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 Quarterly Report Period Ending 31 Oct 70

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCMH

SUBJECT:     Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,
          Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)



SEE DISTRIBUTION



Location:  Cu Chi Base Camp (XT647153), Cu Chi, RVN.
Reporting Officer:  Major General Edward Bautz, Jr.
Prepared by:  Major Carter Morey, 18th Military History Detachment.
Map References:  Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series: L7014, Sheets:  6231 I, II, III, IV; 6232 II, III; 6230 I, II, III, IV; 6329 IV, 6331 I, II, III, IV; 6330 I, II, IV; 6430 I, II, III, IV; 6431 III, 6530 III.

1.     (C)     OPERATIONS:     Significant Activities (Previous Quarter Summary).

     A.     General:  The quarter from 1 May to 31 July 1970 was highlighted by the Cambodian cross-border operations directed by President Nixon on 1 May 1970.  The 1st and 2nd Brigades, 3rd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division and all maneuver battalions of the 25th Infantry Division played an integral part in the attack.  Although limited in time and restricted geographically, the Division was highly successful in destroying enemy supply points, training sites and base areas along the Cambodian border.  The accomplishment of this mission greatly reduced enemy offensive capabilities in the Military Region III area of South Vietnam.  Additionally, the enemy suffered significant personnel losses.  A total of 1075 enemy soldiers were killed, 54 captured and 22 Hoi Chanh received by 25th Infantry Division forces during the nearly two-month-long operations.  Consequently, the enemy was forced to move his personnel and supply bases deeper into Cambodia and considerable time and effort has been required to reconstitute them.  Personnel intended by the enemy for offensive action have been diverted to supply and support service activities.

     The 1st Brigade began Operation TOAN THANG 44 on 6 May with an attack into Base Area 354, which encompassed the border region called the Dog's Face.  The 1st Brigade operated there until 15 May when Operation TOAN THAN 43 Phase III began in which 1st Brigade forces were sent into Base Area 353 around the Fishhook Region.  Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III lasted until 30 June when all US units pulled out of Cambodia.  The 1st Brigade, in both operations, dealt the enemy a severe blow as many tons of food, clothing, medical supplies, weapons and munitions were captured or destroyed.  During the last month of the quarter, the 1st Brigade was assigned to a new area of operations in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces and continued Operation TOAN THANG IV, concentrating on interdicting enemy infiltration from Cambodia and destroying enemy bases along the border.  Tay Ninh Base Camp and the surrounding area, the 1st Brigade's AO before the Cambodian Operation was turned over to the control of the 25th ARVN Division during July, another indication of the success of the Vietnamization Program.

     The 2nd Brigade remained OPCON to II Field Force Vietnam until 7 May when the Brigade reverted to the control of the 25th Infantry Division for operations in Cambodia.  Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase II began on 9 May and lasted until 15 May at which time the 2nd Brigade joined the 1st Brigade in Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III until10 June.  The 2nd Brigade (illegible) like the 1st Brigade ws successful in locating many enemy supply caches and captured or destroyed tons of enemy food and equipment.  During the month of July, the 2nd Brigade assumed control of a new AO around Yuan Loc in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces and resumed Operation TOAN THANG IV, concentrating on the destruction of the enemy and his supplies.  2nd Brigade elements also continued to assist in the pacification program in their new AO.

     While the 1st and 2nd Brigades operated in Cambodia during the months of May and June, the 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV, operating not only in Hau Nghia Province but assuming responsibility for the 1st Brigade's AO in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces as well.  In July, the 3rd Brigade relinquished control of the 1st Brigade's former AO around Tay Ninh Base Camp to the 25th ARVN Division and concentrated its efforts in northern Hau Hghia Province and the area around Dau Tieng in Binh Duong Province.  Emphasis was placed on tactically executing small unit operations, ambushes and combat patrols to locate the enemy, disrupt his movements and uncover his supplies.  Also, the 3rd Brigade during the quarter was tasked with the responsibility of the defense of Cu Chi Base Camp and designated one battalion as Division Ready Reactionary Force.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division sent the 5th Battalion, (illegible) Infantry (illegible) into Base Area 367 in the Parrot's Beak Region of Cambodia on 7 May.  This operation TOAN THANG 500 lasted until 12 May and resulted in 159 enemy killed, 18 prisoners of war captured and 18 Hoi Chanh received.  Also, 126 individual weapons, 4 crew served weapons, 28 tons of ammunition and four tons of rice were captured or destroyed.  Operations by 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div battalions in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces forced sub-regional units to operate in dispersed groups to avoid Allied detection, disrupted sub-regional loyal and main force plans for future attacks, and greatly expanded the pacification program in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces.  With United States Naval force, 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div forces seriously disrupted the enemy's ability to operate along canals and rivers within Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces, prevented enemy reinforcement of men and  supplies to local guerilla forces and reduced the effectiveness of the Viet Cong Infrastructure by continuous monitoring of the enemy's routes of movement.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations remained at a low level during the first week of the reporting quarter (1-7 August).  Main force units generally avoided contact with Allied forces, while supporting local force units in the collection of taxes and the procurement of food and ammunition.  Sub-regional forces continued to be primarily concerned with the transportation of food and supplies from bases in Cambodia.  The most active enemy main force units during the week were the 101 NVA Regiment and 268 Regiment in Sub-region (SR)-1.  The number of mining incidents during the week showed a marked decrease from the 29 reported during the last week of July, resulting in four US soldiers killed and 35 wounded.     

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  Eight contacts were reported in the 1st Bde's AO resulting in nine enemy killed.  A convoy from Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery received small arms and RPG fire from both sides of a road in the Michelin Rubber Plantation 4.5 kms east of Dau Tieng (XT547492) at 1206 hours on (illegible) August.  One US soldier was wounded and there was light damage to one 2-1/2 ton truck and two 105mm howitzers.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery, a Duster and Co D, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf reacted with unknown results.  Three enemy soldiers were killed in two engagements by A/2-14 Inf on 6 August.  At 1700 hours, one enemy was killed with organic weapons 5 kms south of Ben Cui (XT458404).  At 1934 hours, two enemy were killed 400 meters northwest of the 1700 hours contact.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were no significant ground contacts or shelling incidents reported during the week as enemy units in the 2nd Bde's AO suffered from acute logistical shortages.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the first week of August with five maneuver battalions (5th Bn, 60th Inf came under OPCON of the 3rd Bde on 2 Aug 70) operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There was one significant shelling incident reported during the week.  B/5-60 Inf received eight rounds of HA at its night defensive position (NDP) 6 kms north of Trung Lap (XT608271) at 2320 hours on 3 August.  Five US soldiers and one Kit Carson scout were wounded while one PRC 25 radio, one PRC 77 radio and several individual weapons suffered light damage.

     There were eight ground contacts reported in the 3rd Brigade's AO during the week, resulting in 10 enemy killed and two Hoi Chanh received.  C/5-60 Inf engaged two enemy with claymore mines and hand grenades at 2045 hours on 4 August 8 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT651271) resulting in two enemy killed.  One AK47 rifle, one K54 pistol, two packs with assorted civilian clothing, one civilian radio, a small amount of documents, four AK47 magazines with ammunition, and 40 pounds of rice were evacuated.  At 1035 hours on 5 august, C/3-22 Inf engaged 10 enemy 11 kms east of Dau Tieng (XT601477) with organic weapons and artillery resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle.  Two Hoi Chanh were also received.  They identified their unit as the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, Sapper-Intelligence Company, 101 NVA Regiment which operated in the Boi Loi Woods/Trapezoid area.   The two Hoi Chanh stated that morale in the unit was low due to lack of adequate food and medical supplies.  A/5-60 Inf engaged eight enemy with organic weapons 6 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT618299) at 1817 hours on 5 August.  On a sweep of the area at 0800 hours on 6 August by A/5-60 Inf, three enemy bodies were located.  Two enemy soldiers were killed and one AK47 rifle was evacuated by B/3-22 Inf from a contact site 6.5 kms west of Ben Suc (XT506340) at 1850 hours on 6 August.  Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier.

     Enemy activity remained at a low level in the 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div's AO during the first week of August.  The 3-9 Inf Div continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with one maneuver battalion operating in Long An and Hau Nghis Provinces and one maneuver battalion operating in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province.  There were five significant contacts reported during the week resulting in five enemy killed and three captured.  The three prisoners-of-war were captured by A/6-31 Inf at 1235 hours on 4 August after a contact 5 kms west of Duc Hoa (XS525968).  The PW's identified their unit as the Duc Hoa Local Force and said they were engaged in ammunition supply activities when captured.  The most significant incident of the week occurred at 1605 hours on 3 August when an air cushion vehicle (ACF) from the 39th Cavalry with troops of D/6-31 Inf detonated a mine 6.5 kms northeast of Ben Luc (XS662815) resulting in three US soldiers killed and 19 wounded.  The ACV wa a combat loss.

     Action by Division Troops was light during the week, with only one significant contact reported.  A helicopter gunship from Company D, 25th Aviation Battalion, while supporting a 495th Regional Forces (RF) Company contact 2.5 kms northwest of Cu Chi (XT605138) at 2130 hours on 4 August, killed four enemy soldiers with organic weapons.

     A number of notable figures visited Cu Chi Base Camp during the first week of August.  The Reverend John R. Morrett, Dean of St. Andrews Episcopal Cathedral of Honolulu visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 1 August to obtain firsthand information on US activities in Vietnam.  On 2 August, Coloen Billy M. Vaughn, II FFV ACofS, G3 (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  General Ralph E. Haines, CINCUSPAC, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 3 August to obtain an update on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General George A. Godding, DCSINT, HQ USARPAC, visited Tan An and Cu Chi Base Camps on 3 and 4 August to obtain information on intelligence gathering, with particular emphasis on ground sensor activity.  Brigadier General Harold B. Gibson, Jr., CG US Army Support Command, Saigon, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 5 August for an update on 25th Infantry Division activities.  On 7 August, Lietuenant General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., US Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, visited Cu Chi Base Camp to brief commanders and staff on the availability of trained personnel and to discuss personnel problems.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO increased slightly during the second week of August (8-14 August) as the enemy attempted to launch some kind of offensive activity.  The most active units during the week were the 101 NVA and 268 Regiments in SR-1.  In the other sub-regions, enemy main and local force units generally avoided contact, while engaging in supply activities and harassment of the GVN pacification program.  The number of mining incidents increased to 17 from 11 the previous week, resulting in two US soldiers killed and 41 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and Northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There were three significant shelling incidents reported in the 1st Bde's AO during the week.  Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) received 18X82mm mortar rounds at 1910 hours on 8 August resulting in 12 US soldiers wounded and light damage to two mess halls and one bunker.  Fire was returned to the northeast by artillery and mortar with unknown results.  At 0345 hours on 9 August, Dau Tieng Base Camp received 20X82mm mortar and two 122mm rocket rounds resulting in six US soldiers wounded and light damage to two ¼-ton trucks.  Fire was returned to the northeast by artillery and mortar with unknown results.  Dau Tieng Base Camp received 15X75mm recoilless rifle rounds at 2200 hours on 14 August resulting in three US soldiers wounded and light damage to one ¾-ton truck and several buildings.  Fire was returned to the northeast by artillery, with unknown results.

     There were nine contacts by 1st Bde forces during the week, resulting in eight enemy killed and one captured.  D/2-14 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 8 kms east of Dau Tieng (XT572495) at 1750 hours on 8 August with claymore mines and artillery, resulting in five enemy killed and the evacuation of four AK47 rifles, one K54 pistol and a small amount of documents.  The documents identified the 82mm Mortar Company, 101 NVA Regiment, which normally operated in the contact area.  C/2-14 Inf had two contacts with an unknown number of enemy 5 kms south of Ben Cui (XT427408) on 10 August at 1110 hours and 1525 hours.  US casualties were three killed and six wounded.  In the only significant contact of the week in the 1st Bde, a convoy from 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery received seven RPG rounds and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy on Highway 239 4 kms east of Dau Tieng (XT528478), resulting in six US soldiers wounded, moderate damage to one 2-1/2 ton truck and the destruction of one 1/4 ton truck.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and LFT with unknown results.  A/2-14 Inf reacted and captured one prisoner-of-war and evacuated one AK47 rifle, three magazines and documents.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of August with three maneuver battalions operating in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces.  There were no significant ground contacts or shelling incidents reported as enemy units continued to suffer severe supply shortages.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of August with five maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were no indirect fire attacks reported.  Six ground contacts were reported during the week resulting in seven enemy killed and two VCI cadre captured.  R/2-27 Inf with an element of the 25th Inf Div Military Intelligence Company apprehended two female VCI cadre with a small child and medical supplies 4 kms northwest of Trung Lap (XT549242) at 0717 hours on 9 August.  Snipers from R/3-22 Inf killed four enemy soldiers at 1830 and 1850 hours on 10 August in two engagements approximately 4.5 kms west of Ben Suc (XT520347).  A helicopter gunship from D/3 4 Cav engaged three enemy 10 kms northwest of Ben Suc (XT486380) with organic weapons and a FAC at 1350 hours on 13 August.  An aerial rifle platoon (ARP) was inserted and destroyed nine bunkers, 50 pounds of rice and one ChiCom hand grenade.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of August with one maneuver battalion operating in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and one maneuver battalion operating in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province.  Enemy activity remained at a low level as enemy units avoided contact, though there were six engagements resulting in five enemy killed and four prisoners-of-war captured.  D/6-31 Inf captured two PWs at 1625 hours on 8 August 7 kms west of Duc Hoa (XS512973) and evacuated one K54 pistol and one 9mm Browning pistol.  Later, at 1710 hours, C/6-31 Inf captured two PWs 200 meters south of the D/6-31 Inf contact (XS512976).  A UH1H helicopter from the 190th Assault Helicopter Company, while inserting Teams 11 and 14 from Co E (Rgr), 75th Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an enemy force 10 kms west of Tan An (XS445646).  Fire was returned by artillery, airstrike and the insertion of Teams 21 and 22, Co E (Rgr), 75th Inf with unknown results.  US casualties were one killed and three wounded (from 190th AHC) and heavy damage to the UH1H helicopter.

     Brigadier General Robert L. Fair, US Army Director, Management Information Systems visited Cu Chi Base camp to observe 25th Infantry Division data processing operations on 8 August.  The Honorable John J. McKeithen, Governor of the State of Louisiana, visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities and to talk with his constituents.  Major General Jack J. Wagstaff, DCG, II FFV (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 14 and 16 August for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

     Enemy activity remained at a low level throughout the 25th Infantry Division's AO during the third week of August (15-21 August) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact in order to re-establish still inadequate supply channels.  SR-1 was the most active area, with the 101 NVA and 268 Regiments being identified numerous times by captured documents.  Also, moderate sensor activity from the southern portion of the Fishhook Region to the Razorbacks, Michelin Plantation and Saigon River Corridor was recorded.  There were no significant attacks by fire reported during the week.  However, the number of mining incidents increased by four from last week to 21, resulting in one US soldier killed and 26 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  Enemy activity was light, with only three significant contacts reported.  A 5-ton truck from A/2-12 Inf with the 588th Engineer Battalion received small arms and RPG fire from both sides of Highway 13 4.5 kms northeast of Phu Khuong (XT3761607) at 0930 hours on 15 August.  After the initial firing, several enemy soldiers (some dressed in ARVN uniforms and armed with M16 rifles) boarded the truck and engaged the personnel with small arms fire, killing four US soldiers and wounding five.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery, a LST and FAC with unknown results.  In the only other significant action of the week, C/2-60 Inf received small arms fire from six to eight enemy during a sweep of a claymore mine detonation 10 kms northwest of Minh Thanh (XT541721) at 1700 hours on 18 August.  In the ensuing engagement, two enemy were killed by organic weapons fire and a LFT while US casualties were three killed.  One M79 grenade launcher, one AK47 rifle and a few letters were evacuated.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phoc Tuy Provinces.  There were no significant ground contacts or shelling incidents reported but a large cache was located.  D/4-27 Inf located a bunker complex consisting of seven bunkers and one classroom area 17 kms east of Black Horse (XS613967) at 1830 hours on 16 August.  One SKS rifle, one M1 carbine, four M16 magazines with ammunition, two US hand grenades, 50 pounds of clothing, 100 pounds of rice, 15 pounds of medical supplies, six feet of detonating cord with blasting caps, one NVA entrenching tool, one machete, one US pistol belt with two ammo pouches, two pounds of documents, one map and a diary were evacuated.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of August with five maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  There were 10 ground contacts with the enemy resulting in nine enemy killed.  B/2-27 Inf, at an NDP 2 kms southwest of Ben Suc (XT549327), engaged two enemy with claymore mines at 1805 hours on 17 August resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles and four magazines.  A/5-60 Inf received hand grenades from an unknown number of enemy 8 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT646293) at 0310 hours on 19 August.  The enemy force was engaged by claymore mines resulting in two enemy killed.  Two AK47 rifles, two AK magazines, one pack of explosives and one book were evacuated.  There were no US casualties.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of August with one maneuver battalion operating in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and one maneuver battalion in Nhon Trach District.  Enemy activity was at an extremely low level with only two contacts reported, resulting in one enemy killed.

     Major General John R. Deane, Jr., Director, Defense Communications Planning Group (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 15 August for an update on 25th Infantry Division Duffel Bag/Tight Ja(illegible) operations.  Brigadier General E. M. Lynch, US Army Deputy Inspector General, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 15 August to make an appraisal of the IG system of handling complaints and discuss this matter with the IG, commanders and individual soldiers.  Colonel Robert W. Leonard, Chief of Information, MACV (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp, Dau Tieng and FSB Kien on 18 and 19 August for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General Jack Hemingway, CG, 1st Aviation Brigade, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 21 August for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division AO remained at a low level during the last week of August (22-31 August) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported but the number of mining incidents increased by 13 over last week's 34 resulting in one US soldier killed and 63 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  Enemy activity was light with only three contacts reported.  The most significant event of the week occurred at 1145 hours on 30 August when an APC from C/3-4 Cav detonated a 120 pound mine with pressure device 1 km northeast of Phu Khuong (XT353588) resulting in one US soldier killed and eight wounded.  Two significant caches were located by B/2-12 Inf 9 kms south of Minh Thanh (XT607581) on 28 August.  A bunker was located at 0900 hours and 85 pounds medical supplies and one stethoscope were evacuated.  Later, at 1204 hour, another bunker was located in the same area and one sick call list, one record book, two medical books, three grams of novocaine, 100 grams of vitamin B-1, assorted bottles of medicinal alcohol and novocaine, and one set of medical scales were evacuated.  The area showed signs of recent enemy activity.
     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of August with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  Enemy activity was light and no significant caches were discovered.  B/3-22 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 11 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (XT539009) at 0930 hours on 31 August with organic weapons, an air strike, artillery, and a LFT with unknown results.  Enemy small arms fire killed two US soldiers and wounded six.  Three packs and four RPG rounds were evacuated from the contact site.  Later, at 1700 hours, B/3-22 Inf located and evacuated (illegible) RPG rounds, two RPG boosters, a small amount of AK47 ammo, 30 pounds of flour, five pounds of rice, cooking utensils and one pound of C-4.  In the only other contact of significance, A/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms and RPG fire at 1545 hours on 31 August from an unknown number of enemy 500 meters (illegible) east of the H/3-22 Inf 0930 hours contact (XT534014) resulted in one US soldier killed and six wounded and heavy damage to two APCs.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and artillery with unknown results.

     Enemy activity remained at a low level during the fourth week of August in the 3rd Bde's AO as the four maneuver battalions of the Brigade operated in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were nine contacts with enemy forces resulting in 21 enemy killed.  An LST from D/3-4 Cav engaged six enemy 8 kms northwest of Ben Suc (XT506376) at 1120 on 22 August resulting in two enemy killed.  An ARP was inserted in the area and at 1305 hours they located and destroyed one structure and one bunker.  Fifty pounds of rice, 20 water bags, miscellaneous clothing and a small amount of documents were evacuated.  In two engagements on 23 August, A/2-22 Inf (M) killed six enemy with claymore mines 6 kms southeast of Ben Suc in the Ho Bo Woods (XT620294) at 1836 and 1852 hours.  Two of the bodies were located in the contact site while A/3-4 Cav located the other four 1 km west of it (XT611291) at 1225 hours on 24 August.  At 1600 hours on 24 August, !/3-4 Cav located six more enemy bodies at the same spot.  This body count was credited to an A/2-27 Inf contact on 21 August at 1930 hours 3 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT604320).

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with two maneuver battalions operating in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and one maneuver battalion in Nhon Trach District.  There were nine contacts with enemy forces resulting in five enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  The PW as captured by A/5-60 Inf at 1743 hours 23 August after an engagement with three enemy soldiers 10 kms west of Tan (XS449647).  The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no casualties.  A C&C Uh1H helicopter from 3.9 Inf Div, while on visual reconnaissance 8 kms south of Long Thanh (XS58844) received small arms fire at 1255 hours on 27 August resulting in three US soldiers wounded.  An ARP from D/3-4 Cav was inserted and they engaged two enemy with unknown results.

     The larges contact of the week involved Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion from Division Troops.  At 2115 hours on 27 August, helicopter gunship form 5/25th Avn Bn, while supporting the 872nd Regional Forces (RF) Company in a contact 7 kms southwest of Ben Cui (XT405395), engaged an estimated enemy platoon with organic weapons resulting in nine enemy killed and the evacuation of four AK47 rifles and one M16 rifle.  There were no US casualties.

     General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 24 August for an update on 25th Infantry Division activities and to present a Presidential Unit Citation to the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry.  Brigadier General Frank McCarthy (USAR-Ret), producer of the motion picture “Patton”, visited Cu Chi Base Camp Dau Tieng Base Camp and three fire support bases on 24 and 25 August to gather Defense Information for making motion pictures concerning the Army's operations in Vietnam.  Mr. Clyde D. Hardin (GS 18), Assistant SEA to the Secretary of the Army, R&D, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 26 August to obtain information on current and pending actions affecting R&D policy and decisions in the Republic of Vietnam.  The Honorable Egil Krogh, Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs visited Cu Chi Base Camp and two fire support bases on 30 and 31 August to gain firsthand information on the magnitude and consequences of drug abuse problems of US troops in the Republic of Vietnam.

     The 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division killed 103 and captured 10 of the enemy during the month of August, account for (illegible) individual weapons and 4.9 tons of rice captured or destroyed.  Division soldiers destroyed 156 mines and booby traps while detonating 83, resulting in 165 US soldiers wounded and eight killed.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations was light and scattered during the first week of September (1-7 September).  The only significant activity occurred on the evening of 3 September, the anniversary of the death of Ho Chi Minh.  Although six fire support bases received attacks by fire, the damage incurred was not enough to constitute a genuine highpoint.  In general, main force units voided contact while engaging in resupply activities.  The most active units continued to be in SR-1 with elements of the 101 NVA and 268 Regiments identified in captured documents.  The number of mining incidents decreased to 16 from the 34 reported during the last week of August resulting in 20 US soldiers wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with five maneuver battalions (2-34 Armor moved OPCON to 1st Brigade on 3 September ) operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There was one significant shelling incident reported on 3 September when Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT491473) received 25X82mm mortar rounds at 2150 hours.  Only one round impacted inside, wounding one US soldier.  There were three contacts reported during the week resulting in five enemy soldiers killed.  A/2-60 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with claymore mines 11 kms north of Minh Thanh (XT587772) at 1725 hours on 1 September resulting in one enemy killed.  Documents taken from the body identified the Distribution Office, 43rd Postal Transportation Group, Postal Transportation and Communications Office of COSV.  An AH1G Cobra from the 187th AHC received 5 caliber machine gun fire 13 kms east of Katum (XT4690) at 1050 hours on 6 September resulting in two US soldiers wounded and heavy damage to the Cobra which crashed.  D/2-60 Inf reacted to secure the aircraft until it was extracted at 1515 hours.

     A few small caches were located by 1st Bde forces during the week.  D/2-14 Inf located three cases of M-72 LAWs (15 weapons) along a trail 6 kms north of Dau Tieng (XT512534) at 1000 hours on 2 September.  A/3-4 Cav evacuated 15 pounds of medical supplies and one US pistol belt from a bunker complex 4.5 kms southeast of Phu Khuong (XT367549) at 0800 hours on 4 September.  A/2-60 Inf located a munitions cache 13.5 kms east of Katum (XT464885) at 1030 hours on 7 September.  They destroyed 75 RPG rounds, 1.5 cases of powder trains, seven rifle grenades and two ChiCom hand grenades.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents or ground contacts repeated during the week as enemy units in the 2nd Bde's AO suffered from acute logistical shortages.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the first week of September with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were eight significant ground contacts reported during the week resulting in seven enemy killed.  At 1340 hours on 3 September,B/2-27 Inf received one Hoi Chanh 3 kms southwest of Ben Suc (XT562308) with one AK47 rifle and two 150 caliber ammo cans of medical supplies.  The Hoi Chanh identified his unit as the 3rd Platoon, H.5 Sapper/Engineer Company of SR-1 which normally operated in the Saigon River Corridor area.  A/2-27 Inf received one Hoi Chanh at 0930 hours on 4 September 5 kms southwest of Ben Suc (XT528309).  The Hoi Chanh then led A/2-27 Inf to a tunnel complex believed to be a field hospital 1.2 kms northeast of his rally point (XT552314) where two female detainees were apprehended.  Also, they evacuated two AK47 rifles, two ChiCom hand grenades, one US hand grenade, 125 pounds of rice, 40 pounds of medicine and drugs, four bottles of plasma, one surgical kit, one dental kit, one kerosene stove, seven plastic water cans, five 5-gallon cans, two US canteens, one bag of rubber bands, two VC ponchos, one US pistol belt, one US flashlight, and assorted clothing and food.  The Hoi Chanh identified his unit as the B5 Medical Section of SR-1 whose mission was to procure, package and dispense medicine and medicinal supplies to other VC/NVA units operating in the area.  A/2-22 Inf (M), while sweeping the area of a claymore detonation 7 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT654256) on 4 September, received one hand grenade from an unknown number of enemy at 1948 hours.  Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed, two AK47 rifles destroyed and 500 piasters and one notebook evacuated.

     A few small caches were located by 3rd Brigade forces during the week.  Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion evacuated approximately 15 pounds of medical supplies and two pounds of medical books from a spot 1 km east of Ben Suc (XT586339) at 1350 hours on 4 September.  A/2-34 Arm evacuated one .50 caliber ammo can containing 30 bottles of penicillin, vitamins and morphine from a spot 6.5 kms north of Trung Lap (XT598282) at 1700 hours on 5 September.  B/2-22 Inv (M), while sweeping a contact area 8 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT663253), located and evacuated one AK4 7 rifle at 0805 hours.  Later, at 0945 hours, B/2-22 Inf (M) found an old bunker complex 140 meters southeast of the 0805 hours find and evacuated one radio, medical supplies, 50 batteries, one telegraph key, one headset, 17 radio tubes, 75 feet of wire, two homemade receivers, one ChiCom transceiver and eight US ammo cans containing assorted radio parts and tools.

     The 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with one maneuver battalion operating in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces (until 6 September) and one maneuver battalion to Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province.  Three contacts were reported resulting in 10 enemy killed.  Snipers from C/2-47 Inf (M) engaged 10 enemy with organic weapons at 2045 hours on (illegible) September 4.5 kms south of Long Thanh (YS144877) resulting in five enemy killed (located on a sweep of the contact area at 0830 hours on 6 September) the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, 15 pounds of documents and two civilian radios and the destruction of five mines.  The documents identified the 98th Water Sapper Battalion of SR-4 which had last been identified on 20 April following a contact southeast of Noon Trach.  At 1615 hours on 7 September, helicopter gunships from the 240th Assault Helicopter Company engaged 10 enemy with organic weapons 2kms south of Long Thanh (YS135892) resulting in five enemy killed, located by A/2-47 Inf (M) on a sweep of the area.

     A small cache was located by C/2-47 Inf (M) on 6 September 7 kms southeast of Long Thanh (YS160853) at 1050 hours.  They destroyed one bunker, one sampan, five pairs of NVA boots, three pounds of rice, 15 pounds of clothing, miscellaneous cooking utensils, three gallons of gasoline, one small bag of medical supplies, 15 blasting caps, assorted web gear and 20 fighting positions.  Also, they evacuated 15 pounds of documents and located one destroyed .51 caliber machine gun and numerous blood trails.

     A number of notable figures visited Cu Chi Base Camp during the week.  Command Sergeant Major Silas L. Copeland, Sergeant Major of the Army (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 1 September for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Major General John Norton, Deputy Director, Project MASSTER, DA, visited Cu Chi Base Camp to observe MACV and USARV employment of Surveillance Target Acquisition and Night Observation (STANO) equipment and to facilitate Project MASSTER's analysis of the entire STANO system.  On 5 and 6 September, Lieutenant General Frederick C. Wayland, DEPCOMUSMACV (Designate) visited Tan An Base Camp, Cu Chi Base Camp and two fire support bases for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell, US Military Representative to the Paris Peace Talks visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 7 September to gain the best current appreciation of the overall situation within South Vietnam, including pacification and Vietnamization progress and problems.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the week as enemy units avoided contact to secure base areas and replenish depleted supplies.  Contact was extremely light and scattered.  There were 21 mining incidents reported during the week, an increase of five over last week, resulting in two US soldiers killed and 25 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with five maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province and northwest Binh Long Province.  There were no significant ground contacts or shelling incidents reported during the week as enemy units in the 1st Bde's AO avoided contact.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported.  Two ground contacts were reported resulting in one enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  A/4-23 Inf (M) received RPG fire, small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 10 km south of Xuan Loc (YS485975) at 0940 hours on 8 September, resulting in 26 US wounded and light damage to one APC.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, LFT, airstrikes and artillery with unknown results.  C/3-22 Inf engaged five enemy 18 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS605980) at 0930 hours on 11 September with organic weapons and artillery, resulting in one enemy killed and the capture of one wounded PW and one AK47 rifle.  The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of September with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were three significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  A NDP of the 984th Land Clearing Company with C/2-22 Inf (M) 5 kms east of Ben Suc (XT622348) received six 81mm mortar rounds and four unknown type recoilless rifle rounds at 0645 hours on 11 September, resulting in 11 US soldiers wounded and one ARVN wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, LST, LFT and artillery with unknown results.  An NDP of C.22-22 Inf (M) 6 kms east of Ben Suc (XT634345) received 15X60 mortar rounds from the northeast at 2045 hours on 11 September resulting in one US soldier killed (984th LCC) and three US wounded.  Fire was returned by mortar, artillery, LFT, Shadow and a flareship with unknown results.

     There were nine contacts with enemy forces during the week resulting in 12 enemy soldiers killed, one VCS-CD prisoner-of-war captured and one Hoi Chanh received.  B/4-9 Inf engaged five enemy soldiers 5 kms south of Ben Cat (XT737482) at 1804 hours on 9 September with organic weapons and artillery resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles and documents identifying the 83rd Rear Service Group, Rear Service Office of SR-1.  The CP/2-22 Inf (M) 7 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT654255) engaged an unknown number of enemy at 1826 hours on 10 September, resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle and one .45 caliber pistol.  A/2-22 Inf (M) received a Hoi Chanh at 0208 hours on 10 September 2 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT604238).  The Hoi Chanh was the Assistant Chief of Staff for the K-3 Battalion, 268 Regiment, SR (illegible), COSVN.  He stated that in July 1970, because of the heavy casualty rate within the battalions of the 268 Regiment, the Regiment was disbanded and reorganized as the K-3 Battalion which had three infantry companies of 20 men each.  R/2-22 Inf (M) engaged an unknown number of enemy with claymore mines 4 kms west of Ben Suc (XT537341) at 2316 hours on 12 September, resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one AK magazine, one flashlight, six NVA ponchos, a small amount of rice, two hammocks, one life preserver, three equipment bags, one ChiCom hand grenade, two VC pistol belts, a small amount of documents and one NVA compass.  There was no enemy return fire.

     (illegible) Inf located a large munitions cache in a bunker with a reinforced concrete trap door 5.5 kms east of Ben Suc (XT628329) at 1910 hours on 9 September.  They evacuated one 60mm mortar tube and base plate, 13X75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 10X60mm mortar rounds, 17 boxes of 75mm recoilless rifle (illegible), (102 fuses), 14 cans of mortar charges, four ChiCom claymore mines, (illegible) M83 submachine guns with magazines, two boxes of fuses for 60mm mortar rounds, one US 81mm mortar round and 500 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with one maneuver battalion operating in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province.  In preparation for the stand-down of the 3-9 Inf Div, three battalions, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry; 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery became OPCON to USARV on 8 and 10 September and moved to Di An.  There were two ground contacts reported during the week, resulting in two enemy killed.  There were no shelling incidents reported.

     Division Troops accounted for five enemy soldiers killed and two prisoners-of-war captured.  Helicopter gunships from 25th Aviation Battalion, while supporting the 494th PF Platoon 6 kms south of Hiep Hoa (XT430009), engaged an unknown number of enemy at 1400 hours on 10 September with organic weapons resulting in four enemy killed and the capture of one prisoner-of-war, two AK47 rifles and one K54 pistol.

     Brigadier General Lewis E. Maness, Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, USARPAC visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 8 September to determine actions required by subordinate commands as a result of current austere funding.  Staff members of the Congressional Subcommittee on Alcoholics and Narcotics of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 8 September to investigate problems involving the abuse of alcohol, narcotics, and other dangerous drugs by members of the Armed Forces.  Lieutenant General Do Cau Tri, CG III CTZ, visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an update on 25th Infantry Division activities on 8 September.  Brigadier General Ross R. Condit, Jr. CG, USACDC, Combat Support Group visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 9 September to provide personnel of USACDC Combat Service Support Group the opportunity to make an on-site evaluation of current (illegible) support doctrine and practices in both a tactical and non-tactical environment.  General William B. Rosson, DEPCOMUSMACV, made a farewell visit to the 25th Infantry Division on 9 September.  Major General Charles M. Gettys, Chief of Staff, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 14 September for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

     Enemy activity within the 25th  Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the third week of September (15-24 September) as the enemy continued to experience logistical difficulties.  Contacts were limited to harassing attacks by fire against allied outposts.  The number of mining incidents increased by five over last week to 26, resulting in one US soldier killed and 37 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with five maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  In seven contacts with the enemy, 1st Bde forces killed six and captured two prisoners-of-war.  D/1-27 Inf engaged an area of a tripflare activation 9 kms south of Ben Cui (XT461368) at 2040 hours on 16 September with small arms and claymore mines resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of five RPG rounds, one rucksack, three pounds of rice, one pound of documents, one notebook, one log book, one wallet and a bag of clothes.  The documents identified the U/I element of the 268 Regiment of SR-1.  On a sweep of the contact area at 0715 hours on 17 September by D/1-27 Inf, one wounded PW was captured.  The PW identified his unit as the 2nd Company, K-2 Battalion, 268 Regiment of SR-1.  At 1458 hours on 18 September, D/2-60 Inf located five enemy bodies 11 kms northwest of Minh Thanh (XT535718).  The enemy soldiers had been killed by an artillery recon by fire at 1755 hours on 17 September.  D/3-4 Cav and A/3-4 Cav were involved in a contact 6 kms northwest of Ben Cui at 1355 hours on 19 September, in which three enemy were killed and one wounded prisoner-of-war captured.  (See Inclosure 4 for details of this action.)

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions (2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry passed OPCON to 25th Infantry division from the 199th Light Infantry Brigade on 19 September) operating in Bien Hoa, Phuoc Buy and Long Khanh Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  In five contacts with enemy forces, 2nd Bde forces killed two enemy soldiers.  C/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 7 kms south of Xuan Loc (YT48005) at 2045 hours on 17 September resulting in five US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery and LFT with unknown results.  The next day at 0815 hours, C/1-5 Inf (M) located one enemy killed and evacuated one AK47 rifle, two rucksacks, one bottle of vitamins, miscellaneous clothing and a small amount of documents.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported and only (illegible) contacts resulting in five enemy killed.  B/2-22 Inf (M) killed two enemy soldiers with claymore mines at 0915 hours on 20 September 7 kms northeast of Trung Lap (XT654255) and evacuated one ChiCom machine gun magazine.  A small cache was located by C/2-27 Inf 2.5 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT596318) at 1145 hours on 21 September.  They destroyed one bunker and two tunnels and evacuated one M 2 carbine, two SKS rifles, two M (missing) rifles, two cooking pots, a small amount of rice and one entrenching tool.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry division continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with all battalions on stand down waiting for re-deployment to the United States to begin 22 September.

     Two Squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division on 15 September and continued Operation TOAN THANG IV in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces during the third week in September.  No shelling incidents were reported by 11th ACR Squadrons although there were three ground contacts resulting in five enemy killed.  L/3-11 ACR killes four enemy with claymore mines 8 kms west of Tan Uyen (XT889259) at 0705 hours on 17 September.  They destroyed one booby trapped RPG-7 round and evacuated one NVA pistol belt.  ARP/11 ACR received one command detonated booby trapped 82mm mortar round and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 9 kms southeast of Ben Cat (XT795260) at 1820 hours on 17 September resulting in three US soldiers killed and three wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results.

     Dr. William Vivrett, Director of Chaplaincy Services, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 16 September to confer with US Military Chaplains indorsed by the Disciples of Christ.  A CONARC Liaison Training Team visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 17 and 18 September to gather information in related areas of training to be used in improving and updating instruction conducted in CONUS.  General Ralph K. Haines, Jr. CINCUSARPAC, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 20 September to confer with commanders, visit major headquarters and units, review matters of interest to USARPAC, make appropriate calls on local military and government officials and to bid farewell in view of his reassignment to take over CONARC.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the week (22-30 September) as many enemy units experienced logistical and health difficulties.  Numerous booby trapping incidents in the vicinity of the central Trapezoid area and repeated contact with enemy elements southeast of Xuan Loc constituted the bulk of enemy activity.  The number of mining incidents increased by two over last week to 28, resulting in five US soldiers killed and 55 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces during the last week of September.  One shelling incident was reported.  C/2-12 Inf at FSB Denny (XT333896) received six rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire and six rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in one US wounded.  Fire was returned by mortar with unknown results.  There were four contacts with the enemy resulting in two enemy killed and the location of four enemy bodies.  D/2-12 Inf located four enemy bodies 6.5 kms north of Dau Tieng (XT518626) at 1435 hours on 24 September.  The enemy had been killed after a duffel bag activation on 10 September at 1820 hours by artillery.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were five contacts with enemy forces resulting in six enemy killed.  D/2-3 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with claymore mines 9kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT(illegible) at 0810 hours on 24 September resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one US (illegible), one &S compass, one US poncho, one hammock and a small amount of documents.  The documents identified the (illegible) Company, 274 Regiment.  (H/(illegible) Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons 28 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS13955) at 0730 hours on 26 September resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of three AK47's, five (illegible), four AK magazines, 109 AK rounds and 10 pounds of (illegible).  The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.  (illegible) Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons and artillery (illegible) kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT375055) at 1520 hours 26 September, resulting in one enemy killed.  The enemy force returned fire with small arms and RPG fire resulting in two US soldiers wounded.  A MEDEVA UH1H helicopter received one RPG round while coming in to pick up the wounded.  Fire was returned with organic weapons and B/2-(illegible) Inf reacted with unknown results.  The UH1H suffered light damage.     

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of September with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces until 27 September when the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (-) moved to the 2nd Brigade.  There were 13 contacts with enemy forces resulting in 18 enemy killed, two prisoners of war captured and one Hoi Chanh received.   C/2-27 Inf located three tunnels and one bunker at 0908 and 1010 hours on 22 September 3 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT590310).  They evacuated six AK47 rifles, one AK47 magazine, two US canteens, two rucksacks, a small amount of medical supplies and money, 24 pounds of rice and three pounds of documents.  At 1030 hours, C/2-27 Inf received small arms fire from two enemy resulting in one US soldier killed.  Later, at 1040 hours C/2-27 Inf received one Hoi Chanh.  A/4 9 Inf located 7 kms southeast of Ben Suc (XT614279), engaged the area of a claymore mine detonation with organic weapons, artillery and LFT at 1800 hours on 23 September.  A sweep of the area at 1625 hours on 24 September and 1200 hours on 25 September by A/4 9 Inf located three enemy bodies.  They evacuated one AK47 rifle, one bag of medical supplies and one sack of cooking utensils.  They destroyed two bomblets, six ChiCom hand grenades, four pistol belts, two US flashlights, three cloth bags, two ammo pouches and one AK vest.  R/4-9 Inf engaged four to five enemy 6.5 kms southeast of Ben Sur (XT6(illegible) at 1840 hours on 29 September with organic weapons, artillery and LFT resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles.  D/4 9 Inf engaged the area of a claymore mine detonation 5 kms north of Trung Lap (XT605264) at 1948 hours on 29 September with organic weapons, artillery (47 rounds HE) and LFT, resulting in five enemy killed and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles, two backpacks, one K54 pistol, two US pistol belts, nine AK magazines, three M-26 hand grenades, two US claymore mines, one flashlight, three wallets, mess gear, a small amount of medical supplies and 1-1/2 pounds of documents.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of September (22-30 September) with two squadrons operating in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces.  There were six contacts with enemy forces, resulting in seven enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  I/3-11 ACR engaged the area of a claymore mine detonation 9 kms north of Tan Uyen (XT956322) at 2025 hours on 24 September with organic weapons, resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles.  There were no US casualties.  The (illegible) PF Compound 8 kms east of Lai Khe (XT850159) received an unknown number of mortar rounds followed by a ground attack at 0030 hours on 26 September.  They returned fire with organic weapons, artillery and K/3- 11 ACR reacted resulting in the killing of 11 enemy (three credited to K/3-11 ACR) and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles, one K54 pistol and two B-40 rounds.  There were no US casualties.

     The Honorable Robert L. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army (R&D) visited the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Di An and the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi on 24 September to coordinate current and pending actions affecting Department of the Army R&D policy, and to engage in discussions concerning sensors, radar, air surveillance equipment and the Vietnamization responsibilities of USARV as well as the required CONUS support.

     The 25th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment killed 112 and captured eight of the enemy during the month of September, accounted for 83 individual weapons and two crew-served weapons, and 1.25 tons of rice captured or destroyed.  Division soldiers destroyed 162 mines and booby traps while detonating 81, resulting in 137 US soldiers wounded and eight killed.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the first week of October (1-7 October) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact.  The area east of Ben Cat and Lai Khe was the scene of most contacts with small groups of enemy personnel during the week.  No significant shelling incidents were reported, while the number of mining incidents decreased by 17 to 11 resulting in one US soldier killed and 13 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with four maneuver battalions operating in northeast Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  There were no significant contacts with the enemy during the week although a few small caches were located by A/3-4 Cav.  At 1735 hours on 1 October, A/3-4 Cav located 16 bunkers 4 kms east of Phu Khuong (XT386(illegible).  They destroyed the bunkers and evacuated one offset printing press, one plastic bag of medical supplies and four pounds of documents.  A/3-4 Cav destroyed 15 bunkers 5 kms east of Phu Khuong (XT395564) at 1430 hours on 2 September and evacuated one M-2 carbine with magazine, one US protective mask, one US canteen, one US steel helmet, two M16 magazines, 400 feet of nylon roper, three time fuses, two ChiCom hand grenades, miscellaneous cooking pots and two .50 caliber ammo cans of documents.  The documents identified the Tay Ninh Province Rear Service Section.  A small medical cache was located in five bunkers by A/3-4 Cav 4 kms east of Phu Khuong (XT379574) at 1225 hours on 3 October.  They destroyed the bunkers and evacuated 495 bottles of novocaine, seven quinine tablets, six bottles of unknown type pills, one bottle of calcium “C”, 45 sulfa tablets, 28 bottles of aspirin and two bottles of penicillin.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four maneuver battalions operating in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were two contacts with enemy forces resulting in two enemy killed.  A/1-5 Inf (-) with the 238th RF Company engaged two enemy 1.5 kms northwest of Long Thanh (YS128935) with organic weapons at 0017 hours on 4 October resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, 125 pounds of rice, six AK magazines, 180 SK rounds and a small amount of documents.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with three maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were seven contacts with enemy forces during the week resulting in five enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  C/1-27 Inf received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 8 kms northwest of Ben Suc (XT548412) at 1515 hours on 1 October resulting in seven US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery and helicopter gunships with unknown results.  D/1-27 Inf engaged one enemy soldier 7 kms west of Ben Suc (XT505333) with organic weapons at 1755 hours on 2 October, resulting in one enemy killed.  There was no enemy return fire.  D/1-27 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 100 meters northwest of the 2 October contact site (XT504334) at 1050 hours on 4 October.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and helicopter gunships resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one M16 rifle and a small amount of documents.  The documents identified the 268 Regiment which normally operated in the area.

      The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with two squadrons operating in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces.  There were three contacts with enemy forces during the week, resulting in eight enemy killed.  A/1-11 ACR engaged 12 enemy soldiers with organic weapons, artillery and LFT at 2230 hours on 2 October 12.5 kms west of Xuan Loc (YT291098) resulting in four enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, assorted web gear, 5750 piasters and a small amount of documents.  C/4-9 Inf (OPCON to 3/11 ACR) engaged an unknown number of enemy 7 kms southeast of Phuoc Hoa (XT967385) with organic weapons at 0935 hours on 7 October, resulting in two enemy killed and one AK47 rifle evacuated.  Later, at 1030 hours, C/4-9 Inf received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy while sweeping the area, resulting in five US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and LFT, with unknown results until 1110 hours when contact was lost.

     The 25th Infantry Division celebrated its 29th Anniversary on 1 October 1970.  Lieutenant General Frederick Weyland, DEPCOMUSMACV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 1 October to attend a Presidential Unit Citation Ceremony honoring the 3rd Platoon, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry and to receive an update on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General M.J.L. Greene assumed command of the 25th Infantry Division on 6 October as Major General Bautz went on leave.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the second week of October (8-14 October) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact to engage in resupply activities.  The most active areas were in the Trapezoid, Ho Bo woods and Boi Loi Woods areas.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported.  The number of mining incidents increased by one over last week to 12, resulting in 16 US soldiers wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of October with four maneuver battalions operating in northeastern Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces.  Contact was light, with four enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  Helicopter gunships from D/3-4 Cav received small ammo fire from an unknown number of enemy 10 kms northwest of Ben Cui (XT963522) at 1613 hours on 9 October.  Fire was returned with small arms, resulting in three enemy killed, one prisoner-of-war captured, and the evacuation of four AK47 rifles, three K54 pistols, and one box of 18 hand grenades.  A sweep of the area resulted in the location of eight bunkers and the evacuation of 10 pounds of documents, one M16 rifle, 10 pounds of medical supplies, seven flashlights, 24 rucksacks, 106 rounds of K54 ammunition, 875 AK rounds, 102 M16 rounds, four B40 rounds, six B40 boosters, 12 M79 rounds, four ChiCom anti-personnel mines, one M26 hand grenade, one smoke grenade, one US trip flare, nine US pistol belts, four M14 ammo pouches, and miscellaneous clothing and web gear.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of October with four maneuver battalions operating in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  There were three contacts with enemy forces resulting in six enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  A/3-22 Inf engaged five enemy with small arms fire 9 kms southwest of Black Horse (YS975905) at 1045 hours on 12 October resulting in two enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  One AK47 rifle was destroyed and one AK47 rifle with 210 rounds of ammunition was evacuated.  At 0900 hours on 13 October, A/3-22 Inf swept the previous day's contact area and evacuated one K54 pistol, four packs with 20 pounds of documents, two pounds of C4, two electrical blasting caps and miscellaneous clothing.  A/3-22 Inf located one more enemy body at 1500 hours on 14 October, which was credited to the C/3-22 Inf contact of 12 October.  D/3-22 Inf engaged three enemy soldiers with claymore mines 1/4  kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT53017) at 1300 hours on 13 October, resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with three maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.  There were 12 contacts with the enemy during the second week of October, resulting in 21 enemy killed and one prisoner of war captured.  Sct/2-22 Inf (M) killed four enemy soldiers with claymore mines 2.5 kms north of Ben Suc (XT582960) at 1405 hours on 8 October.  There was no enemy return fire.  Rcn/ 1-27 Inf received small arms fire from an estimated three enemy 7 kms north of Ben Suc (XT558404).  Fire was returned by organic weapons and helicopter gunships, resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles and one K54 pistol.  A/1-27 Inf engaged two enemy soldiers with claymore mines and hand grenades at 0714 hours on 10 October 8 kms northwest of Ben Suc (XT551414), resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one bipod for an 82mm mortar, eight 82mm mortar rounds, 12 fuses for an 82mm mortar round, and one US hand grenade.  There was no return fire.  The most significant contact of the week occurred at 0730 hours on 11 October when !/1-27 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with claymore mines and organic weapons 8kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT551425), resulting in six enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured.  They evacuated two AK47 rifles with magazines, 120 AK rounds, 100 pounds of rice, two pounds of fish, five pounds of medical supplies, two pounds of documents, four cans of soy sauce, two packs of Cambodian cigarettes, 15 pounds of ARVN “C” rations, assorted pots and pans, two pounds of raw tobacco, four NVA ponchos, two pounds of tea, 10 pounds of onion skin paper, three hammocks, two NVA pistol belts, 25 pairs of trousers, 13 shirts, and 45 US non-electrical blasting caps.  There was no enemy return fire.  C/1-27 Inf detonated an unknown type booby trap and received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1415 hours on 12 October 7.5 kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT560437), resulting in one US soldier killed and five wounded.  Fire was returned with small arms and LFT with unknown results.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with two squadrons operating in Binh Duon, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces.  There was only one significant contact reported during the week.  I/3-11 ACR killed three enemy soldiers 9.5 kms north of Tan Uyan (XT928306) at 1600 hours on 8 October.  They evacuated one AK47 rifle, one K54 piston, one US protective mask, three backpacks and a small amount of documents.

     Colonel W. Russell Todd, CO (Designate), 3rd Brigade visited Cu Chi Base Camp from 7 thru 20 October for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General David E. Thomas, USARV Surgeon, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 9 October for a farewell visit to the medical personnel of the 25th Infantry Division.  Brigadier General (P) James Ursano, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and administration, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 13 October for an orientation on matters of personnel and administration in the 25th Infantry Division.  Major General Edward Bautz Jr. resumed command of the 25th Infantry Division on 13 October.  Major General Nguyen Xuan Thinh, CG. 25th ARVN Division visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 14 October to tour the facilities.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations during the third week of October (15-21 October) remained at a low level as enemy main and local force units avoided contact to engage in proselytizing activities designed to weaken GVN control.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported throughout the Division's AO although Cu Chi Base Camp did receive one 122mm rocket at 1827 hours on 15 October, resulting in one US soldier wounded and light damage to two buildings.  The number of mining incidents decreased by four to eight resulting in 19 US soldiers wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of October with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh Province (eastern War Zone C), Binh Long Province (western Chon Thanh District) and Bin Duong Province (northern Tri Tam and Khiem Hanh Districts).  Enemy units in the 1st Bde's AO were the 101 NVA, 165 NVA and 209 NVA Regiments.  There were four significant contacts reported resulting in four enemy killed.  A/3-4 Cav engaged three enemy with organic weapons 7 kms northwest of Phu Khuong (XT282618) at 1203 hours on 21 October resulting in three enemy killed.  Enemy small arms fire wounded two US soldiers.  Later, at 1305 hours, A/3-4 Cav received one 60mm mortar round 1.8 kms southwest of the 1203 hours engagement (XT(illegible) resulting in one US soldier wounded.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with three maneuver battalions operating in Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces.  Enemy units opposing the 2nd Bde were the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Artillery Regiment and 84 Rear Service Group.  The 2nd Bde also continued to coordinate its operations with the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF), 43rd ARVN Regiment, 18th ARVN Division and 11th ACR (-).  Contact with enemy forces was extremely light with four reported resulting in five enemy killed.  At 1050 hours on 16 October, D/3-22 Inf detonated claymore mines on two enemy soldiers 13 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT571021) resulting in two enemy killed and two rucksacks with miscellaneous clothing evacuated.  Snipers from R/3-22 Inf engaged 10 enemy 7 kms southwest of Ong Que (YS352932) at 1810 hours on 16 October with organic weapons and supported by artillery and a LFT, resulting in two enemy killed and two AK47 rifles evacuated.  There was no enemy return fire.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of October with four maneuver battalions (2-27 Inf moved to 3rd Bde on 16 October) operating in Tay Ninh And Binh Duong Provinces to interdict enemy movement of men and supplies down the Saigon River Corridor.  Enemy forces operating in the 3rd Bde's AO were the 101 NVA Regt, 268 VC MF Regt, Quyet Thang Regt, 83 Rear Service Group and SR-1 Rear Service units.  There were four contacts with enemy forces resulting in three enemy killed and two captured.  A/2-22 Inf (M) detonated claymore mines on nine enemy soldiers 5 kms north of Ben Suc (XT582387) at 1733 hours on 19 October, resulting in one enemy killed and two prisoners-of-war captured.  The PWs identified their unit as the C-212 food procurement company of the 83rd Rear Service Group which is responsible for the resupply of SR-1.  Three AK47 rifles, one RPG launcher and two RPG rounds were evacuated.  At 1620 hours on 20 October, A/1-27 Inf received RPG round from an unknown number of enemy 7 kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT552427) resulting in five US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by artillery with unknown results.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of October with two Squadrons operating in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces.  Enemy forces in the 11th ACR's AO were SR-5, Dong Nai Regt, 274 Regt and the U-1 Province (VC).  There were three contacts with enemy forces resulting in four enemy killed.  C/4-9 Inf 9OPCON to 3-11 ACR) engaged an unknown number of enemy 5 kms southeast of Phuoc Hoa (XT934390) at 1150 hours on 15 October with small arms, artillery and LFT with unknown results.  The enemy force returned fire with small arms and three RPG rounds but there were no US casualties.  Contact was lost at 1200 hours.  On a sweep of the area at 1425 hours, C/4-9 Inf received small arms, RPG, automatic weapons and mortar fire resulting in two US killed and three US wounded.  Fire was returned y organic weapons, LFT, artillery and air strikes with unknown results.  K/3-11 ACR, reacting to the C/4-9 Inf contact at 1545 hours, received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from 10-15 enemy 400 meters south of the original contact resulting in four US wounded and heavy damage to one APC.  Fire was returned by organic weapons resulting in four enemy killed.  Contact was lost at 1615 hours.  Two MEDEVAC UH1H helicopters, one from the 25th Aviation Battalion and the other from the 15th Medical Battalion, 1st Air Cavalry Division, called in to evacuate the wounded, received small arms fire at 1440 and 1515 hours, resulting in moderate damage to both aircraft.  K/3-11 ACR and A/4-9 Inf (OPCON to 3-11 ACR on 16 October) received small arms and RPG fire from four to five enemy 6 kms southeast of Phuoc Hoa (XT943382) at 1330 hours on 16 October resulting in three US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned bo organic weapons with unknown results.

     Major General Walter J. Woolwine, Asst Dep CG for Materiel, USARV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an update on 25th Inf Div activities with emphasis on logistics.  Brigadier General (P) Frederic E. Davison, Director of Enlisted Personnel, DA, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 17 October to observe and receive command briefings on the status of all aspects of personnel support and current problems in the 25th Infantry Division.  Brigadier General Rolland V. Heiser, Deputy J3, MACV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 19 October for an orientation at 25th Infantry Division activities.  Brigadier General Olin E. Smith, Asst Div Commander, 101st Airborne Division, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 19 and 20 October for an update on 25th Infantry Division activities and to attend the change of command ceremonies for the 3rd Brigade.

     Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations remained at a low level during the fourth week of October (22-31 October) as enemy main and local force units avoided contact and concentrated on conducting terrorist and propaganda activities aimed at disrupting the GVN Pacification Program.  There were no significant shelling incidents reported during the week.  The number of mining incidents increased by five over last week to 13, resulting in three US soldiers killed and 33 wounded.

     The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the week with four maneuver battalions operating in Tay Ninh Province (eastern War Zone C) Binh Long Province (western Chon Thanh District) and Binh Duong Province (northern Tri Tan and Lhien Hanh districts) against the 101 NVA Regiment, 165 NVA Regiment and 209 NVA Regiment.  Contact was extremely light with two being reported resulting in three enemy killed.  A claymore mine set out by the Flame Platoon, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav 7.5 kms northwest of Ben Cui (XT398618) detonated at 1410 hours on 23 October resulting in one enemy killed.  Two enemy were killed by another F/3-4 Cav claymore mine detonation 4 kms northwest of Ben Cui (XT425495) at 0745 hours on 27 October.  One AK47 rifle, 30 pounds of rice and three VC rucksacks were evacuated from the contact site.  A/2-12 Inf swept an area 8 kms west of Bau Tran (XT430770) in War Zone C on 24 and 25 October and located one large cache.  They destroyed 23 bunkers, one fighting position and 26X82mm mortar rounds.  They evacuated assorted bottles of medicine, three CCs of Vitamin K, 100 aspirins, two pair of rubber gloves, 210 vials of penicillin, two pints of plasma, one 115 AC/DC generator, one can of gas, one SKS barrel, 24X75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 340 ChiCom hand grenades, five 20-pound mines, 400 rounds of .51 caliber ammunition, one 107mm rocket, 29 five foot sections of Bangalore torpedoes, 35X82mm mortar rounds and three bicycle wheels with tires.

     The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of October with three maneuver battalions operating in Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Bien Hoa (Nhon Trach District) Provinces against the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Regiment and 84 Rear Service Group.  The 2nd Brigade also continued coordinated operations with the RTAVF, 43rd ARVN Regiment, 18th ARVN Division and the 11th ACR (-).  There were nine contacts with enemy forces resulting in four enemy killed and one captured.  D/3-17 Air Cav engaged two enemy with organic weapons 12 kms south of Long Thanh (YS147819) at 2050 hours on 22 October with unknown results.  Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier and one Kit Carson Scout.  One sampan was located and destroyed.  An APC from B/4-23 Inf (M) detonated a 10 - 20 pound mine with pressure device at 1240 hours on 24 October 8 kms north of Ngai Giao (YS4548838).  The troops riding the APCs from B/4-23 Inf (M) jumped off the tracks only to set off a daisy chain of eight “bouncing betty” type anti-personnel mines, resulting in three US soldiers killed and 17 wounded.  The APC suffered light damage.  C/3-22 Inf received small arms and RPG fire from an estimated 30 enemy 5 kms northwest of Ong Que (YT374040) at 1615 hours on 24 October resulting in three US soldiers wounded.  Fire was returned by organic weapons and artillery with unknown results.  C/3-22 Inf located a small munitions cache in a series of bunkers 5 kms northwest of Ong Que (YT343042) at 1105 hours on 25 October.  They destroyed 18 bunkers and one RPG round and evacuated four AK47 rifles, two M72 LAWs, 235 AK47 rounds, nine AK magazines, one US claymore mine, three M57 firing devices, two ChiCom hand grenades, two pounds of documents and miscellaneous clothing and cooking utensils.  D/3-22 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 9 kms northwest of Ong Que (YT319048) at 1350 hours on 28 October resulting in one enemy killed and one AK47 rifle evacuated.  The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.  D/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy with organic weapons 750 meters northwest of the 28 October contact (YT314054) at 1250 hours on 29 October resulting in one enemy killed and one AK47 rifle evacuated.  They destroyed 20 bunkers and one 82mm mortar round.  There was no enemy return fire.  B/3-22 Inf located a small weapons cache 3 kms north of Ong Que (YT398025) at 1035 and 1315 hours on 31 October.  They evacuated one .30 caliber Browning Automatic Rifle, two SKS rifles, one 75mm recoilless rifle and five Russian anti-tank grenades.  They also destroyed six bunkers, one mess area, one table and one chair.

     The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of October with four maneuver battalions (4-9 Inf (-) moved to 3rd Bde from 11th ACR on 28 October) operating in Tay Ninh Province and Binh Duong Province (southeastern Khiem Hanh, southern Tri Tam, northern Trang Bank and Phu Hoa Districts) against the 101 NVA Regiment, 268 VC MF Regiment, Quyet Thang Regiment, 83rd Rear Service Group and SR-1 Rear Service units.  The 3rd Bde's mission was to interdict enemy movement of men and supplies down the Saigon River Corridor.  There were 11 contacts with the enemy resulting in 16 enemy killed.  B/2-22 Inf (M) killed two enemy with claymore mines 10 kms mortheast of Cu Chi (XT723228) at 0945 hours on 22 October and evacuated one AK47 rifle.  A/2-27 Inf (M) killed two enemy with claymore mines 5 kms northeast of Ben Suc (XT595384) at 1818 hours on 22 October.  A/2-27 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons and artillery 5.5 kms southwest of Ben Suc (XT524309) at 1020 hours on 25 October resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles, one VC poncho, a small amount of documents and miscellaneous personal items.  There was no enemy return fire.  B/2-22 Inf (M) killed four enemy with claymore mines 11 kms northeast of Cu Chi (XT717245) at 1750 hours on 25 October.  Three AK47 rifles were evacuated.  An AP from C/4-9 Inf 7 kms north of Cu Chi (XT685214) engaged three enemy at 2205 hours on 30 October with organic weapons.  A sweep of the area at 0655 hours on 31 October resulted in the location of three enemy bodies and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles, one RPG round, one cooking pot, one and one-half pounds of documents, one NVA canteen, two pounds of medical supplies, two soldering irons, two pounds of flour, three VC ponchos, three pounds of miscellaneous clothing and one hot water bottle.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of October with two squadrons and one maneuver battalion (-)
until 28 October) operating in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces against the 274 NVA Regiment, Dong Nai Regiment, elements from SR-5 and the U-1 Province (VC) forces.  In five contacts, 11th ACR forces killed seven enemy soldiers.  I/3-11 ACR, while approaching two graves with a trap door between them 7 kms south of Phuy Giao (XT890300), engaged three enemy with organic weapons at 1445 hours on 27 October, resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one K54 pistol, two hammocks, three VC ponchos, one flashlight and one transistor radio.  The enemy returned fire with a hand grenade but there were no US casualties.  An NDP from K/3-11 ACR, located 10 kms east of Ben Cat (XT844361), received three to four 60mm mortar rounds, 15-20 RPG rounds and three to five 75mm recoilless rifle rounds at 0130 hours on 30 October, resulting in one US soldier killed and six wounded.  Two APCs suffered heavy damage and two APCs suffered moderate damage.  Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, LFT and Night Hawk, resulting in two enemy killed and two secondary explosions.  Two RPG launchers, one AK47 rifle, four RPG boosters and nine RPG rounds were evacuated.

     Brigadier General (P) James Ursano, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration, USARV visited cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities, with emphasis on maters of P&A.  Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, DCG, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp for a briefing on Keystone progress in the 25th Infantry Division.  Colonel William Sullivan, DCD and LTC Pembroke Curry, (illegible) A/Vice Chief of Staff, DA visited Cu Chi Base Camp to discuss procedures for the preservation of Vietnam Combat Operations data with emphasis on reporting procedures and the use of computers for operational data storage on 28 October.  CMDR Joseph J. Lorfano, US Navy, Special Assistant for SEA, Div Def Information, OASD/PA visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 31 October and 1 November to obtain an update on operations and to discuss public affairs with the IO for background in dealing with and briefing the Washington press on current SEA activities.

     The 25th Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment killed 101 and captured nine of the enemy during the month of October, accounted for 77 individual weapons, seven crew served weapons and .92 tons of rice captured or destroyed.  Division soldiers destroyed 84 mines and booby traps while detonating 44, resulting in four US soldiers killed and 81 wounded.

     During the quarter from 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970, the 25th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (until 22 September) and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment successfully disrupted enemy movement of men and supplies throughout the Division's area of operations thus preventing any significant enemy offensive activity.  In general, fighting was light and scattered during the quarter as the enemy avoided contact.  This low level of activity was attributed to the highly successful Cambodian operations undertaken by the 25th Infantry Division in May and June of 1970 in which enemy border supply points were destroyed.  Enemy units throughout the Division's AO suffered from acute supply shortages, making sustained offensive activity against Division units and installations or Saigon virtually impossible.  The 25th Infantry Division and its OPCON units concentrated on upgrading ARVN/PF/RF forces during the quarter in order to continue the Vietnamization program as well as insure the continued success of the Republic of Vietnam's pacification program.

     The 1st Brigade's AO included eastern War Zone C in Tay Ninh Province, western Chon Thanh District in Binh Long Province and northern Tri Tan and Khien Hanh Districts in Binh Duong Province.  The 1st Bde's maneuver battalions were the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor; 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry; and 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-).  Enemy units operating in the 1st Bde's AO were the 101 NVA Regiment, 165 NVA Regiment and 209 NVA Regiment.  The 1st Brigade was tasked with the defense of Dau Tieng Base Camp and disrupting enemy movement through War Zone C.

     The 2nd Brigade's AO included Tuy Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces.  The 2nd Bde's maneuver battalions were the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry (until 20 August); 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry; 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry; 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry (15-28 September ).  Enemy units in the 2nd Bde's AO were the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Artillery Regiment and 84 Rear Service Group.  The 2nd Brigade conducted ground reconnaissance and search operations through the AO to disrupt enemy movement.

     The 3rd Brigade's AO included Binh Duong Province, southeastern Khien Hanh, Southern Tri Tam, northern Trang Bang and Phu Hoa Districts.  Enemy units in the 3rd Bde's AO were the 101 NVA Regiment, 268 VC MF Regiment, Quyet Thang Regiment, 83 Rear Service Group and SR-1 Rear Service Units.  The 3rd Bde was tasked with denying the use of the Saigon River Corridor by the enemy and with the defense of Cu Chi Base Camp for which one battalion was designated Division Ready Reactionary Force.  The 3rd Bde's maneuver battalions were the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry; 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (until 20 August); 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion (until  20 August); 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry.

     The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division operated in Long An, Hau Nghia and Pien Hoa (Nhon Tranh District) Provinces during the first half of the quarter.  On 22 September, the (illegible) Inf Div became OPCON to USARV at Di An and prepared to return to the United States.

     The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's 1st and 3rd Squadrons became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division on 15 September and operated in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces against the 274 NVA Regiment, Don Nai Regiment, elements of SR-5 and the U-1 Province (VC) unit.

     B.     Personnel

     (1)     During the months of August through October 1970, the aggregate Division personnel strength averaged 16,827 of 17,709 authorized or 95%.  Enlisted personnel strength averaged for this period 15,592 of 16,410 authorized or 95% while officer personnel strength for the period averaged 1,235 of 1,299 authorized or 95%.  Personnel shortages continued to exist in Infantry, Signal Corps and Artillery captains, aviators overall, and non-commissioned officers in the grades E6 through E8 in the 11B, 11C, 12B, 13E, 17K, 31G, 63C and 76P MOS series.

     (2)     During the period 1 August through 31 October 1970, the Division had 39 KIA's, (3 officers and 36 EM), and 542 WIA's (35 officers and 507 EM), excluding OPCON units.  There were 13 non-battle deaths, 131 non-battle injuries and 0 missing in action.  Officer gains for the period numbered 533, while administrative losses were 488.  EM gains were 6,599, while administrative EM losses totaled 6,023.

     (3)     Principal Command and Staff:  The identification of the principal Command Staff personnel within the 25th Infantry Division for the reporting period is as follows:

Commanding General     Major General Edward Bautz, Jr.
          (1 August - 31 Oct 70)

Assistant Division Commander  A     Brigadier General Michael J.L. Greene
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Assistant Division Commander B     Brigadier General John R. Thurman III
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Chief of Staff     Colonel Thomas J. Hanifen
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G1     LTC Patrick R. Lowrey
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G2     LTC Toshio Aoyagi
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G3     LTC Ted G. Westerman
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G4     LTC John H. Claybrook
          (1Aug 70 - 13 Sep 70)

     LTC Don S. McCoy
          (14 Sep 70 - 31 Oct 70)

ACofS, G5     LTC Anthony J. Perrotto
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)
Commanding Officer, 1st Bde     Colonel William F. Graves
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bde     Colonel Joseph R. Ulatoski
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Bde     Colonel James M. Connell
          (1 Aug 70 - 6 Oct 70)

     Colonel William R. Todd
          (7 Oct 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, DIVARTY     Colonel Harry A. Buzzett
          (1 Aug 70 - 5 Aug 70)

     Colonel John P. Cooper
          (6 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, DISCOM     Colonel Linwood B. Mather
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 725th Maint Bn     LTC Wallace H. Dawson
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 25th S&T Bn     LTC Joseph L. Van Camp
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 25th Med Bn     LTC David Arbiter
          (Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 125th Sig Bn     LTC William R. Rogers
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 6th Engr Bn     LTC Forrest T. Gay III
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 25th Avn Bn     LTC Harry W. Drotor
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 4th Bn, 9th Inf     LTC Robert W. Walsh
          (1 Aug 70 - 19 Sep 70)

     LTC Harry J. Thompson
          (20 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf     LTC Charles W. Norton
          (1 Aug 70 - 10 Aug 70)

     LTC Ralph Salucci
          (11 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 4th Bn (M), 23rd Inf     LTC Edward M. Bradford
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 27th Inf     LTC Martin Rosenstein
          (1 Aug 70 - 13 Oct 70)

     LTC Johnny J. Johnston
          (14 Oct 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf     LTC Albert P. Hodges
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf     LTC Oliver P. Combs
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf     LTC Sheppard H. Phillips
          (1 Aug 70 - 13 Aug 70)

     LTC Robert N. Martin
          (14 Aug - 25 Oct 70)

     Major David H. Davis III
          (26 Oct - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf     LTC Nathan C. Vail
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf     LTC John E. Hazelwood
          (1 Aug 70 - 5 Sep 70)

     LTC Hubert K. Bartron
          (6 Sep 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor     LTC Birtrun S. Kidwell
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav     LTC Noel D. Knotts
          (1 Aug 70 - 8 Oct 70)

     LTC Dan D. Drury
          (9 Oct 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 8th Arty     LTC David R. Hampton
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 7th Bn, 11th Arty     LTC Paul M Payson
          (1 Aug 70 - 21 Oct 70)

     LTC Benjamin E. Doty
          (22 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty     LTC Thomas Soberick
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty     LTC Thomas L. Kelly
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Adjutant General     LTC Peter H. Walker
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Division Chaplain     LTC Roy V. Peters
          (1 Aug 70 - 2 Aug 70)

     LTC Joseph P. Mulhern
          (3 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Finance Officer     Cpt Garry D. Foster
          (1 Aug 70 - 9 Aug 70)

     LTC Bobby J. Dean
          (10 Aug 70 - 31 Aug 70)

Information Officer     Maj Robert E. Kelso
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Inspector General     LTC John M. Walton
          (1 Aug 70 - 7 Sep 70)

     LTC James G. Owen
          (8 Sept 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Staff Judge Advocate     Maj Burnett H. Radosh
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Provost Marshal     LTC Clyde L. Murphy
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Division Surgeon     LTC David Arbiter
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Division Chemical Officer     LTC Robert R. Knox, Jr.
          (1 Aug 70 - 31 Oct 70)

Headquarters Commandant     Cpt A. Marc Christianson
          (1 Aug 70 - 4 Sep 70)

     Maj Daniel A. Delliese
          (5 Sep 70 - 31 Oct 70)

     C.  Intelligence:

     (1)     Summary of Enemy Activity.

     (a)     Enemy activity during the reporting period was at a lower level than in previous periods.  During the month of August, contacts were few and most unit identifications were gained from documents and Hoi Chanh.  There was a slight increase in activity in the month of September, although overall enemy activity was low compared to other reporting periods.  During the month of October, enemy levels of activity decreased to a lower level than that of August.

     (b)     Harassing, mining and booby trapping incidents together with isolated and scattered mortar/rocket attacks constituted the bulk of enemy initiated activity for the quarter.  COSVN non-divisional units located were predominantly elements of Rear Service Groups.  There were scattered identifications of COSVN Divisional units, however, these elements appeared to be preoccupied with operations inside Cambodia.

     (c)     There were numerous identifications of Sub-Regional and VC Provincial units with the most significant being the newly formed 1696 Battalion during the month of September.  The formation of this new battalion, by combining the forces of the 269 Battalion and the D16 Battalion, appeared to be in conjunction with the reconfiguration of Sub-Regions Two and Three into one region identified as the Long An Sub-Region.  Indications were that Sub-Regional units were experiencing severe difficulties in health and resupply operations and were forced to concentrate on the solution of these problems in lieu of combat operations.  It was apparent that many units were experiencing personnel and logistics problems; however, reduced activity also indicated that extensive reorganization many have taken place.

     (d)     To combat the pacification program, COSVN has emphasized local proselytizing and political indoctrination missions, and has directed main force units to operate in support of local forces.  Personnel of main force units have also been assigned to local force units to aid them in the mission of constructing a greater base of popular support.  These moves by COSVN probably are in anticipation of the redeployment of US combat elements.  After US redeployment, terrorist tactics are expected to increase and be directed primarily at local governments.  We further expect the enemy to continue to curtail main force large scale operations and concentrate on ambushes, attacks by fire, and terrorist tactics in an attempt to counter the effectiveness of the GVN Pacification Program.

     (2)     Aerial Surveillance

     (a)     During the quarter, there were 126 imagery missions flow in support of 25th Infantry Division Operations.  Coverage included most of Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia Provinces, the eastern sections of Binh Duong and Binh Long Provinces, and the northern section of Long An Province.  Extensive coverage of the Fishhook area, the Razor Backs, the Crescent, the Ho Bo Woods and the Mushroom area was also conducted.  The 126 missions included 57 Air Force and 69 Army missions, with a total of 44,348 feet of imagery.  The type systems employed included Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), Infrared (Red Haze), and Photographic imagery.

     (b)     The missions were interpreted by the Imagery Interpretation Section, 25th Military Intelligence Company, with the following significant finds:

                    20     AA/AW Positions
                    1794     Fighting Positions
                    315     Fox Holes
                    16     Mortar Positions
                    14     Trenches
                    311      Bunkers
                    36     U/G entrances
                    12     Structures
                    1     OLP
                    1     Foot Bridge

     (c)     Extensive use of hand-held photography was also included in the program this past quarter.  Hand-held photos were taken in support of Ranger Operations, and for BDA of air strikes, artillery strikes and commando vaults.  Hand-helds of the Fire Support Bases were used for defensive planning purposes.

     (4)     The interrogation Prisoner of War Section, 25th Military Intelligence Company, processed 54 detainees during the quarter.  This included 24 VCG/VC/NVA/PW, 6 returnees, 6 VCS CD's, 9 civil defendants, and 9 innocent civilians.

     (a)     For the quarter, the IPW Section developed 5 targets for field units.  Two exploitations were successful and resulted in 20 bunkers located and destroyed, two AK47 rifles and two ChiCom hand grenades captured, 125 pounds of plasma, one surgical kit, one dental kit, and miscellaneous materials and food.

     (b)     The decrease in the number of detainees during the past quarter reflected the general decline in enemy activity during the period.

     (5)     Airborne Personnel Detector (XM-3, SNIFF).

     The airborne personnel detector (sniff) continued to be a valuable method of collecting information on the location of enemy forces.  During this reporting period, there were 163 sniff missions conducted in the Division AO.  Two hundred sixty-seven additional missions were scheduled but subsequently cancelled, 129 due to unfavorable weather conditions and 138 due to aircraft priorities.  One hundred sixty-six of the targets detected were engaged with 671 rounds of artillery and all targets were entered into the intelligence data base of the Division and II Field Force, Vietnam.  Utilization figures are as follows:

     SNIFF     1ST BDE     2ND BDE     3RD BDE
UTILIZATION     Aug     Sep     Oct     Aug     Sep     Oct     Aug     Sep     Oct     Total     
No. missions     16     27     25     23     34     32     5     0     1     163
Sniff hours (TOT)     8.25     6.62     7.00     9.90     9.16     8.52     1.16     0     .16     50.77
No. missions cancelled     38     23     17     21     28     0     1     1     0     129
(weather)
No. missions cancelled     32     19     31     17     14     17     2     5     1     138
(aircraft)

     (6)     Counterintelligence activities during the quarter were extensive.  The most significant activity (Operation Starlight) was conducted from 28 Sep to 25 Oct in an effort to improve the defensive posture of Cu Chi Base Camp.  The methods employed by the counterintelligence section included covert night surveillance using starlight scopes for observation of suspected points of entrance and exit of the Base Camp, unannounced gate checks, and raids on areas of suspected illegal activity based on tips from informants.

     (7)     Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) continued to be successfully employed by the Division in both a target acquisition and intelligence role.  Sensors are located to monitor base areas, infiltration routes and areas of enemy activity.

     (a)     During the quarter, the Division implanted 292 unattended ground sensors.  The most significant implant was conducted in the Fishhook - Hump area in Cambodia.  For this operation, a method was developed to implant seismic sensors by manually dropping them from a fixed wing aircraft at 1500 feet.  The method was tested in practice drops and when the actual implant in Cambodia was conducted, a high degree of accuracy was obtained.

     (b)     A training program was started on 25 October to acquaint 10 Vietnamese personnel from the 25th ARVN Division in the operation and maintenance of the Battle Area surveillance System (BASS).  The thirty-day program consisted of 10 days of lecture, demonstration and practical exercise in general topics; 10 days each of specialized instructions and on-the-job training.

     (8)     The use of Ranger teams for long and short range ground reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition continued to be a valuable asset to the Division.  During the reporting period, the Rangers conducted 85 missions which accounted for four enemy killed, four enemy captured, 25 pounds of documents captured, 40 pounds of medical supplies captured, four weapons captured, and considerable information confirming or denying the presence of enemy activity.

     (9)     Intelligence Coordination.

     The 25th Infantry Division extended its intelligence information collection effort by conducting active liaison with units and GVN agencies operating in or adjacent to the Division's AO.  The area covered included 8 Provinces and 22 Districts.  Exchange of intelligence information was made in three ways.  Intelligence publications, particularly the INTSUM, were exchanged with 19 other Headquarters.  Division IPW and CI personnel were assigned at Chieu Hoi Centers in four provinces and at selected PIOCCS.  Finally, the operational liaison net was used for the exchange of intelligence information.

     (D)     Operations.

     (1)     Army Aviation.

     (a)     During the quarter, the 25th Aviation Battalion continued to support the Division in the conduct of Operation TOAN THANG IV.  Support hours fell within the established flying hour program for each type, model and series of aircraft.

     (b)     There have been no changes in daily aircraft requirements during this reporting period.  The battalion continued to support the 25th Infantry Division in a general support role.

     (c)     Statistical Summary of Combat Performance Data:  (1 Aug to 31 Oct 70)

     Aug     Sep     Oct     Total

Flight Hours     3625     3516     3222     10363
Sorties     7902     8058     8548     24508
Passengers Carried     15733     16060     17744     49537
Cargo Carried (Tons)     273     212     217     702
Enemy Eliminated (BC)     22     4     0     26
Enemy Eliminated (Poss)     0     0     0     0
Enemy Structures (Dest)     9     0     0     9
Enemy Structures (Dam)     2     0     0     2
Enemy Sampans (Dest)     0     0     0     0
Enemy Sampans (Dam)     0     0     0     0
Detainees     0     0     0     0
POW's     0     0     0     0

     (d)     The most significant change in the operational concept of the Division's air assets during the reporting quarter was the transfer of the Night Hawk mission from the lift company (!/25th Avn) to the special mission company (B/25th Avn).

     (2)     Engineer Operations.

     (a)     During this quarter, the majority of engineer effort was in the form of direct support of the 25th Infantry Division in combat operations.  Company A continued in direct support of the 2nd Brigade located at Dau Tieng.  Company B continued in direct support of the 2nd Brigade located at Operations Base Lynch.  Company D continued in direct support of the 3rd Brigade located at Cu Chi Base Camp.  Company C continued in general support of the 25th Infantry Division located at Cu Chi.  Company E continued in general support of the 25th Infantry Division with bridge and boat support.

     (b)     Significant Activities:

     (1)     During the reporting quarter, the 65th Engineer Battalion engaged in a wide range of combat support engineering missions.  It fought its usual battles against the torrential monsoon rains emerging victorious as all main surface roads (MSRs) and tactical roads were maintained open throughout the period.

     (2)     Company A, based at Dau Tieng in direct support of the 1st Brigade, constructed upgraded and closed numerous fire support bases as the tactical requirements demanded.  In early August, FSB Grant was completed and elements of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry and 588th Engineer Battalion claimed occupancy until mid-October when it was closed.  Work also continued at FSB Denny from the previous quarter.  Extensive work was done there throughout August and September on improving the drainage, bermline, firing positions, and interior road network.  Progress was continually hampered by heavy rainfall during the quarter.

     (3)     During August, Company A also constructed FSB Eloise and upgraded FSB Warrior, both located in War Zone C.  Upon completion of combat operations in that area, both bases were closed by the end of the quarter.  Company A in early September opened FSB Simmons and reopened FSB Jamie.  Both bases were maintained and upgraded until the end of the quarter when they were subsequently turned over to the ARVN.

     (4)     Company D continued upgrading FSB Kien and Tennessee in the 3rd Brigade's AO southeast of Dau Tieng.  At FSB Tennessee in August and September, additional berm was pushed up, fields of fire cleared, bunkers dug, and interior roads upgraded.  FSB Kien was also improved throughout the quarter.  The interior and access roads were upgraded, and low areas inside the base were raised and leveled.

     (5)     Company D's most significant activity for this quarter was the extensive road upgrade of and land clearing along LTL 14 from Dau Tieng to FSB Tennessee.  A little over 16 kms of the roadway was upgraded.  During the quarter, over 7750 loads of laterite were hauled, placed, lime stabilized, leveled and compacted.  Several coats of paneprime were then applied.  Over 1600 acres of land was cleared on both sides of the road to a distance of 200 meters.  This project was instrumental in eliminating the daily ambushes that had previously occurred along this stretch of road.  In mid-September, Company D constructed a 250 meter approach road from LTL 14 to a rafting site on the Saigon River.  On 28 September, Company C supported by Company E, constructed a 5-float reinforced raft for use there by 3rd Brigade units.  It remained operational on the Saigon River until 30 October when it was extracted by Company D and Company E.  During that time, the raft, operated by personnel from Company E, ferried 65 vehicles and was used on several night ambush patrols.  The raft was instrumental in the rapid extraction of elements from 2-34 Arm and 2-22 Inf (M) from the Ho Bo Woods.  To aid in the extraction, Company C constructed a 300 meter corduroy road in the vicinity of the raft site.

     (6)     In early August, Companies A and C did repair work on TL 4 north of FSB Barbara.  TL 4 is the only land route to FSB Denny, a Field Force Heavy Artillery base near the Fishhook sanctuary area of Cambodia.  After the beginning of September, the mission was given to Company C alone.  Work continued on TL 4 through the end of the quarter.  Extensive rock and laterite hauling was necessary to repair the 28 kms of road.  The work was made extremely difficult by heavy rains.  Sections of the road were washed away periodically, thus requiring reworking.  Over 1,000 cubic meters of rock were used - some hauled as much as 80 miles.  Company E assisted in the hauling.  It is estimated that over 12,000 man-hours and 3,000 equipment hours were expended in keeping this vital road open.

     (7)     In the 2nd Brigade's AO, Company B continued work at Operations Base Lynch and several fire support bases during the quarter.  Throughout the entire quarter, Company B continued upgrading and developing OB Lynch and several fire support bases during the quarter.  Throughout the entire quarter, Company B continued upgrading and developing OB Lynch, on which work had begun in early July.  All sections of the defensive perimeter were improved, including the berm line, fields of fire and defensive wire emplacements.  Most of the interior roads (about 4.1 kms) were upgraded with rock and lime-stabilized laterite.  Several coats of peneprime were then applied.  Company B also opened, upgraded, and maintained FSBs Louise, Hazel and Schwartz during the quarter.

     (8)     In late August, Company D began testing the use of Bangalore torpedoes in land clearing in conjunction with the land clearing and road upgrading project on TL 15.  A CEV was fitted with a special boom for emplacing the bangalore torpedoes.  The results of the testing showed that Bangalore torpedoes were a highly effective method of clearing an area of booby traps and vegetation.  The TL 15 project continued until 13 October.  A total of 7 kms of road were constructed and 5 3 acres of land cleared.  AVLB abutments were also built during this period.

     (9)     On 9 September, Company B moved a platoon from Operations Base Lynch to FSB Schwartz in preparation for upgrading 8 kms of Route 321 running past FSB Schwartz to LTL 2.  The work continued through the rest of the quarter.  Continuous rain and poor drainage resulted in slow progress.  Extensive ditching and shaping of the road was necessary.  Over 6,000 cubic meters of laterite were hauled, spread, lime stabilized, and compacted though rain often made compaction difficult.  A 200 meter access road into FSB Schwartz was also constructed.  The project was about half completed by the end of the quarter.

     (10)     Several other roads within the Division's AO were repaired as necessary.  In the first part of August, Company C emplaced several culverts on LTL 19 totaling 180 feet.  Company A upgraded a section of Route 246 at about the same time.  In early September, Company D upgraded a stretch of TL 6A.

     (11)     On 6 August, Company E provided an AVLB bridge on LTL 13 in support of a land clearing operation which was initiated the previous quarter.  The AVLB remained with the land clearing team until completion of the project (16 August) and was emplaced and extracted a total of 12 times.  In late September, 1 38' 4” dry span was constructed by Company A and airlifted to a site on LTL 13.  One week later, it was extracted.  Company A also repaired approximately 5 kilometers of LTL 13 and installed several culverts.

     (12)     The most significant bridging operation for the quarter was accomplished by Company A, supported by Company E.  On 10 October, Company E transported ten 18' 4” dry spans to Dau Tieng.  There, Company A and Company E assembled the spans which on 11 October were airlifted with a CH54 Skycrane from Dau tieng to LTL 13 near FSB Grant to assist in the extraction of elements of the 62nd Engineer Battalion, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry and the 588th Engineer Battalion.  After the mission was completed, the dry spans were extracted and returned to Dau Tieng.  On 27 October, Company A assembled two 38' 4” dry spans which were airlifted and emplaced on TL 4 for the insertion of II FF Artillery units from Katum.

     (13)     In mid-October as part of the Battalion's Civic Action Program, Company C began land clearing in a deserted village south of Trang Bang.  The area was found to be booby trapped and had an extensive network of tunnels.  Company C cleared approximately 350 acres of land and detected and detonated 18 mines and booby traps.  During the same period, Company D was working on a Refugee Camp south of Cu Chi.  Some land clearing was done, a culvert was emplaced, and two water towers were built.  As the quarter closed, the Battalion was also working on plans for a Province hospital at Bao Trai.

     (14)     In addition to its other missions, each company worked to improve its respective base camp and company area whenever possible.  Company C completed the major portion of the Division Sports Area, including the Division Boxing Arena.  The bunker line was improved and areas subject to flooding were elevated.  At Dau Tien Base Camp, Company A worked on improving the interior roads and helipads.  A convoy holding area was also created by leveling an area and covering it with rock and lime stabilized laterite.  At OB Lynch, Company B located and set up a new water point, constructed a defensive position around it and upgraded the road to it.

     (15)     The most significant unit move during the quarter was Company B's relocation from OB Lynch to Camp Frenzell Jones located in the Long Binh support area complex.  The move was completed on 23 October.  By the end of the quarter, OB Lynch had shrunk to the size of an artillery base.

     (16)     On 16 September, a 45-day land clearing operation was initiated by the 984th Land Clearing company of the 62nd Engineer Battalion.  The area cleared was located in the 3rd Brigade's AO in the Trapezoid southeast of Dau Tieng.  Company D was responsible for coordination of logistic support required by the land clearing team, advice on trafficability of the area being cleared, and maintenance of all access roads required by the team's movement.

     (c)     Water Production for the quarter was as follows:

     Location     August     September     October  

     Cu Chi     800,400          (turned over to PA&E on 29 Aug)
     OB Lynch          107,966     140,330     125,000
     FSB Warrior     8,300     21,800        -----    
     FSB Kien          56,000     175l,350     150,000
     FSB Tennessee            -----       12,825       10,000

     Monthly Totals     972,666     350,305       285,000

Total production for the quarter:  1,607,971 gallons.

     (3)     Artillery Operations.

     (a)     During the reporting period, the 25th Division Artillery performed its primary mission of providing direct and general support to maneuver battalions of the 25th Infantry Division.  At the beginning of the period, the Division had returned recently from Cambodia and had assumed a Wet Weather Season posture.  Tactical operations during the period were characterized by small unit actions in the Division's AO, which stretched from the Cambodian border to the Xuan Loc area.  Artillery made relatively few moves, providing the required support from dispersed fire support bases.  There were a number of self-defense fire support bases occupied by Division Artillery units during this period.  This conserved combat power by releasing maneuver battalions from defensive missions in an around these self-defense fire support bases.  At the end of the period, Division Artillery had begun to stand down in preparation for withdrawal of the 25th Infantry Division (less 2nd Brigade) from the Republic of Vietnam.

     (b)     Organization for combat.

          7-11 Artillery, DS 1st Brigade
          1-8 Artillery, DS 2nd Brigade
          2-77 Artillery, DS 3rd Brigade
          3-13 Artillery, GS 25th Infantry Division

     (c)     2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

     During the first part of the period, the battalion continued to support the 3rd Brigade in the western sector of the Division's AO.  The battalion CP remained at Cu Chi Base Camp.  Because of a slowdown in enemy activity, the majority of support was in the firing of intelligence targets in an effort to deny the enemy communication-liaison routes and staging and base camp areas.  An increase in the coordination with ARVN artillery units to effect coverage of some maneuver elements out of range of US artillery was effected because of the extent of the area that had to be supported.  Reductions in ASR combined with decreased activity resulted in the expenditures of 24,740 rounds for the reporting period.

     (b)     3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery

     The battalion continued to support the division in general support and reinforcing missions.  There were 5 battery moves during the period.  On 28 October, the battalion assumed the responsibility of clearance of fires in the 1st Brigade AO and for Dau Tieng Artillery AASWCC from the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery.  The primary difference in battalion operations during this period was the policy of keeping firing batteries intact as opposed to the previously used method of gaining greater coverage by splitting batteries.  This was made possible by greater coordination and use of ARVN artillery in the Division area and the decrease in enemy activity.  It was also necessitated by the Wet Weather Season posture.  Total expenditures during the period were 18,724 rounds.

     (c)     7th Battalion, 11th Artillery

     Enemy activity decreased rapidly during the period and the battalion organization for combat remained relatively stable during this time.  There were sporadic indirect fire attacks on the battalion headquarters and 1st brigade units at Dau Tieng Base Camp.  The battalion experienced 13 battery moves during the quarter.  During October, the battalion received notification that stand-down operations would begin near the end of the month.  On 24 October, HHB/7-11 Arty moved from Dau Tieng to Camp Frenzell Jones to initiate the battalion stand-down.  On 26 October, B Battery stood down and was moved by airlift to Dau Tieng and then moved by road to Camp Frenzell Jones on 27 October.  A Battery was airlifted to Dau Tieng on 27 October and then moved by road to Camp Frenzell Jones on 28 October.  C Battery was airlifted to Dau Tieng on 28 October and then moved by road to Camp Frenzell Jones on 28 October.  The three vacated fire support bases were turned over to ARVN forces, including all structures, fortifications and ammunition on hand except for ICM ammunition.  The total amount of ammunition turned over to the ARVN forces was 1,852 rounds.  The battalion expended 16,463 rounds during the period.

     (d)     1st Battalion, 8th Artillery

     The battalion continued its direct support mission to the 2nd Brigade.  On 23 October, the battalion CP moved from OB Lynch to Xuan Loc and the battalion rear moved to Camp Frenzell Jones.  During the reporting quarter, the battalion supported 35 contacts with enemy forces and was credited with three enemy KIA (BC).  There were two attacks on fire support bases during the quarter.  On 3 October, A Battery received one RPG round and six 60mm mortar rounds, all landing outside the berm and causing no damage or casualties.  On 23 October, C Battery received small arms fire resulting in one US soldier wounded.  There were five battery moves during the quarter.  Total expenditures during the quarter totaled 14,387 rounds.

     E.     Logistics.         
     (1)     The 25th Infantry Division Support Command continued to provide division-level combat service support to all divisional and several non-divisional units in the AO.  Because of the reduction of troop strength in Vietnam as part of the Vietnamization program, changes were made in disposition of troop units within the Division's AO.  This necessitated adjustments in DISCOM's support operations and the location of supporting units and facilities.  The following are highlights of these changes.

     (a)     On 15 September, the Division assumed responsibility for operations in the Nhon Trach area southeast of Saigon.  To support this increase, forward supply maintenance and medical elements were established at Bearcat Base Camp.

     (b)     On 15 September, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry was assigned to the Division and became OPCON to the 2nd Brigade operating in the Xuan Loc area.  At time of assignment, the 2-3 Inf was in a stand-down status with 85% of its equipment turned in.  The 25th supply and Transport Battalion had to re-equip this battalion by 22 September for field duty.  Support was provided without difficulty through existing Forward Support elements while operating in the field.  

     (2)     During the reporting period, a complete UP4 dispensing facility was provided at Thien Ngon to service US and VNAF aircraft supporting ARVN operations.  As US aircraft began phasing out and VNAF aircraft assumed the support mission, plans were made to turn the JP4 facility over to the 12th Aviation Battalion.

     (3)     The following are significant projects under construction by the Office of the Installation Coordinator, Cu Chi Base Camp.

     (a)     Electrical upgrade throughout the base camp.

     (b)     Construction of head wall and culverts to improve drainage.

     (c)     Construction of latrines.

     (4)     Transportation operations during the period returned to normal after the Cambodian Campaign, although there was a significant increase in USAF special mission air requests (illegible) due to units relocating about the AO.  The significant operational activities included the following:

     (a)     Support of the 1st Brigade stand-down program resulted in moving approximately 125 personnel by fixed wing aircraft every two days during the months of August and September.  Utilization of all fixed wing aircraft continued to be above 85%, with the dedicated C47A (Caribou) averaging a daily utilization of over 11 sorties, and 9,000 pounds for an 89% overall average.

     (b)     The CH47 and CH54 helicopters continued to perform yeoman duty.  Support of the 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade was required from assets allocated to the Division.  This went quite well, except on those days when other priorities overruled a portion of their requested sorties.  In these instances, ARVN declared all sorties CE, which were approved because of unfamiliarity with their actual situation.  During September, they accounted for 18 hours on CE time.  At the end of September, the joint US-ARVN CH47 Company (20th ASH Co) began sole support of the ARVN Brigade as part of the Vietnamization program.  This should eventually phase the Division out of management of this aircraft for ARVN.

     (5)     DISCOM elements participated in 298 Integrated Civic Action Programs (I-CAPS) during this period.  There were 57,415 patients treated of which 4,682 were dental.  During the reporting period, construction was begun on five two-room schools sponsored by the 25th Administration Company, 25th Supply and Transport Battalion, 725th Maintenance Battalion and 269th Aviation Battalion.

     (6)     25th Medical Battalion.

     (a)     The 25th Medical Battalion supported Division units with medical service and supplies.  In addition, non-divisional units were supported with medical supplies.

     Medical Totals:

     Patients seen:

          Disease - 4,729
          Non-battle injuries - 1,348
          IRHA - 127

     Supply and Services:

          Line items issued - 2,562
          MEDCAP line items issued - 672
          Bulk Pharmacy items issued - 3

     (b)     The 40th Medical Detachment (KJ), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided dental treatment for the Division.

     Total treatments - 19,863

     (c)     The 159th Medical Detachment (HA), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided evacuation to divisional and non-divisional units.

     Total Patients - 1,426
     Total Missions - 983
     Flying Time - not computed for the month of October
     Aircraft Availability - 100%
     Aircraft Flyable - 6 (100%)

     (d)     During this quarter, the battalion MEDCAP Program increased tremendously.  Over 40,000 Vietnamese patients were seen and treated by the Medcap Team.  A new program was also instituted whereby Vietnamese, especially children, that have lost arms or legs, were taken to the National Rehabilitation Center in Saigon and fitted for prosthesis.  The Hairlip-Cleft Palate program was also increased during this time.  Hairlip patients were taken to the Barsky Unit of the Cho Ray Hospital in addition to the 3rd field Hospital in Saigon.  The totals for the period 1 July 1970 to 30 September 1970 were 25 prosthetics and 15 hairlip-cleft palate patients.  Patients were also referred from the 2nd and 3rd Brigade Medcaps.  This was the first time that patients were obtained from Medcaps other than 2-5, DISCOM.

     (e)     An MSC Professional program was established with the 12th Evacuation Hospital.  This seminar met every Friday and topics of interest to all were discussed.

     (7)     25th Supply and Transport Battalion.

     (a)     During the last quarter, the S&T Class 1 activities issued 1,865,028 rations, 9,544 sundry packs, 510,000 gallons of ice cream and 11,851,392 pounds of ice.  The Class II & IV Yards supplied 422 major end items and had a 71.2% customer demand satisfaction rate, while the Class III activities pumped 7,067,146 gallons of POL products to supported units.

     (b)     During the period 1 August thru 31 October, S&T FSB's at Dau Tieng and Lynch issued a total of 692,890 rations, 372 sundry (illegible) and 3,367,900 pounds of ice.  The FSB's issued (illegible) gallons of fuel as well as 327 major end items to division units.

     (c)     The convoy vehicles of Company B drove a total of 288,585 miles as they transported Division supplies throughout the Division AO.

     (d)     Transportation for the Division AO.

Statistics:     Tonnage Moved     Miles Traveled     Personnel     Bulk Pol     Water
          22,867 tons     288,585 miles     40,964     1,655,240     (illegible)
                              gal     gal

     (7)     Communication.

     (a)     (entire line illegible)
providing tactical communications to the 25th Infantry Division in the Republic of Vietnam.  The Division was deployed with the Headquarters, 3rd Brigade, Division Support Command, and Division Artillery at Cu Chi Base Camp; the 1st Brigade at Dau Tieng Base Camp; 2nd Brigade at Xuan Loc; and 11th armored Cavalry Regiment at Di An.  The 125th Signal Battalion was collocated with these major units and at two relay sites, four battalion fire support bases and two liaison team sites.

     (2)     Significant events:

     (a)     On 1 August, elements of Company B moved from Tay Ninh to Dau Tieng to support the 1st Brigade.

     (b)     On 3 August, the VHF system from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh relayed through Dau Tieng was inactivated.

     (c)     On 6 August, a VHF system was installed from Dau Tieng to FSB Warrior northwest of Dau Tieng.

     (d)     On 9 August, Company B headquarters moved from Tay Ninh to Cu Chi.

     (e)     On 17 August, a VHF system was installed between Cu Chi and Di An to support the stand down of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

     (f)     On 22 August, a VHF system from Dau Tieng to Katum was inactivated and the personnel and equipment returned to Company B at Cu Chi.

     (g)     On 22 August, FSB Denny was closed and a VHF system from Dau Tieng to FSB Denny was inactivated with personnel and equipment returned to Company B at Cu Chi.

     (h)     On 26 August, a VHF system was established between Dau Tieng and Ben Cui to support the field CP of the 3/4 Cav.

     (i)     On 7 September, Company A supported a 3rd Brigade CPX with a VHF system from Cu Chi to FSB Tennessee.  The system was inactivated upon the termination of the CPX on 10 September.

     (j)     On 8 September, the Cu Chi to Tan An VHF system relayed through Du Hoa was inactivated as elements of the 9th Infantry Division moved to Di An for stand down.

     (k)     On 13 September, an attempt was made to relocate the Thien Ngon to Cu Chi relay from Nui Ba Den to Go Dau Ha but after 10 days of futile attempts, the relay was discontinued.
     (l)     On 14 September, a VHF system was established between Cu Chi and Di An to provide communications between the 25th Infantry Division and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

     (m)     On 16 September, the VHF system between OB Lynch and FSB Tomahawk was inactivated.  The four-channel terminal at FSB Tomahawk was moved to Xuan Loc to provide communication between 2nd Brigade Main and 2nd Brigade Rear.

     (n)     On 22 September, the Cu Chi Di An VHF system supporting the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was inactivated as that unit became OPCON to USARV for redeployment to CONUS.

     (o)     On 4 October, a VHF system was established between OB Lynch and Blackhorse in support of TF 333, a joint US-Vietnamese task force.

     (p)     On 21 October, the OB Lynch Blackhorse system was inactivated as      
TF 333 terminated its mission.

     (q)     On 23 October, the Cu Chi OB Lynch VHF system, relayed through Lon Binh, was deactivated.  The Main CP of the 2nd Brigade moved from OB Lynch to Xuan Loc.

     (r)     On 27 October, the Dau Tieng FSB Jamie VHF system was inactivated because of the movement of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry to Dau Tieng.

     (s)     On 29 October, the Battalion opened a Vietnamese school in the My Khanh Hamlet, Thai My Village, Cu Chi District.  The school was constructed by Vietnamese workers with material purchased with funds donated by the officers and men of the battalion.

     (t)     On 31 October, the Battalion donated $682.42 for the construction of a dispensary in a refugee hamlet in Tan An Hoi Village, Cu Chi District.

     G.     Materiel.

     (1)     The 725th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts and supply to the 25th Infantry Division.  Production continued well above the pre-Cambodian level, with over 13,500 pieces of equipment repaired.  The following are the number of pieces on which maintenance was performed during the quarter:

                    Aug     Sep     Oct
     Wheel          208     219     250
     Tanks and Tracks     184     210     159
     Armament     1,042     677     1,159
     Artillery          84     83     78
     Engineer Equipment     24     23     15
     Generators     111     109     115
     Commel          2,234     2,190     2,926
     Office Machines     162     122     141
     Aircraft          157     164     146
     Aircraft Components     161     199     179
     Refrigeration Equipment     21     17     13
     Other             100         95          89

     Totals          4,488     4,108     5,270

     (2)     During the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1971, the 725th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide effective direct support maintenance and class IX supply support to the 25th Infantry Division and designated OPCON units.  Support realignment for the 2nd Brigade was effected following the move to OB Lynch, with Company C replacing Company D and moving from Cu Chi to Xuan Loc.  The majority of support was provided from that location; and in addition, a forward support detachment was established at OB Lynch.  Following these actions, the 725th Maintenance Battalion had units at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, Dau Tieng, Xuan Loc and OB Lynch.  The widely scattered locations presented pressing repair parts, supply and transportation problems which severely taxed the organic assets.  To alleviate back-hauling problems, Company C was established as a direct customer of Long Binh Depot.  This action immeasurably assisted both A and C Company technical supply activities, while providing faster, more efficient customer support.

     (3)     Particularly noteworthy was the 725th Maintenance Battalion's management of selected maintenance significant Class VII end-items.  Measurable improvement was noted in the already high availability of M551 assault vehicles and 5-ton trucks, with little change in the other record setting availability rates.  To further improve material readiness, a selective management for all wheel vehicles was initiated and was immediately successful in focusing attention on problem areas and effecting their prompt resolution.  During this period, the 725th Maint Bn also established a new equipment backlog low of 97 items dead-lined for direct support or higher level maintenance, while the 25th Infantry Division continued to lead USARV in equipment availability.

     H.     Revolutionary Development/Pacification

     (1)     Hamlet Evaluation System Changes during the quarter:

Province          Month     A     B     C     D     E     V     N     Total

Tay Ninh          Jun     8     105     6     0     0     0     1     120
               Sep     10     104          5     0     0     0     1     120
          Net Change     +2     -1     -1     0     0     0     0     

Binh Duong          Jun     2     115     13     4     0     0     0     134
               Sep     20     107     6     1     0     0     0     134
          Net Change     +18     -8     -7     -3     0     0     0     

Hau Nghia          Jun     2     58     59     17     0     0     0     136
               Sep     3     88     38     7     0     0     0     136
          Net Change     +1     +30     -21     -10     0     0     0

Bien Hoa          Jun     28     118     28     22     0     0     0     196
               Sep     20     133     24     19     0     0     0     196
          Net Change     -8     +15     -4     -3     0     0     0

Long An          Jun     0     251     113     19     2     0     0     385
               Sep     3     289     85     6     2     0     0     385
          Net Change     +3     +38     -28     -13     0     0     0

Long Khanh     Jun     6     69     18     2     0     0     0     95
               Sep     11     56     28     0     0     0     0     95
          Net Change     +5     -13     +10     -2     0     0     0

Phuoc Tuy          Jun     4     73     12     17     0     0     0     106
               Sep     4     90     12     0     0     0     0     106
          Net Change     0     +17     0     -17     0     0     0     

Total               Jun     50     789     249     81     2     0     1     1172
               Sep     71     867     198     33     2     0     1     1172
          Net Change     +21     +78     -51     -48     0     0     0     

     I.     Civic Action.

     (1)     During the period 1 August thru 31October, 10,274 man days were contributed by elements of the 25th Infantry division to civic action projects and 3,938,123 $VN worth of supplies were donated.

     (2)     During the three-month period, the following were expended on (illegible) civic action programs:

               Programs     Man Days     Cost

     Economic Development     13     10,000  $VN
     Education          322     128,130  $VN
     Social Welfare     629     1,389,236  $VN
     Transportation     804     2,418,480  $VN
     Refugee Asst Support     847     106,200  $VN

     (3)     Solatium was paid in the amount of 135,827 $VN.

     (4)     The following  MILCAP Operations were conducted:

                    MEDCAP     ICAP     NITECAP     PATIENTS
     August          260     203     5     74,154
     September     172     172     7     31,000     
     October          114     113     4     29,208

     J.     Psychological Operations.

     (1)     During the months of August, September and October, three major Psychological Operations Campaigns were carried out.  The first, beginning in late September, exploited several reports that the 274th Regiment was extremely low in food supplies.  Utilizing II FFORCEV aircraft for dissemination, approximately 1 million leaflets were dropped over a three week period exploiting the enemy weaknesses.  In early October, a campaign was implemented in Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province aimed at countering suspected enemy propaganda.  The basis for the enemy campaign was the redeployment of the 2-47 Inf (M) from Nhon Trach.  The enemy's attempt to convince the local populace that the allied forces were gone for good was thwarted by the subsequent deployment of the 1-5 Inf (M) into Nhon Trach.  This also gave the PSYSOPS Branch an opportunity to damage the enemy's credibility and gain further support for the GVN by proper exploitation of the situation.  The third and largest of the campaigns began in late October, targeting all enemy units and sympathizers in Sub-Region 1.  Leaflets and tapes exploiting all available intelligence on both main and local force units were produced in conjunction with an intensive pro-GVN campaign in locations of suspected enemy sympathizers.

     (2)     During the campaigns, several leaflets and tapes exploiting information received from Hoi Chanh, prisoners-of-war and intelligence reports were analyzed.  These generally were processed and implemented on a Quick Reaction basis to take advantage of changes in the enemy situation or location.

     (3)     In support of civic action projects, ground broadcast teams accompanied numerous MEDCAPS, broadcasting information on public health subjects and current events along with pro-GVN broadcasts.

     (4)     Total broadcasts and leaflet distributions were as follows:

               Loudspeaker Broadcast     Leaflet Distribution     
               Hours                    
               Aerial     Ground     Aerial     Ground
August          90     297     2,364,830     8,299,880
September          60     178     2,322,000     585,530
October          35     417     1,935,900     425,900

2.     (C)     Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

     A.     Personnel.  None

     B.     Intelligence.

     (1)     Local Nationals.

     (a)     Observation:  Local civilians often are quite knowledgeable as to the location of enemy mines, bunkers, etc.

     (b)     Evaluation:  During engineer operations, little effort was made by qualified personnel to exploit this source of information.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Major operations, even at company level, should be preceded by intensive effort by the S-2, utilizing attached Vietnamese personnel or local allies, to obtain maximum intelligence on locations of enemy mines, booby traps, and ambushes.  Often this can be encouraged by engineer assistance with local problems of high importance to the people but which require little expenditure of troop time or effort to solve the problem.

     (2)     Counterintelligence Operations.

     (a)     Observation:  The use of the starlight scope for observation was successfully employed in a non-tactical role.

     (b)     Evaluation:  This method of surveillance markedly improved the defensive posture of the base camp.  Freedom of access to Cu Chi Base Camp has thus been denied to many who have reaped profitable benefits from unauthorized access, in the recent past.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The use of night surveillance equipment proved valuable in denying entry and access to Cu Chi Base Camp by illegal and unauthorized personnel.

Unattended Ground Sensor Operations.
     (a)     Observation:  To employ ground sensors in Cambodia, it was necessary to implant the sensors with aerial delivery means.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The mission was intricately planned and two practice drops were accomplished.  The actual implant was completed with a high degree of accuracy.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Unattended ground sensors can be accurately and effectively implanted using a slow-flying (80 knots) fixed wing aircraft at 1500 feet altitude.

     C.     Operations.

     (1)     Problems Encountered During the conduct of Combined Ambush Patrols.

     (a)     Observation:  During the conduct of combined ambush patrols, RF/PF personnel often detected enemy personnel before US personnel in the ambush.  This led to engagement before the entire patrol was alerted and oriented on the target.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Premature engagement of the enemy prior to the entire patrol being alerted and oriented on the target allowed enemy elements to escape ambush sites and resulted in friendly troops becoming casualties unnecessarily.

     (c)     Recommendation:  A simple and effective technique of fire control must be established during ambush patrol planning and must be enforced during the actual conduct of the ambush.  Combined ambushes should be integrated to the point of placing an RF/PF soldier between two US soldiers, and vice versa.  This action will tend to build confidence and friendship between the two and help preclude incidents.  In addition, all personnel participating in the ambush patrol should know what assets are available for reinforcement and the proper method of obtaining them for utilization.

     (2)     Actions Taken After Ambush Patrols are Engaged.

     (a)     Observation:  Invariably after a contact on an ambush patrol, the area of contact was searched immediately, the patrol was reinforced or relocated.  In many instances, this action was not necessary because of the size and disposition of the enemy elements.  Generally, a small and well equipped ambush patrol can handle most situations.

     (b)     Evaluation:  In some situations, it was tactically more feasible for the ambush patrol to remain in place, keeping the area of contact under surveillance, especially if the patrol has a kill, anticipating the enemy's return to the area to recover the body.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Depending on the tactical situation, the ambush patrol leader, when feasible, should remain at the site of a contact in order to engage any enemy returning to recover bodies.

     (3)     Stay Behind Ambush of Resupply Points and Trash Sumps.

     (a)     Observation:  During the reporting quarter, three stay behind ambushes of 12 men each were left by the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry at resupply points after the main body departed the area.  Nine enemy KIA's (BC) were confirmed without a friendly casualty during these incidents.

     (b)     Evaluation:  due to the resupply problems that the enemy is encountering, he was hungry enough to risk detection by searching trash sumps located at friendly resupply points in field locations after US departure.  The enemy was aware of US methods of resupply and the weakness of US soldiers in police of resupply and NDP locations.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Well planned, properly positioned, and heavily armed stay behind ambushes should be occasionally employed on resupply points and trash sumps.  This should deter the enemy in utilizing US forces as a method of local resupply.  All US units should be oriented on this fact and command emphasis should be placed on insuring that all positions which US units depart are properly policed for anything of value which the enemy might utilize.

     (4)     Ambushes.

     (a)     Observation:  Combinations of mounted, dismounted and mechanical ambushes deterred VC/NVA use of mines and infiltration routes across Highway 19 and infiltration routes in the Crescent and areas west of the Crescent.

     (b)     Evaluation:  During August 1970, Highway 19 was utilized as part of the convoy route between Cu Chi and Dau Tieng.  The combinations as mentioned were used at critical points such as culvert sites and previously mined areas.  Mounted ambushes along this route could be heard and often seen by the enemy and, therefore, were blocking positions.  Mechanical ambushes materially extended the area controlled.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The tactic of combining mounted, dismounted and mechanical ambushes should be used to extend combat units and to deter enemy infiltration.

     (5)     Enemy Use of B40 and RPG Weapons.

     (a)     Observation:  The enemy has developed considerable skill in the firing of B40 and RPG-7 rounds into the crown of trees above friendly troops and then withdrawing without further engagement.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The resulting tree burst from the B40 and/or RPG-7 rounds inflict maximum casualties to the troops who are afforded no overhead cover.  The danger of this technique is considerably greater than the flat trajectory fire since the bursting radius covers a considerably larger area.

     (c)     Recommendation:  That all personnel, to include veterans and replacements, be required to participate in a continuous training program designed to stress noise and light discipline as well as proper troop dispersal and maximum utilization of natural cover.  Basic tactics and combat techniques should be stressed to unit leaders at each level.  Consideration should be given utilizing a small cover fence to guard entrances to night defensive positions.  Ambushes that go into position before nightfall should be displaced approximately 100 meters under the cover of darkness.

     (6)     Mine Detection.

     (a)     Observation:  The enemy was making more and better use of mines which have no metal parts closer than 18 inches to the surface and therefore were not detectable with standard metallic mine detectors.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Bamboo pressure rods were very effective in initiating firing devices located at the bottom of plastic explosives kept intact by the earthen walls of a hold dug into the roadway.  The mine was very effective because it could take any shape and was not detectable with standard mine detectors.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Non-metallic mine detectors should be issued to engineer troops to be used in conjunction with standard mine detectors.

     (7)     Use of the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV).

     (a)     Observation:  The CEV has not been efficiently employed in combat support missions in the Republic of Vietnam.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Because of the terrain and type of warfare presently employed in Vietnam, the CEV has rarely been used for missions it was designed to perform.  Certain uses for which the CEV was not designed such as pushing up berms and heavy dozing, “busting” roads and trails, clearing jungle and close-in direct fire weapon (165mm gun) have caused significant damage to the CEV, its engine and transmission.

     (c)     Recommendation:  A concerted effort should be made to employ the CEV on missions it was designed to perform, or associated tasks within its capabilities.  Some effective and novel uses were initiated during the quarter such as emplacing bangalore torpedoes for clearing heavily booby trapped areas and pushing a mine roller down a road in order to detonate anti-tank mines in the road.  In the latter method, when the mine-roller hit a mine, the damaged rollers were replaced immediately and the CEV-mine-roller was ready for clearing in about one or two hours.

     (8) Airlifting Equipment with CH54 Skycrane Helicpoter.

     (a)     Observation:  When airlifting Case 490 dozers or other equipment, it was found that a large amount of static electricity drained off the Skycrane.

     (b)     Evalution:  The large amount of static electricity can cause injury to the person hooking up the dozer or other equipment if he is not properly grounded.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The person who is to hook up the equipment to the Skycrane should be made aware of the fact that the lifting cable should be grounded before he attempts to hook the equipment to it.

     (9)     Utilization of Night Hawk in Conjunction with Attack Helicopters.

     (a)     Observation:  The night hawk mission is normally flown without a gunship escort, thus being denied protection or the ability to actively engage targets of opportunity.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The night hawk aircraft has greatly enhanced the operation of the night attack team by flying at lower altitudes with increased capabilities for acquiring targets.  The night hawk and gunship combination has proven to be very effective on numerous occasions.  Without gunship escort, the night hawk aircraft must fly at higher altitudes for its own protection, thus reducing the effectiveness of the searchlight.  The aircraft is armed only with a mini-gun and M-60 machine gun and is therefore incapable of effectively performing an offensive role against anti-aircraft fire.  Should the night hawk aircraft discover targets of opportunity, which is its primary mission, there is no reaction force immediately available for engaging these targets.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The night hawk aircraft should be provided gunship escort using a single aircraft as a minimum.  This would not only provide a defense, but also an immediate offensive reaction force to fully accomplish the purpose of the mission.

     (10)     GVN Officials Participation on Missions.

     (a)     Observation:  The District Chief at Cu Chi City has flown in an aircraft on several occasions to provide immediate political clearance to fire in support of indigenous forces.

     (b)     Evaluation:  RF and PF forces are being required to provide a continual increase of support for villages and hamlets as part of the Vietnamization program.  In the event of an enemy attack, helicopter medical evacuation and aerial support are often required.  Extensive delays in providing support have been eliminated by the District Chief as he has provided rules of engagement and immediate political clearance while airborne, thus denying the enemy an opportunity to escape.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The use of this tactic should be expanded for use by province and district chiefs in other areas as this is a prime example of cooperation by GVN and US forces utilized in the Vietnamization program.

     (11)     The Use of Continuous Teletype Scroll as a working Tactical SOP.

     (a)     Observation:  Preparation of Brigade Tactical (TAC) SOP's are time consuming in preparation and often obsolete when published or too general to be helpful.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The preparation of a workable TAC SOP at Brigade level is a very extensive operation with the end result often obsolete upon completion.  The 3rd Brigade utilized the teletype to prepare a current and workable SOP.  By saving the tapes for policy messages (both brigade and high headquarters) such as mechanical ambush policy, use of gunships, medevac procedures, convoy regulations and current mission statements, the brigade can present to the battalion a workable document.  The tapes are run consecutively and within a single scroll of messages, a new OPCON battalion can be presented with current guidance.  Also, as portions become obsolete, the tape can be modified to only include pertinent information.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The teletype method of compiling a current and workable TAC SOP should be considered for brigade SOP's.

     D.     Organization.  None.

     E.     Training.

     (1)     Integrated Safety and Standardization Program.

     (a)     Observation:  The collective concerted efforts by standardization instructor pilots and aviation safety officers within the 25th Aviation Battalion have resulted in a significant decrease in aircraft accidents and incidents.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The combining of the battalion aviation safety section with standardization and training has been instrumental in the reduction of aircraft accidents by 67.4% from the Fiscal Year (FY) 1970 accident rate.  Working closely with the commander, safety officers and standardization pilots prepared and presented classes covering accident/incident causatives as well as in-flight emergencies.  Additional emphasis was also placed on practical application of countering these causatives during daily missions and on dealing with in-flight emergencies during standardization rides.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Aviation units should consider integration of aviation safety and standardization and training programs.

     (2)     Training Small Unit Leaders.

     (a)     Observation:  The utilization of “shotgun” ambushes and saturating the area of operations with maximum ambush positions required a greater number of well trained small unit leaders than normal operations.

     (b)     Evaluation:  In order for ambushes consisting of 6-10 personnel to be successful, a special training program must be conducted to insure that all unit leaders are well trained down to and including the team leader level.

     (c)     Recommendation:  Companies should insure that all small unit leaders receive special instructions on subjects as required to make them well rounded combat leaders.  Critiques and “lessons learned” topics should be presented on a recurring basis.  Special training subjects for emphasis should include, but not be limited to, map reading, basic tactics, communications procedures, troop leading steps, mechanical ambush techniques, adjustment of artillery and field expedient antennas.

     F.     Logistics.

     (1)     Storage of Calcium Hypochlorite (Chlorine for Water Purification).

     (a)     Observation:  Two fires resulting from this chemical broke out during the quarter, one in a storage area, the other in a water purification unit in transit.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Calcium Hypochlorite heats up when it comes in contact with even small amounts of moisture.  It is issued in two types of containers, plastic bottles and metal cans.  The plastic bottles tend to age and crack.  The metal cans tend to rust and are not designed for easy resealing.

     (c)     Recommendation:  The chemical should be stored in a moisture proof storage area, elevated if possible.  Only one container should be used at a time, and it should be used until it is empty.  The storage area should be inspected frequently.

     G.     Communications.  None

     H.     Materiel.  None

     I.     Other.

     (1)     Requirements for XM-35 Stand-Off Capability versus Maintenance Man Hours.

     (a)     Observation:  The stand off capability of the XM 35 armament sub-system has not been required.  There has been a drastic increase in man hours required to perform maintenance on the aircraft and the XM-35 since installment to provide a fully operational aircraft.

     (b)     Evaluation:  The need for a stand off capability employing the XM-35 armament sub-system's effective range of 2500 meters against large antiaircraft weapons has not been evidenced since the weapon was installed.  Numerous problems have been encountered as a result of firing the XM-35 systems which have required extensive maintenance to be performed to return the aircraft to a fully operational status.  As much as 48 man hours have been required to resolve a weapons stoppage.  The aircraft was non-operational for two weeks awaiting replacement of a gun drive motor.  An additional five man hours per 1000 rounds fired is required due to the shocking force reacting on the Stability Control Augmentation System (SCAS).

     (c)     Recommendation:  The XM-35 system should be removed as its full capabilities have not been required and there is extensive down-time required for maintenance thus reducing aircraft availability.

     (2)     Inadequate Safety Margins in Hasty Landing Zones.

     (a)     Observation:  Aviators are being required to land in hasty landing zones that are small and do not provide adequate safety margins.

     (b)     Evaluation:  Tree strikes are the most common cause of aircraft incidents as revealed by USARV statistics.  There are various causes such as low level flying and inadequate clearance in landing zones.  The most prevalent cause is tree strikes on approach or take-off from hasty landing zones.  This partly the fault of the aviator for not maintaining adequate clearance; however some of the blame must be placed on ground commanders for not preparing adequate landing zones.  Helicopters were not designed to carry maximum loads into areas requiring vertical descent and, unfortunately, ground commanders are generally not well informed on aviation employment and limitations.

     (c)     Recommendation:  There must be continual emphasis on confined area operation for both the aviator and the ground commander.  Flight procedure must be reviewed by the aviator as well as more effort devoted by the ground commander to provide adequate landing zones.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Inclosures                                   /s/  T. J. Hanifen
1.     Troop List                                   T. J. HANIFEN
2.     Changes in Task Organization
3.     Enemy Main Force Unit Identifi-
     cations
4.     Combat After Action Interview Report
     (Crescent)
5.     Commander's Combat Notes
     (Use of Bangalore Torpedoes)
6.     Commander's Combat Notes
     (VC Anti-Tank Mine)
7.     Commander's Combat Notes
     (Employment of Riot Control Agent CS)
AVFBC-RE (Undated) 1st Ind
SUBJECT:     Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 25th Infantry Division, for
               Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, II Field force Vietnam, APO 96266

THRU:     Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN:  AVHDO-D), APO 96375

          Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN:  GPOP-DT,APO 96538

TO:     Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
          Washington, D.C. 20310

1.     (U)     This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters 25th Infantry Division.

2.     (C)     Comments follow:

     a.     Reference item concerning “Unattended Ground Sensor Operations,” page 48, paragraph 2B(3), concur.  This headquarters worked closely with the 25th Infantry Division units during emplacement of ground sensors in Cambodia and found their method of aerial implantation to be most successful and highly accurate.

     b.     Reference item concerning “Mine Detection”, page 51, paragraph 2C(6); concur.  The portable metallic and non-metallic mine detector (AN/PRS-7) is being introduced into the theater.  Training with this detector will be completed by units in MR 3 by 31 December 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



                                        /s/ W. C. Bartel, Jr.
                                        W. C. BARTEL, JR.
                                        CPT, AGC
                                        Asst AG
AVHDO-DO (Undated) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT:     Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division, Period
               Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO:     Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN:  GPOP-DT,
     APO 96558

1.     This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2.     Comments follow:
     a.     Reference item concerning “Mine Detection,” page 51, paragraph 2C(6) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b:  concur.  Approximately 290 AN/PRS-7 mine detectors are in-country to date and 150 more are due in.  Thirty-five percent have been issued and the remainder will be issued pending receipt of additional batteries.  Engineer units were trained prior to 1 January 1971 by a representative from Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia.  Other units will receive training from the Engineers.  No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.  Unit has been so advised.

     b.     Reference item concerning “Airlifting Equipment with CH-54 Skycrane Helicopter,” page 51, paragraph 2C(8):  concur.  Information sheets concerning static electricity are provided each supported unit by the supporting CH-54 unit.  Procedures recommended are:

     (1)     The person to hook the equipment to the CH-54 must wear heavy gloves.

     (2)     The equipment to be lifted must be grounded by connecting it to a ground rod and with an attached second rod the CH-54 is touched to the equipment to be lifted to discharge the static electricity prior to the hookup man touching either.

No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.  Unit has been so advised.

     c.     Reference item concerning “Utilization of Night Hawk in Conjunction with Attack Helicopters,” page 52, paragraph 2C(9).  The desirability of having gunship escort for each night hawk mission is recognized; however, these assets belong to the military region commander and it is his decision whether or not to provide gunship support.  Unit has been so advised.

     d.     Reference item concerning “Storage of Calcium HGypochlorite (Chlorine for Water Purification),” page 54, Paragraph 2F(1).  Recommendation is in line with storage specifications required by GSA.  Calcium Hyprochlorite is packed in either 100 pound drums or 3-3/4 pound containers. Contact with GSA representative confirms that item should be stored in cool dry area away from fire hazard and oxidizable materials.  Item should also be inspected frequently to detect any possible leakage in packing container.  Prime concern is to prevent the contents from coming in contact with moisture because it will heat up.  Unit has been so advised.

     e.     Reference item concerning “Requirements for XM-35 Stand-off Capability versus Maintenance Man Hours,” page 54, paragraph 2I(1).  The need for the XM-35 armament subsystem in RVN has previously been determined.  As with any new system which is introduced into a combat theater there has been problems associated with it.  The environment in which this unit operated during the reporting period negated the use of the XM-35 subsystem.  However, lack of use during a short time in a particular locale is not sufficient rationale for removal of these subsystems.  No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.  Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

                                        /s/ Clark W. Stevens Jr.
                                        Clark W. Stevens, Jr.
                                        Captain AGC
                                        Assistant Adjutant General
Cy furn:
II FFORCEV
25th Inf Div

GPOP-DT (undtd) 3rd Ind (U)
SUBJECT:     Operational Report of HQ, 25th Infantry Division, for Period Ending
               31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2_

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO:     Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
     Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


                                   /s/ L. M. Clancy
                                   L. M. CLANCY
                                   CPT, AGC
                                   Asst AG
(Incl 1)
TROOP LIST
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

                                             AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970

I.     ORGANIC

     a.     Command & Control Elements
               HHC, 25th Inf Div
               HHC, 1st Brigade
               HHC, 2nd Brigade
               HHC, 3rd Brigade
     b.     Combat Elements
               3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry

     c.     Combat Support Elements
               HHB, 2th Inf Div Arty
               1st Bn, 8th Arty
               7th Bn, 11th Arty
               3rd Bn, 13th Arty
               2nd Bn, 77th Arty
               25th MP Company
               25th Aviation Battalion
               65th Engineer Battalion
               125th Signal Battalion

     d.     Combat System Support Elements
               HHA & Band, 26th Dis Spt Cmd
               25th Admin Company
               l26th Med Battalion
               25th S&T Battalion
               725th Maintenance

II.     ASSIGNED

     a.     Command and Control Elements.  None

     b.     Combat Elements
               1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf
               4th Bn, 9th Inf
               2nd Bn, (illegible)
               2nd Bn, 14th Inf
               2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf
               3rd Bn, 22nd Inf
               4th Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf
               1st Bn, 24th Inf
               2nd Bn, 24th Inf
               2nd Bn, (illegible) Armor
               Co F Rgr (illegible) Inf
               2nd Bn, 3rd Inf (illegible)

     c.     Combat Support Elements
               9th Chemical Det
               38th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
               44th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
               46th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
               66th Inf  Plt (illegible)
               265th FA Arty Det (Radar)

     d.     Combat Service Support Elements
               15TH Public Information Det
               18th Military History Det
               20th Public Information Det
               25th Military Intelligence Company

III.     ATTACHED

     a.     Command & Control Elements     None

     b.     Combat Elements
               (illegible)

     c.     Combat Support Elements
               Btry B, (illegible) Bn, 2nd Arty
               Btry (illegible), 29th Arty, (illegible)
               (illegible)
               169th Medical Det, Helicopter Ambulance
               268th FA Det, Radar CM
               (illegible)
               (illegible)

     d.     Combat (illegible) Support Elements
               (illegible) Weather Sqdn Det (USAF)
               (illegible) AA (illegible) Civic Affairs Company
               (illegible) Preventive Med Det
               (illegible) Med Det
               (illegible)
               USA Special Security Det
               (illegible) Radio (illegible) company

IV.     OPERATIONAL CONTROL

     3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division
     (illegible) Armored Cavalry Regiment (M)

V.     DIRECT SUPPORT

     4TH Med Det
     Co B, 36th Signal Battalion
     53rd Signal Det
     61st Trans Det
     86th Hq Co sig Bn Support
     94th Co Maint Bn Support
     116th Assault Helicopter Co
     242nd Assault Helicopter Co
     277th Bn Resupply Service
     283rd Sig Det
     325th Weather Det
     501st Land Clearing Co
     578th Sig Support Co
     587th Sig Support Co

VI.     GENERAL SUPPORT

     8th Aerial Port Sqdn
     12th Med Hospital Evac
     Hq & A Btry, 6th Bn, 15th Arty
     20th TC Co Aircraft
     45th Surg MA (MUST)
     269th Avn Bn Assault Helicopter
     362nd Engr Co
     515th Engr Plt Asphalt Construction
     554th Engr Bn Construction
     588th Engr Bn Combat



Changes in Task Organization

Effective 1 August 70

1st Bde     2nd Bde     3rd Bde
2-12 Inf (-)     1-27 Inf     4-9 Inf (-)
2-14 Inf     1-5 Inf (M)     3-22 Inf
A/3-4 Cav      (illegible) -23 Inf (M)     2-27 Inf
2-60 Inf     1-8 Arty (illegible) (DS)     2-22 Inf (M)
3-4 Cav (-)     B/65th Engr (DS)     B/C/3-13 Arty (155) (82)
A/2-12     D/588th engr (DS)     2-79 Arty (105) (DS)
7-11 Arty (105) (DS)     D/3-4 Cav (OPCON)     D/65th Engr (DS)
A/3-13 Arty (105) (SP) (DS)     
A/65th Engr (DS     Div Arty     3rd Bde 9th Inf Div
          D/3-43 Arty (8”) (GS) (SP)     6-31 Inf
Div Troops          5-60 Inf
F/75th Inf (RGR) (DS)     II FFV Arty     2-47 Inf (M)
25th Avn Bn     B (illeg) Arty (AW) (SP) (GSR)     D/3-17 Air Cav
125th Sig Bn (GS)     C/7-8 Arty (illeg) (8”) (SP) (POF)     E/75th Inf (RGR) (DS
65th Engr (-) (GS)     A/4-27 Arty (155) (GSR) (SP)     C/(illeg) 2 Arty (AW) (SP) (illeg)
2-34 Arm (-)     B/2-32 Arty (175/8”) (SP (GSR)     2-4 Arty (105 (DS) (S)
C/4-9 Inf     B/5-42 Arty (illeg) (GSR)     571 Engr

2 Aug     5-60 Inf to 3rd Bde
     A/3 (illeg) Arty (155) to (illeg)

4 Aug     46th (illeg) Dog Plt to (illeg) Bde
     38th (illeg) Dog Plt to (illeg) Bde
     44th (illeg) Dog Plt to (illeg) Bde
     45th (illeg) Dog Plt to (illeg) Bde
     66th (illeg) to (illeg)
     (illegible)

5 Aug     (illegible) to (illegible)
     (illegible) to (illegible)

6 Aug     (illegible) to (illegible)

10 Aug      (illegible) to (illegible)

11 Aug     (illegible) to (illegible)

13 Aug     D/3-4 Cav to 3rd Bde

15 Aug      D/3-4 Cav to 2nd Bde

17 Aug     3-4 Cav to 3rd Bde

19 Aug     B/2-34 Arm (DS to 1st ARVN Abn Bde)

20 Aug     1-27 Inf to 3rd Bde
     3-22 Inf to 2nd Bde

21 Aug     5-60 Inf to 3-9 Inf Div

25 Aug     D/3-4 Cav to 1st Bde

26 Aug     D/3-4 Cav to 3-9 Inf Div

29 Aug     D/3-4 Cav to 1st Bde

31 Aug     B/2-34 Arm To Div Trps

Effective 1 September

1st Bde     2nd Bde     3rd Bde
2-12 Inf     3-22 Inf     4-9 Inf
2-14 Inf (-)     1-5 Inf (M)     1-27 Inf
2-60 Inf     4-23 Inf (M)     2-27 Inf
1 Plt/3-4 Cav (OPCON)     1-8 Arty (105) (DS)     2-22 Inf (M)
3-4 Cav     B/65th Engr (DS)     A/2-34 Arm (-) (OPCON)
7-11 Arty (105) (DS)     38th Sct Dog Plt (DS)     B/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) GS)
C/3-13 Arty (155) (SP (GSR)          2-77 Arty (1-5) (DS)
A/65th Engr (DS)     Div Arty     44th Sct Dog Plt (DS)
46th Sct Dog Plt (DS)     D/3-13 Arty (8”) (SP) GS)     D/65th Engr (DS)

Div Troops     II FFV Arty     3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div
F/75th Inf (RGR) (GS)     B (-)/5-2 Arty (AW) (SP) (GS)     6-31 Inf
25th Avn Bn     A (-)/7-8 Arty (8”) (SP) (GS) (POF)          5-60 Inf
125th Sig Bn (GS)     B 7-8 Arty (175/8”) (SP) (GS) (POF)          2-47 Inf (M)
65th Engr (-) (GS)     A/1-27 Arty (155) (SP) (GS)          D/3-17 Air Cav
2-34 Armor (-)     B/2-32 Arty (175) 8”) (SP (GS)          F/75th Inf (RGR)
E/2-14 Inf     C/2-32 Arty (155) (GSR)     2 (illeg) Arty (105) (DS)
A/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) (DS)          (illegible) 2-29 Arty (SLT) (GS)
66th Cbt Tracker Plt (GS)          571 Engr
               45th Sct Dog Plt (DS)

3 Sep     2-34 Arm (-) to 1st Bde
     3-9 Inf Div loses 45th Sct Dog Plt
     3-9 Inf Div loses (illeg) 29 Arty
     3-9 Inf Div loses 5-60 Inf

4 Sep     C/2-60 Inf to 3-9 Inf Div

5 Sep     I (-) 2-29 Arty to 3-9 Inf Div

8 Sep     5-60 Inf OPCON USARV
     6-31 Inf OPCON USARV

10 Sep     A/C/D/2-4 Arty OPCON USARV

13 Sep     A/3-13 Arty (155) SP) (REINF) to 2nd Bde

15 Sep     2-3 Inf OPCON to Div Trps
     B/2-4 Arty OPCON USARV
     571 Engr OPCON USARV
     E/75th Inf (RGR) OPCON USARV
     11th Armored Cavalry regiment (-) OPCON 25th Infantry Division

19 Sep     2-3 Inf to 2nd Bde
     2-47 Inf (M) OPCON USARV

22 Sep     3-9 Inf Div OPCON USARV

25 Sep     D/3-4 Cav to 2nd Bde

27 Sep     2-27 Inf (-) to 2nd Bde

28 Sep     2-3 Inf to Div Trps

29 Sep     D/3-4 Cav to 1st Bde

Effective 1 October

1st Bde     2nd Bde     3rd Bde
2-12 Inf     3-22 Inf (+)     4-9 Inf (-) (+)
2-14 Inf (-)     C/1-5 Inf (M)     A/2-34 Arm (-)
2-34 Arm (-) (+)     2-27 Inf (-) (+)     1-27 Inf
B/2-14 Inf     B/4-23 Inf (M)     A/B/2-27 Inf (+)
3-4 Cav (-)     1-5 Inf (M) (-) (+)     1/A/2-34 Arm
D/3-4 Cav     D/3-17 Air Cav     2-22 Inf (M)
7-11 Arty (105) (DS)     4-23 Inf (M) (-)     2-77 Arty (105) (DS)
C/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) (GSR)     1-8 Arty (105) (DS)     B/3-13 Arty (155) (SP (illeg)
A/65th Engr (Ds)     A/3-13 Arty (155) SP) (REINF)     D/6th Engr (DS)
46th Sct Dog Plt (DS     B/65th Engr (DS)     44th Sct Dog Plt (DS)
          38th Sct dog Plt (DS)
Div Troops          11th Armd Cav Regt (-)
2-3 Inf     Div Arty     1-1(illeg) Armd Cav Sqdn
F/75th Inf (RGR) (GS)     D/3-13 Arty (8”) (SP) (GS)     2-1(illeg) Armd Cav Sqdn
25th Avn Bn               OPCON 1st Air Cav
125th Sig Bn (GS)     II FFV Arty     3-11 Armd Cav Sqdn
65th Engr (-) (GS)     B(-)/5-2 Arty (AW) (SP) (GS)          C/4-8 Inf
66th Cbt Tracker Plt (GS)     A(-)/7-8 Arty (8”) (SP) (GSR)     919 Engr Co
          B/7-8 Arty (175/8”) (SP) GS) (POF)
          C/1-27 Arty (155) (SP) (GS)
          A/2-32 Arty (175/8”) (SP) (GS)
          B/2-35 Arty (155) (SP) (GSR)

11 Oct     2-3 Inf Reverted OPCON to 199 Light Infantry Brigade

15 Oct     2-27 Inf (-) to 3rd Bde

21 Oct     4-9 Inf (-) to 11th ACR

28 Oct     4-9 Inf (-) to 3rd Bde


Effective 31 October

1st Bde     2nd Bde     3rd Bde
2-12 Inf     3-22 Inf (+ )     1-27 Inf
2-14 Inf     A/1-5 Inf (M)     2-27 Inf (-)
2-34 Arm (-)     1-5 Inf (M) (-) (+)     2-22 Inf (M)
3-4 Cav (-)     D/3-17 Air Cav     4-9 Inf
D/3-4 Cav (-)     4-23 Inf (M)     2-77 Arty (105) (DS)
7-11 Arty (105) (DS)     1-8 Arty (105) (DS)     B/3-13 Arty (105) (DS) (GSR)
C/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) (GSR)     A/3-13 Arty (155) (SP) (REINF)     D/65th Engr (DS)
A/65th Engr (DS)     B/65th Engr (DS)     44th Sct Dog Plt (DS)
46th Sct dog Plt (DS)     38th Sct Dog Plt (DS)     
               11th Armd Cav Regt (-)
Div Troops     Div Arty     1-11 Armd Cav Sqdn
F/75th Inf (RGR) (GS)     D/3-13 Arty (8”) (SP) (GS)     2-11 Armd Cav Sqdn
25th Avn Bn               (OPCON 1st Cav Div)
125th Sig Bn (GS)     II FFV ARTY     3-11 Armd Cav Sqdn
65th Engr (-) (GS)     B(+)/5-2 Arty (AW) (SP) (GS)     919 Engr Co
66th Cbt Tracker Plt (GS)     B/7-8 (-) Arty (175/8”) (SP) GS) (POF)
          A/2-32 Arty (175/8”) (SP) (GS)
          A/5-42 Arty (155) (SP) (GS)
          C/2-35 Arty (155) (SP) (GS)
          B/5-42 Arty (-) (155) (GS)

(Incl 3)

Enemy Main Force Unit Identifications
31 October 1970

7th VC/NVA Div

141st Regt     (illegible)
165th Regt     XU086205
209th Regt     XT0__879

9th VC/NVA Div

271st Regt     XT______
272nd Regt     XT______
95C Regt     XT______

Tay Ninh (P)

D1 Bn          Unknown
D14 Bn          XT084626

Sub-Region 1

268th Regt     XT_25495
     K1 Bn     XT5___80
     K2 Bn     XT2_86_6
     K3 Bn     XT50_223
101st Regt     XT659__9
     K7 Bn     XT693450
     K8 Bn     XT6_960_
     K9 Bn     XT64242_
1st Quyet Thang Bn     XT_4_130
2nd Quyet Thang Bn     XT_88074
3rd Quyet Thang Bn     XT______

Long An Sub-Region

267th Bn          XT436147
2642nd Bn     XT649023
308th Bn          XT163255
6th LF Bn     XS652815
D6B Bn          XT375171
D12 Sapper Bn     XS694936
1696th Bn     XT433146
1st NVA Regt     XS5_5611
     K4 Bn     XS699729
     K5 Bn     XS6060
     K6 Bn     XS633595
     K7 Bn     XS638590
506th Bn          XS810800
508Th Bn     XS908724
520th Bn          XS793707
265th Bn          XS835660
Dong Phu Bn     Unknown
211 Sapper Bn     XS8_6684

Sub-Region 5

Thanh Loi Bn     XT959076
K1 DN Bn     XT901657
K2 DN Bn     YT047309
K4 Dn Bn     XT851296

Sub-Region 6

N10 Sapper Bn     XT200500
N13 Sapper Bn     XT060206

Military Region 7

274th Regt     YT374042
     K1 Bn     YT4_6036
     K2 Bn     Unknown
     K3 Bn     YS190885
74th Arty Regt     YS128935
     K2 Bn     YS230956
D65 Engr Bn     YS235795
D6 Sapper Bn     YT2011__

Sub-Region 4

D2MF Inf Bn     YS224884
D4 MF Inf Bn     YS260680
D6 Hvy Wpn Bn     YS192924
D8 H20 Sapper Bn     YS265896
D10 Sapper Bn     YS0459

Ba Long (P)

D445 LF Bn     YS623684