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After Action Reports 15
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND873541
By MD Date 4/7/01
HEADQUARTERS
1st BRIDGADE
25th INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCFB-A 29 September 1966
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCOP
APO 96225
1. Name: Operation OAHU
2. Dates: 1 August-31 August 1966
3. Location: Tay Ninh Province, RVN
4. Control HQ: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
5. Reporting Officer: Colonel William B. Sandlin, Jr.
6. Task Organization:
a. Brigade Control:
HHC, 1st Bde (-)
Trp B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav (-)
FASC Plat (-), 25th Sig
Plat (-), 25th MP
ELM, 25th MID
ELM, 16th RRU
b. 4th Bn, 9th Inf (-)
c. 2d Bn, 14th Inf (-)
d. 4th Bn, 23rd Inf
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
AVDFB-A 29 September 1966
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
a. 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf
7. Support Forces.
a. 7th Bn, 11th Arty (-). B Brty, 7th Bn, 11th Arty attached to 2d Bn, 14th Inf for movement departed Cu Chi on 1 Aug for Tay Ninh Airfield (West) pending arrival of main body forces. B Btry, 3d BN, 13th Arty attached to 7th Bn, 11th Arty (-) closed Tay Ninh on 6 Aug. There were 3, 450 rounds of 155mm howitzer ammunition expended during 1,063 support and H&I missions and 16,130 rounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition expended during 2,486 support and H&I missions.
b. Tactical Air: 85 missions consisting of 252 sorties were flown in support of the 1st Bde with the following results:
(1) Structures destroyed: 38
(2) Vehicles destroyed: 1
(3) Sampans destroyed: 5
(4) Gun pits destroyed: 2
(5) Supply pits destroyed: 4
(6) Trellising destroyed: 55 meters
(7) Trench line destroyed: 100 meters
(8) Bridge damaged: 1
(9) Structures damaged: 18
b. Army Aviation:
(1) Sorties-HU1D Aircraft:
(a) Gunships: 112
(b) Tactical trooplift: 898
(c) Resupply: 120
(d) Air evac, G&C, recon and misc: 232
(2) Sorties-CH47 Aircraft:
(a) Resupply: 158
(b) Trooplift: 8
(3) Sorties-OH23G Aircraft:
(a) Tactical: 141
(b) Air evac, C&C, recon, and misc: 159
(4) Ammunition expended (approx):
(a) 7.62 machine gun: 32,000 rounds
(b) 2.75 rockets: 1,400 rounds
(c) Linked 40mm: 3,500 rounds
(5) During this operation, resupply was accomplished to the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf from Cu Chi by use of Ch47 aircraft. Sorties of this type averaged 8 per day. This method of resupply praved adequate for the large quantities POL, ammunition and spare parts required by a mechanized infantry unit. A standby HU1D aircraft was required for emergency loads to back up resupply by CH47 aircraft.
8. Intelligence.
a. Intelligence studies conducted prior to the initiation of OAHU indicated the area of operations, with the exception of Tay Ninh City,district towns, and other centers of governmental influence, had been under VC control and domination for many years. Previous friendly operations conducted throughout the area had disclosed numerous VC installations to include base camps, supply caches and training sites, and although large numbers of these facilities had been destroyed, others were fully operational. The majority of these installations were reported to be located in heavily wooded area north of Tay Ninh City and along the densely vegetated periphery of the Oriental River. Extensive oxcart, trail and sampan activity in these areas tended to confirm the extensive or the above mentioned facilites and their general location.
b. VC activity within the area had been light with the exception of the area bounded by XT1849, XT1847, XT1449, and XT1447 which was known to be habitually occupied by the C40 Company and had been the scene of intense harassing actins by the VC against local forces. An abundance of reports also indicated various large VC units were located in the area encompassed by XT430405, XT480385, and XT50045 with resupply being accomplished by sampan traffic on the Rach Saio River. Continuing reports of large troop movements and local guerrilla activity are depicted by the following recent significant activities:
(1) Elements of 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav, 25th Inf Div encountered roadblocks vic XT326469, XT359469, XT374420 and XT373416 on 22 Jan 66.
(2) On 22 Jan 66, two unidentified companies were reported vic XT410320 (F/2).
(3) On 27 Jun 66, two battalions of the VC 272d Regt were reported to be located in the area bounded by XT490332, XT496339, XT490404, and XT484399 (F/3).
(4) On 12 Jul 66 one unidentified company was reported vic
XT193446 (F/2) and one unidentified VC battalion attacked the Ly Muoi Hamlet located vic XT275442.
(5) On 19 Jul 66, an unidentified VC regiment was reported vic
XT438390 (F/3) and local guerrilla elements conducted propaganda lectures and leaflet drops along Highway 22.
c. Although all data processed prior to OAHU indicated possible contact
With a large VC force, this did not occur. With only the below listed exceptions, VC-1st Bde TF contacts involved sporadic sniper activity from local guerrillas and harassment of convoys in the form of roadblocks and anti-tank mines. On 7 Aug elements of the 4th Bn, 9th Inf, while conducting a search and destroy mission, encountered an undetermined number of VC vic XT054532. The VC elements immediately broke contact, and while fleeing across the Oriental River, were engaged by supporting UH1B gunships resulting in eight VC KIA (Poss). XT086539 was the scene of intense VC activity directed against C Co, 4th Bn, 9th Inf the evening of 8 Aug by an unknown size VC force. The unit throughout the day had encountered sporadic sniper activity, and upon establishment of the unit base camp during the evening hours, the VC concentrated accurate SA and AW fire against the company perimeter. Concurrently, the 1st Brigade FM command primary and alternate frequencies were effectively jammed for a period of approximately thirty minutes. A medical evacuation helicopter dispatched to extract injured personnel from the C Co, 4th Bn, 9th Inf perimeter received false visual landing signals duplicating the prescribed landing signals from a location approximately three to five kilometers north of the actual evacuation site.
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During the period 26-27 Aug elements of the 2d Bn, 14th Inf conducted S&D operations in the heartland of the VC C40 Company domain resulting in the destruction of numerous bunkers, fortified positions and the eradication of fourteen VC KIA (BC) and six VC KIA (Poss). The VC encountered vic XT157469 on 27 Aug by C Co were wearing green uniforms and red scarves which londs further credence to the fact that the unit was in contact with a local force company. C Co ad the recon Plat of 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf apprehended and screened between two hundred fifty and three hundred personnel vic XT340460 which resulted in the capture of six VC and forty six VC suspects.
d. All maneuver elements found the existing maps of the area to be quite
Accurate and correspond closely to the terrain in terms of concealment, critical features, obstacles and available avenues of approach. Generally, in areas of dense vegetation as depicted on geographic aids, movement was restricted and observation hampered, however, camouflage was more than adequate.
e. Weather did not hamper or prohibit any friendly troop movements on
Operations.
f. The overall evaluation of the accuracy of the intelligence information
From higher, adjacent and local headquarters and sources can be considered B/2. (Usually reliable, probably true). The overall, and overall operation security of Operation OAHU was considered excellent.
9. Mission, 1st Bde conducts operations in Tay Ninh Province commencing 1 Aug
66 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies, and bases and support Operation
BLUE JAY vic Tay Ninh Airfield (West).
10. Concept of Operation. 1st Bde will move by air and ground commencing 1 Aug
to establish base and conduct combat operations employing three infantry
battalions (-) to conduct S&D operations, eagle flights, ambushes and
patrolling in AO to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies, and bases; and
supports Operation BLUE JAY vic Tay Ninh Airfield (West).
a. Phase 1 (1-5 Aug 66).
(1) 2d Bn, 14th Inf TF move to and secure base vic Tay Ninh Airstrip by heliborne and ground movement on 010900 Aug 66.
(2) 4th Bn, 9th Inf move to and secure base vic Tay Ninh Airstrip
commencing 030800 Aug 66 via Highway 22 bypass.
(3) 4th Bn, 23rd Inf TF conducts motor march from Cu Chi to Tay
Ninh Airstrip (West) commencing 050800 Aug 66.
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b. Phase II (2 Aug to o/a 30 Aug). 1st Bde conduct S&D operations, eagle
Flights, ambushes and patrolling in AO I and supports Operation BLUE JAY.
c. Phase III. 1st Bde conduct tactical march to base camp Cu Chi.
11. Execution. OPORD 24-66, HQ, 25th Inf Div, received 1200 hours 27 Jul 66.
OPORD 10-66, HQ, 1st Bde issued 1800 hours 30 Jul 66. Operation
commenced at 0900 hours 1 Aug 66 with the following actions:
1 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: The battalion (-) convoy departed 0900 hours from Cu Chi with quartering parties from HHC 1st Bde, SUPCOM, 1st Log Comd, 7th Bn, 11th Arty and 196th Bde. Convoy closed Tay Ninh at 1445 hours. B Co was lifted by helicopter to secure airstrip at Tay Ninh (West). A Co was airlifted by helicopter to Go Dau Ha as a reaction force during the movement of the convoy. At 1130 hours, A Co sustained 4 WIA at XT 402242 from a booby trap. A Co was airlifted to Tay Ninh when the convoy closed arriving there at 1514 hours. Bde S5 met with the Sector S5 at 1330 hours to discuss price controls and civic actions.
2 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion continued to secure Tay Ninh Airstrip (West). Local patrols were sent out during the evening. A CO had a patrol leader wounded from a booby trap vic XT179513. Bde S5 met with District Chief to firm up price list.
3 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: A Co with one platoon from A Co, 65th Engrs and B Btry, 7th Bn, 11th Arty (-) attached, departed base at 0741 hours to XT325470, and effect link up with 4th Bn, 9th Inf. At 1030 hours, A Co searched 15 oxcarts and 120 personnel moving along the road, one individual was detained and later turned over to the Tay Ninh Province officials. Link up with 4th Bn, 9th Inf was made at 1240 hours. Unit returned to base camp at 1437 hours.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion (-) moved by tactical motor march from Cu Chi to Go Dau Ha utilizing Highway 22 (bypass) to Tay Ninh. Unit departed at 0700 hours and arrived at 1745 hours. B Co remained at Cu Chi as a reaction force for the convoy and then was airlifted to Tay Ninh at 1200 hours.
4 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: A&C Cos conducted an S&D operation to vic XT172485,
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negative contact was made. Units returned to base camp at 1600 hours. A MEDCAP was conducted in Ap Thai Troung at 0830, treating 117 patients.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Companies conducted platoon size patrolling vic of base camp. A MEDCAP was conducted in AP Thai Troung at 1300 treating 43 patients.
5 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion conducted a two company (A&C) S&D operation vic XT137481. One VCS was picked up by C Co at XT15492 and was returned to base camp and turned over to IPW team. Units has negative enemy contact returning to base camp at 1630 hours.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Companies conducted platoon size patrols in vic of base camp. All patrols returned to base camp by 1250 hours with negative contact.
6 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained in base camp and conducted maintenance and training.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: C Co conducted an airmobile S&D operation vic XT103542 at 0808 hours and XT112525 at 0818 hours. Units then moved to link up vic XT104534. Unit then moved south to a LZ vic XT105510. In the vic of XT107546, 1 bunker, 18 VC structures, and 6 wells were destroyed. Unit returned back to base camp at 1600 hours. 4 sorties of F-105 prepared LZ at H-30 and 10 minute artillery preparation was fired at H-10. 4000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were dropped at XT1054 at 1030 hours. MEDCAP was conducted at XT1456 at 1130 hours treating 130 patients.
4th Bn, 23rd Inf: Battalion moved from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh by tactical motor march.
7 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion conducted a two company airmobile operation to XT151457 (A Co) and XT153453 (B Co). 3 sorties of F-4cs prepared both LZs at H-30 and a 10 minute artillery preparation was fired at H-10. Both companies conducted S&D operations to the NE to XT180470where a blocking position has been established by a platoon from 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav. A Co located 7VC structures at XT154456, destroying them all. One trench network was located XT160464 by a Co. At 1450 hours, B Co was extracted from XT180470. A Co was extracted at 1508 hours from XT180470.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: B Co conducted an airmobile assault to XT075535 at 0923 hours, 2 sorties of F-105 prepared LZ at H-30 and a 10 minute artillery preparation was fired at H-10. Company moved to XT065536 where they
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conducted S&D operations. The battalion C&C ship received small arms fire at 1055 hours from vic XT084533, artillery was called in, results unknown. B Co destroyed approximately 2250 kilos of rice vic XT063530, by fumping it in a river. The C&C ship for the battalion received SA fire from a sampan at coordinates XT055553, fire was returned with results unknown. B Co moved 300 meters west to check on a large group of women and childten trying to cross the river, all were detained and later ovacuated to a refugee village. At 1258 hours, battalion C&C ship spotted one individual camouflaged with grass vic XT056533, he was taken under fire from the aircraft resulting in 1 VC KIA (Poss). The C&C ship spotted an individual swimming up the river on a brush pile, he was taken under fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1328 hours, B Co located 1000 kilos rice at XT055532, rice was destroyed. Unit then moved to XT094500 for extraction which was completed at 1700 hours. SA fire was received during extraction from XT077521, gun ships returned fire and an immediate airstrike of 2 F-100s was called in. One VC structure was destroyed.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion continued to establish base camp.
8 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion conducted a two company (A&C) airmobile operation to an LZ vic XT1446. Both companies moved from the LZ to XT138478 where they were extracted at 1700 hours with negative contact throughout the day. MEDCAP was conducted at AP Phong Coc treating 103 patients, reward leaflets were also distributed.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: C Co conducted an airmobile S&D operation in vic XT095538. Unit established a base camp and conducted platoon size patrols during the day with negative contact. C Co remained overnight in vic XT086514. At 1845 hours, unit requested a dust off for 2 KIA, 2 WIA resulting from sniper fire, dust off could not be effected until 2130 hours due to sniper fire being received on the LZ. A duplicate set of signals for landing were received approximately 3-5 kilometers north of the C Co LZ by the dust off pilots. Signals received were colored lens flash lights. The pilot while approaching the LZ noticed a Vietnamese in the LZ, he asked if any Vietnamese were in the area of the LZ and when told they were not, immediately pulled up and was guided to correct LZ. Artillery was called in the area where fake signals were coming from with results unknown. C Co reestablished their base camp to ZT084538 at 2135 hours. The brigade frequency was jammed from 1925 hours to 2005 hours, the alternate frequency was also jammed. Brigade operated on the 4th Bn, 9th Inf frequency until jamming ceased.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: B Co conducted an airmobile S&D operation to LZ (XT168532). Unit conducted local S&D operations in vic with negative contact and were extracted at 1730 hours.
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9 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting maintenance and training.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: At 0615 hours B Co started movement to establish link up with C Co vic XT099519. B Co received SA fire from vic XT100519. Fire was returned with unknown results. Both companies returned to base camp at 1755 hours.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: C Co was alerted as a standby reaction force to assist the 4th Bn, 9th Inf if required.
10 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: C Co conducted S&D operations in vic of base camp with negative contact. Unit returned to base camp at 1600 hours.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion remained in base camp conducting maintenance and training in preparation for the following day's operation. A control group moved with A Btry, 7th Bn, 11th Arty to Troung Mit where it established a fire support base for the following day's operation. B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf was attached to 4th Bn, 9th Inf effective 0800.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion remained in base camp as brigade reaction force. MEDCAP was conducted at XT123502 treating 100 patients.
11 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained at base camp preparing bunkers. Battalion was designated as the brigade reaction force.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion conducted a two company airmobile operation to LZ (XT356434) at 1115 hours. Battalion established a base vic of XT356434 and sent out security patrols and Ops, with negative enemy contact throughout the day. C Co located 10 bunkers, 30-40 meters apart vic XT357428, all were destroyed. B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf linked up with 4th Bn, 9th Inf upon completion of their airmobile operation. Unit helped establish security for the battalion.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: B Co conducted an S&D operation to vic XT126528 departing base camp at 0900 hours with negative enemy contract. Company was extracted at 1440 hours from XT116535.
12 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting maintenance and training.
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4th Bn, 9th Inf: Companies sent out platoon size patrols vic of base camp with negative results. B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf conducted S&D operation to vic XT355450. Unit received SA fire from XT353452, fire was returned, no casualties were sustained. Company returned to base camp at 1600 hours.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting maintenance and training.
13 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting maintenance and training.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: B Co conducted S&D operation vic XT3600460 departing base camp at 0700 hours. 8 VCS and 1 VCC were captured at XT341455, VCS were turned over to district chief. VCC was evacuated to IPW at Tay Ninh. Unit returned to base camp at 1725 hours. B Co, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf departed base camp at 1150 hours to recon stroam crossing sites vic XT328407. Unit returned to base camp at 1717 hours.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting maintenance and training.
14 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting maintenance and training. One squad size recon patrol was dispatched in vic of base camp.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: Battalion was extracted from XT355432 at 1200 hours, returning to Cu Chi. All elements has closed Cu Chi by 1610 hours.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting training and maintenance. One squad size recon patrol was dispatched in vic of base camp.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf (-) attached to 1st Bds effective 0700 hours. A Co secured A Btry, 7th Bn, 11th Arty at Go Dau Ha. B Co secured the LZ for the 4th Bn, 9th Inf extraction, vic XT355432. C Co moved from base camp to XT337437 where it conducted S&D operation in the vic. Unit returned to base camp at 1500 hours.
15 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion (-) remained at base camp conducting training and maintenance. Recon plat dispatched one patrol to XT171493,
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departing base camp at 0830 hours. Enroute, unit located 35 punji stakes, one booby trapped hand grenade vic XT172493, all were destroyed. MEDCAP was conducted in Ap Thai Thoung treating 203 patients.
4th Bn, 23rd Inf: Battalion (-) remained base camp conducting maintenance and training. 1 recon patrol was sent out from A Co to XT165635, departing at 0900 hours and returning at 1435 hours. Negative enemy contact.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: B Co departed base camp at 0830 hours to recon the following objectives: XT336345, XT326354, XT318357, and XT310380. Unit captured 1 VCS at XT330424 at 1000 hours. Unit returned to base camp at 1725 hours. C Co conducted reconnaissance on the following objectives: XT363260, XT368317, XT380308, XT384357 and XT399365. At 0915 hours, the unit located and destroyed one mortar position XT329421. The position appeared to have been used within the last 2-4 days. At 1240 hours the company received information from SF advisors that a VC platoon was located vic XT392301. C Co checked the area out with negative contact. At 1316 hours one APC struck a mino vic XT389302. No friendly casualties, minor damage to the track. 1 VCS was apprehended vic XT395330, individual was returned to base camp. C Co closed base camp at 1900 hours. A Co continued mission of securing artillery units at Go Dau Ha. Recon platoon conducted reconnaissance of river crossing sites at XT358454, XT402443, and XT338359. At 1150 hours one APC struck a mine vic XT371422. 5 WIAs were evacuated by dust off. Platoon closed base camp at 1645 hours.
16 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting maintenance and training.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting maintenance and training. MEDCAP was conducted at XT163508 treating 200 patients.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: A Co continued operation by providing security for artillery elements at Go Dau Ha. B Co departed base camp at 0735 hours to conduct S&D operation to XT355340. At 1152 hours, 1 VC was killed (BC) and one Chicom carbine captured at XT370378. Company returned to base camp at 1720 hours. C Co departed at 0735 hours to conduct S&D operation vic XT370346. At 1602 hours unit captured 1 VC, 1 carbine, and killed 1 VC (BC) at XT374345. Unit returned to base camp at 1700 hours. Recon platoon APC struck a mine at XT358438 on an escort mission to Go Dau Ha, unit sustained 1 KIA and 2 WIA. Unit made search of area finding 3 mines in vic XT372422. Platoon stayed at Troung Mit overnight.
17 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained in base camp conducting training
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for selected personnel of the 2d Bn, 14th Inf and 3d Bn, 21st Inf, 196th Bde.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion remained base camp conducting training and maintenance. One recon patrol from B Co departed base camp at 0930 hours moving to vic XT346520. Unit closed base camp at 1140 hours with negative contact.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion conducted maintenance on vehicles and equipment. Two daylight patrols were established, one by C Co departing at 1200 hours, second by B Co departing at 1300 hours. B Co captured 1 VC and 1 Chicom rifle vic XT380445. Both patrols returned to base camp at 1830 hours.
18 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting training and classes for elements of the 196th Bde. One platoon from C Co conducted reconnaissance vic XT167486. One tunnel was located at XT162490 and was destroyed.
4th Bn, 23rd Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting training and maintenance.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: B Co conducted S&D operation vic XT345375 with negative contact and returned to base camp at 1730 hours. C Co conducted S&D operation vic XT360380 with negative contact and returned to base camp at 1800 hours.
19 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: B and C Cos conducted an airmobile operation to LZ at XT247337. B Co landing at 0955 hours and C Co landing at 1015 hours with both units moving to objective at XT271330. At 1153 hours, C Co discovered a tunnel complex containing 400 lbs of rice, 3 booby traps and several firing pits at XT275329 all of which was destroyed in place. At 1300 hours C Co discovered 1 ton of loose rice at XT280329 which was destroyed in place. At 1445 hours C Co discovered 10 tons of loose rice vic XT which was destroyed. Extraction from LZ (XT283328) was completed at 1612 hours. At 1015 hours 1 HU1D in support of 2nd Bn, 14th Inf forced down due to mechanical troubles, 2 platoons from B Co secured the chopper till it was recovered by a CH47 at 1338 hours. MEDCAP conducted at Ap Cao Xa treated 200 patients.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion remained at base camp. A Co conducted one recon patrol vic XT140520. Patrol departed at 0803 hours and closed
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base camp at 1046 hours with negative contact. At 1035 hours, B Co sent one platoon size patrol to XT171423 to check suspected enemy location with negative results. MEDCAP was conducted at Ap Cao Xa treating 150 patients.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: A Co continued to secure artillery unit at Go Dau Ha. Remainder of battalion remained at base camp conducting maintenance of vehicles and equipment.
20 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: C Co conducted S&D operation vic XT1448, at 1110 hours, C Co detained two personnel at XT157478, one was released and the second was returned to Bde IPW team. Company closed base camp at 1530 hours. B Co conducted an eagle flight of one platoon to XT160447 at 1045 hours and were extracted at 1243 hours with negative contact.
4th Bn, 23rd Inf: Battalion (-) remained in base camp conducting training and maintenance. One platoon from B Co conducted a search vic base camp departing 0730 hours and returning 1020 hours with negative contact.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: A Co continued to provide security for the Arty and Engr elements at Go Dau Ha. B Co conducted a Buddy operation in conjunction with PF & RF forces in area vic XT370430, at 1429 hours located three bicycles and a corpse of a woman vic XT370430. The body was evac to Troung Mit and company closed base camp at 1715 hours. C Co conducted a Buddy operation in conjunction with PF & RF forces moving to a blocking position vic XT411431, at 1145 hours vic XT407463, a wounded individual was found, claiming to be an ARVN soldier who had been captured by VC. Individual was evac to ARVN hospital at Tay Ninh. At 1405 hours, 1 friendly WIA was sustained from a ricochet. Individual was returned to base camp. Company closed base camp at 1715 hours.
21 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: One platoon from C Co reinforced with 2 squads from 196th Bde conducted S&D operation in vic XT170483 departing at 0730 hours. At XT 487 unit received sniper fire resulting in 1 WIA. Remainder of C So was airlifted to reinforce the patrol XT172486, unit received 3 rounds SA fire with no casualties. Unit closed base camp at 1800 hours. Remainder of battalion conducted training and maintenance.
4th Bn, 23rd Inf: A Co conducted S&D operation vic XT135517 in search of possible mortar sites. Unit departed base camp at 0800 hours and returned at 1200 hours. Remainder of battalion conducted maintenance and training.
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1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion conducted maintenance on vehicles and equipment. B Co replaced A Co at Go Dau Ha assuming the mission of Arty and Engr security. At 1335 hours, B Co destroyed 1-155 dud, 5- Chicom grenades, 1-25 pound charge rigged for command detonation at XT436353.
22 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: A Co reinforced with 3 platoons from 196th Bde conducted security of laterite pit at Tay Ninh. Remainder of battalion conducted training and maintenance. MEDCAP was conducted in Ap Thai Thoung treating 210 patients.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: B Co conducted a search operation vic of base camp, departing at 0800 hours and returning 1019 hours with negative contact.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion conducted operation “Blockbuster”. B Co secured Arty and Engrs at Go Dau Ha.
23 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: A Co continued to secure laterite pit. At XT158507 unit received one rifle grenade and small arms fire with no casualties.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: B Co conducted a search vic XT145549 and 1 VCS was apprehended XT137526.
1st Bn, (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion continued “Blockbuster”. B Co continued security mission at Go Dau Ha.
24 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: B Co was helilifted from Tay Ninh to Cu Chi commencing at 0955 hours and
closing Cu Chi at 1200 hours. Battalion (-) remained at base camp.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion remained at base camp preparing for future
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion (-) continued “Blockbuster”. D Co continued security mission at
Go Dau Ha. At 0300 hours, B Co received 6 rounds 60mm mortar. A patrol was dispatched in
morning to suspected area vic XT405239 where mortar position was located and destroyed.
25 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: A & C Cos conducted S&D operation to vic XT180467
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with negative contact, A Co was extracted at 1720 hours from XT154453. C Co remained overnight at XT154453 and employed ambushes and patrols. At 2210 hours a Chicom mine was exploded in vic XT155454 resulting in 1 (US) KIA. One eagle flight was conducted by recon platoon to vic XT161495 with negative contact, platoon returned to base camp at 1714 hours.
4th Bn, 23d Inf: Battalion (-) received mission to move to Lai Khe at 1900 hours 25 August and was placed under operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. Unit started airlift by fixed wing aircraft at 2100 hours and completed lift at 260400 hours. Battalion was detached from 1st Bde effective on movement. MEDCAP WAS CONDUCTED AT Ap Cao Xa treating 120 patients.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: C Co and recon platoon conducted S&D operation to XT417436 and XT435451, departing base camp at 0655 hours and closing at 1612 hours. At XT423440 C Co destroyed 4 bicycles, one bunker, and miscellaneous tools.
26 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: C Co began movement to base camp at 0730 hours. At 1135 hours, XT154456, unit received sniper fire. Arty was called resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) by Arty. At 1430 hours, XT147465 unit received sniper fire. Arty was again called in resulting in 6 VC KIA (BC), 3 KIA (Poss) by Arty. At 1505 hours, XT148468, unit again received sniper fire resulting in two (US) WIA. A Co moved to a blocking position XT140480. Both units closed base camp at 1730 hours. An immediate airstrike was called in on the area. MEDCAP conducted at Phuoc Hoa treated 300 patients.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: A & C Cos conducted a two company operation vic XT379478. In the vic XT375475 battalion discovered 19-55 gallon drums of CS gas. At 0900 hours, recon platoon picked up one VCS at XT359460 who was sent to Tay Ninh. At 1110 hours, C Co destroyed a VC structure at XT375480. 5 claymores, 18 frag grenades, and miscellaneous items used for detonation mines. All units closed back to base camp at 1615 hours.
27 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion conducted a two company operation vic XT148475 with A Co establishing a blocking position vic XT157469, C Co came under intensive small arems fire. Arty was called in resulting in 7 VC KIA (BC) and 13 VC KIA (Poss). There were 3 (US) WIA. Both companies returned to base camp at 1600 hours.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion (-) remained in base camp conducting training and maintenance.
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28 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion remained at base camp conducting traning and maintenance.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: A & C Cos conducted a joint search in the following areas, XT3935, 3936, and 3937. Departing base camp at 0700 hours. Area was searched throughout the day with negative contact. At 1510 hours, at XT336397 1 APC struck a mine resulting in 2 (US) WIA, Both units closed base camp at 1855 hours.
29 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Remained at base camp conducting training and maintenance. MEDCAP was conducted at Ap Thai Thoung treating 227 patients.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Recon platoon and C Co departed base camp at 1015 hours to conduct S&D operation vic XT343455. At 1143 hours, 6 WIAs were sustained from a 60mm round vic XT343454. In the immediate area of XT343455 a total of 10 VCC and 85 VCS were evacuted to 1st Bde HQ (Tay Ninh). All elements closed base camp at 1710 hours.
30 August
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Battalion (-) with 3d Bn, 21st Inf, A Co, 1st Bn, 5th Inf attached, conducted an operation in vic XT155468 and XT146466. 3 airstrikes wre flown in support of the operation between 0630 and 0700 hours, 10 minute artillery preparation was fired at 0700. 3d Bn, 21st Inf set up a blocking postion at XT135485. The remainder of the TF pushed toward the blocking position, with negative contact. All elements closed base camp at 1604 hours.
1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Battalion (-) returned to Cu Chi.
31 August
2nd Bn, 14th Inf: CPCON 196th Bde effective 31 August 1966.
1st Bde (-), Returned to Cu Chi by motor convoy, departing 0930 hours and closing base camp (Cu Chi) at 1600 hours. Released from OPCON 196th effective open departure.
12. Results
A. Personnel.
(1) Friendly: Page 16
KIA WIA MIA DOW
4th Bn, 9th Inf 2 6 0 2
2d Bn, 14th Inf 0 16 0 1
4th Bn, 23d In 0 0 0 0
1st Bn (M), 5th Inf 1 19 0 1
Total 3 41 0 4
(2) Enemy Losses.
VC KIA (BC)- 21
VC KIA (Poss)- 74
VCC- 8
VCS- 70
b. Equipment destroyed.
(1) Buildings- 114
(2) Bunkers- 31
(3) Bomb shelters- 8
(4) Tunnels- 9
(5) Trenches- 5
(6) Way Stations- 10
(7) Gun positions- 1
(8) Base camps- 1
(9) Fox holes- 27
(10) Supply installations- 5
(11) Mortar positions- 1
(12) Claymore weapons- 17
(13) At mines- 10
(14) Booby traps- 8
(15) 200 lb bombs- 1
(16) 20 lb bombs- 1
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(17)155m round- 1
(18) 105mm round- 1
(19) Grenades- 25
(20) CBU- 19
(21) Sampans- 9
(22) Wells- 2
(23) Punji pits- 35
(24) Bicycles- 4
(25) 55 gal drums of CS powder- 19
(26) Roadblocks- 1
(27) 45 volt batteries- 9
(28) Blasting caps- 4
(29) Claymore wpn tripods- 3
(30) Bicycle axles- 3
(31) Electric wire- 150 feet
(32) Rice- 27,000 lbs
(33) Fertilizer- 500 lbs
(34) Phosphate- 6.5 lbs
c. Equipment Captured.
(1) Chicom carbine- 2
(2) French rifles- 1
(3) Mauser rifles- 1
(4) Bicycles- 3
(5) Radio antenna- 1
page 18
(6) Voltmeter- 1
(7) Helmets- 2
(8) Demo kits- 1
(9) Canteen- 1
(10) Watch- 1
(11) Uniforms- 3
(12) Carbine magazines- 4
(13) Assorted tools
(14) BAR magazine- 1
(15) Assorted documents
(16) Assorted medicines
(17) Numerous VC propaganda leaflets
13. Administrative Matters
a. Supply
(1) The 1st Brigade established a Brigade Logistical Operation Center at Tay Ninh on 1 August 1966. The 2d Bn, 14th Inf, 4th Bn, 9th Inf, 4th Bn, 23d Inf and 7th Bn, 11th Arty sent all logistical requirements through the BLOC.
(2) In addition to 1st Brigade requirements, the BLOC determined, processed, and monitored the input of all classes of supply needed by the 196th Bde in conjunction with Operation BLUE JAY. The 25th Div SUPCOM and elements of the 1st Log. Comd provided supervisory personnel and equipment vital to the operation of the brigade trains complex, in addition to supply point operations, a QM laundry, shower point, aid station, Graves Registration, forward maintenance support, and water point were incorporated into the support role.
b. Resupply.
(1) Resupply of the 1st Brigade as well as transporting of those requirements in support of Operation BLUE JAY was accomplished by motor convoy from Saigon to Cu Chi to Tay Ninh. Several items of a perishable and immediate operational nature were delivered by air.
Page 19
(2) Helicopters were used extensively for resupply of those 1st Brigade elements
onoperations. Supplies were dispatched from the Battalion Trains to the forward
areas. Resupply, monitored by BLOC personnel was controlled by the battalion.
c. Maintenance: The 725th Maintenance provided contact teams, on call support, and 3d echelon repair service. Maintenance support was excellent throughout the operation.
d. treatment of casualties and evacuation and hospitalization: Support Command staffed and operated a medical clearing station at the Bloc. Additionally, battalion aid stations were operational and a “Dust Off” was provided on call. Patients requiring care beyond the capability of those facilities were evacuated. Excellent medical care was provided and no significant problems arose.
e. Transportation: Troop movement (except airmobile operations) and transporting of supplies and equipment from Saigon and Cu Chi to the BLOC were, with few exceptions, accomplished by motor convoy. No unusual problems arose.
f. Communications: No significant problems were noted.
g. General Comments: Throughout Operation OAHU the BLOC was responsible for supervising logistical operations of the 1st Brigade and the 196th Bde. Because of the nature of the mission BLOC personnel became actively involved as operators as well as planners. This dual role promoted cohesion of efforts between brigades, and also served as a teaching device to the supported brigade. Representatives from SUPCOM and from the Brigade and Battalion S4 sections of both brigades exchanged experiences, problems, and lessons learned, with a view towards early establishment of an operational support element of the 196th Inf Bde. Logistical support both laterally and internally was excellent throughout the operation.
14. Special Equipment and Techniques.
Emphasis was placed on developing an active civil affairs and PSYOPS program that would not only win friends but produce effective intelligence. To accomplish this the following actions were taken.
(1) Civil Affairs.
(a) A price list was agreed upon and a price list was published by Secter and distributed to subordinate units and local agencies.
(b) Transportation was provided by the brigade to move refugees from Ap Phung Binh, XT3048, to New Life Hamlet at XT2849.
Page 20
(c) MEDCAPS conducted by the brigade units and supporting artillery .
throughout the area of operations treated 2,103 patients. In
conjunction with the MEDCAPs, 207 bars of soap, 4,695 items of
assorted clothing and 900 lbs of rice were distributed
(d) School supplies were distributed to 100 school children at Ap Cao Xa.
(e) A party was given by the brigade for the children of Ap Cao Xa. The children were treated with candy, toys, and dinner.
(f) A playground swing set was given to the school at Ap Cao Xa.
(2) PSYOPS: PSYWAR efforts were directed at the guerrilla units in the AO and the
local population in the vicinity of the base camp. Chieu Hoi leaflets were distributed
by helicopter in conjunction with operations, however they didn't produce any
tangible results. Leaflets, to the villagers in the vicinity of the base camp resulting in
three informants for the brigade. The information received from the informants
proved correct and timely
b. Lessons Learned.
(1) A meeting with the local officials should be held as soon as possible to discuss
their CA plans and determine in what areas the brigade can be of assistance. The
initial meeting also produced results in agreeing on a price list which was adhered
to throughout the operation.
(2) Chaplains can be of invaluable assistance in CA activities, especially in the predominately Catholic areas. The Catholic Chaplain was instrumental in establishing good rapport with the civilian leaders in several communities.
(3) Loudspeaker missions flown at 2000 feet were not effective. An altitude of 4000-5000 feet proved more successful from the standpoint of being understood.
(4) The S5 working closely with the S2 is a valuable source of information that can rapidly be developed into effective intelligence.
15. Commanders Analysis.
a. Operation OAHU was completely successful because the 196th Inf Bde was able to move into the Tay Ninh area as scheduled and without harassment or other VC influences.
Page 21
b. The civic actions in that area resulted in making friends with the local people as well as producing active intelligence that was exploited in a timely manner.
FOR THE COMMAMDER:
DONALD A. HAMLIN
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
Page 22
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 96225
THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266
TO: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, ATTN: J343, APO 96243 Forwarded.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
PHILIP U. BONDI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
DISTRIBUTION:
AcofS for force Dev, DA
CG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH
MACV,ATTN: J343 (thru IIFFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: J2 (thru IIFFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: MACT (thru IIFFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: Chief USAF Adv Gp (thru IIFFORCEV)
CG, IIFFORCEV, ATTN: G3 (D&T)
CG, USA Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga.
CG, USA Arm Sch, Ft Knox, Ky.
CO, USA Inf Rech Unit, Ft. Benning, Ga.
USACDC Ln Off, APO 96558
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20210
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (9 May 67) FOR OT 15 May 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Combat After
Action Report for Operation Kailua conducted by 2nd
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (U)
TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
1. Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Kailua. Operation Kailua was conducted by the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division during the period 12 Oct - 14 Nov 1966. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:
/s/ Kenneth G. Wickham
1 Incl KENNETH G. WICKHAM
as Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding General
US Army Combat Development Command
Commandants
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Armor School
US Army Chemical Corps School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Transportation School
US Army Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Civil Affairs School
(see page 2 for Copies furnished)
Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
Security Officer, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
Office of the Director of Defense Research & Engineering
South East Asia Forces, OSD
CO, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mech)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2d BRIGADE 25th INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96225
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