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After Action Reports 23
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDOMH 1 August 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R1)
Location: Vicinity of CU CHI Base Camp (XT647153), CU CHI, RVN
Reporting Officer: Major General F.K. Mearns
Prepared by: Major Richard A. Baun, Commanding Officer, 18th Military History Department
Map References: May, Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series: L7014, Sheets: 6132 II, 6131 I, II; 6232 II - IV,
6231 IV; 6230 I - IV; 6331 III; 6330 I, III, IV.
I. (C ) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.
A. General:: The “Tropic Lightning” Division continued its participation in Operation TOAN
THANG throughout the reporting period. (See TAB B for the Division Operations Plan 1-68.) All divisional resources and assets were committed to this operation which had commenced on 8 April 1968.
To date, Operation TOAN THANG has been divided into two phases: Phase I terminated on 312400 May and Phase II continuing through the end of the reporting period.
Most significant in the activities of the division between 1 May and 31 July were its counter-offensive operations to defeat the “2nd Phase Offensive” of the enemy against SAIGON-CHOLON and its search and destroy maneuvering to thwart and upset the enemy preparations for his “3rd Phase Offensive” of late July or early August
The “2nd Phase Offensive” (the 1st Phase Offensive” being the TET Offensive of 31 January - 18 February) commenced 2 May and continued until 15 May. Alerted by intelligence sources in late April of the impending enemy attacks into the capital region, the 25th Infantry Division maneuvered the bulk of its combat forces into the southeastern quadrant of its tactical area of operational interest to establish a screen beyond the western environs of SAIGON-CHOLON. Deploying itself in depth in western GIA DINH province, eastern HAU NGHIA Province and northern LONG AN Province, during the first few days of May, the Division effectively executed a mobile defense to block the enemy's main avenues of approach from the northwest, west and southwest. When the enemy main force units of the 5th and 9th VC/NVA and the 7th NVA Divisions committed themselves to their approach marches beginning on 2 May, the 25th Infantry Division moved in force as required to successfully intercept and destroy the advancing enemy before he could reach his assault positions into SAIGON-CHOLON.
With his main ground thrust broken and turned back, the enemy then mounted his boastfull “100 rockets a day” 122mm rocket-mortar assaults against the capital region. Mounting extensive day and night, ground/aerial patrols throughout a “rocket belt,” 10-15 kilometers west of SAIGON, the “Tropic Lightning” Division systematically crushed this threat within a few days of its initiation.
A general statistical analysis of the Division's operations between 1 May and 31 May 1968 reveals the following results:
U.S. killed in action 218
U.S. wounded in action 1,156 (893 evacuated)
U.S. equipment destroyed 22 armored personnel carriers
one 8” howitzer
two 155mm howitzers
U.S. equipment damaged
(deadlined 24 hours or longer) one 175mm howitzer
one tank retriever
two 155mm howitzers
two 105mm howitzers
21 armored personnel carriers
U.S. equipment captured five individual weapons
two crew served weapons
Enemy killed in action
(confirmed by body count) 2,275
Enemy prisoners-of-war 77
Enemy equipment and
Supplies captured 478 individual weapons
213 crew served weapons
33.6 tons of rice
one star light scope
471 hand grenades
31,026 small arms rounds
511 rocket, artillery or mortar rounds
100 mortar fuses
Enemy documents captured 183 pounds
Enemy equipment and
Supplies destroyed 1,014 rocket, artillery or mortar rounds
53,185 small arms rounds
1,775 hand grenades
12.8 tons of rice
18 crew served weapons
26 individual weapons
32 cluster bomb units
1,600 pounds of salt
243 mortar fuses
In general, contact with main force enemy units throughout the 25th Infantry Division's tactical.
area of operational interest (TAOI) diminished considerably in June and July. With his 2nd Phase Offensive on SAIGON and subsequently threatened artillery assaults on the capital city totally defeated, the enemy demonstrated little willingness to fight. Rather, in June his main force units that remained outside SAIGON broke contact, dispersed and exfiltrated west into Cambodia and northwest into WAR ZONE C. In executing this pull back, the enemy avoided contact and when engaged was quick to disperse into smaller groups and disengage as quickly as possible. Intelligence sources clearly indicated the enemy's intent of withdrawing his depleted main force units to those traditional sanctuaries for replacements, resupply and retraining for future operations. (p3)
With the departure of the enemy main force units from the SAIGON area, the 25th Infantry Division in June committed approximately a third of its combat forces to the continued defensive posture around SAIGON and deployed the remainder of the division to the west and northwest of the city into the western and central portions of the division TAOI.
The divisional units that remained in the immediate SAIGON area did so as a part of the Capital Military District, (later redesignated the Capital Military Assistance Command as a provisional U.S. Command under the control of II Field Forces to assist in the defense of SAIGON) or as elements under division control maneuvering in western GIA DINH Province outskirts of the city.
While these elements provided a defensive shield in and around SAIGON, the other Tropic Lightning combat forces moved from the immediate capital area to the west and northwest to pursue the dispersed enemy and to seek out and destroy his concealed weapons, ammunition and supply caches.
Extensive and wide ranging battalion size search and destroy and reconnaissance-in-force operations were conducted throughout the southern TAOI from the ORIENTAL RIVER on the south, the Cambodian border on the west, the TAY NINH - BAU CO - DAU TIENG axis on the north, and the SAIGON RIVER - THI TINH RIVER axis on the east. These operations were characterized by coordinated daylight cross country search and destroy sweeps seeking enemy base camps and supply caches, village searches in coordination with Vietnamese officials, airmobile assaults against targets of opportunity. At night the division employed extensive platoon size ambushes along canals, rivers, roads, trails and other likely routes of enemy movement. In addition, extensive night time roving platoon size patrols were employed in suspected areas of night time enemy activity. On an average day in June and July, 50% of the combat forces were employed during the day and 50% at night.
In addition to the search and destroy type activities described above, the division was active in securing the principle means of road communications throughout the southern portion of the TAOI. In addition to screening secondary roads, the division maintained around the clock security operation on the extensive main routes of supply in the TAOI. These MSR's are route 1 from SAIGON to CU CHI to GO DA HAU, route 22 from GO DA HAU to TAY NINH City, route 4 from TAY NINH City to RAU CO, routes 13-26-239 from TAY NINH City to DAU TIENG and route 8A from CU CHI to PHU CONG (CU CHI-LONG RINH MSR).
The only portion of the TAOI that division did not enter in force during June and July was the jungled and sparsely populated WAR ZONE C north of the TAY NINH - BAU CO - DAU TIENG axis. This area was subject, however, to extensive surveillance activity both aerial and long range ground reconnaissance by squad and platoon size units. Extensive Air Force B-52 and tactical fighter strikes were placed throughout WAR ZONE C upon enemy base camps, supply concentrations and other targets of opportunity.
Despite the division's all out efforts to seek out the enemy in June and July, the level of contact dropped to the point in which engagement with local force platoon size units in scattered and infrequent skirmishes became the norm. Considerable success was realized however, in discovering weapons, ammunition and supply caches throughout the areas searched. The only consistent contact established by divisional units occurred in the final two weeks of July, when the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division (OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division) engaged what was established as the 2nd Battalion, 275th VC Regiment along an axis from TRANG BANG (XT489194) to TRUNG LAP (XT585199).
Statistically, “Tropic Lightning” Division operations against the enemy between 1 June and 31 July provided the following results:
U.S. killed in action 145
U.S. wounded in action 879 (699 evacuated)
U.S missing in action 1
U.S. equipment destroyed three helicopters
11 armored personnel carriers
one 155mm howitzer
U.S. equipment damaged
(deadlined 24 hours or longer) 34 trucks
one ITS-4 radar
22 armored personnel carriers
Enemy killed in action
(confirmed by body count) 1,273
Enemy prisoners of war 37
Hoi Chanhs 4
Enemy equipment and
Supplies captured 298 individual weapons
86 crew served weapons
78.35 tons of rice
54,117 small arms rounds
426 pounds of medical supplies
212 hand grenades
333pounds of sugar
904 rocket, artillery or mortar rds.
22 protective masks
8 outboard motors
Enemy documents captured - 137 pounds
Enemy equipment and - 763 rocket, artillery or mortar rds.
Supplies destroyed - 430 mines
18,831 small arm rounds
1,623 hand grenades
26.59 tons of rice
19 crew served weapons
25 individual weapons
12 cluster bomb units
702 RPG rounds
6 outboard motors
1,760 gallons gas
1 protective mask
857.5 pounds of explosive
1,780 blasting caps
3 rocket launchers
4th Battalion, 9th Infantry: This combined force was designated TASK FORCE DUNLOP. The tank battalion took up blocking positions along an axis in the vicinity XT5807, and the infantrymen occupied blocking positions from XT6005 to XT6105 to XT6206. The enemy force was thus surrounded on three sides with a vast swamp area to its rear. The fires of four artillery batteries and eight air strikes were placed on the enemy throughout the day. A total of 35 enemy dead and one POW were confirmed by nightfall .
Elsewhere in the TAOI, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry sited an estimated enemy platoon in bunker position at XT804127. At 1045 the target was struck by helicopter gunships. A subsequent assault on the bunkers revealed six enemy bodies.
An ambush patrol from F Company, 50th Infantry (LRP) at 2215 hours, struck several sampans at XT783105. The following morning six VC KIA were discovered in the vicinity of the ambush.
TASK FORCE DUNLOP continued with its mission of reducing the enemy force which it had
backed up to a swamp. Taking the enemy under heavy fire with supporting artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes, the ground units slowly tightened the vice on the besieged VC. By the end of daylight activities the task force had recovered an additional 26 enemy dead and three prisoners of war. Elements of the task force remained in their blocking positions during the night as supporting fires continued to pound at the enemy positions.
As TASK FORCE DUNLOP continued its operations, other division units engaged in light and widely scattered contacts with the enemy. Helicopters from B Company, 25th Aviation Battalion flying area reconnaissance along the ORIENTAL RIVER between GO DAU HAU and TAY NINH observed and engaged an unknown size enemy force at XT291335. The action resulted in 33 enemy dead and 2 POW's. The enemy force was later identified as a local force VC Company from TAY NINH Province
At 1730H, A Company, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) sweeping approximately four kilometers northeast of DUC HOA received fire from an unknown number of enemy at XS623987. The company attacked into the position and accounted for 15 enemy dead and one POW. This enemy force was determined to be an element of the 273rd VC Regiment.
TASK FORCE DUNLOP was redesignated TASK FORCE DAEMS at 1222H and continued its
operations in the vicinity of XT5906 - XT5905. As ground forces swept into the enemy positions they discovered an additional forty enemy dead, most of whom had been killed by artillery and air strikes. Additionally large numbers of abandoned individual and crew served weapons along with ammunition, supplies and food were discovered. Contact was maintained with the enemy and supporting fires from helicopters, artillery and tactical air continued to be used in heavy volume.
At 1245, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) sweeping along route 1 at a location approximately three kilometers southeast of the CU CHI Base Camp (XT637120) engaged an estimated VC platoon. In a contact that continued until 1800 hours, the company surrounded by helicopter gunships accounted for 22 VC KIA. The enemy force was identified as a unit of the 7th VC local force battalion.
Also on the afternoon of 5 May, B Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry searching approximately three kilometers southwest of the SAIGON RIVER town of PHU CONG discovered a large enemy ammunition cache at XT794117. In addition to large numbers of RPG rounds and hand grenades, the enemy captured 72 complete 122mm rockets and 21,500 rounds of small arms ammunition.
B. Chronology of Significant Combat Actions.
Contact with enemy forces throughout the divisional tactical area of operational interest (TAOI)
On 1 May was relatively light and scattered. Almost all divisional maneuver elements had completed their
redeployment into the southeastern quadrant of the TAOI by this date. Mounting intensive daytime battalion and company size reconnaissance-in-force and air mobile combat assault operations continued with platoon and squad size night stationary and mobile ambush patrols. The division established a virtual 24 hour-a-day screen to the northwest, west and southwest of SAIGON-CHOLON. Despite these blanketing maneuvers, only the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry experienced significant encounters with the enemy. The squadron's B Troop flying armed aerial reconnaissance along and east of the ORIENTAL RIVER, between the 00 east-west grid line and DUC HOA, and C Troop flying similar missions in the southern BOI LOI WOODS (center of mass XT5035) and northeast of TRANG BANG along route 237, detected and engaged small groups of enemy on five separate occasions during the day. The armed helicopters accounted for 15 VC KIA by body count and destroyed one AK-47 and one sampan.
Divisional maneuver battalions and supporting organic and attached aviation units continued their search for the enemy along suspected avenues of approach in the SAIGON-CHOLON area from the northwest, west and southwest. Again, only the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry enjoyed any success in locating the enemy.
B Troop continuing its armed aerial reconnaissance of the area it had over-flown the previous day, observed enemy movement north of DUC HOA in the vicinity of XT5310. Engaging the area with automatic weapons and rockets, the gunships drew intense ground fire. Supporting artillery and Air Force tactical fighter air strikes were placed into the area. Following the lifting of these fires, the air cavalrymen went back into the area on low level reconnaissance and counted 25 enemy dead and four destroyed .50 caliber machine guns. Intelligence sources later identified the enemy as elements of the 271st VC Regiment.
Meanwhile, C Troop had turned its attention to reconnaissance of the IRON TRIANGLE, (center of mass XT7226) and the HO BO WOODS (center of mass XT6027). At 1700 hours the troop detected approximately 60 VC positioned in a tree line along a canal on an axis from XT728181 to XT740178 to XT737173. The armed helicopters engaged the enemy force with their automatic weapons and rockets and then called in artillery and air strikes. A search of the target area subsequent to these attacks revealed 23 VC dead and numerous blood trails leading out of the area to the north. These dead were identified ask being from elements of the 101st NVA Regiment.
On 3 May enemy movement within the division TAOI into assault positions for their planned
attacks became more apparent, and the division reacted accordingly. At 1000 hours, B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, continuing its armed aerial reconnaissance east of the ORIENTAL RIVER, sighted an estimated 200 VC at XT598068. This enemy force was immediately engaged by the gunships and artillery, and tactical fighter air strikes were directed into the area. The 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) which was maneuvering on a search operation a short distance to the south of the enemy position was directed to engage. By 1040 hours the battalion had moved into blocking positions along an axis from XT5906 to XT5904. This maneuver fixed the enemy position, and by 1520 hours the 4th of the 23rd was reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, and the
TASK FORCE DAEMS completed its operations against the enemy force in the general vicinity of XT6005, XT6006, XT6105 and XT5907. The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech) swept through the area during the day and discovered 113 additional enemy dead and substantial numbers of enemy weapons, ammunition and supplies. The total enemy casualties by body count in the four day engagement was 213 dead. From five prisoners taken in the battle, it was learned that the enemy force intercepted and blocked by TASK FORCE DUNLOP - DAEMS consisted of a battalion of the 271st VC Regiment and that the survivors of the engagement, many of them wounded, had fled north through the swamp
As the 4th of the 9th and 1st of the 5th prepared for their mopping up activities for the day, TASK FORCE DAEMS sent the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry and 2nd Battalion 34th Armor south into the vicinity of BOA TRAI to reinforce the ARVN - RF-PF garrison of that town which was attacked by a three battalion enemy force (the 2678, 267 and D-16 VC battalions) in the early morning hours. At XT4805 the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) closed with an enemy unit at 0730. Supported by helicopters and artillery, the battalion accounted for 44 enemy dead and captured one prisoner in an all day running battle to the west of BOA TRAI.
B Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry in a sweep one kilometer north of Route 1, midway between CU CHI and TRANG BANG (XT568175) engaged an estimated VC platoon at 0815 and inflicted 18 KIA and one POW on the enemy before he broke contact and retreated to the west. The 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) maneuvering near CU CHI in the vicinity of its C Company's contact of the previous day, established contact with an enemy force of unknown size and claimed 12 VC KIA in the ensuing fire fight. At 1435, B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry following up on the 4th of the 23rd's contact earlier in the day near BAO TRAI, spotted 50 VC moving west away from the area of contact. The helicopters engaged the fleeing enemy and killed an additional 15 VC.
In the predawn hours of 7 May, A and B Companies of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry commenced a reconnaissance-in-force operation in the vicinity of XT7303 approximately ten kilometers northwest of SAIGON-CHOLON. At 1115 hours this force ran into a large number of enemy, a force that was later identified as the 3rd Battalion 88th NVA Regiment. After a heated encounter that lasted through the day and the night and into the following day, the US force supported by helicopter gunships, artillery and tactical air, inflicted 199 dead on this enemy battalion. The survivors of the NVA battalion fled to the west.
Contact throughout the division TAOI became increasingly more frequent throughout the day, but most actions were with small infiltrating units.
At 0936 Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry was sweeping at XS743925 when it ran into an
unknown size enemy force. Engaging the enemy with organic weapons, the company accounted for 32 VC KIA and two prisoners before contact was lost. Later in the day at 1155, five kilometers to the northwest (XS703962), the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry night defensive location engaged an unknown size VC force that moved into its position. In the fire-fight that took place, 32 VC KIA were recorded and 2 POW's taken. The two actions are believed to have involved the same enemy battalion of the 271st VC Regiment; the later fight taking place as the VC sought to evade the first US unit which took it under fire.
Meanwhile, a short distance to the northeast of there, the VC battalion was fighting its second battle of the day. D Company, 2nd Battalion 27th Infantry was engaging a VC company. With the support of armed helicopters, the US troops drove off the advancing enemy who left 24 dead and two prisoners behind.
Further to the north, the 2nd Battalion , 34th Armor was sweeping Route 1 south of HOC MON (XT741020) in an area where it had a light contact the previous day. At 1245 the tankers came under fire. Returning fire with organic weapons and supported by armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes, the 2nd of the 34th Armor pursued the enemy all day and into the night. Contact was lost at 0200 on the 9th. Forty-four enemy dead were recovered and one prisoner was taken.
Throughout the first week of May, many division base camps, artillery fire support bases and battalion night defensive positions had come under light but harassing enemy stand off rocket and mortar attacks. In the darkness of the early morning hours of 9 May, this enemy tactic was intensified with two heavy assaults.
At 0100 the division headquarters at CU CHI Base Camp was struck by thirty rounds of mixed 122mm and 107mm rockets. The rockets all falling within a span of two minutes resulted in seven killed and 48 wounded. Damage to the base camp installations was light.
An hour later, Fire Support Base MAURY at XT618022 came under a heavy mortar and rocket attack followed by a battalion size ground assault. A Company and the Scout Platoon of the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry which were securing the artillery positions were reinforced by the battalion's B Company and I Troop, 3rd Squadron, 11th Cavalry. In a fight that lasted until 0600, US casualties were nine KIA and 68 wounded. Additionally two 105mm and two 155mm howitzers were destroyed by enemy sappers who had breached the perimeter defense. Fourteen enemy dead were counted at the following morning and one POW was taken.
On the same day at 1450, A and B Companies and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry made an air mobile combat assault into a swamp five kilometers east of DUC HOA (XT 6595) to check out a large enemy force reported to be in the area. Making contact immediately upon the landing, the infantry swept through the area with the support of helicopter gunships. In the contact that lasted until 2100, the infantrymen recovered 66 enemy dead, took three prisoners and captured three 122mm rocket launchers and numerous other items of enemy weapons, ammunition and equipment. The prisoners later identified their unit as the 208th NVA Rocket Regiment.
Continuing their wide spread search for enemy units west of SAIGON, the maneuver battalions of the 25th Infantry Division established numerous small contact on 10 May. The most significant of these involved C Company, 4th Battalion, 7th Infantry which located an enemy force approximately nine kilometers west of SAIGON at XS700914 at 1035. Pursuing the enemy, which was later learned to be elements of the 271st VC Regiment to the north, C Company claimed 26 enemy dead and one prisoner in an all day fight which broke at 2118 hours.
Significant contact with he enemy west of SAIGON continued light and scattered throughout 11 May. At 1445 C Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry fixed an estimated VC platoon in a hedgerow XT835050 approximately three kilometers west of the SAIGON RIVER <uninteligiable>----------------in helicopter gunships and artillery to engage the estimated VC ------------------------------<uninteligiable>
company assaulted the hedgerow at 2020 hours and discovered 15 enemy dead and numerous weapons, equipment and supplies.
The enemy stepped up the tempo of his activities west of SAIGON. In the early morning hours of 12 May, he staged a battalion size attack on artillery Fire Support Base PIKE VI at XS735940. Beginning at 0138 with a mass mortar barrage The enemy staged several human wave assaults on the fire support base perimeter. Defended by Artillery and 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery and elements of the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, the fire support base perimeter turned back all assaults. By 0407, the enemy attack was broken. At daylight, 98 enemy bodies were counted outside the perimeter wire and numerous weapons, ammunition and supplies were found abandoned.
The attacking force later was determined to be a battalion of the 272nd VC Regiment.
Later in the day, C Company, 1st Battalion 5th Infantry (Mech) searching for the enemy in the vicinity of XS7097, discovered an estimated platoon hiding in bunkers. Supported by artillery and air strikes, the company moved into the enemy positions and claimed 17 VC KIA and one POW in the action.
The 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) which had for several days had the mission of clearing the
MSR (Route 1) from GO DAU HA to the HOC MON Bridge (XT712071) was again performing this operation when at 0850 it came into contact with an unknown size enemy force in the village of AP BAU DIEU (XT563167) midway between TRANG BANG and CU CHI. In a running house to house battle that lasted throughout the day, the battalion accounted for 19 enemy dead and one prisoner. The prisoner identified his unit as a TRANG BANG local force company.
At about the same time that the “Triple Deuces” were initiating their contact, Company D of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry was conducting a sweep through an area approximately five kilometers south of PHU CONG (xt795095). During the previous night, artillery had engaged a target in this area detected by radar. The infantrymen in their search discovered 15 VC KIA killed by artillery.
Again about the same time, elements of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade which had become OPCON (operational control) on 12 May to the Tropic Lightning Division, located the enemy in the vicinity of XT7283. With initial contact made at 0820 by the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry, Companies A and D of the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry quickly moved to reinforce. Supported by armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes, these units pursued the estimated VC battalion until 2200 when contact was lost. Enemy losses for the encounter were established at 65 KIA by body count.
Far to the north in TAY NINH Province, the communications relay complex operated at the summit of NUI BA DEN (XT281582) was attacked by enemy sapper forces at 2145 hours. Successful in their effort to breach the perimeter of the mountain top compound, the enemy destroyed the communications relay facilities with mortars and satchel charges. Although the enemy lost 25 KIA in the fight which transpired, 19 US troops died in the fight.
The 199th contact with the enemy in the vicinity of the previous day's encounter continued intense. Establishing a night defensive position at XS720843, Company A, 5th of the 12th and Companies B and D of the 2nd of the 3rd, came under attack at 0255 hours. In a battle that ran to until 0430, these infantry units supported by armed helicopters and artillery accounted for another 60 enemy dead. At about the same time
(0300), C Company, 2nd Battalion 3rd Infantry was attacked in its night defensive position at XS573837. In the ensuing fire fight, the company aided by helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes killed 31 of he attacking enemy. Intelligence gained from documents captured by the 2199th in these three engagements revealed that the enemy force in each case was an element of the 273rd VC Regiment.
On the 13th and 14th of May intelligence sources indicated that enemy units which had moved towards SAIGON beginning on the 3rd of May were now exfiltrating the area in movements back to their sanctuary areas. Divisional units were now employed to pursue the fleeing enemy. The A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry sweeping for the enemy in the northern HO BO WOODS intercepted a large enemy unit moving north at XT560308. In an all day battle, A Troop reinforced by the Squadron's C Troop and supported by gunships, artillery and air strikes accounted for 82 VC KIA and captured three prisoners. The POW's identified their unit as the 7th Battalion, SR-1, local force and reported that the battalion had been in constant contact for ten days with US and ARVN forces and had lost 400 of its 500 personnel either killed, wounded or missing. The survivors were pulling back into WAR ZONE C in northern TAY NINH Province.
On 16 May the pattern of contact with enemy forces throughout the division TAOI continued to move away from SAIGON further indicating the exfiltration of enemy units which had attempted to close on the city early in the month. At 1725 hours B Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry (199th Light Infantry Brigade) searching for enemy forces approximately one kilometer north of the KING SAND CANAL, (XS668878) engaged an unknown enemy force. Attacking the enemy force as it moved west, the company killed 20 VC before the enemy unit was able to break contact. Flying late afternoon armed aerial reconnaissance missions over the HO BO WOODS and IRON TRIANGLE, C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry detected 150 to 200 VC at XT732193. The enemy were engaged by the armed helicopters in addition to artillery and air strikes that were called in. A check of the area following the engagement revealed the bodies of 21 VC.
Searching for suspected enemy ammunition caches along the banks of the RACH TRA Canal north of SAIGON and west of the SAIGON RIVER, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry at XT789073 located and evacuated 98 rounds of 75mm ammo, 40 anti-tank mines, 120 round of RPG-2 ammo, 24 rounds of 60mm ammo, 5 complete 122mm rockets, two AK-47 rifles and 20 pounds of medical supplies. The company also destroyed in place 162 rounds of 82mm mortar ammo. At 1555 while flying the CU CHI Base Camp “rocket belt”, the Division Artillery Command and Control helicopter detected an enemy rocket position in the northern FILHOL PLANTATION (XT648225). Earlier in the day, at 1220 hours, B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry flying reconnaissance in the same general area engaged another rocket site at XT620207 resulting in two VC KIA and eight 122mm rockets destroyed. Engaging the position with its automatic weapons and calling in artillery, ten 122mm rockets were destroyed and ten VC KIA accounted for. The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force operations eight kilometers north of DOC HOA, located 22 VC killed by artillery and air strikes and located and destroyed in place 43 -82mm mortar rounds.
Pressing the search for enemy forces and equipment, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry located and evacuated the following from XT754167: six light machine guns, 20 AK-47 rifles, two 75mm recoilless rifles, five 82mm mortar, one 60mm mortar, one .51 cal machine gun, one 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine gun, five PRC-10 radios, two anti-tank mines and 600 rounds of small arms ammo.
Continuing to search for enemy forces north of DUC HOA, the 6th Battalion, 9th Infantry engaged an unknown size force at XT631042 at 0840. The contact was initiated when D Company made an air mobile combat assault into a “hot” landing zone. D Company was reinforced during the day by A and C Companies as well as supported by artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes. A total of 18 VC KIA were located after contact was broken late in the day. Documents found on the enemy dead identified the enemy unit in contact as the 3rd Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment.
The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry following up on its contact of the previous day searched the area surrounding the battle area. At 0955 at XS634933 Company B took a small VC force under fire and accounted for nine VC KIA, as well as capturing numerous individual weapons and ammunition. Meanwhile, at a location seven kilometers north of TAN SON NHUT Air Base, C Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry on a search and destroy operation, ran into an estimated VC platoon hiding in bunkers along a canal bank. Engaging the enemy with organic weapons, artillery and armed helicopters, C Company destroyed the enemy platoon in place, accounting for 25 VC KIA.
The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry which had been stalking the 3rd Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment for several days north of DUC HOA, found their prey at 0318 when the enemy battalion attacked the 4th of the 9th night location at XS634993. Turning back the enemy assault with the aid of supporting artillery and air strikes, the infantry pursued the enemy as they pulled back. In heavy fighting which ended late in the afternoon of the 21st several kilometers to the north of the night defensive position, the 4th of the 9th accounted for 44 VC bodies and two POW's. Air Force tactical air strikes flown in support of the battalion were credited with an additional 25 VC bodies that were located.
The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech) searching for enemy forces, had moved in the Southern BOI LOI WOODS north of TRANG BANG, received an attack on its night defensive position at XT533290 at approximately 0005 hours. The enemy assault was repulsed and broken by 0345 when the enemy withdrew leaving 29 dead around the perimeter wire and two POW's. The enemy also left behind two machine guns, six RPG rocket launchers, six AK-47 rifles, 34 hand grenades and 57 RPG rounds.
Later in the morning (0840), Troops A and B of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry searching in an area a short distance to the northeast of the 1st of the 5th's contact (XT574278) came into contact with an unknown size enemy force. In a running battle which lasted all day, the cavalrymen, supported by helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes, accounted for another 29 VC dead. Far to the north of these actions, at the TAY NINH Base Camp, an enemy sapper unit at 0500 attacked and overran four gun positions of the 2nd Battalion, 82nd Artillery on the base camp perimeter. Seven VC KIA were accounted for by the defending artillery-men, but the enemy succeeded in destroying one 155mm gun and one 8” Howitzer.
The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry continuing their pursuit of the 3rd Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment, in the DUC HOA area, located an estimated enemy company three kilometers south of the town at XS625985. The battalion's A Company engaged the VC force with organic weapons, artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes between 0830 and 1915 hours. After contact with the enemy was broken, A Company discovered 19 VC KIA. To the north, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry continued its search for enemy forces and weapons and ammunition caches immediately north of TAN SON NHUT Air Base. At 1045 hours, B Company came across an estimated VC platoon at XT824046. After a fire fight which included support from armed helicopters and artillery, 12 VC KIA were accounted for, and two POW's taken.
On 25 May, the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry was relocated from the DUC HOA area to a new battalion area of operations northeast of HOC MON where it established a new base camp at XT778035. Conducting a company size combat assault and sweep to the northwest of the battalion base camp, A Company engaged an unknown number of VC between 1005 and 1430 hours at XT784084. Supported by artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes, the infantry accounted for 23 VC KIA in the engagement.
Combat action in the division TAOI on 27 May was focused on the area 14 kilometers west of SAIGON at XS671925 where the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry was located in a night defensive position. At 2250 on the 26th, the battalion's night position came under mortar fire which was intermittent until 0330 hours when the position came under a massive ground attack. The 4th of the 23rd held off the human wave assaults with the aid of armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes. At dawn, the 4th of the 23rd was reinforced by A and C Troops of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry. The combined US force moved out of the NOP at first light and pursued the enemy which was attempting to break contact. The fire-fights in the general vicinity continued until 1600 hours. The enemy body count within the NDP and the surrounding area was 243 VC KIA as compared to 6 US fatalities. In addition, three personnel were taken who identified their mauled unit as the 2nd Battalion, 273rd VC Regiment. Also captured were 28 AK-47 rifles, 11 RPG-2 rocket launchers, 16 machine guns, six 60mm mortars, 49 60mm mortar rounds, 58 hand grenades, 142 RPG-2 rounds and 22,500 rounds of small arms ammunition.
Meanwhile to the north, B Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry and B Company 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry joined forces to engage an unknown size VC force northeast of HOC MON (ST830043 to ST842045) in a running battle that lasted from 0855 until 1700 hours. By the end of the day the two companies had accounted for 15 VC KIA and large amounts of captured enemy ammunition and supplies.
The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry searching for enemy weapons and ammunition caches in the western FILHOL PLANTATION (XT63802) discovered and evacuated a supply of weapons which included 67 individual weapons and three crew served weapons.
The ground troop (D) of the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry which had been conducting road clearing and security operations on the road from TAY NINH to GO DAU HA for over two weeks without incident, suddenly found the enemy at 0935 on 30 May. Having drawn sporadic small arms fire along the road at XT335345, elements of the Air Cavalry troop probed the area from which the fire had come and encountered an estimated VC company. The cavalrymen called in supporting artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes on the enemy position. Sweeping through the area following the lifting of supporting fires, D Troop discovered 14 enemy bodies.
In the meantime, B Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry sweeping northeast of HOC MON along the SAIGON RIVER (XT839049) engaged a small enemy force heavily dug into a bunker complex. Supported by artillery, armed helicopter gunships and air strikes, the infantrymen overran the enemy positions. They accounted for 11 VC KIA and captured five AK-47 rifles, two RPG-2 launchers and one pistol.
B Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry conducting a reconnaissance-in-force operation along the SAIGON RIVER, approximately six kilometers northeast of HOC MON (XT791096) encountered an unknown size enemy force at 0055 hours. Armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes were called in to attack the enemy positions. Sweeping into the location occupied by the enemy, the infantrymen located 14 VC bodies and captured two AK-47 rifles, one RPG-2 rocket launcher, one 9mm pistol and two pounds of documents. At the same time, a short distance to the southwest of the B Company contact (XT823047), C Company detected an estimated two VC squads hiding in bunkers. Supporting fires were placed on the enemy positions, and C Company discovered six VC KIA when it assaulted the enemy bunkers.
Conducting a search and destroy mission seven kilometers west of SAIGON, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry received fire from an estimated 40 VC at XT708856. Returning fire with organic weapons and calling in supporting artillery and air, the company maintained contact with the enemy from 1355 to 1945. VC losses in the fire-fight were 21 KIA. In the meantime, D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry which had been flying armed aerial reconnaissance over the BOI LOI WOODS, HO BO WOODS and IRON TRIANGLE, detected an unknown number of VC in bunkers at XT728186. In a battle which commenced at 1115 hours, the enemy were hit by armed helicopter, artillery and air strikes. Checking the area following the engagement, the cavalrymen discovered 38 VC KIA.
D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry continued its armed aerial reconnaissance throughout the BOI
LOI, HO BO WOODS, and IRON TRIANGLE on 3 June and detected a rocket firing site at XT625306. Attacking the position at 1130 and calling in air-strikes, the helicopters succeeded in destroying 27 122mm rockets and 2 rocket launchers as well as accounting for two VC KIA.
B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry flying armed aerial reconnaissance along the ORIENTAL RIVER south of BAO TRAI had five separate engagements with small groups of VC moving in the vicinity of the river. The engagements resulted in 17 VC KIA and six enemy sampans destroyed. Helicopters of D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry flying similar missions along the SAIGON RIVER in the vicinity of PHU HOA DONG destroyed 13 enemy sampans throughout the day.
The night defensive position of the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry at XT483196, came under a heavy mortar attack and company sized ground attack at 0113 hours. Receiving a total of 60 mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds, the cavalrymen reacted swiftly to the ground attack before it could get seriously underway. Fire was placed on the enemy by organic weapons, armed helicopters and artillery. A search of the perimeter area following the abortive assault located seven VC KIA, one POW, two AK-47 rifles, two RPG rocket launchers, nine RPG rounds, eight hand grenades and six mines.
Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry conducting an air mobile combat assault at 0745 hours near the SAIGON RIVER town of PHU LONG, landed in a “hot LZ” at XT851048. As the company landed it drew heavy small arms fire, automatic weapons and rocket fire from an unknown size enemy force in the area. The infantrymen returned fire and called in supporting artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes. At 1140 hours, A Company was reinforced by B Company, and at 1400 hours Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry moved in to reinforce the two companies of the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry. All three units remained in contact with the enemy throughout the day and into the night. When the infantry swept through the area of contact the following day, the discovered 46 VC KIA and one POW. Documents taken from the dead enemy and the POW identified the enemy unit in contact as the 1st Battalion, 101st NVA Regiment.
B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry flying armed aerial reconnaissance along the ORIENTAL
RIVER from HIEP HOA to BAO TRAI, and east of BAO TRAI engaged small groups of enemy on three occasions during the day, accounting for 10 VC KIA.
An ambush patrol from Company C, 4th Battalion 9th Infantry engaged approximately 20 VC at 0340 hours at XT815055. The ambush resulted in 15 VC KIA and the capture of 12 AK-47 rifles and 1000 rounds of small arms ammunition.
C Company, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) sweeping through a swamp midway between SAIGON and DUC HOA (XS695950) at 0915 hours, discovered and confiscated a large enemy ammunition cache located in four sunken sampans. The cache included 10 complete 122 rockets, 82, 82mm mortar rounds, 12 cans of 82mm fuses, 24 cans of 82mm primer, and 5,250 AK-47 rifle rounds,. At 1000 hours B Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry sweeping through the SAIGON “rocket belt” received fire from an unknown size enemy force at XT784072. The company returned fire and called in armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes on the enemy positions. Sweeping through the area later in the day, the infantrymen counted 13 NVA KIA and captured two AK-47 rifles, one .30 caliber machine gun and two RPG-2 rocket launchers
The 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division with two battalions (3rd Battalion 187th Airborne Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 5006th Airborne Infantry) became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division. The brigade arrived at the CU CHI Base Camp on 14 June and began preparations for operations within the Division TAOI.
An ambush patrol from C Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry engaged 25-30 enemy at 2355 hours. The enemy force walked into the ambush set by the C Company element at XS724993. In the fire fight that ensued, 15 NVA were KIA from the claymores, hand grenades, small arms and automatic weapons fire of the ambush.
16 June (p15)
A short time later at 0250 hours, the night defensive position of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry at XS740998 came under a heavy mortar attack followed by a human wave ground assault by an estimated battalion sized enemy force. The bunkered perimeter of the night location met the enemy assaults with a heavy volume of fire. The enemy outside the perimeter were also taken under fire by supporting helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes. The following morning a search of the area beyond the perimeter revealed 72 enemy KIA and resulted in the capture of 29 AK-47 rifles, 13 RPG rocket launchers, three machine guns, 20 RPG rounds and 4-0 small arms rounds. One prisoner was also taken. The attacking enemy unit was identified as the 1st Battalion , 272nd VC Regiment.
On 18 June, D Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry searching for enemy arms and ammunition caches northeast of HOC MON discovered a large supply hidden in a tunnel at XT795070. The company confiscated 32 -122mm rocket war heads, six carbines, seven RPG rocket launchers, 12,680 small arms rounds, 88 RPG rounds and 88 -82mm mortar rounds. The 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne which had moved from CU CHI Base Camp to an area of operations in the TRAPEZOID south of the MICHELIN PLANTATION, had been searching in vain for enemy forces in this area. Its first significant contact occurred at 0420 hours on the 18th when a D Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne on a night patrol engaged an unknown size enemy force. Searching through the area of contact at first light, the company located seven VC KIA.
Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry conducted a helicopter borne assault at 1045 hours into a landing zone five kilometers northeast of HOC MON. As the company landed, it came under fire from an enemy force of unknown size occupying the terrain adjacent to the landing zone. Four helicopters were damaged by the fire, but were able to exit the landing zone. The infantry returned fire and called in armed helicopters and artillery for supporting fire. At 1430 hours, elements of Companies B and D linked up with C and the combined units remained in contact throughout the day. A sweep of the contact area the following morning discovered 44 VC KIA, seven AK-47 rifles, eight RPG-2 rounds, 25 hand grenades and miscellaneous medical supplies. The enemy unit in contact was identified as elements of a battalion of the 101st NVA Regiment.
Shifting its area of operations from the TRAPEZOID south of the MICHELIN PLANTATION to western HAU NGHIA Province southwest of TRANG BANG, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division engaged in a significant combat action on 21 June. At 1142 hours, Company A, 1st Battalion, 506th Airborne was searching east of the ORIENTAL RIVER at XT430113 when it ran into the base camp of an estimated VC company. In the heavy fire fight that followed, A Company was reinforced by C Company and A Company, 3rd Battalion , 187th Airborne. Helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes were also brought to bear on the enemy positions. After the contact which lasted through the day and night of 21 June, the area was search and disclosed 64 VC KIA and the capture of 13 AK-47 rifles, two RPG-2 rocket launchers, two machine guns, 29 hand grenades, 19 RPG-2 rounds and 5,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. The enemy unit in contact was later identified as the 267th VC Battalion.
In the early morning hours, the DIVARTY radar at PHU HAO DONG detected unidentified movement between its location and HOC MON. The target was engaged with artillery. The following day helicopters flew over the area, engaged and located 15 VC KIA resulting from artillery.
The reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Battalion, 506th Airborne conducting a night search and destroy operation along the west bank of the ORIENTAL RIVER, discovered a large enemy ammunition cache. At 0210 hours the platoon uncovered 106 -75mm recoilless rifle rounds, one 120 mm mortar round, 110 RPG rounds, 429 -60mm mortar rounds, three 82mm rounds and 1,000 rounds of small arms ammunition at XT420105.
B Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) conducted a combined search and destroy operation north of TRANG BANG with the 34th ARVN Ranger Battalion. The force came under fire from an unknown size enemy force at XT500233. Supported by artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes, the joint force swept into the enemy positions and accounted for 20 VC KIA and four POW's.
Company A, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) conducting a road clearing and security mission on the MSR between TAY NINH and TRANG BANG, received fire from an estimated enemy company at 0900 hours in the vicinity of XT358332. At 0920, Company B, reinforced by the battalion heavy mortar platoon, moved north from TRANG BANG to reinforce A Company. At 1005 a platoon of C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry also moved north from TRANG BANG to reinforce, and at 1141 hours two mechanized ARVN companies from TAY NINH moved into the area of contact. After preparation by armed helicopters and mortars, and a CS drop, B Company and the platoon of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry assaulted into the rubber plantation to the east of the road from which the enemy fire had originated. In the contact which continued until 1905 hours, 21 VC KIA were discovered, two POW's were taken and two AK-47's and one machine gun were captured.
Earlier in the day, the night defensive position of the 1st Battalion, 506th Airborne at XT492235, came under attack from an estimated two companies at 0005 hours. In the contact which lasted until 0230, the paratroopers supported by armed helicopters and artillery turned back the enemy assault and accounted for 38 NVA KIA, and the capture of 12 AK-47 rifles, nine RPG rocket launchers, two machine guns, 2000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 40 hand grenades. The attacking companies were later identified as elements of the 2nd Battalion, 275th VC Regiment.
Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, participating in the squadron's road clearing and security mission of the MSR between TAY NINH City and SAIGON, drew fire from an estimated enemy platoon at 0140 at a point on the MSR four kilometers southeast of GO DA HAU (XT413231) The cavalry troop returned the enemy's fire with organic weapons and called in artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes to hit the enemy positions. Contact with the enemy lasted until 0245 hours. Sweeping through the area at first light, the troop discovered four VC bodies and one AK-47 rifle. At about the same time that this contact was taking place, ten kilometers to the northeast (XT538264) the night defensive position of D Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry came under attack by an unknown size enemy force. Meeting the attack with organic weapons and supporting artillery, the company fought off the enemy charge. Sweeping into the area from which the enemy came, the company located 13 VC KIA and captured two machine guns, two rocket launchers, four AK-47 rifles, and one field radio.
The 25th Infantry Division's major administrative and logistical base camps located at CU CHI, TAY NINH and DAU TIENG, had come under frequent stand off mortar and rocket attacks during the reporting period. However, all of these attacks were minor in nature involving small amounts of ordnance and were conducted more for harassment than any other purpose. The one exception to this norm was the attack which took place on the DAU TIENG Base Camp beginning at 0220 hours and lasting until 0450. During that period of time, the base camp received 42 -107mm rocket rounds and 515 rounds of mixed 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds. This massive artillery assault was combined with two separate ground probes on two sectors against the base camp perimeter. These probes were met by bunker line personnel and reaction forces from the Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and the Headquarters Battery, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery. In both cases, the ground probes were repulsed with the enemy breaching the perimeter in only one location. Results of the attack in the way of US losses were five KIA, 55 WIA, 12 quarter ton trucks, five ¾ ton trucks, three 2 ½ ton trucks, three 5 ton trucks, one APC, and six buildings damaged. Enemy losses were recorded at 16 KIA, six AK-47 rifles and one rocket launcher captured, and 434 satchel charges, 61 RPG rounds, 45-60mm mortar rounds, 16 grenades and four mines destroyed..
Tropic Lightning maneuver elements continued to push their search for enemy supply caches. Searching along a canal bank on e mile southwest of the SAIGON RIVER, town of PHU CONG (XT799124), C Company, 1st. Battalion, 27th Infantry uncovered and captured a large supply cache containing 588 rounds of small arms ammunition, 238 -60mm rounds, 18 -60mm rounds, 18 -82mm rounds, 50 rifle grenades, 40 pounds of medical supplies and one AK-47 rifle. Later in the day, at 1832H Companies B and C, 1st Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry, sweeping an area approximately three kilometers northeast of TRANG BANG (XT520217) engaged an unknown size enemy force. The fire-fight that followed was supported by armed helicopters, artillery and an Air Force “Spooky”, a gattling gun armed C-47 cargo aircraft. Pushing through and overrunning the enemy positions, the paratroopers recovered 21 VC KIA. Four troopers died in the contact and 13 were wounded.
At 0920 hours, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 14t Infantry sweeping west of the SAIGON RIVER, one
kilometer southwest of PHU LONG (XT843046) discovered 12 VC KIA by artillery. Movement had been detected in the area the previous night by radar, and the movement was engaged by artillery. Three destroyed AK-47 rifles and two unserviceable RPG rocket launchers were captured along with three RPG rounds and 14 hand grenades. Searching several kilometers to the northwest of the 2nd of the 14th discovery (XT758124) at 1150 hours, B Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry discovered a cache consisting of one AK-47 rifle, 3,300 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 170 pounds of explosives and 35 blasting caps.
Flying armed aerial reconnaissance at 1140 hours approximately seven kilometers northeast of
TRANG BANG, D troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry detected approximately 50 VC in bunkers and spider holes at XT473257. Assaulting the enemy with their rockets and automatic weapons and calling in artillery and air strikes, the air cavalry men alerted the nearby 3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry to the presence of the enemy unit. At 1547, Companies C and D of the battalion made a helicopter borne assault on the enemy positions. Overrunning the bunkers, the cavalrymen recovered 27 enemy bodies, and captured 15 AK-47 rifles, six RPG rocket launchers, 1000 rounds of AK=47 ammunition, 15RPG rounds and 25 hand grenades.
Pursuing the remnants of the enemy force they attacked to the northeast by following blood trails,
C and D Companies, 1st Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry discovered an additional six enemy bodies, four AK-47 rifles, 17 RPG rounds, 25 pounds of medical supplies, 350 round of AK-47 ammunition, 2100 pounds of rice, 35 pounds of sugar, one RPG rocket launcher, one pound of documents, 40 -82mm rounds, 30 mortar fuses and seven hand grenades.
Flying armed aerial reconnaissance eight kilometers east of the CU CHI Base Camp (XT714127)
at 1145. Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry detected a sampan on a canal. Checking out the contents of the boat, the air cavalrymen captured nine complete 122mm rockets.
At 1040 hours a forward air controller for the 25th ARVN Division detected 10-20 VC unloading two sampans on a canal one kilometer east of the Cambodian border. Air strikes were called in on the site and helicopters of C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry flew into the area to follow up the air strikes. The helicopters engaged several VC in bunkers near the spot where the two sampans lay destroyed. Checking out the results of the attack in the position , the air cavalrymen discovered six VC bodies and determined that the cargo in the sampans had exploded.
Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry searching for enemy arms and weapons caches along the west bank of the SAIGON RIVER, one kilometer south of PHU LONG (XT8404) captured 1,345 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 22 hand grenades, three RPG rounds, two 60-mm mortar rounds, nine 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, and 2 AK-47 rifles.
The 2nd Brigade Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP), a joint US-Vietnamese unit, acting on intelligence, assaulted a house four kilometers north of DUC HOA (XT608008) where a VC meeting was supposedly taking place. Sneaking up on the house at 2230 hours, the CRIP succeeded in surprising the meeting and in the fire fight that took place killed 9 VC and took one PW. Three pistols, one AK-47 rifle and one carbine were captured. The dead VC were later identified as high ranking VC cadre. At 1955, an ambush patrol from D Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, set up along a trail at XT749167 ambushed a VC party. The results of the ambush were 7 VC KIA of the seven man party and the capture of five AK-47 rifles, one RPG rocket launcher, one pistol, 1000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 10 RPG rocket rounds and 50 rounds of 9mm pistol ammunition.
22 July (p19)
At 1056 B Company, 2nd Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry was sweeping three kilometers northeast of TRANG BANG (XT522204) when it encountered an unknown size VC force. Supported by helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes and reinforced by the battalion's C and D companies, the contact with the enemy force continued throughout the day and into the night. A sweep of the area the following day resulted in the discovery of six VC bodies. At the same time to the west of the paratroopers contact, B Company, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry, sweeping four kilometers north of GO DA HAU (XT392301) engaged an unknown size enemy force. Armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes were called in on the enemy positions, and B Company was reinforced by companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech) The contact lasted through the day and into the night. At first light, a sweep of the area revealed 13 VC KIA.
C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry flying armed aerial reconnaissance along the Cambodian border at 1830 hours, detected a platoon size enemy force at XT340200 eight kilometers southeast of GO DA HAU. Attacking with automatic weapons and rockets and calling in artillery and air strikes, the air cavalrymen observed the enemy withdrawing to the west in the direction of CAMBODIA. A low level reconnaissance of the area after the contact revealed 8 VC KIA.
Company C, 2nd Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry sweeping three kilometers northeast of TRANG BANG (XT511219) at 0815 came into contact with an unknown size enemy force. C Company
was reinforced by A and B Companies of the battalion and the contact was supported by helicopter gunships, artillery and Air Force fighter strikes. Contact was maintained until 1120 hours. Sweeping into the enemy positions, the paratroopers recovered 35 VC KIA and captured two AK-47 rifles, one machine gun, one 82mm mortar and 150 rounds of AK-47 ammunition.
C Combat Aviation Support Operations:
During the period of this report, 3,627 Air Force fighter bomber sorties were flown in support of 25th Infantry Division operations. These strikes which carried an estimated 4,574 tons of ordnance, consisted of daily pre-planned air attacks on known or suspected enemy targets and immediate close air strikes in support ;of troops in contact. In addition, 166 B-52 missions (sorties not known) were flown against targets located in the division TAOI. These targets were known or suspected enemy base camps and supply areas and were flown on pre-planned or mission divert bases. Confirmed results of these air operations (figures not included in these cited in paragraph B are as follows:
Enemy KIA - 876
Bunkers destroyed - 4,355
Structures destroyed - 619
Secondary explosions - 189
Secondary fires - 142
Sampans destroyed - 78
Bridges destroyed - 20
Trench line destroyed - 4m790 meters (p20)
Air Force units which provided support to the division during the period of this report were C Flight of the 4th Air Commando Squadron flying out of BIEN HOA Air Base; the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing consisting of the 391st, 557th, 558th and 659th Tactical Fighter Squadrons flying out of CAM RANH BAY; the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing consisting of the 188th , 136th, 308th, 306th and 305th Tactical Fighter Squadrons flying out of TUY HOA Air Base; the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing consisting of the 120th, 352nd, 614th and 615th Tactical Fighter Squadrons flying out of THAU THANG Air Base; the 174th, 355th, 416th and 612th Tactical Fighter Squadrons flying out of PHU CAT Air Base; the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing consisting of the 90th, 510th and the 531st Tactical Fighter Squadrons flying out of BIEN HOA Air Base; and the 8th and 13th Tactical Fighter Squadrons of the Australian Air Force flying out of PHAN RANG Air Base.
Army combat aviation support for the combat operations of the 25th Infantry Division was provided by the organic 25th Aviation Battalion and 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, the 12th Aviation Group, three separate aviation companies, two Air Ambulance Detachments and the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.
Tactical troop lift and aerial resupply throughout the division TAOI was available on a daily basis by the 128th and 173rd Assault Helicopter Companies of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion; the 68th, 118th and 190th Assault Helicopter Companies of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion; the 147th and 205th Assault Helicopter Companies of the 222nd Combat Aviation Battalion; the 116th and 187th Assault Helicopter Companies of the 242nd Combat Support Helicopter Company of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. All these units are organic to the 12th Aviation Group.
Aerial reconnaissance support to the division was made available by the 75th Support Aircraft Company (Mohawks), the 174th Reconnaissance Aircraft Company (Bird Dogs) and the 184th Reconnaissance Aircraft Company.
Armed serial reconnaissance and helicopter gunships were provided to the division daily by the organic 25th Aviation Battalion and D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry; B and C Troops of the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry; and the 334th Armed Helicopter Company (Gunship) of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion.
Air ambulance service to the division was provided by the 159th Air Ambulance Detachment and the 57th Air Ambulance Detachment of the 45th Medical Company (Air Ambulance). The 159th provided air medical evacuation service working out of the CU CHI and TAY NINH Base Camps and the 47th provided similar service working out of the DAU TIENG Base Camp.
D Principle Command and Staff The identification of the principle command and staff personnel within the 25th Infantry Division for the reporting period is as follows:
Commanding General Major General F.K. Means
(1 May - 31 July)
Acting Division Commander Brig. General William T. Gleason
(3 July - 31 July)
Assistant Division Commander (M) Brig. General Donald D. Dunlap
(1 May - 22 June)
Brig. General Glen C. Long Jr.
(11 July - 31 July)
Assistant Division Commander (S) Brig General Carleton Brear Jr.
(1 May - 18 June)
Chief of Staff Col. Burton F. Hood
AcofS G-2 LTC Stanford Touchstone (1 May - 8 Jun)
LTC Ernest F. Condina (9 Jun - 9 Jul)
LTC Harry Rubin (16 Jul - 31 Jul)
AcofS G-2 LTC Albert Stubblebine
AcofS G-3 LTC Chandler Goodnow (1 May)
LTC Alfred M. Bracy (2 May - 31 Jul)
AcofS G-4 LTC Walter I. Brent
AcofS G-5 LTC Vincent I. Brosky
Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade COL Fremont B. Hodson
Commanding Officer, 2nd Brigade COL Raymond O. Miller
Commanding Officer, 3rd Brigade COL Leonard R. Daems (1 May - 3 Jun)
COL Lends J. Ashley (4Jun - 31 Jul) (p20)
Commanding Officer, DIVARTY COL Gordon Sumner Jr.
Commanding Officer, DISCON COL James R. Brownall
Commanding Officer, 725 Main Bn LTC Kenneth D. Cowan
Commanding Officer, 25th S&T Bn LTC John K. Henderson
Commanding Officer, 25th Med Bn LTC Elliot Schofield (1 May - 20 May)
LTC Ranier S. Fakusch )21 May - 10 Jul)
LTC George R. Helsel (11 Jul - 31 Jul)
Commanding Officer, 125th Sig Bn LTC John W. Sorbet
Commanding Officer, 25th Avn Bn LTC Peter W. McGurl
Commanding Officer, 65th Engr Bn LTC Henry A. Flertzheim (1 May - 11 Jun)
LTC James W. Atwell (12 Jun - 31 Jul)
Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion,
9th Infantry LTC Richard R. Simpson
Commandin g Officer, 2nd Battalion,
14th Infantry LTC Alfred M Bracy (1 May)
LTC Thomas C. Munn (2 May - 31 Jul)
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion,
5th Infantry (Mechanized) LTC Thomas C. Lodge (1 May - 25 Jun)
LTC Clifford C. Neilson (26 Jun - 3 Jul)
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion,
27th Infantry LTC Ernest Condina (1 May - 7 Jun)
LTC Stanford Touchstone (6 Jun - 31 Jul)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion
27th Infantry LTC Winfred G. Skelton Jr. (1 May -24 Jul)
LTC John F. Kenny Jr. (25 Jul - 31 Jul)
Commanding Officer 2nd Battalion,
12th Infantry LTC Donald J. Green
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion,
22nd Infantry (Mechanized) LTC King J Coffman
Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion,
22nd Infantry LTC Roy K. Flint
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion,
34th Armor LTC John H. Tipton Jr. (1 May - 20 Jul)
LTC Theodore E. O'Connor (21 Jul - 31 Jul)
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion,
8th Artillery LTC Alan M.R. Dean (1 May - 24 May)
LTC Leslie R. Forney (25 May - 24 Jul)
LTC John P. Cooper (25 Jul - 31 Jul)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion,
78th Artillery LTC Falkner Heard, Jr.
Commanding Officer, 7th Battalion,
11th Artillery LTC Billy J. Leathers (1 May - 8 May)
LTC Forest E. Pierce (9May - 31 Jul)
Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion,
13th Artillery LTC Homer W. Keifer, Jr.
Commanding Officer, 3rd Squadron,
4th Cavalry LTC Glenn K. Otis (1 May - 25 May)
LTC Clemens A. Riley (29 May - 31 Jul)
Adjutant General LTC Clarence A. Riser (1 May - 31 Jun)
Major Donald M Edwards (1 Jul - 21 Jul)
LTC William F. Faught (22 Jul - 31 Jul)
Chaplain LTC Parker C. Thompson (1 May - 22 Jul)
LTC Duncan C. Stewart (24 Jul - 31 Jul)
Finance Officer LTC George B. Barnett
Information Officer Major Andrew J. Sullivan (5 May - 31 Jul)
Inspector General Major Otis G. Wilson (5 May - 31 Jul)
Judge Advocate LTC Jack Norton
Provost Marshall LTC William McClain (1 May - 7 Jul)
Major Ronald S. Duriam (7 Jul - 13 Jul)
LTC Malcom R. Smith (13 Jul - 31 Jul)
Surgeon LTC Rainer S. Pakusch
E. Personnel: During the months of May, June and July, the aggregate division personnel
strength averaged 103.1% of the authorized strength.
Enlisted personnel strength during the period maintained a fairly constant level of 103.45. As of
31 July, the assigned units of the division were authorized 15,810 enlisted personnel with 16,277 assigned and 15,771 present for duty. Units attached to the division had 64 enlisted personnel authorized, 37 assigned and 36 present for duty as of the last day of the reporting period.
Officer personnel strength for the period averaged 97.7% of authorized strength. This represented a two percent drop in strength from the average of the preceding quarter.
Officer and warrant officer personnel strength within assigned divisional units as of 31 July stood at 1,161 assigned with 1,217 authorized. On the same day 1,145 officers and warrant officers were present for duty. Attached units were authorized four officers and warrant officers. On 31 July three were assigned, all three being present for duty.
From 1 May to 31 July, the personnel input to the division was 292 officers, 38 warrant officers and 4,360 enlisted personnel for an aggregate input of 4,690 personnel. Personnel losses both programmed and unprogrammed approximated this level.
Personnel casualties for the period numbered 22 officers and 323 enlisted personnel killed in action, 87 officers, six warrant officers and 1,331 enlisted personnel wounded in action and evacuated, one officer and 23 enlisted personnel non-battle deaths, and one officer and 27 enlisted non-battle injuries requiring evacuation.
Personnel shortages continued to exist in Infantry Captains and non-commissioned officers in the grade of E-7 with 11B HOS and in the grade of E-8 in the 11G HOS. A change in authorization involving artillery, armor and cavalry units created a shortage in turret mechanics.
F. Organization: The organization list of the 25th Infantry Division for the period 1 May to 31 July is as follows:
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 25th Infantry Division
25th Administration Company
25th Military Police Company
25th Aviation Battalion
65th Engineer Battalion
125th Signal Battalion
3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Company F, 50th Infantry (LRP)
390th Quartermaster Detachment
th Military Intelligence Detachment
Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Band, Division --------
725th Maintenance Battalion
25th Supply and Transportation Battalion
25th Medical Battalion
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery
1st Battalion, 8th Artillery
2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery
7th Battalion, 11th Artillery
3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Brigade
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Brigade (p23)
4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mechanized)
2nd Battalion 14th Infantry
4th Battalion, 9th Infantry
2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (-)
1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mechanized)
1st Battalion, 27th Infantry
2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry
2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mechanized)
3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry
2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry
18th Military History Detachment
9th Chemical Detachment
66th Tracker Dog Platoon
15th Public Information Detachment
20th Public Information Detachment
38th Scout Dog Platoon
44th Scout Dog Platoon
46th Scout Dog Platoon
257th Field Artillery Detachment
258th Field Artillery Detachment
Battery B, 5th Battalion, 2nd Artillery
6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (until 8 June)
--1st Aviation Detachment
372nd Radio Research Company
In addition to the above assigned and attached units, the 108th Light Infantry brigade and the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division were placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the 25th Infantry Division.
The 109th Brigade was OPCON to the division from 12-23 May with its organic battalions being the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry.
The 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division 14 June and remained in that status through the end of the reporting period. Organic units of this brigade were: the 1st Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry, `2x1 Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry; the 3rd Battalion 187th Airborne Infantry, and A and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Artillery.
Throughout the reporting period, battalions of the 25th Infantry Division were in turn, placed under the operational control of the Capital Military District (CMD) which was later redesignated Capital Military Assistance Command, a provisional command organized to assist in the defense of SAIGON.
Tab A provides a daily record of the 25th Infantry Division's organization for combat from 1 May to 31 July.
Throughout the reporting period several divisional units were reorganized under new TOE. These are as follows:
1. 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech), 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) and the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) to TOE 7-45G per USARPAC GO 226 DATED 7 May 1968.
2. 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor to TOE 17-35G per USARPAC GO 218 dated 22 April 1968. (p24)
3. 15th and 20th Public Information Detachments to TOE 45-500E PAC 1/68 per USARPAC GO 268 dated 28 May 1968.
4. 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery to TOE 6-355G per USARPAC GO 272 dated 29 May 1968
5. 18th Military History Detachment to TOE 20-17E PAC 1/68 per USARPAC GO 278 dated 29 May 1968.
6. 9th Chemical Detachment to TCE 3-500E PAC 1/68 per GO 297 dated 17 June 1968
The 25th Infantry Division continued to pursue an active internal training program during the reporting period. The heart of this training program was the Division Replacement Training Course, the Division Demolitions and Explosives Course, and the Lightning Combat Leaders Course all provided by the 25th Administration Company.
The Division Replacement training course, an intensive five day and five night Vietnam oriented field training block of instruction required to be taken by all divisional replacements, was completed by 4,145 personnel between 1 May and 31 July. The Mines and Booby Trap Course, a four hour course of instruction in enemy mine and booby trap tactics, required to be taken by all newly arrived divisional personnel, was completed by 4,841 personnel.
The Lightning Combat Leaders Course (LCLC), an eight day field leadership course for fire team and squad leaders, was completed by 552 junior leaders. Five hundred and sixty mine personnel received the four-hour block of instruction comprising the Division Demolitions and Explosives Course. In addition, a four-hour course of instruction in tunnel destruction was attended by 574 students.
Other divisional courses of instruction, the instructing unit and the number of trainees for the period of the report are as follows:
COURSE INSTRUCTING UNIT STUDENTS
Small Arms Inspection 725 Maint Bn 59
Generator Maintenance 725 Maint Bn 50
Mess Management 25th S&T Bn 72
TSEC/KY-38 Maintenance 125th Sig. Bn 111
Crypto Accounting 125th Sig. Bn 21
TSZC/KY-8 Maintenance 125th Sig. Bn 54
Selected division personnel also attended specialized courses of instruction offered by non-divisional organizations between 1 May and 31 July. These courses by title, the instructing unit, location and number of trainees are shown below:
COURSE UNIT LOCATION STUDENTS
Jungle Environmental Fleet Airborne Clark AFB 9
Survival Electronic Training Philippines Unit,
Jungle Survival School Fleet Airborne Clark AFB 3
Electronic Training Philippines
JUSPAO Orientation HQ's, MACV SAIGON 2
Transition/Gunnery 334th Armed BIEN HOA 6
Cable Splicers Course SE Asia Signal LONG BIEN 1
Technical Facilities SE Asia Signal LONG BIEN 1
Imagery Interpretation 1st M / BARS TAN SON NHUT 4
Photo Interpretation 1st M / BARS TAN SON NHUT 4
Airframe Maintenance 765th Trans Bn VUNG TAU 5
Airframe Maintenance 765th Trans Bn VUNG TAU 5
Airframe Maintenance 765th Trans Bn VUNG TAU 7
Turbine Eng Maint-T53 765th Trans Bn VUNG TAU 3
Turbine Eng Maint-T53 765th Trans Bn VUNG TAU 2
Eng. Main, T-63 765th Maint Bn VUNG TAU 7
Supply 765th Maint Bn VUNG TAU 4
LOH (OH-6A) AC Pilot 765th Maint Bn VUNG TAU 10
Transition 765th Maint Bn VUNG TAU -
AN/PPS-Radar Operator US Army Spt Cood QUI NHON 76
IM-27EL Armament 765th Maint Bn VUNG TAU 7
Key Telephone System 1st Signal Bde SAIGON 4
OH-6A Turbine Eng. 765th Trans Bn VUNG TAU 5
G. Intelligence and Security:
Intelligence operations and activities within the 25th Infantry Division during the reporting period
continued under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, LTC Albert N. Stubblebine. LTC Stubblebine was assisted in his responsibilities and duties by his deputy who until 9 July was Major William W. Wilson. On 10 July, Major George Richardson moved from his duties as G-2 Operations Officer to the position of Deputy G-2. Other key members of the G2 section between 1 May and 31 July were Major P.C. Anderson who served as G2 Plans Officer and Major L.G. Quinn who replaced Richardson as G2 Operations Officer on 10 July.
Intelligence planning and operations for the reporting period were developed around the resources of the 25th Military Intelligence Detachment, commanded by Major Gale Goodloe until 21 July, and thereafter by Major Anthony Gallo, the 372nd Radio Research Company commanded by Capt. I.B. Carter, and F Company, 50th Infantry (LRR) long range reconnaissance patrolling) commanded by 1Lt William Shanaman until 30 June and thereafter by Captain Raymond C. Dawson.
The 25th Military Intelligence Detachment provided the G2 with Order of Battle (0B) facilities, photo and imagery interpretation capabilities, interrogation of prisoner of war teams (IPW) and counter intelligence teams. The 372nd Radio Research Company provided specialized communications security and intelligence facilities and operations to the division throughout the TAOI. F Company, 50th Infantry (LRD was the long range reconnaissance patrol arm of the division and reacted to requirements by the G2 to execute patrols to locate enemy forces, base camps and supply activities and to monitor enemy troop movement.
In addition to these assets, the division exploited the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of organic aviation units and facilities as well as those of supporting organizations. Extensive use was made of the “People Sniffer” capability of the 25th Aviation Battalion and 9th Chemical Detachment. Other specialized aerial reconnaissance and surveillance was made available on a daily basis by the 73rd Support Aircraft Company (Mohawk) of the 1st Aviation Brigade which flew daily SLAR missions (side looking aerial radar) and infra-red detection, “Red Haze” missions in response to division requirements.
Another intelligence asset of the division and one that was extensively employed was the CRIP (combined reconnaissance and intelligence platoon). One of these joint US-Vietnamese units was assigned to each Brigade Headquarters and operated directly in support of their parent brigades.
Employing all of these assets to maximum advantage and coordinating closely with intelligence agencies at adjacent and higher headquarters as well as Vietnamese government intelligence agencies, the Tropic Lightning Division G2 establishment was successful in producing information which forecasted the “2nd Phase” Offensive on SAIGON in early May. This information accurately identified the major enemy units that would participate in the operation, each unit's strength, composition and capabilities, and the probably routes of approach each unit would take to move against SAIGON.
Based on this information, the 25th Infantry Division was redeployed in early May to establish a screen to the west of SAIGON and to be in position to intercept the enemy in his approach march. This strategy was imminently successful and resulted in the destruction of the enemy forces and the dissipation of their combat effectiveness before they could reach their assault positions.
As the enemy attack on SAIGON was destroyed and as the enemy broke contact and withdrew, the intelligence apparatus continued to produce data and information which was invaluable in pursuing the enemy forces, capturing his weapons, ammunition and supply caches, and in taking appropriate action to counter his offense and defensive tactics.
Logistics: Logistical management and staff supervision for division operations continued to be provided by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4. Logistical operations were accomplished by the Division Support Command and its organic units: the 25th Medical Battalion, the 725th Maintenance Battalion, and the 25th Supply and Transportation Battalion.
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 performed at three different levels of organization: As the Division G4 office, it guided and supervised supply and property accountability, maintenance and material readiness and current logistical operations. As the installation G4, it reviewed all reports of surveys, organized in the division and attached units. As the sub-zone G4 it provided guidance and supervision concerning the logistical functions of four base coordinators, namely the base camp coordinators for CU CHI, TAY NINH, and DAU TIENG base camps and the senior advisor to the 25th ARVN Division.
During the entire reporting period, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 was LTC Walter I. Brent. His deputy from 1 May to 24 July was Major Gary E. Layton. On 25 July Major John E. Eshelman assumed the duties of deputy G4. The Maintenance Officer with the G4 section was Major Thomas E. Roddin. Supply activities were the responsibility of Captain James A. Town. The G4 office itself is currently organized under paragraph O4 TOE 7-4E. It's organized into administrative, supply and maintenance sections, manned by the four officers referenced above, assisted by six enlisted personnel.
With the lessening of hostile actions as the reporting quarter progressed, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 was able to give increased attention to areas other than purely logistical support of maneuver elements engaged in combat operations. These were primarily in the managerial aspects of logistics and encompassed all fields of supply and maintenance. Working closely with Division Support Command elements, numerous division regulations were developed, updated or reviewed, all to conform with the new or revised division policies or those of higher headquarters.
Of significance were the efforts to update and streamline the procedures necessary to assure the timely submission of data by subordinate units to the division headquarters, and subsequent compilation and submission of this to higher headquarters. Considerable time was also devoted to the expediting and procurement of major items to replace equipment lost through combat operations or normal wear.
The conservation of ammunition has been stressed in recent months. General Abrams recently directed that US Army units attempt to achieve a 10% savings in ammunition expenditures and stated that the savings are able to be attained without a reduction in combat power. 25th Infantry Division experience during the period of this report indicates that such a savings can be easily attained.
With the conversion of many units within the division from TOI to MTOE's, considerable attention has been given in May, June and July to the realignment of assets and the turn in of excess. Although the reorganization of many type units began prior to this reporting period, there were numerous target dates established for conversion completion that came about in May, June or July.
The USARV Readiness Assistance Teams visited organic units of the 25th Infantry Division during the period 17 June to 5 July. The purpose of these visits were to provide assistance and guidance for the improvement of the material readiness program of the division. Areas of; interest to the teams included PLL, ----, TAERS, ASL, Maintenance Management, property books and supporting documents and maintenance of equipment.
Supply support operations continued to be the function of the 25th supply and Transportation Battalion at CU CHI base camp on an area basis (i.e. organic and lodger units) for Class I, Class II, Class III and IIIA, and Class IV (less TOE items which are supplied to organic elements only, and less medical, cryptographic and EAM). The same type support is provided to divisional and lodger units at DAU TIENG by a provisional company of the S&T Battalion. At the TAY NINH base camp, similar support is provided by the 567th Supply and Service Battalion, 29th General Support Group, SAIGON Support Command. In support of divisional units operating in the immediate area of SAIGON, a Supply and Transportation Battalion forward support element participates in a Division Support Command forward support facility at TAN SON NHUT Air Base. This comprehensive entity is referred to as CONEX CITY.
Maintenance support for the division is provided by the 725th Maintenance Battalion with direct support companies at CU CHI, DAU TIENG, and TAY NINH base camps, and a maintenance team at CONEX CITY. The companies at the base camps provide support for only organic divisional units. At CONEX CITY, the maintenance team provides support on an area basis for organic and OPCON units. Back up direct support maintenance is provided to non-divisional elements at CU CHI, DAU TIENG and TAY NINH by non-divisional maintenance companies which include aviation maintenance capabilities.
Medical support is provided by the 25th Medical Battalion whose companies provide an area service and operate the equivalent of post dispensaries or station hospitals at the base camps at CU CHI, TAY NINH and DAU TIENG. Additional medical support is provided the division by the 12th Evacuation Hospital at CU CHI and the 46th Surgical Hospital (MUST) at TAY NINH.
In the services area, the division provides graves registration service at CU CHI and DAU TIENG on an area basis. The SAIGON Support Command provides quartermaster field laundries at each of the base camps. Water distribution is accomplished by the 25th S&T Battalion at CU CHI. The battalion also operates the Post Exchanges at CU CHI, TAY NINH and DAU TIENG under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
For a detailed and statistical review of the logistical operations of the Division Support Command and its subordinate elements, see Tab C.
J. G-5 Activities.
No significant changes occurred during the reporting period concerning the placement or organization of the Revolutionary Development cadre throughout the TAOI. Although the majority of teams were withdrawn from assigned hamlets into District headquarters during the TET Offensive, with the increase in security, they again have been deployed into assigned hamlets. There are presently 30 RD teams deployed throughout the TAOI: seventeen in TAY NINH Province, three in BINH DUONG Province (division portion thereof) and ten in HAU HGHIA Province. As the teams develop an area they are leaving a skeleton, four to five men, rear detachment in each village / hamlet to insure that the area does not deteriorate after the teams departure.
The MACV Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) continues to be a valuable tool for this headquarters. The HES is received, at the earliest one month after rating has been completed. The HES can assist the tactical commander by providing relatively accurate information concerning population location and density. It also provides information as to the status of security and development in specific areas. Below is the hamlet status as of 30 June 1968.
HAMLET CATEGORYY NUMBER POPULATION PERCENT
A 1 9,460 1.1%
B 41 107,734 12.5%
C 157 377,471 43.5%
D 135 265,487 30.6%
E 20 20,711 2.4%
VC 92 73,968 8.5%
NEW HAMLET 12,133 1.4%
TOTAL 19 866,964
During the enemy May offensive, additional destruction to civilian houses was incurred as a result of combat operations against the Viet Cong. The largest damage occurred in CU CHI District, HAU NGHIA Province, where over 430 houses were reported destroyed. Damage was primarily centered in PHUOC HIEP (XT5616) and TAU AN HOI village (XT6313). There were 65 homes destroyed in PHU HOA District, BINH DUONG Province. The division is currently supporting the rebuilding of these homes in cooperation with the District / Province officials.
In TRI TAM District, BINH DUONG Province, the division's support of the CVN Civil Recovery Program has been particularly effective. There were 82 homes constructed or repaired in this program. Additionally, a VIS show room was completed in June. The rebuild program has been entirely a Vietnamese effort, with technical assistance and the majority of materials being provided by the division.
In PHU HOA District, BINH DUONG Province, the most significant project was the continuation of rebuilding of homes damaged during the TET Offensive. 455 packets of lumber, each containing 160 - 200 board-feet of lumber suitable to construct a frame for a 10' X 16” house, have been delivered to three main areas in PHU HOA District. In TRUNG AN (XT7714) all of the 25 houses reported as destroyed have been reconstructed. Work proceeded into the PARIS TAN QUI (XT7314) and TAN THAN DONG (XT7511) areas as planned. At the end of July, there were 76 homes completed in PARIS TAU QUI and 358 completed in TAU THAN DONG. Excellent cooperation has been evident between GVN officials, RD cadre and division civic action personnel. (p29)
A very successful village festival was conducted at TAU THAN DONG (XT7511) involving over 400 families (about 2300 people). Medical care, food, clothing, health items and toys, as well as entertainment were provided to the people in conjunction with the conduct of an ARVN military operation in the area. The response of the people was favorable and the festival successful primarily as a result of the cooperation between the 7th ARVN Regiment, GVN officials, MACOORDS advisory personnel and division civic action personnel.
Progress was made in the rebuilding program in CU CHI District, HAU NGHIA Province. The division supplied transportation, supplemental lumber packets and considerable amounts of salvage lumber to support the rebuild program. The actual construction of the homes was entirely on a self help basis. Over 1000 packets of lumber were pre-positioned to construct homes. Over 578 frames and roofs have been completed, 548 homes have been completely rebuilt and an estimated 1400 homes which were damaged have been repaired.
Route 8A, from CU CHI to PHU CUONG, (XT8114) has been virtually rebuilt. Improvements include widening the entire length of 8A, construction of 2 bridges, numerous culverts and paving the road surface. The completion of this project has enabled the population of PHU HOA District to transport their produce to the PHU CUONG market with greater ease. The highlight of this project was the opening of the PHU CUONG Bridge (XT806135). This provided a much needed line of communication between the province capital of PHU CUONG and the District headquarters at PARIS TAN QUI.
Improving the existing road net between NHI BINH (XT844062) and HOC MON (XT750038) was undertaken by the 2nd Brigade. During the past few months the road was not passable to wheeled vehicles due to bomb craters, erosion and a general lack of maintenance on other portions of the road. The project necessitated filling bomb craters, widening and resurfacing the road, and constructing a bridge at XT8159. The completion of this project not only establishes an improved line of communication in the area, but also enables the local citizens to transport their produce to market in such greater quantities y oxcart and other vehicles, thus improving the economic standing of the people of NHI BINH.
Regional Forces / Popular Forces assistance has continued throughout the TAOI. More emphasis has been placed on self-help projects by the Regional Forces / Popular Forces and this has met with excellent results. Thousands of board feet of lumber from Helping Hand, salvage FSF and powder canisters have been provided for the Regional Forces / Popular Forces in the TAOI. This has assisted them in building homes and furnishings for their homes.
Community Relations Committees and Friendship Councils should be an effective medium to resolve problems that arise between Vietnamese people and US forces. At CU CHI, DAU TIENG and TAY NINH Base Camps, meetings have enhanced a harmonious relationship between the Vietnamese people and US troops.
A numerical summary for civic action construction / repair projects is listed below:
(1) Dwellings 3,217
(2) Roads (km) 68.4
(3) Dispensaries 10
(4) Schools 11
(5) Bridges 7
(6) Other 36
A numerical summary for civic action distribution projects is listed below:
(1) Cement (lbs) 2,800
(2) Tin (sheets) 6,168
(3) Lumber (bd ft) 649,288
(4) Paint (gal) 156
(5) Food (lbs) 22,602
(6) Other (lbs) 76,961
The division Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) continued to provide medical attention to a large number of civilians within the TAOI. During the past three months a total of 777 MEDCAPS were conducted treating 90,093 people.
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) activities throughout the months of May, June and July were primarily in support of combat operations in HAU NGHIA, TAY NINH , BINH DUONG and GIA DINH Provinces.
A total of 42,523,200 leaflets were air-dropped and hand disseminated throughout the Division TAOI. Twenty-one leaflets were originated by G5 and Brigade S-5's. The leaflets were produced by G-5 and the 6th PSYOP Battalion.
Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts conducted during the quarter totaled 213 hours of broadcast time. Ground loudspeaker time totaled 144 hours of broadcast time. Two additional 1000 watt loudspeaker sets and two tape recorders were received by the Division in May. Each 1000 watt set consists of
(1) 4 loudspeakers
(2) 4 amplifiers (250 watts ea.)
(3) 4 control boxes
(4) 4 microphones
(5) power cables
(6) 1 tape recorder
Recently each Brigade is equipped ;with a 1000 watt loudspeaker.
During the month of June 1968, two additional PSYOP teams were assigned bringing the total to 3 PSYOP teams in the division. Each team consists of one officer and one NCO. These teams conduct PSYOP by aerial and hand dissemination of leaflets in an area, and loudspeaker broadcasts.
Additionally two mobile audio visual vans were provided to PSYOP teams by the 6th PSYOP Battalion. Each van contained a movie projector, 250 watt speaker system, slide projector and other PSYOP equipment. The audio visual vans are employed in a ground role and greatly enhance the PSYOP teams capability to communicate with the population
During the quarter, the PSYOP effort was directed against VC/NVA units in the division TAOI. A total of 128 HOI CHINH rallied during the months of May, June and July. This is an increase of 79 over the last reporting period.
Two ARVN Political Warfare (POLWAR) teams from the 5th ARVN Division were attached to the 3rd Brigade during May. A third POLWAR team from the 30th POLWAR Bn was assigned to DISCOM in June. These teams have been valuable in the conduct of face to face PSYOP appeals in conjunction with the Medical Civic Action Program. The two POLWAR teams with the 3rd Brigade returned to their parent unit in June.
K. Signal Activities: (See Tab D)
L Engineer Activities:
During the month of May 1968, “A” Company of the 65th Engineer Battalion provided corporal support to the 25th Infantry Division, while B,C, and D companies provided direct support to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades respectively. “A” Company was continuing construction of highway 8A from XT605113 to XT580082. A total of 14,000 cubic yards of laterite was hauled to provide a two foot lift to the existing roadway. Two platoons of A Company were deployed to NUI BA DEN Mountain during the month, after the Viet Cong had overrun the American positions. The engineers were responsible for rebuilding the defenses and communication center facilities at that location.
The general support mission continued for A Company during June. The second platoon received the main responsibility of building new bunkers and secondary fighting positions on the bunker line at CU CHI Base Camp. First platoon worked on changing the contour of the bunker line and emplacing the new bunkers. Third platoon constructed airmobile radar towers for mortar detection. Elements of the company constructed a 256 foot M4T6 float bridge at XT451191 near TRANG BANG and removed it after tactical units had passed.
“A” Company moved from CU CHI to TAY NINH on 10 July 1968, changing its mission from division general support to direct support of 1st Brigade. The initial assignment changes were to provide demolition teams and mine-sweep teams. The company assumed responsibility for mine sweeping from French Fort (XT285654) to GO DAU HA, and from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH daily.
“B” Company had its tactical CP moved from TAY NINH to CU CHI early in May to continue its direct support of 1st Brigade. The first platoon provided personnel to handle aerial resupply of engineer materials from TAY NINH to NUI BA DEN Mountain. This was in support of the rebuilding project of “A” Company. The major effort of the company was providing daily mine-sweeps from TAY NINH to HOC MON Bridge and from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH daily. The daily mine-sweep of the Main Supply Route was the primary task of “B” Company until 10 July. Their area of responsibility expanded in June to include sweeping from PHU CUONG to CU CHI and from the French Fort (CT285654) to TAY NINH in addition to the normally assigned sweeps. Personnel from the sweep team plus demolition men continued providing demolition teams to infantry battalions under 1st Brigade control. On 10 July, “B” Company moved to CU CHI and assumed the division general support mission. It worked on completing the construction of a RPG rocket protective fence around the CU CHI base camp CH-47 pad, plus final construction of the 65th Engineer bunker-line sector.
Second Brigade received engineer support from “C” Company of the 65th Engineers throughout the period. The brigade had moved its headquarters to HOC MON in early May and “C” Company was responsible for construction of the brigade forward TOC at that location. Also during May the company spent extensive time on construction of bunkers and fortifications at the HOC MON Bridge (XT714072) for defense against enemy attacks. The company also provided demolition teams to the infantry battalions under second brigade control during this time.
The HOC MON Bridge was finished in June and the company shifted its resources to mine-sweep teams and demolition teams in support of brigade operations.
Company “D” supported 3rd Brigade operations in May, June and July, mainly by furnishing demolition teams to the maneuvering battalions under brigade control. The beginning of May found the company OP at DAU TIENG moved to CU CHI to support Task Force D---S. On 12 May, the company's CP later returned to DAU TIENG in June and then to TAN SON NHUT in early July for the remainder of the period and provided demolition teams and mine sweeps to infantry units. The company demolition men were responsible for destruction of numerous tunnels and bunkers around the SAIGON area.
The bridge company, “E” Company, continued its mission of providing tactical bridging support to the 25th Division. A continuing task was to reposition AVLB's at strategic positions on the MSR to provide a quick method of crossing obstacles. The company provided bridge personnel to build and remove the TRANG BANG Bridge (XT541191) in June. Bridge erection boats were provided for security patrol of the PHU CUONG Bridge in July. The boats were c---ated by engineers and infantry personnel provided the fire power for those water-way patrols. During July, also, the company was tasked to experiment with six different dry span configurations to determine their applicability to air-mobile operations in Vietnam.
At the end of July the companies of the 65th Engineer Battalion were located at TAY NINH, CU CHI and TAN SON NUHT. “A” Company was located at TAY NINH in support of first brigade; “B” Company at CU CHI in general support of the 25th Infantry Division; “C” Company at CU CHI in support of second brigade, and `D” Company at TAN SON NHUT in support of third brigade. The bridge company “E” continued bridge support for the division.
II. (C ) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.
(1) Deployment of Bandsmen to RVN:
(a) OBSERVATION: Many first-term enlisted bandsmen have been assigned to a
CONUS Army band for from six month to two years prior to being levied for duty with the 25th Infantry
(b) EVALUATION: Bandsmen arriving for duty with the 25th Infantry Division who fit the above description are not prepared to accomplish the mission of a bandsman in a combat environment. During their service in a CONUS band, weapons training and qualification and other tactical training necessary for the bandsman in combat is apparently receiving little attention. Bandsmen arrive “rusty” and require the expenditure of valuable time for training purposes to restore an acceptable status of training in essential combat skills. This situation has not been the case with bandsmen who arrive in the division directly from Band AIT. The combat skills and principles they learned in basic combat training are still fresh in their minds, and these individuals experience little difficulty in adjusting to the combat role of the bandsman.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: Bandsmen deployed to RVN should come directly from band AIT; or if they are redeployed from a CONUS band, the CONUS band commanders should insure the individuals have been provided adequate combat infantry refresher training before their departure.
(1) Field Hygiene.
(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel who are required to spend extended periods of time in
the field in an environment where they are constantly exposed to the effects of water and moisture frequently develop skin infections and other skin disorders.
(b) EVALUATION: Commanders are constantly advised to take all preventative measures at their disposal to preclude the incidence of skin disorders caused by exposure to water and moisture. Among other things, this involves having their men remove their damp clothing at every possible opportunity.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: To aid the commander in his efforts to combat this hygiene problem, it is recommended that all personnel be issued athletic shorts and shower shoes (thongs) that can be worn whenever possible to permit the drying of the skin by sun and air exposure.
(3) An informal record of disposition of possessions of evacuated personnel.
(a) OBSERVATION: Form FL-60, “Disposition of Evacuated Personnel Possessions” is used as a record to maintain critical information relative to the shipment and disposition of personal property belonging to personnel who have been evacuated from this company. On several occasions in the past completed FL 60's have become lost or otherwise misplaced and tracer actions to determine the whereabouts of personal belongings, or actions taken to properly dispose of belongings, have had to go unresolved. To preclude the possibilities of such situations recurring, a unit within the division has instituted a procedure wherein company supply officers are required to maintain a back-up system to informally account for the disposition of such personal property.
(b) EVALUATION: Such an informal record is required to be maintained for a minimum of 100 days and must include as a minimum the shipping date, shipping number, and the destination of the shipment. This procedure has become invaluable in circumstances where there is a heavy and continuous turn over in personnel and irregularities in shipment are not uncommon.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that in such a critical and sensitive area as the shipment of the possessions of evacuated personnel, an informal back up accounting system be employed at the company level.
(1) Convoy Trail Party NCOIC (p34)
(a) OBSERVATION: Trail party NCOIC's must be experienced and capable of supervising under extremely adverse conditions, including hostile fire.
(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that utilization of a qualified NCO, in grade E-6 or above, reduces the time needed for vehicle recovery operations and the trail party continually moves at the prescribed rate. This can be attributed to experience and supervisory ability.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That trail parties, in convoys consisting of 50 or more vehicles, have an E-6 or above as NCOIC.
(2) Air Observer for Logistical Convoys.
(a) OBSERVATION: Logistical convoys need an air observer due to their size and composition.
(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that using an air observer for logistical convoys can be very beneficial. Experience has shown that the air observer can prevent the convoy from becoming involved in congested areas by halting it, or directing MP escort personnel forward to alleviate the source of congestion. An observer also keeps the convoy vehicles moving at a proper interval and can immediately note any breaks in the convoy which would hinder the security of the elements. Vehicles that become inoperable due to mechanical failure or other reasons such as traffic accidents, can be recovered quicker if the recovery elements know what to expect and prepare for prior to arriving at the scene. An example of this was a 5-ton tractor and trailer loaded with artillery ammunition that experienced three flat tires causing it to become separated from other elements. The flat tires caused other mechanical components of the rear wheels section to become overheated and a fire resulted. The air observer found this vehicle separated from other elements and took immediate action to get assistance from the trail party in the form of additional personnel and fire extinguishers. The air observer is also able to provide continuous communications between the convoy and its base of operation in case tactical support is required.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That an air observer continue to be provided for logistical convoys.
(3) Search Techniques:
(a) OBSERVATION Past records indicate that most ammunition caches discovered in the SAIGON area have been located either in streams or canals or in heavily vegetated areas immediately adjacent to waterways where access by water transportation is possible.
(b) EVALUATION: Recently, numerous caches have been located in open fields and along dikes indicating a possible change to enemy technique. The caches were normally buried in metal containers and were camouflaged to appear as an integral part of the dike and in most instances, would not have been discovered without the employment of mine sweepers or bamboo or metal probes.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders at all echelons insure an increased
emphasis on the employment of mine sweepers and the utilization of probes. Further, that search efforts are extended to all possible cache sites and are not concentrated along water-ways and areas of heavy vegetation.
(4) Night Operations:
(a) OBSERVATION: Command emphasis continues on night activities in an attempt to interdict VC lines of infiltration and communications, and to locate, engage and destroy the enemy.
(b) EVALUATION: The results of increased employment of small units for night operations have been extremely favorable. The following data for the period 2 March - 27 July 1968 is submitted for reference: VC statistics: US statistics:
Number of contacts 201 US KIA 7
POW's 13 US WIA 31
KIA (BC) 184
KIA (poss) 89
Captured weapons 67
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That command emphasis on night operations continue with the employment of platoon and squad size saturation ambushes, and the commitment of roving patrols when the terrain, visibility and enemy situation permits.
(5) Aerial reconnaissance techniques:
(a) OBSERVATION: Small unit leaders with limited military experience have a tendency to traverse planned patrol routes and to circle expected ambush sites numerous times when conducting aerial reconnaissance.
(b) EVALUATION: Aerial reconnaissance of patrol routes, ambush sites, and probably areas of operations is a definite asset to commanders at all echelons. However, “Over aerial reconnaissance:” frequently “telegraphs” to the enemy a unit's intention. At a minimum, it allows the enemy to vacate and area that receives excessive attention. At worst, it allows the enemy to ambush our own operations.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That senior commanders encourage maximum aerial recon training prior to tactical operations and insure that improper surveillance techniques are avoided.
(6) Unit Identification at Night:
(a) OBSERVATION: With command emphasis on night activities the necessity of air support during periods of limited visibility has increased considerably. Air support elements, however, experience difficulty in orientation at night regarding the exact ground location of friendly ground troops.
(b) EVALUATION: Night air support is enhanced and the possibility of costly accidents is eliminated when a pre-arranged system is established for marking the exact position of group forces. The Strobe-light has been found to be a most effective device to accommodate such a system of ground to air visual night communications.
(c ) RECOMMENDATIONS: That all units participating in night operations be equipped with strobe-lights as an identification media. Additional visual methods of identification should be readily available when conducting night tactical operations.
(7) Night Ambush Preparations:
(a) OBSERVATION: Squad or platoon size night ambush patrols can be more effectively executed if a thorough daylight ground reconnaissance of the ambush site is accomplished, and if the ambush sire is maintained under continuous observation prior to its occupation.
(b) EVALUATION: Squad or platoon size ambush patrols have been permitted to sweep through a proposed ambush site during daylight hours as an element of a larger reconnaissance in force element. A small element will remain in a stay behind position in a location that affords good observation as the sweep element with the remainder of the ambush team moves on to exit the area. At dark, the ambush team will rejoin the observation element and establish its ambush position in a known surrounding. This tactic has been found to be highly effective and can be effected without compromising the ambush site.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That the small unit tactic described above be considered for wider application within Vietnam..
(8) Use of artillery against bunkers.
(a) OBSERVATION: The use of artillery against bunkers built into the side of dikes in rice paddy terrain was found to be generally ineffective. Well dug-in bunker positions are relatively immune to mass artillery with the exception of direct hits.
(b) EVALUATION: For bunker busting purposes, it has been found what the air strike with 500 or 750 pound bombs or the direct fire of 8” Howitzers provided the best means ;of stand off attack. Mass artillery attack against well bunkered positions is wasteful.
(c ) RECOMMENDATIONS: That when confronted by well bunkered positions, that air delivered 500 and 750 pound bombs and/or direct fire from 8” guns be used as the primary means of stand off attack. If mass artillery is to be used, the air burst fuse (time, vt) would be the most desirable type of artillery attack.
(9) Use of 60mm Mortar:
(a) OBSERVATION: The effectiveness of 60mm mortars on offensive operations in jungle or rice paddied Vietnam terrain is greater than the 81mm mortars.
(b) EVALUATION: The weight of weapons and ammunition is the key consideration when comparing the 60mm mortar to the 81mm mortar, as the direct support weapon in infantry offensive operations in jungle or paddy environment. The weight of the 81mm mortar and ammunition precludes its being carried by advancing troops moving through jungle or rice paddy. The 60mm mortar has more utility in the close range combat which characterizes most combat situations. It can readily be fired at close range targets without the use of the base placed tripod…
(c ) RECOMMENDATIN: That the 60mm mortar be made available for use in lieu of the 81mm mortar by infantry units operating in jungle and/or rice paddy terrain.
(10) Enemy Employment of Booby Traps:
(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy, now aware of our reluctance to use roads or trails when moving cross country on foot, has lately adopted the tactic of emplacing booby traps 25-30 meters to the flank of such lines of communications.
(b) EVALUATION: US troops cautioned against moving cross country on roads or trails, never-the-less attempt to guide their movement on these landmarks. The enemy, noting this, has more frequently been placing booby traps and mines at a distance from these routes.
(c ) REOMMENDATION: That increased emphasis be placed in training and supervision in the techniques of cross country navigation that will preclude the necessity to even use trails and roads as guiding devices.
(11) Use of White Phosphorous Grenades:::
(a) OBSERVATION: At numerous times smoke aircraft or artillery smoke are not
immediately available to provide a screen to conceal troop movements across open areas.
(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that this contingency can be provided for with little trouble by having troops carry white phosphorous grenades equipped with a delay fuse. This device emits sufficient smoke when used in the proper numbers to provide smoke screens for the movement of small units.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That troops; on an operation ;which will require movement through open areas carry white phosphorous grenades equipped with delay fuses for use if smoke ships or smoke artillery is not immediately available in an emergency.
(12) Road Clearing and Securi;ty Missions:
(a) OBSERVATION: There are a great number of techniques and varied approaches which must be employed in the opening and maintaining of security along any main road.
(b) EVALUATION: The enemy is, after a period of time, able to anticipate the actions of US troops in nearly all operations if a pattern develops in those operations. By varying methods and employing new equipment and techniques, the enemy is continually kept off balance. His use of resupply routes across these main roads as well as his interdiction efforts along the roads are disrupted to such a point that the enemy is no longer able to effectively operate in the area.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That those units involved in road clearing and security missions apply the following recommended techniques when engaging in the operations:
1. Employ scout dogs with the infantry security element which is utilized to secure the mine sweep teams, as the sweep of the road is conducted at night.
2 Employ sniper teams, both at night and during daylight hours at those critical locations where mining and road block incidents normally occur.
3. Provide an award/incentive program for those who find mines along the road.
4. Utilize drop-off ambush patrols at critical areas while moving along road in night sweep.
5. Pay particular attention to organization, rest and motivation of mine sweep teams accompanying the tactical unit. Utilize unit personnel in OJT with the engineers sweep personnel. This allows engineers personnel to obtain relief during long tenuous sweep operations, and unit personnel to become proficient in utilizing organic mine detectors.
(13) Night Convoy Escort / Security Missions:
(a) OBSERVATION: The success of night convoys is determined to a great extent by:
1. the secrecy of the date and route of the convoy
2. the route security provided by combat forces.
(b) EVALUATION: Through experience it has been shown that night convoys can enjoy a great degree of success in reaching assigned destinations if there is sufficient route security present.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That forces available include US tactical units, a convoy security unit and local RF/PF forces. Close coordination with RVN personnel is suggested. However it is necessary to restrict dissemination of convoy information so as to insure secrecy. The convoy security element should be organized with an advance guard that is able to leap frog in front of the moving convoy into prearranged critical areas, or possible ambush sites to preclude the convoy being ambushed. If forces available allow, all critical areas along convoy routes should be out-posted.
(14) Use of helicopters in RVN:
(a) OBSERVATION: A study of assault helicopter utilization has revealed flying time
is consumed in the performance of non-combat missions which could be accomplished by other available means of transportation.
(b) EVALUATION: The ready availability of assault helicopters in RVN has led to the malpractice of using these combat vehicles for administrative type missions that can be accomplished more economically by other means of transportation. (i.e. Air Force in country administrative air transport system, scheduled road convoy, etc.) Insufficient planning and dissemination of the transport services information contributes to the demand for and improper use of combat helicopters.
(c ) RECOMMENDATIONS: That all echelons of command review procedures and policies concerning utilization of combat assault helicopters, and that transportation facilities for administrative traffic be developed to preclude the demand for assault helicopters for this purpose.
(15) Pre-positioning of equipment:
(a) OBSERVATION: Pre-positioning of communications assets are vital to expeditious
(b) EVALUATION: It has been ;found that the practice of retaining uncommitted communications equipment in a platoon or company motor park is detrimental to rapid response to a communications requirement. By pre-positioning equipment according to anticipated needs, dictated by current intelligence, reaction time to provide communications support is greatly reduced. Counter guerrilla warfare is highly susceptible to urgent communications requirements in diverse locations, and pre-positioned equipment is the only acceptable solution for minimum reaction time. As an example, analysis of current intelligence indicated increased activity in the SAIGON area. By moving an uncommitted AN/MRC-69 from DAU TIENG to CU CHI, a delay of response time was avoided when the requirement for another system to the SAIGON area was levied upon this battalion.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That maximum effect be made to pre-positioning communications assets in such a manner as to reduce reaction time for providing communications support. Use should be made of all intelligence available to the command.
(16) Power Hum on Telephone Circuits:
(a) OBSERVATION: Power Hum is created when an AN/AMC-1 is used to terminate telephone circuits routed over pulse code modulation multiplex equipment using the CVA-1584 ring frequency operation.
(b) EVALUATION: The CV-1584, used as a ring frequency converter with AOM multiplex equipment, has no provisions for termination on the loop side of the hybrid coil. This creates an “open circuit” which is highly susceptible to the induction of hum. This situation does not occur in the frequency multiplex systems using the TA-182 ring frequency converter, as termination is applied internally to the loop side of the hybrid coil. External loop termination can be applied to the CV-1584/MTC-1 circuits by applying an “idle line termination kit” to the MTC-1.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: All HTC-1 switchboards terminating circuits from CV-1584 ring frequency converters should be modified with idle trunk terminating network, FSN 5805-892-1081 (MWD 11-5805-234-30/24, dated May 67). This kit applies a resister in parallel with each line to prevent open circuit hum induction.
(17) Mine-sweep Operations - Concealment in Water:
(a) OBSERVATION: The wet season has created additional problems for mine-sweep
operations in that potholes fill with water and offer excellent concealment for mines.
(b) EVALUATION: Evidence of road surface disturbance is often eliminated by rainfall making surface detection impossible. Additionally, the sensitivity of mine employed with anti-lift and anti-disturbance devices is greatly increased as the earth becomes wet. This allows the mine to settle which increases the sensitivity of the anti-lift / anti disturbance device.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: Potholes that are filled with water should be investigated by : (1) hand exploration of the pothole for the presence of trip wires and pressure type firing devices that may be protruding above the bottom of the pothole but concealed by water; and (2) then using the mine detector as in normal sweep operations. However, great care should be taken not to disturb a mine found in wet earth. If removal is desired, it is imperative to use a rope and grappling hook.
(18) Mine-sweep Operations - Command Detonated Mines:
(a) OBSERVATION: Command detonated mines present a hazard to mine-sweep teams and their security. These mines could be detonated before detection with a mine detector.
(b) EVALUATION: Point and flank security must be especially alert for the presence of wires leading from detonated mines. Cut the wires when found, but be careful to cut them separately: otherwise, the circuit would be completed, thus detonating the mine.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: Security elements for mine sweep teams should be briefed on the procedures for disarming command detonated mines prior to a mission.
(19) Use of M4T6 Bridge Balk as Floating Mine Boom.
(a) OBSERVATION: The M4T6 Bridge Balk has been effectively used as a floating
(b) EVALUATION: M4T6 balk can be used effectively as a floating mine boom on minor bodies of water with current less than 5 feet per second. In current greater than 5 feet per second, M4T6 balk booms over 200 feet cannot be closed with 27 ft. bridge erection boats.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: This device should be constructed either on shore or near shore, and then pulled into place utilizing boats. If there is river traffic, an opening sufficient to accommodate this traffic should be provided. Tactical elements covering the boom with fire must be cautioned not to shoot directly at the boom. Some boom sections have been sunk due to friendly fire.
(20) Airlifting K4T6 Dry Span:
(a) OBSERVATION: Careful planning is required for missions in which a B4T6 dry span will be airlifted.
(b) EVALUATION: Airlifting of fully assembled M4T6 dry spans with CH-47's and /
or CH-54's can provide instant bridges in inaccessible areas. In tests of specially configured spans approaching maximum aircraft load, it was found that the effective weight on the aircraft was 25 - 30% more than the actual weight of the bridge. This increase in effective weight is apparently due to the drag of the large flat bridge area.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: Allowances must be made in mission planning for this increase in weight.
(1) Rigging for helicopter sling loads.
(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel whose duties include preparing supplies and material for airlift by helicopter, should be trained in the proper methods of creating aerodynamically stable loads.
(b) EVALUATION: With the increasing use of logistical helicopter airlift, a definite need for qualified rigging personnel has been ;indicated. An average of 7 Chinook loads each day are prepared for a airlift by members of this battalion. Improper rigging seriously increases the required flight time per sortie due to excessive load “swing”./ Proper rigging creates an aerodynamically stable load with less swing. This allows high aircraft speed and reduced re-supply time.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That all units utilizing helicopter airlift of supplies arrange with the supporting helicopter unit for training of personnel rigging loads for airlift.
(1) Order of Battle Files.
(a) OBSERVATION: An efficient system for recording information on enemy units operating in the TAOI was needed.
(b) EVALUATION: The OB section found the use of 5”x3” cards system extremely valuable in recording information on enemy units. Although the OB workbook provides an adequate means for the collection of data on enemy units, it becomes cumbersome if an attempt is made to start files on every unit which is reported as being present in or near the TAOI. Furthermore, there are many unfamiliar units which are reported by agents or identified in documents. A card file system provides an effective means to maintain records on these units. When a new unit is discovered, the information is typed on a 5”x3” card which is filed in numerical order. When enough information is collected, the unit is entered in the OB workbook. The advantages of this system are as follows:
(1) Units reported by agents can be readily traced.
(2) New units can be filed pending further information.
(3) Infiltration groups can be recorded when they first appear and prior to
knowledge of the enemy unit to which they are assigned.
(4) Enemy units in adjacent TAOI's can be recorded without the need for a
(5) The file is more durable and more flexible than a workbook.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the file be considered by other OB
sections operating in an unconventional environment.
(2) Aerial Photography:
(a) OBSERVATION: A more efficient system was needed to assist the Forward Air Controller (FAC's) in locating enemy targets.
(b) EVALUATION: The II Section, 25th MID initiated a program in which targets are located through photo interpretation means and then submitted to the Forward Air Controllers to be verified. If targets are good, they are destroyed. Prior to submission to the FAC's the targets are annotated on photography, describing the target, and giving the coordinates of the general area. This method is very helpful to the FAC's in precisely locating targets and affirming that there is a higher percentage of targets destroyed and a more efficient use of ordnance.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: This system be adapted throughout South Vietnam by US and Allied Forces.
(3) Visual Reconnaissance Techniques:
(a) OBSERVATION: Aerial observation in the past has been done in general patterns
over the whole tactical area of interest. This gave an over-all picture of major enemy movements that might have been occurring.
(b) EVALUATION: Reconnaissance of smaller sections of the terrain lead to increased sightings of enemy activity. Incorporated into this system at the present time is the reconnaissance of specific targets received from other intelligence sources for verification. This enables the aircraft to fly directly to a sector of our area of interest and search out enemy activity.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: A greater percentage of the allotted flight time should be used in verifying and searching out specific targets.
(4) Counter-intelligence Support of Tactical Operations:
(a) OBSERVATION: There is a need for increased participation of CIA agent
personnel in tactical operations mounted against counter-intelligence targets.
(1) Tactical operations conducted by the 25th Infantry Division in response to
Information developed on specific counterintelligence targets have sharply increased between 1 May and 31 July 1968. While generally quite successful, there have been instances where these operations failed to fully exploit the full intelligence potential of these targets. Such less-than-total successes have usually been the result of
(a) The tactical element's preoccupation with; the military tasks at hand, and / or
(b) A failure to fully understand the intelligence objective of the mission.
(2) It is obvious that the tactical commander given the mission of neutralizing a counterintelligence target must retain his prerogative of determining how best to perform his mission, and that the tactical situation may require him to sacrifice long-range potential for immediate tactical gain. It is most important, therefore, that military intelligence be allowed every opportunity to make fully understood the specific intelligence goals of the mission.
(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that CIA agent personnel assigned to USARV tactical elements be allowed to play a larger role in the actual conduct of tactical operations mounted against counter-intelligence targets. Such participation can range from a pre-departure intelligence briefing and subsequent debriefing of the tactical element, to the agent's actual on-the -ground coverage of the target with the unit,. This sort of aggressive participation by CIA agents is absolutely necessary to maximize the exploitation of intelligence.
(5) Screening of Captured Enemy Documents;
(a) OBERVATION: Rapid screening of captured enemy documents by capturing unit can reveal information of immediate intelligence value.
(b) EVALUATION: The overall value and intelligence value of a batch of captured enemy documents may be quickly determined in many cases by immediate rapid screening for and recording of units, codes, letter box numbers and dates. Of particular importance is the currency of the documents (i.e. recent dates) and especially the frequency with which unit designations and codes appear. Normally also, documents containing any papers relating to signal, radio, SOI, or general communications topics, as well as sketch maps; or overlays, merit special attention and immediate exploitation.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that field screening personnel concentrate their initial efforts on items of the categories mentioned. Expeditious evaluation at place of capture can often result in unit identifications being made and/or more rapid dissemination of intelligence information gathered.
(6) Screening of Groups of Detainees:
(a) OBSERVATION: When large groups of detainees are apprehended during cordon and search or similar operations, they generally produce overall unproductive interrogation results usually because of lack of proper discretion in initially selecting those to be detained and evacuated.
(b) EVALUATION: Normally, the best method of singling out potential good sources or suspects is to bring in only those who have something definitely incriminating about their activity at time of capture. For example, those who were running away, hiding, lacked ID cards, or were of draft age yet not in the military service. Anyone else, even if they do in fact possess knowledge of enemy activities, cannot usually be inclined to reveal what information they have.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: Unless a specific suspicious act can be assessed against a certain individual during an operations dragnet, do not bring him in for intelligence exploitation purposes, for the interrogator has no information or starting point from which to question the detainee. A large number of suspects in itself does not by any means imply that useful results will be produced. On the contrary, it presents just that much more of a burden and handicap to the screening agent who is faced with the problem of evaluating detainees with no first-hand knowledge of their circumstances of capture.
(7) Airborne Personnel Detector:
(a) OBSERVATION: In the past personnel detector missions have been conducted without a sound method of determining the validity of enemy locations.
(b) EVALUATION: Using the old system of target location, complete reliance was placed on the experience level of the operator. The operator observed the deflection variation of the two gauges on the instrument. The operator would then decide as to the possibility of a maximum or minimum classification of the target reading. The variation of operator experience produced inconsistent classifications.
The airborne detector is designed to provide proportioned readings in the amount of ammonia and condensation nuclei in the atmosphere. Ammonia readings indicate emissions of ammonia, and of the materials found useful for the detection of humans, as it is the product of human metabolism. Condensation nuclei (CN) readings are selectively measured, and are the product of any combustion such as fuel, tobacco and explosives. Many CN are produced by mankind activities, and therefore can be used to detect his presence.
To take maximum advantage of the instrument capability, a representative value for readings taken from gauges was established. The value of 15milli amperes was assigned to account for background that the instrument will pick up from the crew and atmosphere. All readings between 40 and 70-milli amperes were considered minimum readings. Further all readings between 80 and 100 milli amperes were recorded as maximum. Considering the possible combinations, the following classifications and priorities were assigned.
(a) Readings represent a reading between 80 and 100 on both the ammonia mode and the condensation nuclei mode.
(b) Readings represent readings on both modes between 40 - 79 milli amperes.
(c) Readings represent only the ammonia mode between 80-100
(d) Readings represent only the ammonia mode between 40 - 79
(e) Readings represent the condensation nuclei mode between 80 - 100 milli
(f) Readings represent the condensation nuclei mode between 40 - 79 milli amperes.
The priority of attack was based on the strength of the readings. Therefore priority would be a, c, e, b, d, and f. This method provides the tactical commander with varying degrees of validity regarding plots as well as a more exact determination of target priority.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That this procedure be disseminated to other divisions for their consideration.
(8) Intelligence Through Civic Action
(a) OBSERVATION: In the course of medical civic action programs (MEDCAP) and other civic action projects, Vietnamese often provide information relative to enemy presence, booby traps, weapons and supply caches.
(b) EVALUATION: Information received from Vietnamese civilians during and subsequent to civic action programs has been checked out and found to be highly creditable and reliable in a high percentage of the instances.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: Every effort be made to exploit the intelligence value of civic action programs by assigning trained intelligence personnel to civic action teams formed to execute a civic action program.
1. TOE and MTOE Changes:
(a) OBSERVATION: Consolidation of TOE and MTOE changes into one document is
necessary for ease of use and accuracy. It is especially necessary to provide unit commanders with consolidated documents because this affects unit organization and employment as well as property accountability.
(b) EVALUATION: The numerous and lengthy changes to TOE's and MTOE's coupled with the constant turn-over of property book officers has made it difficult to reconcile property books, determine excess, and recognize shortages. The cross checking involved at unit level upon receipt of each new document easily leads to errors.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TOE's and MTOE's which effect numerous major changes be published as all inclusive documents.
1. Operation of Division:
(a) OBSERVATION: Division run base camp ASP's cannot be managed properly
without an augmentation of MOS qualified personnel.
(b) EVALUATION: While division base camp ASP's are on operational necessity and have to date adequately fulfilled tactical unit requirements, the proper management of the ASP's cannot be accomplished under the existing division TOE. The lack of qualified enlisted personnel makes it difficult to accomplish the accurate accounting procedures required. The lack of MHE hinders proper stackage and stock rotation.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: The operation of the division ASP become a function of 1st Log Comd or that personnel with the requisite skills be provided the division as an augmentation.
1. Preparation of the Army Equipment Status Report (AR 711-5).
(a) OBSERVATION: Through experience it was learned that the accurate completion
of the Army Equipment Status Report can be accomplished only at a centralized location and under expert guidance.
(b) EVALUATION: The preparation of this report at unit level can sometimes lead to an incorrect interpretation of the regulations resulting in a lack of quality control and standards. During the month of June, the report was prepared under the guidance of --------teams, and for the first time, accurate results were obtained. An incidental benefit was gained through the correction of prepared books to correspond with the Army Equipment Status Report.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Army Equipment Status Report be prepared at a central location under the guidance of a division team.
1. Supply Actions at Company and Battalion Level:
(a) OBSERVATION: Positive supply action and planning is limited at company and battalion level by the shortages of MOS qualified personnel.
(b) EVALUATION: During the past quarter, there has been a decrease in the
effectiveness of company and battalion supply operations as a result of a shortage of qualified NCO's and enlisted men. Unit supply, PLL and property accountability have been effected because the few qualified personnel available have found it necessary to perform a multitude of duties in order to meet minor operational requirements. This problem became obvious through the discovery of a notable increase of administrative errors during AGI's and OMI's
(c ) RECOMMENDATION:: That increased emphasis be given to providing MO5 qualified supply personnel. That USARV give consideration to establishing a formal training course for unit supply sergeants and other who have a need for supply MO5 training.
5. The 10,000 Gallon Bladder:
(a) OBSERVATION: The 10,000 gallon bladder has been a constant problem. After eight to ten months use in this environment, the bladder begins to split at the seams.
(b) EVALUATION: It has been determined that by filling the 10,000 gallon bladder with a maximum of 8,000 gallons, the problem of seams splitting is greatly reduced and the life of the bladder is prolonged.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a maximum ;of 8000 gallons be established for the 10,000 gallon bladder.
6. M109 Howitzer:
(a) OBSERVATION: Maintenance problems have been experienced during the period of this report with ball, cab race ring roller bearings, and helical compression springs wearing out excessively on the M109 Howitzer SP due to a lack of lubrication.
(b) EVALUATION: A check of the lubrication order showed that there were no
instructions to lubricate the cab race ring and no grease fittings through which lubrication could be accomplished. By removing three pipe plugs and replacing same with grease fittings, it was found that the bearings could be lubricated. A message was sent to the Automotive Tank Command (ATAC), Army Material Command, explaining the problem and the determined solution thereto. This headquarters was subsequently advised to take the suggested corrective action. Accordingly, instructions were given to all subordinate units to replace the three pipe plugs with appropriate grease fittings and lubricate with GAA at least once a week when traversing the turret. The problem of early bearing failure has been noticeably reduced.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That the corrective action referenced above be published as a MWO to the M109 howitzer SP.
7. Bomb Rack, FSN. 1095-141-9326, for UH-1C Helicopter.
(a) OBSERVATION: It has been found that after approximately 25 hours of flying time, the bomb rack for the UH-1C will start to malfunction because of dust build-up in the reaction wells where the rocker pod connects to the bomb-rack.
(b) EVALUATION: It has been the experience of this unit that the situation outlined above can best be rectified by changing the bomb racks during intermediate inspection.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That the situation as outlined above be studied at higher level to determine the best and most economical solution to the problem.
8. Crossover Drive for the XM-28 Armament Sub-system, FSN 1090-826-5342, on the AH-1C Helicopter.
(a) OBSERVATION: The crossover drive for the XM-28 does not function more than 15-20 hours without shearing the pin on the roller of the assembly, FSN 1090-077-2087.
(b) EVALUATION: There have been repeated failures of the armament sus-system
XM-28 on the AH-1G helicopter due to the shearing of the pin on the roller of the assembly, FSN 1090-077-2097. Most failures have occurred between 15-20 hours of use. The only solution to the problem appears to be the fabrication of a pin from stronger material.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That higher level agencies investigate the problem as cited and determine if a pin of stronger material can be provided.
9 Premature Failure of Hydraulic Serves, FSN 1680-872-1141, on UH-1 and AH-1G helicopters
(a) OBSERVATION: There have been numerous instances of premature failure of hydraulic servos, FSN 1680-872-1141, on UH-1 and AH-1G helicopters in recent months.
(b) EVALUATION: Investigation of these failures has revealed that numerous servos have improper torque place on the servo by the rebuilding or the manufacturing organization.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That units installing the hydraulic control servos take special care to check the torque of the “gland nut” during the installation phase, and that corrective adjustments be made as necessary.
10. Pylon Transducers, FSN 6625-839-0386, for AH-1G helicopters.
(a) OBSERVATION: The pylon transducers, FSN 6625-839-0486 for the AH-1G become dirty after 50-100 hours of operation and cause erratic operation in the roll channel of the S.A.S.
(b) EVALUATION: It has been learned that when the transducer is replaced that it can be covered entirely with plastics or another suitable shielding material to provide protection from dirt, grease, etc. entering the inside of the transducer. This field expedient has proven highly effective.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That the above field expedient be considered by other units experiencing similar problems with malfunctioning transducers.
11. Rigging the Tail Rotor of the UH-1D/H
(a) OBSERVATION: Time required to rig the tail rotor of the UH-D/H can be reduced from three hours to one hour by rigging the left pedal first.
(b) EVALUATION: TM 55-1520-210-2- prescribes that in rigging the tail rotor of the UH-1D/H the right pedal be rigged first. Following this it was determined that the control quill inside the gearbox became disengaged from the splines and that three hours were required to restore the equipment to its proper condition. It was learned that this situation did not occur when the left pedal was rigged first, and that the entire operation could be executed in a maximum of one hour. This information has been submitted to the Army Materiel Command on a DA Form 2028, and the improved procedure has been subsequently approved.
(c ) RECOMMENDATION: That all aircraft maintenance personnel be advised of this pending change of the TM.
12. Failure of “O” ring, hydraulic valve, FSN 1650-911-7349, PH 42255-0-2, on UH-1 helicopter.
(a) OBSERVATION: The failure of the “O” ring , FSN-5-----------PH, MS 28775-011 of the hydraulic valve has been a constant trouble.
(b) EVALUATION: It was learned that the “O” ring was being damaged resulting in the loss of hydraulic fluid, and on occasion, complete loss of aircraft hydraulics. It was discovered that more damage to the “O” ring occurred as the “O” ring was being pushed over the bolt PM 204-076-174-1 before installation of the valve. To eliminate this problem this unit covers the threads of the bolt with plastic tape and dips the “O” ring in clean hydraulic fluid. This prevents the “O” ring from being nicked by the threads when being installed on the bolt. This procedure has been successful on any type of “O” ring that must be installed over sharp surfaces. An EIR on this procedure has been submitted.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above procedure be disseminated for the consideration of other units responsible for aircraft maintenance that may have encountered similar problems with “O” ring failure.
13. Cracked Fuel Cells:
(a) OBSERVATION: M113's develop an excessive number of cracked fuel cells while participating in road clearing operations as a direct result of the high speed of movement.
(b) EVALUATION: A noted difference exists in the number of cracked fuel cells occurring to M113's participating in road clearing operations; over those conducting normal tactical operations.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: The M113 should be driven 12-15 miles per hour. Tract vehicle fuel cells should not be filled to capacity to facilitate expansion.
F ORGANIZATION: None
1. Use of PSYOP/MEDCAP Project in conjunction with cordon and search operations.
(a) OBSERVATION: The use of PSYOP/MEDCAP project in conjunction with cordon and search operations within Vietnamese villages does a great deal to explain to the villagers the reason for the intrusion and to soothe over ruffled feelings the people may have as a result of the operation.
(b) EVALUATION: The utilization of psychological operations teams and medical civic action teams in a village that has just been cordoned and searched has been very effective. The PSYOPS team explain to the villagers the reason for the cordon and search, and the resultant presence within their village of soldiers. The MEDCAP team provides the medical care in such a way to reconcile the treatment directly with the action of the soldiers moving through their village. This coordinated effort has done much to alleviate the objections of the local villagers to the military operations in their villages.
(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That every effort be made to conduct psychological operations, civic action and other beneficial activities in direct coordination with combat operations so that innocent civilians can made a distinct association between them.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
J.R. BROMWELL JR.
Acting Chief of Staff
AVHGC-DST (1 Aug 68)l 2d Ind (C) MAJ. Klingman/ds/ AH33
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968
RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1).
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM,. APO San Francisco 96375
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific ATTN: GPOP----, APO 96558
1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters 25th Infantry Division.
2. (C) Comments follow:
a. Reference item concerning deployment of bandsmen to RVN: (Section 2, p.33) Concur. This is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.
b. Reference item concerning field hygiene: (Section 2, p34)) Concur. The unit will be advised to request a change to CTA 50-901
c. Reference item concerning power hum on telephone circuits: (Section 15, p.39) The open circuit hum and the use of idle line resistors is being investigated by an electronic equipment representative from the UCOM-V Area Office. Findings will be published in the December issue of the USARV Command Communications Pamphlet.
d. Reference item concerning operation of division ASP: (Para. 2, p45) Concur. Under the provisions of USARV Regulation 735-28, CG 1st Logistical Command is responsible for providing adequate ammunition support to include establishing and operating permanent and temporary ASP's as required.
e. Reference item concerning 10,000 gallon bladder,: (Para. 4, p.45) Concur., This headquarters has advised units that the 10,000 gallon collapsible tank should not be filled to the maximum height of 48 inches, but rather that it be filled to a height of only 46 inches (9,568 gallons) in order to allow for expansion.
f. Reference item concerning M109 HOWITZER: (Para. 6, p.46)Concur: This is a matter of concern; for higher headquarters.
g. Reference item concerning bomb rack for the UH-1C helicopter (Para.7, p46) Concur: This is a valid recommendation and will be included for the information of all units in the next issue of the 34th General Support Group Newsletter.
h. Reference item concerning crossover drive for the AG1-28 armament subsystem on the AH-1G helicopter.:(P8b, p46) Concur: The pin referred to has been replaced by shear pin, aluminum, part number 717158-5. This information is forthcoming in a change to TM 9-1000-208-25. The information and requisitioning instructions appeared in the 34th General Support Group Newsletter for September 1968.
i. Reference item concerning premature failures of hydraulic servos on UH-1 and AH-1G helicopters: (Section 9, p.46) Concur: The manufacturer is investigating the cause of these premature failures.
j. Reference item concerning failure of “O” ring of the hydraulic valve on the UH-1 helicopter.(Section11, p47): Non-concur. This procedure is outlined in TM 55-409, dated August 1965, page 24, paragraph 22.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Inf Div for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310
1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as endorsed.
2. Reference 2nd Endorsement, paragraph 2e: This headquarters is querying ATAC by separate action to determine status of MWO action.
3. The 1st Endorsement to this correspondence has been inadvertently detached and will be forwarded when possible.
FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF: