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After Action Report 21
Lessons Learned Operation Cedar Falls DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Adjutant General
Washington, D.C. 20310
AGAM-P (M) (20 Apr 67) 26 April 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Operation CEDAR FALLS
25TH Infantry Division (U)
TO: SEE DISTRIBAUTION
1. Forwarded as enclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Cedar Falls., conducted by the 25th Infantry Division during the period 8 - 26 January 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.
Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding General
US Army Combat Development Command
Commandants
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Armor School
US Army Chemical Corps School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Transportation School
US Army Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Civil Affairs School
Copies furnished to:
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
Security Officer, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
South East Asia Forces, OSD (SA)
Office of the Director of Defense Research & Engineering, ODD (SEAM) ODDR&E
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25th INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 97225
COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATIONS CEDAR FALLS
10 Mar 67
1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a search and destroy and blocking operation along the SAIGON River to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas, denying the use of the SAIGON River in the sector to VC/NVA forces. This operation was conducted in two phases.
Phase I: (D Day) 25th Inf Div under the guise of normal operations deploys the 196th Bde (reinf) by air and ground means to seize the critical ground overlooking the SAIGON River in the HO BO Woods and destroys VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.
Phase II:
a. (D+1 to D+9) 2nd Bde deployed by ground means to blocking positions along the SAIGON River in sector. The 2nd and 196th Bdes prevented VC/NVA exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE area, and controlled the SAIGON River in their sectors to deny its use by VC/NVA forces.
b. Brigade blocking forces conducted detailed search of their sectors and destroyed VC/NVA forces and installations.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 8 January 1967 - 26 January 1967.
3. LOCATION Along the SAIGON River from south of the BOI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG.
4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: II FFORCEV
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Major General Frederick C. Weyand, 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67
6. TASK ORGANIZATION:
25th Inf Div:
2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div:
1st Bn, 27th Inf
2nd Bn, 27th Inf.
2nd Bn, 34th Armor
1st Bn, 8th Arty (DS)
3rd Bn, 13th Arty (-) (GS)
B Co, 65th Engr Bn (-)
196th Inf Bde (LT) (SEP)
2nd Bn, 1st Inf F Trp, 17th Cav
1st Bn (M), 5th Inf 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty
2nd Bn, (M), 22nd Inf A Btry, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty
3rd Bn, 21st Inf 175th Engr Co.
B Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav
7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
a. Air Support
During Phases I and II air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers. A total of 409 sorties were flown in the area of the operations from 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67. B-52 strikes were flown in the AO during the period in support of the operations. They are as follows:
DATE / TIME STRUCK AREA COVERED
060200 Jan 67 XT626303 - XT634314
XT648282 - XT656296
070240 Jan 67 XT582312 - XT586303
XT612322 - XT616312
070200 Jan 67 XT649290 - XT660293
XT653270 - XT669274
061600 Jan 67 XT654248 - XT665270
XT660242 - XT672246
190400 Jan 67 XT570352 - XT601359
XT574340 - XT604347
b. Artillery Support
(1) 5 January: A command and control element from HQ Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty and A Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty displaced from CU CHI Base Camp to vicinity TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center. A Btry, 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty (8” - 175mm) moved from CU CHI to TRUNG LAP and was GSR to the 25th Inf Div. A platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2nd Arty (AWSP) were attached to 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (-) to provide security for the fire support base,. The MPQ-4 Radar Section from 7th Bn, 11th Arty was attached to the 3rd Bn, 13th Arty at TRUNG LAP.
(2) 6 - 7 January: No change in status or location of units.
(3) 8 January: Operation CEDAR FALLS commenced with the 1st Bn, 8th Arty, located in CU CHI Base Camp providing direct support to the 2nd Bde, A Btry, 3rd Bn. 13th Arty was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty from its fire support base at TRUNG LAP. D Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty was in general support of the 25th Division from its location in CU CHI Base Camp.
(p2)
(4) 9 - 12 January: No change in status or location of units.
(5) 13 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from base camp at vic XT74701464 to better support the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The 8” platoon of A Btry, 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty displaced from TRUNG LAP to vic TON SON NHUT, and a platoon of D Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty moved from CU CHI to the TRUNG LAP fire support base, and was attached to A Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty.
(6) 14 January: No change in status or location of units.
(7) 15 January: 8” platoon from A Btry, 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty returned to TRUNG LAP, and the 8” platoon from D Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty was detached from A Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty and returned to CU CHI Base Camp.
(8) 16 - 20 January: No change in status or location of units.
(9) 21 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from XT74701464 to CU CHI BaseCamp.
(10) 22 - 24 January: No change in status or location of units.
(11) 26 January: Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated HQ Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (-); A Btry, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty; A Btry, 2nd Bn,. 32nd Arty and the platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2nd Arty displaced by convoy from TRUNG LAP to CU CHI Base Camp. .
(12) Special Equipment and Techniques: During the operation, Armor Infantry units established multiple base camps and forward positions in the FILHOL Plantation and HO BO and BOI LOI Woods. Up to this time there had been little or no target area survey because of the lack of high ground for a target area base and because of the requirement for an inordinate amount of security for isolated survey parties. Taking advantage of the security offered by the forward bases and by using DME's with NUI BA DEN as a control base, the survey parties were able to establish control in areas that are frequently target areas.
(13) Commanders Analysis: With the artillery fire support originating from CU CHI Base Camp and TRUNG LAP, administrative and supply matters were greatly simplified. Supporting from the base camp enabled the firing batteries to improve defenses and living conditions.
(14) Total missions and rounds fired:
(a) Missions: Support 515, H&I 2,276.
(b) Ammunition expended: HE 14,644, WP 868, ILL 386
(c) Results: 12 VC KIA 9 (BC), 40 VC KIA (poss), 6 Bunkers, 25 sampans, 23
buildings destroyed and 27 buildings damaged.
(p3)
8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:
a. General: The area of operation for the 25th Inf Div during Operations CEDAR FALLS encompassed the area from south of the BOI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG. The division positions were located along the SAIGON River in former VC safe havens in both the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. Enemy units operating in and around the AO included the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 8th Bns of the 165th A Regt, elements of the D 14 Local Forces Bn, elements of MR 4, and local guerrillas. The area contained many foxholes, trenches, tunnels, bunkers and underground fortifications. The VC utilized the SAIGON River to a great extent in moving supplies and equipment
b. Terrain: The terrain in the area of operation varied from broad, flat plains of wet rice land to scrub brush and forested areas with heavy canopy. Cover in the rice paddies, marshes, and swamps was limited to road embankments and dikes. Concealment in the rice land was poor, with fair to good concealment in the forests and high marsh grass area. Fields of fire were poor in the forest to generally good in the rice lands and marshes. However, fields of fire were limited by stream banks and vegetation. Obstacles to overland movement were the interconnecting streams, ditches, and dikes in the rice land marshes.
c. Weather: The weather during the operation was generally clear to partly cloudy with good visibility and light winds. The maximum temperature was 93 degrees and the minimum was 63 degrees with an average high of 86 degrees and low of 68 degrees. Total rainfall for the period was .2 inches.
d. Operations: Light enemy contact was made initially as friendly units moved to the occupied blocking positions in the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. In the extreme eastern portion of the division sector, heavy contact was made with forces of the 2nd Bn, 165 A Regt on 8 January 1967 by elements of the 1st Bn, 27th inf. The enemy encountered by 1st Bn, 27th Inf withdrew under cover of darkness on the night of 8 - 9 January. Throughout the remainder of the operation no other heavy contact was made with the enemy forces, and most of the body count resulted from contacts with small groups of VC. During hours of darkness, maximum use was made of ambushes along the SAIGON River, and several VC were killed by ambush patrols as they sought to escape from the CEDAR FALLS Operational Area. Search and Destroy Operations accounted for most of the daylight activity of friendly forces. Through these S&D operations, several VC base camps along with large amounts of rice, equipment, ammunition and weapons were located. A large tunnel complex was discovered by the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf in the HO BO Woods on 21 Jan at coordinates XT650235, The tunnel is believe to have been the location of a VC headquarters unit. It was destroyed after it had been fully searched.
9. MISSION: To conduct S&D and blocking operations south and west along the SAIGON River, to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas, and to destroy VC base areas. (P4)
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:
a. 2nd Bde: Attached: 2nd Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1
B Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H, D Day
B Co, 65th Engr Bn, effective 1900H, D Day
MID element, effective 1900H, D Day
Attached: 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf to 196th Bde, effective 1900H, D-1
(1) Establish blocking positions in sector along SAIGON River early on D+1 to prevent VC/NVA exfiltration from the IRON TRIANGLE area.
(2) Maintain control of the SAIGON River to prevent its use by VC/NVA forces.
(3) Destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.
(4) Conduct BUDDY Operations in conjunction with 2nd Bn, 7th ARVN Regt to destroy VC/NVA infrastructure in PHU HOA DONG and expand government control over that village.
(5) Continue reorganization of 4th Bn, 23rd Inf in base camp.
(6) Be prepared to release 4th Bn, 23rd Inf to 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FFORCE V reserve is committed.
b. 196th Inf Bde: Attached: 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, effective 1900H D-1
2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, effective 0600H D-1
B Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H D-1
(1) Conduct airmobile operations on D Day to destroy VC/RVN forces in sector with priority of effort in objective A.
(2) On D+1 secure high ground overlooking SAIGON River in sector and establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE.
(3) Maintain control of SAIGON River in sector to deny its use to VC/RVN forces.
(4) Conduct detailed search of sector to destroy VC/RVN forces and; installations.
(5) Upon shift of left limiting point from vic XT571349 to a point east of BEN SUC, be prepared to release control of B Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav to parent unit.
(6) Maintain security of base camp and retain responsibility of securing Route 26 in p blue.
(p6)
(7) Be prepared to release one battalion to the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FFORCEV reserve is committed. If this is released, 196th Bde is relieved from responsibility for securing Route 26.
11. EXECUTION:
a. General: On D-2 (6 Jan 67) the Div, under the guise of normal operations, deployed the 196th Inf Bde reinforced. The 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf DAU TIENG along the southern edge of the BOI LOI Woods to an overnight position. At the same time the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf with Trp B, 3rd Sqdn, attached moved into the area north of the TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center to partially open a route and secure artillery fire support bases. The 3rd Bn, supporting artillery consisting of the 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty and A Btry, 77th Arty was lifted into these bases. The 196th Inf Bde CP and elements of the 3rd Bn 13th Arty and 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty moved by convoy to TRUNG LAP. the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf secured a LZ for the 2nd Bn, 1st Inf. All elements less the fire support base security forces moved to blocking positions along the SAIGON River at the same time the 2nd Brigade moved to blocking position along the SAIGON River north of the FILHOL Plantation and NHA VIEC. Btry deployed with TF 2nd Bn, 34th Armor in the north, TF 2nd Bn, 27th Inf in the center, along with 2nd Bn, 7th ARVN Regt and 1st Bn, 27th Inf in the south. During the nights, a maximum amount of ambushes were emplaced along the river. During daylight hours minimum forces secured the river allowing extensive S&D operations in the VC base areas. Control of traffic on the SAIGON River was the responsibility of the 25th Inf Div while the 1st Inf Div was responsible for the control at the junction of the SAIGON - THI TINH Rivers. The 1st Inf Div with the and 11th Armd Cav Regt blocked enemy escape routes east of the THI TINH River, executed an air-mobile assault north of the IRON TRIANGLE, and then executed S&D operations south through the area. Highlights of the operations were:
(1) B-52 strikes exploited by ground follow-up and occupation.
(2) The effective denial of VC escape routes and use of the SAIGON River as evidenced by the high casualty toll suffered by the VC throughout the operation.
(3) The discovery of a major VC HQ's tunnel complex by the 1/5 (M) Inf in the HOBO/BOI LOI Woods complex from which exploitation resulted in the recovery of important land timely intelligence
(4) The US and ARVN cooperation in the evacuation and relocation of personnel and live stock from the village of BEN SUC to a New Life Hamlet.
(5) The use of a 3rd Riverline RAG Task Force enabling the 196th Inf Bde to search thoroughly along and beneath both sides of the SAIGON River resulting in the exploitation of several VC safe havens.
(6) The destruction of numerous VC fortifications and structures along with the discovery of many VC cache sites.
(7) The effective fire support provided by the supporting artillery from the forward fire support bases and CU CHI plus the integration by tactical air support greatly aided the success of the operation.
(8) The utilization of bulldozers and engineer equipment on the out-skirts of PHU HOA DONG to isolate that village from the VC in the FILHOL Plantation.
b. Significant Actions: (p5)
(1) On 8 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, located 10 tons of rice, 1500 gals of fish sauce, 2 boats (one with motor), 12 CBU's and 3 bicycles vic XT566323. All were destroyed except the rice and motor which were evacuated.
(2) On 8 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf Ambush Patrol engaged an unknown number of VC with SA and AW fire vic XT733297. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification). One US carbine and one Russian rifle were captured and evacuated.
(3) On 9 January, C Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, destroyed 2 underground fortifications vic XT597324. In the same area 35.65 tons of rice were destroyed.
(4) On 9 January, B Co, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor engaged 15 VC on a raft with 90mm fire vic XT688222. Results: 15 VCKIA (BC) (no unit identification).
(5) On 10 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, destroyed 5 VC structures vic XT563313. In the same area 100 tons of rice and 100 gals of tar were located and evacuated.
(6) On 10 January, C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 30 underground fortifications vic XT744155 and 30 underground fortifications vic XT734184.
(7) On 11 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 1 sampan, 1100 lbs of rice, 9 underground fortifications and 20 VC structures. B Co destroyed 61 underground fortifications and 1 sampan vic XT7319.
(8) On 12 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, conducted an airmobile operation from the SAIGON River to vic XT747142 and conducted S&D operations resulting in the capture of 4 tons of rice, 2000 rds of SA, 2 sampans, 1 underground fortification, 1 VC structure and 5500 lbs of rice destroyed.
(9) On 12 January, between 2000 and 2130, A Co, 2lnd Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 13 VC in sampans vic XT715214 to XT716210. Results: 13 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 2 sampans destroyed.
(10) On 13 January, C Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf engaged 4 VC in a sampan vic XT673255. Results: 4 VCKIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 1 sampan destroyed.
(11) On 13 January, B Trp, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT569305 with SA and AW fire. Results: 6 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification).
(12) On 15 January, B Trp, 2nd Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 1 underground fortification, 4 tunnels, 60 50mm rds, and 5 grenades vic XT592288.
(13) On 16 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf engaged 13 VC in a sampan attempting to cross river vic XT673287. Results: 10 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (poss) and 1 sampan destroyed. Miscellaneous documents were captured and evacuated from the same area.
(14) On 16 January, 8 Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 2 underground fortifications and 1 tunnel vic XT615303. One shotgun, 1 cal .45 SMG, 2 Chicom rifles, 1 pellet gun, 1 cal .25 rifle were captured and evacuated.
(15) On 17 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, located 14 tons of polished rice vic XT590306 which was evacuated. In the same location 12.5 tons of rice were destroyed.
(p7)
(16) On 19 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf located 9 VC KIA (BC) vic XT664274 that were a result of operations conducted by the unit in the area. Five tons of rice were located and evacuated.
(17) On 20 January, Co C, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 6 VC in a sampan vic XT718213. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification), 1 VC PW and 1 cal .45 pistol captured and evacuated.
(18) On 20 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, with the assistance of a HOI CHANH located the following: 2 Springfield Rifles, 2 US SMG, 1 French Rifle, 1 Mauser Rifle, 6 CHICOM Carbines, one Shotgun, and 700 rds SA ammo vic XT661281.
(19) On 21 January, A co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, located a tunnel complex consisting of a main tunnel 600 meters long and 10 branch tunnels vic XT650235. Sixty pounds of documents were evacuated.
(20) On 22 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, apprehended 3 VC PW's vic XT704210. VC PW's led the unit to XT704216 where the following items were destroyed: 3 hand grenades, 10 AT mines, 4 homemade bangalore torpedoes, and two 155mm rds. Located and evacuated were: 2 commercial radios, miscellaneous web equipment, 1300 rds SA ammo, 4 Chicom carbines, 1 Russian rifle and 1 Mauser rifle.
c. Revolutionary Development Activities: MEDCAP Teams were used and held. Hand items distributed in PHU HOA DONG. Mass evacuation and relocation of the villagers and livestock of BEN SUC to a New Life Hamlet was completed
d. ARVN participation: The 2nd Bn, 7th ARVN Regt, conducted successful seal and search operations in PHU HOA DONG in coordination and conjunction with the 2nd Bde. The 30th RAG of the 3rd Riverine Zone provided boats to allow the banks of the SAIGON River to be checked for VC caches and sampans
12, RESULTS:
a. US Losses:
(1) Personnel: 40 KIA, 156 WIA
(2) Equipment: 3 APC destroyed, 3 APC damaged (moderate), 2 APC's damaged (heavy), 1 tank-dozer damaged (heavy), 1 tank destroyed, one ¼ ton truck damaged (heavy)
b. Enemy Losses:
(1) Total Personnel Losses:
VC KIA (BC) 331
VC KIA (POSS) 155
VC POW's 39
HOI CHANHS 147
Detainees 147
(2) Total Material Captured: (p8)
(a) Small Arms Weapons:
TYPE QUANTITY
Rifle, Cal 30, M-1 Us 7
Rifle, 7.92mm, Mauser 7
Rifle, AK-47, Soviet Assault 6
Rifle, U/I 5
Rifle, U/I, Soviet 2
Rifle, MAS-36, French 3
Rifle, Type 56, CHICOM 7
Rifle, Cal .25 1
Rifle, Enfield 1
Rifle, Springfield, (US) 2
Rifle, 7.62mm, M-14 (US) 1
Carbine, Cal .30 (US) 12
Carbine, Type 53 CHICOM 35
Carbine, 7.62mm, Soviet 3
SMG, Cal .45 (US) 4
SMG, 7.92mm 2
SMG, CHICOM 1
Pistol, Cal. 45, (US) 6
Pistol, Homemade 8
Pistol, 9mm, P-38 4
Shotgun, U/I 2
Gun, Pellet 3
(b) Crew Served Weapons:
TYPE QUANTITY
Launcher, RPG-2 Rocket 3
BAR, Cal .30, (US) 2
Rockets, U/I 3
(c) HE Rounds
82mm Mortar 2 rds
(d) SA ammo 7717 rds
(e) Rice 253.85 tons
(f) Miscellaneous: NONE
(3) Total Material Destroyed:
(a) HE Rounds
TYPE QUANTITY
155mm 10 rds
105mm 18 rds
90mm 1 rd
81mm 23 rds
60mm 117 rds (p9)
Bombs 15
4.2 inch 2 rds
82mm 1 rd
57mm 26 rds
57mm 26 rds
RPG-2 2 rds
8 inch 3 rds
75mm 3 rds
6 rockets
175mm 1 rd
(b) Mines and Grenades:
TYPE QUANTITY
Bangalore Torpedoes 4
CBU 135
Grenades 451
Shape Charge 1
AT Mines 101
AP Mines 59
(c) SA Ammo. 3013 rds
(d) Miscellaneous:
ITEM QUANTITY
TNT 4 lbs
Salt 200 lbs
Outboard motors 6
Bicycles 10
Sampans 11
Printers Ink 5 gals.
Tar 5 gals
Cement 600 lbs
Documents 285 lbs
Books Four 5 gal cans
CHICOM flashlight Batteries 260
Roll of tin 1 roll (1000' X 3')
Gasoline 10 gals
Typewriters 2
Grenades 10
Medical Supplies 15 lbs
Mask, gas (VC) 121
Mask, protective, (US) 4
Sewing Machine 1
Batteries 24
Misc. clothing & web equip. 0
Civilian Radios 1
Camera 1
Tape Recorders 2 (p10)
Sound Tapes 74
Forging Kit 1
Rolls of Wire 2
Fish Sauce 1500 gals
Outboard Motors 3
Boats 4
Trenches 14
Bicycles 9
Salt 1200 lbs
Sampans 145
Claymore Mines 7
Foxholes 129
TNT 292 lbs
Printing Press 1
Bridges 6
Kerosene 5 gals
Punji Pits 26
Tunnels 521
VC Structures 340
Rice 100.4 tons
13, ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:
a. Logistics: For a listing of logistic problems encountered, see the After Action Report of the 25th Inf Div SUPCOM (App 1).
b. Signal. The circuits established to support this operation are described in the 125th Signal Bn After Action Report (App 1)/
c. Aviation. For Aviation Operations, see 25th Aviation Bn After Action Report (App 1).
14. CIVIC ACTION:
a. 196th Bde:
(1) Conducted a total of 3 MEDCAPS at TRUNG LAP treating 301 patients.
(2) Provided 2,500 lbs of captured rice to ARVN dependents at TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center.
(3) Constructed 5000 meters of road vicinity TRUNG LAP.
b. 2nd Bde:
(1) Conducted a total of 10 MEDCAPS vicinity of PHU HOA DONG, treating 473 patients/
(2) Distributed clothing to approximately 1000 people at PHU HOA DONG (P11)
(3)Constructed a swing for school at PHU HOA DONG.
(4) Constructed playground at PHU HOA DONG.
(5) Delivered 4000 lbs of captured rice (sour) to PF Compound at TAN PHU TRUNG to be used as hog feed.
c. Division:
(1) Provided clothing and commodities to 83 people evacuated from operational area.
(2) Provided 4000 lbs of captured rice to HAU NGHIA Province Chief.
d. Civic Action by Divisional units was confined generally in the vicinity of TRUNG LAP (XT7119) villages. The proximity of US forces has enable units to increase civic action projects in those villages. The security provided by 2nd Bde has enabled the district chief of PHU HOA DONG to reestablish the district office at PHU HOA DONG from PARIS TAN QUI. Evacuation of non-combatants was primarily handled by 1st Div units. 25th Div was involved in the evacuation of 83 non-combatants who were subsequently returned to GVN control at TRUNG LAP New Life Hamlet.
e. Psychological Operations:
(1) The task organization of the division had a HB, light Mobile (Loudspeaker Team) attached to 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div and an ARVN PSYOPS team attached to the 196th Lt Inf Bde. The 246th PSYOP Company was in general support of the 25th Inf Div PSYOP program.
(2) The general attitude of the population toward the US forces was one of mistrust and concern. In the area in and around the village of PHU HOA DONG (XT7121), the population was extremely hostile as this had been a Viet Cong stronghold for many years.
(3) Psychological Operations were directed against enemy targets, emphasizing Allied Might and Introductory Themes. As the operation continued, emphasis was placed on themes to convince the VC that their situation had deteriorated in order to induce them to rally. For this purpose, CHIEU HOI and inevitable victory themes were used. Target areas were systematically covered to reach all intended target audiences. On D+1 the 146tih PSYOP Company and brigades commenced leaflet and loudspeaker operations in the AO. Pre-planned operations to D+5 were executed and then conducted as the tactical situation presented itself. Ground mounted loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted on a nightly basis at (XT7121) across the SAIGON River. There were 3 HOI CHANHS exploited with personalized leaflets and 4 with loudspeaker tapes. Altogether there were 976,265 leaflets dropped and 29 loudspeaker sorties flown in support of the operation,. Total aerial broadcast time was 10 hours and 40 minutes. Total ground broadcast time was 17 hours and 20 minutes. Approximately 70% of all loudspeaker operations were conducted at night.
(4) The operation resulted in 37 HOI CHANHS who returned, 11 of them to US units.
Those who were interviewed acknowledged seeing leaflets and hearing loudspeaker
Broadcasts, and admitted that they were to some extent influenced by the propaganda.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
JAMES D. DETHLEFSEN
Cpt. AGC
Asst AG
Battle For Fire Support Base CrookDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
18TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCMH 30 June 1969
THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam Transcribed by Ron Leonard From
ATTN: Command Historian original documents. Obtained from
APO San Francisco 96375 25th Infantry Museum, Hawaii
10/07/2001
TO: Headquarters
Department of the Army
Attn: O.C.M.H.
Washington, D.C. 20315
1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Fires Support Base Crook (Offensive-Defensive)
2. INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION: 052000 June - 072130 June 1969.
3. LOCATION: Tay Ninh Province, RVN. Map Series 1501, sheet Number NC48-3. Grid XT055595.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. PERSON BEING INTERVIEWED: Maj. Joseph E. Hacia, 05311008, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Officer in command of FSB Crook)
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Division Historian
7. TASK ORGANIZATION
a. Company B, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry.
b. Battery A, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery
Elements of the 3-22 Infantry communications, medical, support, and mortar platoons.
8. SUPPORTING FORCES: Artillery, aviation, and Air Force support was allocated from normal brigade and division assets as the action developed at FSB Crook.
a. U.S. Artillery
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(1) Battery C, 1-27 Artillery (155mm), FSB Washington, (XT146568),II FFV.
GSR.
(2) One platoon, Battery A, 2-32 Artillery (175mm), FSB St. Barbara
(XT272683), II FFV GSR.
(3) One platoon. Battery B, 3-13 Artillery (8 inch), Tay Ninh Base Camp
(XT165515), 25th Division Artillery.
b. ARVN Artillery: One platoon, Battery C, 3-38 Artillery (155mm). Cao Xa
(XT125502).
c. U.S. Aircraft:
5-6 June
(1) 2 Night Hawks, A/2-25 Avn Bn.
(2) 2 AH1G (Cobra), B/2-25 Avn Bn.
(3) 2 AH1G (Cobra), 187th Aslt. Hel Co.
(4) 2 AH1G (Cobra), D/3-4 Cav.
(5) 2 AH1G (Cobra), 334th Aslt. Hel Co
|
6-7 June
2 Night Hawks, A/2-25 Avn Bn
2 UH1C (Gunships), B/2-25 Avn Bn
1 UH1H (Flare), B/2-25 Avn Bn
2 AH1G (Cobra), 187th Aslt. Hel Co.
4 AH1G (Cobra), D/3-4 Cav
|
c. U.S. Air Force Aircraft
5-6 June
(1) 2 F4C Fighters
(2) 8 F-100 Fighters
(3) 2 AC-119 Gunships
(4) 2 AC-47 Gunships
|
6-7 June
2 F4C Fighters
10 F-100 Fighters
1 AC-119 Gunships
2 AC-47 Gunships
|
9. INTELLIGENCE:
a. Enemy - Prior to the beginning of the attacks of Fire Support Base Crook, intelligence indicated that a high point of enemy activity was to occur between 1 and 10 June 1969. Information received from documents captured on 23 and 28 may by the 1st Air Cavalry division revealed that the 88th NVA regiment would attack a U.S. position in the Tay Ninh area. A specific time frame for the attack was not mentioned in the documents; however, they did disclose that the cadre of the 88th Regiment to finish training courses conducted at the Regimental headquarters by 1 June. At this time the Regiment was believed to be dispersed in central War Zone C. The remaining two regiments of the 9th VC/NVA
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Division, the 271st and 272nd, were believed to be located in the base areas in Cambodia, also preparing for attacks in the Tay Ninh area.
Information received from P.W.'s and documents after the attacks on FSB Crook identified the 3rd Battalion, 272nd NVA Regiment as the attacking force on 5-6 June, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 88th NVA Regiment as the attacking force on 6-7 June. The actions and locations of the 3rd Battalion, 272nd NVA regiment just prior to the 5-6 June attack are uncertain; however, the 2nd battalion, 88th Regiment with a strength of 180 men, had moved to the vicinity of XT049678 on 4 June and built defensive positions and continued training. The 3rd Battalion, 88th Regiment with a strength of 200 men had moved to a temporary base camp in the vicinity of XT1061 on 4 June. A 50-man company from the 271st NVA Regiment was attached to the 3rd Battalion. The attacks on FSB Crook coincided with the Midway meeting of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Presidents. It is likely that the enemy objective was to gain a moral or psychological victory, in order to counter the impact of this meeting.
b. Terrain- The terrain surrounding Fire Support Base crook is flat and generally forested. The area to the east is triple-canopy jungle. To the north, there is scattered double-canopy jungle. The area to the south is secondary growth, while to the southwest and west are abandoned rice paddies. The Soui Ben Da stream flows north to south 300 meters to the west of the base. Fields of observation and artillery direct fire are good, extending from the minimum of 220 meters on the east to 350 meters on the north and south up to 1000 meters to the southwest. Fields of fire for small arms are excellent out to 200 meters. The wooded areas on the east and northeast offer the best avenues of approach; however, the is a destroyed village to the south with broken ground and brush which offers a secondary approach to within 200 meters of the base. The base is positioned astride an east-west road, and there is a north-south trail east of the base, which provide rapid approaches into the general area. The only significant obstacle to movement in the area is the Soui Ben Da stream on the west which is not fordable in the immediate vicinity of the base, although there is a footbridge at the road crossing (See Enclosure 2).
c. Weather- During the period 5 to 8 June the area around FSB Crook was characterized by partly cloudy skies in the morning and afternoon with a general overcast (ceiling 1000 feet) by 1900 hours. There were intermittent rain showers in the late afternoon and early evening in the area. At approximately 2400 hours, however, the sky would clear for a radius of five miles around FSB Crook, providing excellent observation and flying conditions.
10. MISSION: Fire Support Base Crook was established in April 1969 to interdict VC/NVA movement northwest of Tay Ninh City and to support the platoon and company sized offensive operations conducted in that area.
11. EXECUTION: The first indication of the impending attack on fore support Base Crook came at 2000 hours on 5 June when the base monitored seismic sensor activations, indicating heavy activity 950 meters east and 550 meters northwest
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west of the base. These two areas were engaged with supporting artillery and the activity ceased. At this time, the AN/PPS-4 radar mounted on the observation tower began to detect groups of 3-4 personnel moving in the wood lines all around the base. Approximately 18 sightings were made between 2000 hours and 0100 hours. The direction and distance of each sighting was relayed to the artillery battery within the base, which engaged each location with time fused direct fire (Killer Junior). Beginning at 2130 hours, the Battalion Executive Officer requested interdictory artillery fires on the trails and likely assembly areas around the base, and placed the e base on 100% alert. As the cloud cover cleared shortly after midnight, an observer with a starlight scope in the tower began to sight the same small groups that had been detected by radar. From 0130 hours to 0255 hours the movement around the base generally c eased, but the interdictory fires were continued.
At 0255 hours, the enemy initiated an attack by fire. 107mm and 122mm rockets, 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds, RPG's and small arms fire began to impact in and around the base. The rate of indirect fire was 80 rounds per minute for the next one and one-half hours. Most of the rockets passed over the base and impacted outside the wire to the east. A mortar round killed one man as an L.P. to the west was being withdrawn. There was little damage and were few casualties within the perimeter. Coordinated with the attack by fire, the enemy launched a battalion-sized assault from the south and east. (See Enclosure 3). The troops within the base laid down a heavy volume of grazing fire, as the howitzers fired “Killer Juniors” to the depth of 150-200 meters all around the base. The supporting 155mm artillery was used to hit the enemy attack positions in the wood line to the south, while the 8-inch artillery fired deeper into this area. The base's 81mm and 4.2” mortars fired on the wood line to the east, and 175mm artillery was used to suppress the enemy firing positions to the north. The intense defensive fires slowed the enemy ground assault but a 16-man element did breach the outer wire on the south with bangalore torpedoes. The men on the bunker line stopped this group with automatic weapons and claymore mines. Although their attack was stopped, the bulk of the enemy force remained in the open firing small arms and RPG's at the bunkers. At approximately 0400 hours, AC-47 and AC-119 gunships, helicopter fore teams, and Air Force fighters arrived over the area. The 175mm artillery fire was shifted 1 kilometer to the north, thus clearing the area to the north and west for engagement by the gunships. The AC-47 gunship poured fire into the open area around the base for 360 degrees. As the helicopters moved in, they were engaged by numerous .51 caliber machineguns (estimated 15) around the area, with the heaviest concentration on the west. One-observation helicopter was damaged and the Brigade command and control ship received five hits. As the helicopters suppressed the anti-aircraft fire, the intense supporting fires forced the enemy to withdraw into the jungle. (See Inclosure 4). By 0530 there was only sporadic fire from the surrounding area, but artillery and TAC air continued to hit suspected targets. At 0645 hours, Company B sent a platoon through the break in the wire to search through the area to the south. As they moved into the old village area they were engages at close range by a group of 10-15 NVA who had remained concealed in spider holes. Grenades wounded the Company B Commander and three radio operators. The platoon moved back to the bunker line by bounds and the
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area was engaged with 155mm Artillery and TAC air strikes, forcing the remaining NVA to flee into the forest to the south. After the search of the battle area was resumed, 76 NVA bodies, 15 small arms, 1 RPG launcher, 10,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and numerous RPG rounds were recovered. The NVA soldiers were dressed in khaki uniforms and wearing “Ho Chi Minh” sandals. Each man had been equipped with an AK-47 rifle, a bandolier, 8 to 10 hand grenades, a cup type gas mask, and was carrying an extra 5 RPG rounds. The bodies were significantly free of extraneous material such as documents, diaries or other personal effects. Three infiltration passes were found, which identified the battalion as an element of the 272nd NVA Regiment.
Later that morning, Companies A and C of the battalion were air-landed approximately 5 kilometers north of FSB Crook to search south towards the base. At 1245 hours, company A became engaged with an unknown sized enemy force and light contact continued until 1`545 hours. Due to this contact the search north of the base was not completed on 6 June,. On the evening of 6 June, the pattern of activity resumed in an almost identical fashion. From 2000 to 2030 hours, the seismic sensors northwest and east of the base transmitted heavy activity. The radar detected two groups of approximately 40 personnel moving 1500 meters north of the base. From 2000 to 0100 hours the radar continued to detect groups of 3 to 5 men in the woodlines all around the base. Each area of activity was engaged with mortar and artillery fire, or direct fire from the howitzers within the base.
By 0100 hours, the majority of the movement had ceased, but all areas continued to be engages with direct (Killer Junior) and indirect fires. At 0200 hours, a Night Hawk helicopter, flying in to support the action, detected large groups of enemy moving towards the base along the road from the east. Artillery fires were immediately shifted to attack these groups, At 0255 the enemy attack by fire began with greater intensity than the previous night. For the first five minutes the rate of fire was 150 rounds of rocket, mortar, and RPG fire per minute, and approximately 50 rounds per minute for the next one and one-half hours. The initial volley wounded three U.S. soldiers. Coordinated with the attack by fire, the enemy launched a two-battalion ground assault, one battalion moving out to the woodline to the northeast, and the other attacking from the northwest (See Enclosure 5). The base engaged the attacking enemy with “Killer Junior” and automatic weapons. The Night Hawk helicopter strafed the enemy coming out of the jungle to the northeast, while two helicopter fire teams hit the battalion on the northwest with machinegun and rocket fire; these gunships were followed by TAC air strikes which dropped napalm and fragmentation bombs on this force. An AC-47 gunship and helicopter gunships engaged the .51 caliber machineguns, which had begun firing from the west of the stream. 175mm artillery was placed on the jungle to the northwest, while mortar fire 155mm and 8 inch howitzer fire was used to suppress the enemy firing positions to the east and south. The area was under continuous illumination by the AC-119 gunship, which engaged the area outside the wire with machinegun fire. (See Enclosure 6). The enemy coming from the northwest breached the first wire barrier, but was stopped by the intense defensive fires. The attack from the northeast was stopped before it reached the wire. The continuous defensive fires forced the enemy to attempt to withdraw, but the volume of automatic fire and bursting munitions
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was so great that the majority were trapped and cut down in the open. Those who did reach the jungle had to move through concentrations of mortar and artillery fire, which was shifted out in pursuit of them.
By 0530 hours, those enemies who could had withdrawn. At 0815 hours, Company A of the battalion was air-landed southeast of the base and began a sweep to the west. Company C landed east of the base at 0845 hours and began a search of that area. The Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon, and two platoons from Company D were brought in to reinforce Company B, and to assist in the sweep to the north.
As the sweep around the base concluded, 323 NVA bodies, 10 PW's, 39 AK-47's, 2 light machineguns, 2 60mm mortars, 90 rounds of 60mm ammunition, 2 RPG launchers, 230 RPG's, 500 hand grenades, 84 satchel charges, 10 bangalore torpedoes, and 3000 rounds of small arms ammunition were recovered. That evening at 2000 hours, the Base Commander (Maj. Hacia) ordered a test firing of all weapons as a precaution in the event of continued enemy attacks. Moments after the test firing began, the base received small arms fire from 360 degrees and several 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. Within 15 minutes they already had received a light volume of mortar and rocket fire. The base returned the fire with automatic weapons, “Killer Junior” and artillery. This duel lasted until 0100 hours when firing ceased. A third enemy attack had been aborted by the initiating of the test fire. 3 NVA bodies were recovered from this attack.
12. COMMAND: The base was under command of Major Joseph E. Hacia, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry. CPT Larry B. Thomas commanded B. Company of the Battalion and CPT Dickson A. Real commanded Battery A, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery. Major Hacia alternated his position between the observation tower and the TOC bunker. CPT Thomas positioned himself along the bunker line at the point of the main attacks. The battery commander remained at the battery firing position.
13. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. Radio- The operation was controlled on the Battalion (3-22 Inf) Command Net. The TOC bunker had one radio on the Battalion Command Net, one radio on the Battalion Logistics Net, and one radio on the company B Command Net. On the tower there were two radios, one on the Battalion command Net and one on the Battery A Fire Direction Net. The Company B CP had one radio on the company Net and one radio on the Battalion Command Net. Battery A operated on their Fire direction Net and monitored the Infantry Battalion Command Net.
b. Wire- The communications bunker was located 15 meters from the TOC. The switchboard had connections to t5he TOC, the tower, the FDC, the Company B CP, and the platoon CP's. In addition to this wire net, there was a “Hot Loop” connecting the TOC, company B CP, FDC. The switchboard operators in the communications center had been instructed to connect all stations in a conference call at the first sign of enemy contact, this addition to the “Hot Loop” provided two open circuit telephone systems.
14. RESUPPLY: Seven CH-47 sorties were required to resupply FSB Crook on the
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mornings of 6 and 7 June. Infantry and artillery expenditures for the period of 5-8 June are as follows;
a. M16 5.56mm -170,360 rounds
b. M60 7.62mm -120,820 rounds
c. Hand Grenades (Frag) -300
d. Caliber .50 MG -13,000 rounds
e. 66mm Rocket (LAW) -156
f. 4.2” Mortar HE &