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After Action Report 20
Operation Gadsden DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25th INFANTRY DIVISION
COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION GADSDEN (22 Mar 67)
1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation GADSDEN was a Search and Destroy and Blocking operation along the CAMBODIAN border to prevent exfiltration and infiltration along routes via CAMBODIAN border, and to destroy VC/NVA force's supplies and base camps. This operation was conducted in four phases:
Phase I: Div Arty GS FSB and elements of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div established base at TRAI BI. One Bn 196th Bde prepared and positioned forces for attack.
Phase II: 3d Bde and 196th Bde attacked on D-Day to seize objectives 1 and 2, secured LZs, established FSBs and an air assault was conducted on each objective area. On D+1, 3d Bde and 196th Bde attacked to seize objectives 3 and 4
Phase III: 25th (US) Inf Div, employed two Bdes, conducted Search and Destroy operations in Zone, then established blocking positions to seal infiltration and exfiltration routes via CAMBODIAN border.
Phase IV: Units conducted operations to the Southeast to destroy VC/NVA forces and base camps.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 2 February 1967 - 21 February 1967
3. LOCATION: Western War Zone C
4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 25th Infantry Division
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Major General Frederick C. Weyand, 2 Feb - 21 Feb '67
6. TASK ORGANIZATION
25TH Inf Div:
196th Bde (LT) (Sep)
2nd Bn, 1st Inf.
4th Bn, 31st Inf.
3rd Bn, 21st Inf.
1st Bn, 5th (M) Inf (Atch)
3rd Bn, 82nd Arty (-) (DS)
Btry D, (-) 5th Bn, 2nd Arty (Atch)
Trp F, 17th Cav
2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-) (Atch)
3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div.
2nd Bn, 12th Inf
2nd Bn, 22nd (M) Inf
3rd Bn, 22nd Inf
4th Bn, 23rd (M) Inf (Atch)
2nd Bn, 77th Arty (DS)
Btry B, 2nd Bn, 11th Arty (-) (Reinf)
Plat, Btry D, 5th Bn, 11th Arty (-) (Reinf)
Trp C, 1st Bn, 10th Cav.
44th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
a. Air Support.
During Phases I, II, III, and IV, air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers. A total of 347 sorties were flown in the area of operation from 2 Feb - 21 Feb '67. B-52 strikes were flown in the AO during the period in support of the operation. They are as follows:
DATE / TIME STRUCK AREA COVERED
012300H Feb 67 XT035778 - XT045789
XT030767 - XT050779
020400H Feb 67 XT028718 - XT019702
XT047700 - XT039689
020600H Feb 67 XT025743 - XT050730
XT050743 - XT025730
030600H Feb 67 WT966575 - WT984735
WT976760 - WT972734
030500H Feb 67 WT970730 - WT983706
WT962731 - WT971706
030700H Feb 67 WT969703 - WT986683
WT980705 - WT975679
050630H Feb 67 XT000647 - WT987628
XT009639 - WT994619
121000H Feb 67 WT963785 - WT983777
WT969798 - WT987792
b. Artillery Support: (See Tab B)
Artillery fires from a series of FSB's were used throughout the operation in both offensive and defensive roles. Moving of artillery was accomplished by CH-47 helicopters and convoys, and occurred simultaneously with movement of the fwd bases. (p2)
c. Army Aviation Support: (See Tab A)
Army Aviation was utilized in combat airmobile assaults and extractions, resupply, C&C, aerial recon, dustoff, and artillery adjustment. Aviation support provided a great degree of mobility and flexibility in Div. Opns. This was an important factor in the success of this opn.
d. Engineer Support: (See Tab C)
Engineer support consisted of jungle clearing, road clearing, road building and tunnel
destruction.
8. (C ) Intelligence:
a. General: Enemy units located in operation GADSDEN included elements of the
9thVC Division (271st Regt & 272 Regt), the 70th Guard Regt, the 680th Training Regt, and numerous elements of COSVN HQ, to include several medical unit subordinate to COSVN. The AO contained extensive supply and ammunition caches, communications storage areas, hospital facilities, base camps and major training complexes. It was expected that the VC would have this area fortified against ground and air mobile assaults. The extensive facilities and the well developed trails and roads indicated that this was an important VC base area for logistical and training activities. Agent reports, PW's, HOI CHANH's, Visual Reconnaissance, LRRP's and USSF Reports were utilized in the development of the enemy.
b. Terrain: The terrain in the area of operation varied from low flat terrain and cultivate
fields to scrub brush and forested areas with double and triple canopy. The latter offered excellent concealment and poor observation. Avenues of approach were generally limited to developed trails and cleared areas. Obstacles included streams, dense forest, and in places, heavy mud in paddy areas near the river. The movement of foot troops and tracked vehicles was much less difficult than that encountered on Operations ATTLEBORO due primarily to the drying of much of the previously inundated area within the AO.
c. Weather: The weather during this operation was generally clear to partly cloudy
with good visibility and light winds. Total rainfall for the period was .01 inch.
d. Operations: Initially combat elements of the 25th Inf Div were concerned with seizing and securing fire support bases and Bn base areas along the main supply route, and infiltration routes of the VC to and from the CAMBODIAN border, Vic LOBO and XOM GIUA. Once blocking positions were established, posture was maintained during the truce. On 3 February the 2/22 Inf (M), engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT012772. The FC fought from concealed positions and maintained contact for several hours. Also, on 3 February, Recon 1/5 Inf (M) received SA, AW, and 57 RR fire from 15 - 20 VC vic WT999699. The VC wore mixed camouflaged uniforms and black pajamas, and fought with considerable determination, exhibiting good discipline and fire control.
On the evening of 4 February in the vic WT973703, the 2/1 Inf received 50 rds of 82mm mortar fire in their battalion base area, sustaining light casualties. Earlier in the day A/2/1 Inf captured a training model of a rocket launcher. This was the first of several indications that the area of Operation GADSDEN was a primary training ground for VC main force units. On 4 February, A/4/31st Inf, vic XT013679, received SA, AW, and rifle grenade fire from 8 - 10 VC. After a moderate exchange of fire, the VC withdrew.
On 5 February A/1/5 Inf (M) received heavy SA, AW and rifle grenade fire from an unknown dr. VC vic WT983666. Fifteen VC were KIA as a result of this operation,. Captured on the field was 1 heavy MG (CHICOM) Type 57, which indicated a company size unit or larger in contact. No unit identification could be made from equipment or documents captured in the area. On 5 February A/2/22 Inf (M) located a large cache vic WT965762, which contained numerous documents identifying elements of the 1st and 2nd Bn's 70th Regiment. Also located were documents mentioning the Central Office Youth Group, the Military Provision Section, Rear Service Bureau, COSVN; Current Affairs, COSVN; and the Postal Transportation Section, COSVN. The latest date shown on the documents was September 1966.
On 6 February 2/22 Inf. (M) received AW, SA and rifle grenade fire from an unknown number of VC. The VC were fighting from underground fortifications and put up a determined effort prior to breaking contact. On the same day, Recon 1/5 Inf (M) vic WT988682 captured documents in a VC base camp identifying C-921 which is the Military Staff Directorate, COSVN. Also found was a list of patients for B-18 dispensary for Dec 66 to Jan 67. This dispensary is believed to be a supporting element Staff Directorate, COSVN. It's presence in the area coupled with the discovery of numerous medical facilities and medical supply caches indicates use of the LOGO area as a rest and recuperation center for the VC.
On 7 February vic WT972678, A & C 1/5 Inf (M) received rifle grenades and heavy SA and AW fire from an estimated VC platoon. Airstrikes and Artillery supported this action resulting in 20 VC KIA (BC). Fortified bunkers and 18 tons of rice were located in the area. Also on 7 February, 2/1 Inf located and destroyed a VC training area consisting of an extensive obstacle course, a stockade, and an elaborate land navigation course. Documents located at the site and in a supply cache near the area identified the 680th Training Regiment, and elements of 3rd 272 Regt which had probably conducted training there.
8 - 12 February 1967 - TET TRUCE: (p4)
During the TET TRUCE period, US Combat elements occupied their battalion bases astride VC supply and infiltration routes and conducted extensive patrolling within their areas of responsibility to deter VC activity during the truce period. There were a total of 6 truce violations against US ground forces: one involving fire on ground forces from the Cambodian side of the river. There were 6 incidents of ground fire against US aircraft, two of which came from the Cambodian side of the river. On 8 February, 1/5 Inf (M) was engaged by an unknown number of VC vic XT010688. Documents captured on the battlefield contained references to Rear Service Group 82, and K-77 which has been reported as a medical unit subordinate to Group 82. The area of capture appeared to be a medical facility and was a possible location of K-77. The 1/5 Inf (M) also discovered a company size base camp vic WT990644, and a supply cache containing documents referring to what is believed to be the 680th Training Regt. Also identified was T13 which has been reported as a training battalion subordinate to COSVN. On 8 February, Recon 4/23 Inf located a small ammo and medical cache and documents referencing C135 which is the Finance and Economy Agency for COSVN. On 10 February, vic WT995670, 1/5 Inf (M) located a very sophisticated training area consisting of 44 structures and fortifications, 2 class rooms, 2 mess halls, and a 75 X 30 meter rifle range complete with silhouette targets. On 11 February, vic XT010688, 4/31 Inf located documents concerning strength and armament figures on C-17, the recoilless rifle company of 271st Regt. Both companies had probably occupied the area recently, and the RR fire received in this general vicinity is most likely attributable to C-17 Co.
(p5)
13 - 21 February, 1967
The final phase of GADSDEN consisted of an attack to the north in exploitation of intelligence information of the 271st Regt, and a final sweep to the south and southeast to destroy and disrupt VC activities in that area. On 13 February vic WT986624, 1/5th Inf (M) destroyed an ordnance facility containing numerous bombs, artillery rounds and grenades, as well as tools and molds for fabrication of ordnance items. This again points out the importance of this area to the VC as a logistical base.
On 16 February vic XT033788, CHIEU HOI, LY VAN THU, Recon Squad, C21 Recon Co, 271st Regt, rallied to 2/22 Inf (M). He stated that the 1st Bn, 4th Bn, Regt HQ, and C-21 Recon Co of 271st Regt had been in the LOGO area vic WT9780 - WT9882 since 6 Feb. and had previously been in DAU TIENG District, BINH DUONG Province.
On 18 February, 2/77 Arty and 2/22 Inf (M) received 50 rds 82mm mortar fire vic XT020780.
On 21 Feb vic XT081828, 3/22 Inf engaged an unknown number of VC. Documents captured on the battlefield contained several references to the 3d Bn, 70th Regt. Also identified was the 1st Bn, 70th Regt and one reference was made to 2d Co, Group 49 which is believed to be a medical unit subordinate to COSVN. Captured documents and information received from interrogation of HOI CHANH, LY VAN THU indicate that the majority of the contacts during GADSDEN were with elements of the 271st Regt and the 70th Regt, with harassment from local guerrillas throughout the operation. The capture of vast amounts of supplies and destruction of base areas and major training sites caused severe losses to the VC in the LOGO land XOM CIUA areas.
9. MISSION: To conduct opns in Western War Zone C, to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations.
10. CONCEPT AND EXECUTION:
On D-2 the 4/23 (M) Inf moved from CU CHI to SOUI DA (XT346582) and conducted Deception Operations. On D-1 the 2/22 (M) Inf, the 2/77 Arty and the 3d Bde command group moved to TRAI BI (XT115705) and established a Bde Base. On D-Day the 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D operations from vic XT1171 to vic XT0678. The 2/12 Inf was airlifted from DAU TIENG to TRAI BI. The 4/23 (M) Inf continued deception Operations vic SOUI DA. The 1/31 Inf conducted an airmobile assault vic XT55684. The 175th Engineer Co installed a bridge at that location, and the 1/5 (M) Inf moved across the bridge and conducted S&D opns to secure obj 2 (XT034717). Elements of the 4/31 Inf and the 3/82 Arty were then helilifted to obj 2. On D+1 the 2/1 Inf was helilifted to obj 4 (WT981700). The 1/5 (M) conducted S&D opns to obj 4, secured LZ's for the 2/1 Inf. The 1/5 Inf (M) encountered AT mines and RPG-2 fire along the routes of its advance. Vic WT999699 the Recon Plt was engaged by an est 15 - 20 VC. Co B reinforced the platoon. Arty and gunships provided support. VC losses were 3 (BC) and 1 (poss). The 2/22 (M) Inf secured obj 1 (XT035740) and moved to obj 3 (WT975949). The 4/23 (M) Inf moved from SOUI DA to obj 1.
On D+2 the 4/31 Inf conducted S&D opn to obj 5 (XT010687). The 2/1 Inf was hit by a mortar attack vic (WT976697). VC used 82mm mortar firing 30 rds. The 2/12 Inf was helilifted to obj 2 (XT11711). The 4/23 (M) Inf moved from obj 1 to FSB Charlie (XT015724). Other units conducted local S&D opns. In a delayed report Co A 2/22 (M) Inf captured large stocks of food and destroyed numerous bicycles, tires, and parts vic (WT983775).
On D+3 the 1/5 (M) Inf moved to obj 6 (WT992665). Co A engaged a large force of VC vic (WT983666). VC were armed with SA, AW and rifle grenades. US used SA, AW and Arty. VC losses were 15 VC (BC), 1 M79, 1 Chicom type 57 MG, 2 AK-47 rifles and 2 Chicom carbines captured. Other units conducted local S&D opns. Co B 2/22 (M) Inf destroyed 9 tons of rice, 3000 lbs of food stuffs, and captured 70 tons of rice vic (WT967762). Co A 4/23 (M) Inf was engaged by a VC force of unknown size vic (XT0120714). Fire was returned with SA, AW and Arty resulting in 11 VC (BC).
On D+4 the units established blocking positions and conducted local S&D opns. Units continued to destroy large amounts of food, bunkers and structures, and captured numerous weapons, communication equipment, mines and explosives, numerous small clashes with small groups of VC continued.
On 6 Feb Co's A and C 1/5 (M) Inf engaged an est VC platoon vic (WT977667). Arty, airstrikes and gunships were employed in support. VC losses were 21 (BC). On 6 Feb HQ 4/23 (M) Inf destroyed a large VC base camp vic (WT977735). On 7 Feb Co C 2/1 Inf destroyed a VC training area vic (WT995670).
On 12 Feb the 2/1 Inf helilifted to FSB DELTA (XT036649). The 1/5 (M) Inf secured FSB DELTA and conducted S&D opns to obj 7 (WT984615). The 2/12 Inf conducted S&D opns to obj C (XT006753). The 4/23 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to obj 1 (XT030785), linked up with the 4/9 Inf, and conducted S&D opns to obj 2 (XT015810), Co B 2/22 (M) Inf captured a large supply of Chicom radios, field phones, generators, radio parts, antenna and batteries vic (WT967764). The 4/9 Inf conducted an airmobile assault and secured obj 1 (XT037785). Co A 4/23 (M) Inf captured 1 VC PW vic (XT012819).
On 13 Feb the 4/31 Inf moved to FSB DELTA (XT036649). Co C 1/5 (M) Inf destroyed a large food and ammunition supply vic (WT986624). The 2/22 (M) Inf moved to obj B (WT9679). The 2/12 moved to blocking positions vic (WT9977). The 4/23 (M) Inf moved to obj E (WT9982). Co A 2/12 Inf captured 6790 rds of SA ammo vic (WT996776).
On 14 Feb the 2/1 Inf conducted S&D opns to obj 8 (XT0559). The 1/5 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to vic (XT0256) and established fwd base. The 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to (WT9780), linked up with the 2/12 Inf and continued S&D opns to vic obj 1 (XT0278). The 4/23 (M) Inf conducted opns to obj 1. An APC of Co C 1/5 (M) Inf was hit by 10 rds of 60mm fire. Co A and C 1/5 (M) Inf each received 8 rds of 60nn fire. The 4/31 Inf returned to TAY NINH. .
On 16 Feb the 2/1 Inf conducted S&D opns to vic (XT0556). The 1/5 (M) Inf returned to TAY NINH. The 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to obj 1 (XT0278).
On 17 Feb the 2/1 In f helilifted to TAY NINH. Other units continued local S&D opns.
On 18 Feb the 4/23 (M) Inf returned to TAY NINH.
On 19 Feb the 3/21 Inf conducted an airmobile assault vic (WT992553) and conducted S&D opns. The 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to vic (XT0779842).
On 20 Feb Co B 3/21 Inf engaged an est VC squad vic (WT975534) resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). The 3/21 Inf returned to TAY NINH. (p6)
On21 Feb units repositioned for Operation JUNCTION CITY.
GADSDEN terminated at 212400.
11. ENEMY LOSSES: Cumulative totals for operation GADSDEN 020001 - 212400 February 1967
Total Personnel Losses: 161 VC KIA (BC), 215 VC KIA (poss), 2 VC PW's.
Total Material Captured: 6 AK47's, 1 rkt launcher, AP-TNG, 5 M79's. 1 CHICOM SMG, 1 CHICOM type 57 MG, 5 CHICOM carbines, 1 US carbine, 3 Mauser rifles, 1 M-14 rifle, 1 rifle (type unk), 1 shotgun, 1 mortar sight, 2 12.7mm AA tripods, 1HMG tripod, 2 AT mines, 11 grenades, 7 57mm REAT rds 9 claymores, 4 CBU's, 2 RPG-2 RDS, 1 75mm rd, 1 55 gal drum of CS=1, 7850 rds of SA ammo, 7 lbs of TNT, 1 TA-312, 3 CHICOM radios, 8 hand generators, 1 PRC-25 radio, 1 PRC-6 radio, 1 Microphone, 1 headset, 3 power cables, 75lbs of radio parts, 25 radio manuals, 1000 lbs of commo wire, 1 box of commo parts, 25 radio antennas, 24 CHICOM field phones, 13 CHICOM hand phones, 10 boxes of radio tubes, 2 battery packs, 1 CHICOM transmitter, 1 CHICOM generator, one 12 volt generator, one 12 volt regulator, 7 voltmeters, 3 voltage testers, 1 diesel engine, 2000 flashlight batteries, 300 notebooks, 19 bicycles, 40 bicycles tires, 70 sheets of tin, 25 gal of calcium carbide, 50 gal of tar, 55 gal of kerosene, 558 lbs of documents, 1 typewriter, 200 shovels, 65 lbs of clothing, 20 lbs of maps, 45 medical books, 10 lbs of medical supplies, misc field equipment, misc books, 1 sewing machine, 2 rice polishing machines, 1200 lbs of sugar, 20 cans of milk, 19 cases of condensed milk, 1000 lbs of tea, 175 gal cooking oil, 75 lbs of soup, 171.05 tons of rice, 2 cases of crackers, 740 lbs of peanuts, 120 lbs of dried fish, 20 gal of soy sauce, 30 cans of tomatoes, 20 lbs of peas, misc food rations, 5.5 tons of salt, 2000 lbs of soap and 30 boxes of soap.
Total Material Destroyed: 28 sampans, 543 VC structures, 5 foot bridges, 4 oxcarts, 588 underground fortifications, 7 trenches, 3 tunnels, 22 boat docks, 17 punji pits, 1 training site, 1 smelter, 1 rifle range, 35 foxholes, 5 AT mines, three 500 lb bombs, two 250 lb bombs, one 82mm rd, two 105mm rds, 10 rifle grenades, one 4.2 rd, 15 lbs of TNT, 3 Claymores, twenty-six 60mm rds, 117 hand grenades, one 81mm rd, 1 AT mine, 2 booby traps, 55 gals gasoline, 55 gals of diesel fuel, 270 gals of kerosene, 225 gals of kerosene, 225 gals of motor oil, 123 bottles of alcohol, 1 bottle of acid, 150 gals of carbide, 50 gals of tar, 200 gals of mash, 26 fuzes with igniters, fifteen 60mm fuzes, 50 rolls of chicken wire, 12 flashlights, 1 drum of CS-1, 1 outboard motor, 25 tons of scrap metal, 1000 ft of commo wire, 60 lbs of clothing, 500 lbs of resin, 37 bicycles, 1 rice polishing machine, 120 lbs of gauze, 58 VC uniforms, 2 VC gas masks, 2 sewing machines, 100 cartons of cigarettes, five 12.7mm AA tripods, 2 tons of soy beans, 500 cans of tuna fish, 100 lbs of soap, 600 bars of soap, 35 gals of hot sauce, 6 cases of canned milk, 3040 lbs of misc food, 20gals of cooking oil, 1120 lbs of dried fish , 422 lbs of peas, 375 lbs of peanuts, and 215.25 tons of rice.
(p7)
12. Following is a listing of Rice Caches (1 ton or over), Base Camps Supply Caches, Ammo Caches, and contacts of estimated size or larger:
2 Feb XT053679 2.5 tons salt
3 Feb XT999699 15 - 20 VC
3 Feb XT012772 Unk nr VC
3 Feb XT026781 Unk nr VC
3 Feb WT085807 Supply base
4 Feb WT972756 50 tons rice
4 Feb WT595643 Unk nr VC
4 Feb XT013679 8 - 10 VC
5 Feb XT966763 10.7 tons rice
5 Feb WT972757 9 tons rice
5 Feb WT974687 Base Camp
5 Feb XT964765 1.95 tons rice
5 Feb XT012714 Unk nr VC
5 Feb WT983666 Platoon (reinforced)
5 Feb WT972763 20 tons rice
5 Feb WT967762 50 tons rice
5 Feb WT967690 1 ton rice, base camp
5 Feb WT965764 Communication equipment cache
5 Feb XT017699 Unk nr VC
6 Feb XT001697 Base camp
6 Feb WT974659 Base camp
6 Feb WT981667 Base camp, supply cache
6 Feb WT998696 Base camp
6 Feb WT987652 4 tons rice
6 Feb WT984742 Base camp
6 Feb WT984742 Unk nr VC
6 Feb WT970740 Unk nr VC
7 Feb WT977735 Base camp, Supply cache
7 Feb WT990644 Base camp, 5 tons salt
7 Feb WT972678 Platoon, 17 tons salt
7 Feb WT961667 4 tons rice, base camp
7 Feb WT982685 TEG site
8 Feb WT988684 Base camp
8 Feb WT967727 Ammunition cache
8 Feb WT962766 48 tons rice
8 Feb WT967766 1.5 tons rice
8 Feb WT967715 Unk nr VC (fr Cambodia)
8 Feb WT966761 Communications equipment cache
8 Feb WT970763 15 tons rice
8 Feb WT966664 1.3 tons rice
8 Feb XT010688 Unk nr VC
8 Feb WT998653 6 tons rice
9 Feb WT977716 3.5 tons rice
9 Feb WT965716 Base camp, supply cache
9 Feb WT963710 1.35 tons rice
9 Feb WT964721 Ordnance factory (p8)
10 Feb WT989653 2 tons soy beans, supply cache
10 Feb WT995607 M-8 site
10 Feb WT968707 4 tons rice, supply cache
10 Feb XT084663 Base camp, supply cache
11 Feb WT974683 5 tons rice
11 Feb XT963767 Base camp, 10 tons rice
11 Feb XT009678 Base camp
11 Feb WT961772 Unk nr VC
11 Feb WT971733 Base camp
12 Feb XT010688 Base camp
12 Feb WT967764 Communications equipment cache
13 Feb WT986624 Ordnance factory
13 Feb WT985605 3.4 tons rice
13 Feb XT996778 Ammunition cache
13 Feb XT995624 Base camp
13 Feb XT987631 25 tons rice
14 Feb WT982579 2.35 tons rice
14 Feb WT989799 Unk nr VC
14 Feb XT012582 2.2 tons rice
14 Feb XT038510 1.35 tons rice
15 Feb XT020550 2.25 tons rice
15 Feb XT049600 9 tons rice
15 Feb XT051850 2.13 tons rice
15 Feb XT048562 Base camp
15 Feb XT027585 Base camp, supply cache
17 Feb XT048838 Base camp
19 Feb WT994536 13 Sampans, 1.25 tons rice
21 Feb XT085825 Unk nr VC
VC use of mortars and Recoilless rifles:
3 Feb XT999699 1 rd 57 RR
3 Feb WT995698 1 rd 57 RR
4 Feb WT973703 50 rds 82mm
5 Feb XT012714 1 rd 57 RR
14 Feb XT025561 26 rds 60mm
18 Feb XT020780 50 rds 62mm
13, ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:
a. Logistics: For a listing of logistic problems encountered, see the After Action Report of the 25th Inf Div, SUBCOM. (Tab A)
b. Signal: The circuits established to support this operations are described in the 125th Signal Bn After Action Report. (Tab B)
c. Artillery: For Artillery Operations see Div Arty After Action Report. (Tab C). (p9)
d. Aviation: For Aviation operations, see 25th Aviation After Action Report. (Tab D).
(p9)
14. CIVIC ACTION:
a. Civic Action: Negative
b. Revolutionary Development: Negative
c. Psychological Operations:
(1) Name of Operation - Operation GADSDEN.
(2) Date of Operation: 2 Feb. - 21 Feb. 67
(3) Task Organization The task organization of the division had an HB Light
Mobile (loudspeaker term) attached to the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, and an ARVN PSYOP team attached to the 196th (Lt) Inf Bde.
(4) Supporting Forces: The 246th PSYOP Company was in general support of the 25th Inf Div PSYOP Program.
(5) Intelligence: No civilians were living in the operational area, other than hostile elements and regular Viet Cong units.
(6) Mission: To conduct psychological operations in the area of operation to convince Viet Cong audiences that their struggle is futile, and that their situation has greatly deteriorated, in order to persuade them to rally to the GVN.
(7) Concept of Operations: A pre-planned schedule of leaflet drops and loudspeaker missions by the 246th PSYOP Company were executed from D-Day to D+3). After D+3, PSYOP activities were conducted to respond to the tactical situation as it developed.
(8) Execution: Psychological operations initially directed to emphasize Allied Might and Introductory themes. Emphasis was later placed on themes to convince the VC that their situation had deteriorated in order to induce them to rally. To accomplish this objective, CHIEU HOI, Inevitable Victory, and Terror themes were used as the operation progressed. Targets were systematically covered to reach all intended audiences. On D-Day the 246th PSYOP Company and Brigades commenced leaflet and loudspeaker operations in the AO. Pre-planned operations to D+13 were conducted as the tactical situation presented itself. One HOI CHANH rallied to the 3d Bde. 4th Div, was interviewed and then exploited by a one hour taped loudspeaker appeal. Altogether there was 1,154,4000 leaflets dropped and 8 loudspeaker sorties flown in support of the operation. Total aerial broadcast time was 4 hours. Approximately 30% of all loudspeaker operations were conducted at night.
(9.) Results - One HOI CHANH rallied to a US unit as a result of the operation, who acknowledged seeing leaflets, hearing loudspeaker broadcasts and being influenced to some extent by the propaganda.
(10) Commander's Analysis: PSYOP activities were adequately planned in that PSYOP support was present at the commencement of the operation with appropriate general themes for leaflet and broadcasts pre-selected. Likely target areas for PSYOP in the AO were likewise selected during the planning phases. The PSYOP program was then tailored to fit the situation when enemy target vulnerabilities became known. Exploitation of the HOI CHANH was an example of PSYOP moving from general to more specific target audiences.
(p10)
FOR THE COMMANDER:
JAMES D. DETHLEFSEN
CAPT, AGC
Asst. AG
7 Incls:
1. Tab A, COAAR, 25th Avn Bn (Withdrawn, Hqs, DA)
2. Tab B, COAAR, 25TH Div Arty
3. Tab C, COAAR, 65th Engr Bn
4. Tab D, COAAR, SUPCOM (Withdrawn, Hqs, DA)
5. Tab E, COAAR, 125th Sig Bn
6. Tab F, COAAR, 3rd Bde, 4th Div (pub sep as 67 X 013)
7. Tab G, COAAR, 196TH Inf
DISTRIBUTION: (p11)
Special
Operation Gadsden-25th Arty HEADQUARTERS, 25th INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCDA - OP 12 March 1967
SUBJECT Combat Operations After Action Report
TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCMHD
APO 96225
1. NAME: Operations GADSDEN
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 31 January through 21 February 1967
3. LOCATION: Western Tay Ninh Province
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS; 25th Infantry Division
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel David E Ott
6. TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDER:
Headquarters, 25th Division Artillery (Colonel Daniel B Williams, Cmdg.)
3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (-)
Battery A
Battery B
Battery D
Battery B (-), 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery (AWSP)
Battery D (-), 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery (AWSP)
3d Battalion, 92nd Artillery; DS 196th Inf Bde.
2d Battalion, 77th Artillery; DS 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
Batteries A and C, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery; GS; Reinf. 25th Div Arty.
8. INTELLIGENCE: Western War Zone C and particularly that area along the Cambodian border south of LO GO is a major VC base and logistical complex. Elements of the 271st and 70th Regiments are known to be in the operational area.
9. MISSION: Provide direct and general support artillery for the committed organic and attached maneuver elements of the 25th Infantry Division as follows:
UNIT MISSION DATES
2 Bn, 77th Arty DS, 3 Bde, 4th Div 31 Jan - 11 Feb
Attchd, 3 Bde, 4th Div 12 Feb - 21 Feb
3 Bn, 82nd Arty D3, 196 Bde 31 Jan - 11 Feb
Attchd, 196 Bde 12 Feb - 21 Feb
3 Bn, 13th Arty
Battery A GS, 25th Div Arty 21 Jan - 11 Feb
GSR, 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty 19 Feb - 21 Feb
Battery B GS, 25th Div Arty 31 Jan - 11 Feb
GSR, 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty 12 Feb - 21 Feb
Battery D CS, 25th Div Arty 31 Jan - 21 Feb
10. EXECUTION:
a. General: The 25th Infantry Division with the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and 196th Infantry Brigade attached, attacked northwest with two brigades into western war zone C to seize objective vicinity LO GO (XT9773), blocked infiltration and exfiltration routes vicinity CAMBODIAN border, and conducted search and destroy operations to destroy VC/NVA forces, supplies and base camps. The 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery and 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery were attached to the 25th Division Artillery on 1 February and reverted to their brigades control on 12 February,
b. 31 January: Headquarters, 25th Division Artillery and Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery, with Batteries B and D, displaced from CU CHI to vicinity TRAI BI (XT126668) and established a general support fire support base, and forward artillery command post. Battery A, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery, displaced from CU CHI and established a fire support base vicinity XT113705.
c. 1 February: The 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery displaced from DAU TIENG to XT122669 and was attached to the 25th Division Artillery. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery displaced to XT115705. The 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery remained in the TAY NINH base camp and became attached to the 25th Division Artillery.
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d. 2 February: Battery A, 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery was air-lifted from TAY NINH to XT033712.
e. 3 February: Headquarters and Battery C, 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery, displaced from TAY NINH to a support base vicinity XT033712. Headquarters and Battery B, 2nd Battalion,
77th Artillery were airlifted from TTRAI BI to the fire support base vicinity XT033712.
Battery Am 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery was airlifted from XT122668 to a fire support base vicinity XT 035785.
f. 4 February: Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery was airlifted from XT035785 to the
fire support base vicinity XT033712.
g. 5 - 19 February: No change in status or location of units.
h. 11 February: Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery displaced from CU CHI to the general support base at TRAI BI (XT126668).
i. 12 February: The 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery and 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery were released from attachment to 25th Division Artillery, and were attached to the 3rd Brigade, 4th Division and 196th Infantry Brigade respectively. Headquarters, Battery A, and Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, displaced from XT033712 to vicinity XT042790. Headquarters, Battery A and Battery C, 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery displaced from XT033712 to XT035645. Battery D, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from XT1226668 to XT115705.
j. February 13: Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery displaced from XT115705 to the
battalion fire support base vicinity XT042790. Battery A and Battery D, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from XT1157075 to establish a fire support base at the Military Reservation, vicinity XT108762.
k. February 14: No change in status or location of units.
l. February 15: Headquarters and Battery A, 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery displaced from
XT035645 to vicinity XT120600. Battery C, 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery displaced from XT035645 to XT056590. Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery displaced from XT127663 to TAY NINH base camp.
m. February 16: Battery C, 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery dis0placed from XT056590 to TAY
NINH base camp.
n. February 17: Headquarters and Battery A, 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery displaced from XT120600 to TAY NINH base camp, terminating the battalion's participation in OPERATION GADSDEN.
o. February 18: The 2lnd Battalion, 77th Artillery displaced from XT042790 to fire support base LEE (XT073795) in preparation for Operation JUNCTION CITY.
p. February 19 - February 21: No change in status or location of artillery units in support of OPERATION GADSDEN. All units remained in their location to prepare to support OPERATION JUNCTION CITY.
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11. RESULTS:
a. Enemy Losses:
(1) 4 VC KIA (BC)
(2) 94 VC KIA (POSS)
(3) 13 Bunkers destroyed;
(4) 6 Sampans destroyed.
(5) 4 Bridges destroyed.
(6) 5 Secondary explosions.
b. Friendly Artillery Losses:
(1) 0 KIA
(2) 11 WIA
(3) No equipment losses.
12, ADMINISTATIVE MATTERS:
a. Maintenance and Transportation:
(1) Operation GADSDEN was supported from two logistical bases, TAY NINH and
TRAI BI. One direct support artillery battalion was supported out of TRAI BI. The general support artillery was positioned in the TRAI BI area and was supported by the TRAI BI logistical base.
(a) The direct support battalions were for the most part resupplied by CH-47. Some of the lighter supplies were delivered to the field locations by use of UHD1.
(b) Resupply of medium and heavy artillery was by road. Most of the ammunition
To the TRAI NI area was by direct haul from LONG BINH on transportation tractor-trailer. The use of these larger trucks reduced the amount of traffic on the MSR and reduced the requirements for MHE.
(2) The CH-47 support and coordination could have been better if both direct support battalions had resupplied out of TRAI BI rather than one from there and one from TAY NINH. The resupply from TRAI BI would have reduced the CH-47's turn-around time by about 40%, thus reducing the required CH-47's to perform the daily resupply missions. CH-47 assets were better controlled and used more effectively after the CH-47 LO was stationed in TRAI BI. The LO gave all users of CH-47 a common control point as well as a contact for the pilots. The CH-47 LO operating in TRAI BI was most satisfactory.
(a) The 3rd Bde, 4th Div, was tasked with providing maintenance support for all units in the TRAI BI area. During the operation, special contact teams were sent to TRAI BI to supplement the maintenance support furnished by the 3rd Bde, 4th Div.
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(b) Maintenance support was improved and deadline time reduced when special contact teams (m109 and M110) were brought forward to assist the direct support maintenance. These contact teams had tools and parts not available in the direct unit. Division back-up maintenance located at TAY NINH proved valuable in reducing maintenance down time.
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(c ) Communications: FM voice radio, radio-teletype and VHF telephone circuits were used during the operation, and communications were generally satisfactory. For the first time in 25th Division air-mobile operations, AN/GRC-46 radio-teletype sets were lifted by CH-47 helicopter with each air-lift direct support battalion headquarters. The addition of this important, secure communications system afforded a significant improvement over previous communications systems used in airmobile operations. Additionally, one direct support battalion headquarters was several times co-located with its supported brigade headquarters, thus permitting the use of VHF telephone links to the artillery battalions. The VHF link materially increased the Division Artillery Commander's ability to control fire,. The inclusion of VHF links to all battalions should be considered for future operations.
13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Photometric Survey
(a) Photometric points were used extensively as registration points. All comments from using units were favorable.
(b) On three occasions coordinate position area survey was possible from a photogrammetric point. Comments on control were favorable. However, on the one occasion when comparison to UTM coordinates was possible, the photogrammetric point (ACC-45-1) was determined to be incorrect by 181.69 M in E and 99.62 M in N.
(c) Reaction to photogrammetric survey has been enthusiastic, but many points are difficult to identify or impossible to occupy. On two out of three occasions, reported inter-visible points were occupied and then proved to be masked by dense foilage.
(d) Azimuth control was primarily obtained from astronomic observation (sun - altitude method). On three occasions azimuth was verified by use of an azimuth gyro,. Division Artillery survey utilizing DME's established control in Fire Support Bases during the operation.
14, CO ANALYSIS:
a. The artillery support during the first phase of Operations GADSDEN was centralized to provide maximum coverage of the assigned area of operation. During the last phase, the GS Artillery was given the mission of GSR to support the Brigade's independent search and destroy operations. The photogrammetric mapping system tested by this unit, has proved that target area survey can be accomplished to a satisfactory degree of accuracy. Fires massed on a common point impacted within a reasonable distance of selected target area.
b. The soundness of centralized artillery control in support of the Division scheme of
maneuver, and attachment and detachment of supporting artillery to provide centralized
artillery support, was well used during OPERATION GASDEN.
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15. STATISTICAL DATA:
a. Artillery Ammunition Expenditures:
(1) HE
(a) 10mm - 27,598
(b) 155mm - 14,715
(c) 8 2,298
Total 44,611
(2) TP
(a) 105mm 878
(b) 155mm 321
Total 1199
(3) Illumination
(a) 105mm 112
(b) 155mm 40
Total 152
b. Artillery Missions By Type: (p19)
105mm 155mm 8 TOTAL
(1) H&I's 3,181 1509 232 4,922
(2) Support 750 321 159 1,230
c. OM-23G, organic aircraft support by organization:
UNIT
Hq, Div Arty 123' + 15 20' + 55 14' + 45 87' = 35
3rd Bn, 13th Arty 16' + 35 1' = 55 3' = 45 10' = 55
2nd Bn, 77th Arty 2'
3rd Bn, 82nd Arty 53' + 35 7' + 45 2' + 30 43' + 15
Other 35 35
TOTAL 201' 30' + 35 21' 144' + 20
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FOR THE COMMANDER for ERNEST J STANDEVE
Major, Artillery, Adjutant
Operation Gadsden-65th Engineers DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 65TH ENGINEER Battalion (INF DIV)
APO US FORCES L 96225
AVDCENB-2 10 March 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)
THRU: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCMHD
APO US Forces 96225
TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243
1. Operation GADSDEN
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 020001 - 212400 February 1967
3. LOCATION: Western War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province, RVN.
Reference Map Sheets 6132 II 6232 III, and 6231 IV of series L 7014
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 25TH Infantry Division
5. REPORTING OFFICER: LTC A.S. Fullerton
6. TASK ORGANIZATION: 65TH Engineer Battalion (-), Company D, 27th
Engineer Battalion: 175th Engineer Company.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES: The 500th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) furnished bridging and technical assistance during the erection of a 160 foot DS Span. This operation was highly successful, and the cooperation and assistance provided by this organization materially contributed to timely bridge placement.
8. INTELLIGENCE: (p20)
a. The terrain is generally flat with a dense jungle tree covering that averages 75 to 90 feet in height. It is mostly single canopy however. In some areas there is double canopy. The heavily wooded areas support dense undergrowth up to 19 feet. The ground is generally trafficable for tracked vehic