After Action Report 18

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Operation Attleboro 1/5th Mech

HEADQUARTERS

1ST BATTALION (MECH) 5TH INFANTRY

APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCSBA-C 10 December 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

TO: Commanding Officer

2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

ATTN: AVDCSB-T

APO U.S. Forces 96225

1.NAME OF OPERATION: Operation ATTLEBORO.

2. DATE OF OPERATION: 062140NOV66-252400NOV66.

3. LOCATION: Tay Ninh Province, South Viet Nam.

4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.

5. REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Victor F. Diaz.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION.

1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, LTC Victor F. Diaz, Commanding.

Scout Plat, 1LT R. A. Szarek

Hvy Mort Plat, 1LT L. H. Wickman

1 Plat, Co B, 65th Engr Bn

Company A, 1LT J. E. McQuinn, Commanding

Company B, CPT R. G. Vanneman, Commanding

Company C, CPT W. A. Blair, Commanding

7. SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. 6th Bn, 8th Arty

b. 2d Bn, 33rd Arty

c. Btry C, 2d Bn, 13th Arty

d. Btry B, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty

e. 1st Bn, 8th Arty

f. Avn Sec, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div

8. INTELLIGENCE.

a. Intelligence Prior to the Operation: The VC 9th Div continued to avoid contact with U.S. Forces operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Dong Provinces. 2d Brigade elements had encountered very light contact since their commitment on 10 November 1966. The 101st NVN Regt was believed to be withdrawing NE toward Phuoc Long Province. Although the main force regiments of the 9th Div received a severe setback during their engagement with U.S. Forces they still retained the capability of attacking at a time and place of their choosing. Brigade units were also expected to make contact with the three battalions of the 70th Regt, which has the mission of security of COSVN in War Zone "C".

b. Enemy Situation During the Operation: Only sporadic contact was made during the entire operation. Significant contact was made near the Cambodian border with elements of the 70th Regiment. Captured documents indicated that a radio station had been operating in the area. The battalion encountered isolated incidents of small arms fire and AT mining. The mines were emplanted on existing roads and in areas that afforded the easiest access for tracked vehicles. Numerous base camps and cache sites were located just south of the Cambodian border; however, there was a lack of complex fortifications, trenches, or tunnels.

c. Terrain and Weather: Thunder storms were often encountered in the afternoon and evenings. Ground fog on several occasions delayed aircraft in the morning hours.

9. MISSION: 1Bn (Mech) 5th Inf moves by road, 071000NOV66, to vic Soui Da (XT 3458) for attachment to the 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div and provides security for the 3rd bde Hq, forward supply base, and two fire support bases. On 100600NOV66 the battalion, detached from the 1st Div, conducts a reconnaissance in force and search and destroy operations in War Zone "C", attached to 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The operation consisted of two major phases.

a. Phase I - The battalion organized two fixed bases and established perimeter defenses to secure the facilities consisting of four artillery batteries, 3rd Bde Hq forward supply airhead, a Special Forces compound and a Popular Forces compound. Patrols were dispatched throughout the AO to prevent VC infiltration and buildup.

b. Phase II - The battalion conducted reconnaissance in force in an attempt to locate VC forces, bases and cache sites. Successive fire support bases were secured and established to facilitate continuous and mutually supporting artillery fires through the axes of advance. Search and destroy operations were conducted in all areas of probable VC activity.

11. EXECUTION.

6 November 1966

The battalion departed Go Dau Ha (XT 3825) at 1005 hours for Soui Da (XT 3458), and was attached to the 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div upon entering the area of operation. The battalion (-) established a base vic XT 340583 and provided a perimeter defense for the 3rd Bde Hq, forward supply airhead, two artillery batteries, a Special Forces compound and a Popular Forces compound. Company A was dispatched to vic XT 394622 to reinforce an infantry battalion which was securing a fire support base consisting of two artillery batteries.

7 November 1966

The battalion (-) continued to secure the base vic XT 340583 and reinforce Co A with the scout platoon to assume responsibility for the fire support base vic XT 394622 due to deployment of the Inf Bn. Patrols were dispatched throughout the AO but no contact was made. Trp B (-), 1/4 Cav and 1st Engr Bn (-), 1st Div Engr was placed under OPCON 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf for perimeter defense.

8 November 1966

Company B was dispatched to fire support base vic XT 394622 to relieve the Scout Platoon and the Bn(-) remained at the base vic XT 340583. Extensive patrolling was conducted throughout the AO but with no significant results. Another fire support base, consisting of one artillery battery, was established vic XT 305535 and the 4th Bn, 31st Inf was placed under OPCON 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf to secure the base. The 4/31st Inf was reinforced by a scout section, 1/5th Mech to secure the base. Night ambushes made no contact and returned at first light.

9 November 1966

Throughout the day all elements remained in their respective positions, conducting local patrols in sector. No contact was made except for Co B. During the morning hours two platoons from Co B were sent on local patrols North and SE of the destroyed bridge vic XT 393628, to locate a crossing point for track vehicles. A crossing site was found; however, eight VC were spotted and engaged vic XT 393628 at 1110 hours. The VC quickly broke contact and fled the area. A search of the area was fruitless. One ambush and two OP/LP's were established during darkness and at 2037 hours two VC were seen approaching the company perimeter. The VC were engaged with mortar and .50 cal MG fire but results could not be determined.

10 November 1966

Trp B 1/4 Cav, 1st Engr Bn and 4/31 Inf reverted to OPCON 1/4 Cav Sqdn. The battalion reverted to OPCON 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div and displaced to vic XT 274686 to secure the Bde base and to conduct reconnaissance in force in zone. At 1314 hours four hooches and three bunkers were destroyed vic XT 248694 and a VC company size overnight base was found vic XT 277703 at 1455 hours. Numerous foxholes and camp fire sites were found and the area appeared to have been used within the last three days. Three OP/LP's were established. None made contact and all returned at 0600 hours, (Incl 1).

11 November 1966

Throughout the day the Bn conducted reconnaissance in force north of the base up to the road junction vic XT 271772. Night ambushes made no contact and returned at first light.

Company A:

Co A departed the area at 0730 hours moving north to check the trails from XT 279280 north to XT 269760. A trail leading east was found at 0755 hours vic XT 274720. At 0819 hours eight ox carts were found and destroyed vic XT 273722. Destroyed at 1005 hours vic XT 269752 were one steel helmet, one poncho, fifteen rice bags and five lean-to huts. A small VC base camp was found at 1200 hours vic XT 269753. Found and destroyed in the area were five Chicom grenades, 200 pounds of rice and 150 gallons of acid-type fluid which was buried in the ground. Three WIA's were sustained from acid burns as a sample was extracted. The area appeared to have been used as recently as 10 November 1966. Five bunkers, with three man capacity, were destroyed vic XT 270755 at 1220 hours. A Chicom claymore, rigged with wires for command detonation, was found and destroyed at 1302 hours vic XT 270755. Between 1359 hours and 1500 hours the company destroyed 9 Chicom grenades, one ton of rice, one concrete bunker and 240 pounds of canned foods vic XT 270756. The company then moved to vic XT 269757 and established its perimeter. One rifle grenade (dud) was fired into the company's perimeter at 1830 hours.

Company B:

Co B departed the battalion base following Co A to reconnoiter trails leading north. While exploiting a trail vic XT 274729, at 1006 hours, two live pigs, a hut and several signs of recent activity were found. Other trails leading east were found vic XT 280725 and vic XT 273727. The company then established two platoon sized blocking positions in conjunction with Co C's operations on the west. One platoon reconnoitered a trail west from XT 268726 to XT 257729 with negative results. At 1630 hours the company departed the area to return to Bn base camp.

Company C:

Co C departed the Bn base at 0730 hours to check the trails leading north, east and west between XT 270690 and XT 256760. A well used trail which appeared to have been used on 10 November 1966 was found vic XT 264704. Fresh ox cart tracks were found at 0915 hours vic XT 254715. A large east to west trail was found at 1013 hours vic XT 256723. At 1110 hours a bunker complex was found vic XT 262737. Upon approaching the complex one VC was flushed from the area and escaped to the east. At 1207 hours five more VC were flushed from vic XT 263734 and also fled to the east. At 1435 hours two trails were found vic XT 261722. One of the trails ran from south to north and the other ran from east to west. The east to west trail had been heavily traveled recently. After exploring these trails and finding nothing, Co C returned to the Bn base (-) one platoon which repaired a damaged vehicle and spent the night in Co A's base area.

12 November 1966

During the day the battalion conducted reconnaissance in force in the areas vic XT 286780, XT 279790 and XT 277776. The Bn CP displaced at 1100 hours to secure and establish the Bde Fire Support Base #1 vic XT 273785. Night ambushes were employed but no contact was made, (Incl 2).

Company A:

Co A departed the company base at 0750 hours to secure the LZ vic XT 286780, for the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. Co A then returned to its base area at 1040 hours and at 1423 hours the company moved to the 2d Bde forward base, vic XT 274686, to provide security in conjunction with two Inf Bn's.

Company B:

Co B departed the battalion base at 0600 hours to conduct a reconnaissance in force of the area vic XT 279790. Heavy footprints were found on an east to west trail vic XT 265784. A north to south trail, with the grass heavily beaten down, was found vic XT 257784 at 1000 hours. A VC base camp, which could accommodate 50 VC was found at 1015 hours vic XT 253782. A search of the area revealed nothing of importance; however, the camp site appeared to have been used within the last three or four days. Found and destroyed at 1202 hours vic XT 255786 were seven two-man shelters. The company then moved down a small trail leading south where ten foxholes were destroyed at 1300 hours vic XT 255794. One CBU bomblet was destroyed at 1420 hours vic XT 271794. The company departed the area and closed into the base at 1435 hours.

Company C:

The company departed at 0618 hours on a reconnaissance in force mission in vic XT 277776. No contact was made; however, 12 CBU bomblets were destroyed and several trails were found in the area vic XT 239772. Co C then returned to the battalion base at 1430 hours and prepared its defensive positions.

13 November 1966

During the day Co's A and B exploited the B52 airstrike bordered by XT 1476-XT 1478-XT1576-XT 1578. Co C remained the vicinity the battalion base securing same. An artillery battery was airlifted in to complete the establishment of Fire Support Base #1. No contact was made during darkness.

Company A:

At 0730 hours Co A departed the Bde base to exploit the B52 airstrike and at 0904 hours arrived vic XT 196768 where it found Co B for a joint movement into the strike area. Numerous bomb craters and destroyed houses were found in the area but there were no signs of recent VC occupancy within the area, before or after the airstrike. Co A completed its check of the area by 1350 hours, and returned to the battalion base. While enroute, at 1520 hours automatic weapons fire was received from XT 230772. No casualties were sustained and fire was returned. At 1527 hours one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 239773. Four minor WIA's were sustained and extensive damage was done to the vehicle. The vehicle was towed into the battalion base and the company closed at 1820 hours.

Company B:

Co B departed the battalion base at 0820 hours to exploit the B52 airstrike. While enroute, at 0843 hours fresh ox cart tracks were found on a trail vic XT 236771. At 0902 hours a pile of scrap metal was found vic XT 206769. Co B then proceeded to vic XT 191769 where an ox cart track and two sets of fresh footprints were found since the rain during the night of 12 November 1966. The lead element observed a road block consisting of trees placed across the road at 0926 hours vic XT 188767. Upon approaching the area a large claymore was detonated against the vehicle by the VC. One minor WIA was sustained but no damage was done to the vehicle. Arty fire and airstrikes were also placed on the area. A check around the road block site two claymores complete with wire and ready for command detonation. Co B then departed at 1050 hours for its objective area. At 1202 hours one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 175764. No casualties were sustained but extensive damage was done to the vehicle. During the search of its objective area numerous bomb craters and 15 houses were found destroyed by the airstrike vic XT 150770 to XT 153770. Co B also destroyed 15 houses in the same area. A close check revealed that the area was probably a VC way-station. Co B then returned to the battalion base.

14 November 1966

Throughout the day the battalion conducted local patrols in sector and secured Fire Support Base #1 during resupply of the artillery battery by CH-47 helicopter. Three ambushes were established during darkness but none made contact.

Company A:

Co A (-) departed the battalion base at 0842 hours to reconnoiter the area SE of the battalion base. A company base was established vic XT 256761 at 0955 hours and from this location platoons were dispatched to XT 251762, XT 263764 and XT 267757. One rice milling machine was found and destroyed vic XT 270756 at 1206 hours. By 1342 hours the search was completed and the company (-) returned to the battalion base leaving one platoon SE of the battalion base as a stay behind until the CH-47 resupply was complete.

Company B:

At 0828 hours Co B made a search of the area north of the battalion base vic XT 265810, XT266815 and XT 273817. Found and destroyed vic XT 270817 at 1035 hours were 1,900 pounds of bagged rice. At 1201 hours vic XT 261809 a VC base camp which could easily accommodate 300 VC was located. The camp was completely ringed with foxholes and early warning positions on a trail leading into the area. The camp site appeared to have been used approximately one week prior. A small way-station, of a 30 VC capacity, was found at 1400 hours vic XT 278828. There were five foxholes around the area. After a thorough search Co B left the area and moved to the battalion base leaving one platoon north of the battalion base as a stay behind until the CH-47 resupply was complete.

Company C:

At 0842 hours Co C reconnoitered the area west of the battalion base to vic XT 244806, XT 258979 and XT 257805. Found at 0930 hours vic XT 252798 were 300 rounds of ammunition approximately the same diameter of a .50 cal round with four small fins on the tail. The ammunition was evacuated for evaluation. At the same time a three man bunker was found and destroyed vic XT 257801. At 1040 hours 44,200 pounds of rice was found vic XT 255807. The rice was covered from the weather and in good condition. With permission granted from higher headquarters the rice was destroyed. A command detonated claymore was set off against the company at 1212 hours vic XT 252797 but no casualties were sustained. A VC base camp was found vic XT 243800 at 1431 hours. The camp could easily accommodate 100 VC and consisted of bunkers with overhead cover, several fire places and a stream running east to west approximately five feet wide and five feet deep. At the same time the platoon located vic XT 246798 engaged four VC. One VC was observed falling; however, he was assisted by the remaining VC and escaped toward the east. At approximately the same time an element engaged two VC vic XT 251797. They also escaped but to the south. Co C then called for and adjusted Arty fire throughout the area and returned to the battalion base leaving one platoon west of the battalion base as a stay behind until the Arty resupply was complete.

Scout Platoon:

Scout Platoon departed the battalion base at 0959 hours escorting damaged APC's back to 2d Bde forward base vic XT 274686. While enroute, at 1037 hours, one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 278702. Two WIA's were sustained and evacuated. Extensive damage was done to the vehicle. After evacuation of casualties the platoon continued to the Bde forward base and returned without incident.

15 November 1966

The Bn displaced to establish the Bde Fire Support Base #2 vic XT 275863. Co A conducted a reconnaissance in force of objective 2, XT 2585 with negative results and closed into the new base at 1416 hours. Co B conducted a reconnaissance in force of objective 1, XT 2786, then secured a landing zone where an artillery battery was lifted in, to complete the establishment of Fire Support Base #2 without incident. Co C displaced after the Bn Cmd Gp and moved to the new battalion base. While enroute, vic XT 266852, five vehicles became mired and remained in that vicinity during the night. The battalion employed two ambushes and seven OP/LP's during darkness. None made contact and all returned at first light, (Incl 3).

16 November 1966

Throughout the day the Bn conducted local S&D operations in zone and all elements returned to the battalion base by 1605 hours. Co C's element destroyed twelve bunkers at 0904 hours vic XT 283864. Scout platoon made a route reconnaissance for future operations. While on the reconnaissance, at 0915 hours, two VC, dressed in black uniforms, were engaged vic XT 290890 but escaped to the east.

17 November 1966

Throughout the day the Bn conducted patrols in zone. Co A dispatched elements to the area south, southwest and west of the battalion base with negative results. Co C also dispatched elements on local patrols in zone and at 1145 hours they destroyed 29 MG positions with aiming stakes for sectors of fire, vic XT 285841. The area appeared unused for at least three or four days. The Scout Platoon departed the battalion base at 0800 hours to make a reconnaissance of the area vic XT 286900. Found and destroyed at 1046 hours vic XT 285897 were 3 huts, 3 bunkers, 1 khaki uniform and 1 large VC classroom. Several documents were found in the area also. Numerous bunkers were found along the trail. While returning, at 1105 hours, four WIA's were sustained from incoming VC mortar fire. The platoon closed into the battalion base at 1124 hours. At 1351 hours the platoon again departed to make a reconnaissance of the stream vic XT 284870 for trafficability and a crossing site. A log bridge was found vic XT 306850 and one APC was sent across with no difficulty. The platoon then returned to the battalion base. The battalion employed three ambushes and six OP/LP's. None made contact and all returned at first light.

18 November 1966

During the day the battalion conducted reconnaissance in force to vic XT 275925 and established a new base, (Incl 4).

Company A:

The company departed the area at 0730 hours following Co B and C to the new battalion base. No contact was made while enroute and the company closed at 1700 hours.

Company B:

Co B departed at 0700 hours and while enroute, engaged an estimated two VC vic XT 302908 at 0956 hours. In the ensuing fire fight one VC was killed (BC). A search of the area disclosed a command detonated claymore, two freshly dug firing positions, one gas mask, one first aid packet and one dozen dry cell 1.5 volt batteries, made by the Cambodian Battery Company, which were connected in series.

Company C:

Co C departed at 0700 hours and at 0910 hours arrived at a VC base camp vic XT 286896. Upon entering the clearing in the area several firing positions were found on the west side of the clearing. A mess hall to accommodate 40 VC was found and destroyed along with two showers, 300 meters of electrical wire, six bicycles, one pair of legs for a claymore and miscellaneous clothing. Several documents were also taken from the area. The documents were checked by interpreters and one described a large VC base camp that existed in the general area. The document further stated that the base had a radio station, a hospital, was a political training center and was outposted with guards and telephones. Another VC base camp was found at 1106 hours vic XT 283895. This camp site also had a mess hall with the capacity of 40 persons, one large class room, two showers and six buildings. At 1335 hours, several APC's became mired vic XT 278912 which could not be extracted before darkness and the company remained in that vicinity over night.

19 November 1966

The battalion continued its reconnaissance in force and established a new base vic XT 274962, (Incl 4).

Company A:

The company departed the area at 0706 hours for objective QUEEN (XT 265944). A search of the area revealed nothing and the company then coiled in the vicinity to wait for the battalion. At 1230 hours the company departed the area and, at 1306 hours vic XT 273975, the company engaged an unknown number of VC. The VC delivered automatic, small arms and mortar fires against the company. In the ensuing fire fight 11 VC were killed (BC) and captured, were two Chicom assault rifles, one U.S. BAR, one U.S. M1 rifle, three Chicom grenades, one 60mm mortar, 11 Chicom hand grenades, 4 60mm mortar rounds, fifteen magazines for Chicom assault rifles, seven magazines for a BAR, 7 rifle grenades, 300 rounds SA ammunition and one bag of assorted documents. Co A sustained three WIA during the brief encounter. The company departed the area at 1520 hours and closed into the battalion base at 1610 hours.

Company B:

Co B departed at 1230 hours and moved to objective JACK (XT 270950). At 1325 hours, a VC base camp was found vic XT 277955 and destroyed were four huts, seven bunkers, fifteen foxholes and miscellaneous clothings and one 500 pound bomb. The company closed into the battalion base at 1600 hours.

Company C:

By 0948 hours all vehicles were extracted and repaired and at 1230 hours the company joined the Bn (-) vic XT 275925. Co C then maneuvered to the west of Co A, who was in a fire fight vic XT 273957, and remained in this blocking position until 1520 hours. Upon entering the battalion base at 1535 hours three VC suspects were seen running NE from vic XT 274963. The suspects were hailed to stop but refused. Co C then fired a burst over the suspects heads but they continued to run and were engaged. Two of the suspects were captured vic XT 274965 and the other escaped to the NE. One of the captured suspects was armed with a hand grenade.

20 November 1966

The battalion continued the reconnaissance in force at 0745 hours to Fire Support Base #3 (XT 336924). By 1405 hours all elements had closed into the new base area without incident. During darkness three ambushes were established. None made contact and all returned at 0600 hours, (Incl 4).

21 November 1966

During daylight hours elements conducted local patrols in zone and performed maintenance of equipment. Co B remained to secure the LZ for the airlifting of the Arty battery into the base.

Company A:

Co A departed at 0719 hours to establish a company base vic XT 315923 and from this location foot patrols were dispatched to the north and southeast. At XT 319910 a foot bridge was found which could sustain travel by heavy loaded ox carts and a docking site which could handle ten sampans at one time. A recently used VC base camp was found at 1318 hours vic XT 329919. Destroyed in the camp site were two AT mines and two CBU bomblets. One APC was hit by an AT weapon, believed to be an RPG-2, at 1413 hours. Two WIA's were sustained and evacuated. The company returned .50 cal MG and M79 fires in suspected locations, then called and adjusted artillery fire throughout the area. After this encounter Co A returned to the battalion base closing at 1638 hours.

Company C:

Co C departed at 0755 hours on a patrol NW of the battalion base. At 0800 hours a 75 foot roll of #4 gage wire and fresh tracks (foot, boots and bicycles) were found on an east to west trail in the area. A search disclosed a VC base area consisting of a bunker/tunnel trench complex which could accommodate 400 to 500 VC. The structures in the area were old but had been recently used. The area was then saturated with artillery fire. Co C then made a deep penetration into the area but nothing of significance was found. A house and two bunkers were destroyed at XT 349040, at 1517 hours. Found within the structures and also destroyed were nine Chicom grenades, 500 pounds of rice, 100 pounds of peas and 100 pounds of salt. Miscellaneous documents were recovered from the area. At 1644 hours small arms fire was received from XT 348948 causing one WIA. Fire was returned but no results were obtained and Co C then returned to the battalion base. During darkness one ambush was established vic XT 343938. At 2140 hours the ambush received three rounds SA fire. 81mm mortar fire was called in on the VC location and a secondary explosion was observed. The ambush returned at 0630 hours.

22 November 1966

The battalion conducted local patrols and performed maintenance during the day.

Company A:

Co A departed on a local patrol at 1106 hours. At 1125 hours one APC was hit by an AT weapon vic XT 326918. Three WIA's were sustained and evacuated. While in the same area at 1139 hours small arms fire was received which caused one WIA. After adjusting Arty fire throughout the area the company then moved to XT 326918 at 1622 hours where twelve bunkers were destroyed. Co A then returned to the battalion base.

Company B:

Co B departed at 0800 hours to conduct local patrols in zone. A platoon located vic XT 346922 received small arms fire from the west at 0855 hours. Fire was returned with no results obtained. Three huts were destroyed at 0942 hours vic XT 348925. Found vic XT 347922 was a docking site with heavy ox cart tracks indicating loading and off-loading activities. At 1226 hours the company found miscellaneous documents in a hut, which the company destroyed vic XT 347918. Co B then returned to the battalion base.

Company C:

Co C departed at 0816 hours on its patrol. Destroyed vic XT 348935 at 0850 hours were one hut and three fish traps. Small arms fire was received at 1027 hours from vic XT 352927 causing one KIA. Fire was returned and while sweeping the area one rifle grenade and small arms fire was received from XT 358938. No casualties were sustained and a heavy volume of fire was returned. Three bunkers were found in the same area at 1148 hours. A check of the area disclosed wires leading out from the bunkers and at the end of one set of wires was a new type mine. All bunkers and the mine were destroyed. Also found and destroyed in the same area were one bunker, 350 feet of blasting wire (Cambodian type), two Cambodian blasting caps and five 7.62mm rounds. Co C then returned to the battalion base.

23 November 1966

The battalion displaced to return to Fire Support Base #1 vic XT 275785, (Incl 4).

Company A:

Co A departed at 0730 hours and while enroute, at 1315 hours, a command detonated mine was employed against the company vic XT 315868; however, no damage was sustained. Two VC were observed fleeing the area and were engaged but they escaped. Co A then closed into the new battalion base at 1735 hours.

Company B:

Co B departed at 0825 hours but due to mechanical difficulties and problems encountered navigating the various crossing sites the company did not close into the battalion base until 2225 hours.

Company C:

Co C departed at 0800 hours and while enroute three VC were engaged vic XT 335897 at 1007 hours. The VC quickly moved into a nearby wooded area and escaped. Co C then moved to the battalion base closing at 1820 hours.

Scout Platoon:

The platoon departed at 0730 hours as lead element of the battalion. At 0746 hours the lead APC hit an AT mine vic XT 329892 resulting in minor damage but no casualties. At 1506 hours another APC hit an AT mine vic XT 308855 and again, no casualties were sustained and minor damage was done to the vehicle. At 1635 hours the platoon was diverted to spend the night at 2d Bde Fire Support Base #2 and closed at 1800 hours.

24 November 1966

Throughout the day Co's A and B remained in base and outposted the local area. Co C departed at 0700 hours to establish Fire Support Base #0, vic XT 185765. At 0812 hours, one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 188768 resulting in minor damage but no casualties. Another APC hit an AT mine at 0822 hours vic XT 183765. Heavy damage was done to the vehicle and five WIA's were sustained and evacuated. Co C then closed into its planned base at 0925 hours and prepared defensive positions. An Arty Btry was airlifted in, completing the fire support base.

25 November 1966

The battalion conducted reconnaissance in force to vic XT 147685 and established a new base. Co A departed at 0800 hours and moved to the new base without incident closing at 1715 hours. Co B departed at 0755 hours as lead element of the battalion and at 0952 hours, one APC hit an AT mine vic XT 234771. Extensive damage was done to the vehicle and three WIA's were sustained and evacuated. Co B then closed into the new battalion base minus three vehicles which were mired on the edge of the base. Co C secured the LZ for the artillery extraction and upon completion departed at 1400 hours for the new battalion base closing at 1700 hours. Heavy Mortar Platoon's Command Post (M577) was extensively damaged by an AT mine at 1410 hours vic XT 160752 and was destroyed in place. Three WIA's were sustained and evacuated, (Incl 5).

Operation ATTLEBORO terminated 252400NOV66.

12. RESULTS.

a. Friendly.

(1) 471 personnel participated in the operation.

(2) 61 WIA (29 of which were treated and returned to duty) and 1 KIA were sustained (Incl 6, casualty list).

(3) Two APC (M113), one carrier, 81mm mortar (M125A1) and one command post (M577) were damaged beyond repair by AT mines and destroyed in place.

b. Enemy.

(1) Killed: 12 VC (BC), 1 (est)

(2) Captured: 2 VCS

1 U.S. M1 rifle

1 U.S. BAR

3 Russian carbines

1 60mm mortar

2 Chicom assault rifles

2 VC notebooks

100 NVN "5" Dong notes

25,000 Dong

2 VC payment books

1 VC flag

Miscellaneous documents

Assorted VC ID cards

(3) Destroyed: 34 Chicom grenades

7 rifle grenades

4 Chicom claymores, complete

5 rounds 7.62mm Russian SMG ammunition

4 60mm mortar rounds

15 CBU bomblets

1 500 pound bomb

48 bunkers

17 firing positions

2 bunker/tunnel complexes

8 ox carts

150 gallons acid (type unknown)

6 bicycles

2 canteens

300 meters electrical wire

350 feet of blasting wire

2 blasting caps

7 magazines (BAR)

PAGE 11 and 12 of the CAAR are missing. Continuing at the top of page 13:

f. Medical Evaluation: Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders and Squad Leaders should insure that their troops always maintain a high state of body cleanliness. Failure to do so, especially in the high heat and humidity found in this area, causes rashes to form on any portion of the body that is covered by clothing.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None.

15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: there was no significant contact made which required any change to pre-planned actions.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. On future operations of this nature the minimum engineer support for a mechanized battalion is one platoon. Due to mobility and spare requirements it is recommended that the engineer platoon be provided with organic M113 APC (4) or sufficient helicopters to transport all personnel and equipment into the work sites as needed.

b. 105mm Howitzer (towed) are too restrictive when placed within the base of a mechanized battalion. Units are restricted to the range of the 105mm Howitzer and the battalion must maintain a stationary base for the artillery. It is therefore recommended that artillery support be provided by 105mm Howitzer (SP) for all mechanized battalions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

6 Incl KENNETH W. LUCAS

as Captain Infantry

Adjutant

CASUALTIES INCURRED DURING OPERATION ATTLEBORO

NAME RANK UNIT DISPOSITION

HOUSEBERG, Sammy SP4 E4 HHC 45th Surg

GARBACZ, John H SP4 E4 HHC 45th Surg

GILLIAM, Harold SGT E5 HHC Rtn to dty

LACEY, Carl E. SGT E5 HHC 45th Surg

CAINES, Larry D SP4 E4 HHC Rtn to dty

McCLOSKEY, David PFC E3 HHC Rtn to dty

BEARD, Harley SSG E6 HHC Rtn to dty

BUTLER, Clyde R SGT E5 HHC Rtn to dty

SZAREK, Raymond 1LT HHC Rtn to dty

WILLIAMS, Chester SP4 E4 HHC 196th Med Bn

WICKMAN, Lance 1LT HHC 25th Med

HALE, Paul E PFC E3 HHC 93rd Evac

SHORT, Franklin SP4 E4 Co A 196th Med Bn

McGUIRE, Peter J 1LT Co A 196th Med Bn

WARD, Richard O 1LT Co A 196th Med Bn

RODRIGUEZ, Rodolfo SSG E6 Co A Rtn to dty

SULLIVAN, Donald L PFC E3 Co A Rtn to dty

FRIDAY, John B PSG E7 Co A Rtn to dty

STEVENS, Paul SP4 E4 Co A 7th Surg

FLYNN, William SP4 E4 Co A 7th Surg

WARDEN, T. O. SGT E5 Co A 7th Surg

McQUINN, James E 1LT Co A Rtn to dty

JUNGKURTH, Doyle SP4 E4 Co A 7th Surg

HAMPTON, Ronald SP4 E4 Co A Rtn to dty

HALE, Richard M SGT E5 Co A 93rd Evac

GILBERT, James 1LT Co A 93rd Evac

ESPINOSA, Atansio PFC E3 Co A Rtn to dty

DOTSON, Terry SSG E6 Co A Rtn to dty

BARTLETT, Dennis L SGT E5 Co A Rtn to dty

KEENER, William F PFC E3 Co A 7th Surg

SPOONER, Vincent J SGT E5 Co A 7th Surg

ALLEN, Garnett Jr SP4 E4 Co A Rtn to dty

LINDEMOEN, Robert D SP5 E5 Co A 7th Surg

McLANE, Richard SGT E5 Co A 7th Surg

FRY, Gerald F SP4 E4 Co A Rtn to dty

LOSEY, Ronald SGT E5 Co B Rtn to dty

MUCKER, Ronnie E SGT E5 Co B Rtn to dty

TERHARK, James G PFC E3 Co B Rtn to dty

SANTOS, David J PFC E3 Co B Rtn to dty

MELTON, Leon SP4 E4 Co B Rtn to dty

NAME RANK UNIT DISPOSITION

LOSEY, Ronald SGT E5 Co B Rtn to dty

CAPOZZOLI, Peter M PFC E3 Co B 45th Surg

LEE, Terry M PFC E3 Co B 45th Surg

RIVERA-GONZALES, Luis PFC E3 Co B 45th Surg

ARIAS-SANCHEZ, Francisco PFC E3 Co B 45th Surg

DOWELL, Thomas G SP4 E4 Co B 8th Support

OWENS, Walter Jr SGT E5 Co B 45th Surg

LOWE, John D SGT E5 Co B Rtn to dty

LUNDQUIST, David C PFC E3 Co B Rtn to dty

COLEMAN, John (Paul) PFC E3 Co B Rtn to dty

RUSSELL, Darrell J PFC E3 Co C 196th Med Bn

CAMMERON, Robert PFC E3 Co C 196th Med Bn

PINION, Dock J SP4 E4 Co C KIA

SCHUTTER, Allan F SP4 E4 Co C Rtn to dty

LINTON, William Jr PVT E1 Co C 196th Med Bn

BUCHMASTER, Carl F SP4 E4 Co C 8th Support

BARR, Thaddeus F PFC E3 Co C 196th Med Bn

KNOOP, Charles P PFC E3 Co C 196th Med Bn

BELL, Thurman L SP4 E4 Co C Rtn to dty

WARD, Carlos PVT E1 Co C Rtn to dty

NORTHCUTT, Michael N SGT E5 Co C 196th Med Bn

HAUN, Henry W SGT E5 Co C Rtn to dty

During the period of 6 Nov 66 through 30 Nov 66 there were a total of 61 WIA's of which 29 returned to duty. There was one KIA. 24 Officers and 459 EM started the operation and 22 Off and 428 EM finished the operation.

Inclosure 6 (Casualty List) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, subj Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32), dtd 10 Dec 66.

Operation Circle Pines-1/5th Mech

HEADQUARTERS

1ST BATTALION (MECH) 5TH INFANTRY

APO San Francisco 96225

TIMAA-C 10 April 1966

SUBJECT: After-Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer

2d Bde Task Force

25th Infantry Division

APO U. S. Forces 96225

1. Operation CIRCLE PINES, search and destroy.

2. Date: 29 March - 5 April 1966.

3. GENERAL: The operation started in the rubber plantation west of Phu Hoa Dong (XT 7119) and continued through the Ho Bo Woods (XT 6229). The Bn OPORD 15-66 was issued 271000MAR66. The operation was conducted with the 2d Bde Task Force. Lt Col Greer is the reporting officer. Task organization and commanders were as follows:

a. 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf: Lt Col T. U. Greer, commanding.

(1) Co A: Capt J. A. Renner, commanding.

(2) Co B: 1/Lt F. G. Trenery, commanding.

(3) Co C: Capt J. G. Andress, commanding.

(4) Recon Plat: 1/Lt D. T. Schou.

(5) Hvy Mort Plat: 1/Lt J. E. McQuinn.

b. Recon Platoon was attached to Co A and Co C was detached to the 1/69th Armor.

4. Intelligence.

a. One Main Force Battalion, the 307 Bn of the 165A Regt, has been reported in the operations area. The 048 Heavy Weapons Company was reported supporting the 307 Bn. Exact locations and dispositions of the VC forces were not known. It was believed that when the VC determined that a major U.S. attack was underway they would attempt to withdraw and exfiltrate in small groups to safe areas in the Ho Bo Woods (XT 6228) and the Iron Triangle (XT 7025). It was expected that the same general harassing and delaying tactics, sniper fire, and boobytraps would be employed by the VC. The VC were known to have anti-armor capability through the use of the Soviet RLRPG-2, which is capable of penetrating 6-7 inches of armor and is effective up to 150 meters.

b. During the operation in the plantation, no large VC force was encountered. The primary mission of the Bn was to seal off all routes of escape out of Phu Hoa Dong while the 7th Regt (ARVN) conducted search and destroy operations throughout the entire village area. This mission was accomplished, but only two- and three-man VC groups were encountered by our blocking position. Upon deploying into the Ho Bo Woods with objectives in the area of XT 6527 and XT 6526, no major enemy contact was made, although ambushes around company perimeters engaged and killed small groups of VC attempting to probe the unit defenses or bypass and depart the area. Co A was ordered into an area vic XT 629305 which reportedly was occupied by small elements from the VC 7th Regt. Co A met heavy resistance in the area from an estimated two VC platoons, but they succeeded in securing the objective. The VC encountered in this area were wearing complete black uniforms, helmets, web and harness equipment. The VC also employed 175mm duds as command detonated mines triggered from well concealed bunkers. A complete battalion attack into the north-western side of the Ho Bo Woods resulted in the following:

Co C completely searched a heavily wooded area within which the Recon Platoon had located a large rice and military equipment cache (XT 598265). There was some enemy contact in the area, but these VC were believed to be only guarding the cache area. Co B and Recon Platoon encountered light to heavy resistance when they moved in the attack vic XT 585290. These VC elements were not identified and throughout the entire operation the battalion did not encounter any VC elements larger than two platoons. Specific identification of units was not made, although several documents, maps, photos, ect., found in tunnels referred to units which had been in the area recently.

c. Terrain and Weather. The weather caused no significant changes in plans throughout the operational period. The terrain in the plantation area consisted of sparse to heavily undergrown rubber plantations and open flat fields. Observation in this area is good to excellent and fields of fire are excellent. There are no obstacles to tracked movement in the plantation area. The streams and bordering marshy fields are obstacles to tracked movement. The Ho Bo Woods area consists of rubber plantations, sparse to dense woods and open rice paddies with some extremely large dikes in the area of XT 605215. Some were approximately four feet high and four feet wide but did not present an obstacle to tracked movement.

d. Fortifications: Extensive three and four level tunnel complexes were located and destroyed in the vic of XT 658247. Small tunnels were also located and destroyed in the vicinity of XT 630303 and XT 658258. The following were recently used by VC for bivouac areas, storage, or both: XT 598265, XT 590270, XT 590275, XT 585305 to XT 598326 to XT 615312. All of the above were reported to Bde S-2 as continuous H&I targets.

5. Mission: 1/5th Mech attacks 290700MAR to seize Obj 1 and conduct search and destroy operations in assigned area of operation.

6. Concept of Operation: Task Force attacked rapidly through the plantation to seize Obj's 1 and 2 and establish blocking positions A, B, C and D to prevent VC movement in and out of Phu Hoa Dong. Preplanned fires were on call (Incl 1).

7. Execution: The Task Force departed the LD on time and secured Obj's 1 and 2 by 0900 hours. All blocking positions were established and occupied by 0935 hours. Upon securing Obj 1, Co A shot one VC attempting to swim the river from the south to the north and detained several indigenous personnel they spotted leaving the area. Co B killed two VC's and captured one, together with several documents, weapons, ammunition and miscellaneous equipment. Co C made no contact. During the afternoon sporadic contact was made by each company, and four VC kills (conf) and one VC wounded were made while the battalion suffered two WIA's. A POW revealed the location of a rice cache which was investigated and confirmed by Co A and turned over to the ARVN for disposition. Co A also located a second rice cache, as well as miscellaneous weapons, ammunition and equipment. Co B also located various small arms, ammunition and equipment. Recon Platoon located several tunnels, weapons and documents, as well as several sampans, which were sunk, and a landing site. The companies coiled for the night in company perimeters and established nine ambushes to augment the security and increase the effectiveness of the blocking positions. By 1945 the task force had killed a total of ten VC (conf) and captured three VC. In addition, six suspects were detained. On the following day all units conducted extensive searches in their areas, resulting in Recon Platoon finding and destroying a tunnel complex and Co A finding two large stores of ammunition, grenades, documents, tng equipment and a considerable amount of penicillin, heroin and miscellaneous medical supplies. Extensive damage was done to one Recon Platoon APC by a command detonated mine. Ten ambushes were established that night, making negative enemy contact. On the third day the Task Force area of operations was enlarged by an additional 12,000 square meters for search and destroy operations. Search and destroy operations commenced early that morning and seven tunnels were destroyed, one M-1 rifle and various documents captured, plus two VC killed (conf) and one VC wounded. One friendly WIA was sustained, and one track suffered moderate damage from an AT mine. That night seven ambush sites were established which accounted for four VC kills confirmed and six estimated in three contacts. One friendly WIA was sustained. On 1 Apr 66 the Task Force continued to occupy blocking positions in conjunction with the ARVN search of Phu Hoa Dong, which was completed that afternoon. At 0915 hours, a new order was received from the Bde CO to move to and occupy a new assembly area in preparation for the continuation of the attack into the Ho Bo Woods (incl 2). At 1330 hours the Bn CP departed the original assembly area, closing on the new assembly area BOBCAT at 1625, with one APC sustaining extensive damage from an AT mine enroute. Shortly thereafter, Capt. E. B. Vickery returned to duty, resuming command of Co B. Upon closing into the assembly area, an attachment of A Trp, 3/4 Cav, commanded by Capt J. R. Monahan, was effected. Eight ambushes were established that night, one of which made enemy contact, reporting one confirmed VC kill and one estimated, as well as one rifle and a small quantity of ammunition and miscellaneous documents captured. The attack was launched at 0730, 2 Apr 66, along assigned axes. The Objectives PAM and KIM were seized at 0901 and 0912, respectively. Objective CAROL was seized by 1200 hours. No enemy contact was made, though A Trp, 3/4 Cav had three vehicles damaged by AT mines. Due to reported VC activity north of the Bde TF objectives, the Bn was given the mission to seize a new blocking position vic OP D (XT 628304). Co A was dispatched to the area at 1450 hours and arrived at 1545 hours. Upon arriving in the vicinity of OP D, they encountered an estimated VC force of two squads and in the ensuring fire fight killed six VC (conf). The objective was secured by 1632 hours. One APC was destroyed by a command detonated mine and resulted in four KIA and six WIA (which included two National Policemen). The mine was later determined to be a 175mm Arty round rigged for electrical detonation. During the search of the TF's area of operations, many weapons, munitions, documents, maps and pictures were captured. Two 100 lb bags of rice and two tunnels were also found and destroyed. Recon Platoon suffered two WIA's in the day's operation while killing one VC (conf), destroying many tunnels and capturing one carbine and a large supply of arms, munitions, and miscellaneous equipment. Eight ambushes were employed by the battalion to supplement the security of each company base. One of the ambushes was sprung at 1955 hours, resulting in eight VC killed (five conf, three est). Several weapons and some munitions, equipment and documents were taken from the bodies. On 3 Apr 66 all units conducted a systematic search of their respective areas, resulting in the capture of several weapons and a quantity of munitions, equipment and documents. Co B suffered two WIA's due to boobytraps. One of the boobytraps captured by Co A consisted of a 175mm shell, fuzed for command detonation and wired to a bicycle generator affixed to a rotary grindstone. Co B dispatched a platoon to check on reported ground fire from vic XT 657273. One of the tracks was destroyed by a mine which ignited the gas tank. One KIA and four WIA's were suffered. The unit suffered another WIA due to small arms fire in the same area. One VC suspect was captured. Recon Platoon estimated killing two VC in tunnels. Eight ambushes were established during the hours of darkness, but none made contact. Final instructions for the continuation of the operation were received at 1900 hours. All units were alerted and at 2300 hours the TF Frag O was issued (Incl 3). The next phase of Operation CIRCLE PINES commenced at 040700APR66. Co C returned to Bn control at 0630 and A Trp, 3/4 Cav reported to the 1/69th Armor at the same time. At 0819 hours the Recon Platoon discovered several large rice caches in a well concealed and fortified area. Co C was diverted from its preplanned mission to conduct a thorough search of the area vic XT 600265. The remainder of the Bn continued on its preplanned operation. At 0855 hours a heavy volume of rifle grenade fire was received while passing through CP 6. Co B suffered three WIA's. The VC were engaged by artillery, gunships and small arms fire. The initial sweep to the north was supported by artillery, Tac air, and gunships. Light VC contact was made by each unit. During the southeast sweep, Co B and Co C were diverted to vic XT 598259. Air and artillery supported the sweep. By 1800 hours Co A closed into a base area. The Bn(-) closed into a new assembly area at 2400 hours. During the day 23 VC were killed (6 conf and 15 est). Several tunnels, five tons of rice, and four rifles were destroyed. Over four tons of rice, a large amount of military equipment, munitions and arms were captured. The Bn suffered 19 WIA's and 1 KIA. At 051610APR66 the Recon Platoon was committed to the 2/27th Inf to assist in securing the area which was attacked earlier that morning. By 0900 hours Co B was also committed to the 2/27th Inf. Co C was placed under Bde OPCON to assist the return movement of the Bde complex. All elements closed into the Bn base camp by 1621 hours. No enemy contact was made.

8. Supporting Forces:

Btry C, 1/8th Arty (DS)

1/8th Arty (-) (GS)

25th Inf Div.

9. Results:

a. VC killed (Confirmed and estimated):

(1) 40 VC killed (body count).

(2) 57 VC killed (est).

(3) 3 VC captured.

(4) 6 VC suspects detained.

b. Destroyed:

(1) 1,420 rounds, Russian, 7.62mm.

(2) 90 carbine rounds.

(3) 60 .45 cal rounds.

(4) 40 crimped cartridges.

(5) 4 .45 cal SMG magazines.

(6) 74 hand grenades.

(7) 19 rifle grenades.

(8) 11 AT mines.

(9) 3 AP mines

(10) 1 175mm command detonated mine.

(11) 1 155mm command detonated mine.

(12) 30 bobbytraps.

(13) 2 81mm boobytraps.

(14) 2 small Claymores.

(15) 6 houses.

(16) 71 tunnels.

(17) 8 bunkers

(18) 4.7 tons of spoiled rice.

c. Captured:

(1) 5 tons of rice.

(2) 3-55 gal drums of miscellaneous military equipment, including 90 flashlights, web equipment, ammo pouches and gloves (all new).

(3) 10 pistol belts.

(4) 13 packs.

(5) miscellaneous maps, narcotics, penicillin and tng manuals.

(6) 1 medical aid kit.

(7) 5 large bags of documents.

(8) 1 SMG.

(9) 1 RPG-2 rocket launcher.

(10) 6 Russian 7.62mm rifles.

(11) 4 bolt action rifles (destroyed).

(12) 3 M1 rifles.

(13) 3 bolt action rifles.

(14) 1 pistol, homemade.

10. Administrative Matters:

a. Supplies: Resupply was accomplished by two methods. Primary method was aerial resupply by helicopter from base camp. The other method was the positioning of Class III and Class IV at OP Ann Margaret while operating in the plantation and then positioning the same supplies in a Bn trains located in the Bde trains area vic Trung Lap. During the operation, 126 sorties delivered the following supplies: Class I - 21,862 pounds; Class II and IV - 8,900 pounds; Class III - 46,000 pounds (5,750 gallons); Class V - 22,198 pounds; and water - 23,925 pounds (2,981 gallons). The largest problem encountered in resupply was receiving the attached unit, A Trp, 3/4 Cav, on the fourth day of the operation and being informed at approximately 1600 hours that they needed 1,000 gallons of MOGAS and 1,500 gallons of diesel fuel to accomplish their mission. The fuel was delivered despite a shortage of daylight time. Another problem encountered was water resupply at base camp. During the first two days of the operation, a 5,000 gallon water tanker was positioned at the helipad; however, its pump was inoperable. It was removed on the third day. Then, and continuously afterwards, the water points were either closed or a long waiting time existed. Recommend that if a completely operational water tanker is not positioned on the helipad that one of the water points be designated for use only by vehicles involved in resupply by helicopters. The availability of helicopters in the early morning and late evening still caused some problems in resupply. Helicopters were never available earlier than 0800 hours and at most times were released at 1700 hours. The tactical operation required constant or considerable movement before 0800 hours and after 1700 hours. Therefore, it is essential that helicopters be available for resupply missions, especially during the periods of 0700-0900 and 1600-1900 hours. The Bn expended 46,000 rounds of 5.56mm, 62,000 rounds of 7.62mm, 22,200 rounds of cal .50, 858 40mm grenades, 180 81mm mortar rounds, 803 hand grenades, 43 incendiary grenades, 195 smoke grenades, 30 M18A1 mines, 1440 pounds of demolitions, and 720 pounds of C4 demolitions.

b. Maintenance: The Bn started the operations with two APC's short due to vehicles being inoperable and turned into support maintenance. During the operations, nine APC's, M113, were damaged by mines; one APC, M113, was slightly damaged by a rocket launcher round; one APC, M113, was damaged by a claymore mine; one Carrier Command Post, M577, was damaged by a mine; and one mortar SP track 4.2", M106, was destroyed completely by fire and secondary explosions. Two of the APC's, M113, which hit mines were further damaged by fire.

c. Transportation: The Task Force consumed 8,058 gallons of MOGAS and 1,700 gallons of diesel fuel.

11. Special Equipment and Techniques: None.

12. Commanders Analysis: Co C was diverted from its preplanned objective on 4 April due to the Recon Platoon's findings. The area was too large for a platoon and showed every indication of being a VC stronghold.

13. Conclusions and Lessons Learned:

a. Ambushes again proved to be most effective. Of five ambushes making contact, a total of 20 VC were killed (11 conf and 9 est).

b. Operating with ARVN was very difficult. The major problems were:

(1) ARVN would not stay on line.

(2) After the first day they did not follow their plan and hence did not asequately clear the village.

c. Cross attachment of mechanized and armored elements created a distinct recovery problem. This unit does not have the capability to recover a damaged tank.

d. Every TC must constantly be aware of his location by frequent reference to the map and through use of the compass.

e. Women and children would leave the village during artillery fires and move toward or through the CP areas.

f. A helicopter pad can be cleared in lightly wooded areas in less than 15 minutes for a single helicopter. This enhances the unit's flexibility in selecting an assembly area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 incl D. M. SNODGRASS

as CWO (W-3)

Ass't Adjutant

Inclosure 4 to After-Action Report, Operation CIRCLE PINES

CASUALTIES INCURRED ON OPERATION CIRCLE PINES

NAME RANK UNIT MOS DISPOSITION TYPE WOUNDS

BEARD, Harley E. SGT E5 HHC 11B40 93rd Evac GSW neck; shrapnel in face

SHIPP, Keith L. PFC E3 HHC 11C10 - - - - Crushed by APC -- KIA

NICHOLS, Larry J. SP4 E4 HHC 11B20 - - - GSW (L) side of back and abdomen-KIA

BLISS, Harvey L. PFC E3 HHC 11B10 93rd Evac Puncture wound (L) leg and (R) knee STOCKER, Clemon SGT E5 HHC 11C40 25th Med Concussion w/strain (back)

COFFEY, Jesse J. SGT E5 Co A 11B40 93rd Evac GSW in chest - WIA to DOW - KIA

FRANKLIN, George S. SP4 E4 Co A 11B20 -- - - - Crushed by APC - KIA

THORNELL, Lester J. SP4 E4 Co A 76K30 -- - - - Crushed by APC - KIA

DORRIS, Curtis E. SP5 E5 Co A 94B20 -- - - - Crushed by APC - KIA

DE JESUS, Miguel SP4 E4 Co A 11B20 93rd Evac Shrapnel in foot and buttocks

(traumatic partial amputation of both feet)

STURGES, Scott L. 1st Lt Co A 1542 93rd Evac Cut on scalp and broken leg

SULLIVAN, Harold A. SSG E6 Co A 11B40 93rd Evac Mult shrapnel in (R) hand and body

HARRIS, John M. SP4 E4 Co A 11B20 25th Med Shrapnel (L) side of back

COFFORTH, Alfred PFC E3 Co A 11B10 Rtn to duty Shrapnel in (R) arm

JOHNSON, William D. PFC E3 Co A 11B10 Rtn to duty Shrapnel in (L) hand

PARKER, James R. PFC E3 Co A 11B10 Rtn to duty Shrapnel in back

BRANCH, Walter A. PFC E3 Co A 11B10 93rd Evac GSW(R) thigh (R) hand (R)wrist

CASTRO-CRESPO, Anidal SP4 E4 Co B 11B20 93rd Evac Shrapnel (R) side of body

GOEHRKE, Lance M. PVT E2 Co B 11B10 93rd Evac Shrapnel (L) leg and arm

HOLMAN, James A. PFC E3 Co B 11B10 93rd Evac Shrapnel (L) ankle

PRILLWITZ, Walter SGT E5 Co B 11B40 93rd Evac Shrapnel (L) leg

BAY, Donald E. PFC E3 Co B 11B10 93rd Evac Shrapnel of scrotum

MCMILLAN, Thomas PFC E3 Co B 11B10 93rd Evac Shrapnel in chest and (R) arm

JOHNSON, Ronald D. PFC E3 Co B 11C10 93rd Evac Mult wounds back, arms, shoulder ARNOLD, Robert E. SSG E6 Co B 11B40 93rd Evac Shrapnel (R) eye forehead and arm

JOHNSON, Donald K. PFC E3 Co B 11B10 3rd Field 85% burn over body

SMITH, Steven M. PFC E3 Co B 11B10 - - - - - GSW in face and neck - - KIA

OWENS, Walter Jr. SGT E5 Co B 11C40 93rd Evac Shrapnel in jaw w/hematoma

KAVANAUGH, John SP4 E4 Co B 11B20 Rtn to Duty Shrapnel in (R) side of head

MARTIN, Guy W. SSG E6 Co B 11B40 3rd Field GSW (L) arm

MCGOUGH, John W. PFC E3 Co B 11B10 Rtn to Duty Shrapnel in (R) side of neck

BALDWIN, Donald D. PVT E1 Co B 11B10 93rd Evac Shrapnel in (L) leg

MURDOCK, Anthony W. SGT E5 Co B 11B40 93rd Evac Shrapnel in (L) arm and (L) leg

SYKES, Hapt J. Jr. PFC E3 Co B 11B10 - - - - - 3d degree burns - KIA

BRAY, Dillard R. Jr. SFC E7 Co B 11B40 25th Med Shrapnel (L) arm (R) heel

MEDGETT, Dewey PVT E2 Co B 11B10 93rd Evac Shrapnel (L) arm and (R) leg

GOODMAN, James R. SP4 E4 Co B 11B20 Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (R) arm

FLYNN, James PFC E3 Co B 11B10 3rd Field Burns over body

HARLER, Ashby W. PFC E3 Co B 11B10 Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (L) arm

NAME RANK UNIT MOS DISPOSITION TYPE WOUNDS

MILLER, Jerry D. SP4 E4 Co B 11B20 3rd Field 60% burns over body

COLLIER, Gerald SP4 E4 Co B 11B20 25th Med Shrapnel wounds (R) arm

MORRIS, Arthur C. SGT E5 Co C 11B40 - - - - - GSW in head - KIA

JARRELL, Roger D. PFC E3 Co C 11B10 - - - - - GSW in head - KIA

TAYLOR, Jimmy B. SGT E5 Co C 11B40 - - - - - GSW in abdomen - KIA

BRASHER, Daniel E. 1st Lt Co C 1542 93rd Evac Shrapnel (L) arm, chest, (L) foot

SEXTON, Dennis W. PFC E3 Co C 11B10 93rd Evac Concussion of (L) elbow

MCCARTNEY, Samuel SSG E6 Co C 11B40 93rd Evac Shrapnel in (R) arm

WONG, Paul A. PFC E3 Co C 11B10 93rd Evac Shrapnel (L) hand (R) arm

DUVALL, Ernest F. SP4 E4 Co C 11B20 25th Med GSW in back

HOPKINS, Charles R. PFC E3 Co C 11B10 93rd Evac Shrapnel in (L) cheek

SMITH, Donnie R. SGT E5 Co C 11B40 93rd Evac Shrapnel (L) arm

TORREY, Edward L. SP4 E4 Co C 11B20 25th Med Shrapnel in (L) side of head

BARNEY, Ernest E. PFC E3 Co C 11B10 93rd Evac GSW (L) arm

DECOT, Michael E. PFC E3 Co C 11B20 93rd Evac Shrapnel in both arms

BISSONNETTE, Don W. SP4 E4 Co C 11B20 93rd Evac GSW (L) shoulder, frac (L)humerus KNOTT, Elvin V. SP4 E4 Co C 11B20 93rd Evac GSW (L) arm frac (L) arm

Shrapnel in chest

HAROLDSON, Jerry L. SP4 E4 Co C 11B20 93rd Evac GSW (L) wrist

PEAL, Jerry C. SSG E6 Co C 11B40 Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (R) side of back

WELLS, Anthony D. PFC E3 Co C 11B10 Rtn to Duty Shrapnel in (R) arm

MASON, Wesley J. 1st Lt Co C 1542 93rd Evac Shrapnel in back (L) elbow