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After Action Reports 25
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 MIKE FORCE: ATTLEBORO, 1 - 7 NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report MIKE Force "Attleboro" 1-7 Nov 66
General:
a. Third Corps MIKE Force had moved to Loc Ninh on 30 October 1966 in support of moving to new camp site, and was on an operation in Loc Ninh area.
b. Third Corps MIKE Force was alerted 2 November 1966 to move from Loc Ninh to Suoi Da. The move was completed at 1430 2 November 1966.
3. Task Organization
a. 530 Nungs in three (3) companies.
b. Seven USASF EM.
c. One USASF Officer.
4. Mission: Combat Reconnaissance.
5. Sequence of Events:
1 Nov
2210-China Boy alerted for movement from Loc Ninh to Suoi Da.
2 Nov
0800-1st MIKE force company extracted from LZ.
0900-Company closed Loc Ninh.
1045-2nd Company extraction began.
1215-Completed extraction 2nd Company.
1030-C-123 aircraft began arriving Loc Ninh.
Direct support helicopter company moved from Loc Ninh to Tay Ninh East to lift MF from Tay Ninh East; and to lift MF from Tay Ninh West to Suoi Da.
1352-Tay Ninh.
1530-Movement of MF from Tay Ninh to Suoi Da completed.
2 Nov
1630-China Boy Company 3 deployed.
3 Nov
0830-China Boy Company 1 deployed.
1220-China Boy Company 3 engaged est VC Co vic XT486687, VC broke contact 1245, fled north. SSG Monaghan wounded right arm and fingers (GSW).
1815-China Boy Company 1 made contact vic XT458587 with est VC platoon. VC broke contact 1830. SSG Garza WIA (GSW).
Page 200
4 Nov
0730-China Boy Company 1 hit mined area vic XT561588. One MF KIA, two MF WIA. Medevac chopper downed by SF fire vic XT485622, while enroute to China Boy Company 1's location. One US KIA (Crew Member), chopper was recovered.
1445-China Boy Company 3 made contact vic XT416670 with est VC Bn or Regt. China Boy Company 3 withdrew south and called in airstrike. On initial contact chain saws, generators, and trucks could be heard. VC counterfired with 81mm and 60mm mortar, AW and SA fire, then tried to close with China Boy Company 3 elements.
1800-Received resupply of ammunition and food vic XT435668.
2200-China Boy Company 3 indicated that he was receiving heavy casualties and VC were encircling him.
2300-China Boy Company 3 indicated light contact.
5 Nov
0230-China Boy Company 3 indicates contact with VC has ceased.
0730-China Boy Company 3 receiving heavy volume of fire. Requested reinforcements.
0745-Radio contact with China Boy Company 3 broken.
0800-China Boy Companies I and 2 proceeding to China Boy Company 3's location.
0845-China Boy Company 2 hit VC bunkers. Negative contact.
0940-28 MF personnel picked up by CIDG CO from Suoi Da.
0935-China Boy Company 3 having casualties evacuated vic XT388634.
1200-Three USSF MIA. 55 MF from China Boy Company 3 made linkup with China Boy Companies 1 and 2. Of those 15 to 25 WIA.
5 Nov
1330-One MF drowned while crossing river with China Boy Company 1.
6 Nov
1040-Est VC platoon with mortars attacked Suoi Da airfield, 4 CIDF KIA, 2 WIA.
1700-9 MF personnel closed in to Suoi Da.
7 Nov
1430-MF begins move to Loc Ninh.
1600-MF completes move to Loc Ninh.
1645-One US body found.
1830-MF bodies returned to Bien Hoa by CV-2 aircraft.
Page 201
6. (C) On 30 October, all 3 companies of the Mike Force deployed to Loc Ninh, A-331 Binh Long Province, to conduct operations in response to intelligence reports that the camp was a possible target for a major VC attack prior to 11 November 1966. However, hard intelligence reports received on 1 November indicated that a VC regiment had moved into the operational area of Camp Suoi Da, A-322, Tay Ninh Province. A decision was made to move the Mike Force into that area, and this was accomplished on 2 November. On 031220 November, the 3rd Mike Force Company made contact with an estimated VC company. The VC immediately broke contact and an airstrike was called in on their route of withdrawal. At 031845, contact was again established with an estimated VC platoon which resulted in 10 VC KIA and two USASF WIA. At 040730, the 1st Mike Force Company hit a mined area and suffered one KIA and two W1A. A Med Evac chopper in the same general vicinity was shot down by small arms fire and resulted in one US KIA. At 041445, the 3rd Mike Force Company made contact with an estimated battalion or regimental sized VC force. This contact resulted in 15 VC KIA and two Mike Force WIA. The Mike Force Company was still in contact at 041540 and attempted to withdraw to the south. At 042000 the Mike Force Commander reported that he was surrounded and had suffered 35 casualties (KIA). The remaining two CIDG companies departed Camp Suoi Da to reinforce the operation. At 042305 the 3rd Mike Force Company Commander reported that he was still in contact. Enemy casualties reported at this time were 50 VC KIA. Contact with the VC was broken at 050330. At 050900 the 3rd Mike Force Company again reported that they were receiving a heavy volume of fire. They were instructed to secure an LZ so that an attempt could be made to extract them from the area. This was accomplished at 051200. All Mike Force elements were extracted at 051830.
Interview with SFC Heaps, 7 Nov 66
At 021630 Nov China Boy 3 landed at LZ vicinity XT491644, and began moving north (see attached overlay). At 031220 Nov vic XT473683 China Boy 3 discovered tunnel complex and fortifications. While destroying complex, VC fired on China Boy 3 wounding SSG Monaghan. China Boy 3 withdrew east to LZ, vic XT487686. Med Evac arrived, casualties were loaded, but because chopper was overloaded it could not take off. SSG Hunt, who came in with the Med Evac elected to remain with China Boy 3 so that casualties could be evacuated. Again China Boy 3 moved west to tunnel complex, but could not take it because of intense fire. China Boy 3 broke contact and moved to vicinity XT465692 (see overlay). Here they heard several motors that sounded like generators and trucks, plus several chain saws. Heavy contact was made. China Boy 3 received heavy automatic weapons fire and mortar fire. Mortars
Page 202
sounded like 60mm. China Boy 3 broke contact and moved to LZ vicinity XT435667 (see overlay). All during the time they were moving to LZ they were receiving sporadic small arms fire. Also when they crossed road vic XT453667, they received mortar fire.
At LZ vic XT435667 China Boy 3 received resupply of food and ammunition. From resupply LZ the unit moved to vicinity XT444672, went into defensive perimeter and began breaking down ammo. While they were breaking down ammo, the VC attacked from the east in a "U" shaped formation. It was beginning to get dark and the VC withdrew to approximately 100 meters east of China Boy 3's position and maintained contact all night. At approximately 0645-0700 the following morning the VC made another assault on China Boy 3's position and overran them. SFC Heaps and SSG Hunt were wounded during this assault. SFC Heaps said he was knocked unconscious and when he came to SSG Hunt was giving him first aid. Heaps and Hunt decided to get to the LZ vic XT424680. They had two Mike Force with them, one was wounded. They couldn't move very fast or very far without resting, and Heaps and Hunt would pass out periodically. Finally Hunt said he could go no further so Heaps left one Mike Force with Hunt and continued to the LZ. After this Heaps didn't remember anything.
Interview of SFC E7 Heaps on 7 Nov 66, 3rd Field Hospital.
REFERENCE: LOC NINH Map Sheet 6245 II
465691 to 473681, first contact
Area of Operations: Major contact overrun at 440669 Weather: Excellent, high clouds, temperature
Terrain: Jungle, (thick) close to water supply, within 500 meters of road on high ground.
Fortifications: Tunnel and bunker complexes for one, two or squad size positions. All with overhead cover and pre-arranged fields of fire. Positions were hardened against direct fire.
Weapons, uniforms and equipment: Automatic weapons were in abundance; of the two weapons captured they were AK's. They had a lot of machine guns, sounded like 30 cal, heavy. Uniforms were mixed, personnel KIA had on black shoes. All of the soldiers encountered had complete sets of web gear.
Significant weapons: Grenade launcher which looked like our "IAW," light in weight, approximately 3 feet long, markings appeared to be Chinese, possible identification: Chinese antitank grenade launcher type 56, P. 155 DA pamphlet 381-10. Indirect fire was provided by 60mm mortars, identification by rounds.
Tactics: Fire discipline was excellent. Upon making contact, VC fired in mass; upon breaking contact VC ceased fire without sporadic firing. The VC maintained contact while the unit was trying to break contact.
Page 203
They mortared and sniped at them in the retreat. After fixing the new location of the 3rd Company they (VC) attacked using squad fire and maneuver up to grenade range and then reverted to individual action. By this time, it was almost dark, so the VC withdrew approximately 100 meters and maintained contact all night. At 0645-0700 the next morning they assaulted using the same tactics with a heavy volume of fire suppressing the 3rd Cormpany's position.
Movement was forward by flanks and frontal assault forces.
Other: The VC troopers were young and aggressive.
At grid 465691-Generators and chain saws were heard.
US/Mike Force and VC casualties from 2-11 Nov. Opn "ATTLEBORO"
UNIT
FRIENDLY
K
W
M
1st
22
72
196th, 25th
46
300
5
USASF
1
3
1
Mike Force
25
17
7
TOTAL:
94
392
13

UNIT
VC
K
POSS
POW
1st
721
5
25th
181
173rd
4
Mike Force
85
448
991
448
5
Following units identified:
271, 272, 273; 320 MFPMB, 70 Regt, 10th NVA Inf.
271 by contact and/or documents.
273 Regt and 272 Regt contact XT4254 by 2/1st Inf.
272 Regt contact on 4 Nov at Suoi Cau XT4530 one of our agents says the 320 are also involved. This is reasonable since this whole area is in their AO.
101st Regt by captive XT431559 on 8 Nov.
70 Regt possibly contact by 1/16 Inf on 9 Nov.
271 by 1 PW on 3 Nov. this unit identified by ASPAR in the southern part of the contact area SW of Dau Tieng.
All of the documents and PW intell reports are still at lower level Headquarters and have not reached FFII yet for closer examination.
US units committed to Operations.
US 173d Abn Bde-2 Bns
ARVN Ranger Bns (Attached)-2
US 1st Div-8 Bns
US 25th Div-3 Bns
196th Bde-1 Bn
/a/ Thomas Myerchin
/ t / Thomas Myerchin
CPT, INFANTRY
COMMANDING

 Quarterly Report Ending 31 July 67

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTATNT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310


IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (3l JAN 68) FOR OT RD-670701                                                      6 February 1968

SUBJECT:     Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3rd Brigade,
25th Infantry Division


TO:          SEE DISTRIBUTION


     1.     Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19.  Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.  

     2.     Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

          BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:



                              /s/ Kenneth G. Wick ham
                              KENNETH G. WICKHAM
                              Major General, USA
                              The Adjutant General
1 Incl
   as

DISTRIBUTION:
          Commanding Generals
               US Continental Army Command
               US Army Combat Developments Command
     Commandants
          US Army Command and General Staff College
     US Army War College
     US Army Air Defense School
     US Army Armor School
     US Army Artillery and Missile School
     US Army Aviation School
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
     US Army Chemical School
     US Army Civil Affairs School
     US Army Engineer School
     US Army Infantry School
     US Army Intelligence School
     US Army Adjutant General School
     US Army Missile and Munitions School
     US Army Southeastern Signal School
     US Army Medical Field Service School
     US Army Military Police School
     US Army Ordnance School
     US Army Quartermaster School
     US Army Security Agency School
     US Army Signal School
     US Army Special Warfare School
     US Army Transportation School

Copies Furnished:
     Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
     Deputy Chiefs of Staff
     Chief of Research and Development
     Assistant Chiefs of Staff
     Chief of Engineers
     The Surgeon General
     The Provost Marshal General
     Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
     Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD (SA)
     National Aeronautics & Space Administration, Office of Defense Affairs
     Director, Weapons System Evaluation Group
     Defense Documentation Center
     CG, US Army Weapons Command
     CO, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division





          This report received at Hqs, Department of the Army without
          indorsements.  To preclude further delay in benefits gained
          from the lessons learned, herein, this report is published
          without complete indorsements.


HEADQUARTERS, 3RD BRIGADE TASK FORCE
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96355

AVDO-0-0P                                        10 August 1967

SUBJECT:     Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 July 1967  
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U).


TO:          See Distribution



SECTION I (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

     1.     (C)     GENERAL:  During the reporting period 1 May to 31 July 1967, the 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division participated in Operation Baker for a total of 92 consecutive days in combat.  The 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division has participated in 448 days of consecutive days in combat as of 31 July 1967.

          a.     Mission:  The Brigade mission in Operation Baker was to assume responsibility within the DUC PHO TAOR, for:

               (1)     Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA, Main Force, Local Force, and Guerrilla units as well as Viet Cong Infrastructure.

               (2)     Support of Revolutionary Development.

               (3)     Counter infiltration operations in the coastal areas within the TAOR.

               (4)     Conduct of psychological operations in support of tactical operations and revolutionary development.

               (5)     Conduct of offensive and reconnaissance operations within the TAOR, coordinating as appropriate with CG 2nd ARVN Division.

               (6)     Conduct of offensive operations outside of DUC PHO TAOR, as directed or approved by CG TASK FORCE OREGON.

               (7)     Participating in the defense of other US and GVN critical installations as directed by CG TASK FORCE OREGON.

               (8)     As directed by CG TASK FORCE OREGON and in coordination with appropriate GVN Provincial and District Authorities, assist in the training of and render support to GVN Regional and Popular Forces.

               (9)     Be prepared on a quick reaction basis when directed by CG TASK FORCE OREGON to relieve and/or reinforce CIDC Camps at BA TO (BS558327), GIA VUC (BS 379270), TRA BONG (BS345882), HA THANH (BS386704), MINH LONG (BS541525), and KHAM DUC (ZC005080).  3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division has primary responsibility for BA TO and GIA VUC; secondary responsibility for the latter four camps.

               (10)     Be prepared on 12 hours notice to provide one reinforced infantry battalion for employment anywhere in South Vietnam.  Be prepared on an additional 12 hours notice, to deploy the remainder of the 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division anywhere in South Vietnam.

          b.     Operational Area (See inclosure 1):  The area designated for Operation Baker encompasses the majority of DUC PHO and parts of MO DUC Districts, Quang Ngai Province, covering an area of approximately 155 square miles.

          c.     Control:  The 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division was under the operational control of TASK FORCE OREGON throughout the reporting period.

          d.     Task Organization:  Principal units of the 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division, with commanders' names and dates of command and the major supporting and operational control units are as follows:

               Headquarters, 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division
                    Colonel James G. Shanahan (1 May - 24 June 1967)
                    Colonel George E. Wear (24 June - 31 July 1967)

               Deputy Commander 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division
                    LTC Rodney B. Gilbertson (1 May - 22 June 1967)
                    LTC John D. Weil (22 June - 31 July 1967)

               1st Battalion, 14th Infantry
                    LTC William H. Miller (1 May - 21 July 1967)
                    LTC Peter P. Petro (21 July - 31 July 1967)

               1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
                    MAJ James E. Moore

               2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry
                    LTC Clinton E. Granger (1 May - 14 June 1967)
                    LTC Norman L. Tiller Sr. (14 June - 31 July 1967)

               2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery
                    LTC Bruce Holbrook (1 May - 18 June 1967)
                    LTC Gerald B. Bobzien (19 June - 31 July 1967)

               C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry
                    CPT John P. Irving III (1 May - 9 May 1967)
                    CPT Ronald Penn (9 May - 28 May 1967)
                    1LT Richard A. Knudson (28 May - 31 July 1967)

               3rd Support Battalion (PROV)
                    MAJ Robert R. Rutledge

               Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion
                    CPT Arthur J. Panszo Jr.

               40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
                    1LT Robert W. Thackeray

               174th Aviation Company (GS) (1 May - 31 July 1967)

               C Co, 2nd 34th Armor (attached) (1 May - 31 July 1967)

               B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (OPCON) (1 May - 15 June 1967)

               Principal Staff:

               S1
                    MAJ John D. Weil (1 May - 15 June 1967)
                    MAJ Henri M. Weinberg (15 June - 31 July 1967)

               S2
                    MAJ Edgar Egeland

               S3
                    MAJ Emil P. Houben

               S4
                    MAJ John A. Joyce

               S5
                    MAJ JOHN W. Schnieder Jr. (1 May - 17 June 1967)
                    CPT Converse B. Smith (17 June - 31 July 1967)

     2.     INTELLIGENCE:

          a.     Situation Prior to Deployment - DUC PHO and MO DUC had been under the domination of ultra Nationalistic Communists since the end of WW II.  These two districts had provided the communists with a regular food source, a secure area for re-supply operations, important operational bases and many well indoctrinated communist leaders.  Volumes of evidence indicate that every phase of daily life was organized to provide complete control over all of the people.  Active in the area were Communist youth organizations, fisherman's associations, women's associations, farmer's associations, a teacher's federation, a merchant's association, a Buddhist association, and others.  An extensive communist school and dispensary system had been organized.  The control of the people was so thorough that the first three months of American Marine operations in the area convinced only three enemy to rally to the GVN.  Government authorities in DUC PHO District estimated that 80% of the 90,000 people of DUC PHO were communists or communist sympathizers.  Regular enemy forces in the vicinity included three battalions of the 22nd NVA Regiment with a composite strength of 1400 men, the 60th Battalion of the 1st VC Regiment with 300 men, the 300th Heavy Weapons Battalion of the 3rd NVA Division with 300 men, and several companies of local forces totaling about 300 men.  These forces were augmented by armed guerrillas in the villages and hamlets and were materially aided by the extensive infrastructure of the local Communist Government.

          b.     The First Phase - 19 April 0 1 June:  The 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division, fought a new type of battle upon deployment of troops in the lowlands of DUC PHO and MO DUC.  Regular enemy troops were entrenched in fortified hamlets and were fighting with the local village and hamlet guerrillas.  It was evident that the enemy had carefully considered all of the approaches to the fortified villages and had constructed mutually supporting bunkers with interconnecting trenches and concealed escape routes.  The enemy fought wll, adjusting his forces to counter US attacks, exercising strict fire discipline and making maximum use of cover and concealment.  The Brigade successfully countered these tactics and defeated the enemy in a series of fierce battles by utilizing helicopter assaults to surround a fortified village and then employing artillery and air strikes to destroy the enemy in his fortifications.  During this period instances of ground to air fire and anti-personnel and anti-tank mining increased as a reaction to US Forces opening roads and conducting extensive search and destroy operations.  The ground to air fire was preplanned and effective, however the enemy soon learned that if he fired at an aircraft US response was always immediate and violent.  The mining incidents revealed that the enemy had several well trained sapper teams who were clever and imaginative in the use of local materials to fabricate their devices.  Effective sources of tactical intelligence consisted of the inherent reconnaissance in force characteristic of search and destroy operations, aerial reconnaissance from patrolling helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, and agent reports from the District Operations and Intelligence Center.  Each was effective, especially the DOIC agent reports which provided US Forces with extremely valuable and current information from which timely operations could be preplanned.  The agent reports were not based solely upon professional low level agents.  Most of the reports came from local people who had a vested interest in the Government of South Vietnam and a hatred and fear of communism.

          c.     The Second Phase - 2 June - 31 July:  In contrast to the earlier period of Operation Baker, the pitched battles with regular enemy soldiers were fought only on the periphery of the area of operation.  The enemy sought to avoid contact and concentrated his efforts on harassing friendly forces and interdicting traffic on Highway #1.  During this period the number of mine and booby trap incidents continued to increase, however instances of ground to air fire against fixed wing and rotary type aircraft began to decrease.  In late June and early July, evidence indicated that two and possibly three regular battalions had infiltrated into the area of operations north of the Tra Cau River.  The brigade had pitched battles with three different regular force battalions in Northern MO DUC District.  The operational bases for these enemy battalions were located in the vicinity of BS7052, BS7753, and BS7361, with the last the most active.  Enemy activity in the southern part of DUC PHO District was reduced considerably.  Several sharp contacts were made during the months of June and July, however most of the fighting consisted of methodically cleaning up small pockets of VC and NVA hiding in tunnels and hedgerows.  Almost 700 VC were killed in this manner, mostly in the Northern part of the Brigade AO.

          d.     Summary of Enemy Personnel & Equipment Losses - 1 May - 31 July:

               (1)     Personnel:

                    KIA          1,339
                    CIA          249
                    RET          224

               (2)     Weapons:

                    SA          390
                    CS          20

               (3)     Other Equipment:

                    (a)     Ammo:

                         SA Ammo     13,034
                         81/82mm Mortar rds     312
                         60mm Mortar rds     1
                         Grenades     349
                         Rocket Launcher     7
                         TNT     139     lbs.
                         250 lb bomb     30

                    (b)     Personal Equipment:

                         Packs     131
                         Clothing Sets     25
                         Canteens     61
                         Web Gear     24
                         Ponchos     131

                    (c)     Misc:

                         Magazines     115
                         Flashlights     2
                         Med Equipment     95     lbs
                         Radios     11

                    (d)     Material Destroyed:

                         Hut     341
                         Rice     717     lbs
                         Bridges     0
                         Bunkers     1,458
                         Caves/Tunnels     29/306
                         Foxholes     132
                         Boats/Rafts     0
                         Salt     0
                         Grain     0

                    (e)     Material Captured:

                         Rice     289.7     tons
                         Salt     21.0     tons

     3.     OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

          a.     Plans:

               (1)     During Operation Baker, the 3rd Brigade TF had contingency plans for the relief and reinforcement of CIDG Camps at the following locations:

                    (a)     Primary:

BA TO - BS556327.
GIA VUC - BS377271.

                    (b)     Secondary:

MINH LONG - BS535510.
TRA BONG - BS391704,
HA THANH - BS391704.

               (2)     3RD Brigade TF prepared a MONTEZUMA Base Defense Plan and a plan to upgrade facilities at MONTEZUMA in preparation for the approaching monsoon season.                    

          b.     Operations:

               (1)     General:  The brigade continued with the missions assigned for Operation Baker throughout the reporting period (1 May - 31 July).  The First and Second Battalions, Thirty-Fifth Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in their respective areas of responsibility with attachments from C Troop, 3/4 Cav and C 2/34 Armor.  The contacts in May were heavy and in some cases were initiated by an enemy attack.  In all cases the enemy forces were defeated and heavy casualties were inflicted.  In June and July the contacts became smaller as the Brigade's operations forced the enemy forces to shift their base of operations into the hills and break up into small elements.  It became more and more a process of locating and destroying small pockets of VC and NVA resistance.  The concept of operations was to advance over suspected avenues of enemy movement, methodically searching for enemy personnel, caches, and fortifications.  The objective was to deny the enemy use of the inhabited lowlands of DUC THO and MO DUC Districts and thereby cut him off from his sources of food, intelligence, labor and recruits.  In order to accomplish this it was necessary to have the physical presence of US fire bases with the battalion command post.  The general plan was to have the infantry battalions establish fire bases with the battalion command post, supporting indirect fire elements, and one rifle company and then conduct sweeps and search and destroy operations with the other rifle companies, attached cavalry, and attached armor elements.  The Infantry was used to find and fix the enemy.  Once this was accomplished, all available fire power was brought to bear on the enemy.  Then the infantry advanced, methodically searching and destroying every enemy position.

               (2)     1st Battalion, 35th Infantry:  During the reporting period, the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in their AO with the battalion CP located at LZ OD (OLIVE DRAB), BS786368.  The battalion had major contacts in fortified villages on 19 May at NGA MAN and on 22 May at DIEN TRUONG (4).  In addition there were many minor contacts and ambush engagements and one major contact in the mountains on 15 July with a reinforced NVA platoon, (See Inclosure 4).

               (3)     2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry:  During the reporting period the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in their AO with the Battalion CP being located at LZ LIZ, BS751436.  The Battalion had three major contacts on 20 May, 21-29 May, and 21 June (See Inclosure 5,6).  A detailed explanation of the techniques employed during these operations is included in the inclosure.  In between these major contacts the battalion concentrated on finding and destroying the enemy located in the many spider holes and tunnels throughout the battalion area of operations.  (See Inclosure 2.)

               (4)     1st Battalion, 14th Infantry:  During the reporting period the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was under the operational control of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

               (5)     Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 45th Cavalry:  From 1 May 1967 to 18 July 1967, C Troop (-) was OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 25th Infantry.  During this period, the Troop conducted search and destroy operations around LZ LIZ and east to the beach area.  One platoon was OPCON to B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry for security of LZ MONTEZUMA, with two of its APC's OPCON to the 39th Engineer Battalion, to provide security for engineer work parties along Highway #1.  A provisional tank platoon was OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry for search and destroy operations along the beach south of LZ GUADALCANAL.  From 19 June to 31 July one APC platoon was OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry for search and destroy operations around LZ LIZ.  The troop (-) was OPCON to the 3rd Brigade for security of LZ MONTEZUMA and the road from LZ MONTEZUMA to LZ GUADALCANAL.  From 3 July 1967 to 31 July 1967 one platoon was OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry for search and destroy operations in the Northwest corner of the battalion AO.

               (6)     D Company, 6th Engineer Battalion:

                    (a)     Engineer support to the infantry battalions in the TAOR averaged five (5) line squads per day and consisted mainly of:

                         1      Clearing landing zones.

                         2     Destruction of enemy caves, tunnels, bunkers, and defensive positions.

                         3     Construction, maintenance, and clearing of defensive perimeters.

                         4     Mine clearing.

                         5     Technical assistance in construction of field fortifications.

                         6     Construction of tactical bridging.

                    (b)     Engineer support at the forward base camp (LZ MONTEZUMA) including:

Construction and maintenance of Brigade forward base.

Helipad construction and maintenance.

Maintaining a water supply point.

Peneprime distribution.

Mine clearing.

Road construction.

                    (c)     Base Defense:  D/65th Engineer Battalion assumed responsibility for the control of the LZ MONTEZUMA Base Defense upon departure of B/1/9 Cav, 1st ACD.

               (7)     2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery:  During the period 1 May 1967 through 31 July 1967, the mission of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery was direct support of the 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division.  Battery A was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry; Battery B was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry; and Battery C was in direct support of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry.

                    (a)     During the reporting period the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery fired the following missions and rounds:

     OBSERVED     OBSERVED     UNOBSERVED     UNOBSERVED
       MISSIONS        ROUNDS         MISSIONS          ROUNDS
          271     8626     1773     7022

          374     8841     1254     5335

          308     8123     1473     4213
          ___     _____     ____     _____

TOTAL     953     25,590     4,500     16,570

                    (b)     In addition to the three firing batteries, one artillery battery and one searchlight section were under the operational control (OPCON) of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery during this period.  These units functioned in an excellent manner.  The firing battery fired in support of the infantry units in contact, fired checking fires, answered immediate fire requests and greatly enhanced our extensive harassment and interdiction (H&I) program.  The searchlight section assisted in the defense of the several fire bases in the Brigade Area of Operation (AO), and was also successfully integrated into the H&I program.  These units, and the period that they were under the OPCON of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery area are listed below:

                    1     Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery, OPCON to 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery (12 July - 31 July 1967);

                    2     Five each searchlights from Battery G, 29th Artillery OPCON to 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery (12 July - 31 July 1967).

               (c)     2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery supported the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery, in a general support - reinforcing role during the period 1 May 1967 through 31 July 1967.  This Battalion with the attachment of Battery C, 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery, fired in support of the infantry in contact, fired blocking fires, answered calls for immediate fire, and added great depth and power to the H&I program of the brigade.

          c.     Aviation:  During the quarterly period the Brigade Aviation Section flew 807 hours, 2018 sorties, and carried 1587 passengers in the OH-23 helicopters.  The UH-1B's flew 204 hours, 475 sorties, and carried 487 passengers.  The totals were:  1011 hours, 2493 sorties, and 2074 passengers.  Two of the OH-23's, armed in July to provide a scout team, were credited with 8 VC KIA and assisted in the capture of three NVA.  Air Mobile support was provided to the 3rd Brigade TF by the 174th Aviation Company, 14th Aviation Battalion throughout the reporting period.  174th Aviation flew 7,678 hours, 44,531 sorties, moved 53,479 troops, carried 3,150 tons of cargo, conducted 101 combat assaults, 43 extractions, accounted for 45 VC KIA, and assisted in the capture of 2 VC.

          d.     Tactical Air support statistics for the reporting period were as follows:

                         FAC Missions     Combat Proofs

                    Req     Flown     Req     Flown

          MAY          191     173     146       76

          JUNE     129        85       85       45

          JULY     170      123     102       72

          TOTAL:     490     381     333     193

          e.     Chemical:  Riot control agent (CS) and white phosphorous grenades were employed to the maximum extent to clear tunnels and bunkers.

          f.     Training:  During the reporting period 3rd Brigade TF personnel graduated from the following schools:

               SCHOOL               # GRADUATED

     3RD Brigade NCO Preparatory School     163

     4th Division NCO School          64

     MACV Recondo School          10

     4th Division Pre Recondo School     7

     4.     LOGISTICS:

          a.     General:  The 3rd Support Battalion (PROV) had primary responsibility for logistical support to the Brigade.  The 1st Log Command, Task Force Gallagher, continued to provide general support to the Brigade.  The reactivation of a formal supply activity account with the 1st Log Command greatly improved the requisitioning and receiving procedures for Class II & IV items, including repair parts.  Class II & IV and maintenance support for elements in the Pleiku Base Camp continued to be provided by the 4th Infantry Division.

          b.     Supply:

               (1)     Class I:

                    (a)      Perishable and nonperishable items were provided by FSA under supervision of Task Force Gallagher, 1st Log Command.  All distribution was made to the Brigade Class I yard for storage and issue.  Ration break-down for all tenant units in LZ MONTEZUMA was accomplished by the 3rd Support Battalion (PROV).  Non-perishables were stored in the open on the ground.  No problems were encountered with open storage due to the dry climate.  Perishables were stored in three (3) 1-1/2 ton reefer freezers.

                    (b)     Class I Statistics:

                         A Rations:     570,400

                         C Rations:     275,700

                    (c)     Class II & IV:

                         1     Depot ships direct to our activity address code, through the Brigade Supply Officer, to a Class II & IV storage and distribution area.  This was made possible by the opening of a supply account enabling all organic, attached and OPCON units to requisition and draw directly from the Brigade Supply Officer, rather than returning to a distant base camp.               

                         2     Initially, requisitioning procedures to depot were ill defined.  However, a workable courier system was established by Task Force Gallagher which enabled prompt passage of requisitions to depots at Qui Nhon, Cam Rahn Bay, and Da Nang.  Long range planning and longer lead times are still required at all levels because of the longer shipping time inherent in sea movements.

                         3     The completion of the airstrip at DUC PHO on 15 May 1967 greatly aided the functioning of the logistical train, bringing quick delivery of personnel replacements, R&R, and necessary items of equipment.

                    (d)     Class III:

                         1     Task Force Gallagher provided wholesale issue of all types of fuel.

                              POL Statistics:

                              Mogas     560,000

                              Diesel     520,000

                              Avgas     110,000

                              JP-4     970,000

                    (e)     Class V:

                         1     Task Force Gallagher operated the local ASP and was in turn supported from Qui Nhon.  Original stockage levels for the ASP did not always meet the demands of the supported units; however, they were easily readjusted.

                         2     Class V Statistics:

                              81HE     26,102

                              4.2 HE     12,568

                              105HE     27,356

          c.     Transportation:

               (1)     Two (2) light truck squads and one (1) medium truck squad from the 3rd Support Battalion supported the brigade units at LZ MONTEZUMA.  The cargo capabilities of the 5 ton bridge trucks, organic to a platoon of the 554th Engineer Company (Float Bridge) has also been used.

               (2)     Air Force C-123 and C-7A aircraft provided a scheduled air lift between the brigade at DUC PHO and its rear detachments at Pleiku.  Averaging four sorties per day, the aircraft compiled the following record during the reporting period:

                    (a)     Sorties:     464

                    (b)     Passengers:     9,855

                    (c)     Cargo:     289     tons

          d.     Medical:

               (1)     Number of patients admitted:     1,695

               (2)     Number of disease cases:     1,006

               (3)     Number of battle casualties:     232

               (4)     Number of non-battle casualties:     457          

     5.     CIVIL AFFAIRS:

          a.     General:  Priority of effort was directed towards the following three areas:  public health and sanitation, public education, and refugee relief.  All projects were designed to be short range and high impact in nature.  All projects were requested by GVN officials and work was performed by indigenous labor.  US personnel and units participating in civic action in DUC PHO were:  S5, 3rd Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division, a team from 41st Civil Affairs Company, a team from 29th Civil Affairs Company and the MACV Sector Advisory Team.  GVN Agencies included four RDC Teams, Refugee Relief Personnel, VIS, and the VN Cultural Drama Team.

          b.     Medcap Results:

               (1)     Sick Call  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      20,953

               (2)     Dental  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     78

               (3)     Baths for Children  . . . . . . . . . . . . .     1,257

          c.     Engineer Projects:

               (1)     Schools:  A new five room high school was 90% completed during the reporting period.  A New five room elementary school was 50% completed and a library/classroom was finished at the Mirat Evangelical Church Refugee Camp.  Repairs were completed on three additional schools, with a total of 16 classrooms being renovated.

               (2)     Wells:  Three new wells were completed, with eight more presently under construction.  Six wells were reclaimed and repaired.

               (3)     Latrines:  Three new latrines are under construction.

               (4)     Orphanage:  A new dining room is under construction at the DUC PHO Orphanage.

               (5)     Hospital:  Repairs were begun to upgrade and improve the facilities at the DUC PHO Hospital.

               (6)     Dams:  One dam was constructed to provide water for the Hoa Thanh Refugee Camp.

          d.     Commerce:  47 local laborers were hired daily to fill sandbags at 70 Piasters per day.  As of 24 July 1967, 350 local laborers were being hired daily to gather rock at 70 Piasters per day.  A total of 350 cubic meters of rock were obtained.

          e.     Refugee Assistance:

               (1)     8000 refugees were generated from military operations in the 3rd Brigade AO.

               (2)     800 refugee housing units were constructed.

               (3)     The following supplies were provided:

                    Rice     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     285     tons

                    Salt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     23     tons

                    Clothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      1,500     lbs

                    Tobacco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     500     boxes                         
                    Candy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003     boxes

                    Soap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     6690     boxes

                    Foodstuffs . . . . . . . . . . . . .     25     tons

                    #10 Cans . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     1000     ea.

          f.     Other:

               (1)     English Classes:  Four hours were given daily with an average attendance of 30 pupils per class.

               (2)     Audio/Visual Programs:  Movies were shown three times a week in the DUC PHO marketplace.  Films were provided by the military and equipment and operators were provided by the Vietnamese Information Service.

          g.     Psywar:

               (1)     Psyops activities during the reporting period included leaflet drops, and aerial and ground speaker missions (both tape and live).  The primary effort was in support of tactical units with the secondary effort directed towards refugees and other personnel already under GVN influence.

               (2)     Leaflet drops and serial speaker missions were accomplished by C-47, U-10, O-2 and UH-1D aircraft.

               (3)     The use of armed propaganda personnel (ex VC specially trained in psywar) to make live broadcasts and appeals was very successful.  They were best utilized on the ground after the infantry had trapped the enemy in caves and tunnels.

               (4)     Tapes and live appeals were directed toward specific individuals and units while exploiting Chu Hoi ralliers.

               (5)     Summary:

                    (a)     Leaflets dropped . . . . . . . . . . . . .     18,279,400

                    (b)     Aerial speaker time . . . . . . . . . . .     70 hrs, 30 min

                    (c)     Ground speaker time  . . . . . . . . .     337 hrs

                    (d)     Chieu Hoi Ralliers . . . . . . . . . . . .     257

                    (e)     Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     17

                    (f)     Leaflets fabricated . . . . . . . . . . .      11

                    (g)     Tapes made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     28

     6.     PERSONNEL: