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 Operation Saratoga
HEADQUARTERS
25TTH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 86225


AVDCDH
SUBJECT:     Combat After Action Report                                                                        30 April 1968


TO:     SEE DISTRIBUTION

     Combat Operation After Action Report for Operation SARATOGA is forwarded for necessary action and/or information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



                              J. D. ZEILTZ
                              2LT, AGC
                              Asst. Adjutant

6 Incl
1.  Incl 1 - (illegible) 1st Brigade
2.  Incl 2 - (illegible) 2nd Brigade
3.  Incl 3 - (illegible) 3rd Brigade - Withdrawn, Hqs, DA  
4.  Incl 4 - (illegible) 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf
5.  Incl 5 - (illegible) 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav
6.  Incl 6 - (illegible) 3rd Sqdn, 17th Cav

DISTRIBUTION:
3-USARV, ATTN;  AVH CS (illegible)
1-ACSFOR, DA
3-MACV, ATTN:  MAC-J343
6-IIFFORCEV, ATTN:  G-3 (D&T)
1-Commandant, USA Inft Sch, Ft. Benning, GA 31029
1-US Military Academy, ATTN:  Librarian, West Point NY 10996





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



In Reply Refer To
AGAM-P (M) (29 May 68)          FOR: OT-RD-68X015                                                                                   3 June 1968


SUBJECT:     Combat After Action Report - Operation SARATOGA, Lessons Learned,
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (U).


SEE DISTRIBUTION     “This document contains information affecting the National Defense of
the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title, 18,
U. S. C., Section 795 and 794.  Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.”

1.     Subject report is forwarded as inclosure for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15.

2.     Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:



                                   KENNETH G. WICKHAM
                                   Major General, USA
                                   The Adjutant General
1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION
Commanding Generals
     US Continental Army Command
     US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
     US Army War College
     US Army Command and General Staff College
     US Army Adjutant General School
     US army Air Defense School
     US Army Armor School
     US Army Artillery and Missile School
     US Army Aviation School
     US Army Chemical School
     US Army Civil Affairs School
     US Army Engineer School
     US Army Infantry School
     US Army Intelligence School

 Operation Saratoga- 1st Brigade

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Brigade
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96385


AVDCFB-C                                                                                                                                  13 April 1968

SUBJECT:     Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation SARATOGA)
          (RCS:  MACV J3-32)

Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCDH
APO San Francisco 96225


1.     (U)     NAME OF OPERATION:  Operation SARATOGA

2.     (U)     DATE OF OPERATION:  250001 February 1968 - 102400 March 1968.

3.     (U)     LOCATION:  TAY NINH and BINH DUONG Provinces, RVN.

4.     (U)     COMMAND HEADQUARTERS:  Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division     

5.     (C)     REPORTING OFFICER:  Colonel Fremont B. Hodson Jr.

6.     (C)     TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Hq, 1st Brigade

b. 2-14 Infantry

c. 2-22 Infantry (Mech)

d. D Trp 3-17 Cav (released from OPCON, 070700 March 1968)

e. 7-11 Arty (DS)

f. 1-27 Arty OSR

g. 2-32 Arty (OS)(-)

h. 5-2 Arty (OS)(-)

7.     (C)     SUPPORTING FIRES:

          a.     Artillery:  Artillery support was characterized by daily movement of the firing batteries to support the airmobile operations of 2-14 Inf.  Fire support bases used were:     

               (1)     FSB WAINWRIGHT II (XT 285 509)

               (2)     FSB BOWIE (XT 239 427)

               (3)     FSB HULL (XT 260 380)

               (4)     FSB LOGAN I (XT 316 552)

               (5)     FSB LOGAN II (XT 231 581)

A total of 6,851 HE, 131 WP, and 147 illumination rounds were expended.  Artillery fire accounted for 4 enemy KIA (BC) and 6 enemy KIA (POSS).  CS units were used for firing TOTs, preparations of landing zones, large tactical targets, and the H&I program.

          b.     Tactical Air:  Tactical Air Support was provided by the 7th USAF.  The missions were controlled by the 1st Brigade TACP.  The following summarizes USAF activities in support of Operation SARATOGA.

               (1)     Missions flown:  59

               (2)     Fighter Sorties:  118

                    a.     Preplanned:  47

                    b.     Preplanned (diverted):  21

                    c.     Divert:  3

                    d.     Immediate:  47

               (3)     Bomb Damage Assessment:  189 bunkers destroyed, 23 bunkers damaged, 762 meters of trench destroyed, 1310 meters of trench uncovered, 8 spider holes destroyed, 100 spider holes uncovered, 100 meters of tunnel uncovered, 1 tunnel entrance exposed, 3 boxes of supplies destroyed, 3 boxes of supplies damaged, 3 automatic weapons destroyed (possible), 4 enemy killed (BC).

          c.     Army Aviation:  Army Aviation statistics for operation SARATOGA are as follows:

               (1)     Sorties (UH-1C, UH-1D Aircraft):  155

                    a.     Combat assaults (gunships):  30

                    b.     Tactical troop lifts:  60

                    c.     Resupply:  20

                    d.     Air Evac, C&C, & Misc:  45

               (2)     (illegible) CH-47 Aircraft:  52

                    a.     Resupply:  45

                    b.     Evacuation:  0

                    c.     Others:  7

               (3)     Sorties CH-23 Aircraft:  200

                    a.     Tactical:  190

                    b.     Administrative:  10

8.     (C)     INTELLIGENCE:  Intelligence studies and experiences prior to the start of Operation SARATOGA indicated the presence of the II14 Local Force Battalion and 4-16 Local Force Companies in the 1st Brigade area of operations.  D-16 Local Force Battalion which normally operated in the AO had departed in late January to take part in the TET Offensive.  Also located in or on the boundaries of the AO were the 680th Training and Rear Service Regiment, and elements of the 83rd Rear Service Group.  The local force elements were thought to be dispersed down to platoon level in order to avoid contact, while conducting limited attacks against RF-PF outposts, and conducting re-supply and propaganda activities.

               D-14 was known to be under strength following attacks on TAY NINH City during mid-February.  Their location was thought to be somewhere east of TAY NINH.  C-40 Local Force Company was located in the “STRAIGHT EDGE WOODS” vic (XT 1637) and generally conducted platoon sized operations in areas of the south and southwest of TAY NINH City.  There had been no recent contact with this unit.  In the MICHELIN PLANTATION the C-64 Local Force Co with several guerilla units had been conducting usual propaganda and harassing activities.  Little was known of the 680th Regiment except that it generally operated along the CAMBODIAN Border vic XT 0065.  The 83rd Rear Service Group was located in the TRAPEZOID conducting re-supply and administrative activities.

               Special Agent reports indicated the bulk of activity in the AO was centered in the northern TRAPEZOID (83rd Rear Service) and north of KATUN on re-supply routes coming east from CAMBODIA on the ORIENTAL RIVER and through the STRAIGHT EDGE, and north from CAMBODIA through BO TUC toward the SAIGON RIVER.

               Vegetation varied from triple canopy jungle to large areas of open rice paddies.  The terrain was generally flat and the central and southern portions of the AO were well populated.  Major rivers in the area were the SAIGON and ORIENTAL.  Weather did not hamper or prohibit friendly troop movements.  Roads in the area were in good condition and were used for re-supply and movement of infantry and artillery.  The ground was firm enough to enable the utilization of mechanized infantry.

               The overall evaluation of the intelligence information from ARVN HQs and other local sources is considered B-3 (usually reliable, possibly true).  On several occasions US troops responded to local agent reports with good results.  Overall operational security was considered good.

9.     (C)     MISSION:

                  a. Within capability, conduct offensive operations in TAY NINH and BINH DUONG Provinces to locate and destroy
                      enemy forces.

b. Provide engineer security for repair of MSR between BAU CO and TAY NINH, TAY NINH and DAU TIENG, TAY NINH and GO DAU HA.

c. Secure FSB ST. BARBARA at BAU CO and LOC between BAU CO and TAY NINH.

d. React to VC initiatives in TAOI.

e. Assume responsibility for defense of DAU TIENG Base Camp.

f. Conduct combined operation with 25th ARVN DIV to drive VC forces from AP TAN HOA (XT 4405).

g. Suspend Rome Plow operations and return ICT to TAY NINH.

h. Secure any TOT operations required for support of II FFV Arty at FSB ST BARBARA.

i. Establish water-borne blocks on SAIGON RIVER and other canal systems to prevent enemy re-supply and movement.

j. Relieved of mission to provide engineer security for repair of MSR, and daily route security and sweeps from TAY NINH to GO DAU HA effective 070700 March 1968.

10.     (C)     CONCEPT OF OPERATION:  The operation was to employ D Troop 3-17 Cav and one infantry battalion to clear and secure the MSR daily, either by sweep or outposting.  The infantry battalion would then conduct combat assault and recon in force operations in the area adjoining the MSR.  The remaining infantry assets of the brigade would be employed in daily airmobile assault, combat assault, recon in force, cordon and search, and bushmaster operations.  Artillery would be moved over land to forward fire support bases to support infantry operations.

11.     (C)     EXECUTION:  (C)

a. Mission order received 240040 February 1968.  

b. Conduct of the Operation:

25 February 1968

          2-14 Inf:  Conducted cordon operation in conjunction with National Police around villages vic. XT 173534, XT 175528, XT 167528 and XT 176536.  Cordon netted 21 suspects, negative contact.  MEDCAP's were conducted at scene of operation, and 30 patients were treated.  Battalion returned to TAY NINH to provide security during hours of darkness.

          2-22 Inf (M):  A Co (-) cleared Rt 22 to GO DAU HA.  A platoon of Co A moved to BAU CO to secure the fire support base, B & C Co secured DAU TIENG and cleared and swept road from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH.  B Co conducted recon in force in area XT 340450, XT 448420 and XT 460449, with negative contact.  C Co conducted recon in force in areas XT 344452, XT354470 and XT 375456, with negative contact.  Battalion returned to DAU TIENG to provide security during hours of darkness.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav. Swept Rt 4 to BAU CO.  Secured Rom Plow effort at BAU CO, and escorted Rome Plow convoy to TAY NINH.

26 February 1968

          2-14 Inf:  Battalion conducted a 3 Company combat assault to LZ vic XT 325526.  D Co remained at TAY NINH as ready reaction force.  Battalion then conducted recon in force to vic XT 329502, negative contact.  A MEDCAP was conducted at HEIP NEHIA, 137 patients were treated, and 100 bars of soap distributed.  Battalion Chaplain distributed 40 lbs of candy to children.  Battalion closed TAY NINH to secure it during hours of darkness.

          2-22 Inf. (M):  Platoon of Co A swept Rt 1 to TAY NINH, and secured an artillery convoy to BAU CO from TAY NINH.  B & C Co. swept road from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH, and escorted convoy; another convoy was escorted from TAY NINH to DAU TIENG.  B & C Co then conducted a recon in force along axis XT 375440, to XT 375480 to XT 358475.  B Co located 3 bicycles, 2 Chicom grenades, vic XT 372484, and destroyed to hooches vic XT 379476, negative contact.  B & C Co closed DAU TIENG to secure during hours of darkness.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Two platoons swept road to GO DAU HA.  One platoon secured FSB WAINWRIGHT.

27 February 1968

          2-14 Inf:  B, C & D Cos conducted combat assaults to LZ vic XT 355545.  A Co (-) acted as blocking force vic XT 375524.  B, C & D Co recon in force to vic XT 368533.  A Co (-) located 6 bunkers, 75 ft of trench, and 3 spider holes, negative contact.  A MEDCAP was conducted at HIEP TROUNG (XT 215485), treating 229 patients.  Bn returned to TAY NINH to secure during hours of darkness.

          2-22 Inf (M):  A Co. (-) conducted sweep of Rt 4, and secured convoy to BAU CO from TAY NINH, and return convoy to TAY NINH.  B & C Co's conducted cordon operations assisted by CRIP and National Police in villages vic XT 511485, XT 520499 and XT520496.  C Co then conducted recon in force to vic XT 520515.  All companies closed DAU TIENG to secure during hours of darkness.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Two platoons swept road to GO DAU HA, one platoon secured artillery batteries at FSB WAINWRIGHT.

28 February 1968

          2-14 Inf:  A, C, & D Co's conducted combat assault to vic XT 117576.  All Co's were in position and began recon in force at 0823 hours to vic XT 109564, negative contact.  Companies closed TAY NINH to secure during hours of darkness at 1615 hours.  Gunships, 1 VC KIA (BC), XT 119488.  B Co moved to Bushmaster positions vic XT 113566, XT 116559, and XT 122666 to remain overnight.

          2-22 Inf (H):  Platoon of A Co swept Rt 4 and conducted convoys between BAU CO and TAY NINH.  Recon platoon conducted sweep mission to TAY NINH.  B & C Co's conducted recon in force from vic XT 4744 to XT 4743.  B Co was diverted to assist recon in clearing numerous barricades.  C Co continued recon in force to vic XT 470415 then set up ambush position vic XT 496456.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Conducted sweep of Rt 22 to GO DAU HA.

29 February 1968

          2-14 Inf:  Conducted combat assault with three companies vic XT202393 and XT 203413 and conducted recon in force to PZ vic XT 18042 for extraction.  B Co returned from overnight Bushmaster location, and remained at TAY NINH as ready reaction force.  B Co departed for Bushmaster vic XT 170460 at 1600.  Co 4, 2-32 Inf now OPCON 2-14 Inf, secured laterite pit with one platoon.  Co A (-) secured artillery in support of 2-14 and conducted road sweep and convoy security from BAU CO to TAY NINH with one platoon.  At 0845 light fire team engaged 4 VC with AW, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).  Co's closed TAY NINH to secure during hours of darkness.  At 2333 TAY NINH Base Camp received 10-20 rds, 62mm mortar.  Results 2 WIA (slight), 10 vehicles damaged.

          2-22 Inf (M)(-):  Conducted recon in force from vic DAU TIENG to vic XT425475 and XT 445475 and returned to DAU TIENG.  At 1520 DAU TIENG Base Camp received 15 rnds 82mm mortar; results:  2 friendly WIA (slight); returned fire with counter-mortar program.  At 1736 DAU TIENG Base Camp received 7 rnds 82mm mortar; results:  2 US WIA (slight), I commo bunker damaged, 1 mess hall damaged.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  CRIP conducted overnight ambush patrol vic XT 186467.  Conducted road recon of Route 22 from TAY NINH to GO DAU HA and out-posted the road for convoy from CU CHI to TAY NINH.

1 March 1968

          2-14 Inf:  Conducted Eagle Flights into LZ's vic XT 305422, XT 306440, XT 300472, and XT365465 with 3 companies.  D Co found VC base camp at XT 355492, with one fresh grave; result:  1 VC (BC).  A Co 2-22 (M) (-) cleared road from BAU CO to TAY NINH and secured convoy from TAY NINH to BAU CO.  Secured laterite pit and artillery in support of Eagle Flight.  Bn closed TAY NINH to secure during hours of darkness.

          2-22 Inf (M)(-):  Conducted recon in force West from DAU TIENG to vic XT 417443.  B Co lead personnel carrier hit a mine vic XT 471468.  Results:  7 US WIA, 1 APC destroyed, 2 mine detectors destroyed.  At 1050 hours DAU TIEN Base Camp received 10 rounds 60 mm mortar, neg casualties, neg damage.  At vic XT 457415 B Co received 150 rounds of automatic weapons fire, and one claymore fired; returned fire with organic weapons, mortars and artillery, negative casualties, negative results.  Bn remained at DAU TIENG to secure during hours of darkness.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Conducted road sweep and AVLB security to loc vic XT 440228.  One platoon remained at bridge site OPCON 4-23 for overnight security of AVLB.

2 March 1968

          2-14 Inf (-):  A Co was OPCON to 2-22, returned to TAY NINGH 1500 hours, and was placed on alert to assist D, 3-17th.  B, C, & D Co's combat assaulted to LZ located vic XT 106451 and XT 110448 and then conducted recon in force along three axis to XT 111460, XT 132455, and XT 142453.  Negative contact.  Companies closed TAY NINH to secure during hours of darkness.

          2-22 Inf (M) (-):  B Co departed to secure LZ vic XT 520478.  A & C Co
2-14 arrived LZ 0730.  B Co then conducted recon in force to XT 517414 to XT 452416 to XT 464411.  B Co located a large quantity of drugs and 3 bunkers with 8-12 inch overhead cover vic XT 464411.  A, 2-14, and C Co searched village vic XT 534481; 5 bunkers were found and destroyed.  C Co located and destroyed 17 bunkers vic XT 468453.  Recon platoon secured engineer efforts on MSR vic XT 503483.  One element securing vic XT 471468.  Bn returned to DAU TIENG to secure during hours of darkness.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Conducted sweep Rt 22 to GO DAU HA.  Established contact vic XT 450225 at 1345 hours.  Negative casualties.  Enemy loses 4 VC KIA (BC).  Contact was broken at 1520 hours.  Village vic XT 4522 was declared not secure, and convoy returned to TAY NINH at 1830.

3 March 1968

          2-14 Inf (-):  A Co (-), A Co (-) 2-22 Inf (M) and artillery moved to positions at FSB vic XT 260380 at 0715.  C Co moved to FSD at 0741 hours, then to LZ vic XT 296287 at 0908 hours.  B Co conducted a combat assault to LZ vic XT 2631.  Companies then conducted recons in force to XT 288296, XT 293308 and XT 288304; negative contact.  Companies then conducted recons in force to XT 288296, XT 293308, and XT 288304; negative contact.  Battalion returned to TAY NINH to secure during hours of darkness.

          2-22 Inf (M) (-):  Recon platoon conducted sweep of MSR to TAY NINH and provided convoy security.  B Co conducted MSR sweep from vic XT 415445 to XT 371424 then moved to a laager position vic XT 3714124.  When convoy to DAU TIENG passed XT 352420 it received RPG and claymore fire resulting in 3 US WIA (dusted off), and 1 US WIA (ambulatory).  Enemy results, 1 KIA (BC).  At 1445 hours APC of B Co hit mine vic XT 453421 resulted in 2 WIA.  C Co departed DAU TIENG to lager position vic XT 497456 and AP vic XT 506447.  Conducted MEDCAP, BIN CUI (XT 462450), treated 182 patients.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Conducted sweep of Rt 22, provided convoy security from TAY NINH to GO DAU HA and secured engineer effort on bridge located vic XT 440229.

4 March 1968

          2-14 Inf:  B, C, & D Co's conducted combat assault to LZ vic XT 264327, then recon in force along 2 axis to vic XT 285390.  At XT275372 received sniper fire, returned with SA weapons; negative casualties; VC casualties unknown.  All elements of Bn and A Co, 2-22 closed TAY NINH 1715 HOURS.  Conducted MEDCAP at HIEP DINH (XT 220490) and treated 247 patients.

          2-22 Inf (M)(-):  Conducted road sweep with C Co vic XT 415443.  C Co conducted recon in force, established temporary laager position at XT 465438, XT 448421 and XT 491400 and clover-leafed from those positions.  At XT 487423 an APC struck a pressure type mine.  Results, 4 US WIA; all were dusted off.  Damage to APC, 3 road wheels blown off, and TC hatch blown off.  B Co conducted recon in force to temporary laager positions at XT 451431 and XT 452419 and conducted cloverleaf operations around those locations.  Recon swept the road from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH and secured the convoy there and back.  All units closed DAU TIENG to secure during hours of darkness.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Conducted road sweep and bridge security.  Swept road from TAY NINH to vic XT 440228.  Secured AVLB at XT 440228.  Troop closed TAY NINH at 1907.

5 March 1968

          2-14 Inf:  At 0220 hours 4 Co's departed base camp to cordon village vic XT 190435 in conduction with National Police.  Due to VC mortaring of MACV and B-32 Special Forces, vic XT 204511, the National Police were diverted from cordon operation.  Battalion then conducted recon in force to vic XT 120270 with 4 companies conducting cloverleaf search vic XT 140478, XT 144471, XT 150464 and XT 156456.  One platoon of A Co conducted a sweep of Rt 4 and secured convoy to TAY NINH, and returned to BAU CO.  Another platoon of A Co secured engineer effort vic XT 113513.  Supervised bunker and Dispensary, Self Help projects at HEIP LONG (XT 233480).  Bn returned TAY NINH to secure during hours of darkness.

          2-22 Inf (M)(-):  B Co swept MSR from vic XT 41442 to west until over-taken by recon platoon.  C Co conducted sweep of MSR to vic XT 414442.  Recon conducted sweep of MSR and provided convoy security to TAY NINH and return.  B & C Co conducted recon in force in the area of operations.  C Co located and destroyed a pressure type mine of 30, ¼ pound blocks of Chicom TNT, vic XT 415443.  Recon platoon APC hit mine at 1110 hours vic XT 522449, blowing off three road wheels, 4 US WIA.  Dust off complete 1115 hours.  Recon platoon hit another mine at 1700 hours vic XT 338458.  Moderate damage, no casualties.  All units closed DAU TIENG to secure during hours of darkness.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Conducted sweep of Rt 22, providing convoy security between TAY NINH and GO DAU HA, and secured engineer effort at bridge vic XT 440228.

6 March 1968

          2-14 Inf:  During early morning hours TAY NINH Base Camp received 22 rnds 82mm mortar, impacting vic XT 147518, resulting in 1 KIA, 35WIA and 8 buildings damaged.  At 0600 2-14 began combat assault with the advance element departing enroute to FSB LOGAN I.  C Co and B (-) secured FSB.  A Co combat assaulted to LZ vic XT 411533 at 0919 hours.  Contact was established immediately.  A Co, 2-22 conducted recon in force along axis XT 3252 to XT 411533 to link up with A Co 2-14 at 1038 hours.  D Co combat assaulted to LZ 1129 hours.  Task force conducted recon in force to vic XT 418538 with extensive contact.  Task Force established wagon wheel XT 418538 at 1745 and remained overnight to continue recon by force at first light.  Results:  15 US WIA, 3 US KIA, 21 Enemy KIA (BC), 11 Enemy KIA (POSS).  One platoon of B Co secured engineer effort at laterite pit, vic XT 311513.  A platoon of A, 2-22 conducted a sweep of Rt 4, and provided convoy security.  A MED CAP was conducted at HIEP HOA, (XT 215485) and 203 patients were treated.

          2-22 Inf (M) (-):  Recon platoon swept MSR to TAY NINH.  B Co out-posted MSR from XT 338458 to XT 416444.  C Co out-posted MSR from XT 416444 to XT 475467.  Recon platoon secured convoy to TAY NINH and return to DAU TIENG.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Conducted sweep of Rt 22 to GO DAU HA and provided convoy security.

7 March 1968

          2-14 Inf:  Bn continued recon in force from previous day with Bn forming RON position vic XT 415527 at 1140 hours.  2-22 Inf (M) (-) ready reaction force was in position vic XT 415515 at 0905.  2-14 conducted recon in force to vic XT 416535.  2-22 conducted recon in force to vic XT 417422.  At 1500 hours 2-14 began extraction from PZ vic XT 417529 with 2-22 securing LZ and A,2-22 conducting recon in force to FSB vic XT 315545.  B Co, 2-14, A & C Btry, 7-11 Arty and A Co, 2-22 moved back to TAY NINH in convoy.  All 2-14 and A Co 2-22 closed DAU TIENG.  Friendly losses:  4 US WIA, enemy losses 5 KIA (BC), 3 60mm mortar tubes, 1 base plate, 2 AK-47, 1 AK-50, and 1 Chicom assault weapon.  2-14 supervised dispensary construction, SELF-HELP Project, HIEP LONG, XT 233480.

          2-22 Inf (M)(-):  Operated with 2-14 as above.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Conducted sweep Rt 22 to GO DAU HA and secured convoy.  One platoon secured engineer effort at laterite pit.

8 March 1968

          2-14 Inf:  Conducted a combat assault with 3 companies to LZ vic 075553 and conducted recon in force to vic XT 072538 for extraction.  C Co provided a platoon for security of the laterite pit, and the remainder of the company supported 2 platoons at XT 115510.  One platoon of A Co, 2-22 swept and cleared Route 4 and provided convoy security back to BAU CO.  Bn conducted MEDCAP, HIEP TROUNG (XT 212475), treated 182 patients.

          2-22 Inf (M) (-):  Cleared and swept MSR from DAU TIENG to vic XT 338458.  B Co cordoned and searched village vic XT 338458.  Result 16 detainees.  C Co conducted recon in force vic XT 435425.  At XT 427423 at 1355 C Co found 2 graves with 2 VC bodies killed by small arms, result 2 VC KIA (BC).  Recon secured the convoy from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH and back.

          D Trp, 3-17 Cav:  Released OPCON 070700 March 1968.

9 March 1968

          2-14 Inf:  Battalion conducted 3 Co assault to LZ vic XT 243632, then conducted recon in force along axis to XT 247638 to XT 275640 to PZ vic XT 262648.  A Co conducted a recon in force along axis XT 284667, to XT 268665 to 266636 to XT 268649.  D Co (-) secured FSB vic XT 232582.  Neg contact.  One platoon of A Co, 2-22 conducted a sweep of Rt 4 and provided convoy security to TAY NINH and return to BAU CO.  One platoon secured engineer effort at laterite pit.  Bn conducted MEDCAP at HEIP AN, (XT 225483), treated 205 patients.

          2-22 Inf (M)(-):  Recon platoon conducted sweep of MSR and provided convoy security to TAY NINH and return to DAU TIENG.  C Co outposted MSR from XT 471468 to XT415414 and conducted recon in force vic XT 412439.  B Co outposted MSR from XT 415414 to XT 337457.  Bn closed DAU TIENG 1905.  DAU TIENG received 6 mortar rnds, unknown size at 1812, neg casualties, neg results.

10 March 1968

     2-14 Inf:  Co Co conducted a recon in force from XT 170467 to XT 154468 to XT 144485 to Highway 13.  B Co conducted a recon in force from XT170467 to XT 135485 to Highway 13.  A Co conducted a recon in force from XT170467 to XT 152485 to Highway 13.  D. Co conducted a recon in force from XT 170467 to XT 164490 to Highway 13.  Negative contact.  A platoon of A Co secured the TAY NINH convoy.

     2-22 Inf (M) (-):  B co swept MSR to vic XT 405444, posted MSR from XT 403444 to XT 338485.  B Co then conducted recon in force from XT 360422 to XT 350402.  Recon platoon swept MSR from XT 405444 to vic XT 338458.  C Co posted MSR from XT 405444 to 474468.  Recon platoon of C Co conducted recon in force from XT 471468 to XT 465420, and secured convoy to TAY NINH and back.  At 1806 DAU TIENG received 5 rnds 82mm mortar; result:  1 civilian WIA (slight) 500 gal MOGAS and 20 barrels Prem-A-Prim destroyed.

12.     Results:

     a.     Personnel.          

          (1)   Friendly     KIA     WIA      NBC     TOTAL

               2-14                  3       10             13

               2-22               14       14              15
               7-11                1          1

               D Trp, 3-17      ___      ___       ___       ___

                                           3       25             28

          (2)  VC/NVA

               KIA  (BC):   58

               KIA  (POSS):   11

               Detainees:   45

               POW's:   3

     b.     Equipment Losses:

          (1)  Friendly:  1 M-17 protective mask, 1 cal .45 pistol, 1 M-60 machine gun, 1 M-16 rifle, 2 mine detectors, 1 Armored Personnel Carrier, 500 gal MOGAS,2 20 BARREL Prem-A-Prim, 1 Commo bunker.

          (2)  Enemy:  Captured or destroyed:  SA Weapons-5; Heavy Weapons-5: SA ammo-1040 rnds; HE Ammo-23 rnds, Mine and Booby Traps-33; Rice (tons)-18.75, structures-20, Bunkers-582, Documents (lb)-14.5, Tunnels (meters)-135, Trenches (meters)-2,150, Sampans-8, Bicycles-57, Pigeons, carrier-6, peanuts, flour, and beans-1000 lb, cloth (yards)-1000, salt (lb)-200, sardines, (cans)-200, nuts (lb)-400, sugar (lb)-175, tea (lb)-15, clothing (lb)-21, Ox cart-1, First Aid Bag-1, machete-1, protective mask-1, and cooking stove-1.

     c.     Bomb Damage Assessments:  All areas where air strikes were conducted were searched by ground forces.

13.     (C)     Administrative Matters:

          a.     Since operations were conducted from the TAY NINH and DAU TIENG base camps, adequate PX facilities were available to all personnel, and it was not necessary to operate mobile PX's.

          b.     No difficulty was encountered in the rapid distribution of mail.

          c.     No difficulty was experienced in transporting replacements or R&R personnel.

          d.     Supply:

               (1)     Class I:

                    “A” Rations          42,800 meals

                    “C” Rations          11,320 meals

               (2)     Class II and IV:  A total of 25.8 short tons were used in support of the operation.

               (3)    Class III:

Mogas          11,100 gal.

Diesel               21,050 gal.

Lube Oil            1,425 gal.

Hydraulic Fluid                 37 gal.

               (4)     Class IV:  107.7 short ton.

          e.     Maintenance:  Maintenance teams were with their respective units and performed all 2nd echelon vehicular maintenance.  There was no 3rd echelon maintenance provided in the field.

          f.     Treatment of casualties, evacuation and hospitalization:  “DUST OFF” support for evacuation of casualties was provided by MEDEVAC units at CU CHI, DAU TIENG, and TAY NINH.  Battalion aid stations treated patients for minor ailments.

          g.     Transportation was provided by organic vehicles and UHID aircraft.

          h.     Communications:  Communications were provided by organic FM, and RIT.

          i.     Medical Evaluation:  Personal health was generally good throughout the operation.  Dapsone Malaria Prophylaxis was used in addition to Chloroquine-Primaquine tablets.  Two cases of malaria were reported during the operation.  Common complaints included colds, minor cuts and scratches.  Skin irritations were a persistent problem with most resulting from the heat.

14.     (C)     Special Equipment and Techniques:  None

15.     (C)     Commanders Analysis:

          a.     VC/NVA attempts to capitalize on gains made during the TET Offensive were thwarted; VC/NVA were kept off balance by daily combat assaults to supply cache and base camp areas, through timely reaction to intelligence.

          b.     The MSR was kept open.

          c.     Base camps at TAY NINH and DAU TIENG remained secure.

          d.     Fire Support Bases at BAU CO and FSB ST. BARBARA remained secure.

16.     (C)     Recommendations:  None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



                                   THOMAS A. STOY
                                   Major, Infantry
                                   Adjutant

       Operation Saratoga-2nd Brigade     

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2ND BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96225

SUBJECT:      Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS J3-32)

TO:          Commanding General
          29th Infantry Division
          ATTN: AVDCOP
          APO US Forces 96225

1.     OPERATION SARATOGA

2.     080600 Dec 1967 - 102400 March 1968

3.     HAU NGHIA, and TAY NINH, BINH DUONG and GIA DINH PROVINCE, Republic of Vietnam.

4.     Central Headquarters:  2nd Bde, 29th Inf Div

5.     Reporting Officers:     Colonel Edwin W. Emerson
               Colonel George F. Hoge
               Colonel Raymond O. Miller

6.     Task Organizations:

     1st Battalion, 27th Infantry          -     LTC ERNEST F CONDINA

     2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry          -     LTC WALTER E ADAMS
                         LTC WINFRED G SKELTON JR

     1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)          -     LTC FREMONT B HODSON
                         LTC HENRY B MURPHY JR
                         LTC THOMAS C LODGE

     2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry           -     LTC RAPHAEL D TICE
                         LTC CHARLES J BAUFF

     3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry           -     LTC THOMAS U HARROLD
                         LTC ROY K FLINT

     4th Battalion, 9th Infantry           -     LTC JOHN H HENCHMAN
                         LTC RICHARD R SIMPSON

     2nd Battalion, 34th Armor           -     LTC HAL B RHYNE
                         LTC JOHN H TIPTON JR

     4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)     -     LTC THOMAS A WARE
                         LTC AVERY S FULLERTON

     1st Battalion, 8th Artillery           -     LTC ROBERT A M DEAN

7.     Supporting Forces:

     a.     Air Support:

          General:  Tactical aircraft from the 7th Tactical Air Force were used to support 2nd Brigade operations.  The 510th, 50th, 531st, 416th, 309th, 308th, 614th, 612th and the 615th tactical fighter squadrons and the 8th and 18th tactical fighter-bombers flew a total of 203 preplanned missions throughout the Brigade area of operations.  221 immediate and 20 diverted air strikes were delivered to suppress VC in contact with US forces.

     b.     Army Aviation

          The four (4) organic OH23's were used on a daily basis by the Battalions for command and control, liaison and reconnaissance missions.  During the period the four aircraft flew a total of 1,122 hours consisting of 2209 tasks, 3509 sorties with 3756 passengers carried.
          The 25th Aviation Battalion provided a UH-1 command and control helicopter to the Brigade commander on a daily basis.  The Brigade Commander used the C&C extensively for controlling multi-battalion combat assaults, making command visits, and observing tactical operations.

          The Bde utilized one or more assault helicopter companies on 76 of 94 days duration of Operation SARATOGA.  The helicopter Companies, normally furnished by the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, were used primarily to conduct combat assaults and eagle flights.

          CH-47's, allocated daily by II Field Force, resupplied the battalions during Operation SARATOGA.  An average of 21 sorties were used to move more than 168,000 lbs of Class I, II, IV and V supplies daily.  Personnel and mail were moved to forward areas by CH-47's daily.  Increased activity and contact with the enemy brought more emergency resupplies than normally experienced.  These were accomplished rapidly and on a timely basis by UH-1D aircraft.  Resupply for two units OPCON to the Brigade during a portion of Operation SARATOGA, was accomplished by moving unit trains to forward locations and drawing supplies from Division FSE established at Tan Son Nhut.  Resupply for Operation SARATOGA was performed without significant problems.

     c.     Artillery Support

          (a)     Direct Support

               1st Battalion, 8th Artillery fired in direct support of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

          (b)     General Support

               3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (155/8”)
               6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (105)

     (2)     Artillery was employed in the Operation to provide:

          Suppression of Sniper Fire

          Destruction of Attacking Enemy (Direct Fire)

          Landing Zone Preparations

          Suppressive Fires

          R&I Fires

          Counter-Mortar Fires

          Smoke and Screening Fires

          Illumination

     (3)     Fired in support of 2nd Brigade Operations for units within Brigade TAOI, were 109,909 rounds 105MM, 155MM, and 8” artillery.

8.     Intelligence:

     a.     The terrain of the area of operation for Operation SARATOGA, was
of varied types.  This terrain ranged from the dry, hard rice paddies of Central Hau Nghia Province to the wet lowland groves and tidal flats of the Saigon and Oriental Rivers.  Operations were also conducted in the thick transition jungle of the Iron Triangle and Ho Bo woods as well as the Rome-Plowed entanglements of the Filhol, Ho Bo, and Upper Triangle areas and the rubber plantations of Tay Ninh Province.  During this period, the weather was hot and dry and imposed no operational difficulties on combat operations in the area.

          Sources of intelligence information varied throughout the quarter, ranging from such sophisticated means of collection as People Sniffer and SLAR, to the utilization of infiltrated agents, incidental sources, Hoi Chanhs, POW's and various other indigenous sources.  Kit Carson Scouts were attached to each rifle company and proved to be useful in exploration of tunnels and base camp areas as well as obtaining information from the Vietnamese.  National Police were utilized in areas of high civilian concentration and also were valuable in dealing with the civilian population.

          During the initial stages of Operation SARATOGA, the enemy order of battle was much the same as it had been for several months previously.  Enemy elements within the TAOI were primarily local force units, operating with little deviation from already established AO's.  The 7th Cu Chi Local Force Battalion ranged the area north of National Route 1 from Trang Bang to Tan Phu Trung while elements of the 1st MR-4 Battalion generally worked the areas to the north of the 7th Cu Chi Battalion (lower Boi Loi, Ho Bo, Filhol).  To the east of Cu Chi, along the western banks of the Saigon, could be found the 2nd Local Force Battalion (Go Mon District).  All these elements mentioned above drew their indirect fire support, in part, from the 8th Artillery Battalion MR-4.  The northwestern portions of the TAOI were the operational areas of the D-14 Battalion (lower Tay Ninh - Boi Loi) and the D-16 Battalion (Straight Edge Woods (lower Tay Ninh).  In southern Hau Nghia and northern Long An (the Pineapple) were located the 269th, 267th and the 506th VC Battalions.  There were occasional sorties of Main Forces and NVA units both through and into the area from the north, but there had not been any extensive NVA MF contacts prior to Operation SARATOGA.  Enemy offensive activity for several weeks prior to the initiation of Operation SARATOGA was principally of a harassing nature.  Stand off attacks were initiated on several provincial towns as well as Cu Chi Base Camp.  Occasional attacks on RF/PF Outposts, primarily along Route 1, made up the bulk of the enemy-initiated action.  The probable locations and strength of units within the TAOI upon initiation of SARATOGA are shown below:

     UNIT               STRENGTH          LOCATION

     1st MR - 4               460               XT5517

     8th VC Arty          230               XT6630

     269th Battalion          270               XS5197

     2nd Go Mon          240               XT7907

     7th Cu Chi               250               XT5922

     D-14                    400               XT5118

     b.     Enemy Contact during Operation:

          The first significant enemy contact of the operation occurred on the night of 12 December 1967 when elements of the 101st NVA Regiment conducted a coordinated attack on the night location of the 1-27 INF.  In this contact, the first by 2nd Brigade units against NVA troops in Hau Nghia, the VC suffered 39 KIA (BC).  The VC withdrew north into the Ho Bo and were next located on 21 December when 2 Co's of the 2-27 INF ran headlong into one of the 101st Regiment's areas.  The daylong action cost the VC 43 KIA (BC) and gave a hint of the defensive tenacity that could be expected in future operations against similar units.  This action added weight to various agent reports that indicated a buildup of NVA units and the addition of NVA soldiers to MF and LF units already situated in the area of operations.  

     On 4 January, the 1-27 INF and 2-27 INF contacted elements of the 2nd Go Mon in their home areas in the bunker complexes on the western banks of the Saigon River.  During the 2 day fight in this area the VC lost 89 KIA (BC).  The buildup of NVA soldiers with LF units was made dramatically evident when on the night of 10 January, the 1-27 INF night location was attacked by a battalion size element, later identified as the 7th Cu Chi Battalion.  A prisoner captured during this battle stated that 50% of his and other units were made up of NVA soldiers.  The addition of NVA soldiers to MF and LF units markedly increased their combat effectiveness, a fact that would become increasingly evident in the days to come.  108 VC were killed in this (illegible) (illegible) attack.  In the middle of January, 4-23 INF (M) engaged elements of the 1st Battalion MR-4 in a 2 day action in the lower Ho Bo.  The 4-23 INF (M) never penetrated the base area completely, but inflicted heavy losses (49 KIA (BC) on the entrenched enemy.  The buildup of MF units within the TAOI was indicated again when the 2-27 INF engaged the Reconnaissance Company of the 272nd Regiment in an all night battle just south of the Saigon River in the Mushroom.  A prisoner taken by the 2-27 indicated that the 272nd was to move into the Cu Chi area and conduct operations beginning in early February.  The extent and importance of their mission became dramatically evident in the next several days.

     The night of 31 January saw the initiation of the VC TET offensive throughout the III CTZ.  Within the 2nd Brigade TAOI, the offensive was initiated with stand off rocket and mortar attacks against Cu Chi, Duc Hoa, Bao Trai and Trang Bang.  This attack signaled the first utilization of 122MM rockets against Cu Chi.  The main emphasis was directed against Ton Son Nhut and Saigon although there were several corollary ground attacks in the TAOI.  The following day, the intent of the enemy in the Cu Chi area became apparent as National Route 1 was interdicted at Tan Thu Trung by a VC Battalion of the 272nd Regiment, the battle to push the 272nd out of the Tan Thu Trung - An Cho area lasted 10 days (6-16 February) and cost the VC 219 dead.  The apparent intent of the enemy to remain in the area, no matter what the consequences, pointed out the importance of this interdiction to the overall success of the VC master plan in and around Saigon.  The enemy consisted of the 271st and 272nd Regiments as well as the 2nd Go Mon and 1st MR-4 Battalions and assorted artillery elements of the 56th and 58th Battalions of the 69th Artillery groups and portions of the 8th Artillery.  Contact was made daily in most portions of the area with well armed, and disciplined VC soldiers.

     The extent of the enemy buildup became obvious as large caches of food, ammunition and equipment to include rockets, were discovered.  Contact with 2nd Brigade in the Saigon area cost the VC 692 KIA (BC), 184 KIA (POSS), and 211 weapons captured.  

     CONCLUSIONS:  The losses sustained by enemy forces, both local force and main force, during Operation SARATOGA has greatly reduced their combat effectiveness.  The large quantities of arms, ammunition and other supplies captured by 2nd Brigade units, have rendered sustained enemy offensive operations in the area extremely difficult without a major resupply effort.  In addition, much knowledge of VC main force and NVA organization, equipment and operation tendencies has been gained by 2nd Brigade units.  This information can be effectively utilized in future operations against similar units.  Large tunnel complexes and caches areas in the Ho Bo, Filhol, and Trung An have been rendered unusable.  Rome Plow operations in the Ho Bo and Iron Triangle have destroyed valuable, previously secure base area.

9.     MISSION

     2ND Brigade conducts offensive operations commencing 8 December 1967 in TAOI to:

          a.     Destroy VC/NVA forces and installations.

          b.     Provide security for Rome Plow operations, in Iron Triangle.

          c.     Support GVN (illegible) programs.

          d.     Deny the use of the Oriental River as a VC/NVA LOC.

          e.     Assist GVN forces in controlling foods resources.

          f.     Reinforce friendly forces in TAOI as required.

10.     Concept of Operation:

     Chronological Summary:

          (1)     OPLAN 25-67 (Operation SARATOGA) Hq 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was issued to participating units.

          (2)     8 December 67 - 23 December 67 - TF 4-23 Infantry (M) (REINF) conducted Rome Plow clearing operations.  A total of 5,250 acres comprised the area designated to be cleared.  Clearing operations were conducted for 16 days.  At the end of the period unit returned to Cu Chi Base Camp.

          (3)     11 December 1967 1-27 Infantry combat assaulted into area west of Trung Lap to establish a night location and conduct operations North of Route 1.  On 12 December, unit made contact with 101st NVA Battalion.  This was the first engagement with an NVA unit in the 2nd Brigade TAOI.

          (4)     17-31 December 1967, 2nd Brigade conducted Tank - Infantry operations in Ho Bo, Boi Loi Woods.

          (5)     3 January 1968 - 05 February 1968 with 28 Rome Plows moved into Filhol Plantation areas and began cutting operations, cutting continued until terminated by TET offensive.  Plows were returned to Cu Chi Base Camp and released from OPCON, 2nd Brigade.

          (6)     4 January 1968 1-27 Infantry moved to FSB CROCKETT and attacked the VC strongholds of Trung An and Ap Mha Viec.  2-27 Infantry Combat assaulted into LZ's along Saigon River vicinity Binh My.  Unit later moved into N/L at Trung An.  Battalions continued operations through area to the Saigon River.

          (7)     29 January 1968 2-27 Infantry conducted night combat assaults into Northern Ho Bo Woods to reinforce Aero Rifles of Troop D, 3rd Squadron 4th ACR.  Contact continued throughout the night.  All units were extracted the following morning.

          (8)     3 February 1968 - 3-22 Infantry attacked Tan Hoa.   4-23 Infantry (M) engaged enemy forces in Tan Phu Trung - Ap Cho area.  Contact in these areas continued until on 14 February when Tan Hoa was taken and, 16 February when Tan Phu Trung and Ap Cho were taken.

          (9)     20 February 1968 2nd Brigade Headquarters moved to Hoc Mon where unit remained until 4 March 1968.  Brigade elements conducted operations North and East of Hoc Mon until 9 March when all units moved into Hau Nghia Province or were released 2nd Brigade OPCON.

     The following units supported the Brigade during Operation SARATOGA:

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry

3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry

2nd Battalion, 34th Armor

1st Battalion, 8th Artillery

3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery

6th Battalion, 77th Artillery

65th Engr Battalion

554th Engr Battalion

168th Land Clearing Task Force

269th Aviation Battalion (Black Baron)

68th Assault Helicopter Company  (Top Tiger)

116th Assault Helicopter Company  (Hornets)

118th Assault Helicopter Company  (Thunderbirds)

128th Assault Helicopter Company  (Tomahawks)

135th Assault Helicopter Company  (EMU)

162nd Assault Helicopter Company  (Vultures)

187th Assault Helicopter Company (Blackhawk)

173rd Assault Helicopter Company  (Robinhood)

188th Assault Helicopter Company  (Black Widow)

147th Assault Support Helicopter Company  (Hill Climbers)

200th Assault Support Helicopter Company  (Packaderras)

205th Assault Support Company  (Geronimo)

213th Assault Support Helicopter Company  (Black Cats)

242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company  (Mule Skinner)

25th Aviation Battalion

25th S&T Battalion

29th Medical Battalion

129th Signal Battalion

12th Evacuation Hospital

7th AA (CA PIT)

9th AA (CA PIT)

5th ARVN Division

25th ARVN Division



(illegible) (RAMROD)          391          TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON

WARHAWK               531          TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON

RAF                         604          TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON

SHARKBAIT               557          TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON

GRIT  (DICE)                 90          TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON

YELLOW JACKET          552          TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON

WHISKEY                    559          TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON

ENTRY  (BUZZARD)          510          TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON

PHANTHOM               559          TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON

(illegible)                              AUSTRALIA B57

BOXER                      12          TACTICAL FIGHTER WING

BLADE                      35          TACTICAL FIGHTER WING

LITTER                      31          TACTICAL FIGHTER WING



8 DEC

     1-5 INF (M):  Remained OPCON to Div

     1-27 INF:  Remained in Cu Chi Base Camp conducting maintenance and training.  Co B provided the Base Camp reaction force.  The 4.2 mortar plt provided security for FSB located vic XT608110

     2-27 INF (-):  Remained OPCON to the 199th Inf BDE (SEP)

     TF 4-23 INF:  Continued to secure Rome Plow clearing operations in the Iron Triangle and conducted S&D operations vic XT732222 and XT692258 discovering several rice and equipment caches

9 DEC

     1-5 inf (m):  Remained OPCON to Division

     1-27 INF:  4.2 platoon continues to provide security for FSB vic XT608110.  Provided one Co for the Base Camp reaction force.  The Recon plt provided the Base Camp patrol force.  Conducted Airmobile combat assaults to LZ's vic XT701099, XT707104, XT763124, and XT516177 with negative contact.  Conducted cordon and search of Vinh Cu vic XT6714, apprehended 36 detainees who were evacuated to 1PW for further interrogation.

     2-27 INF (-):  Remained OPCON to the 199th Inf Bde (SEP)

     TF 4-23 INF:  Continued to secure Rome Plow Clearing operations in the Iron Triangle vic XT7322, XT7323 and XT7025.  Conducted S&D operations vic XT6925, XT7322 discovering three weapons and ammo caches.  At 1305 hrs, Co A discovered a grave vic XT692244 containing 1VC KIA (BC) from gunshot wounds.

10 DEC

     1-15 INF (M):  Remained OPCON to Division

     1-27 INF:  Conducted airmobile combat assaults to LZ's vic XT5617, XT5619, XT5122, XT5322, XT5519, XT6017 and XT6018, sustaining 12 US WIA from booby traps.  At 1500 hrs, vic XT562178 Co D sustained 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA from W/A fire.  At 1458 hrs, the Bde C&C ship engaged 1 VC vic XT565178 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).  Co D provided the Cu Chi Base Camp reaction force and the Recon plt replaced the 4.2 plt at the FSB vic XT608110 and assumed the security mission for the FSB.

     2-27 INF:  Remained OPCON to the 199th Inf Bde (SEP).

     IF 4-23 INF:  Continued to secure Rome Plow clearing operations in the Iron Triangle and secured the Engr Raft site vic XT712309.  Conducted S&D operations vic XT6826 discovering several bunkers/tunnel complexes, weapons, equipment, and rice caches.  (illegible) continued to explore large tunnel complex vic XT733223.

11DEC

     1-5 INF (M):  Remained OPCON to Division.

     1-27 INF:  Conducted airmobile combat assaults to lZ's vic. XT575245, XT597243, XT588235 and XT533222.  At 0900 hrs. vic. XT586244 supporting gunship was shot down by A/W and S/A fire received on LZ, crew sustained no casualties.  At 0937 hrs, vic. XT680241 Co B engaged unknown number of VC in a bunker resulting in 9 VC KIA (BC).  Co B sustained 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA from this engagement.  At 0955 hrs, supporting gunships engaged 1 VC vic XT599237 resulting in 1VC KIA (BC).  At 1240 hrs, Co D vic XT971248 sustained 4 US WIA from booby trap.  At 1526 hrs, vic XT564215 Co C engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC POW.  Recon plt continued to secure FSB vic XT608110.
     TF 4023 INF:  Continued to provide security for Rome Plow clearing operations in the Iron Triangle vic XT6924, XT7324, XT6825 and S&D operations vic XT6926, XT6924 and XT6825.  Co A provided the Cu Chi Base Camp reaction force.  Scout plt continued exploration of the tunnel complex vic XT7222.

12 DEC

     Special Operations:  Crip conducted S&D operations vic XT501114.  At 1100 hrs, engaged 3 VC vic XT501114, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

     1-5 INF (M):  Remained OPCON to Division.

     1-27 INF:  Conducted airmobile combat assaults to LZ's vic XT557249, XT554251, XT503194 destroying several booby traps.  At 0210 hrs, the Bn night position came under attack, receiving mortar, RPG2, rifle grenades, S/A and A/W fire in the perimeter.  Returned fire with arty, mortars, S/A, A/W fire resulting in 39 VC KIA (BC) and 30 VC KIA (POSS), sustaining 10 US WIA.  Co C provided one plat for security of the FSB vic XT549175.

     2-27 INF (-):  Remained OPCON to the 199th Inf Bde (SEP).

     TF 4-23 INF:  Continued to provide security for Rome Plow clearing operation in the Iron Triangle vic XT7026, XT6826 and XT6926.  Conducted S&D operations vic