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After Action Reports 29
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225
AVD CDH 14 February 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65) (BC)
TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
Location: Vicinity CU CHI, CU CHI Base Camp (XT647153), RVN
Reporting Officer: Major General F. K. Mearns
Prepared by: Captain Sidney P. Stone, CO, 18th Military History
Detachment
1. (C) Significant Organizational Activities.
a. Operations
(1) General: There were seven major operations (battalion size or larger) and 716 small unit actions conducted by the 25th Infantry Division during the quarter. All major operations and 219 of the small unit actions resulted in enemy contact.
(2) The 25th Infantry Division Monsoon Campaign which began in May, continued into this reported period until the beginning of the 1967-68 Dry Season Campaign in December. The mission of the division in the Dry Season Campaign: to conduct offensive operations with emphasis in War Zone C, to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, to secure lines of communications (LOC's), to support the Government of Viet Nam (GVN) Revolutionary Development Program and to reinforce Free World Military Assistance Forces and GVN forces as directed, and to prevent VC rice taxation, harvesting or transportation within the Division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI). Within the Division's TAOI during the reporting period, operations KOLEKOLE, BARKING SANDS, DIAMOND HEAD, ATLANTA, and CAMDEN were concluded, and operations SARATOGA and YELLOWSTONE are presently being conducted.
(a) YELLOWSTONE (8 December, 1967-Continuing). This is a multi-brigade operation involving the 1st and 3rd Brigades, 25th Infantry Division and is taking place in War Zone “C” located in the northern part of TAY NINH Province. The purpose of YELLOWSTONE is to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations and complete several engineering projects of rebuilding or constructing road networks, United States Special Forces (USSF)/Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Camps, and KATUM (XT3389) airfield.
The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division established a base camp at KATUM with its TAOI in the northern part of War Zone “C”. The brigade's operation was characterized by daily multiple company sized airmobile combat assaults which were exploited by extensive S&D operations. Another base camp was established at BO TUC (XT 3885) on 19 December 1967 when the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry and two batteries of the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery were airlifted into fire support patrol base (FSPB), BEAUREGARD. During the early hours of 20 December 1967, NVA forces conducted a joint ground-mortar attack against FSPB BEAUREGARD which resulted in 40 KIA's (BC) to the enemy force.
The 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division airmobiled into SUOI TRE (XT 4169) in order to establish a base in its TAOI encompassing the central portion of War Zone “C”. No significant contacts were made before the 3rd Brigade was extracted to participate in Operation CAMDEN.
After completion of CAMDEN, the 3rd Brigade established FXPB BURT in the northern part of its TAOI at SUOI CUT (XT 5079) on 30 December 1967. During the New Years Truce (1-2 January 1968), NVA forces started the battle of SUOI CUT with a coordinated mortar attack on FSPB's BEAUREGARD and BURT. The mortar attack against FSPB BURT was followed by a massive ground attack by two NVA regiments. The NVA charge was repulsed resulting in approximately 400 KIA's by body count and nine prisoners of war (POW's).
Results of Operation YELLOWSTONE to date are: VC personnel losses - 907 KIA (BC) and 137 detainees. VC equipment losses - 134 individual weapons, 59 crew serve weapons, 25 pounds of documents, 42,645 SA rounds, 557.6 tons of rice, 249 mines, 7 radios, and 12 telephones.
(b) SARATOGA (8 December 1967 - Continuing). This operation's first phase ended on 31 January 1968 and corresponds with operation YELLOWSTONE and the last two months of the rice harvest. In conjunction with GVN forces and province officials, 25th Infantry Division (minus YELLOWSTONE forces) conducted operations in the TAOI portions of LONG AN, BINH DUONG, and HAU NNGHIA Provinces; to pacify 25th Infantry Division's TAOI in the provinces; to secure that portion of the allied base area in the Division TAOI: to prevent VC rice taxation, harvesting, or transportation within the Division TAOI; and to destroy VC/NVA forces within the Division TAOI> The execution of SARATOGA was principally effected by the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry.
During the month of December, 1967, the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's Operation SARATOGA was restricted because of the holiday truces and operations ATLANTA and CAMDEN. In January the operation got into full swing. During the period of 4-10 January 1968, there were two significant contacts in the vicinity of AP AN HOA (XT 7416) with one contact resulting in 74 VC KIA (BC). Multi-battalion combat assaults, search and destroy missions, and joint operations with ARVN units were conducted in the vicinity of TRUNG BAP (XT 5921) between 11 January and the end of January. Rome Plow operations were conducted in the FILHOL PLANTAION and HOBO WOODS during January. Before moving the clearing operation from the FILHOL, a total of 4,325 acres had been cleared. By the end of January nearly 4,000 acres had been cleared in the HOBO. In conjunction with attacks on allied facilities in the SAIGON - TAN SON NHUT area during the period of 3-31 January 1968, the VC posed a threat to the 25th Infantry Division base camp at CU CHI, resulting in the 2nd Brigade encountering sizable VC forces east and south of the CU CHI Base Camp (XT 6515). During the first two months of SARATOGA, the kill ratio has been ten to one in favor of US forces.
(c) KOLEKOLE (13 May - 7 December 1967). This operation was a rainy season operation which took place in HAU NGHIA and TAY NINH Provinces. During this quarter, the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry division continued on KOLEKOLE. The mission of KOLEKOLE was to conduct offensive operations against VC units along the Oriental River from TAY NINH to DUC HOA; provide security for engineer activities; deny the VC use of lines of communications in the TAOI; and reinforce Vietnamese operations in the TAOI.
In November and December, 1967, the most significant activity of the 2nd Brigade in Operation KOLEKOLE was centered around security of the engineer operation of rebuilding route 10 from LOC THANH (XT4316) to BAO TRAI (XT 5204) and Rome Plow operations near THAI MY (XT 5415). Two of the 2nd Brigade's battalions were OPCON to the 1st Brigade in an operation near SONG BE (YU139074) during early November, and this accounted for the small amount of activity.
When KOLEKOLE ended on 7 December 1967, much of the operation's TAOI which was previously under South Vietnamese Government and US control remained “status quo” during this period of reduced ground mobility. Statistically, US casualties were 144 KIA, 14 died of wounds (DOW), and 876 WIA opposed to the VC losses of KIA (BC) 797, 150 PW, and 34 HOI CHANHS. The enemy also suffered the loss of supply caches and the interruption of lines of communications in the MY QUI (XT 3913) area.
(d) BARKING SANDS (18 May - 7 December 1967). This operation was a pacification and jungle clearing operation of the first Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts of HAU NGHIA Province and PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province. Numerous small unit actions, which included Bushmaster (extensive company size patrols), C&S of suspected VC hamlets, Roadrunners (mine sweeping of roads) and checkmate (road blocks in unannounced locations to check for VC personnel or supplies being moved by surface transportation), enabled the brigade to reduce VC capability to move freely. In addition, S&D missions employing airmobile combat assaults into the IRON TRIANGLE were conducted when intelligence reports located VC units in the area.
Artillery support for Operation BARKING SANDS envisioned many new concepts which proved to be highly successful in a jungle war against guerilla forces. BARKING SANDS, as never before, utilized the concept of airlift of light artillery batteries to exploit important intelligence data. Further, it was in Operation BARKING SANDS that the concept of a minimum of one artillery battalion equivalent would be used to support any maneuver force larger than a platoon. The results of these new ideas were a greater kill ratio per artillery round fired and most certainly added a confusion factor to the enemy as to the size force which was opposing him.
Jungle clearing operations were continued in the FILHOL PLANTATION in BINH DUONG Province as Operation KUNIA which had begun on 16 September as a jungle clearing operation in the HOBO WOODS. “Roadrunners” were conducted between PHU HOA DONG (XT 7119) and CU CHI Base Camp in order to keep the line of communications open. Contact with the enemy was very light during this operation which was part of Operation BARKING SANDS. The objective of Operation KUNIA was to eliminate the HOBO WOODS and the FILHOL PLANTATION as safe havens for the VC through extensive clearing and destruction of VC base camps and forces.
KAWELA, AKUMU, AND WAIMEA are other operations which were conducted as part of BARKING SANDS, but were completed before this reporting period. Overall, BARKING SANDS had a kill ratio of 1/2.77 in favor of US forces.
(e) DIAMOND HEAD (18 May - 7 December 1967). This operation consisting of S&D operations and security missions was conducted by the 3rd Brigade from base camps at TAY NINH and DAU TIENG. Also, the 3rd Brigade had the mission to secure engineer repair work conducted on the road network in his area of operation (AO).
As the operation continued in November, the 3rd Brigade conducted S&D and C&S operations in the upper BOI LOI WOODS, BEN CUI PLANTATION and along the eastern bank of the SAIGON RIVER south of DAU TIENG. During the first part of November, operations were curtailed due to two battalions being OPCON to the other brigades. While conducting S&D operations near the MUSHROOM bend on the SAIGON RIVER during the period 24-25 November, the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry encountered a company size VC force resulting in a VC body count of 20 plus another 25 more possible KIA's. Contact with enemy forces was light during the remainder of November with December contact being very similar.
Results of Operation DIAMOND HEAD were: Personnel losses - 237 VC KIA (BC), 496 detainees, 4 HOI CHANHS; Material captured and destroyed - 103 individual weapons, 2 crew service weapons, 170 tons of rice, and 34,000 SA rounds.
(f) ATLANTA (18 November - 23 December 1967). This operation was conducted in the IRON TRIANGLE of BINH DUONG Province in order to destroy the VC haven which had not seen any friendly operations since the termination of CEDAR FALLS in January, 1967. Enemy contact was made during the early stages of the operation in the southwestern sector of the IRON TRIANGLE where the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division had airmobile assaulted some of their units and other elements with the Rome Plows moved by land. The majority of the contacts consisted of mechanized Infantry attacks of fortified enemy positions from which the enemy initially fought fiercely and then departed. The repeated discovery of documents as well as the discover of 178.5 tons of rice in the AN THUAN and PHU AN (XT 7222) areas indicated a transfer of large quantities of rice from PHU HO DONG village (XT7120) to storage areas within the IRON TRIANGLE. With the assistance from a BEN CAT District Popular Force unit, the location, exploitation, and subsequent destruction of approximately 10,000 meters of interconnecting tunnels was accomplished. During ATLANTA, Rome Plows cleared a total of 10,995 acres in the IRON TRIANGLE.
The 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducted an airmobile combat assault of one battalion into the southeastern portion of the TRAPEZOID to support operation ATLANTA. From 18 November to 25 November, this battalion conducted S&D operations to interdict and deny VC use of lines of communications from the IRON TRIANGLE.
From an intelligence standpoint, operation ATLANTA was a great success. The location and destruction of a large percentage of the major tunnel complexes along with the extensive land clearing by the Rome Plows will hamper the enemies' ability to move and live in the TRIANGLE. ATLANTA should affect the VC's operations in the PHU HOA DONG area for some time.
(g) CAMDEN (17 December - 31 December 1967). This operation was conducted by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, 25th Infantry Division, in HAU NGHIA, TAY NINH, and BINH DUONG Provinces to locate and destroy the 101st North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment which was reported to be located in the HOBO - BOI LOI WOODS and TRAPEZOID areas. The unexpected presence of a main force unit operating near CU CHI is partially explained by the fact that a rich rice harvest was in progress and the 101st NVA Regiment was present to secure and oversee the transportation of the rice to the North. Numerous small unit actions, which included armor-infantry S&D operations, combined reconnaissance intelligence platoon (CRIP), aerial combat assaults on Landing Zones (LZ's) based on intelligence reports, and multi-battalion airmobile combat assaults were conducted during CAMDEN. The 3rd Brigade, who was operating in the TRAPEZOID area, used mostly company size airmobile combat assaults for interdictory purposes to stop the VC forces exfiltrating in front of the mechanized infantry S&D operations. The 2nd Brigade operating in the HOBO - BOI LOI WOODS, used tank-infantry teams and multi-battalion airmobile combat assaults for S&D operations. VC losses in personnel were 109 KIA (BC) and 4 POW's. The VC also suffered the destruction of several base camp areas and the loss of nearly 33 tons of rice. US forces experienced 27 KIA, 1 died of wounds (DOW) and 118 WIA. Also noteworthy was the massing of combat power from operation YELLOWSTONE for this operation when the 3rd Brigade and several artillery batteries joined with the 2nd Brigade for operation CAMDEN.
b. Artillery Support. During the quarter, Division Artillery fired 51,557 rounds in support and 26,002 rounds for Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) missions. Included in the totals were rounds fired in support of ARVN operations and/or ARVN outposts under attack.
c. Air Support. There were 2,954 sorties during the quarter in support of 1,361 missions with the following results: 52 VC Killed by Air Force (KBAF) (BC), 234 VC KBAF (poss). In addition, 168 VC structures, 1,795 bunkers, 3 sampans, 1 oxcart, 1 bridge, 2 caches, 1 truck, and 5 tunnels were destroyed. There were 44 secondary explosions and 47 secondary fires. There were 32 B-52 strikes in 201 sorties flown in support of combat operations.
d. Army Aviation. There were 18,313 sorties, 3,217 combat missions, 8,933 hours flown, and 32,592 passengers carried. The armed helicopter section expended 1,036,040 rounds of 7.62mm machine gun ammunition, 890 rounds of 5.62mm rifle ammunition, 14,142 rounds of 40mm grenades, and 4,075 aerial rockets in support of combat operations. These missions resulted in the destruction of 17 structures, 22 sampans, 49 VC Killed by Army Aviation (KBAA) (BC), and 106 VC KBAA (poss).
e. Intelligence.
(1) VC Activity
(a) General: During November and December, VC efforts consisted primarily of efforts to delay allied clearing operations, counter sweep operations, and harassing activities along Main Supply Routes (MSR) and vicinity of base camps and field locations. During the last month of the reporting period, VC offensive activity increased. This increased activity was a result of the VC Winter - Spring campaign which began approximately 1 January 68.
(b) VC Tactics: VC activity during November was directed at countering allied sweep operations in HAU NGHIA, Southern TAY NINH and Western BINH DUONG Provinces. In December, simultaneous with the beginning of Operation YELLOWSTONE, counter-sweep operations were conducted primarily in War Zone “C”. At the beginning of January, the VC reverted from a defensive to an offensive posture, with the most notable attacks those at FSB Burt on 1-2 January and the attacks in the SAIGON area on 31 January. In addition to the ground attacks, there was a notable increase in attacks by fire. These attacks, beginning immediately after YELLOWSTONE was initiated, were directed at Base Camps and field CP's. 122mm rockets were employed on several occasions in attacks at KATUM, DAU TIENG, and CU CHI Base Camps.
(2) Significant Contacts.
(a) On 20 December at 0140 the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry received an attack of approximately 250 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire and an unknown number of small arms at FSPB BEAUREGARD (XT3885). They returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, artillery, light fire teams, and air strikes. Documents captured indicated that elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 141st NVA Regiment conducted the attack. Results: 6 US KIA and 22 US WIA. VC losses were 40 VC KIA (BC), 33 VC KIA (poss). Also 15 AK-47 rifles, 4 Russian machine guns, 1 CHI COM rifle, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 1 RPG-7 launcher, 1 M-1 rifle, 1 unknown light machine gun, 2 9mm pistols, and 1 PRC-10 radio.
(b) At 2334 on 1 January 1968, elements of the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments initiated an all-out assault on the 3rd Brigade's FSFB, Burt, vicinity XT499806. Contact lasted until 0530 the next morning. Results: 21 US KIA and 152 US WIA. VC losses were 355 KIA (BC), 5 VC PW's, 75 AK-47 rifles, 16 RPG-2 and 12 RPG-7 launchers, 11 CHI COM LMG, 1 caliber .45 pistol, and scores of ammunition destroyed.
(c) On 29 January at 1625, just prior to the start of the 1968 TET Holiday Truce period, the Aero Rifles from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry vicinity XT 954305 came into heavy contact with an estimated BC Bn force consisting of a recon unit from 272nd NVA Regiment and possibly elements from the local main force Battalions. Fire was returned with all available organic weapons, artillery, LFT, and Spooky. The 2nd Battalion, 27 Infantry conducted a night combat assault to reinforce the Aero Rifles. Results: 9 US KIA and 14 US WIA. VC losses: 64 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC PO WIA, 4 AK-47 rifles, one 82mm mortar tube, and 1 RPG-2 rocket launcher.
(d) On 31 January, the VC launched a large scale offensive in the SAIGON area. Troops B and C of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry while moving to reinforce the Capital Military District area vicinity XS 90950 came into heavy contact with elements of the D-14 and the D-16 VC Battalions at 0708 hours. After an all day fight, contact was broken at 1530 hours. Results: 15 US KIA, 23 US WIA, 3 APC's and 1 tank destroyed. VC losses: 162 VC KIA (BC), 24 VC PW's, and numerous weapons, web gear, and documents.
(3) Conclusion: The tactics employed by the VC during the first two months of the reporting period were devised to delay the US sweep and clearing operations. Tactics during January were employed to complement the Winter-Spring Campaign. The large number of attacks by fire are believed to have been conducted to cover the movement of VC forces to the SAIGON area and to cause as many casualties and as much damage as possible. By creating a threat on Base Camps, the VC hoped to restrict allied reinforcing capabilities to the populated areas and political installations where their man ground efforts were directed.
f. Logistics.
(1) Class I Supply - (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)
(a) Status.
“A” Rations “C” Rations
1 Stockage objective CU CHI 5 10
(days) DAU TIENG 5 10
2 On Hand (days) CU CHI 3 10
DAU TIENG 4 12.5
(b) Fresh fruits and vegetables were received from Class I Issue Point SAIGON.
(c) Ice Cream:
1 Cycle of issue - three times a week.
2 Gallons per week from SAIGON - 1,950
3 Gallons per week from CU CHI - 329
4 Gallons per week from DAU TIENG - 450
(d) Average amount of ice issued daily:
1 Potable - CU CHI - 120,000
- DAU TIENG - 25,000
2 Non-potable - None
(2) Class II & IV (29th Supply & Transport Battalion)
(a) Additions to ASL during quarter - CU CHI - 158
- DAU TIENG - 0
(b) Total lines on ASL - CU CHI - 1,437
- DAU TIENG - 153
(3) Class III (25th Supply & Transport Battalion)
(Consumption Rates)
Daily Quarterly
(a) MOGAS (gals) CU CHI 10,022 902,009
DAU TIENG 4,493 361,200
(b) Diesel (gals) CU CHI 19,375 1,743,580
DAU TIENG 12,664 591,805
(c) JP/4 (gals) CU CHI 1,420 127,775
DAU TIENG 760 62,700
(4) Services:
(a) Contract Laundry - CU CHI - 8,187 bundles
DAU TIENG - 590-485 bundles
(b) QM bath units:
1 Total showers - CU CHI 18,078
Daily average - CU CHI 213
2 Total showers - DAU TIENG 7,900
Daily average - DAU TIENG 263
3 Total showers - Field CU CHI 5,101
Daily average - Field CU CHI 60
4 Total showers - Field DAU TIENG 7,640
Daily average - Field DAU TIENG 86
5 Total showers for quarter 38,719
Daily average 311
(c) Graves Registration:
Deceased US personnel processed during the quarter - CU CHI - 180; DAU TIENG - 61
Deceased RVN personnel processed during the quarter - CU CHI - 68, DAU TIENG - 61
(d) Division water resupply - average daily to CU CHI base camp users - 36,000 gals.
(e) DUC HOA Helicopter Rearm/Refuel Facility - 25th S&T Battalion has completed all construction at facility. Refuel point consists of 5 refueling points for JP-4, tank storage capacity 30,000 gals. AVGAS storage facility consists of M-49C Tanker and collapsible pods with capacity of 2,200 gals. Bunker and protected storage facilities are complete for storage and issue of ammunition and pyrotechnics.
1 TAY NINH - Facility consists of steel storage tanks for 252,000 gals of JP-4 and 20,000 gals of AVGAS with 16 operational refuel points. Berms and bunkers are built for storage and issue of ammunition and pyrotechnics.
2 DAU TIENG - Facility has 24 operational refueling points with JP-4 capacity of 70,000 gals and AVAGAS with capacity of 12,000 gals. Bunkers and berms are provided for storage and issue of ammunition and pyrotechnics.
3 KATUM - Facility opened for operation YELLOWSTONE for providing ammunition and pyrotechnics for operation in the area. Bunkers have been built for protection.
(5) Transportation
(a) Mileage driven:
1 Total - CU CHI 193,000
- DAU TIENG 83,599
2 Average daily - CU CHI 2,098
- DAU TIENG 925
(b) Tonnage moved:
1 Total - CU CHI 9,500
2 Average daily - CU CHI 103.3
- DAU TIENG 64.9
(c) Troops moved by convoy:
1 Total - CU CHI 11,500
- DAU TIENG 220
2 Average daily - CU CHI 125
- DAU TIENG 2.3
(d) Troops moved locally (replacement)
1 Total - CU CHI 18,400
2 Average daily - CU CHI 200.3
(e) Troops hauled (pass truck - CU CHI)
1 Total - 5,000
2 Average daily - 54.3
(6) Operation YELLOWSTONE
During Operation YELLOWSTONE the 25th S & T Battalion was tasked with the mission of providing both personnel and equipment to assist in the timely flow of supplies and equipment through the four established DISCOM Forward Elements.
DISCOM Forward, TAY NINH was under the command of the Battalion S-3, Major Malo. This was the focal point for supply activities for the entire operation.
DISCOM Forward, KATUM under the command of the Battalion XO, Major Pinkston, initially was responsible for the close monitoring and coordination of requisitions submitted and supplies handled through the 1st Logistical Command FSA. This facility was the most forward supply point for all operations in War Zone C. All classes of supplies were handled with initial resupply convoys augmenting the aircraft resupply effort. It was the function of the 25th S & T Bn personnel to insure that these resupply efforts were expeditiously handled and prompt discharge performed. In addition, continuous liaison was effected and up to date records and status reports were maintained on all supply actions.
The 25th S&T Company (Provisional) at DAU TIENG, under the operational control of DISCOM Forward, DAU TIENG, was responsible for the close and continuous processing of requisitions and providing all supplies and services requested by units operating in its area of responsibility.
DISCOM Forward, SOUI DAU included an FSE organized, manned, stocked, and operated by the 25th S&T Bn in conjunction with Operation YELLOWSTONE. Complete storage facilities were established for all classes of supplies, MHE service provided, refrigerated storage and van service provided for perishable Class I supplies and a bath point provided.
(7) Maintenance.
(a) The following jobs were completed by the 725th Maintenance Battalion during the reporting period.
ITEM NOV DEC JAN TOTAL
Wheel Vehicles 273 319 300 892
Track Vehicles 137 130 157 424
Small Arms 989 719 717 2,425
Artillery 161 136 141 438
Chemical 269 123 76 468
Refrigeration 22 26 40 88
Engineer 237 181 212 630
Signal 3,122 2,149 2,305 7,576
Fire Control 289 183 176 648
Office Machines 100 158 176 648
Aircraft 247 227 268 742
Total 5,846 4,351 4,567 14,764
(b) During this reporting period, the maintenance and supply mission of this battalion has been influenced by the following factors:
1 Repair parts availability
2 Geographical location (high temperature and dust).
3 Lack of sufficient maintenance at organizational level.
(8) Medical Support.
The 25th Medical Battalion supported Division units with medical service and supplies. Non-division units were support with medical supplies.
(a) Medical totals:
1 Patients seen - 11,913
a Disease - 8,399
b Non-battle injuries - 2,364
c IRHA - 1,450
2 Lab tests - 8,968
3 Immunizations - 5,555
4 Prescriptions filled - 7,938
(b) Dental patients seen - 9,186
1 Dental examinations - 7,916
2 Other (extractions, etc.) - 1,270
(c) Supply and Service
1 Line items issued - 6,629
2 Short tonnage total - 26.5
3 MED CAP line items issued - 1,525
4 Short tonnage total - 5.5
5 Bulk pharmacy items issued - 2,880
6 Eyeglasses ordered (pairs) - 455
7 Maintenance work orders received - 104
a Work orders completed - 84
b Work orders remaining at - 20 end of report period
(9) Transportation Office.
(a) Highway continues to be the primary mode of transportation for the resupply of CU CHI, TAY NINH, and DAU TIENG base camps. Following is a breakdown of regular resupply convoys operated in the division area:
1 CU CHI - SAIGON convoys
a Total Convoys - 182
b Number of convoys per day - 2
c Total vehicles - 9,025
d Number of vehicles involved in unit distribution
- 3,500
2 SAIGON/CU CHI - TAY NINH convoys
a Total convoys - 179
b Number of convoys per day - 2
c Total vehicles - 21,405
d Vehicles by unit
1st Log Comd 12,336
25th Div and attached units 10,222
PHILGAG 858
3 TAY NINH - DAU TIENG convoys
a Total Convoys - 178
b Number of convoys per day - 2
c Total vehicles - 8,543
4 TAY NINH - KATUM convoys
a Total convoys - 48
b Number of convoys per day - 2
c Total vehicles - 4,091
5 TAY NINH - SUOI convoys
a Total convoys - 61
b Number of convoys per day - 2
c Total vehicles - 1,038
6 TAY NINH - HOC MON convoys
a Total convoys - 46
b Number of convoys per day - 1
c Total vehicles - 1,517
(b) Special airlift data for the quarter is as follows:
ACFT MISSIONS PRIORITIES SORTIES PAX CARGO (lbs)
C-130 2 TE 17 1,146 221,400
27 CE 175 2,782 3,577,933
14 I 21 60 405,839
C-123 1 ER 1 12,700
20 CE 133 1,318 1,358,169
46 I 60 1,466 310,126
C-7A 1 CE 1 4,034
90 I 643 15,467 376,469
(c) The Division Baggage Section steadily increased its volume of business this quarter due to the large number of rotating personnel. The section served 3,078 personnel and shipped 3,990 pieces of baggage weighing a total of 345,680 pounds.
g. Administration.
(1) Personnel. During the past quarter the personnel posture of the Division has been good. The assigned strength dropped from 105% to 100% of authorized strength early in the quarter and remained at that level during most of the quarter. The shortage of Infantry Captains and NCO's continued to be a problem. In addition, there has been a shortage of engineer NCO's and a shortage in certain key maintenance areas. There was a critical shortage of artillerymen early in the quarter, but sufficient replacements have now been received and this no longer appears to be a problem area.
(2) Key Gains/Losses
(a) 1 Nov 67 - LTS Homer W. Keifer, Jr. assumed command of 3rd Bn, 13th Arty; LTC Thomas H. Ball transferred to II FFORCEV.
(b) 1 Nov 67 - LTC John M Henchman assumed command of 4th Bn, 9th Inf; LTC Thomas G. Banks appointed XO 1st Bde.
(c) 3 Nov 67 - LTC Billy J. Leathers assumed command of 7th Bn, 11th Arty LTC Alvin C. Hutchins transferred to MACV.
(d) 8 Nov 67 - LTC Alfred M. Bracy assumed command of 2nd Bn, 14th Inf; LTC James V. Ladd departed.
(e) 11 Nov 67 - LTC John G. Pappageorge appointed XO, 3rd Bde; LTC James F. Greer departed.
(f) 15 Nov 67 - BG Donnelly P. Bolton transferred to MACV.
(g) 15 Nov 67 - LTC Eldin D. Pulsipher appointed XO DISCOM; LTC Ted E. Gordiner departed.
(h) 30 Nov 67 - LTC Glenn H. Otis assumed command of 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav; LTC Richard R. Simpson appointed G-1; LTC John M. Shea departed.
(i) 4 Dec 67 - COL James R. Brownell assumed command of DISCOM; COL Leonard Daems assumed command of 3rd Bde; COL Kenneth E. Buell departed.
(j) 7 Dec 67 - LTC James B. Speer appointed Division Chemical Officer; LTC Noel L. Bergeron departed.
(k) 8 Dec 67 - LTC Ernest F. Condina assumed command of 1st Bn, 27th Inf; LTC David R. Hughes transferred to II FFORCEV.
(l) 10 Dec 67 - LTC Henry A. Flertzheim assumed command of 6th Engr Bn; LTC Avery S. Fullerton assumed command of 4th Bn, 23rd Inf; LTC Thomas A. Ware appointed XO 3rd Bde; LTC Richard C. Rogers departed.
(m) 10 Dec 67 - LTC William L. Albright assumed command of 2nd Bn, 77th Arty; LTC Allen T. Lindholm evacuated due to injury.
(n) 18 Dec 67 - LTC Chandler Goodnow appointed G3; COL Robert M. Ward departed.
(o) 20 Dec 67 - LTC Fremont B. Hodson assumed command of 1st Bde; COL Edwin H. Mark Jr. departed on emergency leave and remained in CONUS due to injury.
(p) 2 Jan 68 - LTC Henry B. Murphy, Jr. assumed command of 1st Bn, 5th Inf; LTC Jere W. Sharp appointed G4.
(q) 10 Jan 68 - LTC Clarence A. Riser appointed AG: LTC Robert S. Young departed.
(r) 15 Jan 68 - LTC Ranier S. Pakusch appointed Division Surgeon; LTC Hugh S. Wiley departed.
(s) 16 Jan 68 - LTC Elliot Schofield assumed command of 25th Bed Bn; MAJ John B. Leary departed.
(3) Post Exchanges within the Division area remained in operation. Following statistical data is furnished:
PX FLOOR SPACE STORAGE SPACE SALES
CU CHI 8,000 Sq. Ft. 14,841 Sq. Ft. $2,756,384.65
DAU TIENG 6,000 Sq. Ft. 2,500 Sq. Ft. $ 738,341.25
TAY NINH 5,000 Sq. Ft. 3,300 Sq. Ft. $ 809,989.77
(4) Strength as of 31 January 1968.
(a) Assigned Units OFF WO EM AOG
AUTH 1,044 13 5 15,894 17,023
ASGD 1,064 152 16,129 17,345
PDY 1,019 148 15,799 16,966
(b) Attached Units OFF WO EM AOG
AUTH 51 3 593 647
ASGD 46 3 567 616
PDY 43 3 551 597
(c) Losses (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)
OFF WO EM AOG
KHA/DOW 22 2 315 339
WHA 56 6 1197 1259
MHA 0 0 *5 *5
NBD 1 0 16 17
NBI 1 0 167 168
* All losses have been recovered but are awaiting positive identification before listing as KHA.
(6) Gains (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)
OFF WO EM AOG
353 32 4,845 5,230
(7) Provost Marshal Activities:
(a) Convoys. The 25th Military Police Company assumed the mission for escorting the CU CHI - TAY NINH Convoy from the 3/4 Cav on the 8th of November 1967. The unit's mission includes designating the timing, speed, density, order of march, and action during enemy attacks. The average number of vehicles in the convoy each day during the reporting period was one hundred and thirty-five (135).
(b) Joint Police Patrols. DAU TIENG Patrols were initiated on 6 November 1967 and TAY NINH Patrols were established on 23 November 1967. Joint Molbile Checkpoints consist of U.S. Military Police, ARVN QUAN CANH, and GVN National Police organized for the purpose of controlling population and resources and:
1 Conduct thorough searches of persons and vehicles to interdict VC movement of personnel and supplies.
2 Control traffic to reduce accidents and expedite the flow of traffic.
3 Render whatever services possible to promote the health and welfare of the people.
(c) Operation YELLOWSTONE. One Military Police platoon (-1) was attached to the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Two squads of the security platoon were attached to the 25th Inf Div, HHC to provide security for Div Hqs at the Division Forward in DAU TIENG.
h. Revolutionary Development Support.
(1) Six additional Revolutionary Development (RD) teams became operational in TAY NINH Province, bringing the total operation there to 18. Projected goal in 1968 is to have 25 teams operating in TAY NINH Province. The teams, as they develop an area, are leaving a skeleton 4-5 man rear detachment in each of the villages/hamlets to insure that the area does not deteriorate in the teams' absence. Seven teams are now working in HAU NHGIA Province, an increase of one since last quarter. Additionally, six civil/military teams have been formed from RF/PF, National Police, Youth and sports personnel, District/Village/Hamlet officials and HOI CHANK. These teams appear to be successful in augmenting the RD program. The one RD team in PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province continues to work in the PHU HOA DONG area.
(2) The National Priority area has been enlarged as a part of the 1968 RD plan. The area now includes all populated areas in the TAOI.
i. Civic Action
(1) For the Division's Dry Season Campaign (DRYSECAP), Civic Action (CA) areas of responsibility were modified. The 1st Bde of the Division moved permanently from CU CHI Base Camp (XT 6515) to TAY NINH West (XT 1752). To assure continuity, CA platoons were realigned to permit them to remain in the area in which they had been operating. The 1st Bde was assigned civic action responsibility for PHU KHUONG and PHOC NINH Districts, TAY NINH Province. The 3rd Bde continues to work in TRI TAN District, BINH DUONG Province and KHEIM HANH District, TAY NINH Province.
The 2nd Brigade works in HIEU THIEU District, TAY NINH Province and in DUC HUE and DUC HOA Districts in HAU NGHIA Province. Div Arty continues to work in TRANG BANG District, HAU NGHIA Province and DISCOM in CU CHI District, HAU NGHIA Province, and PHU HOA District, BINH DUONG Province. A portion of GIA DINH Province was added to the Division's TAOI on 15 December 1967. It included a part of BINH CHAN and TAN BINH Districts and all of HOC MON and GO VAP Districts. The only civic action conducted in this area by the Division in the past has been support of the 25th ARVN Division dependents in HOC MON. Several other units are conducting civic action in this area and Division civic action responsibilities and relationships with the units conducting civic action in the area are pending clarification by II FFORCEV.
(2) A new high was reached in the number of civic action projects conducted with 431 completed in the last quarter. During the reporting period, many Christmas, New Year and TET activities were conducted with emphasis on winning support for the GVN and goodwill for US Forces. Over 2,425 pounds of candy and 15,885 toys were distributed to 19,635 children during the Christmas-New Year and TET holiday seasons. A total of 302,293$VN from private voluntary contributions, civic action funds, and private association funds was expended in support of these activities.
(3) There were 520 MEDCAPS during the last quarter, the highest number of MEDCAPS ever conducted by the Division and an increase of 256 MEDCAPS over the same period in 1966-1967. During the reporting period, MEDCAPS were conducted at 75 different locations throughout the TAOI. Medical treatment on a regularly scheduled basis was provided at 33 different locations. An inoculation program was instituted in association with MEDCAPS and 2400 children and 1900 adults received smallpox and cholera inoculations during the period. These inoculations were combined efforts by Division medical personnel and District medical teams.
(4) MEDCAPS treated 72,000 patients during the reporting period. 27,894 were treated during the month of January. This is the greatest number of patients treated during any single month since the Division has been in RVN.
(5) Division elements captured 600 tons of rice during the quarter. About 200 tons of this rice was evacuated for use in civic action projects. Approximately 100 tons of rice was given to Province Chief, TAY NINH Province. Care in distribution is exercised to avoid disruption of the local rice market. A total of 10 tons of this rice was donated to orphanages in SAIGON by Division units.
(6) Commodities continue to be supplied by CRS, USAID, and CARE. The CA AIK fund is increasing in importance. Commodities brought to RVN as a part of the Helping Hand Project are nearly exhausted and there are no provisions for replenishment. There will be increased reliance on the CA AIK Fund for CA supplies and commodities in the future.
(7) Assistance was provided to VN civilians and military dependents immediately following the VC attack on BAO TRAI, HAU NGHIA Province on 7 and 9 January 1968. Approximately 700 people were homeless as a result of the attack. Quick reaction by Civil Affairs personnel helped to meet the immediate needs of the people. 211 family and individual refugee kits containing sleeping mats, pots and pans, chop sticks, rice, and soup base were provided by the Division. Additionally, 4 tons of rice and 26 boxes of clothing were supplied.
j. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).
(1) PSYOP activities were primarily in support of combat operations in HAU NGHIA, TAY NINH, and BINH DUONG Provinces.
(2) A total of 65,260,100 leaflets were airdropped and hand disseminated throughout the division's TAOI. 37 leaflets were originated by G5 PSYOPS and S5's of the Division brigades. The leaflets were produced locally or by the 6th PSYOP Battalion.
(3) Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts conducted during the quarter totaled 280 hours of broadcast time and ground loudspeaker time totaled 72 hours. Three 1,000 watt loudspeaker sets and 3 tape recorders were received by the Division in December. Each 1,000 watt set consist of:
4 horns
4 amplifiers (250 watts)
4 control boxes
4 microphones
power cables
A 500 watt loudspeaker set was issued to each brigade and the Division Cavalry squadron for aerial and ground loudspeaker operations. One tape recorder was issued to the 1st Bde and one to the 3rd Bde. These sets are designed to be mounted on vehicles or the H-23 aircraft. G5 has a 1,000 watt set which can be mounted on a UH-1D/H.
(4) During the month of November 1967, an HE (Audio Visual) team (US) from the 6th PSYOP Bn was placed in support of the 25th Infantry Division. This team consists of one officer, one NCO, and a Jeepster equipped with a movie projector. They conduct PSYOPS by aerial and hand dissemination of leaflets, aerial and ground loudspeaker broadcasts, and showing of educational and propaganda films. The team is presently supporting the 2nd Brigade's Operation SARATOGA.
(5) During the quarter, the 246th PSYOP C o, supporting the III Corps area and the primary source of PSYOP support for the Division, was re-designated as the 6th PSYOP Bn. Its parent unit, which was the 6th PSYOP Bn has been re-designated as the 4th PSYOP Group. More PSYOP field teams from the 6th PSYOP Bn are expected to be made available to support this Division within 4-6 months as a result of the reorganization.
(6) CHIEU HOI program: During the months of November and December, the Division concentrated its effort on hard core VC and NVA units in War Zone “C”. During the quarter, 119 HOI CHANH rallied in the Division's TAOI. A drop in the number of returnees is occurring throughout the III Corps area.
k. Medical
(1) Personnel.
(a) The 25th Infantry Division has authorized and assigned the following Army Medical Service Officers:
Authorized Assigned
Medical Corps 37 37
Medical Service Corps 31 29
Dental Corps 4 3
The authorization for Medical Corps Officers has been reduced by seven (from an initial forty-four to the presently authorized thirty-seven). This reduction was effected under the provisions of unclassified message, AVHSU 64171, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, 18 September, 1967, Subject: Medical Service. In summary, this message reduced one Medical Corps Officer space in the Clearing Platoon of each Medical Company of the division's Medical Battalion. The three brigade surgeons were also eliminated by this message. Staff medical advice to the brigade commander is to be furnished by the medical company commander in support of this brigade.
(b) During this quarter, the Division Surgeon's Office has been up to full strength with the exception of the Division Aviation Medical Officer. The Preventive Medicine Specialist previously attached to this section was lost through normal attrition (DEROS). He is not to be replaced. A veterinarian and two enlisted veterinarian specialists are attached to HHC, 25th Infantry Division. They perform their duties under the general and technical supervision of the Division Surgeon. The Veterinarian and his enlisted staff provide immunization of pets of the Division, inspect meat and food supplies, perform Veterinary Civic Action Program (VETCAP) missions, detain animals suspected of rabies, and perform other various and sundry duties dictated by operations within the 25th Infantry Division's Tactical Area of Operations.
(2) Equipment. The reduction of Division level ground ambulances and associated personnel spaces has not yet been reduced fifty percent (50%) as outlined in the message mentioned in paragraph 1K (1) (a) above. The medical units of the Division are not in lack of any of their vital equipment. No medical equipment shortages have been reported to this office during the last quarter.
(3) Training.