission was flown over the 4th Bn, 23d Inf AO.  Tapes used were the special family tape and the second directed at the 165th Regt.  20,000 special leaflets for the Filhol Plantation and 25,000 Chieu Hoi and 5,000 safe conduct passes were dropped.    

     1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  A Co conducted S&D operations vic XT715208.  During the day the company located and destroyed 2 grenades and 3 tunnel complexes vic XT7-52-3.  1 VCS was  captured at XT709201 and 1 VCS XT705207.  Individuals were returned to base camp and then turned over to ARVN.  One loudspeaker mission was flown over 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf AO.  

6 September

4th Bn,  9th Inf:  Battalion conducted local S&D operations vic of the battalion base camp
with A Co moving to vic XT696179 and B Co to XT695173.  Both units had negative contact during the day.  B Co did destroy 15 booby traps, 9 spider holes, and 1  105 round all in vic XT695173.

     4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  A Co conducted S&D operations to vic XT633209.  Unit destroyed the following vic XT633209:  3 tunnels, 1 structure, 900 lbs of rice (loose).  Negative contact during the day.  C Co conducted S&D operations south to vic XT633178.  At 1250 hours, XT625180, unit received 6 WIAs from 2 booby traps.  All individuals were evacuated by battalion C&C ship.  At 1555 hours, XT624178, 10 WIAs were sustained from a booby trapped 81mm round.  Individuals were evacuated by dust-off.  The following were destroyed during the day:  1  105 round,  1 hand grenade,  2 bunkers,  500 lbs rice,  2 tunnels,  and 1 AT mine.

                                                            (p7)   
     1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  Battalion conducted S&D operations vic XT710200 with A Co moving to vic XT714203.  At 0842 hours, XT704205, an APC struck a mine.  No casualties, but extensive damage to the track vehicle.  Unit destroyed 10 bunkers, 1  105 round, 2  250 lb bombs and 1 trench all in the vic XT714203.  9 VCSs were apprehended during the day and returned to Div PW compound.  B Co conducted S&D operations vic XT715192.  At 0800 hours Co received SA fire and 2 rifle grenades vic XT708201.  Unit returned fire.  Results unknown.  Negative friendly casualties.  6 VCS were apprehended during the day and returned to the Div PW compound.  5000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were distributed in Phuo Hoa Dong.  10,000 terror leaflets #153-66 were dropped in the area of 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf  AO.

7 September

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  Battalion conducted combined operations with elements of the 1st and 4th
Bn, 7th Regt ARVN.  C Co was airlifted into LZ Charlie, XT714188 where they linked up with one platoon of 1st Bn (Mech),  5th Inf.  Both units conducted S&D operations north to vic XT713187 to XT694177.  ARVN units blocked to the south of LZ Charlie.  A&B Cos blocking position A, XT690179 and B, XT693174 respectively.  At 0935 hours C Co received 2-3 sniper rounds from vic XT703178.  Fire was returned, results unknown.  No friendly casualties.  At this same location 15  70-80 lb bags of rice were discovered.  Rice was evacuated back to base camp   At 1015 hours, 2 VCC were captured XT704174 by the 7th Regt ARVN.  At 1150 hours XT699177 unit sustained 1 slight WIA from sniper fire.  Fire was returned, results unknown.  Individual was evacuated back by track vehicle.  At 2200 hours, battalion CP received 5 rifle grenades resulting in 1 US WIA.  Fire was returned with artillery.  Results unknown.  Medcap was conducted at Phu Hoa Dong vic XT7118 for 225 patients.

     4th Bn,  23d Inf:  Battalion conducted two separate company size operations with A Co airlifted into LZ vic XT623214.  At 0930 hours vic XT628218 A Co received 5 rounds SA fire.  Artillery and mortar fire was called on suspected location.  Results unknown.  During the day A Co destroyed 8,000 lbs of rice, 2 concrete bunkers, and 1 mortar position.  C Co moved to vic Bao Cap, XT633177 and back.  Negative contact during the day.

     1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  B Co conducted S&D operations southeast into the village of Phu Thuan, XT7218 and back to base camp.  During their operation, B Co captured 3 VCSs, 4000 lbs of rice, 1,200 lbs rice evacuated, remainder was distributed to local population.  VCSs were turned over to local ARVN authorities.  A Co provided 1 platoon for attachment to 4th Bn, 9th Inf on their operation .  C Co joined the battalion in the forward area at 1430 hours.  5,000 JUSPAO and Chieu Hoi leaflets #146 were distributed in the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf AO.
(p8)


8  September

     4th Bn, 9th Inf:  A 2 company S&D operation was conducted with A&B Cos moving to vic XT699178.  A Co received AW fire from XT698180 resulting in 3      WIAs.  Artillery fire was called in, results unknown.  Individuals were evacuated by dust-off.  B Co conducted S&D operations in a combined operation with A Co to XT699178.  At 0925 hours, vic XT698174 unit had 5 KIAs and 5 WIAs  from a command detonated mine.  During the day the unit destroyed the following:  3  105 rounds,  2 tunnels,  and 2  105 rounds booby trapped.

     4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  Battalion conducted 2 separate company size operations with A Co searching north of base camp vic XT638214.  Negative contact during the day.  A Co destroyed the following:  3 AT mines, 1  105 round,  2 rifle grenades and 1  250 lb bomb.  B Co conducted S&D operations vic XT648199 with negative contact during the day.  Leaflet drop 10,000 #941,  #092,  #153-66 was conducted over 4th Bn,  23d Inf AO.  

     1st Bn (Mech),  5th Inf:  3 separate company operations were conducted in vic Ben Co XT710198.  A Co moved to vic XT702203.  The following items were located during the day:  1 US BAR rifle,  17 Chicom grenades,  1 AT mine,  assorted documents, and 8,500 lbs of loose rice.  Rifle and documents evacuated, remainder destroyed.  B Co conducted combined S&D operations with 1st Co,  1st Bn,  7th Regt ARVN vic XT715204 and XT764197.  Negative contact during the day.  C Co conducted S&D operations with 3 Co,  1st Bn,  7th Reg ARVN to vic XT711196 and XT707190.  Negative contact during the day.  4,960 lbs of rice was turned over to district chief after it was located vic XT711194.

9 September

4th Bn,  9th Inf:  Battalion conducted  2 separate S&D operations, company size.  A Co moved to  XT673187 where the company established a base and dispatched platoon size patrols throughout the day.  Negative enemy contact.  B Co conducted S&D operations to vic XT678167 and back to base camp.  At 1500 hours, XT689168, unit received SA fire.  Fire was returned, results unknown.  1 US WIA resulted from this fire.  B Co destroyed the following during the day:  2 AT mines,  2  81mm rounds,  1  4.2” round and 1  20lb frag bomb.

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  C Co conducted S&D operations to XT648199 where a company base vic XT648199 was established and patrols were dispatched during the day.  Negative enemy contact during the day.  A Co remained at base camp forward.

1st Bn (Mech),  5th  Inf:  Battalion re-established their base camp to XT680211 with A Co moving with battalion (-) to that location.  B Co conducted S&D to the new CP.  At 1325 hours, XT692203, one APC struck an AT mine resulting in minor damage to the track.  Again at 1503 hours, XT692203, another APC struck a mine resulting in slight damage to the vehicle.  11 VCSs were detained during the day and were evacuated back to ARVN district.

                                        (p9)

 10 September

4th Bn,  9th Inf:  Battalion moved back to base camp Cu Chi closing at 1305 hours.  2 stay
behind patrols were left vic XT680168 and XT678169.  At 0030 hours, ambush patrol vic XT678169  made contact with an undetermined number of VC.  Results, 2 VC KIA (Poss).  Patrol returned to base camp at 1635 hours.  B Co patrol observed 3-4 VC vic XT687169.  Unit detonated a claymore and fired SA resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (Poss).

     4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  A  2 company separate operation was conducted during the day with A Co  moving to vic XT644188.  Negative contact during the day.  C Co moved to vic XT621193.  Negative contact during the day.

          1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  Battalion conducted a 2 company operation with A Co moving to
objective area vic XT673232 and B Co moving to objective area vic XT665237.  During the day, A Co captured one VC with 1 M-1 rifle vic XT653237.  Both units destroyed the following:  3 AT mines,  5 bunkers at XT678224, and 1 classroom at XT675229.

11 September

4th Bn,  23d Inf:  Battalion remained in their base camp forward as reaction force for the   
     brigade.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  2 separate company operations were conducted during the day with A Co moving to XT647227.  At 1135 hours vic XT646229 unit received SA fire.  No friendly casualties.  Fire was returned, results unknown.  At 1208 hours, XT654230, 1 APC was hit with a 50 cal AP round which resulted in 2 US WIA.  Individuals were evacuated by dust-off.  At 1222 hours, XT646229 1 APC struck an AT mine resulting in 2 WIAs.  Individuals were picked up by battalion C&C ship.  B Co conducted S&D operations to XT640225.  At 1320 hours vic XT643224, 2 APCs were damaged by AT mines.  No casualties, minor damage to tracks.  At 1645 hours, vic XT641225, company received 9 rifle grenades.  Indirect fire was called into suspected VC position, results unknown.  During the day the unit destroyed the following:  3 AT mines, 5  105 rounds,  5 structures, and 4  60mm rounds.  At 1900 hours, battalion perimeter received 4 rounds 60mm resulting in 1 US KIA.   Artillery was called in on the suspected location.  Results unknown.  At 2005 hours B Co received 15 rounds of friendly artillery causing  1 KIA, and 3 WIAs.     

12 September

4th Bn,  23d Inf:  Battalion departed from their forward base camp XT644204 at 1100
hours and closed Cu Chi base at 1320 hours.  A Co left a stay behind ambush vic XT649189.  At 1335 hours, stay behind ambush engaged 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (Poss).  One 45 cal pistol was taken from the VC.  Patrol returned to Cu Chi at 0953 hours.  UH1D aircraft received AW fire vic XT649181 causing moderate damage to the aircraft and 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA..  
                                                  (P10)

1st Bn (Mech),  5th  Inf:  Battalion departed their forward base camp XT681212 at 0857 hours enroute to Cu Chi base camp and closed at 1218 hours.

12. Results.

a.  Personnel.

(1)  Friendly:
                KIA     WIA      MIA       DOW
5th Bn,  9th  Inf          4     32     0     1
4TH  Bn,  23d  Inf          2     33     0     0
Total               6     65     0     1

(2)  Enemy Losses:

VC  KIA  (BC):      8
VC  KIA  (POSS)     16
VCC            3
VCS          46





b. Equipment captured:

(1)   BAR:           1  

                        (2)   M-1  rifle:    2

                        (3)   .45  pistol:    1

(4)   M72  LAW:  1

(5)   Bayonet:       1

(6)   MG ammo:   2000 rounds

(7)   Chicom rifle grenades:         2

(8)   82mm mortar rds:                 1

(9)   57mm RR rounds                 3  

(10)  AT mine:                        1

(11)  ½ lb blocks  TNT:                 3

(12)  VC  gasmask:                1

(13)  Pistol belts:                     3              

  (p11)     (page missing?)

(12)  30  cal rounds  (carbine):   60

(13)  AT  mines:                48

(14)  AP mines:                     7

(15)  Booby traps:               35

(16)  Rifle grenades:                 4

(17)  Hand grenades:               44

(18)  Claymores:                    8

(19)  M1 ammo clips:               8

(20)  BAR magazines:               9

(21)  Punji pits:                   5

(22)  Rice:          12,180  lbs

(23)  Cement:               100  lbs

(24)  Pack:                     1       

(25)  C4  blocks:                    5

                         (p13)

13. Administrative Matters:  All administrative matters were handled routinely from the Division Base Camp and there were no problems involved due to the close proximity of the AO to the base camp.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:  There were none applicable to this operation.

15. Commander's Analysis:  Operation KIPAPA was highly successful and served to deny the Filhol Plantation to the Viet Cong.  It is extremely important that this area be continually operated in to deny its use to the enemy.  Particularly as it is so close to the Cu Chi Base Camp.


 FOR THE COMMANDER:




                         Donald A Hamlin
                         Major, Infantry
                         Adjutant


                    (p13)


 Operation Kolchak I

Back To After Action reports




                 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
            HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
                 APO US FORCES 96225

    AVTLBDB-T                                                                                  17 March 1966

    SUBJECT:    Combat After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

    THRU:        Commanding General
            lst Infantry Division
            APO US Forces 96345

    TO:        Commander
            US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
            ATTN: MAC J34
            APO US Forces 96243

        1. In accordance with MACV directive number 335-8 the following report is submitted:

            2D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION OPERATION
                    KOLCHAK I

    During the period 260800-281515 February 1966, the 2d Brigade conducted a search and destroy operation to include maximum destruction of VC tunnels and fortifications in assigned TAOR. The operation was conducted in Hau Nghia Province, Cu Chi District bounded by coordinates X-618157, X-624163, X-627164, X-621155, (OBJ TARO). 2d Bde OPORD 13-66 was issued at 241200 February 1966 outlining plans for the operation. Col L. M. Johnson, Jr. is the reporting officer. Task Force organization and Task Force commander were as follows.

        Task Force 1/27 Inf, Lt Col Cawthra, Commanding

            lst Bn, 27th Inf (-)
            A Troop, 3d Sqad 4th Cav
            B Co, 65th Engr

        2. Intelligence.

       a. An estimated VC Local Force platoon had been operating in the general vicinity of the objective area. Only three to fifteen VC previously had been encountered at any one time. The enemy had limited his actions to sniper fire, squad size actions, booby traps and mines. Several tunnels and trenches had been previously located and destroyed in the objective area. These indicated that the enemy lived in the area as well as infiltrated into and out of the objective area from the West and North.

       b. Enemy situation during the operation. In the initial attack, the enemy resistance included sporadic sniper fire and the use of AT mines and booby traps against US Forces. VC strength estimated to be not more than 3 to 7 personnel during the initial attack. Three (3) VC were killed. The VC unit could not be identified.
        c. The terrain from the LD to the objective area was typical rubber plantation. In the objective area, the terrain was typified by bamboo and secondary growth hedgerows, concealed trenches and foxholes,
and both open areas and areas containing tall trees surrounded by secondary positions from which he previously defended and operated at will.

                        Page 1



                d. Fortifications. The Engineer Team closed approximately 3,000 meters of trenches leading to and in the objective area. In the objective area numerous small tunnels and spider holes were discovered and closed with demolitions and by bulldozers.

         3. Mission. lst Bn 27th Inf TF attacked to secure Objective TARO and to search out and destroy VC personnel and fortifications in the objective area. Implied mission was to continue to secure perimeter in base camp.

         4. Concept of Operation. 1/27 Inf attacked along two axes 260800 Feb 66 to secure Objective TARO and destroy VC personnel and fortifications within objective area. A 1/27 attacked along Axis RIBBON to secure the northern half of objective; A 3/4 Cav attacked along Axis QUEEN to secure southern half of objective; Infantry preceded tracks to PL SADDLE (expected area of lst VC contact), then vehicles passed through Infantry and led the attack on both axes using recon by fire. Upon consolidation of objective,
     Engineers began systematic destruction to include closing trenches and clearing of trees and brush. Two air strikes and an artillery preparation preceded the ground attack. Two gun ships were on stand by for part of the first day and during the second day. A 1/8 Artillery was in DS for the operation. The 4.2 mortar section (3 tubes) A 3/4 Cav was Op/Con of Mortar Platoon l/27 during the operation. Priority of air support was given to l/27 for the operation.

         5. Execution. The attack on both axes commenced at 260800 as planned, preceded by air strikes and an artillery and 4.2 preparation of 132 and 96 rounds, respectively. Tanks led infantry through PL SADDLE. Light enemy fire began when lead APC on axis RIBBON detonated a VC AT mine. Range from    suspected VC position to lead element was approximately 100 meters. The VC firing was silenced by heavy machine gun fire. Subsequently 2 APC's under Engineer control hit AT mines and had tracks blown off. No US casualties. The lead elements entered the objective area and secured it by 1035 hrs and
engineers immediately began systematic closing of trenches. Enemy sniper fire was received at 1110 from XT 625155, fire was returned and enemy fire ceased. The Battalion tunnel team investigated tunnels in the area (XT 629161 and XT621159). At 1300 one VC KIA was found in a spider hole. The victim held in his hand a US Claymore plunger and a Russian 7.62 Mossin Nagant, Model 1944. The Engineer work continued throughout the day until 1800 hrs when night defensive positions were manned. During the first night the TF received 12-15 rounds of 60 mm mortar fire and sporadic sniper fire. DS Artillery fired  H&I fires during the night to assist in defense of perimeter. 1/27 Inf Recon Plat (+) was tasked to occupy a blocking position along PL BOOT to prevent VC from mining the area during the night. Engineer work commenced 270730. A 1/27 discovered a tunnel (XT 619157) and search of tunnel revealed 2 large bags
of documents and clothing which were turned over to Bde S2. The tunnel ended at a distance of 30 meters. The tunnel was destroyed at 0957. A 3/4 Cav received two (2) WIA as result of booby trap. A 3/4 Cav found a bag of documents at approximately 1000 hrs. Engineers destroyed 7 AT mines, 5 AP mines, one    claymore (VC), 2 M79 duds, 1 grenade dud and 2 105 mm duds. A 1/27 found one VC 30 lb claymore. The second night H&I fires continued. A total of 256 HE rounds H&I were fired during the two nights of the operation. Ambushes were established both nights but had no contact. At 280400 2 VC took the second
platoon Co A under fire with small arms. Fire was returned with two VC KIA. During the period 270730 - 281430 Engineers continued to clear the area. At 281430 the TF extracted under 54 rounds of Arty WP. The TF closed Base  Camp at 1545.

                         Page 2


         6. Supporting Forces:

         a. Artillery Support:

           (1) A 1/8 DS 1/27.

           (2) 1/8 (-) GS 2d Bde.

           (3) 2/32 (-) GS, reinf 1/8.

        b. How and when Artillery employed:

          (1) Arty supported the attack with a preparation between H -hour and H+16 minutes
                                (132 rds HE).

              (2) On call missions 26-28 Feb 66.

          (3) H&I fire conducted during night (256 HE rds)
        
          (4) 59 rds of Arty WP used during extraction,

        c. Results of Artillery: All artillery fires were well coordinated and effective. H&I fires proved to
                            be very effective during hours of darkness.

        d. US Air Force:

           (1) Preplanned strikes were directed on objectve area durinp week preceeding operations.

           (2) A preplanned air preparation was directed onto objective     H-70 minutes to H-10           
                                minutes.
           (3) Fighter bombers on continuous ground alert in III Corps (ARVN) area to be assigned
                                 mission, as cleared by 2d Bde FSCC. Armament mixed loads.

           (4) Arty FO's marked air targets with WP as required.
           (5) Air strikes were controlled by 2d Bde ALO in coordination with S3, 1/27.

          (6) Air strikes were effective in destruction of VC fortifications and emplacements in obj
                                area.

        e. Two gunships here on ground alert during first two days of operations.

    7. Results of Operation:

        a. US Forces: KIA: 0

                  WIA: 3

                  MIA: 0 E

                  Equipment damaged: 3 APC's had tracks blown.

        b. VC Losses: KIA: 5

                  Equipment Cautured/Dest:

                                                                               1 7.62 Massin Nagant NATO, Model 194
        
                               7 - AT mines

                               5 - AP mines

                               1 - Claymore

                               3 Bags, documents

                               1200 lbs of rice

                               3 - Extensive trench
                               complexes

                               7 Acres land cleared

    8. Administration and Logistics:

        Resupply was accomplished by using 2 APC's. Medical APC's were used to evacuate the 3 US WIA's. There were no communication problems.

                        Page 3

     9. Special Equipment and Techniques. The tank dozers and flame thrower APC's materially increased the ability of Engineers to accomplish the destruction.

    10. Commanders Analysis. Compared to other techniques in operations in which destruction was paramount, the separation of destruction and  security missions is the best solution. In this operation, such was the case and maximum advantage was taken in terms of time and equipment to accomplish maximum destruction. No significant changes to the basic plan were made.

        11. Conclusions and Lessons Learned.

        a. Conclusion: TF 1/27 accomplished their mission.

        b. Lessons learned:

           (1) Engineer units are best utilized as units in destruction type missions with Infantry providing security.

           (2) Personnel must be made aware of the danger of exploding booby traps when burning brush in areas formerly occupied by VC.

           (3) Recon by fire can be employed to advantage in areas of hedgerows and undergrowth.

           (4) H&I fires around a perimeter assist in night defense.

           (5) Cav units just as Infantry should be prepared tooccupy perimeter and employ all available fire power to include claymores and trip flares. In addition, Cav units must be prepared to communicate by wire at night time. Use of vehicular radios at night requires running     of vehicle periodically, thus creating a noise blanket which can be used     by VC in approaching the perimeter.

        FOR THE COMMANDER:



    1 Incl                    A. R.KNIGHT
       as                    Major, Infantry
                        Adjutant

    Distribution:

    10 - CG. 1st Inf Div
     4 - CG, 25th Tnf Div

                        Page 4



 Operation Fargo


     AVTLFB-C (23 Jul 66)     lst Ind (U)
     SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS MACV JV32) (U)

     HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISON, APO 96225          29 July 1966

    THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: ACofS G3 (D&T)
    APO 96266

    TO: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, ATTN: J343,

    Forwarded.

    FOR THE COMMANDER:

                    PHILLIP U. BONDI
                    CPT, AGC
                    Asst AG

    DISTRIBUTION:            
      ACofS for Force Dev, DA
      CG USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH
      MACV, ATTN: J343 (thru IIFFORCEV)
      MACV, ATTN: J3 (thru IIFFORCEV)
      MACV, ATTN: MACT (thru IIFFORCEV)
      MACV, ATTN: Chief, USAF Advisory Group (thru IIFFORCEV)
      CG, USARV, ATTN: AVC (D & H)
      CG, IIFFORCEV, ATTN: ACofS G3 (D & T)
      CG, USA Infantry School, Ft Benning, GA.
      CG, USA Armor School, Ft Knox, Ky.
      USACDC Ln Off APO 96558
      USA Inf H Res Unit, Ft Benning, Ga.





                     HEADQUARTERS
                   25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
                 APO San Francisco 96225.
    AVTLFB-C                                                                             23 July 1966.
    SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS MACV J3-32)

    THRU:     Commanding General    
         25th Infantry Division
           ATTN: AVTLCG-MH
         APO US Forces 96225



    TO:    Commander
        US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
        ATTN: J343
        APO US Forces 96243
    
        1.    Operation FARGO: 1st Brigade Search and Destroy, Operation to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps.

        2. Dates of operation: 120420 - 141515 June 1966.

        3. Locations Area of operations was in the vicinity of PHUOC-HIEP-AP BAU DIEU Villages bounded by coordinates XT555195 North; XT570175 East;XT550153 South; XT540172 West.

        4. Control Headquarters: lst Brigade, 25th Infantiy Division.
    
        5. Reporting Officers Colonel William B. Sandlin, Jr.

        6. Task Organization and Commanders:

        a. 2d Bn, 14th Inf (-) Lt Col Shultz, Cmdg.
        3d Plat, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
        Engr Sqd, 65th Engr Bn
        VN National Police

        b. 4th Bn, 9th Inf, Lt Col Booths Cmdg.
        2d Plt, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
        Engr Sqd, A Co, 65th Engr Bn    
        MP Sqd, 25th MP Co

                        Page 1


     7. Support Forces:      

         a. Artillery: 7th Bn, 11th Arty was employed in Direct Support   of the lst Brigade.

              (1) How and when employed.

             (a) 7th Bn, 11th Arty (-) supported from base camp Cu Chi.

             (b) B Btry supported from 2d Bn, 14th Inf base camp area XT556168.

             (c) Fire was used primarily as H&I fire. 56 H&I missions were fired totalling 224 rounds. 18 support missions were fired totalling 108 rounds.

             (2) Results: H&I fires denied VC freedon of movement during hours of darkness.

        b. Tactical Air: No suitable air targets were determined during this operation.

        c. Army Aviation: Forty (40) UH-1D and sixteen (16) UH-1B to lift an Infantry battalion and one Infantry company simultaneously into three landing zones. During the operational period, 368 sorties were flown which consisted of airmobile assault, command and control, aerial reconnaisance, aerial resupply, and medical evacuation.    

    8. Intelligence:

            a. Intelligence studies conducted prior to operation FARGO indicated VC activity within the operational area has been generally concentrated along Hwy 1 and Hwy 7. Since 1 May, both routes have been the scene of numerous mine incidents. Anti-aircraft incidents in the area have increased in the past month. The C50 Company was reported in the vic XT506171. Reports indicate the C50's mission is to stage attacks along Hwy 1, to collect taxes and capture GVN employees. The C50 Company is reportedlyarmed with 1-60mm mortar, 1-lmg, 4-ARs, 2-M79s and assorted small arms, The C26 Company, strength 100, was reported in the vic XT569168 on 18 May. This is the 2d report of this company in the same area. The company reportedly posesses 1-60mm mortar, 1-.30 cal MG, 5-ARs, 4 grenade launchers and assorted small arms. Due to the large number of mine incidents, it is concluded    that VC sapper units are also present and operating with local force guerrilla units. The actual mission and organization of these sapper elements is unknown, however these squads have the mission of mining and interdicting Hwy1 and 7. The operational area is known to contain numerous guerrilla units that operate out of the many villages and hamlets. Three guerrilla squads operate consistently vic PHUOC HIEP (XT569170).

        b.  Recent significant activities revealed that on 1 Jun 3 National police vehicles traveling from Cu Chi to Trang Bang were ambushed

                    Page 2



     by a VC squad with AW's at XT554169. One vehicle was destroyed, 6 ARVN's KIA, 1 WIA, and 20,000 piastres (payroll) stolen. Oh 3 June, elements from Trung Lap Ranger Training Center were ambushed at XT593210 by 20 to 40 VC.

         c. During the operation VC contact was limited to occassional sniper fire. The VC employed booby traps within the AO and a road block along Hwy 1. Number of VC guerrillas operating in AP could,not be confirmed.

        d. The terrain In the area of operations consisted of thick hedge rows, some heavy brush and wooded areas which offered excellent concealment and cover from direct fire weapons. There are also many clearings and rice fields which offered the VC excellent fields of fire. There were no major obstacles which could affect the movement of track vehicles and dismounted troops. The weather had no effect on the conduct of the operation. The only natural obstacle within the area of operations is the Rach Ba Dap Creek that flows southward across Hwy 1 (XP543177), however, it would be an obstacle only during heavy rains which would make it untrafficable by track vehicles.

        e. Summary: Over all evaluation and accuracy of intelligence was rated B/2 (usually reliable and probably true). The overall security of operation FARGO was considered excellent.

        9. Mission:

            a. lst Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducts search and destroy operations during the period 12 - 14 June 1966 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps vic PHUOC HIEP (XT555170) and to interdict VC movements in area of operation.

             b. Conduct airmobile and ground assault 12 June 1966 into obj area to encircle VC forces.
             
    
             d. Provide wire, pickets and technical advice on installation of RF and PF outposts in Brigade sector.

        10. Concept of Operation: lst Brigade conducts airmobile and ground     operations in assigned area with two battalions (-) during the period 12-14 June 1966. 2d Bn, 14th Inf established blocking position in the AO as the 4th Bn, 9th Inf conducts S&D operations in area. A Co, 2d Bn, 14th Inf is designated as brigade reaction force. On 12 Jun 66, 2d Bn, 14th Inf moves one (1) rifle company from operational base camp (Operation Fort Smith) over ground to establish blocking positions from coordinates XT553155 to
 XT53178 to be completed by 0700 hrs. In order to block VC attempting to move from PHUOC HIEP. One (1) rifle company will be airlifted from Cu Chi base location to LZ 1 by 0630 hrs and will later link up with ground force to help establish blocking positions. On orders, upon completion of blocking mission, 2/14 Inf will continue to conduct S&D operations in Fort Smith AO.

Page 3


     4th Bn, 9th Inf airlifted from Cu Chi base camp lands at LZs 2, 3, and 4 and establishes blocking positions from coordinates XT557178 to XT568170 by 0700 hrs; initiates detailed search starting at 0730 hrs East to West from LD to boundary, linking up with 2/14 Inf blocking forces NLT 1500 hrs. Upon link up continue detailed S&D mission with priority to location and destruction of VC caches and facilities in PHUOC HIEP. On the second day of the operation, 13 June, 4/9 Inf will continue S&D operation and civic     action activities. Wire pickets, and technical advice on installation to RF and PF outposts will be part of the civic action program. Plan for helilift extraction of 4/9 Inf from AO 141500 June 3.966.

          11. Execution: 1st Bde OPORD 8-66 (Operation Fargo) was issued 101400     June 66. Operation commenced 120430 June 66.

            a. 2/14 Inf: Co C and the Recon Plt moved from the battalion base camp location vic XT522198 (Operation Fort Smith area of operation) at 0430 hrs to establish blocking positions along PL RED. The Cav Plt attached to the battalion moved from the battalion base camp at 0615 hrs to secure LZ 1 (XT52156) and occupy coordination point at XT551173. B Co was helilifted from the Cu Chi base camp and landed on LZ l at 0630 hrs. At 0630 hrs, C Co and the Recon Plt arrived at coordinates XT548167 on PL RED and immediately established blocking positions from this point to the coordination point at XT55178. B Co linked up with the 3/4 Cav Plt after landing and established blocking positions from XT55155 to XT548167 along PL RED. All blocking positions were maintained without incident until 4/9 Inf completed it's S&D mission in the area of PL RED. At 1400 hrs all elements of 2/14 Inf withdrew from blocking positions and continued Operation Fort Smith.

            b. 4/9 Inf:  At 0630 hrs the battalion departed from base camp Cu Chi by helicopter for the operational area of Operation Fargo. The first element lifted, A Co, landed at LZ 2 and established contact with 2/14 Inf. One (1) VCS was detained at XT564180 who stated that VC elements, size unknown, were moving south from LZ 2. Co C & B landed at LZ 3 and 4 respectively, crossed LD at 0725 hrs and commenced S&D operations. B Co detained 16 civilians and later released them after interrogation. Elements of both companies discovered and destroyed 1 ton of rice in vic XT557166. As the S&D operation continued B Co apprehended three VCS and 1 draft dodger. Upon interrogation, one of them was determined to be a VCC. At 1620 hrs the battalion closed on 0bj 2 and established a base camp. Resupply was effected immediately. A Co located and destroyed 1 anti-tank mine vic XT553177 at 1645 hrs. Ambush patrols were sent out during the night at locations XT545277, XT548172, and XT554177. Patrols had negative VC contact and returned to base camp at 0600 hrs.

                    13 June 1966

        4/9 Inf: At 0900 hrs, C Co, while conducting a S&D operation encoun tered sniper fire at coord XT655178. Fire was eliminated as a result of friendly small arms fire. 100 rounds of ammunition marked 188 with large star figure were located and destroyed in vic of sniper fire. The rounds

                       Page 4



     were 127 cal and were assumed to be used for anti-aircraft purposes. At 1000 hrs 25 persons were apprehended at XT555192. All persons were questioned by the National Police element attached to the battalion. The interrogation resulted in one of the 25 being held for further questioning by MP authorities. B Co at 0900 hrs located and destroyed 1 booby trapped grenade, 1 tunnel, and 9 houses at coord XT548103 during it's S&D operation. At 1050 hrs, generally at the same coordinates, the company  was hit by heavy sniper fire and sustained 2 WIAs. Fire was immediately returned by the company to establish a superiority of fire resulting in one (1) VC killed (BC), 1 VC captured. At 1420 his the battalion conducted a     MEDCAP mission in the village of An Due at coord XT536180 and treated 29 individuals. The engineer element attached to the battalion completed a triple strand concertina fence around the PF compound located at XT540276.The last VC engagement took place at 1700 hrs as C Co encountered 2 VC at coord XT553177, which resulted in 1 VC killed (poss). By 1800 hrs all battalion elements had returned to the operational base camp area. Ambush patrols were located at coord XT548185, 549192, 55182 and 559178. All patrols returned by 0600 hrs the following morning. Patrols had negative VC contact.

                     14 June 1966    

        4/9 Inf: A Co with the Cav Plt departed the operational base camp at 0730 hrs to investigate a road block on Hwy 1 at XT603140 as reported by a captured VC. The company, enroute, encountered several booby traps and apprehended two VCS in vic XT612163. By 1030 hrs, the road was cleared. The road block consisted of 16 dirt mounds, ranging from 6" to 18" high that covered the entire width of the road. A Co then moved from the highway to a rice cache location pointed out by the same VC the previous day. At this location, coord XT621159, the company uncovered and destroyed 500 lbs of loose rice located in a 5' X 4' hole. Extraction of the battalion commenced at 0800 hrs with B Co helilifted from base area to Cu Chi closing at 0842 hrs.  C Co began heliborne extraction at 1300 hrs and completed closing at Cu Chi by 1325 hrs. Prior to extraction, C Co conducted two (2) plt sized S&D operations that commenced at 0615 hrs. At 1005 hrs the company destroyed 1 booby trapped 105mn round in vic XT565184. A Co, after completion of it's mission of clearing road blocks along Hwy 1, moved by road convoy and closed Cu Chi base camp 1515 hrs terminating Operation Fargo.


        12. Results:

            a. Personnel lossess:


            (1.) Friendly.

                 4th Bn, 9th Inf : 3 WIA


            (2) Enemy.

                VC(BC)    VC (poss)    VCC     VCs

                1      1               1      35


                    Page 5



         b. Enemy Losses.

            (1) Captured 2 tons rice,
    
            (2) Destroyed.
        
            (a) AT Mines: 1
        
            (b) Booby trapped grenades: 1
            
            (c) Tunnel complex: 1
        
            (d) Houses: 9
            
            (e) 188 Ammunition: 100 rds

            (f) 105 How booby-trapped: 1
    
            (g) Road block 6" X 8": 16
    
            (h) Loose rice: 500 lbs

    13. Administrative Matters.

        a. Supply.

           (1) Resupply was accomplished by UH1Ds and road convoy.

           (2) 77 UHlD sorties were flown totaling approximately 48 tons.

           (3) Due to the fact that the 4th Bn, 9th Inf established a battalion trains area and fed a modified A ration the amount of Class I and water needed accounted for 60% of resupply effort.

        b. Maintenance. No significant problems were encountered.

        c. Treatment of Casualties. Evacuation by dust-off helicopter was sucessful.

        d. Transportation. A reduced headquarters and trains element     moved by convoy and rifle companies were helilifted with no significant problems.

        e. Communications. New radios were issued prior to the operation and effective communications were maintained.

    14. Commanders Analysis. The overall results of this operation in conjunction with Operation Fort Smith has certainly won friends for the United States in this area. During this operation on 13 June the 4th Bn, 9th Inf conducted a MEDCAP II in the vic AP MAY DUC at which 29 patients were treated. Due to limited time period for this operation there were no discernable results of the one civic action activity. But taken with CA oparatims in the Operation Fort Smith which was conducted in approxi-

                        Page 6




     mately the same area it can safely be assumed that it contributed to the overall success of the mission. The 4/9 Inf distributed about 20,000 assorted leaflets, to include Safe Conduct Passes; Chieu Hoi (Open Arms); and 969 Reward leaflets throughout the Bn TAOR. These leaflets were delivered mostly by hand
and the effects of this distribution cannot be determined due to the shortness of the operation.  It is felt
that this distribution assisted the overall operation.

         FOR THE COMMANDER:




    1 Incl                    JIMMIE B. SPIVEY
    Overlay to OPORD 8-66            Captain, Infantry
                        Adjutant

                    
                    Page 7




 Operation Kalihi



                           DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                  HEADQUARTERS  1ST BRIGADE  25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
                                APO  San Francisco  96225


AVDCFB-A                                                                                                                   17 December  1966

SUBJECT:     Combat Operations After Action Report

TO:    Commanding General
          25th Infantry Division
          ATTN;   AVDCOP
          APO  96225



     1.   Name:   Operation KALIHI

     2.   Dates:   150745H  Sep 66 - 142400H  Nov  66

     3.   Location:   Filhol Plantation  (XT675200)

     4.   Control HQ:  1st Brigade,  25th  Infantry Division

     5.   Reporting Officer:

a. 15 Sep 66 - 30 Oct 66.  Colonel William B. Sandlin, Jr.

b. 30 Oct 66 - 14 Nov  66.  Colonel Francis S. Conaty, Jr.

      6.  Task Organization:

Headquarters,  1st Brigade
2d Bn,  14th  Inf
4th Bn,  23d  Inf
Troop A,  2d Sqdn,  4th Cav
Troop B,  2d Sqdn,  4th Cav
Demo Teams,  65th Engr
Flame Track Section,  65th Engr
1Plat,  1st Bn,  5th Inf (Mech)

7.  Support Forces:

a.   Artillery:  The 7th Bn,  11th Arty provided general support for KALIHI with the 2d Bn, 13th Arty reinforcing.  The operation was supported from the Cu Chi base camp except for one platoon which was dispatched with the 4th Bn,  23d Inf during the period that the battalion base was located vic XT728146.  The battalion fired 2,290 H&I missions in support of the operation for a total ;of 8,334 rounds.  The battalion fired 879 support missions in support of the operation for a total of 11,673 rounds.                              
     (P1)

b.  Tactical Air:  Tactical air support was provided by the 7th USAF and VNAF.  The missions were controlled by the 1st Brigade TACP.                         

(1)   Missions flown:                             150
                        (2)   Fighter sorties:                               450

                                          (a)   Preplanned USAE:       342

                                          (b)   Immediate USAE            10

                                          (c)   VNAF:                                68

(3)  Results:

(a)   VC  KIA  (BC):                         4

(b)   VC  KIA  (Poss):                      32

(c)   VC structures destroyed:      142

(d)   VC structures damaged:        64

(e)   Bunkers destroyed:                 20

(f)   Bunkers damaged:                  19

(g)   Trenches destroyed:              10

(h)   Trenches damaged:                4

(i)   Sampans destroyed:              16

(j)   Sampans damaged:                 1

(k)   Secondary fires:                      5

(l)   Secondary explosions             7

(m)  Tunnels destroyed:                 3

c.  Army Aviation:

(1)  Sorties HUID Aircraft:                         (p2)

        (a)   Gunships:               31

        (b)   Tactical troop lift:          226

       (c)   Resupply:               130

       (d)   Med evac,  C&C, recon and misc:     112

                        (2)   Sorties  CH47  Aircraft:          7

                        (3)   Sorties  CH23G  Aircraft          

                                    (a)   Tactical:               61

                                    (b)   Air evac,  C&C, recon and misc:     81

(4)   Ammunition expended:

     (a)   Machine gun 7.62mm:     15,000 rds

      (b)   Rockets 2.75mm:          92  rds

      (c)  Link 40mm grenade:          260  rds

8.  Intelligence:

a.   Intelligence studies and collection undertaken prior to the start of Operation KALIHI indicated that  elements of the 2d Bn and 7th  Bn, 165A Regiment were operating in the assigned area of operations.  In addition, the Cu Chi “Quyet Chien II” local force platoon, with a strength of approximately 25 men, was known to operate in the Phu Hoa Dong - Ben Co area (XT705196).

b.  The area between grid line 68, east to grid line 70, and north-south grid lines 21 and 16 and the Ap Nha Viec area (XT7516) were known from experience to be areas of heavy mining and booby traps.  This knowledge was confirmed when during the course of the operation 60 booby traps, 14 AT mines, and 2 AP mines were destroyed.

c.   Prior to and during the operation, a continued intelligence operations center was established and operated at Phu Hoa Dong (XT713190) and Binh Dong Sector Headquarters at Phu Cuong (XT8114).  The Operations Center at Phu Hoa Dong was manned by one (1) liaison officer from the maneuver battalion operating in this area, and an interrogator/interpreter team from 25th MI Detachment.  This team proved invaluable in obtaining information from captured VCS, and local inhabitants of the village.  The efforts of this team resulted in identifying and disclosing the modus-operandi of the T2200 commo/liaison/supply team operating from Phu Hoa Dong.
(p3)
d.  The Operation Center at Phu Cuong (XT8013) was manned by the Brigade Assistant S2, and Operations NCO, and interrogation/interpreters provided by Sector Headquarters.  Later this operations center was moved to Phu Hoa sub-sector Headquarters at Paris Tan Qui (XT726143).  The exploitation of Chieu Hoi's at this operations center resulted in significant losses to the VC propaganda and infrastructure organization in Phu Hoa District.  Of great importance was the capture of a 16mm projector and 10 reels of film used by the VC to further their propaganda and proselytizing efforts in Phu Hoa District.  This capture will have significant effects, in that it will decrease the VC ability to pursue their propaganda program in Phu Hoa district and VC designated Saigon-Cholon Special Region.

e.  VC contact in the initial stages of Operation KALIHI consisted of sporadic sniper fire from groups of 2-3 VC.  On 4 Oct 66, the determination of the VC to inflict heavy casualties on friendly forces was evidenced when 2 APCs of B 3 / 4 Cav received possible 57mm recoilless rifle fire vic XT698173.  VC harassing actions, i.e. sniping, grenade, and booby trap incidents, increased during the week following this engagement.  

f.   At 1215 hrs, 13 Oct 66, Co B, 2d Bn, 14th Inf and 2d Plat, A 3 / 4 Cav made contact with what was confirmed to be the C4 Company (Heavy Weapons), 7th Bn, 165A Regiment.

g.   This contact was initiated by elements of the C4 Company, when an APC was hit by 2 RPG-2 rounds from a trench at XT762227.  In the engagement following, artillery fire was placed on the VC positions resulting in 6 VC KIA (BC), a follow up airstrike resulted in 8 VC KIA (Poss).

h.   A search of the target area following the airstrike by Co B, 2d Bn, 14th Inf, resulted in contact with an estimated VC company.  Results of this contact was 13 FC KIA (BC),  7 VC KIA (Poss),  1 VCC, 2 Chicom SMG, and 2 Chicom carbines.

i.    Interrogation of the VCC confirmed that contact with the C4 Company, 7th Bn, 165A Regiment had in fact been established.  The aggressiveness of the individual soldier, artillery and airpower effected a serious defeat on the 7th Bn, 165A Regiment.  From a reported strength of 37 men in the C4 Company, confirmed by the VCC, a total of 19 VC KIA (BC) and 15 VC KIA (Poss) casualties were sustained by this unit.  

j.    Following the defeat of the C4 Company, 7th Bn, 165A Regiment, VC activity regressed to occasional sniper fire from cells of 2-3 VC.

k.   On 23 Oct. 66, while extracting A/4/23d Inf, four HUID aircraft were forced down when they sustained hits from small arms and automatic weapons vic XT742198.  A security force was dispatched to the downed aircraft, and was engaged with an unknown size VC force for approximately 11 hours before the aircraft were extracted.  Reports from both combined intelligence operation centers  indicated that friendly elements were in contact with forces of the 2d Bn, 165A Regiment.  Although earlier reports had indicated that the 2d Bn, 165A Regiment was located in the area, the information was not confirmed.
(p4)
l.   Weather did not hamper or prohibit friendly troop movements on tactical air during the operation.

m.  The overall evaluation of the intelligence information gained from source NIGHEN, adjacent local ARVN Headquarters and other local sources is considered B/3.  (Usually reliable, possibly true).  The overall operation security of Operation KALIHI was considered excellent.

9.  Mission:  The mission of KALIHI was to conduct daily small unit operations in the Filhol Plantation to locate and destroy VC forces and supplies, to deny the VC freedom of movement within the Filhol Plantation, to provide early warning of VC  attempts to attack the 25th Infantry Division base camp at Cu Chi, to be prepared to conduct operations vic XT7719 in conjunction with the 1st Infantry Division operations, to conduct combined operations in conjunction with elements of the 1st Bn, 7th ARVN Regiment, to conduct civil affairs activities in Phu Hoa Dong to include assistance to dependents of the 21st Bn, 7th ARVN Regiment and to conduct saturation patrolling to prevent infiltration into the village of Vinh Cu.

10. Concept of Operation:  The concept of KALIHI was to conduct squad, platoon, company, and battalion operations in the Filhol Plantation and areas within the 1st Brigade base defense area of responsibility.  Each 1st Brigade battalion was given a patrol area of responsibility in which to conduct nightly ambush patrols and operations to provide early warning and to deny the VC freedom of movement in the areas adjacent to the base camp area.  1st Brigade forces which were not committed to other operations were used to conduct company and larger size operations in the KALIHI area of operations.  The operation received fire support from artillery in the division base camp area.   Operation Blackjack (Incl. 1) was conducted in the KALIHI AO by the 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav as a separate operation not controlled by this headquarters.

11. Execution:  The operation was initiated with FRAG  O 49, HQ, 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div, 14 Sep 66 based on verbal orders.  FRAG  O 23-66, HQ, 25th Inf Div was received on 15 Sep 66.  The operation was terminated on 14 Nov 66 by verbal orders, HQ, 25th INF Div.

15  September                   
 (p5)

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  Co C with a platoon from 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf moved into the Filhol Plantation crossing the LD at 0700 hours.  S&D operations were conducted to an objective area vic XT655193 where a company overnight base was established.  At 1455 hours the Mech Inf platoon captured 1 VCS vic XT636193.  No further contact made.  Ambush patrols were dispatched in the vicinity of the company base.  

Civil Affairs/Psy/Ops:   At 0900 hours the Brigade S5 presented 15 solatium boxes to families in Vinh Cu who suffered property losses resulting from combat operations.  A MEDCAP II was conducted in Vinh Cu treating 85 patients and distributing 45 bars of soap.  A leaflet drop was conducted vic XT7020, XT7018, XT7218, and XT7220.  10,000 weapon reward leaflets and 3,300 JUSPAO newspapers were distributed.  

16  September

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  Co C conducted S&D operations from it's overnight base to OP Ann Margaret and
returned to base camp without incident.  The attached mech plat conducted S&D operations to an objective  area vic XT6221.  At 1410 hours the platoon received 2 rounds SA fire vic XT625220.  The fire was returned with no observed BDA.  The platoon then conducted S&D operations to OP Ann Margaret and returned to base camp closing at 1615 hours.

17   September

       4th Bn, 23d Inf:  Co A departed 0705 hours on a company S&D operation in the Filhol Plantation.  At 0820 hours Co A destroyed two (2) bunkers (7' x 6' x 15') at XT682177.  At 0852 hours Co A destroyed one (1) tunnel at XT681167.  At 0922 hours Co A destroyed one (1) tunnel at XT685167.  At 0945 hours Co A destroyed two (2) spider holes at XT685166;  another tunnel was destroyed at 1005 hours at XT665169.  Co A located and destroyed one (1) hand grenade booby trap and two (2) AT mines (8” in diameter and 4” thick) XT686183 at 1145 hours.  At 1200 hours Co A found and destroyed two (2) AT mines and one (1) booby trapped hand grenade at XT686183.  At 1345 hours Co A located and destroyed one (1) booby trapped 4.2” mortar round at XT675178.  Co A closed battalion base camp at 1450hours.

Civil Affairs/Psy Ops:  At 0800 hours 10,000 terror leaflets and 10,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were air dropped vic XT6918.

18  September

     4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  The battalion continued KALIHI with Co C conducting an airmobile assault on a LZ vic XT647195 at 1012 hours.  The LZ was secured by a  platoon from Co A, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf.  The units conducted S&D operations in the area and established an overnight base vic XT645192.  At 1415 hours the mech plat destroyed 1 AT mine vic XT638213.  At 1615 hours the mech plat received 7 rifle grenades vic XT638218.  Fire was returned with 50 Cal MG with no further battle damage assessment.  The units closed into a forward base area at 1625 hours, completed resupply operations by helicopter and dispatched saturation ambush patrols.

19  September                   

 (p6)

4th Bn,  23d Inf:  Co C with attachments continued S&D operations in the AO moving at 0800
hours along a route toward the Cu Chi base.  At 0950 hours Co C encountered a booby trap vic XT632185 resulting in 1 WIA and 1 KIA.  The area was covered by fire with SA by 3 VC.  1 WIA was received from SA fire.  The fire was returned with SA and artillery with no further BDA.  At 1100 hours Co C located a tunnel complex at XT632185, and destroyed 2 M79 rounds, 4 rifle grenades, 1 bag assorted documents, 100 lbs rice, 4  105 rds as mines, 1 155mm rd as a mine, 1  60mm mortar round,  4 M16 magazines.  The documents were evacuated.    At 1305 hours a M113 from the mech plat detonated an AT mine vic XT632185.  At 1440 hours Co C destroyed 1 AT mine and 2 grenades vi XT630180.  The units returned to the Cu Chi base closing at 1840 hours.  At 2110 hours a patrol in the AO engaged with SA and killed (poss) 1 VC vic XT649174.     

20  September

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  At 0805 hours Co A conducted an airmobile movement to vic XT712188 where a
base was established to conduct BUDDY operations with the 1/7 ARVN.  The unit conducted S&D operations in the area in conjunction with 1/7 ARVN with negative contact.  The units closed into the forward base area at 1440 hours.  The company provided the ARVN elements with assistance in constructing defensive positions with overhead cover.  

Civil Affairs/PsyOps:  A MEDCAP was conducted in Vinh Cu with 65 patients treated.

                                    21    September
     4th Bn, 23d  Inf:  At 0750 hours Co A moved to conduct S&D operations vic XT7018 with 1/7 ARVN blocking on the north and west.  At 0815 hours 1/7 ARVN received 2 M79 rounds and 2 rifle grenades vic XT707198 and received SA fire from vic XT712179.  Fire was returned with no further BDA.  At 0825 hours Co A destroyed an AP mine vic XT703183.  At 0840 hours Co A received 3 rds SA fire vic XT703183 from an undetermined location.  At 1008 Co A received SA fire vic XT702181.  The fire was returned with no further BDA.  At 1021 hours Co A received SA fire vic XT702181 with 1 WIA.  Fire was returned in the general suspected direction with no BDA.  AT 1112 Co A received AW fire vic XT700180.  The fire was returned with no BDA.  At 1128 the unit received heavy SA fire vic XT700180.  Fire was returned with artillery and SA.  A search of the area produced no BDA.  Three (3) US WIA resulted from this action.  At 1220 hours Co A engaged 3 VC with SA vic XT700182 resulting in 2 VC KIA (poss).  
At 1515 hours Co A received 1 WIA from SA fire vic XT700182.  Fire was returned with no further BDA.  The units returned to the forward base at 1615 hours.

      Civil Affairs/PsyOps.  A MEDCAP was conducted in Phu Hoa Dong (XS7118) treating 115 patients.

22  September                   

 (p7)

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  At 0750 hours a platoon from 3 / 4 Cav departed base camp and joined
Co A to conduct a S&D operation from their base through the Filhol, on an axis toward OP Ann Margaret and back to the Cu Chi base.  At 0930 hours the unit destroyed a booby trapped Chicom grrenade vic XT693187.  At 1130 hours they destroyed 5 spider holes vic XT678180.  The units closed back into the Cu Chi base at 1300 hours.

Civil Affairs/psyOps:  A MEDCAP was conducted in Vinh Cu, treating 75 patients and distributing 48 bars of soap.  In the village of Phu Hoa Dong, 250 lbs of men's and women's clothing were distributed.  In addition, 200 ea Reward for Weapons by type (leaflets), 200 ea Reward for Info leaflets, and 10,000 Info. Leaflets were distributed.  

23   September

4th Bn,  23d Inf:  At 0720 hours Co B conducted an airmobile combat assault on an LZ
vic XT670204.  This was preceded by an air and artillery preparation of the area. At 0725 hours the lift elements received SA fire in the LZ from an undetermined location.  At 1150 hours the company destroyed 2 punji pits, a booby trapped grenade and some small fortifications vic XT672202.  The unit continued S&D operations in the vicinity and then toward OP Ann Margaret closing into the Cu Chi base at 1320 hours.

24  September

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  At 0840 hours Co A dispatched two platoons into the Filhol plantation
to conduct S&D operations vic XT6518 and XT6718 respectively.  No contact was made and the platoons returned, closing the Cu Chi base camp at 1300 hours.

25  September

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:  Ambush operations were conducted in the AO with no contact.

26  September

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:   At 0745 hours Co C conducted an airmobile combat assault on a LZ vi
XT645213 and moved to conduct S&D operations vic XT6419 where an overnight base is established.  A helicopter conducting the lift received 1-5 rounds SA fire vic XT645199.  The unit had no contact and moved to its forward base area at 1300 hours.  Saturation ambush patrols were dispatched in the area with no contact.

27  September                 
 (p8)

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:   At 0800 hours Co C commenced S&D operations moving on an axis
toward OP Ann Margaret.  At XT6330189 at 1125 hours, Co C destroyed one (1) AT mine, two (2) booby traps,  three (3) grenades and one (1) house with bunker and short tunnel.  At 1215 hours vic XT626188, Co C located a tunnel with one (1) US carbine, documents and one (1) bottle of wine.  The tunnel was destroyed and the other items were evacuated.  At 1330 hours vic XT625180 Co C received three (3) WIAs from a booby trap.  They were evacuated by a Dust-off.  The following heat casualties resulted:  (2) at 1415 hours;  (4) at 1600 hours;  (3) at 1710 hours.  All were evacuated by dust-off.  Co C closed battalion base camp at 1840 hours.

Civil Affairs/PsyOps:   Approximately 450 children from 2 schools in Vinh Cu were given the following items this afternoon to help them celebrate the Vietnamese holiday of Trung Thu (Mid-Autumn Festival):  300 ceremonial lanterns,  158 cakes,  200 packages of candy,  300 individual toys,  600 small packages of crackers.  The children were well behaved, generally appreciative of the gifts and thanked the US troops by singing songs of appreciation..  Persons attending the event in addition to the children were the Battalion Commander 4/23d Inf, village chief, director of schools, teachers and village elders.  PIO coverage by 1st Brigade and 25th Inf Div.  A  MEDCAP treated 80 patients.  

28   September

4th Bn,  23d Inf:  At 1400 hours Co B departed base camp to conduct S&D operations vic
XT6817.  The unit searched and destroyed a tunnel vic XT676171 at 1515 hours.  At 1800 hours the company established a forward base vic XT686176.  Fifteen punji pits were destroyed in the area.  Ambush patrols were dispatched in the area.  At 2155 hours a patrol engaged an undetermined number of VC vic XT691175 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 US WIA.

29  September

4th Bn,  23d Inf:  Co B continued S&D operations vic XT6816.  At 1045 hours the Co
searched and destroyed 3 tunnels vic XT676167.  The unit returned to the Cu Chi base with negative contact closing at 1215 hours.

Civil Affairs/PsyOps:   A MEDCAP was conducted in Vinh Cu treating 75 patients and distributing 25 bars of soap.  Battalion S5 attended a village celebration of Trung Thu.  The village, on a whole, accepted the US forces.  Vietnamese-US relations were furthered.

30  September

4th Bn,  23d  Inf:   At 1345 hours Co C conducted an airmobile assault on a LZ vic
XT620220 and conducted S&D operations to an objective area vic XT6320.  At 1530 hours the unit searched and destroyed a tunnel vic XT629217.  At 1645 hours the unit destroyed 1,000 lbs loose rice and captured assorted documents vic XT629217.  An overnight base was established at XT639200 and ambush patrols dispatched.  Two VC were engaged with artillery vic XT629215 at 1348 hours with no BDA due to dense cover.
                                        (p9)

1  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:  At 0905 hours Co C commenced S&D operations from the overnight
base area to an objective area vic XT6619.  The unit then returned to the Cu Chi base by air with  negative contact, having a platoon stay behind ambush vic XT632180.  The company returned, closing at 1520 hours.  At 1800 hours the patrol received 2 WIA from a booby trap at XT632180.    At 1730 hours a command helicopter apprehended a VCS attempting to hide in a stream at XT618193.

Civil Affairs/Psy Ops:   The 4/23d Inf distributed 25 school books to the Vinh Cu school.  A leaflet drop was conducted vic XT7017 - XT7119.  5,000 Chieu Hoi #189,  2,000 Chieu Hoi #938 and 1,000 Terror #153 were dropped.  25 “Allied Might” posters were posted in Vinh Cu.

2  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   Co B continued KALIHI with airmobile assault at 1500 hours into a LZ
vic XT695172 and conducted S&D operations to an objective area vic XT695173.  At 1353 hours Co B located and destroyed one (1) 81mm mortar round vic XT699174.  At 1400 hours Co B located and retained anti-American propaganda at XT691120.  Co B arrived at obj vic XT695172 at 1420 hours.  At 1515 hours Co B destroyed two (2) tunnels, two (2) 60mm mortar rounds, two (2) AT mines and two (2) grenades at XT695171.  At 2215 hours Co B received two (2) sniper rounds from XT697170.  Fire was returned; no casualties resulted.

3  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued operations in the Filhol Plantation with a S&D
BUDDY operation.  Co B joined by a platoon (-). 3 / 4 Cav conducted S&D operations in an area vic XT6917, XT6915, XT7019 and XT7119 with 1/7 ARVN.  The Cav plat moved from the Cu Chi base joining Co B in the AO.  At 1035 hours the ARVN unit linked up with Co B vic XT700180 to conduct joint operations in the AO.  At 1050 hours ARVN received SA fire vic XT700180.  Fire was returned with unknown results.  At 1345 hours the units began S&D operations toward their respective bases.  At 1445 hours Co B searched and destroyed a tunnel with a room vic XT695182.  At 1715 hours Co B destroyed a 250 lb bomb vic XT696173.  The company moved to a forward base vic XT695173 at 1745 hours leaving a stay behind platoon ambush vic XT698178.

Civil Affairs/PsyOps:   The 4/23d Inf distributed 50 children's books to the school in Vinh Cu (XT6614).  The battalion coordinated with the Vinh Cu hamlet chief to remove a grave in the vic of the Cu Chi base entrance.

                    4    October               
     (p10)

     4th Bn,  23d  Inf:   The battalion continued operations in the Filhol Plantation with Co B and the Cav platoon (-).  At 0825 hours the Cav platoon received 30-40 rounds SA fire while extracting the platoon stay behind ambush.  The fire was returned with 50 Cal and SA with no further results.  At 0915 hours a M113 from the Cav plat received fire from a 57mm RR or RPG-2 with no hits vic XT695170.  Two (2) US WIA resulted from the frag effect of the round.  At 1240 hours Co B destroyed one (1) booby trapped 60mm mortar round vic XT694171.  At 1430 hours Co B stay behind ambush was sprung on six (6) VC.  One (1) VC KIA (Poss) resulted.  Co B closed base camp 1530 hours.  Co A dispatched two (2) squad size ambush patrols in the brigade TAOR with negative contact.  

Civil Affairs/PsyOps:   The 2/14th Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 85 patients and distributing 30 bars of soap.

5  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued operations in the Filhol Plantation.  At 1600
     hours Co C conducted a one (1) platoon airmobile to LZ vic XT632174.  Co C platoon moved to
vic XT629195 and established ambush for the night.  Another platoon from Co C departed OP Ann Margaret 1530 hours and established ambush vic XT683166.  Both Co C patrols had negative contact.  

Civil Affairs/PsyOps:  The 4/23d Inf and 1st Bde S5s met with the Phu Hoa District Chief at Phuy Hoa Dong (XT7017) to discuss CA plans for the hamlet.

6  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued small unit operations in the Filhol Plantation.  
Co B dispatched five (5) squad sized ambushes in the Filhol Plantation and three (3) fire team sized ambushes in the Vinh Cu area.  Locations of squad sized ambushes were XT649180, XT658180, XT659142, and XT673143.  All patrols reported negative contact.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion was introduced with KALIHI in the Filhol Plantation with Co B with one platoon (-tanks) 3 / 4 Cav moving at 1245 hours to conduct S&D operations vic XT6617 to XT6917.  At 1300 hours the company searched an destroyed a tunnel vic XT674170.  At 1330 hours they destroyed three fresh spider hole and a hole 4'x 6'x 4' vic XT674170.  An overnight base was established vic XT690175 at 1445  hours and ambush patrols dispatched.  

7  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with A conducting an airmobile
assault into a LZ vic XT661193 at 0920 hours and conducting S&D operation to an objective area
vic XT6519.  The company destroyed a 105 dud vicinity XT666194 at 0930.  At 1145 hours they destroyed 2  105mm duds, spider hole and a well vic XT656197.  The company established an overnight base and dispatched ambushes.                  
    (p11)
     2d Bn,  14th Inf:  The battalion continued KALIHI in the FILHOL with Co B and attached
Cav plat (-) conducting S&D operations to an objective area vic XT6916 and XT6918 to OP Ann Margaret and returned to the Cu Chi base at 1100 hours.  At 0750 hours Co B detonated a grenade booby trap vic XT692175.  Three US WIA resulted.  At 0850 hours a M113 detonated a grenade booby trap vic XT692176.  At 0825 hours Co B received SA fire vic XT692176.  The fire was suppressed with a flame track, SA, and Artillery.  No further BDA.  At 0845 Co B destroyed 2 VC structures, 4 spider holes, and a tunnel vic XT692175.  At 1030 hours leaving a platoon behind ambush vic XT680173.  

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The Bde CO and staff met with the Phu Hoa District Chief and his  US Advisor to discuss pacification plans for Phu Hoa Dong.  The 2nd Bn 14th Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 85 patients and distributing 25 bars of soap, 1,000 sandbags and 10 rolls of concertina wire were given to the PF/RF outpost in Vinh Cu.

     4th Bn,  23d Inf:  S5 flew to Phu Hoa Dong to coordinate activities with senior advisor.  At 090930 hours 4th Bn 23d Inf made a leaflet drop from XT6021 to XT6222.  Types included 5,000 ea #146, 2,000 ea #040-1,  1,000 ea #SP938 and 1,000 ea #216.

8  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued operations in the FILHOL Plantation with Co
A and a plat (-tanks) 3 /4 Cav.  At 0715 hours during Co A's supply extraction a Hornet helicopter encountered power failure and landed vic XT646207.  Co C moved and secured the downed helicopter at 1045 hours.  At 1110 hours the downed helicopter was extracted by CH-47 aircraft.  At 1335 hours approximately two (2) automatic weapons and (4) semi-automatic weapons opened fire on Co A.  It was believed the VC were in a “box-type ambush” and prematurely triggered the ambush.  SA and M-79 fire was returned plus artillery fire was called in on the VC position.  No friendly casualties resulted.  Co A moved and secured the platoon from 3 /4 Cav who had just recovered five (5) immobilized tracks.  Both Co A and platoon 3 /4 Cav established base vic XT641193 and ambushes were conducted in the area.  AT 2115 hours an ambush patrol for Co B received 2 grenades vic XT650175.  The action was returned with SA and Artillery.  A search of the suspected area produced no further BDA.

9  October                  

  (p12)

4th Bn,  23d Inf:  The battalion continued operations in the FILHOL Plantation with  
Co A and the Cav (-) plat.  The units commenced S&D operations at 0800 hours to vic XT645222 to an objective area vic XT 650192 where an overnight base was established at 1545 hours and ambush patrols conducted.  At 1405 hours Company destroyed a concrete bunker 5'x 5'x5' vic XT656206.  At 1240 hours Co A destroyed a 105mm dud vic XT654213.  At 1806 hours the Company adjusted artillery on 2 VC vic XT660193 resulting in 2 VC KIA (Poss).

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The Battalion continued KALIHI with Co A conducting S&D operations from vic OP Ann Margaret to XT6818 commencing 0900 hours.  At 1130 hours Co A received 3-5 SA rds and 5 rifle grenades in response to recon by fire vic XT688176.  They returned with fire and movement using SA, AW and artillery.  A search of the suspect area produced no BDA, however, fresh digging in old trenches was discovered.  At 1455 hours the company established an overnight position and patrol base vic XT689181.

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The 4th Bn 23d Inf conducted a leaflet drop of 5,000 Chieu Hoi #146,  2,000 Terror #153-66,  1,000 Chieu Hoi #983 and 1,000 requests for information #216 at XT6021, XT6022, XT6221 and XT6222.

10  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The Battalion continued operations in the FILHOL with Co A and the
Cav plat (-) conducting S&D operations from the forward base to vic XT648183 to OP Ann Margaret closing the Cu Chi base camp at 1007 hours.  A plat stay behind ambush was left vic XT653191.  At 0905 hours the Company destroyed an 8” and a 105mm dud vic XT652186.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued operation KALIHI with Co A conducting S&D operations from the overnight base to objective areas vic XT6918 and XT6916.  The company returned to the Cu Chi base at 1145 hours leaving a platoon stay behind ambush vic XT960165.

11  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued operations in the FILHOL with the platoon
ambush vic XT653191.  The unit returned to the Cu Chi base at 0735 hours with negative contact.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued operations in the FIJLHOL with a platoon ambush vic XT690165,  The unit returned to the Cu Chi base at 0815 hours with negative contact.

Civil Affairs / PsyOps:  The 2/14th Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 104 patients and distributing 35 bars of soap.

12  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued operations in the FILHOL Plantation with a
platoon size ambush vic XT657186.  The unit returned to the Cu Chi base at 0800 hours with negative contact.                                       

 (p13)
     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with a battalion S&D operation.  Co C and the recon platoon at 0800 hours conducted an airmobile assault on a LZ vic 690210 following an artillery and air preparation.  The landing was completed at 0835 hours and the elements moved to secure a second LZ vic XT681221.  The LZ was secured at 0835 hours.  One platoon from 3 /4 Cav moved from the Cu Chi base to join the 2/14th Inf at LZ 1.  The movement of the Cav platoon was inhibited by poor trafficability and the platoon was reoriented toward LZ 2.  At 1148 hours Co B was landed at LZ 2 and was joined by the Cav platoon.  The battalion (-) then conducted S&D operations to an objective area vic XT6624.  At 1130 hour Co C destroyed 4 bunkers with interconnecting tunnels vic XT685219.  At 1650 hours resupply helicopters received 8-10 rounds SA fire from vic XT672242 with no hits.  Gunships were used to suppress the fire.  No search of the area was made because it was outside the Division TAOR on the north side of the Saigon River.  A battalion overnight base was established vic XT667241 and saturation ambushes conducted.

Civil Affairs / Psyops:   The 4/23d Inf distributed 50 JUSPAO History Books to the school and 500 JUSPAO newspapers in Vinh Cu.

13  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI in an expanded  AO which included
the area east of the Filhol Plantation to the Saigon River.  At 0745 hours Co C moved from the Cu Chi base to conduct S&D operations to an objective area vic XT6914 and to secure to battalion MSR between Cu Chi and XT728143.  A company overnight base was established vic XT700148 at 1521 hours.  Coordination was established with the 1/7 and 4/7 ARVN battalions in Phu Hoa District.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:  The battalion (-) continued its operations in the Filhol Plantation with S&D operations vic XT6522 and XT6723.  Co B and C with the Cav plat (-) and flame-tracks commenced operations at 1021 hours following a CAS mission in the area.  At 1205 hours, Co B and the Cav plat engaged a VC company following an artillery and CAS mission on the VC positions which had been observed by a FAC.  The VC were engaged with SA, artillery and 50 Cal and the flame-tracks.  A M113 received 2 hits from a RPG-2 and the VC returned fire with SA and AW.  The US forces employed movement and fire to pursue the VC who broke contact and fled at 1240 hours.  The action resulted in 1 VCC (WIA) captured, 11 VC KIA (BC),  15 VC KIA (Poss), and 5 VC weapons captured.  US losses were 7 WIA and one M113 damaged but operational.  At 1315 hours Co C searched and destroyed a tunnel vic XT659234.  The battalion(-) closed into an overnight base vic XT672232 at 1715 hours and dispatched saturation ambush patrols.  

Civil Affairs / PsyOps:   The 2/14th Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 120 patients and distributing 50 bars of soap.  300 pickets and stakes were given to PF forces in Vinh Cu.

14    October                   

 (p14)

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued Operation KALIHI.  At 0745 hours Co B and battalion headquarters (-) commenced movement by foot 0730 hours for AO vic XT725149.  Co B and battalion headquarters (-) closed forward base at 1030 hours.  Vehicle convoy departed Cu Chi at 1000 hours and closed forward base a t1050 hours.  Battalion (-) devoted remainder of day establishing the forward base with bunkers and overhead cover.  Co's B and C each sent out two (2) patrols with negative contact.

2d Bn, l4th Inf:   The battalion (-) continued KALIHI in the Filhol with S&D operations to objective areas vic XT6722 and XT6821.  At 1100 hours an airborne observer engaged 5 VC with Arty vic XT666239 resulting in 4 VC KIA (poss).  At 1125 hours Co C and the Cav plat (-) encountered a booby trapped and mined area, vic XT675231.  9 US WIA and 1 M113 damaged resulted.  The area was cleared.  In the same area the units searched and destroyed 3 structures and a tunnel all booby trapped.  The mined area was approximately 200 feet long on both sides of the road.  An overnight base was established vic XT684218 and saturation patrolling conducted.  
Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The brigade S5 visited the families of 2 boys who were killed picking up a 40mm grenade dud in the perimeter area.  Assistance is being provided.  A leaflet drop directed toward the 165A Regt with 10,000 safe conduct passes and 10,000 special leaflets vic XT6623.  A loud-speaker mission was flown by the 246th Psywar Co with the same theme in the area.     

15  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI in the AO.  At 0730 hours Co B
conducted a joint search and clear operation with 16th Co 4/7 ARVN west of the battalion base to the village of Tan Hoa XT7014.  Co B found five tunnels at 0930 hours vic XT701145.  One tunnel had four small tunnels leveling out to spider holes and was 500 meters long.  These were searched and destroyed.  At 1010 hours vic XT695140 one large tunnel was located.  Chieu Hoi stated this tunnel was used by the VC to enter and leave the village.  The tunnel's dimensions were 2 ½' x 3 ½'.  Length of tunnel was unknown due to the water in the tunnel.  The tunnel was destroyed.  A  M79 manual and some M79 plastic containers were found in a house at 1120 hours vic XT695144.  These were evacuated along with a female suspect from the same location.  At 1345 hours Co B received small arms fire at XT692146.  Fire was returned and one VC was wounded.  The VC entered a tunnel and was later discovered dead by ARVN troops working with Co B.  A further check resulted in two VC KIA (poss) by blowing the tunnel.  At 1350 hours Co B received 9 rounds of SA fire vic XT692146.  Fire was returned with unknown results.  Co B closed forward base vic XT726150 at 1650 hours.  The forward base sent out 4 ambush patrols.  All reported negative contact.                             

 (p15)
     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued operations in the Filhol Plantation with S&D operations in objective areas vic XT6821 to XT6820 commencing at 0835 hours.  At 1040 hours the Cav plat (-) searched and destroyed a freshly dug tunnel vic XT684218.  At 1325 hours Co B destroyed 5 VC structures with adjoining bunkers vic XT698209.  At 1356 hours the battalion forward base received 7 rounds SA fire from an undetermined location.  At 1500 hours a resupply helicopter received 7-8 rounds AW fire vic XT701205.  The battalion overnight and patrol base was established vic XT699209.  At 2130 hours a Co A patrol engaged a VC squad with M79, SA and LAW.  The action resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 4 VC KIA (Poss).  At 2314 hours Co C engaged a VC sampan with SA vic XT692214 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

16  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with a S&D BUDDY operation with   
4/7 ARVN.  One Co 4/7 ARVN secured a LZ vic XT760118 for Co B at 0745 hours and then moved to a blocking position vic XT765113.  Co B was helilifted to the LZ at 0745 hours and then moved to blocking positions vic XT740115 and XT749110.  At 0745 hours Co C and 4/7 ARVN conducted S&D operations from vic XT713205 to XT739111.  At 1130 hours Co B detained 7 persons and turned them over to district for interrogation.  At 1235 hours, Co B sank 7 sampans with SA fire vic XT724154.  The elements returned to their respective forward combat bases at 1505 hours.  At 2105 hours a Co C patrol engaged 11-12 VC with SA and mortars vic XT734145.  A search of the area produced no further results.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with S&D BUDDY operations in the
Filhol Plantation.  1/7 ARVN established blocking positions vic XT710200 while the 2/14 conducted S&D operations from vic XT7020 to XT7520.  At 0740 hours a M113 from the Cav plat (-) detonated an AT mine vic XT701208.  The vehicle was disabled and had to be evacuated.  At 1000 hours the recon plat received SA fire while securing the disabled Cav plat (-) M113.  The fire was returned with SA and 50 cal resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (Poss).  At 1045 hours elements from Co C detonated a booby trap vic XT700208 resulting in 1 US WIA.  At 1113 hours Co B received SA fire from a VC in a house using women and children as cover.  The VC was engaged after he was forced from the building but escaped.  AT 1405 hours the recon plat engaged a VC squad vic XT713205 with SA and M79.  The action resulted in 1 VCC WIA, 1 VCS WIA and one US WIA.  The battalion established a defensive base for the night vic XT705208 at 1610 hours.  

Civil Affairs/ PsyOps:  A MEDCAP was conducted in Paris Ton Quoy during which time 100 patients were treated.  
                                                                                               (p16)         and destroy operation commencing 0730 hours.  Co C crossed LD at 0730 hours to occ
17  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with a BUDDY operation.  The
battalion conducted airmobile and BUDDY S&D operation vic XT7313 - XT7510 with 4/7 ARVN commencing 0645 hours.  Co B was air-lifted at 0700 with LZ vic XT76116 and moved along axis to a predetermined blocking position vic XT758098.  16th Co, 4/7 ARVN occupied blocking position vic XT51103.  At 0730 hours Co C crossed LD to commence a S&D operation along an axis pushing toward Co B's blocking position.  4/7 ARVN (-) crossed LD at 0730 hours and pushed toward 16th Co blocking position.  At 1030 hours Co C apprehended two (2) VCS at XT755116.  VCS's were evacuated through ARVN channels.  Both 4/7 ARVN and 4/23 had negative contact during the operation.  4/7 ARVN closed base camp at 1447 hours.  Co B closed the battalion forward base at 1440 hours.  Co C closed the forward at 1630 hours.
(P17)   
     2d Bn, 14th Inf:   The battalion continued S&D operations in the Filhol Plantation conducting operations from vic XT6916 to XT7020.  At 0840 hours a M113 from the Cav plat detonated an AT mine vic XT695171 resulting in 1 US WIA and a damaged M113.  At 0930 hours the Cav plat received AW fire vic XT710193.  The fire was returned with SA and 50 cal MG with no further BDA.  At 1415 hours a heliborne FO adjusted Arty on 4 VC vic XT696210 resulting in 4 VC KIA (Poss).  At 1445 hours the Cav plat destroyed a log bunker vic XT704206.  At 1530 hours the Cav plat destroyed a VC bicycle vic XT698210.  At 1630 hours the battalion received 5-6 rounds of 60mm mortar fire in their overnight base vic XT6622.  Counter-mortar fire was fired with Arty.

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The 2/14 Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 150 patients and distributing 50 bars of soap.  The 4/23 Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Paris Tan Qui (XT7214) treating 75 patients and distributing 300 bars of soap.  The 246th Psywar Co flew a loudspeaker mission vic XT7416 warning VN personnel in the area of impending bombings.   Two Chieu Hoi's rallied from the area.  They spoke of the influence of leaflet drops and loudspeaker missions.

19 October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with S&D BUDDY operations.  4/23
Inf conducted a joint search and clear operation with 4/7 ARVN (-) commencing 0600 hours.  Co B and 15th Co, 4/7 ARVN crossed LD at 0630 hours.  Recon plat 4/23 occupied blocking position XT687148 at 0630 hours.  Intelligence plat 4/7 ARVN occupied blocking position vic XT694133 and XT699139 effective 0630 hours.  Co B and 15th Co, 4/7 ARVN moved along designated route pushing toward blocking positions occupied by recon plat 4/23.  Both 15th Co and Co B had negative contact and closed their respective base camps at 1230 hours.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion (-) continued BUDDY operations in the Filhol Plantation from XT6920 to XT7219 and XT6916.  An overnight patrol base was established at 1600 hours vic XT690165.  4/7 ARVN conducted S&D operations and established blocking positions vic XT7119 for the operations.  At 0755 the 1/7 ARVN received 3 rounds SA fire vic XT713180.  They returned the fire with no further results.  At 0801 hours the 1/7 ARVN captured two VC with carbines vic XT713180.  The VC and equipment were evacuated through ARVN channels.  At 0820 hours the 1/7 ARVN engaged and killed 1 VC with SA and captured two suspects vic XT722183.  At 1115 hours Co C 2/14 received SA fire from an estimated 5 VC XT710208 with SA and Arty.  A search of the area produced no further BDA.  At 1155 hours Co C searched and destroyed 5 VC structures vix XT712208.  At 1530 hours Co C received SA and AW fire from 2-5 VC vic XT690165 resulting in 1 US WIA.  The fire was returned with Arty fire and movement with no further BDA.
                                             (p18)
Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The 2/14 conducted a MEDCAP in Phu Hoa Dong treating 40 patients.  The brigade flew a loudspeaker mission vic XT7416 with tapes made by recent Chieu Hois.  10,000 safe conduct leaflets were dropped in conjunction with the missions.

20  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued BUDDY operations in the KALIHI AO.  The
4/23 Inf conducted search and destroy operation vic village of Ap Nha Viec (XT7416) commencing 0700 hours.  Co C in conjunction with 3B 3 /4 Cav conducted a coordinated search and destroy along assigned axis.  Co C located and destroyed 600 lbs of rice vic XT740166.  One plat Co B captured one VCS vic XT728168.  The operation resulted in no other contact with Co C and 3B 3 /4 Cav closing battalion forward base at 1410 hours.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued BUDDY operations in the Filhol Plantation with the 1/7 ARVN.  The battalion (-) conducted S&D operations in objective areas vic XT6916 to XT7118 and returned to an overnight and patrol base vic XT690168 at 1530 hours.  The 1/7 ARVN conducted S&D operations to vic XT7118 where they established blocking positions for the 2/14 Inf.  At 0830 hours Co B searched and destroyed a tunnel vic XT690166.  At 0900 hours the Cav plat received 4-5 rounds SA fire vic XT690173.  The fire was neutralized with SA and 50 cal MG fire with no further BDA.  At 1245 hours Co B captured and evacuated 37 suspects vic XT713184.  They were evacuated through ARVN channels.  At 1305 hours the recon plat engaged 2 VC with SA vic XT687167.  One weapon was captured but the VC escaped.  At 1000 hours a M113 from the Cav plat detonated an AT mine vic XT702180 resulting in one M113 damaged.  At 1010 hours Co B received 5-6 SA rounds vic XT702176.  The fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA (Poss).  At 1315 hours the recon plat captured a suspect vic XT713187 who was evacuated through ARVN channels.  At 1515 hours Co B detonated a grenade booby trap vic XT692168 resulting in 1 US WIA.  

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The 4/23 Inf conducted a MEDCAP vic Paris Tan Qui treating 35 patients.  The 2/14 Inf conducted a dental and regular MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 124 medical patients, 14 dental patients, extracting 24 teeth and distributing 55 bars of soap.  

21  October                

    (p19)

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with S&D operations.  The 4/23 Inf
conducted search and destroy operation vic village Trung An (XT7615) commencing 0530 hours.  Co B departed battalion forward base at 0530 hours and linked up with 3B 3 /4 Cav at prescribed location, then proceeded on a coordinated S&D along designated axis.  While enroute, Co B received SA sniper fire vic XT752150 returning the fire with negative results.  In addition, a mine field located vic XT752150 (approx 200 meters x 100 meters) was partially destroyed by artillery fire.  At coordinates XT750150 Co B located and destroyed one booby trap.  Again SA fire was received vic XT759153;  fire was returned with negative results.  In the same location, three bunkers were located and destroyed.  At 1130 hours Co B located and destroyed a hut for two personnel containing one helmet liner and one m79 round.  Co B received one WIA while removing a booby trap at 1220 hours vic XT764153, not serious enough for evacuation.  Co B and 3B 3 /4 Cav closed battalion forward base at 1300 hours.  Battalion forward sent out four ambush patrols.  All reported negative contact.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued S&D operations in the Filhol Plantation in objective areas vic XT6717 and XT6817.  The battalion returned to the Cu Chi base at 1420 hours leaving a plat stay behind ambush vic XT690165.  At 1730 hours the ambush engaged 2 VC with SA vic XT690165 resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and one assault rifle captured.  The plat then returned to the Cu Chi base camp closing at 1810 hours.  The Cav plat and other attachments were released upon closing the Cu Chi base camp.

   22  October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued S&D operations in the KALIHI AO.  Co B
conducted airmobile operation to LZ vic XT750205 commencing 0830 hours.  3B 3 /4 Cav occupied blocking position vic XT741169.  At 0845 hours 3B 3 /4 Cav enroute to blocking position, hit an AT mine vic XT739155 resulting in no casualties.  Co A upon landing on LZ, apprehended one female VCS at XT752205.  In the same area, Co A located and destroyed 2 tons of loose rice, 200 lbs of salt and in addition, found one male VC KIA, one male VC WIA, and two female WIA resulting from an airstrike and artillery prep on the LZ.  At1135 hours vic XT753204 Co A destroyed one sampan and located a radio repair kit, a voltage regulator, one 15mm movie projector and film.  In addition Co A found two 9mm sub-machine guns, ten pistol belts with 20 grenades, one sleeping bag and one first-aid pouch located at XT751201 at 1210 hours.  Co A received sniper fire at 1315 hours at XT748202 resulting in 1 US WIA.  The fire was returned resulting in four VC KIA (BC).  At 1425 hours Co A again received heavy SA fire at XT746199 resulting in three US WIAs.  Gunships were called in on the VC position.  As Co A was extracting at 1617 hours, the company received an undetermined number of M79 rounds resulting in one helicopter being disabled and one US WIA vic XT46199.  At 1633 hours dust-off was completed for WIA on damaged helicopter.  At 1645 hours an immediate CAS mission began in the vic of the VC firing vic XT746199 and was completed at 1715 hours.  This strike resulted in ten VC KIA (poss).  The decision was made to extract the downed chopper by CH47.  At 1850 hours Co A began extracting from PZ.  In the process of extraction, one UH1 helicopter went down 100 meters from PZ.  A second UH1 helicopter went down 150 meters from PZ.  The 3rd chopper went down 170 meters from the PZ.  The 4th chopper went down 250 meters northeast of XT741198 where the other three choppers were generally located.  Approximately 23 personnel from Co A returned to the area of the downed chopper after being extracted.  Upon arrival to the area, the small contingent of Co A came under SA fire at 2000 hours resulting in three WIAs which were (p20) evacuated by dust-off.  One plat of Co B was airlifted to the area and joined the Co A contingent in securing of the downed choppers.  At 2005 hours Co A was still under SA fire and sustained three WIAs.  Dustoff was completed at 2050 hours.  Attempts were made throughout the night to locate and secure the 4th downed helicopter.  These were unsuccessful.  Flare ships remained on station throughout the night and maximum suppressive fire by Arty was employed in the area.

     2d  Bn,  14th Inf:     The battalion continued operation KALIHI with night ambush patrols in the Filhol Plantation with no contact.

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The brigade S5 distributed 400 special messages about the American policy in VN and special notices from ARVN III Corps on the Chieu Hoi policy in the village of Vinh Cu.  The 2/14 air-dropped 500 special dragon leaflets in the area of Phu Hoa Dong.

23  October

4th Bn,   23d Inf:   The situation continued from the previous evening in the vic XT7419.  
The remainder of Co B was lifted to site of downed helicopters commencing 0700 hours.  At 0810 hours, Co A sent ten men to the 4th helicopter to check out the unsecured chopper.  The 4th helicopter was located and one WIA from Co A was discovered.  The search party reached the 4th downed helicopter at 0840 hours.  Co C was airlifted from Cu Chi to battalion forward base at 0900 hours for possible reinforcement.  First downed chopper was evacuated at 0920 hours.  Co B located 15 rounds (7.62) Russian, machette and destroyed one lb of loose rice at XT743196.  At 1010 hours the 2d chopper was extracted.  At 1055 hours 3d chopper was extracted and at 1105 hours the 4th downed chopper was extracted.  Co B destroyed five huts vic XT743200, at 1130 hours.  At 1205 hours Co B found documents vic XT745198.  Co B located and destroyed 5,200 lbs of rice vic XT746198 at 1230 hours.  At 1242 hours Co B located and destroyed 2,000 lbs of loose salt at the same location.  An additional 3,000 lbs of loose rice was destroyed by Co B at 1311 hours at same location.  Co B destroyed an additional 300 lbs of loose rice at 1325 hours vic last location.  Both Companies A and B completed extraction by helicopter to battalion forward base by 1500 hours.  Co C returned to battalion  rear at Cu Chi via helicopter and closed rear area at 1530 hours.  Co A was credited in the previous day's action with 4 VC KIA (BC) and 13 VC KIA (poss).

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with ambush operations in the Filhol Plantation with negative results.

 24    October     
  (p21)
     4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI in the assigned AO with a search and destroy operation vic village Ap An Tram (XT7316) commencing 0700 hours.  Co B and 3B 3 /4 Cav participated in this operation.  While enroute to link up point, 3B 3 /4 Cav received four rounds of SA and six rounds of automatic weapons vic XT740150.  One WIA 3B 3 /4 Cav from friendly M79 round at 0805 hours vic XT740150.  Co B found and destroyed three grenade type booby traps at 0830 hours vic XT742155.  At 1000 hours the Cav plat received effective AW fire vic XT749174.  The plat returned the fire with negative results.  At 1125 hours Co B destroyed three huts and 300 lbs of loose rice at XT747175.  Co B at 1320 hours found one VC KIA resulting from artillery fire vic XT745175.  Co B located 1500 lbs of loose rice vic XT744174.  At the same location Co B destroyed 15 VC structures plus material to build 1 structure and 2 spider holes.  Co B returned to the battalion forward base closing at 1515 hours.  At 1700 hours Co B stay behind plat received probing fire vic XT748160.  The fire was returned with SA and M79 fire resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and one VC KIA (Poss).  The dead VC was carrying 1 US grenade, 2 Chicom grenades and 1 set of US identification tags.  Stay behind patrol closed forward base at 1800 hours.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with a S&D operation in the Filhol Plantation.  Co A commenced movement at 0915 hours to an objective area vic XT690164 where an overnight patrol base was established.  At 1600 hours Co A  received two rifle grenades vic XT690165.  The suspect area was engaged with SA and artillery.  A search of the area produced no observed results.  At 1255 hours Co A located 4 fresh graves, a US helmet and a 60mm mortar round vic XT692164.  At 1555 hours Co A received AW fire vic XT685164.  The fire was returned with SA and a search of the area conducted with no further results.

  25   October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with Co A and a plat 3 /4 Cav
conducting a S&D operation.  The units moved by separate route to vic XT741157 and conducted S&D operations to objective areas vic XT7417 and XT7516.  A plat stay behind reaction force was left vic XT742163.  At 1240 hours a M113 from the Cav plat detonated an AT mine vic XT741160 with no casualties.  The Co (-) and the Cav plat returned to the battalion forward base at 1740 hours.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with Co A continuing S&D operations in objective area vic XT6916 to vic XT6817.  Co A destroyed an AT mine vic XT692170 at 1022 hours.  They returned to the Cu Chi base at 1655 hours.  At 1420 hours Co C conducted an airmobile assault on a LZ vic XT621204 and conducted S&D operations to an objective area vic XT6319.  An overnight patrol base was established vic XT634190 at 1650 hours.  A plat 3 /4 Cav attached to Co C conducted S&D operations from the base camp to XT631198 where it linked up with Co C and continued operations.

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The 4/23 Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Paris Tan Qui treating 300 patients.  The 2/14 Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 170 patients and distributing 70 bars of soap.                                          
(p22)

                    26    October          

     4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with a BUSHMASTER operation initiated by Co B vic XT725152.  The battalion (-) moved from its forward base by air and convoy to Cu Chi closing at 1240 hours.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:  The battalion continued S&D operations in the Filhol Plantation with Co C and the attached Cav plat.  The unit conducted BUDDY operations from XT6319 to XT6420 where an overnight patrol base was established.  

Civil Affair / Psy Ops:   The 4/23 Inf gave 19,000 sandbags to the 1/7 ARVN for improvement of their compound at Phu Hoa Dong.

27   October

4th Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI in the assigned AO with the
BUSHMASTER operation.  At 0332 hours Co B moved from its overnight base toward XT754154 leaving the ambush plat vic XT739154 as a deception location for the BUSHMASTER.  At 0632 the Co received AW fire vic XT753153 while moving toward the objective area.  The fire was returned with SA, AW and artillery.  While moving against the suspected VC positions at 0647 hours the Co encountered a booby trapped area.  3 US WIA resulted from continued VC SA fire.  At 0715 hours a dustoff aircraft received SA fire vic XT753153.  Gunships were called to cover the dustoff.  At 0805 the BUSHMASTER plat received SA fire from an undetermined location vic XT739154.  The fire was returned with SA.  At 0830 hours a gunship received one hit from SA vic XT760150.  The AC returned to the Cu Chi base.  At 0927 Co B sustained 1 WIA from shell fragments vic XT753153.  At 1000 hours Co B received 3 WIA from SA vic XT53153 while trying to maneuver against the VC positions.  The Co continued to maneuver and place SA, AW and Arty fire on the VC positions, XT753153.  .  At 1135 hours Co A and a plat 3 /4 Cav were committed to the action from Cu Chi and the BUSHMASTER plat moved to rejoin the Co.  At 1247 the Cav plat joined Co B in the area and an integrated mech/inf assault of the objective area was conducted.  Co A moved to a reaction force position vic XT64141.  At 1345 hours Co B sustained 1 WIA from a booby trap vic XT759149.  The assault of the objective area was completed and the VC broke contact and fled.  At 1615 hours the Cav plat searched and destroyed a tunnel vic XT760150.  At 1745 hours Co B and the Cav plat were returned to the Cu Chi base camp closing at 1820 hours.  Co A remained in the objective area and established an overnight patrol base vic XT765143.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with S&D operations in the Filhol Plantation.  Co C and a plat 3 /4 Cav moved at 0945 hours to conduct operations in objective areas vic XT6420 to XT6619.  An overnight patrol & Co base established at XT664194.  At 1230 hours Co C located and destroyed 2 AP mines vic XT661169 and 1 AP mine vic XT667197.

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The 2/14 Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 120 patients and distributing 30 bars of soap.
                                             (p23)
                                                                             28    October      the landing, Co C with its Cav plat moved back to base camp closing at 1615 hours andth Bn,  23d Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with the air extraction of Co A from
vic XT769140 at 0730 hours and returning them to the Cu Chi base.

     2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with a S&D BUDDY operation with 1/7 ARVN in the Filhol Plantation.  Co B with an attached Cav plat conducted S&D operations from vic XT675197 to XT698189 with the 1/7 ARVN blocking vic XT701186.  At 1045 hours Co B received 3-5 rounds of SA from an undetermined location vic XT693191.  At 1235 hours they received SA fire vic XT700185.  The fire was returned and neutralized with SA fire.  The action resulted in  1 US WIA.  The unit established an overnight base at vic XT698189 at 1205 hours.  At 2330 hours Co B received 6-7 rifle grenades and 2 60mm mortar rounds from vic XT703187.  The fire was returned with SA, M79 and artillery.  Three US WIA resulted.  A search of the area produced no further BDA.

29  October                   
 (p24)

2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with a S&D BUDDY operations with
1/7  ARVN.  Co B and the attached Cav plat conducted S&D operations from XT705180 to XT698172 where an overnight base was established.  1/7 ARVN established blocking positions during the daylight hours vic XT708177.  At 0021 hours the Co received 1 60mm mortar round in the Co base area from an undetermined location.  At 0700 hours Co B received 3 rounds SA fire vic XT699184.  The fire was returned with SA and M79.  One US WIA resulted.  A search of the suspected area produced nothing further.  At 1000 hours Co B received 1 WIA from a booby trapped 105mm round vic XT704179.  The man DOW.  At 1310 hours Co B engaged a VC vic XT704175 with SA and M79.  The action resulted in 1 VC KIA (poss).  At 1400 two M113s from the Cav plat hit a command detonated mine and received SA fire vic XT702176.  The unit returned fire with 50 cal MG, M79, SA and MG resulting in 6 VC KIA (poss), 7 US WIA and 2 damaged M113s.  The units closed into their overnight base at 1730 hours.  At 1900 hours Co B received 2 WIA from booby traps vic XT698172.

30  October

2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued BUDDY operations in the Filhol Plantation.  
Co B and the Cav plat moved from the overnight base to an objective area vic XT698172 and then returned to the Cu Chi base, closing at 1400 hours.  The Cav plat was released upon closing.  Co A moved from Cu Chi to a blocking position for Co B vic XT701187 at 0800 hours.  The 1/7 ARVN established blocking positions vic XT7118 for the operation.  At 0330 hours a Co B patrol was engaged by an unknown number of VC with claymores (2) and rifle grenades.  The fire was returned with SA, AW, M79 and artillery.  A plat was committed to reinforce the patrol.  The action resulted in 9 VC KIA (Poss), 1 US KIA, and 5 US WIA.  At 0910 Co B engaged a reinforced VC squad in a trench line vic XT698175 with SA, AW, and artillery.  The VC broke contact and withdrew.  The action resulted in 6 WIA.  At 0945 hours a soldier from Co B detonated a mine vic XT698175.  1 US WIA.  At 1300 hours an airborne FO adjusted fire on 4 VC vic XT692192 resulting in 4 VC KIA (Poss).  Co A and its attached Cav plat occupied blocking positions until Co B passed and then continued on S&D operations to an objective area vic XT689166 where an overnight base was established.  At 1525 hours the recon plat joined Co A in the objective area.

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The 2/14 Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 111 patients and distributing 40 bars of soap.

1  November     
2d  Bn,  14th  Inf:     The battalion continued KALIHI with Co A, the recon plat, and a Cav
plat in the Filhol Plantation.  The units continued ambush and S&D operations vic XT6816 and XT6817.  At 1220 hours Co A destroyed a 105mm dud vic XT601172.  A company base was established at XT691163 and saturation patrolling conducted.

2  November

2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued S&D operations in the Filhol Plantation with
Co A.  The plat from 3 /4 Cav was released at 1200 hours and returned to the Cu Chi base. At 0910 hours Co A destroyed a 105mm dud vic XT603173.  At 1300 hours Co A searched and destroyed a 90 foot tunnel vic XT680168.  Three rifle grenades, 15 rounds SA ammo, 1 AT mine, and 1 entrenching tool were captured and evacuated.  At 1637 hours the company established an overnight base vic XT686172.                             
 (p25)

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The brigade air dropped 20,000 #35-67 leaflets vic XT7616, XT7316, XT7119, XT6622, XT6723, and XT7319.

3  November

2d Bn,  14th Inf:   The battalion continued KALIHI with multiple operations in the Filhol
Plantation.  Co continued ambush and S&D operations vic XT6918.  The company returned to the Cu Chi base at 1200 hours to assume defensive missions in the battalion area.  At 0600 hours the battalion (-) Co A moved from base camp to conduct S&D operations and occupy blocking positions vic XT6921 in conjunction with a 2d Brigade operation.  The battalion (-) closed into the objective area at 1040 hours.  At 1925 hours Co C engaged 3 VC vic XT683214.  A search of the area produced 1 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (POSS).  At 2350 hours the recon plat patrol engaged and killed (poss) 3 VC vic XT689211.

Civil Affairs / Psy Ops:   The 2/14 Inf conducted a MEDCAP in Vinh Cu treating 141 patients and distributing 50 bars of soap.  200 JUSPAO and 150 Free World and American History magazines were distributed in Vinh Cu.  

4  November

2d Bn,  14th Inf:  The battalion (-) was recalled from KALIHI to prepare for participation
in other division operations.  The battalion (-) conducted S&D operations from the overnight position to the Cu Chi base camp closing at 1730 hours.  At 1520 hours Co C destroyed 4 105mm duds vic XT663197.

5 November

2d Bn,  14th Inf:    The battalion continued KALIHI with Co C conducting S&D and
ambush operations in the Filhol Plantation vic XT6816.  The company commenced operations at 1332 moving to the objective area.  The company moved into the objective area and established an overnight base at 1600 hours.                                        
6  November

2d Bn,  14th Inf:   Co C returned to base camp closing at 0855 hours.

7 - 14  November      

No 1st Brigade forces were available for KALIHI.

12.  Results:

a.   Personnel.                                  
 (p26)

      (1)   Friendly:               KIA     WIA     MIA     DOW

     2D  Bn,  14th Inf          2     40     0     2
     4th  Bn,  23d  Inf          3     39     0     2
     3d  Sqdn,  4th Cav          9     0     0     0

      (2)   Enemy:          VC KIA (BC)     -38
               VC KIA (poss)       93
               VCC - 3
               VCS - 71

b.  Equipment lost / damaged

(1)  Friendly equipment damaged.

(a)   M113     10
(b)   UH1 aircraft    6

(2)  Enemy equipment destroyed

(a) SA  ammo  -  205
(b) AP mines  -  2
(c) AT mines  -  14
(d) Grenades  -  10
(e) Booby traps  -  60
(f)  Explosives  -  10 lbs
(g) 105mm  -  10
(h) Loose rice  -  10,562 lbs
(i) Salt  -  200 lbs
(j) 60mm mortar rounds  -  3
(k) Claymore  -  1
(l) 4.2  mortar rounds  -  2
(m) Sampans  -  19
(n) Barge  -  1                              (p27)
(o) VC structures  -  102
(p) Bunkers  -  52
(q) Foxholes  -  23
(r) Trenches  -  13
(s) Tunnels  -  35
(t) Punji pits  -  32
(u) Gasoline  -  5 gals

(3) Enemy equipment captured.

(a) Flashlights  -  2
(b) Wire splicer  -  1
(c) Voltmeter  -  1
(d) Microphone  -  1
(e) Voltage regulator  -  1
(f) Hanson meter  -  1
(g) Printed circuit board & tuner  -  1
(h) Transistors & Diodes  -  1 bag
(i) Capasitors  -  1 bag
(j) Pliers  -  2
(k) Screwdrivers  -  3
(l) Movie projector bulbs  -  5
(m) Assorted medicine  -  2 bags
(n) Transistor radio  -  1
(o) Radio tubes  -  6
(p) RCA 16mm movie projector  - 1
(q) 16mm reels of film  -  10                   

(p28)
(r) Wrenches  -  14
(s) Documents  -  8 lbs
(t) AT mines  -  1
(u) Rifle grenades  -  3
(v) Chicom submachine gun  -  2
(w) Type 56 Chicom carbine  -  2
(x) Chicom assault rifles  -  2
(y) US carbines  -  3
(z) Shotgun  -  1
(aa) 9mm rifles  -  2
(bb) Grenade launcher  -  1
(cc) AA mount  -  1
(dd) Sleeping bag  -  1
(ee) Canteens  -  5
(ff)   Commo wire  -  30 feet
(gg) M16 magazine  -  1
(hh) Entrenching tool  -  1
(ii)  Machetes  -  2
(jj) First aid packet  -  1

13.  Administrative Matters:

a.   Resupply:   Throughout operation KALIHI, unit resupply was conducted from Cu Chi.  Although most of the supplies were delivered by UH1D helicopters, maximum use of land convoy was scheduled whenever possible.  Units controlled their own resupply and extraction.

                                        (p29)

b.   Maintenance:   Attachment of contact teams to the battalions was not required.  Support was on an “on call” basis and proved adequate.  In all cases, as an expedient measure, evacuation of attached vehicles was made by the parent organization rather than the agencies providing direct support to the 1st Brigade.

c.   Treatment, evacuation, and hospitalization of casualties:  WIAs were evacuated to  
Cu Chi directly from the areas of operations.  Excessive reaction time for dustoff was encountered in some instances because of a non-availability of standby aircraft at the 25th Division base.

            d.   Communications:   The non-availability of radio communications between the Division Medical Battalion and the medical evacuation facility at Saigon inhibited coordination of medical evacuation.  In many instances command and control helicopters were used for evacuation because the status of dustoff aircraft could not be verified by this unit or the Med. Bn.  

            e.   General comments:   During operation KALIHI the brigade TAOR remained in proximity to Cu Chi.  This enabled units to make full utilization of division resources.  Logistical operations presented few problems, and overall coordination was simplified because of the proximity of the operation to Cu Chi.  Units made maximum effective use of allotted aircraft, showing increasing effectiveness in planning and anticipating operational requirements.  

14.  Special Equipment and Techniques:

a.   A smoke screen laid by a heliborn generator proved effective to cover the extraction
of troops from a PZ by helicopter.  For maximum effectiveness two heliborn smoke generators would be required to cover a landing or pick-up zone.

            b.   The use of armor protected flame throwing vehicles as a part of integrated ARMOR /
Infantry operations against VC in trenches and bunkers proved effective.

15.  Commander's Analysis:

a.   Operation KALIHI was successful in interdicting VC Lines of communication and
supply in the Filhol Plantation and precluded the use of the area as a base to attack the 25th Division base camp.  The duration of the operation and the forces available did not facilitate pacification operations in the AO or the village of Phu Hoa Dong.  The village of Phu Hoa Dong remains a VC dominated area.

      b.      The use of mechanized infantry forces and integrated armor / infantry teams when
properly utilized, are the most effective forces to be employed against the VC in areas where trafficability permits their usage.  The shock action and psychological effect of operations utilizing armor, air forces, and artillery are most effective in assaulting and demoralizing VC forces.

                                             (p30)

 Quarterly Report Ending 31 Oct 1970

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCMH

SUBJECT:     Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,
          Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)



SEE DISTRIBUTION



Location:  Cu Chi Base Camp (XT647153), Cu Chi, RVN.
Reporting Officer:  Major General Edward Bautz, Jr.
Prepared by:  Major Carter Morey, 18th Military History Detachment.
Map References:  Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series: L7014, Sheets:  6231 I, II, III, IV; 6232 II, III; 6230 I, II, III, IV; 6329 IV, 6331 I, II, III, IV; 6330 I, II, IV; 6430 I, II, III, IV; 6431 III, 6530 III.

1.     (C)     OPERATIONS:     Significant Activities (Previous Quarter Summary).

     A.     General:  The quarter from 1 May to 31 July 1970 was highlighted by the Cambodian cross-border operations directed by President Nixon on 1 May 1970.  The 1st and 2nd Brigades, 3rd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division and all maneuver battalions of the 25th Infantry Division played an integral part in the attack.  Although limited in time and restricted geographically, the Division was highly successful in destroying enemy supply points, training sites and base areas along the Cambodian border.  The accomplishment of this mission greatly reduced enemy offensive capabilities in the Military Region III area of South Vietnam.  Additionally, the enemy suffered significant personnel losses.  A total of 1075 enemy soldiers were killed, 54 captured and 22 Hoi Chanh received by 25th Infantry Division forces during the nearly two-month-long operations.  Consequently, the enemy was forced to move his personnel and supply bases deeper into Cambodia and considerable time and effort has been required to reconstitute them.  Personnel intended by the enemy for offensive action have been diverted to supply and support service activities.

     The 1st Brigade began Operation TOAN THANG 44 on 6 May with an attack into Base Area 354, which encompassed the border region called the Dog's Face.  The 1st Brigade operated there until 15 May when Operation TOAN THAN 43 Phase III began in which 1st Brigade forces were sent into Base Area 353 around the Fishhook Region.  Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III lasted until 30 June when all US units pulled out of Cambodia.  The 1st Brigade, in both operations, dealt the enemy a severe blow as many tons of food, clothing, medical supplies, weapons and munitions were captured or destroyed.  During the last month of the quarter, the 1st Brigade was assigned to a new area of operations in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces and continued Operation TOAN THANG IV, concentrating on interdicting enemy infiltration from Cambodia and destroying enemy bases along the border.  Tay Ninh Base Camp and the surrounding area, the 1st Brigade's AO before the Cambodian Operation was turned over to the control of the 25th ARVN Division during July, another indication of the success of the Vietnamization Program.

     The 2nd Brigade remained OPCON to II Field Force Vietnam until 7 May when the Brigade reverted to the control of the 25th Infantry Division for operations in Cambodia.  Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase II began on 9 May and lasted until 15 May at which time the 2nd Brigade joined the 1st Brigade in Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III until10 June.  The 2nd Brigade (illegible) like the 1st Brigade ws successful in locating many enemy supply caches and captured or destroyed tons of enemy food and equipment.  During the month of July, the 2nd Brigade assumed control of a new AO around Yuan Loc in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces and resumed Operation TOAN THANG IV, concentrating on the destruction of the enemy and his supplies.  2nd Brigade elements also continued to assist in the pacification program in their new AO.

     While the 1st and 2nd Brigades operated in Cambodia during the months of May and June, the 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV, operating not only in Hau Nghia Province but assuming responsibility for the 1st Brigade's AO in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces as well.  In July, the 3rd Brigade relinquished control of the 1st Brigade's former AO around Tay Ninh Base Camp to the 25th ARVN Division and concentrated its efforts in northern Hau Hghia Province and the area around Dau Tieng in Binh Duong Province.  Emphasis was placed on tactically executing small unit operations, ambushes and combat patrols to locate the enemy, disrupt his movements and uncover his supplies.  Also, the 3rd Brigade during the quarter was tasked with the responsibility of the defense of Cu Chi Base Camp and designated one battalion as Division Ready Reactionary Force.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division sent the 5th Battalion, (illegible) Infantry (illegible) into Base Area 367 in the Parrot's Beak Region of Cambodia on 7 May.  This operation TOAN THANG 500 lasted until 12 May and resulted in 159 enemy killed, 18 prisoners of war captured and 18 Hoi Chanh received.  Also, 126 individual weapons, 4 crew served weapons, 28 tons of ammunition and four tons of rice were captured or destroyed.  Operations by 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div battalions in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces forced sub-regional units to operate in dispersed groups to avoid Allied detection, disrupted sub-regional loyal and main force plans for future attacks, and greatly expanded the pacification program in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces.  With United States Naval force, 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div forces seriously disrupted the enemy's ability to operate along canals and rivers within Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces, prevented enemy reinforcement of men and  supplies to local guerilla forces and reduced the effectiveness of the Viet Cong Infrastructure by continuous monitoring of the enemy's routes of movement.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations remained at a low level during the first week of the reporting quarter (1-7 August).  Main force units generally avoided contact with Allied forces, while supporting local force units in the collection of taxes and the procurement of food and ammunition.  Sub-regional forces continued to be primarily concerned with the transportation of food and supplies from bases in Cambodia.  The most active enemy main force units during the week were the 101 NVA Regiment and 268 Regiment in Sub-region (SR)-1.  The number of mining incidents during the week showed a marked decrease from the 29 reported during the last week of July, resulting in four US soldiers killed and 35 wounded.     

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  Eight contacts were reported in the 1st Bde's AO resulting in nine enemy killed.  A convoy from Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery received small arms and RPG fire from both sides of a road in the Michelin Rubber Plantation 4.5 kms east of Dau Tieng (XT547492) at 1206 hours on (illegible) August.  One US soldier was wounded and there was light damage to one 2-1/2 ton truck and two 105mm howitzers.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery, a Duster and Co D, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf reacted with unknown results.  Three enemy soldiers were killed in two engagements by A/2-14 Inf on 6 August.  At 1700 hours, one enemy was killed with organic weapons 5 kms south of Ben Cui (XT458404).  At 1934 hours, two enemy were killed 400 meters northwest of the 1700 hours contact.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were no significant ground contacts or shelling incidents reported during the week as enemy units in the 2nd Bde's AO suffered from acute logistical shortages.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the first week of August with five maneuver battalions (5th Bn, 60th Inf came under OPCON of the 3rd Bde on 2 Aug 70) operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There was one significant shelling incident reported during the week.  B/5-60 Inf received eight rounds of HA at its night defensive position (NDP) 6 kms north of Trung Lap (XT608271) at 2320 hours on 3 August.  Five US soldiers and one Kit Carson scout were wounded while one PRC 25 radio, one PRC 77 radio and several individual weapons suffered light damage.

     There were eight ground contacts reported in the 3rd Brigade's AO during the week, resulting in 10 enemy killed and two Hoi Chanh received.  C/5-60 Inf engaged two enemy with claymore mines and hand grenades at 2045 hours on 4 August 8 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT651271) resulting in two enemy killed.  One AK47 rifle, one K54 pistol, two packs with assorted civilian clothing, one civilian radio, a small amount of documents, four AK47 magazines with ammunition, and 40 pounds of rice were evacuated.  At 1035 hours on 5 august, C/3-22 Inf engaged 10 enemy 11 kms east of Dau Tieng (XT601477) with organic weapons and artillery resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle.  Two Hoi Chanh were also received.  They identified their unit as the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, Sapper-Intelligence Company, 101 NVA Regiment which operated in the Boi Loi Woods/Trapezoid area.   The two Hoi Chanh stated that morale in the unit was low due to lack of adequate food and medical supplies.  A/5-60 Inf engaged eight enemy with organic weapons 6 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT618299) at 1817 hours on 5 August.  On a sweep of the area at 0800 hours on 6 August by A/5-60 Inf, three enemy bodies were located.  Two enemy soldiers were killed and one AK47 rifle was evacuated by B/3-22 Inf from a contact site 6.5 kms west of Ben Suc (XT506340) at 1850 hours on 6 August.  Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier.

     Enemy activity remained at a low level in the 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div's AO during the first week of August.  The 3-9 Inf Div continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with one maneuver battalion operating in Long An and Hau Nghis Provinces and one maneuver battalion operating in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province.  There were five significant contacts reported during the week resulting in five enemy killed and three captured.  The three prisoners-of-war were captured by A/6-31 Inf at 1235 hours on 4 August after a contact 5 kms west of Duc Hoa (XS525968).  The PW's identified their unit as the Duc Hoa Local Force and said they were engaged in ammunition supply activities when captured.  The most significant incident of the week occurred at 1605 hours on 3 August when an air cushion vehicle (ACF) from the 39th Cavalry with troops of D/6-31 Inf detonated a mine 6.5 kms northeast of Ben Luc (XS662815) resulting in three US soldiers killed and 19 wounded.  The ACV wa a combat loss.

     Action by Division Troops was light during the week, with only one significant contact reported.  A helicopter gunship from Company D, 25th Aviation Battalion, while supporting a 495th Regional Forces (RF) Company contact 2.5 kms northwest of Cu Chi (XT605138) at 2130 hours on 4 August, killed four enemy soldiers with organic weapons.

     A number of notable figures visited Cu Chi Base Camp during the first week of August.  The Reverend John R. Morrett, Dean of St. Andrews Episcopal Cathedral of Honolulu visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 1 August to obtain firsthand information on US activities in Vietnam.  On 2 August, Coloen Billy M. Vaughn, II FFV ACofS, G3 (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  General Ralph E. Haines, CINCUSPAC, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 3 August to obtain an update on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General George A. Godding, DCSINT, HQ USARPAC, visited Tan An and Cu Chi Base Camps on 3 and 4 August to obtain information on intelligence gathering, with particular emphasis on ground sensor activity.  Brigadier General Harold B. Gibson, Jr., CG US Army Support Command, Saigon, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 5 August for an update on 25th Infantry Division activities.  On 7 August, Lietuenant General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., US Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, visited Cu Chi Base Camp to brief commanders and staff on the availability of trained personnel and to discuss personnel problems.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO increased slightly during the second week of August (8-14 August) as the enemy attempted to launch some kind of offensive activity.  The most active units during the week were the 101 NVA and 268 Regiments in SR-1.  In the other sub-regions, enemy main and local force units generally avoided contact, while engaging in supply activities and harassment of the GVN pacification program.  The number of mining incidents increased to 17 from 11 the previous week, resulting in two US soldiers killed and 41 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and Northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There were three significant shelling incidents reported in the 1st Bde's AO during the week.  Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) received 18X82mm mortar rounds at 1910 hours on 8 August resulting in 12 US soldiers wounded and light damage to two mess halls and one bunker.  Fire was returned to the northeast by artillery and mortar with unknown results.  At 0345 hours on 9 August, Dau Tieng Base Camp received 20X82mm mortar and two 122mm rocket rounds resulting in six US soldiers wounded and light damage to two ¼-ton trucks.  Fire was returned to the northeast by artillery and mortar with unknown results.  Dau Tieng Base Camp received 15X75mm recoilless rifle rounds at 2200 hours on 14 August resulting in three US soldiers wounded and light damage to one ¾-ton truck and several buildings.  Fire was returned to the northeast by artillery, with unknown results.

     There were nine contacts by 1st Bde forces during the week, resulting in eight enemy killed and one captured.  D/2-14 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 8 kms east of Dau Tieng (XT572495) at 1750 hours on 8 August with claymore mines and artillery, resulting in five enemy killed and the evacuation of four AK47 rifles, one K54 pistol and a small amount of documents.  The documents identified the 82mm Mortar Company, 101 NVA Regiment, which normally operated in the contact area.  C/2-14 Inf had two contacts with an unknown number of enemy 5 kms south of Ben Cui (XT427408) on 10 August at 1110 hours and 1525 hours.  US casualties were three killed and six wounded.  In the only significant contact of the week in the 1st Bde, a convoy from 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery received seven RPG rounds and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy on Highway 239 4 kms east of Dau Tieng (XT528478), resulting in six US soldiers wounded, moderate damage to one 2-1/2 ton truck and the destruction of one 1/4 ton truck.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and LFT with unknown results.  A/2-14 Inf reacted and captured one prisoner-of-war and evacuated one AK47 rifle, three magazines and documents.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of August with three maneuver battalions operating in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces.  There were no significant ground contacts or shelling incidents reported as enemy units continued to suffer severe supply shortages.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of August with five maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were no indirect fire attacks reported.  Six ground contacts were reported during the week resulting in seven enemy killed and two VCI cadre captured.  R/2-27 Inf with an element of the 25th Inf Div Military Intelligence Company apprehended two female VCI cadre with a small child and medical supplies 4 kms northwest of Trung Lap (XT549242) at 0717 hours on 9 August.  Snipers from R/3-22 Inf killed four enemy soldiers at 1830 and 1850 hours on 10 August in two engagements approximately 4.5 kms west of Ben Suc (XT520347).  A helicopter gunship from D/3 4 Cav engaged three enemy 10 kms northwest of Ben Suc (XT486380) with organic weapons and a FAC at 1350 hours on 13 August.  An aerial rifle platoon (ARP) was inserted and destroyed nine bunkers, 50 pounds of rice and one ChiCom hand grenade.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of August with one maneuver battalion operating in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and one maneuver battalion operating in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province.  Enemy activity remained at a low level as enemy units avoided contact, though there were six engagements resulting in five enemy killed and four prisoners-of-war captured.  D/6-31 Inf captured two PWs at 1625 hours on 8 August 7 kms west of Duc Hoa (XS512973) and evacuated one K54 pistol and one 9mm Browning pistol.  Later, at 1710 hours, C/6-31 Inf captured two PWs 200 meters south of the D/6-31 Inf contact (XS512976).  A UH1H helicopter from the 190th Assault Helicopter Company, while inserting Teams 11 and 14 from Co E (Rgr), 75th Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an enemy force 10 kms west of Tan An (XS445646).  Fire was returned by artillery, airstrike and the insertion of Teams 21 and 22, Co E (Rgr), 75th Inf with unknown results.  US casualties were one killed and three wounded (from 190th AHC) and heavy damage to the UH1H helicopter.

     Brigadier General Robert L. Fair, US Army Director, Management Information Systems visited Cu Chi Base camp to observe 25th Infantry Division data processing operations on 8 August.  The Honorable John J. McKeithen, Governor of the State of Louisiana, visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities and to talk with his constituents.  Major General Jack J. Wagstaff, DCG, II FFV (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 14 and 16 August for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

     Enemy activity remained at a low level throughout the 25th Infantry Division's AO during the third week of August (15-21 August) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact in order to re-establish still inadequate supply channels.  SR-1 was the most active area, with the 101 NVA and 268 Regiments being identified numerous times by captured documents.  Also, moderate sensor activity from the southern portion of the Fishhook Region to the Razorbacks, Michelin Plantation and Saigon River Corridor was recorded.  There were no significant attacks by fire reported during the week.  However, the number of mining incidents increased by four from last week to 21, resulting in one US soldier killed and 26 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  Enemy activity was light, with only three significant contacts reported.  A 5-ton truck from A/2-12 Inf with the 588th Engineer Battalion received small arms and RPG fire from both sides of Highway 13 4.5 kms northeast of Phu Khuong (XT3761607) at 0930 hours on 15 August.  After the initial firing, several enemy soldiers (some dressed in ARVN uniforms and armed with M16 rifles) boarded the truck and engaged the personnel with small arms fire, killing four US soldiers and wounding five.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery, a LST and FAC with unknown results.  In the only other significant action of the week, C/2-60 Inf received small arms fire from six to eight enemy during a sweep of a claymore mine detonation 10 kms northwest of Minh Thanh (XT541721) at 1700 hours on 18 August.  In the ensuing engagement, two enemy were killed by organic weapons fire and a LFT while US casualties were three killed.  One M79 grenade launcher, one AK47 rifle and a few letters were evacuated.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phoc Tuy Provinces.  There were no significant ground contacts or shelling incidents reported but a large cache was located.  D/4-27 Inf located a bunker complex consisting of seven bunkers and one classroom area 17 kms east of Black Horse (XS613967) at 1830 hours on 16 August.  One SKS rifle, one M1 carbine, four M16 magazines with ammunition, two US hand grenades, 50 pounds of clothing, 100 pounds of rice, 15 pounds of medical supplies, six feet of detonating cord with blasting caps, one NVA entrenching tool, one machete, one US pistol belt with two ammo pouches, two pounds of documents, one map and a diary were evacuated.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of August with five maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  There were 10 ground contacts with the enemy resulting in nine enemy killed.  B/2-27 Inf, at an NDP 2 kms southwest of Ben Suc (XT549327), engaged two enemy with claymore mines at 1805 hours on 17 August resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles and four magazines.  A/5-60 Inf received hand grenades from an unknown number of enemy 8 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT646293) at 0310 hours on 19 August.  The enemy force was engaged by claymore mines resulting in two enemy killed.  Two AK47 rifles, two AK magazines, one pack of explosives and one book were evacuated.  There were no US casualties.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of August with one maneuver battalion operating in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and one maneuver battalion in Nhon Trach District.  Enemy activity was at an extremely low level with only two contacts reported, resulting in one enemy killed.

     Major General John R. Deane, Jr., Director, Defense Communications Planning Group (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 15 August for an update on 25th Infantry Division Duffel Bag/Tight Ja(illegible) operations.  Brigadier General E. M. Lynch, US Army Deputy Inspector General, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 15 August to make an appraisal of the IG system of handling complaints and discuss this matter with the IG, commanders and individual soldiers.  Colonel Robert W. Leonard, Chief of Information, MACV (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp, Dau Tieng and FSB Kien on 18 and 19 August for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General Jack Hemingway, CG, 1st Aviation Brigade, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 21 August for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division AO remained at a low level during the last week of August (22-31 August) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported but the number of mining incidents increased by 13 over last week's 34 resulting in one US soldier killed and 63 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  Enemy activity was light with only three contacts reported.  The most significant event of the week occurred at 1145 hours on 30 August when an APC from C/3-4 Cav detonated a 120 pound mine with pressure device 1 km northeast of Phu Khuong (XT353588) resulting in one US soldier killed and eight wounded.  Two significant caches were located by B/2-12 Inf 9 kms south of Minh Thanh (XT607581) on 28 August.  A bunker was located at 0900 hours and 85 pounds medical supplies and one stethoscope were evacuated.  Later, at 1204 hour, another bunker was located in the same area and one sick call list, one record book, two medical books, three grams of novocaine, 100 grams of vitamin B-1, assorted bottles of medicinal alcohol and novocaine, and one set of medical scales were evacuated.  The area showed signs of recent enemy activity.
     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of August with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  Enemy activity was light and no significant caches were discovered.  B/3-22 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 11 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (XT539009) at 0930 hours on 31 August with organic weapons, an air strike, artillery, and a LFT with unknown results.  Enemy small arms fire killed two US soldiers and wounded six.  Three packs and four RPG rounds were evacuated from the contact site.  Later, at 1700 hours, B/3-22 Inf located and evacuated (illegible) RPG rounds, two RPG boosters, a small amount of AK47 ammo, 30 pounds of flour, five pounds of rice, cooking utensils and one pound of C-4.  In the only other contact of significance, A/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms and RPG fire at 1545 hours on 31 August from an unknown number of enemy 500 meters (illegible) east of the H/3-22 Inf 0930 hours contact (XT534014) resulted in one US soldier killed and six wounded and heavy damage to two APCs.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and artillery with unknown results.

     Enemy activity remained at a low level during the fourth week of August in the 3rd Bde's AO as the four maneuver battalions of the Brigade operated in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were nine contacts with enemy forces resulting in 21 enemy killed.  An LST from D/3-4 Cav engaged six enemy 8 kms northwest of Ben Suc (XT506376) at 1120 on 22 August resulting in two enemy killed.  An ARP was inserted in the area and at 1305 hours they located and destroyed one structure and one bunker.  Fifty pounds of rice, 20 water bags, miscellaneous clothing and a small amount of documents were evacuated.  In two engagements on 23 August, A/2-22 Inf (M) killed six enemy with claymore mines 6 kms southeast of Ben Suc in the Ho Bo Woods (XT620294) at 1836 and 1852 hours.  Two of the bodies were located in the contact site while A/3-4 Cav located the other four 1 km west of it (XT611291) at 1225 hours on 24 August.  At 1600 hours on 24 August, !/3-4 Cav located six more enemy bodies at the same spot.  This body count was credited to an A/2-27 Inf contact on 21 August at 1930 hours 3 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT604320).

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with two maneuver battalions operating in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and one maneuver battalion in Nhon Trach District.  There were nine contacts with enemy forces resulting in five enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  The PW as captured by A/5-60 Inf at 1743 hours 23 August after an engagement with three enemy soldiers 10 kms west of Tan (XS449647).  The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no casualties.  A C&C Uh1H helicopter from 3.9 Inf Div, while on visual reconnaissance 8 kms south of Long Thanh (XS58844) received small arms fire at 1255 hours on 27 August resulting in three US soldiers wounded.  An ARP from D/3-4 Cav was inserted and they engaged two enemy with unknown results.

     The larges contact of the week involved Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion from Division Troops.  At 2115 hours on 27 August, helicopter gunship form 5/25th Avn Bn, while supporting the 872nd Regional Forces (RF) Company in a contact 7 kms southwest of Ben Cui (XT405395), engaged an estimated enemy platoon with organic weapons resulting in nine enemy killed and the evacuation of four AK47 rifles and one M16 rifle.  There were no US casualties.

     General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 24 August for an update on 25th Infantry Division activities and to present a Presidential Unit Citation to the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry.  Brigadier General Frank McCarthy (USAR-Ret), producer of the motion picture “Patton”, visited Cu Chi Base Camp Dau Tieng Base Camp and three fire support bases on 24 and 25 August to gather Defense Information for making motion pictures concerning the Army's operations in Vietnam.  Mr. Clyde D. Hardin (GS 18), Assistant SEA to the Secretary of the Army, R&D, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 26 August to obtain information on current and pending actions affecting R&D policy and decisions in the Republic of Vietnam.  The Honorable Egil Krogh, Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs visited Cu Chi Base Camp and two fire support bases on 30 and 31 August to gain firsthand information on the magnitude and consequences of drug abuse problems of US troops in the Republic of Vietnam.

     The 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division killed 103 and captured 10 of the enemy during the month of August, account for (illegible) individual weapons and 4.9 tons of rice captured or destroyed.  Division soldiers destroyed 156 mines and booby traps while detonating 83, resulting in 165 US soldiers wounded and eight killed.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations was light and scattered during the first week of September (1-7 September).  The only significant activity occurred on the evening of 3 September, the anniversary of the death of Ho Chi Minh.  Although six fire support bases received attacks by fire, the damage incurred was not enough to constitute a genuine highpoint.  In general, main force units voided contact while engaging in resupply activities.  The most active units continued to be in SR-1 with elements of the 101 NVA and 268 Regiments identified in captured documents.  The number of mining incidents decreased to 16 from the 34 reported during the last week of August resulting in 20 US soldiers wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with five maneuver battalions (2-34 Armor moved OPCON to 1st Brigade on 3 September ) operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There was one significant shelling incident reported on 3 September when Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT491473) received 25X82mm mortar rounds at 2150 hours.  Only one round impacted inside, wounding one US soldier.  There were three contacts reported during the week resulting in five enemy soldiers killed.  A/2-60 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with claymore mines 11 kms north of Minh Thanh (XT587772) at 1725 hours on 1 September resulting in one enemy killed.  Documents taken from the body identified the Distribution Office, 43rd Postal Transportation Group, Postal Transportation and Communications Office of COSV.  An AH1G Cobra from the 187th AHC received 5 caliber machine gun fire 13 kms east of Katum (XT4690) at 1050 hours on 6 September resulting in two US soldiers wounded and heavy damage to the Cobra which crashed.  D/2-60 Inf reacted to secure the aircraft until it was extracted at 1515 hours.

     A few small caches were located by 1st Bde forces during the week.  D/2-14 Inf located three cases of M-72 LAWs (15 weapons) along a trail 6 kms north of Dau Tieng (XT512534) at 1000 hours on 2 September.  A/3-4 Cav evacuated 15 pounds of medical supplies and one US pistol belt from a bunker complex 4.5 kms southeast of Phu Khuong (XT367549) at 0800 hours on 4 September.  A/2-60 Inf located a munitions cache 13.5 kms east of Katum (XT464885) at 1030 hours on 7 September.  They destroyed 75 RPG rounds, 1.5 cases of powder trains, seven rifle grenades and two ChiCom hand grenades.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents or ground contacts repeated during the week as enemy units in the 2nd Bde's AO suffered from acute logistical shortages.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the first week of September with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were eight significant ground contacts reported during the week resulting in seven enemy killed.  At 1340 hours on 3 September,B/2-27 Inf received one Hoi Chanh 3 kms southwest of Ben Suc (XT562308) with one AK47 rifle and two 150 caliber ammo cans of medical supplies.  The Hoi Chanh identified his unit as the 3rd Platoon, H.5 Sapper/Engineer Company of SR-1 which normally operated in the Saigon River Corridor area.  A/2-27 Inf received one Hoi Chanh at 0930 hours on 4 September 5 kms southwest of Ben Suc (XT528309).  The Hoi Chanh then led A/2-27 Inf to a tunnel complex believed to be a field hospital 1.2 kms northeast of his rally point (XT552314) where two female detainees were apprehended.  Also, they evacuated two AK47 rifles, two ChiCom hand grenades, one US hand grenade, 125 pounds of rice, 40 pounds of medicine and drugs, four bottles of plasma, one surgical kit, one dental kit, one kerosene stove, seven plastic water cans, five 5-gallon cans, two US canteens, one bag of rubber bands, two VC ponchos, one US pistol belt, one US flashlight, and assorted clothing and food.  The Hoi Chanh identified his unit as the B5 Medical Section of SR-1 whose mission was to procure, package and dispense medicine and medicinal supplies to other VC/NVA units operating in the area.  A/2-22 Inf (M), while sweeping the area of a claymore detonation 7 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT654256) on 4 September, received one hand grenade from an unknown number of enemy at 1948 hours.  Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed, two AK47 rifles destroyed and 500 piasters and one notebook evacuated.

     A few small caches were located by 3rd Brigade forces during the week.  Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion evacuated approximately 15 pounds of medical supplies and two pounds of medical books from a spot 1 km east of Ben Suc (XT586339) at 1350 hours on 4 September.  A/2-34 Arm evacuated one .50 caliber ammo can containing 30 bottles of penicillin, vitamins and morphine from a spot 6.5 kms north of Trung Lap (XT598282) at 1700 hours on 5 September.  B/2-22 Inv (M), while sweeping a contact area 8 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT663253), located and evacuated one AK4 7 rifle at 0805 hours.  Later, at 0945 hours, B/2-22 Inf (M) found an old bunker complex 140 meters southeast of the 0805 hours find and evacuated one radio, medical supplies, 50 batteries, one telegraph key, one headset, 17 radio tubes, 75 feet of wire, two homemade receivers, one ChiCom transceiver and eight US ammo cans containing assorted radio parts and tools.

     The 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with one maneuver battalion operating in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces (until 6 September) and one maneuver battalion to Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province.  Three contacts were reported resulting in 10 enemy killed.  Snipers from C/2-47 Inf (M) engaged 10 enemy with organic weapons at 2045 hours on (illegible) September 4.5 kms south of Long Thanh (YS144877) resulting in five enemy killed (located on a sweep of the contact area at 0830 hours on 6 September) the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, 15 pounds of documents and two civilian radios and the destruction of five mines.  The documents identified the 98th Water Sapper Battalion of SR-4 which had last been identified on 20 April following a contact southeast of Noon Trach.  At 1615 hours on 7 September, helicopter gunships from the 240th Assault Helicopter Company engaged 10 enemy with organic weapons 2kms south of Long Thanh (YS135892) resulting in five enemy killed, located by A/2-47 Inf (M) on a sweep of the area.

     A small cache was located by C/2-47 Inf (M) on 6 September 7 kms southeast of Long Thanh (YS160853) at 1050 hours.  They destroyed one bunker, one sampan, five pairs of NVA boots, three pounds of rice, 15 pounds of clothing, miscellaneous cooking utensils, three gallons of gasoline, one small bag of medical supplies, 15 blasting caps, assorted web gear and 20 fighting positions.  Also, they evacuated 15 pounds of documents and located one destroyed .51 caliber machine gun and numerous blood trails.

     A number of notable figures visited Cu Chi Base Camp during the week.  Command Sergeant Major Silas L. Copeland, Sergeant Major of the Army (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 1 September for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Major General John Norton, Deputy Director, Project MASSTER, DA, visited Cu Chi Base Camp to observe MACV and USARV employment of Surveillance Target Acquisition and Night Observation (STANO) equipment and to facilitate Project MASSTER's analysis of the entire STANO system.  On 5 and 6 September, Lieutenant General Frederick C. Wayland, DEPCOMUSMACV (Designate) visited Tan An Base Camp, Cu Chi Base Camp and two fire support bases for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell, US Military Representative to the Paris Peace Talks visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 7 September to gain the best current appreciation of the overall situation within South Vietnam, including pacification and Vietnamization progress and problems.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the week as enemy units avoided contact to secure base areas and replenish depleted supplies.  Contact was extremely light and scattered.  There were 21 mining incidents reported during the week, an increase of five over last week, resulting in two US soldiers killed and 25 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with five maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province and northwest Binh Long Province.  There were no significant ground contacts or shelling incidents reported during the week as enemy units in the 1st Bde's AO avoided contact.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported.  Two ground contacts were reported resulting in one enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  A/4-23 Inf (M) received RPG fire, small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 10 km south of Xuan Loc (YS485975) at 0940 hours on 8 September, resulting in 26 US wounded and light damage to one APC.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, LFT, airstrikes and artillery with unknown results.  C/3-22 Inf engaged five enemy 18 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS605980) at 0930 hours on 11 September with organic weapons and artillery, resulting in one enemy killed and the capture of one wounded PW and one AK47 rifle.  The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of September with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were three significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  A NDP of the 984th Land Clearing Company with C/2-22 Inf (M) 5 kms east of Ben Suc (XT622348) received six 81mm mortar rounds and four unknown type recoilless rifle rounds at 0645 hours on 11 September, resulting in 11 US soldiers wounded and one ARVN wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, LST, LFT and artillery with unknown results.  An NDP of C.22-22 Inf (M) 6 kms east of Ben Suc (XT634345) received 15X60 mortar rounds from the northeast at 2045 hours on 11 September resulting in one US soldier killed (984th LCC) and three US wounded.  Fire was returned by mortar, artillery, LFT, Shadow and a flareship with unknown results.

     There were nine contacts with enemy forces during the week resulting in 12 enemy soldiers killed, one VCS-CD prisoner-of-war captured and one Hoi Chanh received.  B/4-9 Inf engaged five enemy soldiers 5 kms south of Ben Cat (XT737482) at 1804 hours on 9 September with organic weapons and artillery resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles and documents identifying the 83rd Rear Service Group, Rear Service Office of SR-1.  The CP/2-22 Inf (M) 7 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT654255) engaged an unknown number of enemy at 1826 hours on 10 September, resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle and one .45 caliber pistol.  A/2-22 Inf (M) received a Hoi Chanh at 0208 hours on 10 September 2 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT604238).  The Hoi Chanh was the Assistant Chief of Staff for the K-3 Battalion, 268 Regiment, SR (illegible), COSVN.  He stated that in July 1970, because of the heavy casualty rate within the battalions of the 268 Regiment, the Regiment was disbanded and reorganized as the K-3 Battalion which had three infantry companies of 20 men each.  R/2-22 Inf (M) engaged an unknown number of enemy with claymore mines 4 kms west of Ben Suc (XT537341) at 2316 hours on 12 September, resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one AK magazine, one flashlight, six NVA ponchos, a small amount of rice, two hammocks, one life preserver, three equipment bags, one ChiCom hand grenade, two VC pistol belts, a small amount of documents and one NVA compass.  There was no enemy return fire.

     (illegible) Inf located a large munitions cache in a bunker with a reinforced concrete trap door 5.5 kms east of Ben Suc (XT628329) at 1910 hours on 9 September.  They evacuated one 60mm mortar tube and base plate, 13X75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 10X60mm mortar rounds, 17 boxes of 75mm recoilless rifle (illegible), (102 fuses), 14 cans of mortar charges, four ChiCom claymore mines, (illegible) M83 submachine guns with magazines, two boxes of fuses for 60mm mortar rounds, one US 81mm mortar round and 500 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with one maneuver battalion operating in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province.  In preparation for the stand-down of the 3-9 Inf Div, three battalions, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry; 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery became OPCON to USARV on 8 and 10 September and moved to Di An.  There were two ground contacts reported during the week, resulting in two enemy killed.  There were no shelling incidents reported.

     Division Troops accounted for five enemy soldiers killed and two prisoners-of-war captured.  Helicopter gunships from 25th Aviation Battalion, while supporting the 494th PF Platoon 6 kms south of Hiep Hoa (XT430009), engaged an unknown number of enemy at 1400 hours on 10 September with organic weapons resulting in four enemy killed and the capture of one prisoner-of-war, two AK47 rifles and one K54 pistol.

     Brigadier General Lewis E. Maness, Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, USARPAC visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 8 September to determine actions required by subordinate commands as a result of current austere funding.  Staff members of the Congressional Subcommittee on Alcoholics and Narcotics of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 8 September to investigate problems involving the abuse of alcohol, narcotics, and other dangerous drugs by members of the Armed Forces.  Lieutenant General Do Cau Tri, CG III CTZ, visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an update on 25th Infantry Division activities on 8 September.  Brigadier General Ross R. Condit, Jr. CG, USACDC, Combat Support Group visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 9 September to provide personnel of USACDC Combat Service Support Group the opportunity to make an on-site evaluation of current (illegible) support doctrine and practices in both a tactical and non-tactical environment.  General William B. Rosson, DEPCOMUSMACV, made a farewell visit to the 25th Infantry Division on 9 September.  Major General Charles M. Gettys, Chief of Staff, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 14 September for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

     Enemy activity within the 25th  Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the third week of September (15-24 September) as the enemy continued to experience logistical difficulties.  Contacts were limited to harassing attacks by fire against allied outposts.  The number of mining incidents increased by five over last week to 26, resulting in one US soldier killed and 37 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with five maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  In seven contacts with the enemy, 1st Bde forces killed six and captured two prisoners-of-war.  D/1-27 Inf engaged an area of a tripflare activation 9 kms south of Ben Cui (XT461368) at 2040 hours on 16 September with small arms and claymore mines resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of five RPG rounds, one rucksack, three pounds of rice, one pound of documents, one notebook, one log book, one wallet and a bag of clothes.  The documents identified the U/I element of the 268 Regiment of SR-1.  On a sweep of the contact area at 0715 hours on 17 September by D/1-27 Inf, one wounded PW was captured.  The PW identified his unit as the 2nd Company, K-2 Battalion, 268 Regiment of SR-1.  At 1458 hours on 18 September, D/2-60 Inf located five enemy bodies 11 kms northwest of Minh Thanh (XT535718).  The enemy soldiers had been killed by an artillery recon by fire at 1755 hours on 17 September.  D/3-4 Cav and A/3-4 Cav were involved in a contact 6 kms northwest of Ben Cui at 1355 hours on 19 September, in which three enemy were killed and one wounded prisoner-of-war captured.  (See Inclosure 4 for details of this action.)

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions (2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry passed OPCON to 25th Infantry division from the 199th Light Infantry Brigade on 19 September) operating in Bien Hoa, Phuoc Buy and Long Khanh Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  In five contacts with enemy forces, 2nd Bde forces killed two enemy soldiers.  C/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 7 kms south of Xuan Loc (YT48005) at 2045 hours on 17 September resulting in five US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery and LFT with unknown results.  The next day at 0815 hours, C/1-5 Inf (M) located one enemy killed and evacuated one AK47 rifle, two rucksacks, one bottle of vitamins, miscellaneous clothing and a small amount of documents.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported and only (illegible) contacts resulting in five enemy killed.  B/2-22 Inf (M) killed two enemy soldiers with claymore mines at 0915 hours on 20 September 7 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT654255) and evacuated one ChiCom machine gun magazine.  A small cache was located by C/2-27 Inf 2.5 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT596318) at 1145 hours on 21 September.  They destroyed one bunker and two tunnels and evacuated one M 2 carbine, two SKS rifles, two M (missing) rifles, two cooking pots, a small amount of rice and one entrenching tool.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with all battalions on stand down waiting for re-deployment to the United States to begin 22 September.

     Two Squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division on 15 September and continued Operation TOAN THANG IV in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces during the third week in September.  No shelling incidents were reported by 11th ACR Squadrons although there were three ground contacts resulting in five enemy killed.  L/3-11 ACR killes four enemy with claymore mines 8 kms west of Tan Uyen (XT889259) at 0705 hours on 17 September.  They destroyed one booby trapped RPG-7 round and evacuated one NVA pistol belt.  ARP/11 ACR received one command detonated booby trapped 82mm mortar round and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 9 kms southeast of Ben Cat (XT795260) at 1820 hours on 17 September resulting in three US soldiers killed and three wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results.

     Dr. William Vivrett, Director of Chaplaincy Services, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 16 September to confer with US Military Chaplains indorsed by the Disciples of Christ.  A CONARC Liaison Training Team visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 17 and 18 September to gather information in related areas of training to be used in improving and updating instruction conducted in CONUS.  General Ralph K. Haines, Jr. CINCUSARPAC, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 20 September to confer with commanders, visit major headquarters and units, review matters of interest to USARPAC, make appropriate calls on local military and government officials and to bid farewell in view of his reassignment to take over CONARC.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the week (22-30 September) as many enemy units experienced logistical and health difficulties.  Numerous booby trapping incidents in the vicinity of the central Trapezoid area and repeated contact with enemy elements southeast of Xuan Loc constituted the bulk of enemy activity.  The number of mining incidents increased by two over last week to 28, resulting in five US soldiers killed and 55 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces during the last week of September.  One shelling incident was reported.  C/2-12 Inf at FSB Denny (XT333896) received six rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire and six rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in one US wounded.  Fire was returned by mortar with unknown results.  There were four contacts with the enemy resulting in two enemy killed and the location of four enemy bodies.  D/2-12 Inf located four enemy bodies 6.5 kms north of Dau Tieng (XT518626) at 1435 hours on 24 September.  The enemy had been killed after a duffel bag activation on 10 September at 1820 hours by artillery.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were five contacts with enemy forces resulting in six enemy killed.  D/2-3 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with claymore mines 9kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT(illegible) at 0810 hours on 24 September resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one US (illegible), one &S compass, one US poncho, one hammock and a small amount of documents.  The documents identified the (illegible) Company, 274 Regiment.  (H/(illegible) Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons 28 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS13955) at 0730 hours on 26 September resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of three AK47's, five (illegible), four AK magazines, 109 AK rounds and 10 pounds of (illegible).  The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.  (illegible) Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons and artillery (illegible) kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT375055) at 1520 hours 26 September, resulting in one enemy killed.  The enemy force returned fire with small arms and RPG fire resulting in two US soldiers wounded.  A MEDEVA UH1H helicopter received one RPG round while coming in to pick up the wounded.  Fire was returned with organic weapons and B/2-(illegible) Inf reacted with unknown results.  The UH1H suffered light damage.     

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of September with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces until 27 September when the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (-) moved to the 2nd Brigade.  There were 13 contacts with enemy forces resulting in 18 enemy killed, two prisoners of war captured and one Hoi Chanh received.   C/2-27 Inf located three tunnels and one bunker at 0908 and 1010 hours on 22 September 3 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT590310).  They evacuated six AK47 rifles, one AK47 magazine, two US canteens, two rucksacks, a small amount of medical supplies and money, 24 pounds of rice and three pounds of documents.  At 1030 hours, C/2-27 Inf received small arms fire from two enemy resulting in one US soldier killed.  Later, at 1040 hours C/2-27 Inf received one Hoi Chanh.  A/4 9 Inf located 7 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT614279), engaged the area of a claymore mine detonation with organic weapons, artillery and LFT at 1800 hours on 23 September.  A sweep of the area at 1625 hours on 24 September and 1200 hours on 25 September by A/4 9 Inf located three enemy bodies.  They evacuated one AK47 rifle, one bag of medical supplies and one sack of cooking utensils.  They destroyed two bomblets, six ChiCom hand grenades, four pistol belts, two US flashlights, three cloth bags, two ammo pouches and one AK vest.  R/4-9 Inf engaged four to five enemy 6.5 kms southeast of Ben Sur (XT6(illegible) at 1840 hours on 29 September with organic weapons, artillery and LFT resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles.  D/4 9 Inf engaged the area of a claymore mine detonation 5 kms north of Trung Lap (XT605264) at 1948 hours on 29 September with organic weapons, artillery (47 rounds HE) and LFT, resulting in five enemy killed and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles, two backpacks, one K54 pistol, two US pistol belts, nine AK magazines, three M-26 hand grenades, two US claymore mines, one flashlight, three wallets, mess gear, a small amount of medical supplies and 1-1/2 pounds of documents.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of September (22-30 September) with two squadrons operating in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces.  There were six contacts with enemy forces, resulting in seven enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  I/3-11 ACR engaged the area of a claymore mine detonation 9 kms north of Tan Uyen (XT956322) at 2025 hours on 24 September with organic weapons, resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles.  There were no US casualties.  The (illegible) PF Compound 8 kms east of Lai Khe (XT850159) received an unknown number of mortar rounds followed by a ground attack at 0030 hours on 26 September.  They returned fire with organic weapons, artillery and K/3- 11 ACR reacted resulting in the killing of 11 enemy (three credited to K/3-11 ACR) and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles, one K54 pistol and two B-40 rounds.  There were no US casualties.

     The Honorable Robert L. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army (R&D) visited the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Di An and the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi on 24 September to coordinate current and pending actions affecting Department of the Army R&D policy, and to engage in discussions concerning sensors, radar, air surveillance equipment and the Vietnamization responsibilities of USARV as well as the required CONUS support.

     The 25th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment killed 112 and captured eight of the enemy during the month of September, accounted for 83 individual weapons and two crew-served weapons, and 1.25 tons of rice captured or destroyed.  Division soldiers destroyed 162 mines and booby traps while detonating 81, resulting in 137 US soldiers wounded and eight killed.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the first week of October (1-7 October) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact.  The area east of Ben Cat and Lai Khe was the scene of most contacts with small groups of enemy personnel during the week.  No significant shelling incidents were reported, while the number of mining incidents decreased by 17 to 11 resulting in one US soldier killed and 13 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with four maneuver battalions operating in northeast Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There were no significant contacts with the enemy during the week although a few small caches were located by A/3-4 Cav.  At 1735 hours on 1 October, A/3-4 Cav located 16 bunkers 4 kms east of Phu Khuong (XT386(illegible).  They destroyed the bunkers and evacuated one offset printing press, one plastic bag of medical supplies and four pounds of documents.  A/3-4 Cav destroyed 15 bunkers 5 kms east of Phu Khuong (XT395564) at 1430 hours on 2 September and evacuated one M-2 carbine with magazine, one US protective mask, one US canteen, one US steel helmet, two M16 magazines, 400 feet of nylon roper, three time fuses, two ChiCom hand grenades, miscellaneous cooking pots and two .50 caliber ammo cans of documents.  The documents identified the Tay Ninh Province Rear Service Section.  A small medical cache was located in five bunkers by A/3-4 Cav 4 kms east of Phu Khuong (XT379574) at 1225 hours on 3 October.  They destroyed the bunkers and evacuated 495 bottles of novocaine, seven quinine tablets, six bottles of unknown type pills, one bottle of calcium “C”, 45 sulfa tablets, 28 bottles of aspirin and two bottles of penicillin.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were two contacts with enemy forces resulting in two enemy killed.  A/1-5 Inf (-) with the 238th RF Company engaged two enemy 1.5 kms northwest of Long Thanh (YS128935) with organic weapons at 0017 hours on 4 October resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, 125 pounds of rice, six AK magazines, 180 SK rounds and a small amount of documents.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with three maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were seven contacts with enemy forces during the week resulting in five enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  C/1-27 Inf received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 8 kms northwest of Ben Suc (XT548412) at 1515 hours on 1 October resulting in seven US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery and helicopter gunships with unknown results.  D/1-27 Inf engaged one enemy soldier 7 kms west of Ben Suc (XT505333) with organic weapons at 1755 hours on 2 October, resulting in one enemy killed.  There was no enemy return fire.  D/1-27 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 100 meters northwest of the 2 October contact site (XT504334) at 1050 hours on 4 October.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and helicopter gunships resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one M16 rifle and a small amount of documents.  The documents identified the 268 Regiment which normally operated in the area.

      The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with two squadrons operating in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces.  There were three contacts with enemy forces during the week, resulting in eight enemy killed.  A/1-11 ACR engaged 12 enemy soldiers with organic weapons, artillery and LFT at 2230 hours on 2 October 12.5 kms west of Xuan Loc (YT291098) resulting in four enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, assorted web gear, 5750 piasters and a small amount of documents.  C/4-9 Inf (OPCON to 3/11 ACR) engaged an unknown number of enemy 7 kms southeast of Phuoc Hoa (XT967385) with organic weapons at 0935 hours on 7 October, resulting in two enemy killed and one AK47 rifle evacuated.  Later, at 1030 hours, C/4-9 Inf received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy while sweeping the area, resulting in five US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and LFT, with unknown results until 1110 hours when contact was lost.

     The 25th Infantry Division celebrated its 29th Anniversary on 1 October 1970.  Lieutenant General Frederick Weyland, DEPCOMUSMACV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 1 October to attend a Presidential Unit Citation Ceremony honoring the 3rd Platoon, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry and to receive an update on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General M.J.L. Greene assumed command of the 25th Infantry Division on 6 October as Major General Bautz went on leave.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the second week of October (8-14 October) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact to engage in resupply activities.  The most active areas were in the Trapezoid, Ho Bo woods and Boi Loi Woods areas.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported.  The number of mining incidents increased by one over last week to 12, resulting in 16 US soldiers wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of October with four maneuver battalions operating in northeastern Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  Contact was light, with four enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  Helicopter gunships from D/3-4 Cav received small ammo fire from an unknown number of enemy 10 kms northwest of Ben Cui (XT963522) at 1613 hours on 9 October.  Fire was returned with small arms, resulting in three enemy killed, one prisoner-of-war captured, and the evacuation of four AK47 rifles, three K54 pistols, and one box of 18 hand grenades.  A sweep of the area resulted in the location of eight bunkers and the evacuation of 10 pounds of documents, one M16 rifle, 10 pounds of medical supplies, seven flashlights, 24 rucksacks, 106 rounds of K54 ammunition, 875 AK rounds, 102 M16 rounds, four B40 rounds, six B40 boosters, 12 M79 rounds, four ChiCom anti-personnel mines, one M26 hand grenade, one smoke grenade, one US trip flare, nine US pistol belts, four M14 ammo pouches, and miscellaneous clothing and web gear.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of October with four maneuver battalions operating in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were three contacts with enemy forces resulting in six enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  A/3-22 Inf engaged five enemy with small arms fire 9 kms southwest of Black Horse (YS975905) at 1045 hours on 12 October resulting in two enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  One AK47 rifle was destroyed and one AK47 rifle with 210 rounds of ammunition was evacuated.  At 0900 hours on 13 October, A/3-22 Inf swept the previous day's contact area and evacuated one K54 pistol, four packs with 20 pounds of documents, two pounds of C4, two electrical blasting caps and miscellaneous clothing.  A/3-22 Inf located one more enemy body at 1500 hours on 14 October, which was credited to the C/3-22 Inf contact of 12 October.  D/3-22 Inf engaged three enemy soldiers with claymore mines 1/4  kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT53017) at 1300 hours on 13 October, resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were 12 contacts with the enemy during the second week of October, resulting in 21 enemy killed and one prisoner of war captured.  Sct/2-22 Inf (M) killed four enemy soldiers with claymore mines 2.5 kms north of Ben Suc (XT582960) at 1405 hours on 8 October.  There was no enemy return fire.  Rcn/ 1-27 Inf received small arms fire from an estimated three enemy 7 kms north of Ben Suc (XT558404).  Fire was returned by organic weapons and helicopter gunships, resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles and one K54 pistol.  A/1-27 Inf engaged two enemy soldiers with claymore mines and hand grenades at 0714 hours on 10 October 8 kms northwest of Ben Suc (XT551414), resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one bipod for an 82mm mortar, eight 82mm mortar rounds, 12 fuses for an 82mm mortar round, and one US hand grenade.  There was no return fire.  The most significant contact of the week occurred at 0730 hours on 11 October when !/1-27 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with claymore mines and organic weapons 8kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT551425), resulting in six enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  They evacuated two AK47 rifles with magazines, 120 AK rounds, 100 pounds of rice, two pounds of fish, five pounds of medical supplies, two pounds of documents, four cans of soy sauce, two packs of Cambodian cigarettes, 15 pounds of ARVN “C” rations, assorted pots and pans, two pounds of raw tobacco, four NVA ponchos, two pounds of tea, 10 pounds of onion skin paper, three hammocks, two NVA pistol belts, 25 pairs of trousers, 13 shirts, and 45 US non-electrical blasting caps.  There was no enemy return fire.  C/1-27 Inf detonated an unknown type booby trap and received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1415 hours on 12 October 7.5 kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT560437), resulting in one US soldier killed and five wounded.  Fire was returned with small arms and LFT with unknown results.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with two squadrons operating in Binh Duon, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces.  There was only one significant contact reported during the week.  I/3-11 ACR killed three enemy soldiers 9.5 kms north of Tan Uyan (XT928306) at 1600 hours on 8 October.  They evacuated one AK47 rifle, one K54 piston, one US protective mask, three backpacks and a small amount of documents.

     Colonel W. Russell Todd, CO (Designate), 3rd Brigade visited Cu Chi Base Camp from 7 thru 20 October for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General David E. Thomas, USARV Surgeon, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 9 October for a farewell visit to the medical personnel of the 25th Infantry Division.  Brigadier General (P) James Ursano, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and administration, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 13 October for an orientation on matters of personnel and administration in the 25th Infantry Division.  Major General Edward Bautz Jr. resumed command of the 25th Infantry Division on 13 October.  Major General Nguyen Xuan Thinh, CG. 25th ARVN Division visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 14 October to tour the facilities.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations during the third week of October (15-21 October) remained at a low level as enemy main and local force units avoided contact to engage in proselytizing activities designed to weaken GVN control.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported throughout the Division's AO although Cu Chi Base Camp did receive one 122mm rocket at 1827 hours on 15 October, resulting in one US soldier wounded and light damage to two buildings.  The number of mining incidents decreased by four to eight resulting in 19 US soldiers wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of October with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh Province (eastern War Zone C), Binh Long Province (western Chon Thanh District) and Bin Duong Province (northern Tri Tam and Khiem Hanh Districts).  Enemy units in the 1st Bde's AO were the 101 NVA, 165 NVA and 209 NVA Regiments.  There were four significant contacts reported resulting in four enemy killed.  A/3-4 Cav engaged three enemy with organic weapons 7 kms northwest of Phu Khuong (XT282618) at 1203 hours on 21 October resulting in three enemy killed.  Enemy small arms fire wounded two US soldiers.  Later, at 1305 hours, A/3-4 Cav received one 60mm mortar round 1.8 kms southwest of the 1203 hours engagement (XT(illegible) resulting in one US soldier wounded.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with three maneuver battalions operating in Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces.  Enemy units opposing the 2nd Bde were the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Artillery Regiment and 84 Rear Service Group.  The 2nd Bde also continued to coordinate its operations with the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF), 43rd ARVN Regiment, 18th ARVN Division and 11th ACR (-).  Contact with enemy forces was extremely light with four reported resulting in five enemy killed.  At 1050 hours on 16 October, D/3-22 Inf detonated claymore mines on two enemy soldiers 13 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT571021) resulting in two enemy killed and two rucksacks with miscellaneous clothing evacuated.  Snipers from R/3-22 Inf engaged 10 enemy 7 kms southwest of Ong Que (YS352932) at 1810 hours on 16 October with organic weapons and supported by artillery and a LFT, resulting in two enemy killed and two AK47 rifles evacuated.  There was no enemy return fire.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of October with four maneuver battalions (2-27 Inf moved to 3rd Bde on 16 October) operating in Tay Ninh And Binh Duong Provinces to interdict enemy movement of men and supplies down the Saigon River Corridor.  Enemy forces operating in the 3rd Bde's AO were the 101 NVA Regt, 268 VC MF Regt, Quyet Thang Regt, 83 Rear Service Group and SR-1 Rear Service units.  There were four contacts with enemy forces resulting in three enemy killed and two captured.  A/2-22 Inf (M) detonated claymore mines on nine enemy soldiers 5 kms north of Ben Suc (XT582387) at 1733 hours on 19 October, resulting in one enemy killed and two prisoners-of-war captured.  The PWs identified their unit as the C-212 food procurement company of the 83rd Rear Service Group which is responsible for the resupply of SR-1.  Three AK47 rifles, one RPG launcher and two RPG rounds were evacuated.  At 1620 hours on 20 October, A/1-27 Inf received RPG round from an unknown number of enemy 7 kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT552427) resulting in five US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by artillery with unknown results.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of October with two Squadrons operating in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces.  Enemy forces in the 11th ACR's AO were SR-5, Dong Nai Regt, 274 Regt and the U-1 Province (VC).  There were three contacts with enemy forces resulting in four enemy killed.  C/4-9 Inf 9OPCON to 3-11 ACR) engaged an unknown number of enemy 5 kms southeast of Phuoc Hoa (XT934390) at 1150 hours on 15 October with small arms, artillery and LFT with unknown results.  The enemy force returned fire with small arms and three RPG rounds but there were no US casualties.  Contact was lost at 1200 hours.  On a sweep of the area at 1425 hours, C/4-9 Inf received small arms, RPG, automatic weapons and mortar fire resulting in two US killed and three US wounded.  Fire was returned y organic weapons, LFT, artillery and air strikes with unknown results.  K/3-11 ACR, reacting to the C/4-9 Inf contact at 1545 hours, received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from 10-15 enemy 400 meters south of the original contact resulting in four US wounded and heavy damage to one APC.  Fire was returned by organic weapons resulting in four enemy killed.  Contact was lost at 1615 hours.  Two MEDEVAC UH1H helicopters, one from the 25th Aviation Battalion and the other from the 15th Medical Battalion, 1st Air Cavalry Division, called in to evacuate the wounded, received small arms fire at 1440 and 1515 hours, resulting in moderate damage to both aircraft.  K/3-11 ACR and A/4-9 Inf (OPCON to 3-11 ACR on 16 October) received small arms and RPG fire from four to five enemy 6 kms southeast of Phuoc Hoa (XT943382) at 1330 hours on 16 October resulting in three US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned bo organic weapons with unknown results.

     Major General Walter J. Woolwine, Asst Dep CG for Materiel, USARV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an update on 25th Inf Div activities with emphasis on logistics.  Brigadier General (P) Frederic E. Davison, Director of Enlisted Personnel, DA, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 17 October to observe and receive command briefings on the status of all aspects of personnel support and current problems in the 25th Infantry Division.  Brigadier General Rolland V. Heiser, Deputy J3, MACV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 19 October for an orientation at 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General Olin E. Smith, Asst Div Commander, 101st Airborne Division, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 19 and 20 October for an update on 25th Infantry Division activities and to attend the change of command ceremonies for the 3rd Brigade.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations remained at a low level during the fourth week of October (22-31 October) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact and concentrated on conducting terrorist and propaganda activities aimed at disrupting the GVN Pacification Program.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  The number of mining incidents increased by five over last week to 13, resulting in three US soldiers killed and 33 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh Province (eastern War Zone C) Binh Long Province (western Chon Thanh District) and Binh Duong Province (northern Tri Tan and Lhien Hanh districts) against the 101 NVA Regiment, 165 NVA Regiment and 209 NVA Regiment.  Contact was extremely light with two being reported resulting in three enemy killed.  A claymore mine set out by the Flame Platoon, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav 7.5 kms northwest of Ben Cui (XT398618) detonated at 1410 hours on 23 October resulting in one enemy killed.  Two enemy were killed by another F/3-4 Cav claymore mine detonation 4 kms northwest of Ben Cui (XT425495) at 0745 hours on 27 October.  One AK47 rifle, 30 pounds of rice and three VC rucksacks were evacuated from the contact site.  A/2-12 Inf swept an area 8 kms west of Bau Tran (XT430770) in War Zone C on 24 and 25 October and located one large cache.  They destroyed 23 bunkers, one fighting position and 26X82mm mortar rounds.  They evacuated assorted bottles of medicine, three CCs of Vitamin K, 100 aspirins, two pair of rubber gloves, 210 vials of penicillin, two pints of plasma, one 115 AC/DC generator, one can of gas, one SKS barrel, 24X75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 340 ChiCom hand grenades, five 20-pound mines, 400 rounds of .51 caliber ammunition, one 107mm rocket, 29 five foot sections of Bangalore torpedoes, 35X82mm mortar rounds and three bicycle wheels with tires.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of October with three maneuver battalions operating in Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Bien Hoa (Nhon Trach District) Provinces against the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Regiment and 84 Rear Service Group.  The 2nd Brigade also continued coordinated operations with the RTAVF, 43rd ARVN Regiment, 18th ARVN Division and the 11th ACR (-).  There were nine contacts with enemy forces resulting in four enemy killed and one captured.  D/3-17 Air Cav engaged two enemy with organic weapons 12 kms south of Long Thanh (YS147819) at 2050 hours on 22 October with unknown results.  Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier and one Kit Carson Scout.  One sampan was located and destroyed.  An APC from B/4-23 Inf (M) detonated a 10 - 20 pound mine with pressure device at 1240 hours on 24 October 8 kms north of Ngai Giao (YS4548838).  The troops riding the APCs from B/4-23 Inf (M) jumped off the tracks only to set off a daisy chain of eight “bouncing betty” type anti-personnel mines, resulting in three US soldiers killed and 17 wounded.  The APC suffered light damage.  C/3-22 Inf received small arms and RPG fire from an estimated 30 enemy 5 kms northwest of Ong Que (YT374040) at 1615 hours on 24 October resulting in three US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and artillery with unknown results.  C/3-22 Inf located a small munitions cache in a series of bunkers 5 kms northwest of Ong Que (YT343042) at 1105 hours on 25 October.  They destroyed 18 bunkers and one RPG round and evacuated four AK47 rifles, two M72 LAWs, 235 AK47 rounds, nine AK magazines, one US claymore mine, three M57 firing devices, two ChiCom hand grenades, two pounds of documents and miscellaneous clothing and cooking utensils.  D/3-22 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 9 kms northwest of Ong Que (YT319048) at 1350 hours on 28 October resulting in one enemy killed and one AK47 rifle evacuated.  The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.  D/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy with organic weapons 750 meters northwest of the 28 October contact (YT314054) at 1250 hours on 29 October resulting in one enemy killed and one AK47 rifle evacuated.  They destroyed 20 bunkers and one 82mm mortar round.  There was no enemy return fire.  B/3-22 Inf located a small weapons cache 3 kms north of Ong Que (YT398025) at 1035 and 1315 hours on 31 October.  They evacuated one .30 caliber Browning Automatic Rifle, two SKS rifles, one 75mm recoilless rifle and five Russian anti-tank grenades.  They also destroyed six bunkers, one mess area, one table and one chair.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of October with four maneuver battalions (4-9 Inf (-) moved to 3rd Bde from 11th ACR on 28 October) operating in Tay Ninh Province and Binh Duong Province (southeastern Khiem Hanh, southern Tri Tam, northern Trang Bank and Phu Hoa Districts) against the 101 NVA Regiment, 268 VC MF Regiment, Quyet Thang Regiment, 83rd Rear Service Group and SR-1 Rear Service units.  The 3rd Bde's mission was to interdict enemy movement of men and supplies down the Saigon River Corridor.  There were 11 contacts with the enemy resulting in 16 enemy killed.  B/2-22 Inf (M) killed two enemy with claymore mines 10 kms mortheast of Cu Chi (XT723228) at 0945 hours on 22 October and evacuated one AK47 rifle.  A/2-27 Inf (M) killed two enemy with claymore mines 5 kms northeast of Ben Suc (XT595384) at 1818 hours on 22 October.  A/2-27 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons and artillery 5.5 kms southwest of Ben Suc (XT524309) at 1020 hours on 25 October resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles, one VC poncho, a small amount of documents and miscellaneous personal items.  There was no enemy return fire.  B/2-22 Inf (M) killed four enemy with claymore mines 11 kms northeast of Cu Chi (XT717245) at 1750 hours on 25 October.  Three AK47 rifles were evacuated.  An AP from C/4-9 Inf 7 kms north of Cu Chi (XT685214) engaged three enemy at 2205 hours on 30 October with organic weapons.  A sweep of the area at 0655 hours on 31 October resulted in the location of three enemy bodies and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles, one RPG round, one cooking pot, one and one-half pounds of documents, one NVA canteen, two pounds of medical supplies, two soldering irons, two pounds of flour, three VC ponchos, three pounds of miscellaneous clothing and one hot water bottle.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of October with two squadrons and one maneuver battalion (-)
until 28 October) operating in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces against the 274 NVA Regiment, Dong Nai Regiment, elements from SR-5 and the U-1 Province (VC) forces.  In five contacts, 11th ACR forces killed seven enemy soldiers.  I/3-11 ACR, while approaching two graves with a trap door between them 7 kms south of Phuy Giao (XT890300), engaged three enemy with organic weapons at 1445 hours on 27 October, resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one K54 pistol, two hammocks, three VC ponchos, one flashlight and one transistor radio.  The enemy returned fire with a hand grenade but there were no US casualties.  An NDP from K/3-11 ACR, located 10 kms east of Ben Cat (XT844361), received three to four 60mm mortar rounds, 15-20 RPG rounds and three to five 75mm recoilless rifle rounds at 0130 hours on 30 October, resulting in one US soldier killed and six wounded.  Two APCs suffered heavy damage and two APCs suffered moderate damage.  Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, LFT and Night Hawk, resulting in two enemy killed and two secondary explosions.  Two RPG launchers, one AK47 rifle, four RPG boosters and nine RPG rounds were evacuated.

     Brigadier General (P) James Ursano, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration, USARV visited cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities, with emphasis on maters of P&A.  Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, DCG, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp for a briefing on Keystone progress in the 25th Infantry Division.  Colonel William Sullivan, DCD and LTC Pembroke Curry, (illegible) A/Vice Chief of Staff, DA visited Cu Chi Base Camp to discuss procedures for the preservation of Vietnam Combat Operations data with emphasis on reporting procedures and the use of computers for operational data storage on 28 October.  CMDR Joseph J. Lorfano, US Navy, Special Assistant for SEA, Div Def Information, OASD/PA visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 31 October and 1 November to obtain an update on operations and to discuss public affairs with the IO for background in dealing with and briefing the Washington press on current SEA activities.

     The 25th Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment killed 101 and captured nine of the enemy during the month of October, accounted for 77 individual weapons, seven crew served weapons and .92 tons of rice captured or destroyed.  Division soldiers destroyed 84 mines and booby traps while detonating 44, resulting in four US soldiers killed and 81 wounded.

     During the quarter from 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970, the 25th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (until 22 September) and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment successfully disrupted enemy movement of men and supplies throughout the Division's area of operations thus preventing any significant enemy offensive activity.  In general, fighting was light and scattered during the quarter as the enemy avoided contact.  This low level of activity was attributed to the highly successful Cambodian operations undertaken by the 25th Infantry Division in May and June of 1970 in which enemy border supply points were destroyed.  Enemy units throughout the Division's AO suffered from acute supply shortages, making sustained offensive activity against Division units and installations or Saigon virtually impossible.  The 25th Infantry Division and its OPCON units concentrated on upgrading ARVN/PF/RF forces during the quarter in order to continue the Vietnamization program as well as insure the continued success of the Republic of Vietnam's pacification program.

     The 1st Brigade's AO included eastern War Zone C in Tay Ninh Province, western Chon Thanh District in Binh Long Province and northern Tri Tan and Khien Hanh Districts in Binh Duong Province.  The 1st Bde's maneuver battalions were the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor; 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry; and 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-).  Enemy units operating in the 1st Bde's AO were the 101 NVA Regiment, 165 NVA Regiment and 209 NVA Regiment.  The 1st Brigade was tasked with the defense of Dau Tieng Base Camp and disrupting enemy movement through War Zone C.

     The 2nd Brigade's AO included Tuy Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces.  The 2nd Bde's maneuver battalions were the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry (until 20 August); 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry; 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry; 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry (15-28 September ).  Enemy units in the 2nd Bde's AO were the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Artillery Regiment and 84 Rear Service Group.  The 2nd Brigade conducted ground reconnaissance and search operations through the AO to disrupt enemy movement.

     The 3rd Brigade's AO included Binh Duong Province, southeastern Khien Hanh, Southern Tri Tam, northern Trang Bang and Phu Hoa Districts.  Enemy units in the 3rd Bde's AO were the 101 NVA Regiment, 268 VC MF Regiment, Quyet Thang Regiment, 83 Rear Service Group and SR-1 Rear Service Units.  The 3rd Bde was tasked with denying the use of the Saigon River Corridor by the enemy and with the defense of Cu Chi Base Camp for which one battalion was designated Division Ready Reactionary Force.  The 3rd Bde's maneuver battalions were the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry; 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (until 20 August); 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion (until  20 August); 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division operated in Long An, Hau Nghia and Pien Hoa (Nhon Tranh District) Provinces during the first half of the quarter.  On 22 September, the (illegible) Inf Div became OPCON to USARV at Di An and prepared to return to the United States.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's 1st and 3rd Squadrons became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division on 15 September and operated in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces against the 274 NVA Regiment, Don Nai Regiment, elements of SR-5 and the U-1 Province (VC) unit.

     B.     Personnel

     (1)     During the months of August through October 1970, the aggregate Division personnel strength averaged 16,827 of 17,709 authorized or 95%.  Enlisted personnel strength averaged for this period 15,592 of 16,410 authorized or 95% while officer personnel strength for the period averaged 1,235 of 1,299 authorized or 95%.  Personnel shortages continued to exist in Infantry, Signal Corps and Artillery captains, aviators overall, and non-commissioned officers in the grades E6 through E8 in the 11B, 11C, 12B, 13E, 17K, 31G, 63C and 76P MOS series.

     (2)     During the period 1 August through 31 October 1970, the Division had 39 KIA's, (3 officers and 36 EM), and 542 WIA's (35 officers and 507 EM), excluding OPCON units.  There were 13 non-battle deaths, 131 non-battle injuries and 0 missing in action.  Officer gains for the period numbered 533, while administrative losses were 488.  EM gains were 6,599, while administrative EM losses totaled 6,023.

     (3)     Principal Command and Staff:  The identification of the principal Command Staff personnel within the 25th Infantry Division for the reporting period is as follows:

Commanding General     Major General Edward Bautz, Jr.
          (1 August - 31 Oct 70)

Assistant Division Commander  A     Brigadier General Michael J.L. Greene
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Assistant Division Commander B     Brigadier General John R. Thurman III
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Chief of Staff     Colonel Thomas J. Hanifen
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G1     LTC Patrick R. Lowrey
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G2     LTC Toshio Aoyagi
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G3     LTC Ted G. Westerman
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G4     LTC John H. Claybrook
          (1Aug 70 - 13 Sep 70)

     LTC Don S. McCoy
          (14 Sep 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G5     LTC Anthony J. Perrotto
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)
Commanding Officer, 1st Bde     Colonel William F. Graves
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bde     Colonel Joseph R. Ulatoski
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Bde     Colonel James M. Connell
          (1 Aug 70 - 6 Oct 70)

     Colonel William R. Todd
          (7 Oct 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, DIVARTY     Colonel Harry A. Buzzett
          (1 Aug 70 - 5 Aug 70)

     Colonel John P. Cooper
          (6 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, DISCOM     Colonel Linwood B. Mather
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 725th Maint Bn     LTC Wallace H. Dawson
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 25th S&T Bn     LTC Joseph L. Van Camp
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 25th Med Bn     LTC David Arbiter
          (Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 125th Sig Bn     LTC William R. Rogers
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 6th Engr Bn     LTC Forrest T. Gay III
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 25th Avn Bn     LTC Harry W. Drotor
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 4th Bn, 9th Inf     LTC Robert W. Walsh
          (1 Aug 70 - 19 Sep 70)

     LTC Harry J. Thompson
          (20 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf     LTC Charles W. Norton
          (1 Aug 70 - 10 Aug 70)

     LTC Ralph Salucci
          (11 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 4th Bn (M), 23rd Inf     LTC Edward M. Bradford
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 27th Inf     LTC Martin Rosenstein
          (1 Aug 70 - 13 Oct 70)

     LTC Johnny J. Johnston
          (14 Oct 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf     LTC Albert P. Hodges
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf     LTC Oliver P. Combs
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf     LTC Sheppard H. Phillips
          (1 Aug 70 - 13 Aug 70)

     LTC Robert N. Martin
          (14 Aug - 25 Oct 70)

     Major David H. Davis III
          (26 Oct - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf     LTC Nathan C. Vail
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf     LTC John E. Hazelwood
          (1 Aug 70 - 5 Sep 70)

     LTC Hubert K. Bartron
          (6 Sep 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor     LTC Birtrun S. Kidwell
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav     LTC Noel D. Knotts
          (1 Aug 70 - 8 Oct 70)

     LTC Dan D. Drury
          (9 Oct 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 8th Arty     LTC David R. Hampton
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 7th Bn, 11th Arty     LTC Paul M Payson
          (1 Aug 70 - 21 Oct 70)

     LTC Benjamin E. Doty
          (22 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty     LTC Thomas Soberick
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty     LTC Thomas L. Kelly
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Adjutant General     LTC Peter H. Walker
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Division Chaplain     LTC Roy V. Peters
          (1 Aug 70 - 2 Aug 70)

     LTC Joseph P. Mulhern
          (3 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Finance Officer     Cpt Garry D. Foster
          (1 Aug 70 - 9 Aug 70)

     LTC Bobby J. Dean
          (10 Aug 70 - 31 Aug 70)

Information Officer     Maj Robert E. Kelso
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Inspector General     LTC John M. Walton
          (1 Aug 70 - 7 Sep 70)

     LTC James G. Owen
          (8 Sept 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Staff Judge Advocate     Maj Burnett H. Radosh
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Provost Marshal     LTC Clyde L. Murphy
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Division Surgeon     LTC David Arbiter
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Division Chemical Officer     LTC Robert R. Knox, Jr.
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Headquarters Commandant     Cpt A. Marc Christianson
          (1 Aug 70 - 4 Sep 70)

     Maj Daniel A. Delliese
          (5 Sep 70 - 31 Oct 70)

     C.  Intelligence:

     (1)     Summary of Enemy Activity.

     (a)     Enemy activity during the reporting period was at a lower level than in previous periods.  During the month of August, contacts were few and most unit identifications were gained from documents and Hoi Chanh.  There was a slight increase in activity in the month of September, although overall enemy activity was low compared to other reporting periods.  During the month of October, enemy levels of activity decreased to a lower level than that of August.

     (b)     Harassing, mining and booby trapping incidents together with isolated and scattered mortar/rocket attacks constituted the bulk of enemy initiated activity for the quarter.  COSVN non-divisional units located were predominantly elements of Rear Service Groups.  There were scattered identifications of COSVN Divisional units, however, these elements appeared to be preoccupied with operations inside Cambodia.

     (c)     There were numerous identifications of Sub-Regional and VC Provincial units with the most significant being the newly formed 1696 Battalion during the month of September.  The formation of this new battalion, by combining the forces of the 269 Battalion and the D16 Battalion, appeared to be in conjunction with the reconfiguration of Sub-Regions Two and Three into one region identified as the Long An Sub-Region.  Indications were that Sub-Regional units were experiencing severe difficulties in health and resupply operations and were forced to concentrate on the solution of these problems in lieu of combat operations.  It was apparent that many units were experiencing personnel and logistics problems; however, reduced activity also indicated that extensive reorganization many have taken place.

     (d)     To combat the pacification program, COSVN has emphasized local proselytizing and political indoctrination missions, and has directed main force units to operate in support of local forces.  Personnel of main force units have also been assigned to local force units to aid them in the mission of constructing a greater base of popular support.  These moves by COSVN probably are in anticipation of the redeployment of US combat elements.  After US redeployment, terrorist tactics are expected to increase and be directed primarily at local governments.  We further expect the enemy to continue to curtail main force large scale operations and concentrate on ambushes, attacks by fire, and terrorist tactics in an attempt to counter the effectiveness of the GVN Pacification Program.

     (2)     Aerial Surveillance

     (a)     During the quarter, there were 126 imagery missions flow in support of 25th Infantry Division Operations.  Coverage included most of Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia Provinces, the eastern sections of Binh Duong and Binh Long Provinces, and the northern section of Long An Province.  Extensive coverage of the Fishhook area, the Razor Backs, the Crescent, the Ho Bo Woods and the Mushroom area was also conducted.  The 126 missions included 57 Air Force and 69 Army missions, with a total of 44,348 feet of imagery.  The type systems employed included Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), Infrared (Red Haze), and Photographic imagery.

     (b)     The missions were interpreted by the Imagery Interpretation Section, 25th Military Intelligence Company, with the following significant finds:

                    20     AA/AW Positions
                    1794     Fighting Positions
                    315     Fox Holes
                    16     Mortar Positions
                    14     Trenches
                    311      Bunkers
                    36     U/G entrances
                    12     Structures
                    1     OLP
                    1     Foot Bridge

     (c)     Extensive use of hand-held photography was also included in the program this past quarter.  Hand-held photos were taken in support of Ranger Operations, and for BDA of air strikes, artillery strikes and commando vaults.  Hand-helds of the Fire Support Bases were used for defensive planning purposes.

     (4)     The interrogation Prisoner of War Section, 25th Military Intelligence Company, processed 54 detainees during the quarter.  This included 24 VCG/VC/NVA/PW, 6 returnees, 6 VCS CD's, 9 civil defendants, and 9 innocent civilians.

     (a)     For the quarter, the IPW Section developed 5 targets for field units.  Two exploitations were successful and resulted in 20 bunkers located and destroyed, two AK47 rifles and two ChiCom hand grenades captured, 125 pounds of plasma, one surgical kit, one dental kit, and miscellaneous materials and food.

     (b)     The decrease in the number of detainees during the past quarter reflected the general decline in enemy activity during the period.

     (5)     Airborne Personnel Detector (XM-3, SNIFF).

     The airborne personnel detector (sniff) continued to be a valuable method of collecting information on the location of enemy forces.  During this reporting period, there were 163 sniff missions conducted in the Division AO.  Two hundred sixty-seven additional missions were scheduled but subsequently cancelled, 129 due to unfavorable weather conditions and 138 due to aircraft priorities.  One hundred sixty-six of the targets detected were engaged with 671 rounds of artillery and all targets were entered into the intelligence data base of the Division and II Field Force, Vietnam.  Utilization figures are as follows:

     SNIFF     1ST BDE     2ND BDE     3RD BDE
UTILIZATION     Aug     Sep     Oct     Aug     Sep     Oct     Aug     Sep     Oct     Total     
No. missions     16     27     25     23     34     32     5     0     1     163
Sniff hours (TOT)     8.25     6.62     7.00     9.90     9.16     8.52     1.16     0     .16     50.77
No. missions cancelled     38     23     17     21     28     0     1     1     0     129
(weather)
No. missions cancelled     32     19     31     17     14     17     2     5     1     138
(aircraft)

     (6)     Counterintelligence activities during the quarter were extensive.  The most significant activity (Operation Starlight) was conducted from 28 Sep to 25 Oct in an effort to improve the defensive posture of Cu Chi Base Camp.  The methods employed by the counterintelligence section included covert night surveillance using starlight scopes for observation of suspected points of entrance and exit of the Base Camp, unannounced gate checks, and raids on areas of suspected illegal activity based on tips from informants.

     (7)     Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) continued to be successfully employed by the Division in both a target acquisition and intelligence role.  Sensors are located to monitor base areas, infiltration routes and areas of enemy activity.

     (a)     During the quarter, the Division implanted 292 unattended ground sensors.  The most significant implant was conducted in the Fishhook - Hump area in Cambodia.  For this operation, a method was developed to implant seismic sensors by manually dropping them from a fixed wing aircraft at 1500 feet.  The method was tested in practice drops and when the actual implant in Cambodia was conducted, a high degree of accuracy was obtained.

     (b)     A training program was started on 25 October to acquaint 10 Vietnamese personnel from the 25th ARVN Division in the operation and maintenance of the Battle Area surveillance System (BASS).  The thirty-day program consisted of 10 days of lecture, demonstration and practical exercise in general topics; 10 days each of specialized instructions and on-the-job training.

     (8)     The use of Ranger teams for long and short range ground reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition continued to be a valuable asset to the Division.  During the reporting period, the Rangers conducted 85 missions which accounted for four enemy killed, four enemy captured, 25 pounds of documents captured, 40 pounds of medical supplies captured, four weapons captured, and considerable information confirming or denying the presence of enemy activity.

     (9)     Intelligence Coordination.

     The 25th Infantry Division extended its intelligence information collection effort by conducting active liaison with units and GVN agencies operating in or adjacent to the Division's AO.  The area covered included 8 Provinces and 22 Districts.  Exchange of intelligence information was made in three ways.  Intelligence publications, particularly the INTSUM, were exchanged with 19 other Headquarters.  Division IPW and CI personnel were assigned at Chieu Hoi Centers in four provinces and at selected PIOCCS.  Finally, the operational liaison net was used for the exchange of intelligence information.

     (D)     Operations.

     (1)     Army Aviation.

     (a)     During the quarter, the 25th Aviation Battalion continued to support the Division in the conduct of Operation TOAN THANG IV.  Support hours fell within the established flying hour program for each type, model and series of aircraft.

     (b)     There have been no changes in daily aircraft requirements during this reporting period.  The battalion continued to support the 25th Infantry Division in a general support role.

     (c)     Statistical Summary of Combat Performance Data:  (1 Aug to 31 Oct 70)

     Aug     Sep     Oct     Total

Flight Hours     3625     3516     3222     10363
Sorties     7902     8058     8548     24508
Passengers Carried     15733     16060     17744     49537
Cargo Carried (Tons)     273     212     217     702
Enemy Eliminated (BC)     22     4     0     26
Enemy Eliminated (Poss)     0     0     0     0
Enemy Structures (Dest)     9     0     0     9
Enemy Structures (Dam)     2     0     0     2
Enemy Sampans (Dest)     0     0     0     0
Enemy Sampans (Dam)     0     0     0     0
Detainees     0     0     0     0
POW's     0     0     0     0

     (d)     The most significant change in the operational concept of the Division's air assets during the reporting quarter was the transfer of the Night Hawk mission from the lift company (!/25th Avn) to the special mission company (B/25th Avn).

     (2)     Engineer Operations.

     (a)     During this quarter, the majority of engineer effort was in the form of direct support of the 25th Infantry Division in combat operations.  Company A continued in direct support of the 2nd Brigade located at Dau Tieng.  Company B continued in direct support of the 2nd Brigade located at Operations Base Lynch.  Company D continued in direct support of the 3rd Brigade located at Cu Chi Base Camp.  Company C continued in general support of the 25th Infantry Division located at Cu Chi.  Company E continued in general support of the 25th Infantry Division with bridge and boat support.

     (b)     Significant Activities:

     (1)     During the reporting quarter, the 65th Engineer Battalion engaged in a wide range of combat support engineering missions.  It fought its usual battles against the torrential monsoon rains emerging victorious as all main surface roads (MSRs) and tactical roads were maintained open throughout the period.

     (2)     Company A, based at Dau Tieng in direct support of the 1st Brigade, constructed upgraded and closed numerous fire support bases as the tactical requirements demanded.  In early August, FSB Grant was completed and elements of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry and 588th Engineer Battalion claimed occupancy until mid-October when it was closed.  Work also continued at FSB Denny from the previous quarter.  Extensive work was done there throughout August and September on improving the drainage, bermline, firing positions, and interior road network.  Progress was continually hampered by heavy rainfall during the quarter.

     (3)     During August, Company A also constructed FSB Eloise and upgraded FSB Warrior, both located in War Zone C.  Upon completion of combat operations in that area, both bases were closed by the end of the quarter.  Company A in early September opened FSB Simmons and reopened FSB Jamie.  Both bases were maintained and upgraded until the end of the quarter when they were subsequently turned over to the ARVN.

     (4)     Company D continued upgrading FSB Kien and Tennessee in the 3rd Brigade's AO southeast of Dau Tieng.  At FSB Tennessee in August and September, additional berm was pushed up, fields of fire cleared, bunkers dug, and interior roads upgraded.  FSB Kien was also improved throughout the quarter.  The interior and access roads were upgraded, and low areas inside the base were raised and leveled.

     (5)     Company D's most significant activity for this quarter was the extensive road upgrade of and land clearing along LTL 14 from Dau Tieng to FSB Tennessee.  A little over 16 kms of the roadway was upgraded.  During the quarter, over 7750 loads of laterite were hauled, placed, lime stabilized, leveled and compacted.  Several coats of paneprime were then applied.  Over 1600 acres of land was cleared on both sides of the road to a distance of 200 meters.  This project was instrumental in eliminating the daily ambushes that had previously occurred along this stretch of road.  In mid-September, Company D constructed a 250 meter approach road from LTL 14 to a rafting site on the Saigon River.  On 28 September, Company C supported by Company E, constructed a 5-float reinforced raft for use there by 3rd Brigade units.  It remained operational on the Saigon River until 30 October when it was extracted by Company D and Company E.  During that time, the raft, operated by personnel from Company E, ferried 65 vehicles and was used on several night ambush patrols.  The raft was instrumental in the rapid extraction of elements from 2-34 Arm and 2-22 Inf (M) from the Ho Bo Woods.  To aid in the extraction, Company C constructed a 300 meter corduroy road in the vicinity of the raft site.

     (6)     In early August, Companies A and C did repair work on TL 4 north of FSB Barbara.  TL 4 is the only land route to FSB Denny, a Field Force Heavy Artillery base near the Fishhook sanctuary area of Cambodia.  After the beginning of September, the mission was given to Company C alone.  Work continued on TL 4 through the end of the quarter.  Extensive rock and laterite hauling was necessary to repair the 28 kms of road.  The work was made extremely difficult by heavy rains.  Sections of the road were washed away periodically, thus requiring reworking.  Over 1,000 cubic meters of rock were used - some hauled as much as 80 miles.  Company E assisted in the hauling.  It is estimated that over 12,000 man-hours and 3,000 equipment hours were expended in keeping this vital road open.

     (7)     In the 2nd Brigade's AO, Company B continued work at Operations Base Lynch and several fire support bases during the quarter.  Throughout the entire quarter, Company B continued upgrading and developing OB Lynch and several fire support bases during the quarter.  Throughout the entire quarter, Company B continued upgrading and developing OB Lynch, on which work had begun in early July.  All sections of the defensive perimeter were improved, including the berm line, fields of fire and defensive wire emplacements.  Most of the interior roads (about 4.1 kms) were upgraded with rock and lime-stabilized laterite.  Several coats of peneprime were then applied.  Company B also opened, upgraded, and maintained FSBs Louise, Hazel and Schwartz during the quarter.

     (8)     In late August, Company D began testing the use of Bangalore torpedoes in land clearing in conjunction with the land clearing and road upgrading project on TL 15.  A CEV was fitted with a special boom for emplacing the bangalore torpedoes.  The results of the testing showed that Bangalore torpedoes were a highly effective method of clearing an area of booby traps and vegetation.  The TL 15 project continued until 13 October.  A total of 7 kms of road were constructed and 5 3 acres of land cleared.  AVLB abutments were also built during this period.

     (9)     On 9 September, Company B moved a platoon from Operations Base Lynch to FSB Schwartz in preparation for upgrading 8 kms of Route 321 running past FSB Schwartz to LTL 2.  The work continued through the rest of the quarter.  Continuous rain and poor drainage resulted in slow progress.  Extensive ditching and shaping of the road was necessary.  Over 6,000 cubic meters of laterite were hauled, spread, lime stabilized, and compacted though rain often made compaction difficult.  A 200 meter access road into FSB Schwartz was also constructed.  The project was about half completed by the end of the quarter.

     (10)     Several other roads within the Division's AO were repaired as necessary.  In the first part of August, Company C emplaced several culverts on LTL 19 totaling 180 feet.  Company A upgraded a section of Route 246 at about the same time.  In early September, Company D upgraded a stretch of TL 6A.

     (11)     On 6 August, Company E provided an AVLB bridge on LTL 13 in support of a land clearing operation which was initiated the previous quarter.  The AVLB remained with the land clearing team until completion of the project (16 August) and was emplaced and extracted a total of 12 times.  In late September, 1 38' 4” dry span was constructed by Company A and airlifted to a site on LTL 13.  One week later, it was extracted.  Company A also repaired approximately 5 kilometers of LTL 13 and installed several culverts.

     (12)     The most significant bridging operation for the quarter was accomplished by Company A, supported by Company E.  On 10 October, Company E transported ten 18' 4” dry spans to Dau Tieng.  There, Company A and Company E assembled the spans which on 11 October were airlifted with a CH54 Skycrane from Dau tieng to LTL 13 near FSB Grant to assist in the extraction of elements of the 62nd Engineer Battalion, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry and the 588th Engineer Battalion.  After the mission was completed, the dry spans were extracted and returned to Dau Tieng.  On 27 October, Company A assembled two 38' 4” dry spans which were airlifted and emplaced on TL 4 for the insertion of II FF Artillery units from Katum.

     (13)     In mid-October as part of the Battalion's Civic Action Program, Company C began land clearing in a deserted village south of Trang Bang.  The area was found to be booby trapped and had an extensive network of tunnels.  Company C cleared approximately 350 acres of land and detected and detonated 18 mines and booby traps.  During the same period, Company D was working on a Refugee Camp south of Cu Chi.  Some land clearing was done, a culvert was emplaced, and two water towers were built.  As the quarter closed, the Battalion was also working on plans for a Province hospital at Bao Trai.

     (14)     In addition to its other missions, each company worked to improve its respective base camp and company area whenever possible.  Company C completed the major portion of the Division Sports Area, including the Division Boxing Arena.  The bunker line was improved and areas subject to flooding were elevated.  At Dau Tien Base Camp, Company A worked on improving the interior roads and helipads.  A convoy holding area was also created by leveling an area and covering it with rock and lime stabilized laterite.  At OB Lynch, Company B located and set up a new water point, constructed a defensive position around it and upgraded the road to it.

     (15)     The most significant unit move during the quarter was Company B's relocation from OB Lynch to Camp Frenzell Jones located in the Long Binh support area complex.  The move was completed on 23 October.  By the end of the quarter, OB Lynch had shrunk to the size of an artillery base.

     (16)     On 16 September, a 45-day land clearing operation was initiated by the 984th Land Clearing company of the 62nd Engineer Battalion.  The area cleared was located in the 3rd Brigade's AO in the Trapezoid southeast of Dau Tieng.  Company D was responsible for coordination of logistic support required by the land clearing team, advice on trafficability of the area being cleared, and maintenance of all access roads required by the team's movement.

     (c)     Water Production for the quarter was as follows:

     Location     August     September     October  

     Cu Chi     800,400          (turned over to PA&E on 29 Aug)
     OB Lynch          107,966     140,330     125,000
     FSB Warrior     8,300     21,800        -----    
     FSB Kien          56,000     175l,350     150,000
     FSB Tennessee            -----       12,825       10,000

     Monthly Totals     972,666     350,305       285,000

Total production for the quarter:  1,607,971 gallons.

     (3)     Artillery Operations.

     (a)     During the reporting period, the 25th Division Artillery performed its primary mission of providing direct and general support to maneuver battalions of the 25th Infantry Division.  At the beginning of the period, the Division had returned recently from Cambodia and had assumed a Wet Weather Season posture.  Tactical operations during the period were characterized by small unit actions in the Division's AO, which stretched from the Cambodian border to the Xuan Loc area.  Artillery made relatively few moves, providing the required support from dispersed fire support bases.  There were a number of self-defense fire support bases occupied by Division Artillery units during this period.  This conserved combat power by releasing maneuver battalions from defensive missions in an around these self-defense fire support bases.  At the end of the period, Division Artillery had begun to stand down in preparation for withdrawal of the 25th Infantry Division (less 2nd Brigade) from the Republic of Vietnam.

     (b)     Organization for combat.

          7-11 Artillery, DS 1st Brigade
          1-8 Artillery, DS 2nd Brigade
          2-77 Artillery, DS 3rd Brigade
          3-13 Artillery, GS 25th Infantry Division

     (c)     2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

     During the first part of the period, the battalion continued to support the 3rd Brigade in the western sector of the Division's AO.  The battalion CP remained at Cu Chi Base Camp.  Because of a slowdown in enemy activity, the majority of support was in the firing of intelligence targets in an effort to deny the enemy communication-liaison routes and staging and base camp areas.  An increase in the coordination with ARVN artillery units to effect coverage of some maneuver elements out of range of US artillery was effected because of the extent of the area that had to be supported.  Reductions in ASR combined with decreased activity resulted in the expenditures of 24,740 rounds for the reporting period.

     (b)     3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery

     The battalion continued to support the division in general support and reinforcing missions.  There were 5 battery moves during the period.  On 28 October, the battalion assumed the responsibility of clearance of fires in the 1st Brigade AO and for Dau Tieng Artillery AASWCC from the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery.  The primary difference in battalion operations during this period was the policy of keeping firing batteries intact as opposed to the previously used method of gaining greater coverage by splitting batteries.  This was made possible by greater coordination and use of ARVN artillery in the Division area and the decrease in enemy activity.  It was also necessitated by the Wet Weather Season posture.  Total expenditures during the period were 18,724 rounds.

     (c)     7th Battalion, 11th Artillery

     Enemy activity decreased rapidly during the period and the battalion organization for combat remained relatively stable during this time.  There were sporadic indirect fire attacks on the battalion headquarters and 1st brigade units at Dau Tieng Base Camp.  The battalion experienced 13 battery moves during the quarter.  During October, the battalion received notification that stand-down operations would begin near the end of the month.  On 24 October, HHB/7-11 Arty moved from Dau Tieng to Camp Frenzell Jones to initiate the battalion stand-down.  On 26 October, B Battery stood down and was moved by airlift to Dau Tieng and then moved by road to Camp Frenzell Jones on 27 October.  A Battery was airlifted to Dau Tieng on 27 October and then moved by road to Camp Frenzell Jones on 28 October.  C Battery was airlifted to Dau Tieng on 28 October and then moved by road to Camp Frenzell Jones on 28 October.  The three vacated fire support bases were turned over to ARVN forces, including all structures, fortifications and ammunition on hand except for ICM ammunition.  The total amount of ammunition turned over to the ARVN forces was 1,852 rounds.  The battalion expended 16,463 rounds during the period.

     (d)     1st Battalion, 8th Artillery

     The battalion continued its direct support mission to the 2nd Brigade.  On 23 October, the battalion CP moved from OB Lynch to Xuan Loc and the battalion rear moved to Camp Frenzell Jones.  During the reporting quarter, the battalion supported 35 contacts with enemy forces and was credited with three enemy KIA (BC).  There were two attacks on fire support bases during the quarter.  On 3 October, A Battery received one RPG round and six 60mm mortar rounds, all landing outside the berm and causing no damage or casualties.  On 23 October, C Battery received small arms fire resulting in one US soldier wounded.  There were five battery moves during the quarter.  Total expenditures during the quarter totaled 14,387 rounds.

     E.     Logistics.         
     (1)     The 25th Infantry Division Support Command continued to provide division-level combat service support to all divisional and several non-divisional units in the AO.  Because of the reduction of troop strength in Vietnam as part of the Vietnamization program, changes were made in disposition of troop units within the Division's AO.  This necessitated adjustments in DISCOM's support operations and the location of supporting units and facilities.  The following are highlights of these changes.

     (a)     On 15 September, the Division assumed responsibility for operations in the Nhon Trach area southeast of Saigon.  To support this increase, forward supply maintenance and medical elements were established at Bearcat Base Camp.

     (b)     On 15 September, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry was assigned to the Division and became OPCON to the 2nd Brigade operating in the Xuan Loc area.  At time of assignment, the 2-3 Inf was in a stand-down status with 85% of its equipment turned in.  The 25th supply and Transport Battalion had to re-equip this battalion by 22 September for field duty.  Support was provided without difficulty through existing Forward Support elements while operating in the field.  

     (2)     During the reporting period, a complete UP4 dispensing facility was provided at Thien Ngon to service US and VNAF aircraft supporting ARVN operations.  As US aircraft began phasing out and VNAF aircraft assumed the support mission, plans were made to turn the JP4 facility over to the 12th Aviation Battalion.

     (3)     The following are significant projects under construction by the Office of the Installation Coordinator, Cu Chi Base Camp.

     (a)     Electrical upgrade throughout the base camp.

     (b)     Construction of head wall and culverts to improve drainage.

     (c)     Construction of latrines.

     (4)     Transportation operations during the period returned to normal after the Cambodian Campaign, although there was a significant increase in USAF special mission air requests (illegible) due to units relocating about the AO.  The significant operational activities included the following:

     (a)     Support of the 1st Brigade stand-down program resulted in moving approximately 125 personnel by fixed wing aircraft every two days during the months of August and September.  Utilization of all fixed wing aircraft continued to be above 85%, with the dedicated C47A (Caribou) averaging a daily utilization of over 11 sorties, and 9,000 pounds for an 89% overall average.

     (b)     The CH47 and CH54 helicopters continued to perform yeoman duty.  Support of the 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade was required from assets allocated to the Division.  This went quite well, except on those days when other priorities overruled a portion of their requested sorties.  In these instances, ARVN declared all sorties CE, which were approved because of unfamiliarity with their actual situation.  During September, they accounted for 18 hours on CE time.  At the end of September, the joint US-ARVN CH47 Company (20th ASH Co) began sole support of the ARVN Brigade as part of the Vietnamization program.  This should eventually phase the Division out of management of this aircraft for ARVN.

     (5)     DISCOM elements participated in 298 Integrated Civic Action Programs (I-CAPS) during this period.  There were 57,415 patients treated of which 4,682 were dental.  During the reporting period, construction was begun on five two-room schools sponsored by the 25th Administration Company, 25th Supply and Transport Battalion, 725th Maintenance Battalion and 269th Aviation Battalion.

     (6)     25th Medical Battalion.

     (a)     The 25th Medical Battalion supported Division units with medical service and supplies.  In addition, non-divisional units were supported with medical supplies.

     Medical Totals:

     Patients seen:

          Disease - 4,729
          Non-battle injuries - 1,348
          IRHA - 127

     Supply and Services:

          Line items issued - 2,562
          MEDCAP line items issued - 672
          Bulk Pharmacy items issued - 3

     (b)     The 40th Medical Detachment (KJ), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided dental treatment for the Division.

     Total treatments - 19,863

     (c)     The 159th Medical Detachment (HA), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided evacuation to divisional and non-divisional units.

     Total Patients - 1,426
     Total Missions - 983
     Flying Time - not computed for the month of October
     Aircraft Availability - 100%
     Aircraft Flyable - 6 (100%)

     (d)     During this quarter, the battalion MEDCAP Program increased tremendously.  Over 40,000 Vietnamese patients were seen and treated by the Medcap Team.  A new program was also instituted whereby Vietnamese, especially children, that have lost arms or legs, were taken to the National Rehabilitation Center in Saigon and fitted for prosthesis.  The Hairlip-Cleft Palate program was also increased during this time.  Hairlip patients were taken to the Barsky Unit of the Cho Ray Hospital in addition to the 3rd field Hospital in Saigon.  The totals for the period 1 July 1970 to 30 September 1970 were 25 prosthetics and 15 hairlip-cleft palate patients.  Patients were also referred from the 2nd and 3rd Brigade Medcaps.  This was the first time that patients were obtained from Medcaps other than 2-5, DISCOM.

     (e)     An MSC Professional program was established with the 12th Evacuation Hospital.  This seminar met every Friday and topics of interest to all were discussed.

     (7)     25th Supply and Transport Battalion.

     (a)     During the last quarter, the S&T Class 1 activities issued 1,865,028 rations, 9,544 sundry packs, 510,000 gallons of ice cream and 11,851,392 pounds of ice.  The Class II & IV Yards supplied 422 major end items and had a 71.2% customer demand satisfaction rate, while the Class III activities pumped 7,067,146 gallons of POL products to supported units.

     (b)     During the period 1 August thru 31 October, S&T FSB's at Dau Tieng and Lynch issued a total of 692,890 rations, 372 sundry (illegible) and 3,367,900 pounds of ice.  The FSB's issued (illegible) gallons of fuel as well as 327 major end items to division units.

     (c)     The convoy vehicles of Company B drove a total of 288,585 miles as they transported Division supplies throughout the Division AO.

     (d)     Transportation for the Division AO.

Statistics:     Tonnage Moved     Miles Traveled     Personnel     Bulk Pol     Water
          22,867 tons     288,585 miles     40,964     1,655,240     (illegible)
                              gal     gal

     (7)     Communication.

     (a)     (entire line illegible)
providing tactical communications to the 25th Infantry Division in the Republic of Vietnam.  The Division was deployed with the Headquarters, 3rd Brigade, Division Support Command, and Division Artillery at Cu Chi Base Camp; the 1st Brigade at Dau Tieng Base Camp; 2nd Brigade at Xuan Loc; and 11th armored Cavalry Regiment at Di An.  The 125th Signal Battalion was collocated with these major units and at two relay sites, four battalion fire support bases and two liaison team sites.

     (2)     Significant events:

     (a)     On 1 August, elements of Company B moved from Tay Ninh to Dau Tieng to support the 1st Brigade.

     (b)     On 3 August, the VHF system from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh relayed through Dau Tieng was inactivated.

     (c)     On 6 August, a VHF system was installed from Dau Tieng to FSB Warrior northwest of Dau Tieng.

     (d)     On 9 August, Company B headquarters moved from Tay Ninh to Cu Chi.

     (e)     On 17 August, a VHF system was installed between Cu Chi and Di An to support the stand down of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

     (f)     On 22 August, a VHF system from Dau Tieng to Katum was inactivated and the personnel and equipment returned to Company B at Cu Chi.

     (g)     On 22 August, FSB Denny was closed and a VHF system from Dau Tieng to FSB Denny was inactivated with personnel and equipment returned to Company B at Cu Chi.

     (h)     On 26 August, a VHF system was established between Dau Tieng and Ben Cui to support the field CP of the 3/4 Cav.

     (i)     On 7 September, Company A supported a 3rd Brigade CPX with a VHF system from Cu Chi to FSB Tennessee.  The system was inactivated upon the termination of the CPX on 10 September.

     (j)     On 8 September, the Cu Chi to Tan An VHF system relayed through Du Hoa was inactivated as elements of the 9th Infantry Division moved to Di An for stand down.

     (k)     On 13 September, an attempt was made to relocate the Thien Ngon to Cu Chi relay from Nui Ba Den to Go Dau Ha but after 10 days of futile attempts, the relay was discontinued.
     (l)     On 14 September, a VHF system was established between Cu Chi and Di An to provide communications between the 25th Infantry Division and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

     (m)     On 16 September, the VHF system between OB Lynch and FSB Tomahawk was inactivated.  The four-channel terminal at FSB Tomahawk was moved to Xuan Loc to provide communication between 2nd Brigade Main and 2nd Brigade Rear.

     (n)     On 22 September, the Cu Chi Di An VHF system supporting the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was inactivated as that unit became OPCON to USARV for redeployment to CONUS.

     (o)     On 4 October, a VHF system was established between OB Lynch and Blackhorse in support of TF 333, a joint US-Vietnamese task force.

     (p)     On 21 October, the OB Lynch Blackhorse system was inactivated as      
TF 333 terminated its mission.

     (q)     On 23 October, the Cu Chi OB Lynch VHF system, relayed through Lon Binh, was deactivated.  The Main CP of the 2nd Brigade moved from OB Lynch to Xuan Loc.

     (r)     On 27 October, the Dau Tieng FSB Jamie VHF system was inactivated because of the movement of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry to Dau Tieng.

     (s)     On 29 October, the Battalion opened a Vietnamese school in the My Khanh Hamlet, Thai My Village, Cu Chi District.  The school was constructed by Vietnamese workers with material purchased with funds donated by the officers and men of the battalion.

     (t)     On 31 October, the Battalion donated $682.42 for the construction of a dispensary in a refugee hamlet in Tan An Hoi Village, Cu Chi District.

     G.     Materiel.

     (1)     The 725th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts and supply to the 25th Infantry Division.  Production continued well above the pre-Cambodian level, with over 13,500 pieces of equipment repaired.  The following are the number of pieces on which maintenance was performed during the quarter:

                    Aug     Sep     Oct
     Wheel          208     219     250
     Tanks and Tracks     184     210     159
     Armament     1,042     677     1,159
     Artillery          84     83     78
     Engineer Equipment     24     23     15
     Generators     111     109     115
     Commel          2,234     2,190     2,926
     Office Machines     162     122     141
     Aircraft          157     164     146
     Aircraft Components     161     199     179
     Refrigeration Equipment     21     17     13
     Other             100         95          89

     Totals          4,488     4,108     5,270

     (2)     During the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1971, the 725th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide effective direct support maintenance and class IX supply support to the 25th Infantry Division and designated OPCON units.  Support realignment for the 2nd Brigade was effected following the move to OB Lynch, with Company C replacing Company D and moving from Cu Chi to Xuan Loc.  The majority of support was provided from that location; and in addition, a forward support detachment was established at OB Lynch.  Following these actions, the 725th Maintenance Battalion had units at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, Dau Tieng, Xuan Loc and OB Lynch.  The widely scattered locations presented pressing repair parts, supply and transportation problems which severely taxed the organic assets.  To alleviate back-hauling problems, Company C was established as a direct customer of Long Binh Depot.  This action immeasurably assisted both A and C Company technical supply activities, while providing faster, more efficient customer support.

     (3)     Particularly noteworthy was the 725th Maintenance Battalion's management of selected maintenance significant Class VII end-items.  Measurable improvement was noted in the already high availability of M551 assault vehicles and 5-ton trucks, with little change in the other record setting availability rates.  To further improve material readiness, a selective management for all wheel vehicles was initiated and was immediately successful in focusing attention on problem areas and effecting their prompt resolution.  During this period, the 725th Maint Bn also established a new equipment backlog low of 97 items dead-lined for direct support or higher level maintenance, while the 25th Infantry Division continued to lead USARV in equipment availability.

     H.     Revolutionary Development/Pacification

     (1)     Hamlet Evaluation System Changes during the quarter:

Province          Month     A     B     C     D     E     V     N     Total

Tay Ninh          Jun     8     105     6     0     0     0     1     120
               Sep     10     104          5     0     0     0     1     120
          Net Change     +2     -1     -1     0     0     0     0     

Binh Duong          Jun     2     115     13     4     0     0     0     134
               Sep     20     107     6     1     0     0     0     134
          Net Change     +18     -8     -7     -3     0     0     0     

Hau Nghia          Jun     2     58     59     17     0     0     0     136
               Sep     3     88     38     7     0     0     0     136
          Net Change     +1     +30     -21     -10     0     0     0

Bien Hoa          Jun     28     118     28     22     0     0     0     196
               Sep     20     133     24     19     0     0     0     196
          Net Change     -8     +15     -4     -3     0     0     0

Long An          Jun     0     251     113     19     2     0     0     385
               Sep     3     289     85     6     2     0     0     385
          Net Change     +3     +38     -28     -13     0     0     0

Long Khanh     Jun     6     69     18     2     0     0     0     95
               Sep     11     56     28     0     0     0     0     95
          Net Change     +5     -13     +10     -2     0     0     0

Phuoc Tuy          Jun     4     73     12     17     0     0     0     106
               Sep     4     90     12     0     0     0     0     106
          Net Change     0     +17     0     -17     0     0     0     

Total               Jun     50     789     249     81     2     0     1     1172
               Sep     71     867     198     33     2     0     1     1172
          Net Change     +21     +78     -51     -48     0     0     0     

     I.     Civic Action.

     (1)     During the period 1 August thru 31October, 10,274 man days were contributed by elements of the 25th Infantry division to civic action projects and 3,938,123 $VN worth of supplies were donated.

     (2)     During the three-month period, the following were expended on (illegible) civic action programs:

               Programs     Man Days     Cost

     Economic Development     13     10,000  $VN
     Education          322     128,130  $VN
     Social Welfare     629     1,389,236  $VN
     Transportation     804     2,418,480  $VN
     Refugee Asst Support     847     106,200  $VN

     (3)     Solatium was paid in the amount of 135,827 $VN.

     (4)     The following  MILCAP Operations were conducted:

                    MEDCAP     ICAP     NITECAP     PATIENTS
     August          260     203     5     74,154
     September     172     172     7     31,000     
     October          114     113     4     29,208

     J.     Psychological Operations.

     (1)     During the months of August, September and October, three major Psychological Operations Campaigns were carried out.  The first, beginning in late September, exploited several reports that the 274th Regiment was extremely low in food supplies.  Utilizing II FFORCEV aircraft for dissemination, approximately 1 million leaflets were dropped over a three week period exploiting the enemy weaknesses.  In early October, a campaign was implemented in Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province aimed at countering suspected enemy propaganda.  The basis for the enemy campaign was the redeployment of the 2-47 Inf (M) from Nhon Trach.  The enemy's attempt to convince the local populace that the allied forces were gone for good was thwarted by the subsequent deployment of the 1-5 Inf (M) into Nhon Trach.  This also gave the PSYSOPS Branch an opportunity to damage the enemy's credibility and gain further support for the GVN by proper exploitation of the situation.  The third and largest of the campaigns began in late October, targeting all enemy units and sympathizers in Sub-Region 1.  Leaflets and tapes exploiting all available intelligence on both main and local force units were produced in conjunction with an intensive pro-GVN campaign in locations of suspected enemy sympathizers.

     (2)     During the campaigns, several leaflets and tapes exploiting information received from Hoi Chanh, prisoners-of-war and intelligence reports were analyzed.  These generally were processed and implemented on a Quick Reaction basis to take advantage of changes in the enemy situation or location.

     (3)     In support of civic action projects, ground broadcast teams accompanied numerous MEDCAPS, broadcasting information on public health subjects and current events along with pro-GVN broadcasts.

     (4)     Total broadcasts and leaflet distributions were as follows:

               Loudspeaker Broadcast     Leaflet Distribution     
               Hours                    
               Aerial     Ground     Aerial     Ground
August          90     297     2,364,830     8,299,880
September          60     178     2,322,000     585,530
October          35     417     1,935,900     425,900

2.     (C)     Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

     A.     Personnel.  None

     B.     Intelligence.

     (1)     Local Nationals.

     (a)     Observation:  Local civilians often are quite knowledgeable as to the location of enemy mines, bunkers, etc.

     (b)     Evaluation:  During engineer operations, little effort was made by qualified personnel to exploit this source of information.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Major operations, even at company level, should be preceded by intensive effort by the S-2, utilizing attached Vietnamese personnel or local allies, to obtain maximum intelligence on locations of enemy mines, booby traps, and ambushes.  Often this can be encouraged by engineer assistance with local problems of high importance to the people but which require little expenditure of troop time or effort to solve the problem.

     (2)     Counterintelligence Operations.

     (a)     Observation:  The use of the starlight scope for observation was successfully employed in a non-tactical role.

     (b)     Evaluation:  This method of surveillance markedly improved the defensive posture of the base camp.  Freedom of access to Cu Chi Base Camp has thus been denied to many who have reaped profitable benefits from unauthorized access, in the recent past.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The use of night surveillance equipment proved valuable in denying entry and access to Cu Chi Base Camp by illegal and unauthorized personnel.

Unattended Ground Sensor Operations.
     (a)     Observation:  To employ ground sensors in Cambodia, it was necessary to implant the sensors with aerial delivery means.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The mission was intricately planned and two practice drops were accomplished.  The actual implant was completed with a high degree of accuracy.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Unattended ground sensors can be accurately and effectively implanted using a slow-flying (80 knots) fixed wing aircraft at 1500 feet altitude.

     C.     Operations.

     (1)     Problems Encountered During the conduct of Combined Ambush Patrols.

     (a)     Observation:  During the conduct of combined ambush patrols, RF/PF personnel often detected enemy personnel before US personnel in the ambush.  This led to engagement before the entire patrol was alerted and oriented on the target.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Premature engagement of the enemy prior to the entire patrol being alerted and oriented on the target allowed enemy elements to escape ambush sites and resulted in friendly troops becoming casualties unnecessarily.

     (c)     Recommendation:  A simple and effective technique of fire control must be established during ambush patrol planning and must be enforced during the actual conduct of the ambush.  Combined ambushes should be integrated to the point of placing an RF/PF soldier between two US soldiers, and vice versa.  This action will tend to build confidence and friendship between the two and help preclude incidents.  In addition, all personnel participating in the ambush patrol should know what assets are available for reinforcement and the proper method of obtaining them for utilization.

     (2)     Actions Taken After Ambush Patrols are Engaged.

     (a)     Observation:  Invariably after a contact on an ambush patrol, the area of contact was searched immediately, the patrol was reinforced or relocated.  In many instances, this action was not necessary because of the size and disposition of the enemy elements.  Generally, a small and well equipped ambush patrol can handle most situations.

     (b)     Evaluation:  In some situations, it was tactically more feasible for the ambush patrol to remain in place, keeping the area of contact under surveillance, especially if the patrol has a kill, anticipating the enemy's return to the area to recover the body.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Depending on the tactical situation, the ambush patrol leader, when feasible, should remain at the site of a contact in order to engage any enemy returning to recover bodies.

     (3)     Stay Behind Ambush of Resupply Points and Trash Sumps.

     (a)     Observation:  During the reporting quarter, three stay behind ambushes of 12 men each were left by the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry at resupply points after the main body departed the area.  Nine enemy KIA's (BC) were confirmed without a friendly casualty during these incidents.

     (b)     Evaluation:  due to the resupply problems that the enemy is encountering, he was hungry enough to risk detection by searching trash sumps located at friendly resupply points in field locations after US departure.  The enemy was aware of US methods of resupply and the weakness of US soldiers in police of resupply and NDP locations.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Well planned, properly positioned, and heavily armed stay behind ambushes should be occasionally employed on resupply points and trash sumps.  This should deter the enemy in utilizing US forces as a method of local resupply.  All US units should be oriented on this fact and command emphasis should be placed on insuring that all positions which US units depart are properly policed for anything of value which the enemy might utilize.

     (4)     Ambushes.

     (a)     Observation:  Combinations of mounted, dismounted and mechanical ambushes deterred VC/NVA use of mines and infiltration routes across Highway 19 and infiltration routes in the Crescent and areas west of the Crescent.

     (b)     Evaluation:  During August 1970, Highway 19 was utilized as part of the convoy route between Cu Chi and Dau Tieng.  The combinations as mentioned were used at critical points such as culvert sites and previously mined areas.  Mounted ambushes along this route could be heard and often seen by the enemy and, therefore, were blocking positions.  Mechanical ambushes materially extended the area controlled.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The tactic of combining mounted, dismounted and mechanical ambushes should be used to extend combat units and to deter enemy infiltration.

     (5)     Enemy Use of B40 and RPG Weapons.

     (a)     Observation:  The enemy has developed considerable skill in the firing of B40 and RPG-7 rounds into the crown of trees above friendly troops and then withdrawing without further engagement.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The resulting tree burst from the B40 and/or RPG-7 rounds inflict maximum casualties to the troops who are afforded no overhead cover.  The danger of this technique is considerably greater than the flat trajectory fire since the bursting radius covers a considerably larger area.

     (c)     Recommendation:  That all personnel, to include veterans and replacements, be required to participate in a continuous training program designed to stress noise and light discipline as well as proper troop dispersal and maximum utilization of natural cover.  Basic tactics and combat techniques should be stressed to unit leaders at each level.  Consideration should be given utilizing a small cover fence to guard entrances to night defensive positions.  Ambushes that go into position before nightfall should be displaced approximately 100 meters under the cover of darkness.

     (6)     Mine Detection.

     (a)     Observation:  The enemy was making more and better use of mines which have no metal parts closer than 18 inches to the surface and therefore were not detectable with standard metallic mine detectors.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Bamboo pressure rods were very effective in initiating firing devices located at the bottom of plastic explosives kept intact by the earthen walls of a hold dug into the roadway.  The mine was very effective because it could take any shape and was not detectable with standard mine detectors.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Non-metallic mine detectors should be issued to engineer troops to be used in conjunction with standard mine detectors.

     (7)     Use of the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV).

     (a)     Observation:  The CEV has not been efficiently employed in combat support missions in the Republic of Vietnam.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Because of the terrain and type of warfare presently employed in Vietnam, the CEV has rarely been used for missions it was designed to perform.  Certain uses for which the CEV was not designed such as pushing up berms and heavy dozing, “busting” roads and trails, clearing jungle and close-in direct fire weapon (165mm gun) have caused significant damage to the CEV, its engine and transmission.

     (c)     Recommendation:  A concerted effort should be made to employ the CEV on missions it was designed to perform, or associated tasks within its capabilities.  Some effective and novel uses were initiated during the quarter such as emplacing bangalore torpedoes for clearing heavily booby trapped areas and pushing a mine roller down a road in order to detonate anti-tank mines in the road.  In the latter method, when the mine-roller hit a mine, the damaged rollers were replaced immediately and the CEV-mine-roller was ready for clearing in about one or two hours.

     (8) Airlifting Equipment with CH54 Skycrane Helicpoter.

     (a)     Observation:  When airlifting Case 490 dozers or other equipment, it was found that a large amount of static electricity drained off the Skycrane.

     (b)     Evalution:  The large amount of static electricity can cause injury to the person hooking up the dozer or other equipment if he is not properly grounded.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The person who is to hook up the equipment to the Skycrane should be made aware of the fact that the lifting cable should be grounded before he attempts to hook the equipment to it.

     (9)     Utilization of Night Hawk in Conjunction with Attack Helicopters.

     (a)     Observation:  The night hawk mission is normally flown without a gunship escort, thus being denied protection or the ability to actively engage targets of opportunity.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The night hawk aircraft has greatly enhanced the operation of the night attack team by flying at lower altitudes with increased capabilities for acquiring targets.  The night hawk and gunship combination has proven to be very effective on numerous occasions.  Without gunship escort, the night hawk aircraft must fly at higher altitudes for its own protection, thus reducing the effectiveness of the searchlight.  The aircraft is armed only with a mini-gun and M-60 machine gun and is therefore incapable of effectively performing an offensive role against anti-aircraft fire.  Should the night hawk aircraft discover targets of opportunity, which is its primary mission, there is no reaction force immediately available for engaging these targets.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The night hawk aircraft should be provided gunship escort using a single aircraft as a minimum.  This would not only provide a defense, but also an immediate offensive reaction force to fully accomplish the purpose of the mission.

     (10)     GVN Officials Participation on Missions.

     (a)     Observation:  The District Chief at Cu Chi City has flown in an aircraft on several occasions to provide immediate political clearance to fire in support of indigenous forces.

     (b)     Evaluation:  RF and PF forces are being required to provide a continual increase of support for villages and hamlets as part of the Vietnamization program.  In the event of an enemy attack, helicopter medical evacuation and aerial support are often required.  Extensive delays in providing support have been eliminated by the District Chief as he has provided rules of engagement and immediate political clearance while airborne, thus denying the enemy an opportunity to escape.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The use of this tactic should be expanded for use by province and district chiefs in other areas as this is a prime example of cooperation by GVN and US forces utilized in the Vietnamization program.

     (11)     The Use of Continuous Teletype Scroll as a working Tactical SOP.

     (a)     Observation:  Preparation of Brigade Tactical (TAC) SOP's are time consuming in preparation and often obsolete when published or too general to be helpful.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The preparation of a workable TAC SOP at Brigade level is a very extensive operation with the end result often obsolete upon completion.  The 3rd Brigade utilized the teletype to prepare a current and workable SOP.  By saving the tapes for policy messages (both brigade and high headquarters) such as mechanical ambush policy, use of gunships, medevac procedures, convoy regulations and current mission statements, the brigade can present to the battalion a workable document.  The tapes are run consecutively and within a single scroll of messages, a new OPCON battalion can be presented with current guidance.  Also, as portions become obsolete, the tape can be modified to only include pertinent information.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The teletype method of compiling a current and workable TAC SOP should be considered for brigade SOP's.

     D.     Organization.  None.

     E.     Training.

     (1)     Integrated Safety and Standardization Program.

     (a)     Observation:  The collective concerted efforts by standardization instructor pilots and aviation safety officers within the 25th Aviation Battalion have resulted in a significant decrease in aircraft accidents and incidents.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The combining of the battalion aviation safety section with standardization and training has been instrumental in the reduction of aircraft accidents by 67.4% from the Fiscal Year (FY) 1970 accident rate.  Working closely with the commander, safety officers and standardization pilots prepared and presented classes covering accident/incident causatives as well as in-flight emergencies.  Additional emphasis was also placed on practical application of countering these causatives during daily missions and on dealing with in-flight emergencies during standardization rides.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Aviation units should consider integration of aviation safety and standardization and training programs.

     (2)     Training Small Unit Leaders.

     (a)     Observation:  The utilization of “shotgun” ambushes and saturating the area of operations with maximum ambush positions required a greater number of well trained small unit leaders than normal operations.

     (b)     Evaluation:  In order for ambushes consisting of 6-10 personnel to be successful, a special training program must be conducted to insure that all unit leaders are well trained down to and including the team leader level.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Companies should insure that all small unit leaders receive special instructions on subjects as required to make them well rounded combat leaders.  Critiques and “lessons learned” topics should be presented on a recurring basis.  Special training subjects for emphasis should include, but not be limited to, map reading, basic tactics, communications procedures, troop leading steps, mechanical ambush techniques, adjustment of artillery and field expedient antennas.

     F.     Logistics.

     (1)     Storage of Calcium Hypochlorite (Chlorine for Water Purification).

     (a)     Observation:  Two fires resulting from this chemical broke out during the quarter, one in a storage area, the other in a water purification unit in transit.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Calcium Hypochlorite heats up when it comes in contact with even small amounts of moisture.  It is issued in two types of containers, plastic bottles and metal cans.  The plastic bottles tend to age and crack.  The metal cans tend to rust and are not designed for easy resealing.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The chemical should be stored in a moisture proof storage area, elevated if possible.  Only one container should be used at a time, and it should be used until it is empty.  The storage area should be inspected frequently.

     G.     Communications.  None

     H.     Materiel.  None

     I.     Other.

     (1)     Requirements for XM-35 Stand-Off Capability versus Maintenance Man Hours.

     (a)     Observation:  The stand off capability of the XM 35 armament sub-system has not been required.  There has been a drastic increase in man hours required to perform maintenance on the aircraft and the XM-35 since installment to provide a fully operational aircraft.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The need for a stand off capability employing the XM-35 armament sub-system's effective range of 2500 meters against large antiaircraft weapons has not been evidenced since the weapon was installed.  Numerous problems have been encountered as a result of firing the XM-35 systems which have required extensive maintenance to be performed to return the aircraft to a fully operational status.  As much as 48 man hours have been required to resolve a weapons stoppage.  The aircraft was non-operational for two weeks awaiting replacement of a gun drive motor.  An additional five man hours per 1000 rounds fired is required due to the shocking force reacting on the Stability Control Augmentation System (SCAS).

     (c)     Recommendation:  The XM-35 system should be removed as its full capabilities have not been required and there is extensive down-time required for maintenance thus reducing aircraft availability.

     (2)     Inadequate Safety Margins in Hasty Landing Zones.

     (a)     Observation:  Aviators are being required to land in hasty landing zones that are small and do not provide adequate safety margins.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Tree strikes are the most common cause of aircraft incidents as revealed by USARV statistics.  There are various causes such as low level flying and inadequate clearance in landing zones.  The most prevalent cause is tree strikes on approach or take-off from hasty landing zones.  This partly the fault of the aviator for not maintaining adequate clearance; however some of the blame must be placed on ground commanders for not preparing adequate landing zones.  Helicopters were not designed to carry maximum loads into areas requiring vertical descent and, unfortunately, ground commanders are generally not well informed on aviation employment and limitations.

     (c)     Recommendation:  There must be continual emphasis on confined area operation for both the aviator and the ground commander.  Flight procedure must be reviewed by the aviator as well as more effort devoted by the ground commander to provide adequate landing zones.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Inclosures                                   /s/  T. J. Hanifen
1.     Troop List                                   T. J. HANIFEN
2.     Changes in Task Organization
3.     Enemy Main Force Unit Identifi-
     cations
4.     Combat After Action Interview Report
     (Crescent)
5.     Commander's Combat Notes
     (Use of Bangalore Torpedoes)
6.     Commander's Combat Notes
     (VC Anti-Tank Mine)
7.     Commander's Combat Notes
     (Employment of Riot Control Agent CS)
AVFBC-RE (Undated) 1st Ind
SUBJECT:     Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 25th Infantry Division, for
               Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, II Field force Vietnam, APO 96266

THRU:     Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN:  AVHDO-D), APO 96375

          Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN:  GPOP-DT,APO 96538

TO:     Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
          Washington, D.C. 20310

1.     (U)     This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters 25th Infantry Division.

2.     (C)     Comments follow:

     a.     Reference item concerning “Unattended Ground Sensor Operations,” page 48, paragraph 2B(3), concur.  This headquarters worked closely with the 25th Infantry Division units during emplacement of ground sensors in Cambodia and found their method of aerial implantation to be most successful and highly accurate.

     b.     Reference item concerning “Mine Detection”, page 51, paragraph 2C(6); concur.  The portable metallic and non-metallic mine detector (AN/PRS-7) is being introduced into the theater.  Training with this detector will be completed by units in MR 3 by 31 December 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



                                        /s/ W. C. Bartel, Jr.
                                        W. C. BARTEL, JR.
                                        CPT, AGC
                                        Asst AG
AVHDO-DO (Undated) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT:     Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division, Period
               Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO:     Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN:  GPOP-DT,
     APO 96558

1.     This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2.     Comments follow:
     a.     Reference item concerning “Mine Detection,” page 51, paragraph 2C(6) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b:  concur.  Approximately 290 AN/PRS-7 mine detectors are in-country to date and 150 more are due in.  Thirty-five percent have been issued and the remainder will be issued pending receipt of additional batteries.  Engineer units were trained prior to 1 January 1971 by a representative from Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia.  Other units will receive training from the Engineers.  No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.  Unit has been so advised.

     b.     Reference item concerning “Airlifting Equipment with CH-54 Skycrane Helicopter,” page 51, paragraph 2C(8):  concur.  Information sheets concerning static electricity are provided each supported unit by the supporting CH-54 unit.  Procedures recommended are:

     (1)     The person to hook the equipment to the CH-54 must wear heavy gloves.

     (2)     The equipment to be lifted must be grounded by connecting it to a ground rod and with an attached second rod the CH-54 is touched to the equipment to be lifted to discharge the static electricity prior to the hookup man touching either.

No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.  Unit has been so advised.

     c.     Reference item concerning “Utilization of Night Hawk in Conjunction with Attack Helicopters,” page 52, paragraph 2C(9).  The desirability of having gunship escort for each night hawk mission is recognized; however, these assets belong to the military region commander and it is his decision whether or not to provide gunship support.  Unit has been so advised.

     d.     Reference item concerning “Storage of Calcium HGypochlorite (Chlorine for Water Purification),” page 54, Paragraph 2F(1).  Recommendation is in line with storage specifications required by GSA.  Calcium Hyprochlorite is packed in either 100 pound drums or 3-3/4 pound containers. Contact with GSA representative confirms that item should be stored in cool dry area away from fire hazard and oxidizable materials.  Item should also be inspected frequently to detect any possible leakage in packing container.  Prime concern is to prevent the contents from coming in contact with moisture because it will heat up.  Unit has been so advised.

     e.     Reference item concerning “Requirements for XM-35 Stand-off Capability versus Maintenance Man Hours,” page 54, paragraph 2I(1).  The need for the XM-35 armament subsystem in RVN has previously been determined.  As with any new system which is introduced into a combat theater there has been problems associated with it.  The environment in which this unit operated during the reporting period negated the use of the XM-35 subsystem.  However, lack of use during a short time in a particular locale is not sufficient rationale for removal of these subsystems.  No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.  Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

                                        /s/ Clark W. Stevens Jr.
                                        Clark W. Stevens, Jr.
                                        Captain AGC
                                        Assistant Adjutant General
Cy furn:
II FFORCEV
25th Inf Div

GPOP-DT (undtd) 3rd Ind (U)
SUBJECT:     Operational Report of HQ, 25th Infantry Division, for Period Ending
               31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2_

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO:     Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
     Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


                                   /s/ L. M. Clancy
                                   L. M. CLANCY
                                   CPT, AGC
                                   Asst AG
(Incl 1)
TROOP LIST
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

                                             AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970

I.     ORGANIC

     a.     Command & Control Elements
               HHC, 25th Inf Div
               HHC, 1st Brigade
               HHC, 2nd Brigade
               HHC, 3rd Brigade
     b.     Combat Elements
               3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry

     c.     Combat Support Elements
               HHB, 2th Inf Div Arty
               1st Bn, 8th Arty
               7th Bn, 11th Arty
               3rd Bn, 13th Arty
               2nd Bn, 77th Arty
               25th MP Company
               25th Aviation Battalion
               65th Engineer Battalion
               125th Signal Battalion

     d.     Combat System Support Elements
               HHA & Band, 26th Dis Spt Cmd
               25th Admin Company
               l26th Med Battalion
               25th S&T Battalion
               725th Maintenance

II.     ASSIGNED

     a.     Command and Control Elements.  None

     b.     Combat Elements
               1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf
               4th Bn, 9th Inf
               2nd Bn, (illegible)
               2nd Bn, 14th Inf
               2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf
               3rd Bn, 22nd Inf
               4th Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf
               1st Bn, 24th Inf
               2nd Bn, 24th Inf
               2nd Bn, (illegible) Armor
               Co F Rgr (illegible) Inf
               2nd Bn, 3rd Inf (illegible)

     c.     Combat Support Elements
               9th Chemical Det
               38th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
               44th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
               46th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
               66th Inf  Plt (illegible)
               265th FA Arty Det (Radar)

     d.     Combat Service Support Elements
               15TH Public Information Det
               18th Military History Det
               20th Public Information Det
               25th Military Intelligence Company

III.     ATTACHED

     a.     Command & Control Elements     None

     b.     Combat Elements
               (illegible)

     c.     Combat Support Elements
               Btry B, (illegible) Bn, 2nd Arty
               Btry (illegible), 29th Arty, (illegible)
               (illegible)
               169th Medical Det, Helicopter Ambulance
               268th FA Det, Radar CM
               (illegible)
               (illegible)

     d.     Combat (illegible) Support Elements
               (illegible) Weather Sqdn Det (USAF)
               (illegible) AA (illegible) Civic Affairs Company
               (illegible) Preventive Med Det
               (illegible) Med Det
               (illegible)
               USA Special Security Det
               (illegible) Radio (illegible) company

IV.     OPERATIONAL CONTROL

     3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division
     (illegible) Armored Cavalry Regiment (M)

V.     DIRECT SUPPORT

     4TH Med Det
     Co B, 36th Signal Battalion
     53rd Signal Det
     61st Trans Det
     86th Hq Co sig Bn Support
     94th Co Maint Bn Support
     116th Assault Helicopter Co
     242nd Assault Helicopter Co
     277th Bn Resupply Service
     283rd Sig Det
     325th Weather Det
     501st Land Clearing Co
     578th Sig Support Co
     587th Sig Support Co

VI.     GENERAL SUPPORT

     8th Aerial Port Sqdn
     12th Med Hospital Evac
     Hq & A Btry, 6th Bn, 15th Arty
     20th TC Co Aircraft
     45th Surg MA (MUST)
     269th Avn Bn Assault Helicopter
     362nd Engr Co
     515th Engr Plt Asphalt Construction
     554th Engr Bn Construction
     588th Engr Bn Combat



Changes in Task Organization

Effective 1 August 70

1st Bde     2nd Bde     3rd Bde
2-12 Inf (-)     1-27 Inf     4-9 Inf (-)
2-14 Inf     1-5 Inf (M)     3-22 Inf
A/3-4 Cav      (illegible) -23 Inf (M)     2-27 Inf
2-60 Inf     1-8 Arty (illegible) (DS)     2-22 Inf (M)
3-4 Cav (-)     B/65th Engr (DS)     B/C/3-13 Arty (155) (82)
A/2-12     D/588th engr (DS)     2-79 Arty (105) (DS)
7-11 Arty (105) (DS)     D/3-4 Cav (OPCON)     D/65th Engr (DS)
A/3-13 Arty (105) (SP) (DS)     
A/65th Engr (DS     Div Arty     3rd Bde 9th Inf Div
          D/3-43 Arty (8”) (GS) (SP)     6-31 Inf
Div Troops          5-60 Inf
F/75th Inf (RGR) (DS)     II FFV Arty     2-47 Inf (M)
25th Avn Bn     B (illeg) Arty (AW) (SP) (GSR)     D/3-17 Air Cav
125th Sig Bn (GS)     C/7-8 Arty (illeg) (8”) (SP) (POF)     E/75th Inf (RGR) (DS
65th Engr (-) (GS)     A/4-27 Arty (155) (GSR) (SP)     C/(illeg) 2 Arty (AW) (SP) (illeg)
2-34 Arm (-)     B/2-32 Arty (175/8”) (SP (GSR)     2-4 Arty (105 (DS) (S)
C/4-9 Inf     B/5-42 Arty (illeg) (GSR)     571 Engr

2 Aug     5-60 Inf to 3rd Bde
     A/3 (illeg) Arty (155) to (illeg)

4 Aug     46th (illeg) Dog Plt to (illeg) Bde
     38th (illeg) Dog Plt to (illeg) Bde
     44th (illeg) Dog Plt to (illeg) Bde
     45th (illeg) Dog Plt to (illeg) Bde
     66th (illeg) to (illeg)
     (illegible)

5 Aug     (illegible) to (illegible)
     (illegible) to (illegible)

6 Aug     (illegible) to (illegible)

10 Aug      (illegible) to (illegible)

11 Aug     (illegible) to (illegible)

13 Aug     D/3-4 Cav to 3rd Bde

15 Aug      D/3-4 Cav to 2nd Bde

17 Aug     3-4 Cav to 3rd Bde

19 Aug     B/2-34 Arm (DS to 1st ARVN Abn Bde)

20 Aug     1-27 Inf to 3rd Bde
     3-22 Inf to 2nd Bde

21 Aug     5-60 Inf to 3-9 Inf Div

25 Aug     D/3-4 Cav to 1st Bde

26 Aug     D/3-4 Cav to 3-9 Inf Div

29 Aug     D/3-4 Cav to 1st Bde

31 Aug     B/2-34 Arm To Div Trps

Effective 1 September

1st Bde     2nd Bde     3rd Bde
2-12 Inf     3-22 Inf     4-9 Inf
2-14 Inf (-)     1-5 Inf (M)     1-27 Inf
2-60 Inf     4-23 Inf (M)     2-27 Inf
1 Plt/3-4 Cav (OPCON)     1-8 Arty (105) (DS)     2-22 Inf (M)
3-4 Cav     B/65th Engr (DS)     A/2-34 Arm (-) (OPCON)
7-11 Arty (105) (DS)     38th Sct Dog Plt (DS)     B/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) GS)
C/3-13 Arty (155) (SP (GSR)          2-77 Arty (1-5) (DS)
A/65th Engr (DS)     Div Arty     44th Sct Dog Plt (DS)
46th Sct Dog Plt (DS)     D/3-13 Arty (8”) (SP) GS)     D/65th Engr (DS)

Div Troops     II FFV Arty     3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div
F/75th Inf (RGR) (GS)     B (-)/5-2 Arty (AW) (SP) (GS)     6-31 Inf
25th Avn Bn     A (-)/7-8 Arty (8”) (SP) (GS) (POF)          5-60 Inf
125th Sig Bn (GS)     B 7-8 Arty (175/8”) (SP) (GS) (POF)          2-47 Inf (M)
65th Engr (-) (GS)     A/1-27 Arty (155) (SP) (GS)          D/3-17 Air Cav
2-34 Armor (-)     B/2-32 Arty (175) 8”) (SP (GS)          F/75th Inf (RGR)
E/2-14 Inf     C/2-32 Arty (155) (GSR)     2 (illeg) Arty (105) (DS)
A/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) (DS)          (illegible) 2-29 Arty (SLT) (GS)
66th Cbt Tracker Plt (GS)          571 Engr
               45th Sct Dog Plt (DS)

3 Sep     2-34 Arm (-) to 1st Bde
     3-9 Inf Div loses 45th Sct Dog Plt
     3-9 Inf Div loses (illeg) 29 Arty
     3-9 Inf Div loses 5-60 Inf

4 Sep     C/2-60 Inf to 3-9 Inf Div

5 Sep     I (-) 2-29 Arty to 3-9 Inf Div

8 Sep     5-60 Inf OPCON USARV
     6-31 Inf OPCON USARV

10 Sep     A/C/D/2-4 Arty OPCON USARV

13 Sep     A/3-13 Arty (155) SP) (REINF) to 2nd Bde

15 Sep     2-3 Inf OPCON to Div Trps
     B/2-4 Arty OPCON USARV
     571 Engr OPCON USARV
     E/75th Inf (RGR) OPCON USARV
     11th Armored Cavalry regiment (-) OPCON 25th Infantry Division

19 Sep     2-3 Inf to 2nd Bde
     2-47 Inf (M) OPCON USARV

22 Sep     3-9 Inf Div OPCON USARV

25 Sep     D/3-4 Cav to 2nd Bde

27 Sep     2-27 Inf (-) to 2nd Bde

28 Sep     2-3 Inf to Div Trps

29 Sep     D/3-4 Cav to 1st Bde

Effective 1 October

1st Bde     2nd Bde     3rd Bde
2-12 Inf     3-22 Inf (+)     4-9 Inf (-) (+)
2-14 Inf (-)     C/1-5 Inf (M)     A/2-34 Arm (-)
2-34 Arm (-) (+)     2-27 Inf (-) (+)     1-27 Inf
B/2-14 Inf     B/4-23 Inf (M)     A/B/2-27 Inf (+)
3-4 Cav (-)     1-5 Inf (M) (-) (+)     1/A/2-34 Arm
D/3-4 Cav     D/3-17 Air Cav     2-22 Inf (M)
7-11 Arty (105) (DS)     4-23 Inf (M) (-)     2-77 Arty (105) (DS)
C/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) (GSR)     1-8 Arty (105) (DS)     B/3-13 Arty (155) (SP (illeg)
A/65th Engr (Ds)     A/3-13 Arty (155) SP) (REINF)     D/6th Engr (DS)
46th Sct Dog Plt (DS     B/65th Engr (DS)     44th Sct Dog Plt (DS)
          38th Sct dog Plt (DS)
Div Troops          11th Armd Cav Regt (-)
2-3 Inf     Div Arty     1-1(illeg) Armd Cav Sqdn
F/75th Inf (RGR) (GS)     D/3-13 Arty (8”) (SP) (GS)     2-1(illeg) Armd Cav Sqdn
25th Avn Bn               OPCON 1st Air Cav
125th Sig Bn (GS)     II FFV Arty     3-11 Armd Cav Sqdn
65th Engr (-) (GS)     B(-)/5-2 Arty (AW) (SP) (GS)          C/4-8 Inf
66th Cbt Tracker Plt (GS)     A(-)/7-8 Arty (8”) (SP) (GSR)     919 Engr Co
          B/7-8 Arty (175/8”) (SP) GS) (POF)
          C/1-27 Arty (155) (SP) (GS)
          A/2-32 Arty (175/8”) (SP) (GS)
          B/2-35 Arty (155) (SP) (GSR)

11 Oct     2-3 Inf Reverted OPCON to 199 Light Infantry Brigade

15 Oct     2-27 Inf (-) to 3rd Bde

21 Oct     4-9 Inf (-) to 11th ACR

28 Oct     4-9 Inf (-) to 3rd Bde


Effective 31 October

1st Bde     2nd Bde     3rd Bde
2-12 Inf     3-22 Inf (+ )     1-27 Inf
2-14 Inf     A/1-5 Inf (M)     2-27 Inf (-)
2-34 Arm (-)     1-5 Inf (M) (-) (+)     2-22 Inf (M)
3-4 Cav (-)     D/3-17 Air Cav     4-9 Inf
D/3-4 Cav (-)     4-23 Inf (M)     2-77 Arty (105) (DS)
7-11 Arty (105) (DS)     1-8 Arty (105) (DS)     B/3-13 Arty (105) (DS) (GSR)
C/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) (GSR)     A/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) (REINF)     D/65th Engr (DS)
A/65th Engr (DS)     B/65th Engr (DS)     44th Sct Dog Plt (DS)
46th Sct dog Plt (DS)     38th Sct Dog Plt (DS)     
               11th Armd Cav Regt (-)
Div Troops     Div Arty     1-11 Armd Cav Sqdn
F/75th Inf (RGR) (GS)     D/3-13 Arty (8”) (SP) (GS)     2-11 Armd Cav Sqdn
25th Avn Bn               (OPCON 1st Cav Div)
125th Sig Bn (GS)     II FFV ARTY     3-11 Armd Cav Sqdn
65th Engr (-) (GS)     B(+)/5-2 Arty (AW) (SP) (GS)     919 Engr Co
66th Cbt Tracker Plt (GS)     B/7-8 (-) Arty (175/8”) (SP) GS) (POF)
          A/2-32 Arty (175/8”) (SP) (GS)
          A/5-42 Arty (155) (SP) (GS)
          C/2-35 Arty (155) (SP) (GS)
          B/5-42 Arty (-) (155) (GS)

(Incl 3)

Enemy Main Force Unit Identifications
31 October 1970

7th VC/NVA Div

141st Regt     (illegible)
165th Regt     XU086205
209th Regt     XT0__879

9th VC/NVA Div

271st Regt     XT______
272nd Regt     XT______
95C Regt     XT______

Tay Ninh (P)

D1 Bn          Unknown
D14 Bn          XT084626

Sub-Region 1

268th Regt     XT_25495
     K1 Bn     XT5___80
     K2 Bn     XT2_86_6
     K3 Bn     XT50_223
101st Regt     XT659__9
     K7 Bn     XT693450
     K8 Bn     XT6_960_
     K9 Bn     XT64242_
1st Quyet Thang Bn     XT_4_130
2nd Quyet Thang Bn     XT_88074
3rd Quyet Thang Bn     XT______

Long An Sub-Region

267th Bn          XT436147
2642nd Bn     XT649023
308th Bn          XT163255
6th LF Bn     XS652815
D6B Bn          XT375171
D12 Sapper Bn     XS694936
1696th Bn     XT433146
1st NVA Regt     XS5_5611
     K4 Bn     XS699729
     K5 Bn     XS6060
     K6 Bn     XS633595
     K7 Bn     XS638590
506th Bn          XS810800
508Th Bn     XS908724
520th Bn          XS793707
265th Bn          XS835660
Dong Phu Bn     Unknown
211 Sapper Bn     XS8_6684

Sub-Region 5

Thanh Loi Bn     XT959076
K1 DN Bn     XT901657
K2 DN Bn     YT047309
K4 Dn Bn     XT851296

Sub-Region 6

N10 Sapper Bn     XT200500
N13 Sapper Bn     XT060206

Military Region 7

274th Regt     YT374042
     K1 Bn     YT4_6036
     K2 Bn     Unknown
     K3 Bn     YS190885
74th Arty Regt     YS128935
     K2 Bn     YS230956
D65 Engr Bn     YS235795
D6 Sapper Bn     YT2011__

Sub-Region 4

D2MF Inf Bn     YS224884
D4 MF Inf Bn     YS260680
D6 Hvy Wpn Bn     YS192924
D8 H20 Sapper Bn     YS265896
D10 Sapper Bn     YS0459

Ba Long (P)

D445 LF Bn     YS623684