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After Action Report 19
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECH) 5TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96225
AVTLSBA-C 6 May 1966
SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Operation KALAMAZOO
TO: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade
25th Infantry Division
APO U. S. Forces 96225
1. Operation KALAMAZOO, search and destroy.
2. Date: 130600APR66 - 141830APR66.
3. General: The 1st Bn (mech) 5th Infantry, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, conducted search and destroy operations in TAOR (Incl 1). The Bn OPORD No 17-66 was issued at 121400APR66. Lt Col T. U. Greer is the reporting officer. Task organization and commanders were as follows:
1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf (Lt Col T. U. Greer, commanding).
Tm RENNER (Capt J. A. Renner, commanding), Co A, 1/5th
Mech; 2/C/1/69th Armored/ 1 demo tm.
Tm GUTZMAN (Capt P. C. Gutzman, commanding), Co C (-),
1/69th Armored; 3/A/1/5th Mech; 1/B/1/5th Mech; 1 demo tm.
Tm VICKERY (Capt E. B. Vickery, commanding), Co B (-),
1/5th Mech; 3/C/1/69th Armored; 1 demo tm.
Recon Platoon (1/Lt D. T. Schou).
Hvy Mort Plat (1/Lt J. E. McQuinn).
4. Intelligence.
a. The 305th Battalion of the 165th A Regiment had established bases in the Filhol Plantation and continues to conduct harassing type activities within the plantation and the outlying areas. During the hours of darkness, radar has detected vehicular movement along the roads and trails running through the plantation area. The last reported location of the 305th Bn was in vic coord XT 650208 on 9 Apr 66. Documents captured at this location revealed that personnel from the 1st and 4th Companies of the 305th were involved in the action. It was also believed that elements of the 305th Bn took part in the attack on A/2/27th on 5 April. The 307th Bn was believed to be operating in the Ho Bo Woods area with the last reported location on 11 Apr in the vic XT 614255, XT 614268 and XT 634267. As a result of recent combat operations, the 305th Bn was not considered to be at full strength.
b. During the operation no major enemy force of significant size was engaged by this unit. Several ambushes were employed; however no night contact was made. Elements of the TF received automatic weapons fire from approximately 15-20 VC. This was the largest enemy contact during the entire operation. It was expected that once the VC determined a major U. S. effort was launched the VC would exfiltrate north to the Ho Bo Woods.
c. The terrain was primarily dense to sparsely populated rubber trees and rice paddies. There were scattered, thickly wooded areas which considerably limited visibility. There were no natural obstacles to tracked movement; however, all roads, trails and trafficable areas were mined. The weather caused no change in plans or courses of action.
5. Mission: TF GREER conducts search and destroy operations in the TAOR, commencing 130600APR66, establishes TF base vicinity Psn VICKY (XT 647207) and prepared for operations into the Ho Bo Woods on order.
6. Concept of Operation: TF GREER attacks with Tm VICKERY, TM GUTZMAN and Tm RENNER to seize VICKY, GRACE and ROSE, respectively. Each team conducts search and destroy operations in AO and continues to attack on order (Incl 1).
7. Execution: TF GREER departed base camp at 0600 and all elements crossed the LD by 0630 hours, Tm VICKERY arrived on the edge of Psn VICKY at 0700 and by 0718 the psn was seized and occupied without enemy resistance. Tm GUTZMAN seized and secured Psn GRACE at 0722. As Tm VICKERY and Tm GUTZMAN commenced the search in their AO, Tm RENNER seized and secured Psn ROSE at 0800 and immediately started a detailed search of the AO. The search progressed methodically and at 0811 one APC from Co C, 1/69th hit a mine vic XT 655176. No casualties were sustained; however, the vehicle could not be repaired in place and was evacuated. By 0905 Tm VICKERY was occupying Psn VIOLET and preparing to move to Psn VERA. Meanwhile, Tm GUTZMAN, enroute to Psn GLORIA, had three APC's throw tracks due to dense vegetation. Forward progress was temporarily impeded; however, the vehicles were repaired in place and continued with the advance to Psn GLORIA. One APC from Tm RENNER hit an AT mine 200 meters east of Psn ROSE. No casualties were sustained; however, the vehicle had to be evacuated due to the extent of damage. Personnel from Tm RENNER found and destroyed a box of grenades in the vicinity of the downed APC. At 0950 Tm GUTZMAN arrived on Psn GLORIA and began searching operations. Tm RENNER received automatic weapons fire from the SE of Psn ROSE at 0958 and quickly maneuvered elements in an attempt to run down the VC. At 0950 gunships reported receiving heavy automatic fire from XT 632238 (Area ZULU) and Tm VICKERY was diverted into the area. Arty fires were adjusted throughout Area ZULU as Tm VICKERY moved rapidly into the area with the mission of sweeping the area around the creek vic XT 643233. Co A, 1/5th Mech reported one man slightly wounded by rifle grenade fragments while chasing a small VC element vic Psn VICKY at 1030. Helicopters reported receiving ground fire from XT 627175 at 1110 and Tm GUTZMAN was instructed to move to that vicinity and develop the situation. A med evac track of Tm RENNER hit an AT mine on Psn
ROSE at 1120 that blew one track off and damaged the road wheel. No casualties were sustained and the vehicle was evacuated. Tm GUTZMAN, working in the southern edge of Psn GLORIA, received mortar fire at 1123 and elements were maneuvered in the direction of the fire in an attempt to suppress it. One tank of Tm GUTZMAN was hit by a round from an AT weapon at 1140 that penetrated the tank and wounded one man. The tank was slightly damaged and continued the movement. The AT weapon was later identified as an RPG-2, when the fin assembly was found. Co A received rifle grenade fire on Psn ROSE at 1157 from an estimated reinforced rifle squad. The unit returned 81mm mortar fire on the enemy as troops were maneuvered against the enemy, but the enemy broke contact. During the engagement, Tm RENNER sustained five WIA's from rifle grenade shrapnel. At 1210, Tm VICKERY arrived in Area ZULU where the helicopter received fire (XT 627175) and began a systematic search of the area and at 1212 an airborne observer spotted approximately 10 VC breaking out into the open 200 meters in front of Tm Vickery's elements who quickly pushed in that direction while 4.2" mortar fire was adjusted into the target area. A systematic search of tunnels and bunkers in the area revealed a rice cache but no VC and the search was continued. At 1216 hours the lead tank hit an AT mine that blew one track off and damaged the road wheel. Two APC's from Tm Renner hit AT mines at 1230 while searching Psn ROSE, causing moderate damage to the APC's and three minor WIA's, who were treated and remained with the unit. At 1255 the Bn Cmdr in a C & C helicopter spotted 10 VC who were flushed in the open by Tm VICKERY vic XT 64172238. 4.2" mortar fire was delivered on the VC and two VC kills were estimated. Tm VICKERY continued to search Area ZULU and at 1302 the unit sustained two KIA's and one WIA from small arms fire from spider holes vic XT 638236. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was returned. Recon Platoon found a rice cache of approximately 1000 lbs at 1348 vic XT 678222. Two VC were seen entering a house in the 6117 grid square by gunships at 1402. An airstrike was delivered on the house at 1419 and a secondary explosion occurred. At 1415 Tm RENNER found and destroyed a small ammunition cache vic XT 646229. Tm VICKERY sustained two KIA's and six WIA's from a heavy volume of accurate rifle grenades and small arms fire from XT 635235 at 1442. The unit immediately engaged the VC by fire and maneuver, but the VC broke contact. The search was continued and at 1510 the crew chief of a resupply helicopter, diverted to the area for evacuation of Co B's WIA's was wounded. At 1520, the TF VTR hit an AT mine vic XT 640223, causing moderate damage to the track; however, no casualties were sustained. Recon Platoon found 40 graves at 1620 hours vic XT 654223. An inspection of the grave sites disclosed that the tombstones were engraved with VC flags and carbines engraved under the flag. The graves were determined to be one month old. One APC from Co A, 1/5th Mech hit an AT mine vic XT 640227. Extensive damage was done to the right track; however, no casualties were sustained. Tm GUTZMAN spotted a VC who was getting into a well. The unit gave chase as the VC moved down into the well and into a tunnel entrance that branched off from the well. A through search of the well and tunnel disclosed no VC or equipment. The well and all tunnel entrances were destroyed. Another APC from Tm RENNER hit an AT mine vic XT 666225 at 1825, causing minor damage to the track. The vehicle was repaired and placed into action. A tank of Tm GUTZMAN, while towing a damaged tank, hit an AT mine at 1833, causing minor damage to the track. Tm RENNER killed one VC at 1834 who emerged from a hole and threw a grenade at an APC vic XT 639217. At 1840 a tank crew with a stuck vehicle vic XT 628229 shot and killed three VC who were attempting to emplace a machinegun approximately 100 meters from the mired tank. By 1857 Tm RENNER, Tm GUTZMAN, and Recon Platoon closed into the Bn area and were preparing defenses for the night. At the same time a flare ship was requested for the personnel extracting three tanks which had become mired in Tm VICKERY's area during the afternoon. The vehicles were finally extracted and closed into TM VICKERY's area at 2325 hours. Between 2330 and 0200 no enemy contact was made. Tm VICKERY received an undetermined number of rifle grenades into their position vic XT 632235 at 0205 causing one casualty (minor) who was treated and remained with the unit until 0750. Tm RENNER departed the Bn perimeter at 0645 enroute to check the area bordered by roads from XT 641221 to XT 644214 to XT 670235 to XT 667238. At the same time Tm GUTZMAN moved out to check the sector bordered by roads from XT 644214 to XT 648207 to XT 677225 to XT 673231 with a NE direction of attack. The teams had the additional mission of checking the trench area vicinity Psn VICKY and VERA. By 0743, Tm RENNER had completed searching the first portion of their objective area and immediately moved to check the remainder of its sector. At 0750 one APC hit an AT mine. No damage was done to the track; however, two minor WIA's were sustained and, after treatment remained with the unit. Two command detonated mines were set off against one of Tm RENNER's APC's vic XT 643219 at 0803 hours. No damage was done to the track and the unit commenced a chase attempting to overrun the VC. Tm VICKERY received automatic weapons fire at 0846 from the streamline vic XT 628223. Arty fire was adjusted on the area and the enemy broke contact. No results could be determined. The Bn Smaj, traveling with one tank and one APC, received fire at 0915 from an estimated 15-20 VC vic XT 628223. Arty fire was immediately adjusted on the enemy. Three VC kills were estimated. Tm VICKERY began a sweeping search of their area at 0950 and immediately started to receive light small arms fire. Automatic and small arms fire was returned and in the ensuing fire fight, one WIA was sustained before the enemy broke contact. Tm VICKERY pursued in the direction of the fleeing VC and at 1107 spotted one VC getting into a hole. As the VC moved into the hole, five AT mines were set off around the hole. Elements of Tm VICKERY moved up to the hole and a check disclosed that three more AT mines were around the hole and that the VC was inside. The VC was killed and the mines destroyed and the team was instructed to complete its mission and return to the Bn CP. On its way back, Co B, 1/5th Mech was given the mission of checking the area where a secondary explosion was observed on 13 Apr vic XT 636253. Tm RENNER located a rice cache at 1535 vic XT 645215. In the process of checking the rice cache it was found to be boobytrapped and the unit sustained one KIA and two WIA's. A Dust Off helicopter received automatic weapons fire from vic XT 640225 and could not land. Gunships and Arty took the automatic weapons under attack. Operation KALAMAZOO was terminated at 1707 and by 1900 all elements of TF GREER had returned to base camp.
8. Supporting Forces: Btry C, 1/8th Arty (DS); 1/8th Arty (-)(GS); 3/13th Arty (GS); Lt Fire Tm (UH1D); Tac Air.
9. Results:
a. VC killed (confirmed and estimated).
(1) 9 VC killed (body count).
(2) 15 VC killed (estimated).
(3) 15 VC suspects detained.
b. Destroyed:
(1) 69 hand grenades
(2) 68 tunnels (short).
(3) 12 CBU bombs.
(4) 4 rifle grenades.
(5) 15 AT mines.
(6) 3 60mm duds.
(7) 9 105mm duds.
(8) 1 8" dud.
(9) 1 M72 LAW.
(10) 7 20mm rounds.
(11) 20 .50 cal rounds.
(12) 13 1/4 lb blocks of dynamite.
(13) 350 rounds 7.62mm linked ammo.
(14) 41 bunkers.
(15) 36 buildings.
(16) 3 trenches.
(17) 50 boobytraps.
(18) 2,600 lbs of rice (boobytrapped).
(19) 1 Russian MG.
(20) 300 M1 rounds.
c. Captured:
(1) Miscellaneous papers and documents.
(2) 1 rifle, U.S., M1.
(3) 2 RPG rounds.
(4) 2 RPG charges.
(5) 1 large Chicom grenade.
d. U.S. Equipment Damaged:
(1) 8 APC's - AT mines.
(2) 1 VTR - AT mine.
(3) 2 tanks - AT weapons.
(4) 1 tank - AT mine.
10. Administrative Matters:
a. Personnel: 484 personnel started the operation and 452 completed, three of whom were WIA's who had returned to duty. There were seven KIA's and 27 WIA's (Incl 2).
b. Supplies: Resupply was accomplished by helicopter from base camp. At times the unit had three helicopters working and at other times only one. Bde made all necessary helicopter support available. Due to experience gained in previous operations the resupply use of helicopters was more efficient. The previous average per lift was 935 lbs. During Operation KALAMAZOO, the average per lift was 1125 lbs. 5,700lbs of water, 5,880 lbs of Class I, 8,270 lbs Class V and 1910 lbs Class II and Iv were lifted. It was not necessary to effect resupply of Class III. The Bn expended 600 rounds of 5.56mm, 1000 rounds of 7.62mm, 900 rounds of .50 cal, 45 rounds of 40mm, 106 rounds of 4.2" mortar HE (16 VT fused and 20 WP), 132 hand grenades, 5 CS-1 grenades, 31 smoke grenades and 100 lbs of TNT.
c. Maintenance. One M88 and eight M113's became inoperable. The M88 and five M113's were disabled due to a combination of mines and mechanical failure. The M88 and five of the M113's were returned to duty during the operation. All three of the M113's not returned to duty were disabled due to combat damage.
d. Transportation. The Bn consumed 2968 gallons of MOGAS.
e. Communications. No communication problems were encountered during the operation.
11. Special Equipment and Techniques: None.
12. Commander's Analysis:
a. The area in the vicinity of Obj ROSE was laced with mines and the VC were continuously laying them throughout the operation. It is a difficult area to traverse without hitting mines, as there are only a few areas traversable without difficulty by track vehicles.
b. It was surprising that there were so many unblown tunnels in the Obj ROSE area, since the area has been worked before by this division.
c. The area north of Rach Son Creek between XT 645232 and XT 653255 has never been worked by this division. It is believed that this area is well tunneled and well used by the VC.
13. Conclusions and Lessons Learned: No new lessons learned.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
2 Incl BILLY J. HAMMONDS
as Captain, Infantry
Adjutant
CASUALTIES SUSTAINED DURING OPERATION KALAMAZOO
NAME RANK UNIT DISPOSITION TYPE WOUNDS MOS
SCOTT, Jimmy L. SP5 E5 HHC 3rd Field GSW in head 91B20
CONWAY, Richard A. SGT E5 Co A Rtn to Duty S/ in arm 11B40
MATHALLER, Kenneth L. SP4 E4 Co A 25th Med Bn Shrapnel in chest 11B20
SULLIVAN, Donald L. PVT E2 Co A 25th Med Bn Shrapnel in (l) leg 11B10
BROWN, Girnie R. PFC E3 Co A 25th Med Bn Shrapnel in neck 11B10
SKATES, Dale E. PFC E3 Co A 25th Med Bn Shrapnel (l&r) hand 11B10
SCOTT, William Jr. PFC E3 Co A 25th Med Bn Shrapnel (r) leg 11B10
RODRIGUEZ, Rodolfo SSG E6 Co A Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (l) forearm 11B40
WILLIAMS, Walter J. SP4 E4 Co A 3rd Field Shrapnel (l) shoulder 11B20
and (r) foot
CASTLEMAN, Rickey D.PFC E3 Co A Rtn to Duty Rupt both ear drums 11B10
RHODES, James Jr. PFC E3 Co A Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (l) shoulder 91B20
LOVE, John E. L. SP4 E4 Co A Rtn to Duty Rupt ear drum 11B20
SHAFFER, Paul K. SFC E7 Co A Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (r) arm 11C40
SEWELL, Bernard SSG E6 Co A 25th Med Bn Shrapnel (l) thigh, (r) hand 11B40
SELDON, Melvin R. SP4 E4 Co A 25th Med Bn Shrapnel (l) face 11B20
MOLIERE, Larry J. Jr. PFC E3 Co A Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (l) arm, chest 11B10
LANIER, Warren M. SGT E5 Co A Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (l) arm 11B40
HARRIS, Elton O. SSG E6 Co A Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (l) eyelid, hand 11B40
& side of head
THOMAS, Lewis M. PFC E3 Co A KIA Mult S/W over body 11B10
WALDROP, Winford P. SSG E6 Co B Rtn to Duty Shrapnel (l) arm 11C40
MCCULLION, Joseph R. PVT E2 Co B Rtn to Duty Shrapnel in neck 11B10
ESPER, James V. SFC E6 Co B 93rd Evac Shrapnel (l) knee 11B40
HACKETT, Robert W. SP4 E4 Co B 25th Med Bn Shrapnel (l) leg 11B20
PURCELL, John W. SGT E5 Co B 93rd Evac Shrapnel (l) hand, (l) thigh 11B40
ROTHRANG, Howard F. Jr. PFC E3 Co B KIA GSW in chest 11B10
STEVER, Frank E. SGT E5 Co B 93rd Evac GSW (r) thigh 11B40
D'AMICO, Frank A. 1ST LT Co B KIA GSW thru neck 1542
FACKRELL, Clenton B. SGT E5 Co B KIA GSW in head 11B40
TAYLOR, James R. PVT E2 Co B KIA GSW in abdomen 11B10
LAMARR, Phillip SP4 E4 Co B KIA GSW in head 11B20
CHEWNING, Leroy R. SP4 E4 Co B 93rd Evac Shrapnel (l) hand 11B20
CONLEY, Green SP4 E4 Co B KIA GSW in head 11B20
HARRIS, David K. SP4 E4 Co B Rtn to Duty Shrapnel in abdomen 11B20
BENNETT, Robert SGT E5 Co B Rtn to Duty Shrapnel in cheek 11B40
Inclosure 2 (Casualty List) to After-Action Report, Operation KALAMAZOO
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECH) 5TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCSBA-C 22 September 1966
SUBJECT: Combat After-Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)
THRU: Commanding Officer
1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCFB-C
APO U.S. Forces 96225
TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDC-OP
APO U.S. Forces 96225
1. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation KIPAPA.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 030715SEP66 - 121215SEP66.
3. LOCATION: Filhol - Liocara - Balancie Plantation (XT 6720), Hau Nghia Province, Viet Nam.
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th infantry, attached to 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Victor F. Diaz.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION.
1st Bn (Mech) (-) 5th Inf, LTC Victor F. Diaz, Commanding
Scout Plat, SFC S. McCartney, Jr.
Hvy Mort Plat, 1LT L. B. Wcckman
Company A, CPT J. B. Gerard, Commanding
Company B, CPT R. G. Vanneman, Commanding
Company C, CPT W. A. Blair, Commanding
One squad, Co A, 65th Engr Bn
Six RVN National Policemen
7. SUPPORTING FORCES: Btry B, 7th Bn, 11th Arty (DS).
8. INTELLIGENCE.
a. Intelligence Prior to the Operation: It was known that the Filhol Plantation continued to be an area of considerable VC activity. This activity included small arms fire, mines and antiaircraft fire. The plantation is the normal operational area of the 7th Bn, 165A Regt, which was reported vic XT 637224 on 27 Aug 66 and vic XT 685219 on 29 Aug. The 7th Bn normally operated in company size units and was expected to employ its four RPG-2 rocket launchers and two 57mm recoilless rifles. A rallier had reported a storage trench vic XT 646217 and three antitank mines vic XT 648214. The plantation is known to have extensive tunnel and trench networks.
b. Terrain and Weather: The terrain is generally flat with relatively sparse open areas. The area primarily consists of rubber trees and dense woods. This heavy growth caused track and foot movement to be relatively slow and tedious. Weather conditions during the operation presented little or no problem.
c. Enemy Situation During the Operation.
(1) throughout the operation the VC seemed to have broken into groups of three to four personnel. Working as small groups, the VC effectively evaded friendly forces. Their defensive tactics were to snipe at a moving mechanized column or any aircraft that came within small arms range.
(2) The best source of intelligence continues to be POW's. The use of information gained through immediate interrogation proved extremely helpful. Captured personnel are usually willing to divulge information and in some cases physically point out VC fortifications and tunnels.
(3) Documents captured during the operation included a roster of a VC company habitually operating in the Filhol Plantation area. Other documents were training manuals or political in nature.
(4) There was significant evidence of VC activity along the river line adjacent to the plantation. Medical supplies and Cambodian goods were captured in tunnels or stores run by Vietnamese.
(5) The Vc made extensive use of antitank mines and boobytraps. The mines were primarily located along the roads and in the northern portion of the plantation along the Rach Son creek line.
(6) Tunnels in the area ranged in length from small escape routes leading from houses to extensive concrete lined networks. Local Vietnamese labor was often forced by the VC to dig lengthly trenches throughout the area.
9. MISSION: 1st Bn (Mech) (-), 5th Inf conducts search and destroy operations in the Filhol Plantation to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps and interdict VC LOC commencing 030715SEP66 (Incl 1, Operation Overlay).
10 CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The battalion (-) moves into the 1st Bde AO and conducts S&D operations to locate and destroy VC forces, base areas and supplies; conducts reconnaissance in force and spoiling attacks against known or suspected VC units or activities or preparations during and after the election. Operations to be conducted away from the polling areas but along known or suspected VC locations.
11. EXECUTION.
3 September 1966
The battalion (-) departed base camp (XT 6516) at 0715 hours to conduct S&D operations in the Filhol Plantation to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and bases (Incl 1). At 1815 hours Co B, Scout Platoon and the Battalion Command Group departed the Filhol Plantation and returned to base camp, closing at 2050 hours. Co A remained at XT 659211 during darkness and Co C remained under OPCON of the 2nd Bde.
Company A:
Prior to the reporting period Co A was attached to the 1st Bde and located its company base vic XT 695211. The company dispatched two platoons from its position to make a sweep to the battalion base vic XT 679211. One platoon (-) remained at the battalion CP as security; the other platoon (+) returned to the company base and assisted in local S&D operations in the sector. During darkness three ambushes were employed, one of which made contact at 2342 hours when two grenades were received into its position at XT 694211. The ambush returned small arms fire into the suspected VC location, then relocated in the same general area and remained until first light. No evidence of the VC was found.
Company B:
The company departed base camp at 0630 hours under OPCON of the 4/23rd Inf to conduct S&D operations vic XT 635195 and returned to base camp at 2000 hours.
Company C:
The company (-) remained in base camp under OPCON of the 2nd Bde effective 0730 hours. The company had one platoon attached to the 1.27th Inf.
Scout Platoon:
The platoon departed base camp at 0715 hours as the lead element of the battalion (-) to vic XT 679211. The platoon made a sweep of the surrounding area and found a downed aircraft (Sky Raider) vic XT 685206. The plane was stripped and appeared to have been there a considerable time. The number on the tail section was 134519. The platoon closed into base camp at 2050 hours.
4 September 1966
At 0730 hours Co B, the Battalion Command Group and the Scout Platoon departed base camp to conduct S&D operations in the Filhol Plantation (Incl 2, Overlay). The battalion (-) linked up with Co A vic XT 695211 and moved to the battalion base vic XT 709203. During darkness two ambushes and three OP/LP's were established. No contact was made and all returned at first light. Co C remained under OPCON of the 2d Bde.
Company A:
At 0800 hours the company received approximately five rounds of small arms fire and an element was dispatched but no contact was made. At 0910 hours the company effected link-up with Co B and conducted an S&D operation sweeping to the southeast to vic XT 709203. The company apprehended two VC suspects at 1459 hours vic XT 709204.
Company B:
The company departed base camp at 0730 hours to link up with Co A, then to make a coordinated S&D operation. At 1019 hours one APC overturned down an embankment vic XT 699208 injuring five EM who were later evacuated. The vehicle was righted and towed to battalion base. Two antitank mines were found and destroyed at 1122 hours vic XT 698205. The company closed the battalion base at 1430 hours. Elements were dispatched to make a sweep of the surrounding area and apprehended three VC suspects vic XT 705202 at 1452 hours. The suspects were taken to the battalion CP where one was questioned and released. The two remaining suspects were evacuated to the 1st Bde. At 2235 hours three rifle grenades were received in the company's perimeter but no casualties were sustained.
Scout Platoon:
The platoon departed base camp at 0730 hours as a rear guard following the elements to the link-up points and from there to the battalion base. The platoon made a sweep of the area surrounding the CP and found several miscellaneous documents and three Chicom grenades which were destroyed vic XT 711203.
5 September 1966
Throughout the day elements conducted local S&D operations in sector. Co C (-) remained under OPCON of the 2d Bde and had one platoon that remained attached to the 1/27th Inf. Two ambushes and three OP/LP's were established during darkness. None made contact and all returned at first light.
Company A;
The company departed the battalion base at 0711 hours to conduct local S&D operations in sector. At 0745 hours the company destroyed two small tunnel systems vic XT 707204. At 1010 hours the company found and destroyed a hastily constructed hut, one booby trapped Chicom grenade outside the hut and one Chicom grenade inside the hut. At 1050 hours an element vic XT 707203 found a tunnel complex which had several tunnels leading in various directions. After all the tunnels were checked, they were destroyed. One VC suspect was apprehended at 1108 hours vic XT 709201. Elements were dispatched to vic XT 709205 to search for snipers who fired on the resupply helicopter. One element apprehended one VC suspect vic XT 705205 at 1725 hours. All elements closed into the battalion base at 1935 hours.
Company B:
The company departed the battalion base at 0705 hours to conduct local S&D operations in sector. At 0730 hours two VC suspects were detained vic XT 712203. A further search of the area uncovered several miscellaneous documents and two trenches running southeast and southwest which were destroyed. At 0902 hours two VC suspects were apprehended vic XT 706203 and a small cache containing miscellaneous items was also found. At 0959 hours six tubes of penicillin and six tubes of glucose were found vic XT 712200. One VC suspect was apprehended at 1100 hours vic XT 706202.
Scout Platoon:
Throughout the early morning hours the platoon made a local search in zone, finding approximately one pound of medical supplies vic XT 708204 at 1000 hours. The platoon completed its search and returned to the battalion base.
6 September 1966
During the day local S&D operations were conducted in sector. Co C (-) remained under OPCON of the 2d Bde and had one platoon attached to the 1/27th Inf.
Company A:
At 0700 hours the company (-) departed the area to conduct local S&D operations in its assigned sector. At 0717 hours the ambush located vic XT 702203 checked the immediate area and discovered one 105mm round rigged for command detonation. The round was destroyed and the ambush relocated its position. One VC suspect was apprehended at 0744 hours vic XT 707194. At 0746 hours three more VC suspects were apprehended vic XT 707194. At 0750 hours the ambush received two rifle grenades and approximately 14 rounds of small arms fire into its position, but the source could not be located. At 0845 hours one APC was extensively damaged by a command detonated mine vic XT 704205. No casualties were sustained. Two VC suspects were apprehended at 0847 hours vic XT 708194. Elements searching vic XT 706194 at 1021 hours apprehended one VC suspect. Two 250 pound bombs, rigged for command detonation, were found and destroyed at 1045 hours vic XT 704205. Also destroyed in the area was one bunker tunnel complex and a trench with recently fired .30 cal shell casings. At 1147 hours vic XT 706196 one VC suspect was apprehended. At 1302 hours a four level tunnel was found and destroyed vic XT 704206. In the same area one VC suspect was apprehended at 1615 hours. One element at XT 705198 found and destroyed three huts and ten fighting bunkers at 1416 hours. The same element found a bag hanging in a tree vic XT 703198 at 1450 hours. The bag contained miscellaneous documents, pictures, a wallet and an ID card. Two magazines for a Thompson submachine gun were found at 1535 hours. The company employed two ambushes and two OP/LP's during darkness, all of which returned at first light.
Company B:
The company departed on local S&D operations in sector at 0700 hours. One VC suspect was apprehended at 0731 hours vic XT 708194. At 0815 hours two more VC suspects were apprehended vic XT 710199. The company destroyed one hut with one 105mm dud, one 81mm dud and miscellaneous artillery type warheads vic XT 709197 at 0846 hours. Five VC suspects were apprehended vic XT 718199 at 1252 hours. The company closed into the battalion base at 1317 hours. Two OP's were established during darkness. No contact was made and both returned at first light.
Scout Platoon:
The platoon remained in the vicinity of the battalion base to provide security for the resupply helipad and made local sweeps near the battalion perimeter.
7 September 1966
The battalion (-) continued to conduct S&D operations in the AO. Co B and one platoon of Co A conducted operations in conjunction with the 4/9th Inf (Incl 3, Overlay). Three ambushes were established during darkness. None made contact and all returned at first light.
Company A:
At 0700 hours the company departed the battalion perimeter enroute to establish a platoon size blocking position (BOB) (Incl 3) vic XT 698190 and to conduct local S&D operations in the immediate area. While enroute to the blocking position one antitank mine was found and destroyed vic XT 713201 at 0755 hours. The blocking position was established at 0715 hours. At 0905 hours the platoon on the blocking position apprehended one VC suspect who stated he knew where a VC headquarters and tunnel was located. He also stated that there were 20 to 30 VC in the tunnel. At 1115 hours the company (-) destroyed one bunker at XT 706205. At 1230 hours one VC was wounded and captured vic XT 709208. His weapon, an M1 rifle, and 140 rounds cal .30 ammunition were also captured. At 1316 hours one male and two female VC suspects were apprehended vic XT 709208. Two 105mm duds rigged for command detonation were destroyed vic XT 703205 at 1450 hours. In the same area two 155mm duds were also found and destroyed. One of the female VC suspects escaped into a tunnel vic XT 702203 at 1745 hours. At 1755 hours one WIA was sustained from shrapnel from an incoming rifle grenade. The wound was minor and the casualty was later evacuated on the resupply helicopter. The company had one platoon that returned to base camp to attend the ambush academy. One platoon remained in the vicinity of the tunnel complex during darkness.
Company B:
At 0630 hours the company departed the battalion base to sweep the eastern edge of the AO and to link up with the 4/9th Inf. The platoon dispatched to link up with the 4/9th Inf was in position at 0725 hours. The company (-) made a sweep along the eastern edge of the AO (Incl 3). At 1101 hours the company apprehended three VC suspects vic XT 720190. At 1215 hours twelve 100 pound bags of rice were captured vic XT 719195. The company (-) closed into the battalion base at 1315 hours.
Company C (-):
At 1215 hours the company (-) was released from OPCON of the 2d Bde and moved to the battalion base. The company (-) closed at 1455 hours without incident.
Scout Platoon:
The platoon remained vicinity the battalion base and made local sweeps around the battalion base. At 1813 hours one WIA was sustained by small arms fire vic XT 704205. A search of the area was made with negative results. In the same general area one bunker and one tunnel were destroyed.
8 September 1966
Throughout the day the battalion (-) conducted S&D operations in the AO in conjunction with the 1/7th ARVN (Incl 4, Overlay).
Company A (-):
At 0700 hours the company (-) departed the battalion base enroute to exploit the tunnel at XT 702203. The elements arrived in the area at 0727 hours and joined the platoon that had remained overnight. Throughout the day the elements explored the tunnel and surrounding area. Found inside the tunnel were one command detonated mine with wires attached, one U.S. BAR, SN 874565, 17 Chicom grenades, five VC grenades, and 280 rounds cal .30 ammunition. The element outside the tunnel received two incoming rifle grenades at 1135 hours but no casualties were sustained and fire was placed into suspected VC locations. The element searching the surrounding area captured 4,500 pounds of loose rice in a vacant house. The rice was bagged and extracted. The tunnel was destroyed and the company returned to the battalion base.
Company B:
The company conducted S&D operations with an ARVN company under its operational control in Obj 1 (XT 715203) and Obj (XT 705196) (Incl 4). At 1030 hours the elements completed operations in Obj 1 and reported the destruction of ten spider holes. At 1505 hours an ordnance cache was found at XT 705196 which contained three 105mm duds, one claymore and three 155mm duds. At 1536 hours the elements completed the operation and Co B returned to the battalion base.
Company C (-):
One platoon remained attached to the 1/27th Inf. At 0620 hours the company (-) departed the battalion base to conduct a joint S&D operation with ARVN forces at Obj 2 (XT 712196) and Obj 4 (XT 709190) (Incl 4). One small tunnel was destroyed vic XT 714206. At the same time 3,640 pounds of rice was captured at XT 712195. At 1035 hours the same element captured 1320 pounds of rice in the same area. At this time the total rice captured was turned over to the province chief. The elements then searched Obj 4 and, finding nothing, the company returned with the ARVN forces to their compound and then returned to base camp under OPCON of the 2d Bde. The Heavy Mortar Platoon returned to base camp and was attached to Co C effective 1900 hours.
9 September 1966
The battalion (-) displaced to a new battalion base at XT 680211 and conducted local sweeps in the sector.
Company A:
The company dispatched one platoon to make a sweep of the area vic XT 702203. Upon completion of the sweep the platoon returned to the battalion base and joined the company to move to the new battalion base. While enroute, the company found and destroyed one 81mm dud at 0955 hours vic XT 701202. By 1200 hours the company had closed into the battalion base. During the afternoon hours the company prepared its defensive positions.
Company B:
At 0830 hours the company departed the battalion base to make a sweep in the southern edge of the AO vic XT 708186. Two VC suspects were apprehended vic XT 705185 at 0912 hours. At 0920 hours three more VC suspects were apprehended in the same area. At this time all suspects were evacuated to the ARVN compound in the area. The company then returned to vic XT 709186 and apprehended five more VC suspects and at 1015 hours still another suspect was extracted from a tunnel in the area. The six VC suspects were also evacuated to the ARVN compound. While enroute to the new battalion base one APC hit an antitank mine vic XT 692203 at 1315. Minor damage was done to the vehicle but no casualties were sustained. In a search of the surrounding area three antitank mines were found and destroyed. At 1455 hours another APC hit an antitank mine in the same area. Again, minor damage was done to the APC and no casualties were sustained.
10 September 1966
Throughout the day the battalion (-) conducted S&D operations in the AO (Incl 5, Overlay). Co C (+) remained under OPCON of the 2d Bde.
Company A:
The company conducted S&D operations in Obj 2 (XT 664240) and Obj 3 (XT 652230) (Incl 5). At 1033 hours one 105mm dud was destroyed vic XT 665238. At 1115 hours one element completed the destruction of a partially caved-in bunker at XT 664241. By 1310 hours the search of Obj 2 was completed and the company moved to Obj 3. At 1515 hours four VC were engaged vic XT 653228. Two VC were killed (body count) and one VC was captured along with his weapon, an M1 rifle, SN 567268. Also captured were one set of web gear, a bayonet, three hand grenades, 11 M1 clips, 86 rounds of M1 ammunition and miscellaneous documents. while in the area the company destroyed one bunker with sleeping quarters for two. At 1805 hours the company returned to the battalion base (XT 637211).
Company B:
The company conducted S&D operations in Obj 1 (XT 674230) (Incl 5). At 0830 hours one command detonated mine was destroyed at XT 681224. At 0920 hours one antitank mine was destroyed in the same area. In a further search of the area two tunnels, five bunkers and one antitank mine were destroyed. At 1312 hours one homemade hand grenade was destroyed vic XT 675226. At 1326 hours one boobytrapped hand grenade was destroyed in the same area. An element destroyed an underground shelter vic XT 675229 at 1425 hours. The shelter was five feet deep, twenty-seven feet long and eight feet wide. The company then returned to the battalion base.
11 September 1966
Throughout the day Co's A and B conducted S&D operations in Obj J (XT 645226) and Obj R (XT 639225), respectively (Incl 6, Overlay). Co C remained under OPCON of the 2d Bde. The Scout Platoon, Security Platoon and the Battalion Command Group displaced to vic XT 637211.
Company A:
At 0816 hours the company departed the battalion base enroute to conduct S&D operations in Obj J (Incl 6). By 1000 hours the company had arrived in its AO. At 1056 hours the company destroyed two houses with booby trapped entrances, seven bunkers with sleeping quarters and one command detonated mine. One bunker-tunnel complex vic XT 648229 was destroyed and miscellaneous documents were captured. Signs of recent use were found in the area. Small arms fire was received from XT 646229 at 1136 hours and elements were maneuvered to close with the VC. At 1205 hours two WIA's were sustained, one from small arms fire and the other from shrapnel when an armor piercing round penetrated an APC's cupola vic XT 654230. At 1211 hours one APC hit an antitank mine vic XT 646229. Minor damage was done to the vehicle but no casualties were sustained. In the same area at 1220 hours a 105mm dud rigged for command detonation was set off against an APC. Three casualties were sustained and minor damage was done to the vehicle. Two OP/LP's were established during darkness. No contact was made and all returned at first light.
Company B:
At 0800 hours the company departed the battalion base enroute to conduct S&D operations in Obj R (XT 639225) (Incl 6). One 105mm dud was destroyed at 1007 hours vic XT 640221. At 1009 hours one APC hit an antitank mine vic XT 640222. Minor damage was done to the vehicle and no casualties were sustained. The element at XT 640221 made a thorough search of the area and at 1200 hours reported the destruction of three antitank mines, one CBU bomb, one booby trap and one tunnel complex. At 1320 hours two APC's hit antitank mines vic XT 643288. No casualties were sustained, but minor damage was done to both vehicles. Found and destroyed at 1435 hours vic XT 644227 in VC sleeping quarters that were six feet deep and nine feet square were three claymores, four CBU's, two 60mm rounds, four antipersonnel mines, four stick type grenades and five blocks of TNT. Numerous documents were captured which contained name, rank and pictures of VC in the Cu Chi area. In a further search of the area the following were found and destroyed: 21 antitank mines, two 60mm mortar rounds and a small tunnel which contained scrap metal for the production of claymores. At 1550 hours elements at XT 645228 destroyed five buildings, one 55 gallon drum of rice and two 100 lb bags of rice and captured several miscellaneous documents. The platoon that was located at XT 641228 received five incoming rifle grenades at 1640 hours. No casualties were sustained and artillery fire was adjusted throughout suspected VC locations. While enroute to the battalion base at 1715 hours, the company destroyed one Chicom claymore, two booby traps and two bunkers at XT 640220. At 1900 hours the company sustained one KIA and three WIA from friendly artillery fire at XT 637211. One claymore team was employed during the hours of darkness. No contact was made and the team returned at first light.
12 September 1966
The battalion (-) displaced at 0900 hours and returned to base camp closing at 1215 hours ending Operation KIPAPA and the battalion's attachment to the 1st Bde. Throughout the remainder of the day the battalion (-) performed maintenance of weapons, vehicles and equipment. Co C (+) remained under OPCON of the 2d Bde.
12. RESULTS.
a. Friendly.
(1) 560 personnel started the operation and 534 completed. The latter figure includes 11 WIA who remained with their units. Included in the 26 personnel who did not return to their units during the operation are one KIA and one DOW (Incl 7, Casualty List).
(2) Ten APC's, M113, were damaged by mines. Two were repaired in the field and continued the operation.
b. Enemy.
(1) 3 VC killed (BC), 1 VCC and 43 VCS.
(2) Material, equipment and facilities.
(a) Captured: 2 M1 rifles; 1 U.S. BAR; 1 U.S. bayonet; 6 tons of rice; Miscellaneous medical supplies; miscellaneous documents; Other Miscellaneous items.
(b) Destroyed: 5 claymores; 5 booby trapped grenades; 32 antitank mines; 24 Chicom grenades; 5 VC grenades; 3 command detonated mines; 2 250 lb bombs (rigged for command detonation); 4 105mm duds (rigged for command detonation); 10 105mm duds; 2 155mm duds (rigged for command detonation); 2 81mm duds; 4 antipersonnel mines; 1 homemade hand grenade; 5 blocks of demolition; 2 magazines; 9 small tunnels; 4 large tunnel complexes; 1 VC sleeping quarters; 1 underground shelter; 9 huts
PAGES 12, 13, 14, AND 15 MISSING FROM THE CAAR. PAGE 16 AS FOLLOWS:
14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None.
15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS.
a. The mere presence of a mechanized U.S. infantry unit in an area will significantly disrupt VC planned operations. In this respect, Operation KIPAPA achieved its purpose of preventing the VC from mounting operations against the polling places.
b. On the other hand, the VC very rapidly re-establish control over an area after the U.S. unit leaves.
c. Unless a relatively large number of troops is used simultaneously to occupy and search an area, the VC will merely move and keep out of the way of the searching unit.
d. Detailed searches of densely populated areas by U.S. units are only marginally profitable. Even with one interpreter and two Vietnamese National Policemen attached to each company, many valuable indications of VC presence are usually overlooked by the troops because of the language barrier and lack of familiarity with local customs.
16. RECOMMENDATIONS :
a. That, whenever possible, Vietnamese pacification forces remain in a formerly VC controlled area after U.S. troops are withdrawn.
b. That elements of a U.S. unit leaving an area remain behind covertly for the purpose of ambushing VC suspects returning to or investigating the abandoned area.
c. That U.S. forces be employed in sufficient numbers to saturate an area, thus preventing the VC suspects from merely moving away from the searching units.
d. That Vietnamese elements be used to perform the actual searching of houses and screening of civilians, with the U.S. unit providing
Page 17 is missing from the CAAR.
CASUALTIES SUSTAINED DURING OPERATION KIPAPA
NAME RANK UNIT DISPOSITION
VARTENUK, George PFC E-3 HHC 25th Med
HENDRICKSON, Dennis PFC E-3 HHC 7th Surg
FRANKLIN, Joseph SP5 E-5 HHC 7th Surg
GARCES-MORALES, Rafael SP4 E-4 Co A 7th Surg
LANIER, Warren SGT E-5 Co A Rtn to Duty
FERRARI, James SGT E-5 Co A 7th Surg
BOND, Bobby SP4 E-4 Co A 7th Surg
DICKIE, James SGT E-6 Co A 7th Surg
BARUZZI, Marco PFC E-3 Co A 7th Surg
HONSINGER, Timothy PFC E-3 Co A 7th Surg
DEVLIN, Frank PFC E-3 Co A Rtn to Duty
BARTLETT, Dennis SGT E-5 Co A Rtn to Duty
BECERRA, David 2LT Co A Rtn to Duty
McELROY, James SP4 E-4 Co A Rtn to Duty
CARUSO, Arthur PFC E-3 Co B 7th Surg
DAILEY, Billy SP4 E-4 Co B 7th Surg
BENAVENTE, Vincente SSG E-6 Co B 7th Surg
HOWARD, David SP4 E-4 Co B Rtn to Duty
McCLURE, John PFC E-3 Co B Rtn to Duty
HAMILTON, Frederick PFC E-3 Co B 7th Surg
KARI, Robert SP4 E-4 Co B 25th Med
TREMBLY, Ralph SP4 E-4 Co B Rtn to Duty
RIVERA-SIERRA, Edwin SP4 E-4 Co B Rtn to Duty
CLEMONS, Lewis SP4 E-4 Co B Arthur Lewis Disp
VALEO, Richard SP4 E-4 Co B Arthur Lewis Disp
BENNET, Robert SGT E-5 Co B 7th Surg
LEWIS, Christopher SP4 E-4 Co B 7th Surg
IRVING, Earl E. Jr SP4 E-4 Co B KIA
THOMPSON, Daniel SFC E-7 Co B 7th Surg
JARRELL, Earnest L. SP4 E-4 Co B Rtn to Duty
WILLIAMS, Joe L SGT E-5 Co B Rtn to Duty
LEVERLAND, Michael SP4 E-4 Co C 25th Med
PRITCHARD, Larry PFC E-3 Co C 7th Surg
SOLIZ, Rolando PFC E3 Co C DOW
STERLING, Edward PFC E-3 Co C 3rd Field
VICYCH, John SGT E-5 Co C 3rd Field
BETRAMI, Edward PFC E-3 Co C 25th Med
Inclosure 7 (Casualty List) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, subj Combat After-Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32), dtd 22 Sep 66.
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECH) 5TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCSBA-C 25 August 1966
SUBJECT: Combat After-Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)
TO: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCSB-T
APO U.S. Forces 96225
1. NAME OF OPERATION : Operation KOKO HEAD
2. DATES OF OPERATION : 240700JUL66 - 061640AUG66.
3. LOCATION : Liocara Plantation (XT 6422), Ho Bo Woods and vic (XT 6527 - XT 6424 - XT 6123) and Trung Lap and vic (XT 5021), Hau Nghia Province, Viet Nam.
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS : 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf.
5. REPORTING OFFICER : Lt Col Victor F. Diaz.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION :
1st Bn (Mech) (-) 5th Inf, Lt Col V. F. Diaz, Commanding
Recon Plat, Lt J. E. McQuinn
Hvy Mort Plat, Lt L. B. Wickman
Company A, Capt J. A. Renner, Commanding
Company B, Capt. R. C. Vanneman, Commanding
Company C, Capt W. A. Blair, Commanding (Attached to 4/9th Inf
until 27 July 1966)
Six RVN National Policemen.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES.
a. C Btry, 1/8th Arty: DS.
b. 1/8th Arty (-) and 3/13 Arty (-) : GS.
8. INTELLIGENCE.
a. 24 July 1966: On 23 july 1966 the Bn S5 received information from the village chief concerning two tunnels and approximately nine VC north of Ap Ben Do Hamlet (Tan Phu Trung). The chief also furnished two guides to point out the tunnels. The guides were a Popular Forces soldier and a Chieu Hoi and were picked up by Co A enroute to the area 24 July. It was determined that the VC were probably members of the tax collection unit operating in the area. The tunnels were located at XT 700110 and XT 702107. Both were unoccupied and destroyed by Co A. A further search of the wooded area disclosed a well camouflaged house at XT 707101 which was also destroyed. A small VC base camp was found vic XT 702104 and four bunkers and a tunnel were destroyed at XT 707103. A small amount of documents found in the tunnel were tax records. It is notable that this area was cleared by bulldozers at one time and vegetation has since regrown and is quite dense in many spots. The VC base camp consisted of six huts made with bamboo and tree trunks that were knocked down into a horizontal position. The horizontal limbs were used for the roof. Undergrowth was placed against the limbs. This formed a very well camouflaged shelter underneath. Trafficability in the area was good. As in the past, close cooperation between the village chief and the Bn S5 resulted in the specific location of VC installations in the Tan Phu Trung area.
b. 27 to 30 July 1966: Intelligence received from HQ, 2d Bde indicated a possible build up for an attack on Trung Lap or Trang Bang in the near future. There was also a suspected supply and infiltration route (nortn/south) somewhere in the area. Many reports had been received indicating that elements of the VC 271st and 273rd Regt's were located in the Boi Loi Woods along the north edge of the AO. The Boi Loi is also known to be the base area for the 320th VC Bn. In the two week period prior to the operation, elements of the 1st Bn, 165A Regt were also active in the AO. A thorough search of the area was made with the following results: Two VC armed with carbines were killed by an ambush at XT 516309; a total of 43 VCS were evacuated, most of which were found working in the fields. Information had been received that the village of Loc Bung (XT 516264) was a VC hideout. Coordination was made with an RF outpost at XT 508260 and 20 RF troops aided in the search. Once the village was surrounded, all male suspects were screened by the RF soldiers and 13 were evacuated as VCS. The terrain in this area was trafficable, but many rice paddies were too soft for APC's to cross. The AO is characterized generally by wet paddies with scattered clumps of woods and brush.
c. In the two weeks prior to the operation, intelligence reports from HQ, 2d Bde and other divisional units indicated that elements of the 1st Bn, 165A Regt had been seen frequently in the AO vic XT 6229 and XT 6226. Elements of the 7th Bn, 165A Regt were reported in the Filhol Plantation vic XT 6622. A VC weapons training center was reported to be located vic XT 5928. Past operations and reports indicated that habitual VC base and rest areas were located vic XT 588264, XT 575247, XT 575234, XT 600245 and XT 645237. A new Vc company was reported to be located vic XT 5926. During the actual operation no VC units of any size were encountered. All actions involved not more than a VC squad and usually consisted of the three - to five - man cells operating within and covering mined and /or boobytrapped areas.
d. Significant Intelligence Gained:
(1) XT 643247. A base camp was found with a cache of 2000 pounds of rice, several maps of the Saigon-Cholon area showing detailed locations of U. S. and ARVN petroleum storage areas, numerous sketches of ARVN outposts and friendly hamlets, and a sketch map of the Cu Chi base camp. This area was heavily mined and booby trapped.
(2) XT 651237. This area was heavily mined and boobytrapped and defended by a three to five-man cell. The VC were pursued into a tunnel. Tunnel runners located an 81 or 82mm mortar sight and some documents concerning a VC mortar company (a company roster was found, also a document stating the unit had five 81mm mortars). The unit was later identified as a weapons company of the 7th Bn, 165A Regt. After the documents and mortar sight were recovered, a fire fight developed in the tunnel and the VC moved the remainder of the mortar further back into the tunnel. A "Mighty Mite" was used and a second tunnel entrance was located some 100 meters away (due to visibility limitations in the heavy underbrush a helicopter was called to the area and located the second tunnel entrance, marked by escaping smoke). Two air holes were also located and blocked. After six hours of attempting to remove the VC from the tunnel, both entrances and the two air vents were blown. The result was a collapse of the tunnel (traceable on the surface).
(3) XT 646236 to XT 647234. Indications of a VC base camp were found with several hidden houses, one small concrete anti-aircraft bunker, several new bunkers, camouflaged huts and building materials. At this location two VC were killed. Several pounds of documents, training manuals and three weapons were captured. All installations were destroyed.
(4) XT 639240. Three VC were engaged. Two escaped and one was captured. The captured VC spoke good English and was armed with a Chicom (type 56) assault rifle. It was found that he was a member of the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, C20 Section, H2 HQ. This is a reconnaissance and intelligence unit subordinate to the Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Region. The unit's mission is reporting friendly unit dispositions throughout thePhu Hoa District and Binh Duong Province, including the Ho Bo Woods and Filhol Plantation. He also indicated that the 1st Bn, 165A Regt coordinated with Arty elements from COSVN during the 26-27 July mortar attack on the Cu Chi base camp. He gave his unit HQ location as XT 637232. An immediate check of the location was made by the 2/27th Inf and a concrete tunnel complex was destroyed.
(5) XT 640229. Three bombs from the 1 August 1966 B52 strike had created large craters in a heavily mined and boobytrapped area. These items were unearthed, uncovered or dislodged. Electrical wires to command detonated mines had been severed. A bunker and tunnel complex was also destroyed by the bombs. It is noteworthy that a bunker and three-level tunnel found at this location had an M113 cargo hatch as the bunker top and an M113 commander's hatch as a trap door between levels. On 4 August 1966 a VC rallier stated that his unit (4th Squad, 2nd Platoon, 1st Company, 7th Bn, 165A Regt) had been under direct attack by B52's at Xom Bung (XT 645230) and were ordered to break up immediately into small groups and move out of the area.
(6) XT 643217. B/1/5th Mech located and destroyed an extensive bunker system with two three-level tunnels that contained 30,000 rounds of .30 cal armor piercing ammunition (Chicom) and large quantities of mines and grenades. At this same location a week prior, Co B had an APC destroyed by a command detonated mine with seven U.S. KIA. On that date the time schedule prevented a thorough search of the area. On returning to the area it was found that the APC wreckage was untouched and still had many 40mm grenade rounds (damaged) scattered in the vicinity.
(7) XT 645234 to XT 646235. Two concrete bunkers, four dirt and log bunkers and one three level tunnel were destroyed. Assorted medical supplies and propaganda material were captured.
(8) XT 615268. Four rows of barbed wire, approximately 30 feet long with each row constructed in a different manner, were located. This indicated some type of training area.
(9) XT 653274. Two bombs from the B52 strike had destroyed a VC company CP. A trench, bunker, tunnel and several huts were destroyed. There were two dead VC, a company roster for H1B Company listing one captain and four lieutenants, 60 black uniforms, three bolts of black cloth, one U.S. carbine, one Chicom "56" assault rifle and miscellaneous documents.
(10) XT 653282. A rice cache of 900 pounds was found in a hut.
(11) XT 646236. A rice cache was found buried in a 55 gallon drum with 2000 rounds of small arms ammunition.
(12) XT 621256 and XT 648249. Many recently traveled trails were found. At the later coordinates were indications (ie, water containers with soap, food scraps, several fires - some of which were still warm - and cooking utensils) that a large (possible company size) VC force had spent the night.
(13) XT 623256. A large bunker complex with many boobytraps were destroyed.
(14) XT 620224. Five steel reinforced bunkers and a thirty meter tunnel were destroyed. Equipment for making grenades and 25-30 pounds of lead (in rods) was captured. This area had many boobytraps.
(15) XT 675281. The area was heavily mined and boobytrapped, with many huts. Two bunkers with interconnecting tunnel were destroyed, two weapons were recovered and two VC were presumed killed when the tunnel was destroyed.
(16) XT 648242. In a large hole (similar to a well) 400 pounds of explosives in 1/4 pound blocks, one Chicom claymore, one flare pistol and miscellaneous equipment were found.
(17) Ambush patrols were utilized each night during the operation. On some nights as many as eight were used. No contact was made, nor any VC movement observed.
e. The B52 strike seemed most effective when the bombs created a large crater. Bunkers and tunnels were physically affected only when directly hit (ie, in one instance a bunker located 15 feet from a crater measuring approximately 40 feet in diameter by 20 feet deep was unaffected). In two areas many mines and boobytraps were uncovered or dislodged. Wiring used for detonating mines was severed.
f. Terrain: The ground in the wooded areas was firm and provided excellent trafficability. Movement in rice paddies was generally good, with some exceptions. All wooded areas had a large amount of undergrowth that limited visibility but not trafficability.
9. MISSION : 1st Bn (mech) (-), 5th Inf conducts S&D operations in 2d Bde AO on order; provides mechanized reaction force on order.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The 1st Bn (Mech)(-), 5th Inf based at Cu Chi conducts local S&D operations, civil affairs activities, maintenance and retraining; is prepared for employment as base reaction force on order.
11. EXECUTION.
24 July 1966
The village chief of Tan Phu Trung (XT 6809) offered the assistance of a Popular Forces soldier and a Chieu Hoi to locate tunnels vic XT 700110 which were being used by the VC. Co A and Recon Plat were dispatched to the area. After a thorough search, four well camouflaged huts, bunkers and tunnels were located and destroyed. Several documents, one Chicom carbine and two VC suspects were also captured.
25 July 1966
The battalion (-) conducted retraining and maintenance.
26July 1966
The battalion (-) conducted retraining, maintenance and convoy security missions to Bao Tri (XT 5204). Co B was attached to the 2/27th Inf.
27 July 1966
Eight daylight ambushes were established. One made contact vic XT 516309 at 1455 hours, resulting in two VC killed (BC) and one U.S. carbine, one Chicom carbine, three hand grenades, 50 rounds small arms ammunition and miscellaneous documents captured. The battalion (-) departed at 0800 hours to conduct S&D operations south of the Boi Loi Woods vic XT 5130 (Incl 1, Operation Overlay). Company A operated in Obj SAM and Obj HARRY apprehending eight VC suspects. Co B was relieved from the 2/27th Inf and joined the battalion (-) enroute to the AO. They then operated in Obj JOE, Obj BILL and Obj TOM. Several ambushes were set along the southern edge of the Boi Loi and at 1455 hours two VC were killed (BC) and two rifles captured. The Recon Platoon initially blocked for Co B on Obj JOE then conducted operations vic XT 480297 where 15 VC suspects were apprehended. (Eight of the suspects apprehended were confirmed as VC by the 25th Div IPW team.) The battalion (-) established a fire support base vic XT 479271 and Btry C (-), 1/8th Arty (105mm How) was airlifted in to support the battalion (-). Co C returned to the rear basecamp at 1830 hours terminating their attachment to the 4/9th Inf.
28 July 1966
Eight ambushes were established during darkness 27-28 July. None made contact and all returned at first light. The battalion (-), assisted by the local RF platoon, encircled the village of Loc Hung (XT 5226) and apprehended 19 VC suspects, of which five were confirmed to be Viet Cong.
29 July 1966
Seven ambushes were established during darkness 28-29 July. One made contact at 2030 hours vic XT 482295. Two WIA were sustained; enemy casualties were unknown. The ambush returned to Bn base. All other ambushes returned at first light. The battalion (-) continued operations in the AO (Incl 2, Operation Overlay) which netted one VC and 15 suspects. The battalion CP remained in position to secure the LZ for extraction of the Arty battery. By 1830 hours the battalion had returned to base camp.
30 July 1966
Battalion activities included maintenance, conduct of civil affairs operations at Tan Phu Trung (XT 6809) and escort of an Artillery convoy from Duc Hue (XT 4405) to base camp.
31 July 1966
Lt Col Victor F. Diaz assumed command of the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry vice Lt Col T. U. Greer. The battalion conducted maintenance and prepared for future operations.
1 August 1966
The battalion departed base camp at 0725 hours on a mission of exploiting and determining the effectiveness of a B52 bomb strike vic XT 640225 - XT 665240. In conjunction with this mission the battalion conducted S&D operations in the AO (Incl 3, Operation Overlay).
Company A:
The company, with Recon Platoon attached, established blocking position X-RAY, then exploited the bomb strike on Obj 2. With the exception of three AT mines, the company had no enemy contact. An extensive bunker-tunnel complex was discovered vic XT 640229. Another tunnel complex was found vic XT 645227. There was little or no evidence of the B52 strike in the objective area.
Company B:
The company moved to clear and hold Obj 1 until passage of Company A, then conducted a detailed search vic XT 646215. A bunker-tunnel complex was discovered vic XT 643217 which contained an ammo cache of small arms ammo, grenades and AT mines. After completing the search the company moved to Obj 13. At 1650 hours two houses were found vic XT 624243 containing a rifle, 15 artillery rounds, 2 AT mi |