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 Operation Gadsden

                    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY


                         OPERATION GADSDEN                           (22 Mar 67)

     1.   NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION:   Operation GADSDEN was a Search and Destroy and Blocking operation along the CAMBODIAN border to prevent exfiltration and infiltration along routes via CAMBODIAN border, and to destroy VC/NVA force's supplies and base camps.  This operation was conducted in four phases:
     Phase I:      Div Arty GS FSB and elements of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div established base at TRAI BI.  One Bn 196th Bde prepared and positioned forces for attack.

     Phase II:    3d Bde and 196th Bde attacked on D-Day to seize objectives 1 and 2, secured LZs,  established FSBs and an air assault was conducted on each objective area.  On D+1, 3d Bde and 196th Bde attacked to seize objectives 3 and 4

     Phase III:   25th (US) Inf Div, employed two Bdes, conducted Search and Destroy operations in Zone, then established blocking positions to seal infiltration and exfiltration routes via CAMBODIAN border.

     Phase IV:   Units conducted operations to the Southeast to destroy VC/NVA forces and base camps.
     2.   DATE OF OPERATION:  2 February 1967 - 21 February 1967

     3.   LOCATION:   Western War Zone  “C”

     4.    CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS:  25th  Infantry  Division

5.   REPORTING OFFICER:    Major General Frederick C. Weyand,  2 Feb - 21 Feb '67


25TH  Inf  Div:

          196th  Bde  (LT)  (Sep)
          2nd   Bn,  1st  Inf.
          4th  Bn,  31st  Inf.
          3rd   Bn,  21st  Inf.
          1st  Bn,  5th  (M)  Inf  (Atch)
          3rd   Bn,  82nd   Arty  (-)  (DS)
          Btry D,  (-)  5th  Bn,  2nd  Arty  (Atch)
          Trp  F,  17th  Cav
          2nd  Bn,  34th  Armor (-)  (Atch)
          3rd  Bde,  4th  Inf Div.
          2nd  Bn,  12th  Inf
          2nd  Bn,  22nd  (M)  Inf
          3rd  Bn,  22nd  Inf
          4th  Bn,  23rd  (M)  Inf  (Atch)
          2nd  Bn,  77th  Arty  (DS)
          Btry B,  2nd  Bn,  11th  Arty  (-)  (Reinf)
          Plat,  Btry D,  5th  Bn,  11th  Arty  (-)  (Reinf)
          Trp  C,  1st  Bn,  10th  Cav.
          44th  Inf  Plat  (Scout Dog)


a.   Air Support.

During Phases I, II, III, and IV, air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers.  A total of 347 sorties were flown in the area of operation from 2 Feb - 21 Feb '67.  B-52 strikes were flown in the AO during the period in support of the operation.  They are as follows:


012300H  Feb  67                    XT035778 - XT045789
                              XT030767 - XT050779

020400H  Feb  67                    XT028718 - XT019702
                              XT047700 - XT039689

020600H  Feb  67                    XT025743 - XT050730
                              XT050743 - XT025730

030600H  Feb  67                    WT966575 - WT984735
                              WT976760 - WT972734

030500H  Feb  67                    WT970730 - WT983706
                              WT962731 - WT971706

030700H  Feb  67                    WT969703 - WT986683
                              WT980705 - WT975679
050630H  Feb  67                    XT000647 - WT987628
                              XT009639 - WT994619

121000H  Feb  67                    WT963785 - WT983777
                              WT969798 - WT987792

     b.   Artillery Support:   (See Tab B)

Artillery fires from a series of FSB's were used throughout the operation in both offensive and defensive roles.  Moving of artillery was accomplished by CH-47 helicopters and convoys, and occurred simultaneously with movement of the fwd bases.                       (p2)

     c.   Army Aviation Support:   (See Tab A)

           Army Aviation was utilized in combat airmobile assaults and extractions, resupply, C&C, aerial recon, dustoff, and artillery adjustment.  Aviation support provided a great degree of mobility and flexibility in Div. Opns.  This was an important factor in the success of this opn.             

     d.   Engineer Support:   (See Tab C)

           Engineer support consisted of jungle clearing, road clearing, road building and tunnel

8.     (C )  Intelligence:
a.   General:  Enemy units located in operation GADSDEN included elements of the
9thVC Division (271st Regt & 272 Regt),  the 70th Guard Regt, the 680th Training Regt, and numerous elements of COSVN  HQ,  to include several medical unit subordinate to COSVN.  The AO contained extensive supply and ammunition caches, communications storage areas, hospital facilities, base camps and major training complexes.  It was expected that the VC would have this area fortified against ground and air mobile assaults.  The extensive facilities and the well developed trails and roads indicated that this was an important VC base area for logistical and training activities.  Agent reports, PW's, HOI CHANH's, Visual Reconnaissance, LRRP's and USSF Reports were utilized in the development of the enemy.

b.   Terrain: The terrain in the area of operation varied from low flat terrain and cultivate
 fields to scrub brush and forested areas with double and triple canopy.  The latter offered excellent concealment and poor observation.  Avenues of approach were generally limited to developed trails and cleared areas.  Obstacles included streams, dense forest, and in places, heavy mud in paddy areas near the river.  The movement of foot troops and tracked vehicles was much less difficult than that encountered on Operations  ATTLEBORO due primarily to the drying of much of the previously inundated area within the AO.
c.    Weather:   The weather during this operation was generally clear to partly cloudy
with good visibility and light winds.  Total rainfall for the period was .01 inch.

          d.   Operations:   Initially combat elements of the 25th Inf Div were concerned with seizing and securing fire support bases and Bn base areas along the main supply route, and infiltration routes of the VC to and from the CAMBODIAN border, Vic LOBO and XOM GIUA.  Once blocking positions were established, posture was maintained during the truce.  On 3 February the 2/22 Inf (M), engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT012772.  The FC fought from concealed positions and maintained contact for several hours.  Also, on 3 February, Recon 1/5 Inf (M) received SA, AW, and 57 RR fire from 15 - 20 VC vic WT999699.  The VC wore mixed camouflaged uniforms and black pajamas, and fought with considerable determination, exhibiting good discipline and fire control.  

On the evening of 4 February in the vic WT973703, the 2/1 Inf received 50 rds of 82mm mortar fire in their battalion base area, sustaining light casualties.  Earlier in the day A/2/1 Inf captured a training model of a rocket launcher.  This was the first of several indications that the area of Operation GADSDEN was a primary training ground for VC main force units.  On 4 February, A/4/31st Inf, vic XT013679, received SA, AW, and rifle grenade fire from 8 - 10 VC.  After a moderate exchange of fire, the VC withdrew.

 On 5 February A/1/5 Inf (M) received heavy SA, AW and rifle grenade fire from an unknown dr. VC vic WT983666.  Fifteen VC were KIA as a result of this operation,.  Captured on the field was 1 heavy MG (CHICOM) Type 57, which indicated a company size unit or larger in contact.  No unit identification could be made from equipment or documents captured in the area.  On 5 February A/2/22 Inf (M) located a large cache vic WT965762, which contained numerous documents identifying elements of the 1st and 2nd Bn's 70th Regiment.  Also located were documents mentioning the Central Office Youth Group, the Military Provision Section, Rear Service Bureau, COSVN; Current Affairs,  COSVN; and the Postal Transportation Section, COSVN.  The latest date shown on the documents was September 1966.  

On 6 February 2/22 Inf. (M) received AW, SA and rifle grenade fire from an unknown number of VC.  The VC were fighting from underground fortifications and put up a determined effort prior to breaking contact.  On the same day, Recon 1/5 Inf (M) vic WT988682 captured documents in a VC base camp identifying C-921 which is the Military Staff Directorate, COSVN. Also found was a list of patients for B-18 dispensary for Dec 66 to Jan 67.  This dispensary is believed to be a supporting element Staff Directorate, COSVN.  It's presence in the area coupled with the discovery of numerous medical facilities and medical supply caches indicates use of the LOGO area as a rest and recuperation center for the VC.  

On 7 February vic WT972678, A & C 1/5 Inf (M) received rifle grenades and heavy SA and AW fire from an estimated VC platoon.  Airstrikes and Artillery supported this action resulting in 20 VC KIA (BC).  Fortified bunkers and 18 tons of rice were located in the area.  Also on 7 February, 2/1 Inf located and destroyed a VC training area consisting of an extensive obstacle course, a stockade, and an elaborate land navigation course.  Documents located at the site and in a supply cache near the area identified the 680th  Training Regiment, and elements of 3rd 272 Regt which had probably conducted training there.    

8 - 12  February  1967  -  TET  TRUCE:                              (p4)

     During the TET TRUCE period, US Combat elements occupied their battalion bases astride VC supply and infiltration routes and conducted extensive patrolling within their areas of responsibility to deter VC activity during the truce period.  There were a total of 6 truce violations against US ground forces: one involving fire on ground forces from the Cambodian side of the river.  There were 6 incidents of ground fire against US aircraft, two of which came from the Cambodian side of the river.  On 8 February, 1/5 Inf (M) was engaged by an unknown number of VC vic XT010688.  Documents captured on the battlefield contained references to Rear Service Group 82, and K-77 which has been reported as a medical unit subordinate to Group 82.  The area of capture appeared to be a medical facility and was a possible location of K-77.  The 1/5 Inf (M) also discovered a company size base camp vic WT990644, and a supply cache containing documents referring to what is believed to be the 680th Training Regt.  Also identified was T13 which has been reported as a training battalion subordinate to COSVN.  On 8 February, Recon 4/23 Inf located a small ammo and medical cache and documents referencing C135 which is the Finance and Economy Agency for COSVN.  On 10 February, vic WT995670, 1/5 Inf (M) located a very sophisticated training area consisting of 44 structures and fortifications, 2 class rooms,  2 mess halls,  and a 75 X 30 meter rifle range complete with silhouette targets.  On 11 February, vic XT010688, 4/31 Inf located documents concerning strength and armament figures on C-17, the recoilless rifle company of 271st Regt.  Both companies had probably occupied the area recently, and the RR fire received in this general vicinity is most likely attributable to C-17 Co.
13 - 21  February,  1967   

     The final phase of GADSDEN consisted of an attack to the north in exploitation of intelligence information of the 271st Regt, and a final sweep to the south and southeast to destroy and disrupt VC activities in that area.  On 13 February vic WT986624, 1/5th Inf (M) destroyed an ordnance facility containing numerous bombs, artillery rounds and grenades, as well as tools and molds for fabrication of ordnance items.  This again points out the importance of this area to the VC as a logistical base.  

     On 16 February vic XT033788, CHIEU HOI,  LY VAN THU, Recon Squad, C21 Recon Co, 271st Regt, rallied to 2/22 Inf (M).  He stated that the 1st Bn, 4th Bn, Regt HQ, and C-21 Recon Co of 271st Regt had been in the LOGO area vic WT9780 - WT9882 since 6 Feb. and had previously been in DAU TIENG District,  BINH DUONG Province.  

     On 18 February, 2/77 Arty and 2/22 Inf (M) received 50 rds 82mm mortar fire vic XT020780.

              On 21 Feb vic XT081828, 3/22 Inf engaged an unknown number of VC.  Documents captured on the battlefield contained several references to the 3d Bn, 70th Regt.  Also identified was the 1st Bn, 70th Regt and one reference was made to 2d Co, Group 49 which is believed to be a medical unit subordinate to COSVN.  Captured documents and information received from interrogation of HOI CHANH, LY VAN THU indicate that the majority of the contacts during GADSDEN were with elements of the 271st Regt and the 70th Regt, with harassment from local guerrillas throughout the operation.  The capture of vast amounts of supplies and destruction of base areas and major training sites caused severe losses to the VC in the LOGO land XOM CIUA areas.

     9.   MISSION:   To conduct opns in Western War Zone C, to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations.


               On D-2 the 4/23 (M) Inf moved from CU CHI to SOUI DA (XT346582) and conducted Deception Operations.  On D-1 the 2/22 (M) Inf, the 2/77 Arty and the 3d Bde command group moved to TRAI BI (XT115705) and established a Bde Base.  On D-Day the 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D operations from vic XT1171 to vic XT0678.  The 2/12 Inf was airlifted from DAU TIENG to TRAI BI.  The 4/23 (M) Inf continued deception Operations vic SOUI DA.  The 1/31 Inf conducted an airmobile assault vic XT55684.  The 175th Engineer Co installed a bridge at that location, and the 1/5 (M) Inf moved across the bridge and conducted S&D opns to secure obj 2 (XT034717).  Elements of the 4/31 Inf and the 3/82 Arty were then helilifted to obj 2.  On D+1 the 2/1 Inf was helilifted to obj 4 (WT981700).  The 1/5 (M) conducted S&D opns to obj 4, secured LZ's for the 2/1 Inf.  The 1/5 Inf (M) encountered AT mines and RPG-2 fire along the routes of its advance.  Vic WT999699 the Recon Plt was engaged by an est 15 - 20 VC.  Co B reinforced the platoon.  Arty and gunships provided support.  VC losses were 3 (BC) and 1 (poss).  The 2/22 (M) Inf secured obj 1 (XT035740) and moved to obj 3 (WT975949).  The 4/23 (M) Inf moved from SOUI DA to obj 1.

On D+2 the 4/31 Inf conducted S&D opn to obj 5 (XT010687).  The 2/1 Inf was hit by a mortar attack vic (WT976697).  VC used 82mm mortar firing 30 rds.  The 2/12 Inf was helilifted to obj 2 (XT11711).  The 4/23 (M) Inf moved from obj 1 to FSB Charlie (XT015724).  Other units conducted local S&D opns.  In a delayed report Co A 2/22 (M) Inf captured large stocks of food and destroyed numerous bicycles, tires, and parts vic (WT983775).  

On D+3 the 1/5 (M) Inf moved to obj 6 (WT992665).  Co A engaged a large force of VC vic (WT983666).  VC were armed with SA, AW and rifle grenades.  US used SA, AW and Arty.  VC losses were 15 VC (BC), 1 M79, 1 Chicom type 57 MG, 2 AK-47 rifles and 2 Chicom carbines captured.  Other units conducted local S&D opns.  Co B 2/22 (M) Inf destroyed 9 tons of rice, 3000 lbs of food stuffs, and captured 70 tons of rice vic (WT967762).  Co A 4/23 (M) Inf was engaged by a VC force of unknown size vic (XT0120714).  Fire was returned with SA, AW and Arty resulting in 11 VC (BC).

On D+4 the units established blocking positions and conducted local S&D opns.  Units continued to destroy large amounts of food, bunkers and structures, and captured numerous weapons, communication equipment, mines and explosives, numerous small clashes with small groups of VC continued.

On 6 Feb Co's A and C 1/5 (M) Inf engaged an est VC platoon vic (WT977667).  Arty, airstrikes and gunships were employed in support.  VC losses were 21 (BC).  On 6 Feb HQ 4/23 (M) Inf destroyed a large VC base camp vic (WT977735).  On 7 Feb Co C 2/1 Inf destroyed a VC training area vic (WT995670).  

On 12 Feb the 2/1 Inf helilifted to FSB DELTA (XT036649).  The 1/5 (M) Inf secured FSB DELTA and conducted S&D opns to obj 7 (WT984615).  The 2/12 Inf conducted S&D opns to obj C (XT006753).  The 4/23 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to obj 1 (XT030785), linked up with the 4/9 Inf, and conducted S&D opns to obj 2 (XT015810),  Co B 2/22 (M) Inf captured a large supply of Chicom radios, field phones, generators, radio parts, antenna and batteries vic (WT967764).  The 4/9 Inf conducted an airmobile assault and secured obj 1 (XT037785).  Co A 4/23 (M) Inf captured 1 VC PW vic (XT012819).  

     On 13 Feb the 4/31 Inf moved to FSB DELTA (XT036649).  Co C 1/5 (M) Inf destroyed a large food and ammunition supply vic (WT986624).  The 2/22 (M) Inf moved to obj B (WT9679). The 2/12 moved to blocking positions vic (WT9977).  The 4/23 (M) Inf moved to obj E (WT9982).  Co A 2/12 Inf captured 6790 rds of SA ammo vic (WT996776).  

     On 14 Feb the 2/1 Inf conducted S&D opns to obj 8 (XT0559).  The 1/5 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to vic (XT0256) and established fwd base.  The 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to (WT9780), linked up with the 2/12 Inf and continued S&D opns to vic obj 1 (XT0278).  The 4/23 (M) Inf conducted opns to obj 1.  An APC of Co C 1/5 (M) Inf was hit by 10 rds of 60mm fire.  Co A and C 1/5 (M) Inf each received 8 rds of 60nn fire.  The 4/31 Inf returned to TAY NINH.  .  

     On 16 Feb the 2/1 Inf conducted S&D opns to vic (XT0556).  The 1/5 (M) Inf returned to TAY NINH.  The 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to obj 1 (XT0278).  

     On 17 Feb the 2/1 In f helilifted to TAY NINH.  Other units continued local S&D opns.  

     On 18 Feb the 4/23 (M) Inf returned to TAY NINH.

     On 19 Feb the 3/21 Inf conducted an airmobile assault vic (WT992553) and conducted S&D opns.  The 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to vic (XT0779842).

     On 20 Feb Co B 3/21 Inf engaged an est VC squad vic (WT975534) resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC).  The 3/21 Inf returned to TAY NINH.                                (p6)

     On21 Feb units repositioned for Operation JUNCTION CITY.
     GADSDEN terminated at 212400.

     11.  ENEMY LOSSES:   Cumulative totals for operation GADSDEN 020001 - 212400 February 1967

     Total Personnel Losses:  161 VC KIA (BC),  215 VC KIA (poss), 2 VC PW's.

     Total Material Captured:  6 AK47's, 1 rkt launcher,  AP-TNG, 5 M79's.  1 CHICOM SMG,  1 CHICOM type 57 MG,  5 CHICOM carbines,  1 US carbine,  3 Mauser rifles,  1 M-14 rifle,  1 rifle (type unk),  1 shotgun,  1 mortar sight,  2  12.7mm AA tripods,  1HMG tripod,  2 AT mines,  11 grenades,  7 57mm REAT rds  9 claymores,  4 CBU's,  2 RPG-2 RDS,  1  75mm rd,  1  55 gal drum of CS=1,  7850 rds of SA ammo,  7 lbs of TNT,  1  TA-312,  3 CHICOM radios,  8 hand generators,  1 PRC-25 radio, 1 PRC-6 radio,  1 Microphone,  1 headset,  3 power cables,  75lbs of radio parts, 25 radio manuals,  1000 lbs of commo wire,  1 box of commo parts,  25 radio antennas,  24 CHICOM field phones,  13 CHICOM hand phones,  10 boxes of radio tubes,  2 battery packs,  1 CHICOM transmitter,  1 CHICOM generator,  one 12 volt generator,  one 12 volt regulator,  7 voltmeters,  3 voltage testers,  1 diesel engine, 2000 flashlight batteries,  300 notebooks,  19 bicycles,  40 bicycles tires,  70 sheets of tin,  25 gal of calcium carbide,  50 gal of tar,  55 gal of kerosene,  558 lbs of documents,  1 typewriter,  200 shovels,  65 lbs of clothing,  20 lbs of maps,  45 medical books,  10 lbs of medical supplies,  misc field equipment,  misc books,  1 sewing machine, 2 rice polishing machines,  1200 lbs of sugar,  20 cans of milk,  19 cases of condensed milk, 1000 lbs of tea,  175 gal cooking oil,  75 lbs of soup,  171.05 tons of rice,  2 cases of crackers,  740 lbs of peanuts,  120 lbs of dried fish,  20 gal of soy sauce,  30 cans of tomatoes,  20 lbs of peas,  misc food rations,  5.5 tons of salt,  2000 lbs of soap and 30 boxes of soap.

     Total Material Destroyed:  28 sampans, 543 VC structures,  5 foot bridges,  4 oxcarts,  588 underground fortifications,  7 trenches,  3 tunnels,  22 boat docks,  17 punji  pits,  1 training site,  1 smelter,  1 rifle range,  35 foxholes,  5 AT mines,  three 500 lb bombs,  two 250 lb bombs,  one 82mm rd,  two 105mm rds,  10 rifle grenades,  one 4.2” rd,  15 lbs of TNT,  3 Claymores,  twenty-six 60mm rds,  117 hand grenades,  one 81mm rd,  1 AT mine,  2 booby traps,  55 gals gasoline,  55 gals of diesel fuel, 270 gals of kerosene,  225 gals of kerosene,  225 gals of motor oil,  123 bottles of alcohol,  1 bottle of acid,  150 gals of carbide,  50 gals of tar,  200 gals of mash,  26 fuzes with igniters,  fifteen 60mm fuzes,  50 rolls of chicken wire,  12 flashlights,  1 drum of CS-1,  1 outboard motor,  25 tons of scrap metal, 1000 ft of commo wire,  60 lbs of clothing,  500 lbs of resin,  37 bicycles,  1 rice polishing machine,  120 lbs of gauze,  58 VC uniforms,  2 VC gas masks,  2 sewing machines,  100 cartons of cigarettes,  five 12.7mm AA tripods,  2 tons of soy beans,  500 cans of tuna fish,  100 lbs of soap,  600 bars of soap,  35 gals of hot sauce,  6 cases of canned milk,  3040 lbs of misc food,  20gals of cooking oil,  1120 lbs of dried fish ,  422 lbs of peas,  375 lbs of peanuts, and 215.25 tons of rice.     
     12.   Following is a listing of Rice Caches (1 ton or over),  Base Camps Supply Caches,  Ammo Caches,  and contacts of estimated                 size or larger:

          2  Feb               XT053679          2.5 tons salt
          3  Feb               XT999699          15 - 20  VC
          3  Feb               XT012772          Unk nr VC
          3  Feb               XT026781          Unk nr VC
          3  Feb               WT085807          Supply base
          4  Feb               WT972756          50 tons rice
          4  Feb               WT595643          Unk nr VC
          4  Feb               XT013679          8 - 10  VC
          5  Feb               XT966763          10.7 tons rice
          5  Feb               WT972757          9 tons rice
          5  Feb               WT974687          Base Camp
          5  Feb               XT964765          1.95 tons rice
          5  Feb               XT012714          Unk nr VC
          5  Feb               WT983666          Platoon (reinforced)
          5  Feb               WT972763          20 tons rice
          5  Feb               WT967762          50 tons rice
          5  Feb               WT967690          1 ton rice, base camp
          5  Feb               WT965764          Communication equipment cache
          5  Feb               XT017699          Unk nr VC
          6  Feb               XT001697          Base camp
          6  Feb               WT974659          Base camp
          6  Feb               WT981667          Base camp, supply cache
          6  Feb               WT998696          Base camp
          6  Feb               WT987652          4 tons rice
          6  Feb               WT984742          Base camp
          6  Feb               WT984742          Unk nr VC
          6  Feb               WT970740          Unk nr VC
          7  Feb               WT977735          Base camp,  Supply cache
          7  Feb               WT990644          Base camp,  5 tons salt
          7  Feb               WT972678          Platoon,  17 tons salt
          7  Feb               WT961667          4 tons rice, base camp
          7  Feb               WT982685          TEG site
          8  Feb               WT988684          Base camp
          8  Feb               WT967727          Ammunition cache
          8  Feb               WT962766          48 tons rice
          8  Feb               WT967766          1.5 tons rice
          8  Feb               WT967715          Unk nr VC (fr Cambodia)
          8  Feb               WT966761          Communications equipment cache
          8  Feb               WT970763          15 tons rice
          8  Feb               WT966664          1.3 tons rice
          8  Feb               XT010688          Unk nr VC
          8  Feb               WT998653          6 tons rice
          9  Feb               WT977716          3.5 tons rice
          9  Feb               WT965716          Base camp, supply cache
          9  Feb               WT963710          1.35 tons rice
          9  Feb               WT964721          Ordnance factory            (p8)
          10 Feb               WT989653          2 tons soy beans, supply cache
          10 Feb               WT995607          M-8 site
          10 Feb               WT968707          4 tons rice, supply cache
          10 Feb               XT084663          Base camp, supply cache
          11 Feb               WT974683          5 tons rice
          11 Feb               XT963767          Base camp, 10 tons rice
          11 Feb               XT009678          Base camp
          11 Feb               WT961772          Unk nr VC
          11 Feb               WT971733          Base camp
          12 Feb               XT010688          Base camp
          12 Feb               WT967764          Communications equipment cache
          13 Feb               WT986624          Ordnance factory
          13 Feb               WT985605          3.4 tons rice
          13 Feb               XT996778          Ammunition cache
          13 Feb               XT995624          Base camp
          13 Feb               XT987631          25 tons rice
          14 Feb               WT982579          2.35 tons rice
          14 Feb               WT989799          Unk nr VC
          14 Feb               XT012582          2.2 tons rice
          14 Feb               XT038510          1.35 tons rice
          15 Feb               XT020550          2.25 tons rice
          15 Feb               XT049600          9 tons rice
          15 Feb               XT051850          2.13 tons rice
          15 Feb               XT048562          Base camp
          15 Feb               XT027585          Base camp, supply cache
          17 Feb               XT048838          Base camp
          19 Feb               WT994536          13 Sampans, 1.25 tons rice
          21 Feb               XT085825          Unk nr VC

          VC use of mortars and Recoilless rifles:

          3  Feb               XT999699          1 rd  57  RR
          3  Feb               WT995698          1 rd  57  RR
          4  Feb               WT973703          50 rds  82mm
          5  Feb               XT012714          1 rd  57 RR
          14 Feb               XT025561          26 rds  60mm
          18 Feb               XT020780          50 rds  62mm     


a.   Logistics:   For a listing of logistic problems encountered, see the “After Action Report  of      the 25th Inf Div,  SUBCOM.   (Tab A)

b.     Signal:  The circuits established to support this operations are described in the 125th Signal Bn After Action Report.   (Tab B)

c.   Artillery:   For Artillery Operations see Div Arty After Action Report.  (Tab C).        (p9)

d.   Aviation:   For Aviation operations, see 25th Aviation After Action Report.  (Tab D).

a.   Civic Action:                            Negative
b.   Revolutionary Development:   Negative
c.   Psychological Operations:

(1)   Name of Operation     -   Operation GADSDEN.

(2)   Date of Operation:         2  Feb. - 21  Feb.  67

(3)   Task Organization         The task organization of the division had an HB Light
Mobile (loudspeaker term) attached to the 3d Bde,  4th Inf Div,  and an ARVN PSYOP team attached to the 196th (Lt) Inf Bde.

          (4)   Supporting Forces:         The 246th PSYOP Company was in general support of the 25th Inf Div PSYOP Program.

          (5)   Intelligence:   No civilians were living in the operational area, other than hostile elements and regular Viet Cong units.

          (6)   Mission:   To conduct psychological operations in the area of operation to convince Viet Cong audiences that their struggle is futile, and that their situation has greatly deteriorated, in order to persuade them to rally to the GVN.

          (7)   Concept of Operations:   A pre-planned schedule of leaflet drops and loudspeaker missions by the 246th PSYOP Company were executed from D-Day to D+3).  After D+3, PSYOP activities were conducted to respond to the tactical situation as it developed.

          (8)   Execution:   Psychological operations initially directed to emphasize Allied Might and Introductory themes.  Emphasis was later placed on themes to convince the VC that their situation had deteriorated in order to induce them to rally.  To accomplish this objective, CHIEU HOI,  Inevitable Victory, and Terror themes were used as the operation progressed.   Targets were systematically covered to reach all intended audiences.  On D-Day the 246th PSYOP Company and Brigades commenced leaflet and loudspeaker operations in the AO.  Pre-planned operations to D+13 were conducted as the tactical situation presented itself.  One HOI CHANH rallied to the 3d Bde. 4th Div, was interviewed and then exploited by a one hour taped loudspeaker appeal.  Altogether there was 1,154,4000 leaflets dropped and 8 loudspeaker sorties flown in support of the operation.  Total aerial broadcast time was 4 hours.   Approximately 30% of all loudspeaker operations were conducted at night.

(9.)     Results - One HOI CHANH rallied to a US unit as a result of the operation, who acknowledged seeing leaflets, hearing loudspeaker broadcasts and being influenced to some extent by the propaganda.

          (10)   Commander's Analysis:   PSYOP  activities were adequately planned in that PSYOP support was present at the commencement of the operation with appropriate general themes for leaflet and broadcasts pre-selected.  Likely target areas for PSYOP in the AO were likewise selected during the planning phases.  The PSYOP program was then tailored to fit the situation when enemy target vulnerabilities became known.  Exploitation of the HOI CHANH was an example of PSYOP moving from general to more specific target audiences.



                                   JAMES D. DETHLEFSEN
                                   CAPT,  AGC
                                   Asst.  AG

7 Incls:
1.     Tab  A,  COAAR,  25th  Avn  Bn     (Withdrawn,  Hqs,  DA)
2.    Tab  B,   COAAR,  25TH  Div  Arty
3.    Tab  C,   COAAR,  65th  Engr  Bn
4.    Tab  D,   COAAR,  SUPCOM     (Withdrawn,  Hqs,  DA)
5.    Tab  E,   COAAR,   125th  Sig Bn
6.    Tab  F,   COAAR,   3rd Bde,  4th  Div   (pub sep as 67 X 013)
7.    Tab  G,  COAAR,   196TH  Inf

DISTRIBUTION:                                             (p11)


 Operation Gadsden-25th Arty

                         APO  San Francisco  96225

AVDCDA - OP                                                                                                                                12  March  1967

SUBJECT     Combat Operations After Action Report

TO:          Commanding General
          25th  Infantry Division
          ATTN:   AVDCMHD
          APO   96225

     1.   NAME:     Operations GADSDEN

     2.   DATE OF OPERATION:   31  January  through  21  February  1967

     3.   LOCATION:   Western Tay Ninh Province

     4.   CONTROL HEADQUARTERS;   25th Infantry Division

     5.   REPORTING OFFICER:   Colonel David E Ott


Headquarters,  25th Division Artillery    (Colonel Daniel B Williams, Cmdg.)

3d  Battalion,  13th  Artillery (-)

     Battery  A

     Battery  B

     Battery  D

Battery B (-),  5th Battalion,  2d  Artillery  (AWSP)

Battery D (-),  5th Battalion,  2d  Artillery  (AWSP)

3d  Battalion,  92nd Artillery;  DS  196th  Inf  Bde.

2d  Battalion,  77th  Artillery;  DS  3d  Bde,  4th  Inf Div.
            7.       SUPPORTING FORCES:

Batteries A and C,  2nd   Battalion,  32nd  Artillery;  GS;  Reinf.  25th  Div  Arty.

8.    INTELLIGENCE:   Western War Zone “C” and particularly that area along the Cambodian     border south of LO GO is a major VC base and logistical complex.  Elements of the 271st and 70th Regiments are known to be in the operational area.

9.   MISSION:    Provide direct and general support artillery for the committed organic and attached maneuver elements of the 25th Infantry Division as follows:

     UNIT               MISSION                   DATES

      2 Bn,  77th Arty          DS,  3 Bde,  4th   Div          31 Jan - 11 Feb
                    Attchd, 3 Bde,  4th Div          12 Feb - 21 Feb

     3 Bn,  82nd Arty          D3,  196  Bde               31 Jan - 11 Feb
                    Attchd, 196 Bde               12 Feb - 21 Feb

     3 Bn,  13th Arty
          Battery  A          GS,  25th Div  Arty          21 Jan - 11 Feb
                         GSR,  3rd Bn,  82nd Arty          19 Feb - 21 Feb

          Battery  B          GS,  25th Div  Arty          31 Jan - 11 Feb
                    GSR,  3rd Bn,  82nd Arty          12 Feb - 21 Feb

          Battery  D          CS,  25th Div  Arty          31 Jan - 21 Feb


a.   General:   The 25th Infantry Division with the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and 196th Infantry Brigade attached, attacked northwest with two brigades into western war zone “C” to seize objective vicinity LO GO (XT9773), blocked infiltration and exfiltration routes vicinity CAMBODIAN border, and conducted search and destroy operations to destroy VC/NVA forces, supplies and base camps.  The 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery and 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery were attached to the 25th Division Artillery on 1 February and reverted to their brigades control on 12 February,

b.   31 January:   Headquarters, 25th Division Artillery and Headquarters, 3d Battalion,  13th Artillery, with Batteries B and D, displaced from CU CHI to vicinity TRAI BI (XT126668) and established a general support fire support base, and forward artillery command post.  Battery A,  3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery, displaced from CU CHI and established a fire support base vicinity XT113705.

c.   1 February:   The 2nd Battalion,  77th Artillery displaced from DAU TIENG to XT122669 and was attached to the 25th Division Artillery.  Battery C, 2nd Battalion,  77th Artillery displaced to XT115705.  The 3rd Battalion,  82nd Artillery remained in the TAY NINH base camp and became attached to the 25th Division Artillery.
d.   2  February:   Battery A, 3rd Battalion,  82nd Artillery was air-lifted from TAY NINH to XT033712.
e.   3 February:   Headquarters and Battery C, 3rd Battalion,  82nd Artillery, displaced from              TAY NINH to a support base vicinity XT033712.  Headquarters and Battery B, 2nd Battalion,
                  77th Artillery were airlifted from TTRAI BI to the fire support base vicinity XT033712.  
Battery Am 2nd Battalion,  77th Artillery was airlifted from XT122668 to a fire support base   vicinity XT 035785.

f.     4 February:  Battery A,  2nd Battalion,  77th Artillery was airlifted from XT035785 to the
fire support base vicinity XT033712.

g.     5 - 19  February:  No change in status or location of units.

h.   11 February:  Battery A,  2nd Battalion,  32nd Artillery displaced from CU CHI to the general support base at TRAI BI (XT126668).

i.   12 February:   The 2nd Battalion,  77th Artillery and 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery were released from attachment to 25th Division Artillery, and were attached to the 3rd Brigade, 4th Division and 196th Infantry Brigade respectively.  Headquarters, Battery A, and Battery B, 2nd Battalion,  77th Artillery, displaced from XT033712 to vicinity XT042790.  Headquarters, Battery A and Battery C,  3rd Battalion,  82nd Artillery displaced from XT033712 to XT035645.  Battery D,  3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from XT1226668 to XT115705.

j.   February 13:   Battery C, 2nd Battalion,  77th Artillery displaced from XT115705 to the
battalion fire support base vicinity XT042790.  Battery A and Battery D, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from XT1157075 to establish a fire support base at the Military Reservation, vicinity XT108762.

k.   February 14:   No change in status or location of units.

l.   February 15:   Headquarters and Battery A, 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery displaced from
XT035645 to vicinity XT120600.  Battery C, 3rd Battalion,  82nd Artillery displaced from XT035645 to XT056590.  Battery B, 3rd Battalion,  82nd Artillery displaced from XT127663 to TAY NINH base camp.

m.     February 16: Battery C,  3rd Battalion,  82nd Artillery dis0placed from XT056590 to TAY
        NINH base camp.

n.   February 17:   Headquarters and Battery A,  3rd Battalion,  82nd  Artillery displaced from XT120600 to TAY NINH base camp, terminating the battalion's participation in OPERATION GADSDEN.

o.   February 18:   The 2lnd Battalion,  77th Artillery displaced from XT042790 to fire support base LEE (XT073795) in preparation for Operation JUNCTION CITY.

p.   February 19 - February 21:  No change in status or location of artillery units in support of OPERATION GADSDEN.  All units remained in their location to prepare to support OPERATION JUNCTION CITY.
     11.   RESULTS:
a. Enemy Losses:

(1) 4 VC KIA  (BC)
(2) 94  VC KIA  (POSS)
(3) 13  Bunkers destroyed;
(4) 6  Sampans destroyed.
(5) 4  Bridges destroyed.
(6) 5  Secondary explosions.

b. Friendly Artillery Losses:

(1) 0  KIA
(2) 11  WIA
(3) No equipment losses.


       a.   Maintenance and Transportation:

     (1)   Operation GADSDEN was supported from two logistical bases,  TAY NINH and
TRAI BI.  One direct support artillery battalion was supported out of TRAI BI.  The general support artillery was positioned in the TRAI BI area and was supported by the TRAI BI logistical base.

(a) The direct support battalions were for the most part resupplied by CH-47.  Some of the lighter supplies were delivered to the field locations by use of UHD1.

(b) Resupply of medium and heavy artillery was by road.  Most of the ammunition
To the TRAI NI area was by direct haul from LONG BINH on transportation tractor-trailer.  The use of these larger trucks reduced the amount of traffic on the MSR and reduced the requirements for MHE.

          (2)   The CH-47 support and coordination could have been better if both direct support battalions had resupplied out of TRAI BI rather than one from there and one from TAY NINH.  The resupply from TRAI BI would have reduced the CH-47's turn-around time by about 40%, thus reducing the required CH-47's to perform the daily resupply missions.  CH-47 assets were better controlled and used more effectively after the CH-47 LO was stationed in TRAI BI.  The LO gave all users of CH-47 a common control point as well as a contact for the pilots.  The CH-47 LO operating in TRAI BI was most satisfactory.

(a) The 3rd Bde,  4th Div, was tasked with providing maintenance support for all units in the TRAI BI area.  During the operation, special contact teams were sent to TRAI BI to supplement the maintenance support furnished by the 3rd Bde,  4th Div.
(b) Maintenance support was improved and deadline time reduced when special contact teams (m109 and M110) were brought forward to assist the direct support maintenance.  These contact teams had tools and parts not available in the direct unit.  Division back-up maintenance located at TAY NINH proved valuable in reducing maintenance down time.
     (c )   Communications:   FM voice radio, radio-teletype and VHF telephone circuits  were used during the operation, and communications were generally satisfactory.  For the first time in 25th Division air-mobile operations, AN/GRC-46 radio-teletype sets were lifted by CH-47 helicopter with each air-lift direct support battalion headquarters.  The addition of this important, secure communications system afforded a significant improvement over previous communications systems used in airmobile operations.  Additionally, one direct support battalion headquarters was several times co-located with its supported brigade headquarters, thus permitting the use of VHF telephone links to the artillery battalions.  The VHF link materially increased the Division Artillery Commander's ability to control fire,.  The inclusion of VHF links to all battalions should be considered for future operations.

     13.   SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:   Photometric Survey

(a) Photometric points were used extensively as registration points.  All comments from using units were favorable.

(b) On three occasions coordinate position area survey was possible from a photogrammetric point.  Comments on control were favorable.  However, on the one occasion when comparison to UTM coordinates was possible, the photogrammetric point (ACC-45-1) was determined to be incorrect by 181.69 M in E and 99.62 M in N.

(c) Reaction to photogrammetric survey has been enthusiastic, but many points are difficult to identify or impossible to occupy.  On two out of three occasions, reported inter-visible points were occupied and then proved to be masked by dense foilage.

(d) Azimuth control was primarily obtained from astronomic observation (sun - altitude method).  On three occasions azimuth was verified by use of an azimuth gyro,.  Division Artillery survey utilizing DME's established control in Fire Support Bases during the operation.  

a.   The artillery support during the first phase of Operations GADSDEN was centralized to provide maximum coverage of the assigned area of operation.  During the last phase, the GS Artillery was given the mission of GSR to support the Brigade's independent search and destroy operations.  The photogrammetric mapping system tested by this unit, has proved that target area survey can be accomplished to a satisfactory degree of accuracy.  Fires massed on a common point impacted within a reasonable distance of selected target area.  

                             b.   The soundness of centralized artillery control in support of the Division scheme of
                             maneuver, and attachment and detachment of supporting artillery to provide centralized   
                             artillery support, was well used during OPERATION GASDEN.        


a. Artillery Ammunition Expenditures:

(1) HE

      (a)   10mm     -     27,598
      (b)   155mm -      14,715
      (c)   8”                    2,298

              Total             44,611

(2) TP

      (a)   105mm               878
      (b)   155mm               321

       Total                         1199

(3) Illumination

      (a)    105mm               112
      (b)   155mm                 40

                 Total                152     

b. Artillery Missions By Type:                    (p19)

                       105mm       155mm           8”                TOTAL
                 (1)     H&I's         3,181          1509          232          4,922
                 (2)    Support       750            321          159          1,230

c. OM-23G,  organic aircraft support by organization:


Hq,  Div Arty          123' + 15”     20' + 55”     14' + 45”     87' = 35”

3rd Bn,  13th  Arty          16' + 35”     1' = 55”          3' = 45”          10' = 55”

2nd Bn,  77th  Arty          2'

3rd  Bn,  82nd  Arty     53' + 35”     7' + 45”          2' + 30”          43' + 15”

Other                         35”                                                                                 35”     
          TOTAL                   201'          30' + 35”          21'          144' + 20”


          FOR THE COMMANDER               for  ERNEST J STANDEVE
                                               Major, Artillery,  Adjutant     

 Operation Gadsden-65th Engineers

                    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
        HEADQUARTERS,  65TH  ENGINEER  Battalion  (INF DIV)
                    APO  US  FORCES L  96225

AVDCENB-2                                                                                                                                10  March  1967

SUBJECT:     Combat Operations After Action Report  (RCS:  MACV J3-32)

THRU:          Commanding General
          25th  Infantry Division
          ATTN:   AVDCMHD
          APO  US  Forces  96225

TO:          Commanding General
          US Military Assistance Command,  Vietnam
          ATTN:  J343
          APO  US  Forces  96243

            1.    Operation GADSDEN

2.     DATES OF OPERATION:     020001 - 212400 February 1967

3.     LOCATION:   Western War Zone C,  Tay Ninh Province,  RVN.  
          Reference Map Sheets 6132 II 6232  III, and 6231  IV  of series L 7014      

4.     COMMAND HEADQUARTERS:     25TH  Infantry Division

5.     REPORTING OFFICER:          LTC A.S. Fullerton

6.     TASK ORGANIZATION:          65TH Engineer Battalion (-),  Company D, 27th
Engineer Battalion:  175th  Engineer Company.

            7.     SUPPORTING FORCES:   The 500th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) furnished bridging and technical assistance during the erection of a 160 foot DS Span.  This operation was highly successful, and the cooperation and assistance provided by this organization materially contributed to timely bridge placement.

             8.    INTELLIGENCE:                                   (p20)

a.   The terrain is generally flat with a dense jungle tree covering that averages 75 to 90 feet in height.  It is mostly single canopy however.  In some areas there is double canopy.  The heavily wooded areas support dense undergrowth up to 19 feet.  The ground is generally trafficable for tracked vehicles except in densely wooded areas, marshes and streams.  Numerous logging trails were noted throughout the area.  These provided trafficable routes through the jungle, and extended to possible crossing sites along the DEN DA RIVER.

                   b.   Description of roads:

(1)  Route QL/22 from Tay Ninh north to XT074897 is a good laterite surfaced road, trafficable to both wheeled and tracked vehicles.  A bridge is required at XT097763 to span a 70 foot gap.

(2)  Route LTR/20 from XT083816 southwest to WT970751 is a good laterite surfaced road trafficable to both wheeled and tracked vehicles.

(3)  Route FL/13 from XT148599 to XT110599 is in fair condition with one bypass,   XT130588, around  a destroyed culvert.  APC's can cross the bypass.  From XT110559 to XT056594 the road is in fair to poor condition, but should be passable to APC's with the exception of destroyed culvert at XT054595.  This is a 10 foot culvert which must be bridged.  At XT105599 there is a destroyed bridge across a water gap of about 130 feet.  The road from XT054595 to WT970751 is generally fair to poor with many cuts and craters.  However, this section of road is passable for APC's.  

                    c.  Bridging Sites:

                         (1)   ST097763   -  There are permanent abutments emplaced creating a good AVEP site.
                               Fording is impossible due to stream depth of 4 feet and steep approaches.      
                         (2) ST0533682  -  Approaches are steep but passable.  The gap is 130 feet.  Fording is
9.   MISSION:   65th Engineer Battalion (-) accomplishes combat engineering tasks to support 25th Infantry Division attack into War Zone C.

10.  CONCEPT OF OPERATION:   65th Engineer Battalion (-) proves tactical bridging to TAY NINH NLT,          D-7 and establishes bridge park;  assists in training elements of 175th Engineer Company and Company D,  27th Engineer Battalion in emplacement of tactical bridging;  prepares tactical bridging NLT D-2 for air movement into AO to support crossings of 25th Infantry Division:  maintains land repairs MSR (Route 1 and 22)  Cu Chi to XT298362;  provide WSP's as required;  provides general engineer support as required.
11.   EXECUTION   On 26 January 1967, a platoon from Company C, 65th Engineer Battalion, moved from the Cu Chi Base Camp to Tay Ninh Base Camp with the components for two, 30 foot and two 45 foot fixed span bridges to be utilized during Operation GADSDEN.   These bridges were planned for rigging with 40,000 pound payload, slings for helicopter airlift to selected bridge sites.  In addition to the fixed span bridging, approximately 200 ft of Light Tactical bridging was taken to Tay Ninh to be rigged for aerial delivery.  From 27 January through 1 February, training was conducted by C Company, assisted by a specialist from E Company, for members of  Company D, 27th Engineer Battalion and the 175th Engineer Company.  The training was composed of rigging for aerial delivery and emplacement upon delivery.            (see P23)

     On 30 January 1967, the Battalion Forward CP moved to Tay Ninh with the Division Forward CP.  Included in the Battalion Forward CP were the CO, ADE, S-2 and the S-3.  The remainder of Company C also moved to Tay Ninh on this date.

     On 3 February 1967, the components for two Light Tactical bridges were airlifted into position.  One, 55 feet long, was emplaced at coordinates XT097763 while the other, 130 feet long, was emplaced at coordinates XT053682.  Both of these bridges remained in place  for 2 days prior to being dismantled for aerial extraction.

     On 4 February 1967, Company C initiated work on upgrading Route 4 from Tay Ninh to XT285618.  This upgrading required the removal and replacement of two Eiffle Bridges.  The first bridge, located at XT213527, was a 70 foot span.  This bridge was removed and replaced by a timber trestle bridge.  An intermediate pier was constructed on a rock filled crib, and the span reduced to 50 feet.  The second bridge, located at XT215545, was a 50 foot span placed over a damaged culvert.  This bridge was removed and the culvert sides improved.

     On 6 February 1967, a third tactical bridge was airlifted into place.  This was a 45 foot fixed span at XT975699.

     On 14 February, the components for a 160 foot Light Tactical bridge were airlifted for emplacement at XT054595.

     Throughout this operation, engineer troops were employed for demolitions, mine detections, and clearing while attached to or in direct support of the maneuver elements.

     On 16 February 1967,   Company B, 65th Engineer Battalion, which had moved from Cu Chi on 15 February, began construction of a 160 foot Double - Single Bailey Bridge at Coordinates XT097763.  This bridge was erected over a destroyed concrete T beam bridge.  An; intermediate pier was placed on the deck of the dropped concrete span.  Bridge completed on 19 February.
12.   RESULTS:   During this operation, the battalion sustained three (3) personnel wounded in action, one requiring evacuation.  No enemy losses were recorded.
              13.   ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:   There were no major administrative problems reported.

             14.   SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:   During Operation GADSDEN a technique was utilized for providing tactical bridging to inaccessible locations.  Light Tactical bridge components and fixed spans were rigged for aerial delivery.  Packets were weighed and configured so that the bridging could be lifted by CH-47 Chinook helicopters.  The packets were prepared and numerically lifted to provide necessary components for staged construction.  The first lift consisted of engineers for site preparation.  Subsequent deliveries were made of bridge components.  In the case of the Light Tactical Bridge, the first bridge lifts were the pontoons followed by the decking.  The fixed span bridging operation, initially provided for frame delivery and helicopter positioning followed by successive decking loads.  

     This technique proved to be very effective and materially contributed to the operation by minimizing water barrier delays.

     15.   COMMANDER ANALYSIS:   The use of airlifted tactical bridging was most effective.  Prior training is considered essential to insure correct packing and rigging for delivery and extraction.

     16.   RECOMMENDATIONS:   It is recommended that the air delivery of tactical bridging be considered in future operations.  The timely delivery of pre-packaged components and fixed spans provided a high degree of flexibility in the selection of maneuver routes.   

               FOR THE COMMANDER:

                                        H.A. FROEHLE
                                        CPT,               CE

 Operation Gadsden- 125th Signal

                         DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                             125TH SIGNAL BATTALION  (INF DIV)

AVDCSI                                                                                                                                      10  March  1967

SUBJECT:     After Action Report and Lessons Learned - Operation GADSDEN (U)

TO:          Commanding General
          25th Infantry Division
          ATTN:  AVDCMHO

          1.     (C)  TACTICAL SITUATION

a.  Operation GADSDEN was a nineteen day operation conducted in Western War Zone C. of the Republic of Vietnam, from 2 February 1967 throughout 21 February 1967.  Initially the 25th Infantry Division attacked northwest with two brigades to seize objectives vicinity LO GO (XT9775), blocked infiltration and exfiltration routes in the vicinity of CAMBODIAN border, conducted search and destroy operations to destroy VC NVA forces, supplies and base camps.

b.  The Lightning Signal Battalion supported the tactical operations plan with adequate and timely communications.  VHF, FM and HF radio, were installed, operated and maintained to provide command control communications to control, from the Lightning forward CP, tactical operations of the major subordinate units of the division.


a.  The GADSDEN concept of operations called for the establishment of a Lightning Forward CP in the vicinity of the Tay Ninh base camp.  This was accomplished between 27 Jan and 1 Feb 1967.  Command control was shifted on D-Day from Lightning Main to Lightning Forward CP.

b.  To support the concept of operations, the Lightning Signal Battalion moved by convoy on D-5 from  Cu Chi to Tay Ninh base camp.  The contingent consisted of fifty vehicles and one hundred and fifty-five officers and men.  The main body was preceded on D-6 by an advance party of two vehicles, one officer, and three EM.  The advance party selected locations for each communications site, a troop billet area, and a water pool area.  Thorough advance planning enabled Lightning Signal elements to position all vehicles in the CP area, prepare the billeting area and personnel bunkers with a minimum delay.
         3.   (C)   COMMUNICATIONS  MEMO:
          Concept:  The signal concept called for establishing communications from the Lightning Forward CP to Lightning Main CP and between Lightning Forward CP and forward units which included the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, and the Division Artillery Forward CP.  The concept was executed without major problems or incidents, and communications to all major subordinate units and to Lightning Main were installed by D-1.  The following communications means were installed, operated and maintained for the duration of the operation.  

            a.    VHF Multi-channel:   Four 12 channel VHF radio systems were terminated at Lightning Forward.  One system was established between Lightning forward and Lightning Main.  Systems were established between Lightning Forward and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade;  the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division; and the 25th Division Artillery.  Each VHF system provided common user and sole user telephone circuits and teletype circuits required for command control.  (Incl 1)

           b.    Communication Center Operations:   A total of 741 messages for an average of 39 per day were processed during Operation GADSDEN at the Lightning Forward Communications Center.  Secure teletype proved to be the primary means for exchanging classified messages between Lightning Forward, higher and subordinate headquarters.
            c.  FM Radio:

(1) FM radio communication was used extensively during this operation as a primary means for exchanging information between Lightning Forward and Lightning Main on both secure voice, using the KY-8, and in the clear.  This was made possible by the use of a 60 foot antenna pole at both the Main and Forward CPs.  Both secure and clear transmissions were repeatedly made between Lightning Forward and major subordinate units.  

(2) A FM Retransmission station located on Bui BA Den (XT282582) was operated on an “as required” basis on the Division primary frequency.  The station proved useful.  Its use will continue on a full time basis.  

(3) Radio Wire Integration (RWI) Operation:  no calls were processed.  RWI is an excellent means of placing calls between mobile or airborne FM radio stations and the CP telephone system.  RWI will be emphasized during future operations.  

d.  High Frequency Radio (HF):  HF radio employing secure radio teletype was used throughout Operation GADSDEN.  Two nets were established.  These were the Division Command Net (RATT) #2 and Division Admin/Log, Net #4 (RATT).  Command Net #2 was primarily for operational messages.  Net #4 between the Division Support Command and for logistical traffic of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, and the 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.  Both nets operated satisfactorily throughout the exercise.
e.  Telephone Operators:  Telephone switchboard service at Lightning Forward was provided by Lightning Signal on a 24 hour basis.  An AN/MTC-3 Manual switchboard with a 120 line capacity was installed.  A total of 42 trunks and 50 local lines were terminated.  An average of 1600 calls were processed each day.  In addition to the common user telephones intalled in th CP, some sole user or hot line circuits were terminated at Lightning Forward.  The majority of the sole-user circuits were provided to the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC) and the Fire Support Element.

         4.   MAINTENANCE:   125TJ Signal Battalion performed organizational maintenance for signal equipment from the forward CP area.  Crypto maintenance was provided for all Division elements and emergency radio and generator repair to the Forward DTOC and FSE elements.

         5.   LESSONS LEARNED:   Operation GADSDEN demonstrated that:
a.  FM radio is a reliable means of communications provided antennas of sufficient height are used.

b.  Radio Wire Integration is needed within the Division as a means of providing a tie-in between mobile and airborne FM radio stations and CP telephone switchboard systems.

c.  That automatic re-transmission stations are an extremely valuable asset during operations over extended distances.


a.  That radio use be increased within the Division.

b.  That use be made of Radio Wire, Interaction facility of Lightning Forward and Lightning Main CPs.


                                   JERRY DERNAR
                                   1 Lt,   Sig Co


VHF  Systems Diagram
Teletuype Diagram
Division Radio Nets
Telephone Traffic Diagram  

 Operation Wahiawa

SUBJECT:     Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS J3/32)

THRU:          Commanding General
          II Field Force Vietnam
          APO, San Francisco 96227

TO:          Commander
          US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
          ATTN:     J343
          APO, San Francisco 96243

     1.     Name:     Operation WAHIAWA
     2.     Date:     160700-271700
     3.     Location:     Northwest portion of HAU NGHIA Province in an area bounded by  
XT4836, XT6236, XT6128, XT4826, XT6624, XT6022, XT6317 and XT7116 known as the BOI LOI WOODS, HOBO WOODS AND FILHOL PLANTATION.
     4.     Control Headquarters:     Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.
     5.     Reporting Officer:     Major General Fred C. Weyand, US Army.
     6.     Task Organization:
a. 1st Brigade (Colonel Sandlin, Commanding)
(1) HHC, 1st Bde
Troop A, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav (-)
Platoon, Co A, 65th Eng (-)
1st FASC Plat, Co B, 125th Signal Bn
1st Spt Plat, 16th RRU
1st Plat, 25th MP Co (-)
Elm 25 MID
(2) 2d Bn 14th Inf (-) (Lt Col Shultz, Commanding)
1st Plat Trp A, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
Sqd, Co A, 65th Eng Bn

(3) 4th Bn, 23d Inf (-) (Lt Col Barszcz, Commanding)
2d Plat, Trp A, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
Sqd, Co A, 65th Eng Bn

(4) 4th Bn, 9th Inf (Lt Col Booth, Commanding)

b. 2d Brigade
(1)       HHC, 2d Bde (Colonel Tarpley, Commanding)
Recon Plat 1/5 (M)
Plat, Trp A, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
Plat (+), Co B, 65th Eng Bn
2d FASC Plat, 125th Signal Bn
2d Plt, 25th MP Co
4 man Psy Op Team, 49th (ARVN) Regt
(2)      1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf (Col Greer, Commanding) Helicopter

(3)      1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) (Lt Col Mooney, Commanding) Helicopter

(4)      2d Bn, 27th Inf (-) (Lt Col Bashore, Commanding)

7.  Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support:
(1) Organization for combat:
(a) 1st Bn, 8th Artillery (-) DS 2d Bde
(b) 7th Bn, 11th Artillery (-) DS 1st Bde
(c) 3d Bn, 13th Artillery
1 3d Bn 13th Artillery (-) GS 25th Inf Div
2 Btry A, 3d Bn 13th Artillery (-) GSR 1/8 Arty
3 Btry C, 3d Bn 13th Artillery (-) GSR 7/11 Arty
4 Plat (8' How) D 3/13 Arty GSR 1/8 Arty
(2) How and when artillery was employed:

(a)      The artillery in support of the 1st Brigade moved to TRUNG LAP (XT5821) on 17 May. The artillery in support of the 2d Brigade moved on 15 Mat to position vicinity XT483263 and on 22 May displaced to vicinity XT536285. The 4.2” mortar platoons of the 2/14 Inf and 4/23 Inf were placed under the operational control of the CO 7/11 Arty. In the 1stBrigade the timeliness of the request and fire was hampered by the lack of the new family of radios. Fire missions had to be relayed from the FO to the FDC by the battalion liaison officers. This problem has since been alleviated by the receipt of new radios.

(b)       Artillery fire was used primarily to suppress enemy fires; to soften suspected enemy positions in front of advancing maneuver elements and preparation for airmobile assaults.
(c)       Total missions and rounds fired were as follows:
1 7/11 Arty (105)          670 missions     13081 rounds
2 1/8 Arty (105)          1606 missions     10349 rounds
3 3/13 Arty (155&8”)     725 missions     3848 rounds
4 Totals               3219 missions     27677 rounds

b.   Tactical Air:

(1)  Seventy air strikes were flown in support of the Division, 29 for the 1st Bde and 41 for the 2d Bde.
(a)  Of the 70 strikes, 40 were by the US Air Force, 18 by the US Navy and 12
       by VNAF.
(b)  All preplanned strikes were requested by telephone (hot line) through 25th
       Inf Div G3. Immediate strikes were requested by radio.
(c)   Average reaction time for the immediate strikes was 20 minutes.

(2)  Results. 10 VC KBA (BC), 29 VC KBA (poss), 79 buildings destroyed, 69 buildings damaged, 12 trenches destroyed, 7,100 lbs of rice destroyed, 3 sampans sunk, 4 bunkers destroyed and 3 secondary explosions.

c.  Army Aviation.

(1)   1st Brigade
     (a)  Five different Airmobile Co's supported the 1st Brigade. The average number of aircraft available each day, except for the four major airmobile operations, were nine UHID's and two fire teams. These were utilized for resupply, command and control, combat surveillance, medical evacuation and assault missions. A total of 1182 sorties were flown in support of the 1st Brigade.
      (b) A total of four battalion and four platoon airmobile lifts were conducted by 4th Bn, 9th Inf and 2d Bn, 14th Inf.
(2)   2d Brigade
      (a) The 118th Airmobile Co flew 645 sorties and airlifted 37.2 tons of supplies. They also supplied UHIB gunships and UHID Command and Control ships throughout the operation.
      (b)  The brigade provided each maneuver battalion on OH 23G helicopter daily. Also brigade maintained the artillery advisory radio net and the helipad control net throughout the operation.
      (c)  On 16 May the 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Inf were helilifted into the AO by Co A, 25th Aviation Battalion, Co A 501s Avn Bn and the 118th Airmobile Co.
     (d)  On 22 May the 2d Bn, 27th Inf (-) conducted an airmo assault within the area of operations (AO).
     (e)  On 27 May, 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Inf (-) were airlifted from the AO.
      (f)  During the conduct of the operation company size element from the 1st Bn, 27th Inf and 2d Bn, 27th Inf were repositioned and rotated into the AO by the 118th Airmobile Co which was DS to the 2d Brigade.

(3)      Ground fire was intense throughout the operation with 10 helicopters being hit during the operation. Two helicopters sustained four hits, however, they were not disabled.

8.  Intelligence:
a.  Enemy Situation Prior to Operation.

(1)      165 A Regimental Headquarters was believed to be located vicinity of XT6031, XT6431, XT6728, XT5827. This unit was reported to be armed with one .50 Cal MG, one 12.7mm MG, six 20mm MG and thirty-four automatic rifles.
(2)     1st Battalion 165 A Regiment:
    (a) Strength: 200.
    (b) Area of Operations: XT6030, XT7030, XT7016, XT6018.
    (c) Armament: Two .50 Cal MG's, one 12.7mm MG, and you individual weapons.
(3)     The BOI LOI WOODS was known to contain supply bases and believed to be the base area for the 320th Local Force Bn. The BOI LOI WOODS area was a known VC stronghold and important commo-liaison base linking to Delta with MR 8 and in particular, War Zones C and D.  A VC captive reveals that the TAY NINH Provincial Committee was located in the BOI LOI. On 7 66 b1/5 contacted elements of C4903 Company, 320th LF Bn as substantiated documents found on the VC KIA. This action was characterized by heavy, accurate and well-disciplined SA and AW fires. Visual reconnaissance indicated extensive trench network in the southern edge of the BOI LOI. During operation MASTIF in Feb 66, the 1st Div discovered large rice caches and numerous base areas in the BOI LOI. Post engagements with VC in this area revealed that the enemy displayed good control of his units, executed action rapidly and violently, and delivered accurate SA and AW fires. Maximum use of mines, booby traps and harassing fires was affected throughout the operational area.

b.   Enemy Situation During the Operation.

(1)      Although all information prior to Operation WAHIAWA indicated probable contact would be made with one or more of the Main Force units, this in fact, did not occur. ON numerous occasions all participating units encountered sporadic to heavy sniper fire in respective areas of operation but at no time was definite contact attained with VC Main Force units. The VC employed to the utmost the principles of camouflage, concealment and defense in depth as evidenced by the extensive use of land mines and booby traps during defensive and delaying activities. When operating in independent groups the VC effectively used sniper fire in conjunction with excellent camouflage discipline and extensive tunnel systems to engage friendly units. On occasion, the VC effectively employed command detonated mines and Claymore type weapons against friendly maneuver elements when close physical contact was imminent. As a result of the vast amounts of material (especially rice) captured and/or destroyed during Operation WAHIAWA it was apparent the FILHOL PLANTATION and HOBO WOODS had long been used as a local storage and resupply haven for VC forces either operating within or in transit through the area of operations. It is felt the aggressive response and positive action undertaken by maneuver elements against these supply/storage areas and fortifications will seriously hamper and curtain VC activities in the immediate future and hinder any large-scale operations previously planned for execution.
(2)       Documents found on 17 May 66 vic XT518337 indicated the TAY NINH Provincial Committee had been located in the area. The locations of four sections subordinate to the TAY NINH Provincial Committee were discovered as follows: TAY NINH Military Intelligence Sub-sections XT500316, TAY NINH Provincial Armament Sub-sections (XT511339), Workers Proselyting Section, TAY NINH Provincial Committee (XT527338). Enormous infrastructure activities associated with COSVN Rear Service staff were located in the BOI LOI. Documents discovered in vic XT500313 indicated the presence of the 320th Bn Hq (d14). On 20 May 66, vic XT520308, a VC carried a message from 320th Bn Co to the 403d Co inquiring into the location and condition of the company. The major enemy contact was made by B/2/27 at 191400 May 66 vic XT533333. An estimated VC platoon was engaged by B/2/27 which resulted in 16 VC KIA (BC), and 12 VC KIA (poss). A total of 46 caches of rice, ammunition, medicine, cloth, fish, tin and wax were located and evacuated or destroyed during the operation. The most significant caches were located as follows:
Rice- XT564325, 537324, 539321, 565325, 572315, 574311,529338.
Ammunition- XT529333.
Medicine- XT554307, 529311, 516343, 523340.
Cloth, POL, Dried Fish, Tin, Salt, Sugar, Peanuts- XT564325, 524352,565323, 580309, 551312, 599324, 586308, 516434, 516313, 523339, 578308.
Additionally, Division units located and destroyed 9 VC base camps, 2 arms repair shops and 1 medical aid station as follows:
Base Camp- XT496322, 525337, 540318, 582305, 528343, 525337,496323, 500131, 575298.
Arms repair shops- XT500316, 511334.
Medical aid station- XT538320.
The numerous caches, base camps and captured documents substantiate that the BOI LOI was a major COSVN Rear Service supply area.

c.  Terrain and Weather.

(1)     The terrain of the FILHOL PLANTATION was found to be generally flat to gently rolling. The vegetation consisted primarily of rubber trees interspersed with heavy jungles and underbrush, which made foot movement restrictive in certain areas. Observation was greatly restricted in areas of heavy jungle and underbrush; conversely, camouflage and concealment in these same areas was more than adequate. The terrain traversed in the HOBO WOODS is very similar to that of the FILHOL PLANTATION; however, numerous hedgerow type formations, fry and flooded rice paddies and occasional abandoned villages were encountered. In areas of deride growth overland movement was hindered until accessible routes could be found through or around the vegetation obstacle.
(2)      Early morning fog delayed resupply to the maneuver units in several instances; however, this is not an uncommon occurrence during this period of the year. Although some rainfall did occur during Operation WAHIAWA it did not materially affect or hinder any troop movement or operations.
(3)      The terrain was generally flat with open areas north and south of the BOI LOI WOODS. Open areas consisted of rice paddies and cultivated fields. The dense undergrowth, trees and B-52 bomb craters restricted movement of tracked vehicles, on existing trails and low brush areas. Foot movement was slow and tedious. The vegetation provided excellent concealment for the VC in their harassing type tactics and limited friendly observation. Trenches, bunkers and spider holes provided cover to the VC from friendly SA and AW fire. Inasmuch as the trench network was generally oriented to the south LZ's were selected to the north of the BOI LOI. Weather conditions delayed the initial air strike and hellebore lift for two hours on 16 May 66. Low ceilings during the morning hours rains experienced had little effect on operations, however, protracted rains would seriously restrict movement of tracked vehicles in the area of operations.

9.     Mission.          The 25th Infantry Division conducts search and destroy operations   beginning 16700 May 66 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and bases in BOI LOI WOODS-FILHOL PLANTATION area (Appendix 1 (Annex C to OPORD)).

10.     Concept of Operations.     Division conducts airmobile and ground operations with two
Brigades during the period 16-26 May 66 to destroy VC forces, supplies and bases in the area of operations.

a. 1st Brigade.

(1)  Conduct search and destroy operations in objective areas 1 and 2 beginning 160700 May 66.
(2)  Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in objective area 3.
(3)  Be prepared to establish Bde fwd base area vic TRONG LAP (XT590220) as required to support operations north of objective area 2.
(4) On 30 minutes notice, provide one company as div reaction force. Company released to brigade upon request.
b.  2d Brigade.

(1) Established Bde fwd area vic XT510260 NLT 151500H May 66. Provide security for SUPCOM Forward Support Operations Center (FSOC).
(2) Conduct search and destroy operations in objective area 4 and 5 beginning 160700 May 66.
(3) Conduct search and destroy operations in objective area 6 on order.
(4) On 30-minute notice, provide one company as Div reaction force. Company released to brigade upon request.
11.     Execution.     OPORD 10-66, Hq 25th Infantry Division was published on 101200
                                                          May 66.

                              D-1 (15 May 66)

                              2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 1100, Co A departed base camp escorting the 2d Bde quartering party. Upon closing into the fwd CP area, several personnel were observed fleeing the area. Elements of A/1/5 pursued and apprehended 16 VC suspects. At 1200 Co B and the Bn CP departed base camp escorting the 2d Bde CP and elements comprising the 2d Bde forward support base. Co A arrived at the Bn CP at 1800. Co C remained in the vic of Bde CP to secure wheeled vehicles, which had encountered difficulty traversing the terrain along the route to the CP.

                    D Day (16 May 66)

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Crossed the LD, (Bn bunker line) at 0700 with A/3/4 Cav screening to the front. Bn moved generally north into FILHOL PLANTATION with no enemhy contact by the main body.  At 1000 the Cav Platoon received SA fire vic XT682197. The platoon immediately returned fire and continued to its assigned area. At 1130 the Cav Platoon encountered 5 VC including one woman vic XT679215 and brought them under fire, killing one and wounding one. Attempts to recover the wounded VC were unsuccessful. Several documents and items of personal equipment were found on the body recovered and in the area where the VC dropped them as they fled. No friendly casualties were sustained. The Bn closed XT670205 at 1500, and secured a perimeter for the night. Preparation and securing of the LZ was completed at 1600. Resupply was affected immediately. During the night three ambushes were employed.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Crossed LD (Bn bunker line) at 0735. Recon Platoon found tunnel complex vic XT650175. Also located in the same area were three (3) Elm mortar duds and one (1) booby trap. All were destroyed at 0945 hrs. Recon Plt received sniper fire at XT648184b at 0950. Fire was returned with no casualties on either side. At 1151 Recon Plt again received sniper fire from VC vic XT635210. Arty was used and VC withdrew. No casualties were sustained. Recon Plt located house, XT648208, with warm rice on a table Building was destroyed. Recon Plt and ¾ Cav Plt received sniper fire, XT649209 at 1845 hrs. One (1) WIA in Recon Plt. Sniper fire suppressed.
                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 0835, A and B Co's commenced their attack into the objective area vic XT5230. C Co, released at 0800 from Bde control moved to rendezvous with the other attacking elements. A Co reached the SW edge of Obj 4, vic XT494308 and commenced S&D operations to the NW at 0922, B Co continued to attack due east to reach their initial objective vic XT5130. C Co moved to establish blocking positions vic XT500320, 504324 and 512327. B Co continued to attack to the east and arrived vic XT5330 at 1005 with no significant contact and commenced a thorough search of the area C Co now attacking to the SE vic XT512327, and A Co attacking NE vic XT5031, linked up to conduct a thorough search of the area. At 1405, vic XT513326 C Co located a major supply cache consisting of sheet metal, tin, wax, medical supplies, buttons and cloth. All units continued to search the SW portion of Obj 4 throughout the afternoon without contact. A & B Co's established their bases around the Bn CP vic XT4830 and C Co remained in the area XT516313. 1/5th (Mech) units established 12 night ambushes with no significant contact.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: At 0955, 1/27th Inf (-) completed an airmobile assault into LZ WHITE vic XT5433 with negative contact. Upon securing the CP area, XT547324, B and C Co commenced S&D operations into the NE side of Obj 4 (vic XT5432 and 5433). C Co located and destroyed a heavily booby-trapped area vic XT545332. B Co continued to sweep vic XT542320 with negative contact. 1/27 Inf (-) elements established four night ambushes. Throughout the night the ambushes and Bn CP received sporadic ineffective sniper fire from the heavily wooded area to there west.

2d Bn, 27th Inf:     At 1050 the battalion (-) completed an airmobile assault into LZ RED. On the first lift, elements received SA and AW fire with 3 WIA, and one (1) crew chief killed. Gunships silenced the fire with undetermined results. At 1143 A&C Co's commenced a sweep along the edge of heavy woods to the SE and SW. A Co located package of documents vic XT543342 which indicated that C Co 402 LF Bn had been in the area. A & C Co made no significant contact but they did receive some sporadic sniper fire from several locations inside the thick woods. Arty fire was continually placed on the flank of both elements and succeeded in silencing the sniper fire. The Bn 4.2 mortars were airlifted into the Bn CP from the Bde fwd base at 1350. C Co located a small base area vic XT528434 at 1400. The area had been used recently and was not destroyed due to the desirability lof 527347. All elements closed Bn CP at 1800. A total of six (6) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

                    D+1 (17 May 66)

                    1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Continued S&D operations toward obj TOM. (XT668235) A 2/14, Cav Plat and Recon Plat moved at 0700 hours to occupy blocking positions at XT657227 (A Co), XT664226 (Recon) and XT668232 (3/4 Cav) in conjunction with a preplanned airstrike on obj TOM. At 0930 hours the air strike was aborted and the Cav Plat was ordered to move through obj TOM and link up with A Co. No enemy contact was encountered during the move through obj TOM. Cav Plat and the mechanized flamethrower of the engineer squad were detached. A Co then searched northeast to obj TOM arriving at 1400 hours. B Co with CP group departed at 0830 hours and searched directly north towards obj TOM discovering a large cache of rice at 1400 hours vic XT670230 (estimated 50 tons). One platoon was left to guard the rice supply area and Co (-) continued on to obj TOM arriving at 1600 hours. At 1700 hours the platoon from B Co was withdrawn from the rice area and rejoined the Bn. A Co also found and destroyed approx 150 lbs of rice vic XT663224 at 1330 hours. Bn secured a perimeter around obj TOM by 1700 hours. The 4.2” Mort Plat displaced at 1300 hours from Bn base camp to the Bde TAC CP, XT593215. Two ambush patrols were sent out from obj TOM. No enemy contact was made throughout the night. No casualties were sustained during the day's operations.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: APC from Cav Plat detonated a mine, XT638203, at 0825 hours. No casualties sustained. B Co received sniper fire, XT645204, at 0915 hrs. Three (3) men wounded and evacuated at 1010 hrs. Carbine and various written material was captured vic XT64221 at 1230 hrs. At approx 1400 hrs lead elements of battalion moved into a mined and booby-trapped area at XT643227. Three (3) KIA's and nine (9) WIA's were evacuated by “DUST OFF”. Bn withdrew and established forward base at XT640212.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: Bde reaction force Cu Chi.

Bde tactical CP with DS fire support elements (7th Bn, 11th Arty reinf) departed Cu Chi and closed Trung Lap 1600 hrs.

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: 1/5 (M) elements continued to conduct S&D opens in the SW sector of Obj 4 vic XT4931 and XT5031. C Co continued to search the cache area found on 16 May. B Co found and destroyed base camp vic XT496322 which contained living quarters, mess hall, training area and a small firing range. The area appeared to have been used the day before. A Co surprised four VC in a base camp vic XT500313, wounding two (2) VC. Following the VC blood trails, A Co elements found one (1) VC body and a M1 rifle in a tunnel vic XT499317. At 1625, Co A found a small CP vic XT500316 and surprised four (4) VC who immediately ran when fired upon. Two VC KIA (poss) resulted and several books and a portable typewriter were found in the area. At the same time other elements of A Co found another CP area at XT505320 and captured a TA-312 telephone and a PRC-10 Radio. Three company bases were established and a total of twelve (12) night ambushed were positioned.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: 1/27 Inf (-) commenced through S&D opens in their sector of Obj 4. At 1150 B Co captured 6,600 lbs of rice at XT540313. No significant contact was made throughout the day and all elements closed the Bn CP at 1600. A total of four (4) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0615 A & C Co's conducted local sweeps lof the area forward of their perimeters. A Co located and destroyed a large tunnel with an 8 ft room at XT523347. A & C Co commenced their S&D opens while Security and Recon Plats secured the CP area. At 0915 the Security Plat received sniper fire. C Co destroyed five (5) bunkers at XT519336. At 1313 C Co received heavy AW and SA fire from XT513336. While C Co was maneuvering against the fire, 4 WIA were sustained and in the final assault on the position six (6) more WIA were sustained. The VC position was a small village. Two (2) VC were killed, a Russian SMG and 300 lbs of cloth were captured. A Co located and destroyed a tunnel complex at XT523340, capturing 60 lbs of medical supplies and documents. A & C returned to the Bn perimeter and B Co was airlifted from base camp into the area at 1630. Three (3) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

                    D+2 (18 May 66)
                    1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Continued S&D operations around it's perimeter. B Co returned to the area of rice supply discovered on the previous day at XT670230 to assist in its removal. Recon Plat established two OP's on the Saigon River vic XT663242 and XT667243. A cache of rice was found at 1030 hours by B Co vic XT663225. Numerous tunnels and spider holes were found and destroyed. B ¾ Cav assisted B Co in the removal of rice stores, transporting it by APC to a LZ vic XT669235 for extraction by helicopter. A total of 20 tons of rice were removed and an estimated 10 tons were 1500 hrs. Ambush sites were occupied at XT664241, XT667241, XT671235 and XT659238 with negative contact. Two claymore mines were detonated by VC near the Bn perimeter, but no casualties were sustained.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: At approximately 1022 A Co received sniper fire from XT637210. Fire was returned with no known VC casualties. B Co received fire from friendly helicopters at XT637216 at 1116 hrs with two (2) WIA and one (1) KIA. At 1347 hrs B Co received sniper fire at XT637222. Two (2) WIA's were evacuated by resupply chopper. No known VC casualties. At approximately 1417 hrs the Bn S2 recovered one (1) At mine, 2000 rds 7.62 ammo clip, 200 rds 7.62 link, four (4) grenades, and ten (10) unidentified tube shape objects. All items were evacuated to Bde S2. Bn TF stopped at XT637227 at 1500 hrs for the night.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: At 0630 a platoon from 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav departed TRUNG LAP to secure LZ B which was accomplished by 0915 hrs. The original LZ time of 0930 hrs was delayed because of weather to 1100 and at this time the first flight elements landed on the LZ. The lift consisted of 7 flight elements with 6-10 UHID aircraft per element. A total of 446 personnel were lifted into LZ. The lift was completed at 1131 hrs. No enemy fire was encountered in the LZ. At 1220 the Bn crossed the LD in a search and destroy operation toward objective BILL (XT643254) having destroyed 5 tunnels and 15 buildings enroute. Many documents and papers, one tractor with ditch digger attachment and 4 bicycles were captured. Resupply by air was effected and the Bn secured a perimeter for the night. A Co had two minor WIA from booby trap fragments during the afternoon. During the night the Bn received 8-10 60 mm rounds or rifle grenades in the perimeter with no casualties.

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: 1/5 (M) unit continued to search and destroy in the SW sector of Obj 4. At 0950 A Co discovered a typewriter at XT500316 and an arms room containing MG spare parts and an armored school graduation certificate. At 1257 A Co was ordered to search an area west of Obj 4 vic XT486330. At 1632 A Co surprised two VC attempting to emplace a claymore mine resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC), one (1) carbine and one (1) claymore captured. Night defensive positions were established in the vic of the Bn CP XT4930. Six (6) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: 1/27 Inf conducted S&D opens in the SE portion of Obj 4. C Co found one (1) claymore, a medical aid station with two cans of US and Chinese medical supplies, assorted clothing and a bag of documents at XT538420. At 1110 B Co located a supply point at XT5333314 with canned goods, WD-1/T wire, clothes, 600 rds of small arms ammo, and 6,300 lbs of rice. C and B Co returned to the Bn base at 1600. A total of four night ambushes were established with negative contact.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0815 A, B and C Co's commenced S&D opens into the heavy woods south of the Bn CP. Throughout the day there was no enemy contact which allowed 2/27 Inf to conduct a thorough search of the area bags of rice XT529341; five (5) tunnels XT523334; three (3) VC bodies in fresh graves XT523340; 15,000 rds 7.92mm, four (4) 81mm mortar rds XT529333; 25 gallons of oil, 15 pints of paint, 3 lbs TNT, XT529333; VC base camp XT525337. The Bn established nine (9) night ambushes.

                    D+3 (19 May 66)

                    1st Brigade
2d Bn, 14th Inf: Continued S&D operations vic base area. A search of the area where the enemy claymore mines were detonated on the preceding night revealed no significant findings. Numerous tunnels and mines were found and destroyed by each platoon within their sectors. There was little enemy contact during the day; occasional sightings of the VC across the Saigon River vic XT657241 and several rounds of sniper fire were directed toward the searching platoons. By 1530 hrs all elements had returned to Bn base area. Ambush sites were occupied around the perimeter but no contact was made. At 2030 hours one enemy claymore mine was detonated against the Bn perimeter resulting in 5 US casualties: 1 KIA, 4 WIA. The casualties were evacuated the following morning.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Began movement at 0735 hrs. Just prior to moving C Co sustained a WIA from sniper fire. Individual was evacuated by air and DOA at Cu Chi base. Mines, booby traps and punji pit (XT637228) were reported at 0911 hrs. Bn also had four (4) WIA's, XT634230 at 1440 hrs. Fire was returned with .50 Cal MG, small arms and flame track. One (1) VC was killed by BC. Cav Plat had another WIA- at same location at approx 1520 hrs. Bn TF stopped for the night at XT639232 at 1740 hrs. Several booby traps and tunnels with connecting shelters were reported by Co C at XT639229. Sniper fire was received, XT638228, by the Cav Plat at 1925 hrs.

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  At 0730 hrs the perimeter received sniper fire resulting in one friendly KIA and 2 WIA. At 0830 resupply was completed and the units moved out on S&D. One Em was KIA by sniper fire at XT638252 at 1040 hrs. During the S&D operation the units destroyed 6000 lbs of rice, 40 lbs salt, 8 rifle grenades, one tunnel, 80 ft long, one tunnel 120 ft long, 8 newly constructed bunkers and numerous dwellings. Units returned to the Bn forward base at 1530.

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  At 0743 the Bn moved to conduct S&D opens in AO “C” vic XT5634. An APC from Co C hit a large AT mine causing extensive damage to the vehicle and two (2) WIA at XT531306. A Co found a large cache vic XT564235 which contained 34,000 lbs of rice, 150 ea 5 gal cans of kerosene and 500 sheets of tin, all stored on pallets, rolls of black cloth, sewing machines, dried fish. A Co also killed one (1) VC (BC) in the area and captured one 9mm SMG. All units returned to the Bn base at 1605 and a total of nine (9) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0735 a plat from A CO, 1/27th was airlifted into the operational area from base camp as a Bn reaction force. The Bn continued to search the heavily wooded area to the west of their CP. C Co located 1600 lbs of rice at XT535323. Three (3) VC were observed moving in an area where Recon Plat had received sniper fire. Mortar fire was adjusted on the VC resulting in three (3) VC KIA (poss). A small base camp was located in vic XT540318. C Co located 1600 ea 100 kilo bags of rice stored in bins along with sheet tin, assorted clothing and some food at XT537324. B and D closed into the Bn base at 1615. Three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0900 2/27 Inf units commenced their S&D opens with A Co moving into the SW, C Co moving to the south and B Co moving to XT520334 to extract a rice cache and complete searching in that area. During these to extract a rice cache and complete searching in that area. During these sweeps A and C Co were to penetrate deep into the wooded area for it was believed that earlier contact with the VC and small caches were only the outposts of larger fortifications hidden in the dense woods. A and C Co's made contact almost simultaneously at approximately 0925. A Co received intensive SA and AW fire from vic XT523339 and the area south. On three occasions they were engaged by fire and booby traps and each time the VC broke contact when the fire was returned and arty was placed on their suspected positions. A command-detonated mine wounded five (5) US soldiers and a total of nine (9) were wounded by the SA fire. Dense woods and heavy fire caused one “dust off” aircraft to depart the area and abort its mission at which time carrying parties were dispatched from the Bn CP under the control of the Bn S2. A Co continuing its mission located a well-camouflaged fortified village, which was surrounded with thick underbrush and was heavily booby-trapped. As A Co fired into the village eleven (11) VC were observed being hit by the fire. In maneuvering towards the village A Co received six (6) causalities at which time the unit backed off and placed a heavy volume of artillery fire on the area. The Co moved back to the Bn base and an air strike was placed on the area at 1700. During the entire time A Co was in contact, C Co was also engaged while moving through dense woods. C Co began to received SA and AW fire vic XT535334 but each time the VC broke contact. At 1710 C Co reached a fortified village (XT533333) and immediately brought in arty fire killing 12 VC. C Co sustained 3 WIA. B Co was diverted from the rice cache and ordered to pass thru C Co, which had secured the village, and to continue the attack to the south. B Co received heavy fire from another fortified position vic XT533331 and sustained four casualties. Heavy artillery fire was shifted and B Co elements continued to maneuver, they received evacuation of the wounded while continuous artillery fire was placed on the VC position. All elements closed the Bn CP at 1830. 1/8th Arty continued to saturate the VC positions and the suspected escape routes.

                    D+4 (20 May 66)

                    1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf:  Continued operations with the entire battalion being airlifted from obj TOM to LZ “C” XT634310 commencing 1030 hrs. LZ “C” was secured by B Co with no enemy contact. Last elements closed in LZ at 1130 hrs and Bn proceded to search and destroy towards obj TED (XT654283). A Co received enemy sniper fire as it moved towards its assigned area vic XT632307. The Bn occupied a defensive perimeter vic XT632314. There were no significant actions during the night.

4th Bn, 14th Inf:  Bn TF remained at XT639232 until approx 1430 hrs due to weather, which prevented resupply. After equipment was extracted Bn TF continued S&D mission to XT623238, arriving at 1615 hrs. An ambush was left at CP location for 19 May 1966 and engaged approx (21) VC at 1721 hrs. Results were (7) VC KIA by BC and (5) VC KIA (poss). There were no US losses. Destruction for the day (2) Claymore mines, (25) lbs of salt, wire and batteries, (600) lbs potash, (200) lbs peanuts, and (400) lbs rice.

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  The Bn was unable to move as planned due to no availability of aircraft for extraction of night kits. Co A moved to the east on a search and destroy mission and Co C remained at Bn base until extraction and resupply was completed. Extraction and resupply was completed at 1400 and the Bn was ordered to move to objective BOB (XT658258). From 1430-1530 A Co suffered 6 WIA including the Co Commander from AP mines. Objective BOB was secured at 1735 hrs.

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  At 0700 the Bn moved to establish blocking positions and ambush points along the northern, western and southern boundary of the 2/27 Inf to preclude VC infiltration from the area. The concept included A Co screening and blocking to the north vic XT503347 and XT535345 then conducting S&D opens to the Saigon River. B Co would screen and block to the west vic XT505347 and XT510330. C Co established squad size ambushes vic XT513329 to XT581312. A Co located 2500 lbs of rice, 27 new bicycles and 20 hand grenades vic XT530350 and B Co located 1500 lbs of rice vic XT513344.  At 1247, A Co killed one (1) VC (BC) and captured one (1) rifle at XT527359. At 1700 the units had completed their missions and commenced movement to Bn base area. At 1743, C Co wounded and captured one VC with his rifle at XT520308. Initial interrogation and a letter the VC was carrying indicated that he was on a recon mission from the 320th Bn to the 403d company inquiring as to the situation in the area. The 320th Bn has not heard from the company in five days. A total of three (3) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf:  The Bn continued to S&D in their sector on the western side of Obj 4. Recon Plat killed one (1) VC (BC) at XT552316. At 1540 C Co located 256,800 lbs of rice and 3400 lbs of peanuts vic XT542328. At 1543, the Bn Co spotted two (2) VC in the open. Gunships were called and engaged the VC resulting in two VC KIA (BC). The units returned to the Bn base at 1600 and three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0900 air strikes were placed on both fortified villages where the units made contact on 19 May. A, B and C Co's conducted local sweeps while the Recon Plat was dispatched to thoroughly search the fortified village, XT533333, and assess the damage from the artillery and air strikes. A Co found two (2) fresh graves and five VC bodies vic XT525339. Recon Plat reported the village at XT533333 was 70% destroyed, as was the village at XT535334, which was checked by A Co. There was no significant enemy contact throughout the day. The Recon Plat established an ambush at the hospital complex vic XT525340 at 1916. At 2040 the A Co sector was proved from the northwest by an estimated 2 VC squads. Heavy arty fire, mortars and small arms were placed in the area with illumination, resulting in seven (7) VC KIA (BC) and eight (8) VC KIA (poss). There were no friendly Casualties.

                    D+5 (21 May 66)
                    1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf:  At 1000 the Bn commenced moving toward obj TED along the route XT634307 to XT645290 to XT655287. At XT634307 A Co received fire and began advancing towards XT628304. The firefight intensified and A Co sustained 2 KIA, 3 WIA and 1 MIA. Artillery fires and gunships were used to suppress enemy fire. Enemy casualties were not determined, however, the size of the VC force was estimated at one platoon entrenched inside a wood line approximately 40 to 80 meters forward of A Co. One body was not recovered due to the intense enemy fire and suspension of operations in the area due to darkness. At 1400 hours one dust off helicopter attempting to evacuate A Co's wounded was downed as a result of enemy fire. The ship was rapidly secured and was evacuated at 1625 hours. B Co conducted S&D operations to the left of A Co. The Bn returned to XT635310 with all elements closing in perimeter by 1900 hrs. No further enemy contact was made during the night.

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  The Bn TF started moving at 1030 hrs. By 1210 hrs the TF had moved approx 1500 meters north at XT620254. While enroute several tunnels and villages were investigated then destroyed. 300 lbs of rice and 100 lbs of beans were destroyed. Sniper fire was received by B Co XT613251, at 1320 hrs. Small arms fire was returned. B Co sustained two (2) WIA in the action, which were evacuated. Enemy lost one (1) VC KIA by BC. Bn TF secured perimeter at XT606264 at 1530 hrs.

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  At 0100 A Co successfully executed an ambush resulting in 2 VC KIA (poss) and 1 US WIA. At 0745 hrs the Bn sustained one WIA from friendly artillery in the Bn base. The Bn continued to search and destroy moving north to obj BUD (XT647279). During the movement the Bn encountered many booby traps and at least 4 mines. Mines were wooden and of CHICOM manufacture. One APC hit a mine, which damaged the track. Light sniper fire was also encountered during the move. Several tunnels, a quantity of rice and other items were destroyed during the move. The Bn closed into obj BUD at 1630 hrs and immediately effected resupply. Nine ambush patrols were dispatched at dark to return at 0600.

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  Throughout the day the entire Bn conducted maintenance of vehicles and equipment in preparation for the next phase of operation WAHIAWA. The Bn established twelve night ambushes, eleven of which were to remain in position until 221500 May 66.

1st Bn, 27th Inf:  The Bn conducted maintenance of equipment and finalized plans for the next phase of operation WAHIAWA. At 0900, an air strike was placed in the area where the rice cache was discovered, XT536325, to destroy buildings and small structured comprising the storage base. A Co (-) was airlifted into the AO from base camp at 0820. Three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0700, A Co commenced a sweep forward of their area to police the battlefield where they had been proved the night before. Expended brass, canteens, ammo pouches, clothing, one VC body and several drag marks were found. B Co was airlifted from the area back to base camp at 0915. Local sweeps were conducted in the Bn area along with maintenance of equipment in preparation for the next phase Operation WAHIAWA. Air strike was placed on both fortified villages encountered on 19 May 66. Six (6) night ambushes were established.

                    D+6 (22 May 66)

                    1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf:  The Bn moved from its perimeter, XT635310, south towards the road and continued S&D operations to vic XT643300 where the new perimeter was to be established. A Co, in the lead, encountered sporadic sniper fire and maneuvered to the left. B Co was ordered to pass A Co and take the lead. B Co sustained seven casualties, which were evacuated by dust off. At approximately 1500 hours an OH-23 helicopter was downed vic the old Bn base camp area, XT635304, and was secured overnight by the Recon Plat. The helicopter was evacuated the following morning. There was no further enemy contact and no casualties during the night. Resupply was not affected at the close of the day due to poor weather conditions.

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  Bn TF moved from XT612264 to XT590258 with little resistance closing at 1750 hrs. The following items were destroyed, 17 houses, 19 tunnels, 2700 lbs rice, 75 lbs tobacco, 100 lbs cotton, 200 lbs wheat and 3 bags phosphorus. Resupply was not affected due to weather (rain and low ceiling).

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  The Bn started resupply and the exchange of Co's A &B at 0900. C Co and the Recon Plat moved to the northwest to conduct S&D mission. At 1335 B Co had closed into the LZ and moved to the southwest to conduct S&D mission. B Co found a tunnel at XT 657276 containing a ton of rice and sustained two WIA from a VC booby trap in a house nearby. The rice, tunnel and house were destroyed. B Co returned to Bn base at 1655. C Co encountered heavy sniper fire at XT656286 resulting in VC sniper KIA (BC). C Co destroyed 2500 lbs rice and several tunnels and dwellings returning to the Bn base at 1630. The Bn secured for the night and was resupplied. At 2030 hrs one ambush patrols were dispatched at dark to return prior to 0730. At 2030 hrs one ambush patrol from B Co received 4 or 5 hand grenades resulting in one friendly KIA. At 220750 May while returning to the Bn base one patrol from C Co was hit by sniper fire resulting in one friendly KIA and one friendly WIA.

                    2d Brigade

2 d Bde FSOC:  At 0730 the artillery fire support base and the Bde CP displaced to XT5344285 to support the next phase of the operation. All elements closed at 1430.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  At 0704, A Co (-) moved to secure the LZ (XT542296) for 2/27 Inf (-) and at 0715 the Bn CP displaced to XT554276. At 0930 an ambush from C Co at XT488296 wounded and captured one (1) VC armed with two CHICOM grenades. At 0945 B Co ambush at XT517308 killed one (1) VC at 0945, killed one (1) VC (BC) and three VC (poss). One Russian 7.62 mm SMG, three magazines of 7.62mm and two grenades were captured. All units moved to bases vic XT555277 and three (3) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0025, C Co killed one (1) VC (BC) and two (2) VC (poss) when motar fire was placed on VC probing the perimeter. The Bn conducted a tactical march into their new base area vic XT562332 with negative contact. Plat from A ¾ Cav was attached to 1/27 Inf at 1700. All units closed the Bn base by 1710 and four (4) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0955 the Bn, commenced displacement to their new base area, XT549301. Security elements and supplies were airlifted and the remainder of the Bn conducted a tactical march closing the new area at 1350 with negative contact. The Bn established six (6) night ambushes.

                    D+7 (23 May 66)

                    1st Brigade

2d Bn 14th Inf:  An airstrike was requested and flown in vic XT629304 at 1000 hrs. Bn did not enter the area after the air strike. Bn commenced movement after being resupplied. The plan was to move from present location to vicinity of obj TEX (XT628299). Upon reaching vic XT639299 A Co encountered sniper fire from a trench line. A Co suppressed the enemy fires. The Bn base was established vicinity XT639299, at 2000 hrs. No resupply was received due to poor weather conditions; however, the most seriously wounded were evacuated at midnight after an improvement in the weather conditions. There was no enemy contact during the night.

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  Resupply was initiated at 0830 hrs. A Co captured 12,000 lbs of rice at XT590264. Rice was destroyed. At 1115 hrs B Co received sniper fire at XT598262. Sustaining 1 WIA. Fire was returned; results unknown. TF moved to XT582252 for the night.

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  Orders for local S&D were changed and at 1405 hrs the Bn departed for objective B (XT616287) conducting S&D enroute. An estimate 10-15 snipers were encountered enroute resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poss). The Bn closed into obj B at 1610, was resupplied by air and secured a perimeter for the night. 6 ambush patrols were dispatched at 1910 to return at 0720 the next morning. Two ambushes were successfully executed during the night resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  The commander's concept for the next phase consisted of a full Bn attack into an objective area bounded by XT5831, XT6033, XT6230. The plan called for rapid movement to seize objectives to the north and NE and then commence slow, detailed search and destroy operation in zone. Artillery and air preparation were placed in the obj area prior to the attack. There was only one (1) significant enemy contact throughout the attack, which commenced at 0730. At 1104, A Co engaged three VC in a group, killing one (1) VC (BC) and two (2) VC (poss). The entire objective area was heavily mined both with AT and large command detonated mines. A total of six (6) APC's hit mines resulting in 11 WIA and extensive damage to three of the vehicles. Several small caches were found in the area including rice, kerosene, documents, ledgers and 3,000 empty rice bags. The Bn CP displaced to vic B Co at XT582305. A and C established a consolidated base vic XT608318. The Bn employed eleven (11) night ambushes.

1st Bn, 27th Inf:  1/27 Inf (-) conducted S&D opns in the northern sector of Obj 5 with Co's B and C and ¾ Cab Plat attacking SE along the Saigon River and A co moving south into the dense woods vic XT560320 commencing at 0730. Throughout the day there was no enemy contact. Several tunnels and small bunkers were destroyed in the area. A cache consisting of 60,000 lbs of rice and 4,000 lbs of peanuts was discovered vic XT572315. All units moved back to the Bn base, closing at 1710. Three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0730 the Bn commenced, S&D opens in the southern sector of Obj 5 (XT5630). At 0828 a Chinese claymore was detonated against C Co, wounding seven (7) men. The element from C Co also received heavy SA and MG fire from an undetermined size force. Artillery and mortar fires were placed on the VC position at XT599303, and when elements made no furthered enemy contact throughout the day. C Co located a large cache vic XT551212 consisting of cloth, batteries, bundles of plastic, kerosene, rolls of wire and levels. A and C Co's closed the Bn base by 1628 and six (6) night ambushes were established.

                    D+8 (24 May 66)

                    1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf:  Bn commenced movement at 1200 hrs. B Co moved through A Co and immediately began receiving sniper fire from vic XT636298. B Co maneuvered and suppressed the fire, sustaining six casualties, two KIA and four WIA. The enemy was enclosed in three bunkers that controlled the area. Estimated strength of the enemy was seven personnel. Grenades and direct fire anti-tank weapons were used to silence and destroy the bunkers. The unit continued to obj B (XT627286), closing at 1700 hours. Two ambush patrols were employed during the night with no enemy contact.

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  Bn TF began movement north on S&D mission. At approx 1045 hrs B Co received friendly artillery rounds in their location at XT584225. Two (2) WIA were sustained, one (1) of which DOW. At 1500 hrs Bn TF halted at XT585272 for the night. During the days operation numerous houses and 2800 lbs of rice were destroyed.

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  Bn conducted local S&D operations with C Co moving to the NW, B Co moving SW and the Recon Plat moving SE. During the day 1700 lbs rice, 5 dwellings, numerous mines and booby traps, 7 tunnels, VC flags, VC uniforms and numerous other items were destroyed. B Co sustained 8 WIA from 2 booby-trapped hand grenades at XT624281. The 2/14th Infantry moved into area of operations arriving at 1710 hours, and occupied the northeastern side of the perimeter for the night. The Bn dispatched 4 ambush patrols for the night.

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  At 0700 all units of the Bn commenced to conduct thorough S&D opens in their respective sectors. 1/5 (M) element continued to find several caches in the area, which appeared to have been used recently as a VC unit base and rest camp. At 1345 A Co received a new mission to attack NW along the Saigon River to link up with elements of 1/27 Inf (-). Elements of C Co sunk several sampans and located small caches of food supplies while searching along the Saigon River vic XT599324. All units moved to a Bn base vic XT583205 at 1730. Nine (9) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0730, the Bn continued to conduct S&D opens in their sector of Obj 5 with negative enemy contact. At 1323, B Co located a bunker containing fifty 5 gal cans of medical supplies at XT554307. The units completed their sweeps and returned to the Bn base at 1620. Three (3) night ambushes were established. At 2020, while moving into position one ambush called in artillery fire on five (5) VC resulting in 5 VC KIA (poss).

2d Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0730, after screening the area to the front of their positions A and C Co commenced S&D opens in their sectors of Obj 5. A Co received sniper fire resulting in two minor WIA's. Artillery fire was placed on the suspected VC position but they had broken contact. A and C co completed their missions and by 1800 had closed the Bn base. Six (6) night ambushes were established.

                    D+9 (25 May 66)

                    1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf:  Bn moved out at 1230 hours from objective b southeast for 600 meters, south for 400 meters then south-west to obj F (XT619263). B Co was lead element for movement and encountered no VC enroute. Rear elements, however, did encounter sniper fire from vic XT625285 prior to departing the old Bn base. All elements closed base area vic (XT619263) at 1730 hours and secured in area with 4/9 Inf. Four ambush patrols were employed during the night with no enemy contact.

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  Bn TF moved to XT583199 with no enemy activity or action reported. One (1) casualty from snakebite was evacuated. Bn TF continued operation with only activity being two (2) VCS apprehended that were evacuated to Bde.

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  Bn moved out at 0900 in S&D toward objective F (XT619263). Enroute C Co encountered light sniper fire resulting in two friendly WIA. The Bn destroyed 20 dwellings, 6 of which were booby-trapped, 5200 lbs rice, 4 tunnels, 6 bunkers and numerous other items. The Bn arrived at obj F at 1630 hours, was resupplied and secured a perimeter for the night. Four ambush patrols were dispatched at 1845 and returned at 0630 the following morning. The patrols had no contact.

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  The battalion dispatched elements to occupy platoon size ambushes along the southern edge of Obj 4 and 5. One platoon from C Co completed operations in the 1/5 (M) AO by screening east from XT586308 to XT590308. At 1005 B Co ambush vic XT578296 killed two (2) VC (BC) and captured four CHICOM grenades and miscellaneous documents. At 1305 the Bn cP displaced to XT555275. At 1420 C Co ambush (XT311105) killed one VC (BC) and captured one (1) CHICOM rifles, two (2) hand grenades and web equipment. The platoon size ambushes remained in position at night and three (3) more ambushes were established in the vicinity of the battalion CP.

1st Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0825 the battalion commenced a tactical march to the new base vic 2d Bde CP XT530280. At 1215 a VC Claymore was detonated along the route, wounding six (6) personnel vic XT542210. A thorough search of the area was made with negative contact. The battalion closed the new area at 1400 and prepared defensive positions. Six (6) night ambushes were established. At 2220 the ambush vic XT527257 killed one (1) VC (BC).

2d Bn, 37th Inf:  The battalion commenced displacement to new base vic XT493246 at 0630. A security force was airlifted to the new CP location at 0950. All elements closed the new location at 1246, and defensive positions were immediately prepared. A total of six (6) night ambushes were established.

                    D+10 (26 May 66)

                    1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf:  Bn commenced movement 0830 hrs from obj F to Bde forward base vic XT593216. There was no enemy contact enroute. Unit passed thru elements of 4/9th Inf vic XT617224 enroute to Bde base. Listening posts were employed outside the Bn perimeter during the night, and there was no enemy contact.

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  Bn moved south of TRUNG LAP to secure road from TRUNG LAP to Highway 1.

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  Bn moved south to obj M (XT618225) at 1030. The Bn left a seven-man element from the Recon Plat behind to establish an ambush at the old position. A VC force of 8 or 9 men made a reconnaissance by fire of the position at 1230 hrs, then moved in an started to police the area for ammo cans, trash, etc. The recon element sprung the ambush at a distance of 30 meters and got 3 VC body count and 3 VC KIA possible. As the patrol moved out of position to search the bodies they were fired on by a superior force and withdrew under cover of small arms and artillery fire. They joined the remainder of the Bn on obj M at 1435. The Bn occupied perimeter positions for the night and resupplied. At approximately 1710 the Bn perimeter received 4 rounds of 8-inch artillery. This artillery was fired from the Cu Chi base camp. The Bn sustained 2 KIA and 18 WIA from the friendly artillery fire and one of the wounded later died. VC snipers were engaged resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 KIA (poss). Seven ambush patrols were dispatched at 1830. An ambush patrol from B Co detonated a claymore mine against a VC force with unknown results at 2105.

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  At 0730 the A Co ambush located vic XT553313 killed 2 VC (BC) and captured a CHICOM assault rifle, seven ammo magazines and two CHICOM grenades. At 0810 all ambushes were ordered to return to the Bn base, closing at 0910. The Recon Plat called in artillery fire on four (4) VC in the open resulting in four (4) VC KIA (poss). At 1800 B Co was ordered to secure the 2/27th Inf (-) CP. B Co arrived at 1920 and was placed under OPCON co 2/27th Inf.

1st Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0755 C Co commenced S&D opens in AO “B” vic XT5127. C Co returned to the Bn base at 1140 with negative enemy contact. A Co commenced S&D opens vic XT5227 and XT5327 at 1030, returning at 1420 with negative contact. Six (6) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0900, A Co, Recon Plat and the MEDCAP team initiated searching opens vic XT5124. Several rounds of ineffective sniper fire were received by advancing elements but exact VC positions could not be determined. The Recon Plat captured one (1) VCC at 1045 vic XT588329. The VC gave information about the location of members of his squad and that he knew where 50 VC were hiding in a tunnel. Based on this information, A Co, C Co and Recon Plat were diverted from their mission to exploit the intelligence information. At 1500, the tunnel (XT503210) was located and encircled. While investigating the tunnel, one man from A Co was wounded three times in the legs. Certain that there were VC in the tunnel, the unit set up a defensive perimeter around the tunnel for the night. The battalion CP was augmented by B Co, 1/5th (Mech) Inf. Continuing to search the area, two 45 cal pistols, 1 carbine and several assorted documents were found in one of the adjacent tunnels.

                    D+11 (27 May 66)

                    1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf:  Bn was extracted from the area by CH47 and UHID helicopters, extraction was begun at 0800. All elements closed Div base camp at 1030 hrs. There was no contact enroute or during the day.

4th Bn, 9th Inf:  At 0743 all patrols returned to Bn base without making contact. At 0800 the Bn moved out for the ARVN Ranger Camp at TRUNG LAP closing there at 0910 without incident. The first elements departed in the Cu Chi base area at 1100 hrs.

4th Bn, 23d Inf:  Bn TF provided convoy security for Bde returning to Cu Chi from TRUNG LAP. Co A received one (1) WIA at XT58200. Evacuated by “Dust Off”. Bn started movement to Cu chi with first elements arriving at 1250 hrs. Entire Bn closed base camp area at 1310 hrs.

                    2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf:  At 0730 B Co returned to 1/5 (M) control and the bn commenced its mission of clearing and securing the road from XT508259 to XT488205 for the overland extraction of the Bde CP. At 1107 the Bn CP commenced its move along the route to vic XT492212. At 1515, all elements had passed through the bn security forces at which time 1/5 (M) commenced their overland move closing base camp at 1855.

1st Bn, 27th Inf:  At 0625 the Bn cleared the road from 2d Bde CP to XT504257. The ¾ Cav Plat and elements from the 65th Engr remained to secure the road while 1/27th Inf elements moved back to their base. At 1000 the Bn commenced an airmobile extraction from the AO to base camp. Airlifted elements closed Cu Chi at 1120. The 4.2 mortar plt, which was attached to, the 1/8th Arty returned with the FSOC elements at 1600.

2d Bn, 27th Inf:  During the night elements at the location of the tunnel received intermittent Sa and rifle grenade fire into their positions. C Co killed one (1) VC (BC) attempting to escape the encirclement. Elements conducting a sweep at 0630 found the VC body, a pistol and a rifle. Personnel went back into the numerous tunnel entrances to continue the search. Several noises were heard inside and the decision was made to extract the personnel and commence completed destruction of the entire tunnel complex. A special tunnel team was flown into the area from Saigon and by 1112 the complete destruction had been accomplished. The Bn returned to its CP area and at 1254 commenced an airmobile extraction from the AO, all elements closing base camp by 1342.

12.   Results:

Dried Beef
100 lbs
4.18 tons
VC KBA (poss)
1.8 tons
VC KIA (poss)
4000 lbs
500 gals
Medical Supplies
4000 lbs
Small arms
98698 yds
Heavy weapon
550 sheets
30 sheets
10 bars
Base camps
Heavy wire
30 rolls
Supply Points
Sewing Machines
Duplicating Machine
847.4 tons
615 lbs
Batteries (4.5 volt)
Dried fish
3800 lbs
Dental Set
550 lbs
Entrenching tools
200 lbs
375 lbs
Outbound Motor
1-6 HP
75 lbs
1000 lbs
2,630 gals
115 Gals
TA 312-PT

100 lbs

13.  Administrative Matters.

a.  Supply. All maneuver elements were resupplied by helicopter. 1st Bn, 8th Arty and Hq 2d Bde were resupplied by one vehicular convoy. In addition, on 19 May, 400 rounds of artillery ammunition were supplied to the 1st Bn, 8th Arty using the Air Force LAPES system of delivery. A Forward Support Operations Center was established by Support Command with 2d Bde CP in order to provide Class I thru IV support to the brigade.
b.  Maintenance.
The 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry had 11 M113 Personnel Carriers hit by mines during the operation. Of the 11, five were repaired in the field, five were evacuated to base camp for repairs and one was blown in place.
c.  Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation.
(1) The Bn Aid Stations Accompainied the maneuver battalions into the AO.
(2) The 25th Medical Bn provided each Bde with a clearing platoon and maintained “dust off” aircraft on standby throughout the operation.
d.  Communication.

(1) Types utilized.
(a) FM radio.
(b) AM radio.
(c) Point to point (hotline) telephone.
(d) Switchboard to switchboard (comman user) telephone.
(e) Teletype (on-line) crypto.
(f) Courier.
(2) Communications difficulties were experienced by the 1st Bde primarily due to the lack of authorized radios. This problem has since been alleviated.
14.  Special Equipment and Techniques:  None.
15.  Commander's Analysis.
a.  The use of stay behind ambushes again proved effective. As a unit departed an area where they had been for any length of time, well-concealed ambush forces were able to surprise VC moving into the area.
b.  When VC units in well-camouflaged fortified positions are encountered in dense woods such as the BOI LOI; maximum artillery and air must be brought to bear on the VC positions prior to an infantry assault.
c.  Searching a known VC area is not sufficient. Slow, detailed and often repetitive searching is necessary to locate caches and VC installations.
d.  Gunships must enter the command net of the unit they support and must know the unit scheme of maneuver. If necessary, the gunship commander should land and be briefed by the commanding officer or the S3.
e.  Battalion CP's must be capable of rapid displacement by air. Units must program early lift of excess equipment such as night kits, demolitions, etc., by normal resupply ships.
f.   The firing of the center tube, artillery or mortars, on the axis of advance is effective both as a means of maintaining direction in dense vegetation and for expediting support fires when enemy contact is made.
g.  The establishment of a Forward Support Operations Center (FSOC) along with a Fire Support Base and Brigade CP is not advisable when cross-country movement or repetitive travel on roads subject to heavy mining is necessary. Maximum use of aerial resupply, and hense minimum essential equipment in the Brigade Forward CP remains as the most practical approach to operations of Brigade size in the present Division TAOR.


                                        PHILIP U. BONDI
                                        CPT, AGG
                                        Asst AG