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 Operation Fort Smith

HEADQUARTERS
2D BATTALION 14TH INFANTRY
(BATTLE DRAGONS)
APO San Francisco 96225
AVTLFBB                                                                                                                               19 July 1966
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report MACV (RCS/J3/32)
THRU:  Commanding Officer
       1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
       APO 96225
TO:    Commander
       US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
       ATTN: J343
       APO US Forces 96243
1. Name or Identity and/or Type of Operation:
   a. Operation FORT SMITH.
   b. Search and Destroy; Pacification.
2. Dates of Operation:
   03 June to 03 July 1966.
3. Location:
   Hau Nghia Province in area bounded by XT-465233, XT-560233, XT-490140 and XT-570135. (Majority area of operations in the Trang Bang District).
4. Control Headquarters:
   2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry vic AP AN Binh (XT-515193).
5. Reporting Officer:
   CO, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry (Lt Col Shultz, Commanding)
6. Task Organization:
   CO, A 2/14 Inf (Capt Norberg, Capt McQuillen)
   CO, B 2/14 Inf (Lt. Muir, Capt Williams)
   CO, C 2/14 Inf (Capt Turner)
   Engr Sqd A/65th Engr (SSG Turner, SSG Forest)
   3A 3/4 Cav (Lt Appler) (25-29 Jun)
   2B 3/4 Cav (Lt Kyle, Lt Conner) (5-10 Jun, 19-25 Jun)
   3B 3/4 Cav (Lt Miller) (3 Jun-5 Jun, 10 Jun-19 Jun)
   1A 3/4 Cav (Lt Spielman) (29-3Jul)
   VHF Team, B/125th Signal
   Radio Team, 1st Bde
   MID Team, 25th Inf Div
7. Supporting Forces: Supporting forces included direct support artillery by B Btry, 7/11 Arty from 3 June 66 to 3 July 66. A Btry, 7/11th Arty reinforced the fires of B Btry, 7/11th Arty from 17 June 66 to 21 June 66.  3/13th Arty provided general support from 3 June 66 to 3 July 66. 7th USAF provided tactical air on 20 minute ground alert but was not utilized during the operation. Army aviation support from 25th Aviation Bn, 145th Aviation Bn, a/82 Avn Co., and 13th AVN Bn greatly contributed to the success of operation FORT SMITH by providing Command and Control aircraft, light and heavy gun teams for combat operations and daily resupply aircraft. All aviation units that supported our operations did an outstanding job in coordination and execution of all airmobile operations conducted.  Trang Bang District Chief supported TF 2/14 Inf with an attachment of 4 National Policemen for employment during Search and Destroy operations, pacification operations and night ambushes.  There were also 3 MEDCAP personnel and equipment provided from the Trang Bang District for pacification and MEDCAP operations. Intelligence and Vietnamese Information Service personnel were provided to support TF 2/14th Inf operations to search and interrogate civilians for intelligence information. Their overall effectiveness was outstanding.  Intelligence information provided by the district chief was timely and accurate. The VIS (Psy War Team) personnel were responsive and effective in the operations conducted.  The US Advisors and Government Representatives at Trang Bang district also provided support during operations by using squad and platoon PF and RF forces in blocking positions to seal off the objective areas.
8. Intelligence:
   a. Intelligence Prior to Operations:
   VC Activity within the operations area was generally concentrated along Highway 1. Since 1 May 66, the area, vic XT490190, XT530225, XT525188, XT502250 was the scene of numerous anti-aircraft and mine incidents.  Most VC fortifications observed during visual reconnaissance and interpretation of aerial photographs were also located in the same area. The Trang Bang Company (AKA B85) strength 80, normally operates with 5 mile radius of district of Trang Bang.  The C54 company was last reported at XT475345. The C120 (LF) company was reported operating in the Southwest corner of the operational area, it's strength estimated 50-120 personnel. The C50 company (LF) was reported at XT532218, (B/2 evaluation).  The 320 LF Bn was also operating in the area.
   b. Enemy Situation During Operation:
   Throughout the entire operation, the VC activity consisted of sniper and harassing small arms fire. Mines both AP and AT, booby traps, claymore type weapons, 60mm mortars and hand grenade incidents were numerous.  The enemy operated in units smaller than company size. Units of squad size and smaller were common in the area of operations. VC units indicated t obe in the area of operations were the 491st company and the 132nd company.  These units were operating in the area from XT4915 to XT5715. The 2nd Bn 165A was reported at vic XT400210, XT560200. The 1st Bn 165A was reported vic XT575270. A Bn size unit (possibly the 320th) was reported at vic XT525245.  Also an unidentified VC company with an attached guerrilla platoon was reported at vic XT569248, XT569244, XT575248, and XT575244.
   c. Terrain and Weather:
   (1) The terrain is generally flat, marshy and soft.  There are several heavily wooded areas within the area of operations. But mostly the area consists of thick hedgerows with clearings in which peanuts, sugar cane, or rice are planted.  These hedgerows offered the enemy good cover and concealment as well as fields of fire, when friendly troops were on the approach march. Vegetation is ideal for VC guerrilla tactics.  There were no major obstacles for foot troops; however during heavy rains the Cau Truong Chua river on the west side of the area of operations became untrafficable for foot troops and vehicles. Trafficability for wheeled vehicles is poor.  APC's could still move in selected routes over rice paddy areas.
   (2) The weather during the operation was fair for foot troops.  Heavy rains made secondary roads impassible to vehicles. Generally it was hot and humid in the mornings and cloudy and rainy in the evenings.  Weather was generally favorable for air support in the morning and fair to poor in the afternoon and evenings, commencing about 1400 hours daily.
   d. Fortifications: No major fortifications were found within the area of operations. Fortifications consisted of trench systems, spider holes and a few tunnels which were not elaborate.
   e. Psy War: The evaluation of the population and their attitude in hamlets and villages within the AO of the 2/14th Inf was improved because of the active and continuous Psy War program employed.  The District Chief of Trang Bang District coordinated the activities of his VIS (Vietnamese Information Service), his intelligence personnel, loud speaker systems, aircraft available, and his personal appearance to talk to villagers.  The most significant success was in the village of AP AN PHU. The village area of AP AN PHU XT510168 has over 1000 families and a total of 3448 persons living in the area.  The district chief described the area as being a rich community where the majority of the people are educated. He described the VC activity in the area as being active in the realm of gathering supplies and foodstuffs to ship north.  He described the people as accepting the VC because they had no choice in the matter, due to fear and intimidation. The people were happy to be able to continue their farming and therefore tolerated the VC.  The VC propaganda directed that the people would leave the village every time the government forces attempted an operation in the area. This permitted the VC to conceal themselves among the people allowing them to escape.  Also, the propaganda described the government as being corrupt and the Americans as animals who would slaughter people, rape, burn homes, and destroy crops.  Our operations, conducted in the AP AN PHU area were deliberate plans coordinated with the Trang Bang District Chief to win over the people of AP AN PHU to the government.  This was accomplished first by a ground operation to eliminate any VC forces, and to orient the troops on the terrain. The second and third operations in the area were mainly to educate the people concerning their government, and the policies and purpose of the Americans being here.  Education of the people was accomplished by leaflets being air-dropped, the district chief making personal contact with the people on the ground, and the VIS making speeches to the people.  In conjunction with these efforts, Helping Hand material was passed out and the Bn Surgeon conducted MEDCAP in the area. All of these actions created a positive win for the government as illustrated by the actions of the people during the last heliborne operation in AP AN PHU.  Operations were conducted in AP AN PHU on 13 June 66, 21 June 66, 24 June 66, and 2 July 66.  On 2 July 66, when TF 2/14th Inf conducted a heliborne operation in AP AN PHU, the people were reacting as the District chief desired. Only 10% of the people evacuated the area.  Most of the people remained at home, and those in the fields continued their work. The people spoke freely and offered information as to when, where, and the number of VC in the area, and the location of booby traps and mines.   Some families told of the VC instructing them to leave and that they had refused, saying "Every time we go, rice and valuables are missing when we return. We will stay". The VC prior to operation FORT SMITH had a strong hold on the people in AP AN PHU. As a result of our operations in the AO, the VC hold over the people was relinquished. This fact was made evident by two families that requested to be relocated in new life hamlets in the Trang Bang District.  The success in employment of Psy War operations cannot be under-estimated. The attitudes of the people is now oriented to the government.  The villagers now have a clearer understanding of their government and the purpose of Americans in Vietnam due to the education and influence exerted through the Trang Bang District Chief.
   9. Mission:
   TF 2/14 conducted tactical motor march to AO 030800 June 66 and established Bn base camp to interdict VC lines of communication; conducts S&D of VC forces, bases and supplies; establishes liaison with US Advisory team Trang Bang District; conducts combined opns with ARVN forces; assist in pacification of AO; provides wire, pickets and technical assistance on installations to PF and RF units in AO.
   10. Concept of Operation:
   TF 2/14th Inf conducts S&D operations vic AP AN BINH, Trang Bang District (XT515193) for approximately three weeks commencing 030800 June 1966.  TF 2/14 conducts tactical motor march from Base Camp (Cu Chi) to establish a Bn base vic XT515193 (AP AN BINH). TF 2/14th will establish liaison with local District Chief through the US Advisors and conduct patrols, security, pacification operations, Psy war missions and a positive civic action program.
   11. Execution:
(3 June 66)
   2/14th Inf received 1st Bde OPORD 7-66 (Operation FORT SMITH) dtd 010800 H June 1966, planned the execution of the mission and issued TF 2/14th Inf OPORD 6-66 (Operation FORT SMITH) dtd 012200 June 66 to conduct a tactical motor march from base camp to the RP (XT514189) commencing 030900 June 66.  TF consisted of A 2/14, C 2/14, Recon Plat, Mort Plat, 1 short range Radar Tm, Security and Assault Plat, 3rd Plat B Trp 3/4 Cav, 1 Squad A 1/65th Engr, VHF Tm B/125 Signal, Radio Tm 1st Bde, MID Tm 25th Inf Div and 8 National Policemen attached.  Upon arrival RP, A 2/14 with attachments cleared Bn base vic XT515197 and established a defensive perimeter with CP locations as follows:  Co A - XT514196, Co C - XT516198, B 7/11 Arty - XT519198, HHC - XT515196 and Bn CP XT515197. Companies of the 2/14th Inf rotated in AO, but CP locations remained generally the same throughout the operation. Upon closing Bn base area, A 2/14 reported sniper small arms and rifle grenades in their area from vic XT513199 on or about 031520 June 66.  A 2/14 returned fire and VC withdrew to Northwest. No casualties were reported for friendly or VC. 4 VCS were picked up vic XT 515190 without proper identification on or about 031030 June 66.  These were turned over to Trang Bang District Chief, later discovered to be detainees only. 031800 June 66 Bn base received sniper small arms firing and 2 rounds 60mm mortar at XT521196 no casualties reported.  Sniper fire was received from XT514200, fire was returned with small arms.  VC sniper was silenced. No casualties were reported. TF 2/14 Inf dispatched five (5) ambush patrols at 032000 June 66.  A 2/14 patrol reported VC followed ambush patrol for 200-250 meters and disappeared. No contacts established by ambush patrols. 032351 June 66, C 2/14 reported 3 rds carbine fire from XT521201.  Returned fire silenced VC snipers.  No casualties reported. 040430 June 66, C 2/14 reported 3 rds carbine fire from XT515200. Returned fire. VC silenced. No casualties reported. All ambush patrols closed Bn base 040735 June 66. Recon Plat reported road cleared with mine detector from Bn base to Hi-way #1 effective 040735 June 66.
(4 June 66)
    TF 2/14th Inf conducted S&D operations vic XT515210 (AP AN THOI) 040915 June 66, with elements of the 3/4 Cav Plat blocking from the North vic XT515213 and A 2/14 and C 2/14 S&D from South (XT505193) to North (XT515213).  Two VCS were captured vic XT516198 by C 2/14 040945 June 66. VCS turned over to MID vic Bn base.  041050 June 66, C 2/14 reported bunker located XT521212 unoccupied destroyed with demolitions.  041054 June 66, A 2/14 reported VC aid station abandoned with 2 lbs of medicine. Turned in medicine to Bn base medics - tunnel (aid station) destroyed in place (XT515205). National Police with A 2/14 advise burning all homes of farmers with incriminating equipment such as signs, medicine, ammunitions, pictures of known VC and VC small arms fire. Houses were located general vicinity of AP AN THOI.  041230 Recon Plat cleared 200 meters forward of perimeter.  Recon Plat reported people were departing their homes leaving hot meals on tables also extensive tunnel systems were located in the area of homes. Recon Plat received sniper fire (carbine) from XT529197 at 041317 June 66.  Returned fire with automatic wpns & small arms. Snipers silenced. All elements closed Bn base 041432 June 66.  042250 C 2/14 ambush patrol vic XT525206 reported VC following them. Hasty ambush set for VC. No further sightings of VC.  042331 June 66, C 2/14 patrol reported one round mortar 60mm mortar fired to their front vic XT525206. No casualties reported.
(5 June 66)
    Operation Frag order #1 for "FORT SMITH" direct TF 2/14th Inf to S&D in vic XA LAM VO (1) (XT530218) and leave a stay behind ambush in objective area vic XT531219. Co "C" moved from Bn base 050400 to block obj from the North vic XT533223.  050430 A 2/14 ambush patrol captured one VCS vic XT525213 on bicycle. 050545 C 2/14 reports hearing voices and carts moving out of the village XA LAM VO (1) north. C 2/14 secured blocking positions North of obj at 050640 June 66.   Artillery and 4.2 blocked the west (XT528228) of obj w/fires. A 2/14 reported civilians in obj area claim 25 VC were there last night but departed the area prior to our arrival. C 2/14 received 2 rounds small arms sniper fire from XT547224.  C 2/14 returned fire and maneuvered foot troops against location. VC withdrew.  051200 Recon Plat 1/4 ton vehicle destroyed by mine XT518207, 3 men injured.  Wounded men air evacuated to Cu Chi. Recon Plat discovered small arms cache in house XT517207. House burned and ammo cache destroyed in place. A 2/14 stay behind ambush reported killing one VC with small arms fire 051617 June 66 at XT542230.   Ambush sprung by a National Police firing his pistol at range of 250 meters.  Artillery, gun ships, and Cav Plat were utilized to kill and cause VC (estimated 25 armed men) to withdraw.  Two VC KIA (BC) and three additional dead reported by ARVN intelligence next day. One (1) rifle (VC) captured and turned in to MID 051730 June 66. Reaction to the reported VC contact was immediate.  The Bn Cmdr was airborne and positive radio contact established with ambush element. Artillery was directed from an airborne observer and a light gun team was employed in conjunction with a Cav Plat which maneuvered to block and sweep through the VC positions at XT537225 controlled by Bn Cmdr airborne. Stay behind ambush of A 2/14 closed Bn base 051730 June 66. No friendly casualties reported.
051930 June 66 TF 2/14 dispatched 5 ambush patrols with negative results. Radar PPS-4 reported 052040 June 66 3 or 4 persons and 1 bicycle moving from north to south 360 meters to 310 meters forward of perimeter vic XT526201.  No further Radar sightings.  052115 June 66, A 2/14 perimeter spotted 3 VC with starlight devices and fired M79s. VC withdrew vic XT513200. 052345 June 66, B 7/11 Arty reported 4 rounds VC sniper small arms fire received at XT521201.  Returned w/MG. Snipers silenced. No casualties reported. 060600 June 66 all patrols closed Bn base.  Negative contact reported except that a VC or something follows patrols out of perimeter area for short distances.  Follower seems to know when he is observed or heard and stops or disappears without being killed or captured.
(6 June 66)
   Frag Order #2 is a heliborne operation to S&D vic AP BAO ME and XA BAO ME (XT505214)  3/4 Cav Plat and Recon Plat blocks from the East from XT511215 to XT509209 at 061200 June 66. C 2/14 is helifted at 061210 June 66 to block obj area from the North from XT505221 to XT510220.  RF and PF forces would block west end of obj from XT498220 to XT494200 at 061200 June 66. A 2/14 maneuvered from South to North into obj area at 061320 June 66 S&D enroute. A 2/14 killed one water buffalo attacking soldier and civilians in area.  One (1) US Soldier evacuated to Trang Bang. C 2/14 captured 3 VCS at XT505220 at 051250 June 66. A 2/14 captured 3 VCS vic XT501208 at 061355 June 66.  061545 June 66 B 7/11 Arty had three men cutting bamboo vic XT522200 who received sniper fires from house. Arty destroyed house with WP rounds. Dozer with A 2/14 filled in 450 meters of VC trench line vic XT508213 at 051548 June 66.  All units closed Bn base 061801 June 66. Stay behind ambush located XT501204. TF 2/14 Inf dispatched 5 ambush patrols 061900 June 66.  Ambush site at XT512194 recalled because close proximity to ARVN ambush site.   (S&A Plat ambush returned Bn base 062130 June 66). No contacts made by ambush patrols. All patrols closed Bn base 070628 June 66.
(7 June 66)
Frag Order #3 TF 2/14 conducts S&D operations, vic AP AN THOI (XT515208) by blocking in the North with 3/4 Cav Plat XT515213 at 070815 June 66. S&A Plat and Recon Plat blocks from East at XT520202 and XT520205 at 070800.  A 2/14 and C 2/14 will S&D from XT508195 North to XT516210. 3/4 Cav Plat received sniper fire from XT514217 at 070848 June 66. Cav maneuvered and returned fire. VC disappeared.   C 2/14 reported one 81mm mortar round found at XT508196, destroyed in place with demolitions 070925 June 66. A 2/14 captured female VCS XT514202 June 66. 2 VC snipers engaged by Recon Plat and 3/4 Cav element 070929 June 66 vic XT513210.  VC withdrew West with carbines slung over shoulders. C 2/14 destroyed 3 spider holes vic XT512206 071017 June 66. A 2/14 requested dozer use in his area to cover trench lines. Dozer arrived his location 071100 June 66, and hit a mine.  Killed Capt Norberg, A Co Commander and Pfc Rivera of A Co 2/14. Both were standing alongside dozer. Mine damaged dozer blade and hydraulic lines. 3 other men wounded by blast of mine air evacuated to Cu Chi 071132 June 66.  071250 June 66, S&A Plat captured 2 VCS and received sniper fires from XT525206. S&A returned fire and VC withdrew North. C 2/14 observed 1 VC with rifle XT530204. Wounded VC with small arms but continued mission S&D South towards Bn base.  072000 June 66, TF 2/14 sent out 4 ambush sites with negative contact reported. Road to Hi-way #1 cleared w/mine detector by Recon Plat completed 080700 June 66.
(8 June 66)
   8 June 66 - Frag order #4, TF 2/14 conducted S&D in AP TINH PHONG (XT535209 and XA LAM VO (2) (XT550221).  A 2/14 moved on foot June 66, to block obj from the north, east and south vic XT550227, XT555224 and XT550219. 3/4 Cav Plat (-) moved from Bn base 080700 June 66, to block north vic XT541229.  C 2/14 moved on foot from Bn base S&D enroute through obj AP TINH PHONG (XT535209) at 080700 June 66.  A 2/14 reported automatic fire from VC sniper KIA one US soldier vic XT558225 at 080730 June 66. A 2/14 returned fire and VC withdrew Southeast into trench line.  Artillery was directed into VC positions. Recon Plat captured one VCS vic XT514190 080700 June 66. VCS turned in to MID Bn base.  Gun ships reported extensive trench lines vic XT569230 extending 1000 meters northwest. Gun ships unloaded ordinance into trench system prior to departure. 080820 June 66, 3/4 Cav Plat (-) reported 5 VC with wpns vic XT549235.  VC taken under fire with automatic wpns from APC's at 250 meter range. VC disappeared moving North into jungle area.  080827 June 66, C 2/14 reported 8 VC moving South vic XT536199. VC disappeared into brush 700 meters away.  C 2/14 fired on one VC 080849 June 66 at XT546214, results unknown. C 2/14 reported 400 lbs rice, 20 lbs salt found at XT548022. Vietnamese military intelligence personnel recommended destruction in place because it is VC cache.  Cache destroyed in place. S&A Plat reported one US heat casualty vic XT550217 081310 June 66. TF 2/14 dispatched four (4) ambush patrols at 081900 June 66.  081935 June 66, C 2/14 ambush patrol captured one (1) VCS at XT528221 and received sniper fire from XT526214. Patrol returned fire and called artillery. VC withdrew East. All ambush patrols closed Bn base 090605 June 66.   090750 June 66, Recon Plat completed road clearing operation from Bn base to Hi-way #1.
(9 June 66)
    TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #5) civic action operation in coordinating with Trang Bang District Chief in XA CAY CAU (XT514188) during the morning and XA AN DUC (XT532180) in the afternoon.  Operations area was secured by one rifle company and 2 APCs and one (1) 2 1/4 ton trk were utilized to transport medical supplies and helping hand material. S&A Plat secured helping hand (S-5) and medcap activities concurrently. Psy War leaflets and speeches presented by District Chief and Vietnamese Information Services kept the people orderly and informed. Each area received Medcap, Helping Hand material, and Psy-war lectures for approximately 2 hours beginning 090900 June 66.  091149 June 66 Bn base received 30 rounds sniper fire from vic XT511195. One US WIA evacuated to Cu Chi by air.  Defensive concentrations fired vic XT520192 by Arty FO injured 2 civilians Nguyen-Thi-Na (53 year old woman) and Tran-Van-Duong (56 year old man-husband). Two civilians evacuated to Trang Bang then to Saigon by air.  TF 2/14 dispatched 4 night ambush positions at 091930 June 66.  100002 June 66 ground surveillance reported 5 persons moving towards perimeter vic XT519200. Target engaged with M79 and small arms. 5 VC possible KIA.   100618 June 66 all patrols return Bn base with negative results. 100637 June 66, Recon Plat cleared road to hi-way #1 with mine detector.
(10 June 66)
   Frag order #6 directed TF 2/14 to Search and Destroy in and along the Cau Truong Chua river from XT501193 to XT513220 100800 June 66. (10) picket stations blocked on west bank of river utilizing minimum 4 man positions from XT508218 to XT505203.  (9) picket stations blocked on east bank of river from XT513215 to XT508195. A 3/4 Cav Plat reaction force west of river vic XT504207 and a tank section reaction force with recon Plat vic Bn base.  100740 June 66, C 2/14 reported 4 VC at XT507212 carrying bags and moving towards river. C 2/14 reported sniper fire from XT510218 at 100745 June 66. Returned fire and VC withdrew east towards river.   C 2/14 continued to blocking position and VC withdrew north. 100845 June 66 S&A Plat in water searching north in river with C 2/14 (-) on his left and A 2/14 on his right. A 2/14 spotted 5 VC with weapons headed north 100855 June 66 at XT513213.   C 2/14 picket station 4 reported 2 VC at XT507228 100925 June 66. A 2/14 picket station #2 reported 2 VC with weapons and wounded one w/small arms and attempted to move in on other VC at XT514212 100951 June 66, A 2/14 at picket station #2 heard squad size element maneuvering around its east. A 2/14 picket station #2 heard movement on flanks of its position. 101040 June 66 S&A Plat killed one VC in river XT508206.   A 2/14 picket station #2 receiving fire from 4 sides. Reaction force (3 tanks and Recon Plat) sent mounted to assist. A 2/14 picket station #2 1 VC KIA and 1 US WIA XT509218 101130 June 66.  Picket station 1, 2, and 3 of A 2/14 joined together at picket station #2 and fought off VC squad surrounding picket station #2. C 2/14 reported capturing 4 VC's vic XT505208.  A 2/14 picket station #2 reported 7 VC KIA (BC) 3 VC WIA, captured 1 pistol belt, 1 magazine, 3 rds ammo one hand grenade at XT514212 101300 June 66. A 2/14 reported one (1) VC WIA XT512219 101325 June 66.  A 2/14 reported (1) VC WIA at XT511205 with small arms, VC disappeared into underbrush 101340 June 66. 13 VC's released by district chief representative vic XT505208 at 101440 June 66. The people were farmers from XA BAO ME.  A VC captured by district chief on earlier operations led C 2/14 to alleged cache but nothing was found. 20 VC's released 101730 June 66 vic XT505208. District chief representative identified people as farmers. All elements closed Bn base 101800 June 66. TF 2/14 dispatched 4 ambush sites at 102100 June 66. Negative results from ambush patrols.  All patrols closed in Base 110625 June 66.
(11 June 66)
   On 11 June 66 TF 2/14 Inf was given eagle flight mission to search and destroy in vicinity of AP DUONG TRAN NHO (XT551193) with one rifle company plus attached 3/4 Cav Plat. A 2/14 conducted helilift 110835 June 66 to XT551193, S&D in area with VCC informers to located VC equipment, documents and personnel.  3/4 Cav blocks on south vicinity XT550180. 3/4 Cav Plat captured 5 VCS vic XT549182, 110857 June 66. 110930 June 66, received information from local Vietnamese that woman wounded by artillery fires died of wounds in Saigon Hospital.  S-5 and interpreter assisted, and B Btry donated money and foodstuffs and offered their apologies to the family. Assistance was given to insure claims from the family would be handled promptly by the District Chief (Trang Bang District).  111033 June 66, A 2/14 received 10 rounds sniper fire from XT550187. A 2/14 returned fire and VC moved north east. A 2/14 captured 5BCC XT530183 111215 June 66. A 2/14 received sniper fire from XT548188 111352 June 66.  A 2/14 returned fire, VC silenced. A 2/14 destroyed 1 tunnel XT547194 111450 June 66. 3/4 Cav at 111550 June 66 reported sniper fire XT533188 WIA 1 US in chest. Man air evacuated by C&C ship to CU CHI.   3 VCC and 2 VCS captured by 3/4 Cav Plat 111220 June 66 vic XT545190. 3/4 Cav Plat captured 6 VCS 110857 June 666. At XT549188 A 2/14 found carbine magazine w/30 rounds ammo vic XT547183 and turned equip in to MID Bn base 111715 June 66.  C 2/14 found 1 home made single shot rifle XT520208 111717 June 66. C 2/14 reported VC Chicom claymore set off vic XT518201 at 112120 June 66 no casualties reported. TF 2/14 dispatched 4 patrols 112000 June 66.  Short range radar sighted 11 man target vic XT528201. Target taken under fire with small arms 112315 June 66 and target disappeared.
(Operation Fargo 12 Jun 66)
   Operation FARGO reported on feeder report to 1st Bde 29 June 1966 covered period 120400 June 66 - 121500 June 66.  1 Plat A 2/14 returned CU CHI 121515 June 66. B 2/14 closed Bn base 121700 June 66. A 2/14 employed 2 plat size ambushes vic XT525213 and XT530196 121830 June 66. VC set off one Chicom claymore vic XT513196 at 122014 June 66. 1 US WIA.  Radar reported target at vic XT122304 June 66. Small arms and M79 fired results unknown. [More about Operation Fargo...]
(13 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducts S&D operations vic AP AN PHU following Frag order #8.  130400 June 66, C 2/14 moved on foot to block objective area from the south and east with 12 (4 man) picket stations from XT515175 to XT515163 to XT512161.  Local PF and RF forces blocked on North and West vic XT512186 and XT495172 by 130630 June 66.  B 2/14 with 3/4 Cav Plat and Civic Action teams attached conducted S&D from North to South in AP AN PHU (XT505169) 130545 June 66. 130635 June 66 all picket stations in positions and C 2/14 captured 1 VCS at station #1 (XT515175) and 20 VCS at station #5 (XT516170). S&A Plat captured chicom claymore mine vic XT515198 turned in to Bde. B 2/14 reported sniper fires w/rifle grenades vic XT507174. VC withdrew South.  C 2/14 received sniper and rifle grenade fires vic XT516164. C 2/14 returned fire and VC silenced. B 2/14 131000 June 66 reported 5 VC with weapons (1 submachine gun, 1 automatic rifle, 3 rifles) vic XT506176.   VC fired upon by stay behind ambush wounding 2 VC. No friendly casualties.  B 2/14 captured 1 VCS vic XT505161 131304 June 66. B 2/14 received sniper fire from vic XT505165 131455 June 66. VC silenced with small arms.  S&A Plat reported 1 VC w/camouflage vic XT512195. VC moved west when fired upon with M79. 131645 June 66, 2 rounds of 60mm mortar landed vic B 7/11 Arty. No casualties reported. All TF 2/14 elements closed Bn base 131740 June 66.  TF 2/14 dispatched 4 ambush patrols 132000 June 66. 132100 June 66, VC claymore mine set off vic XT514196. 1 US WIA. All patrols closed 140615 June 66 with negative results.  B 2/14 discovered VC claymore mine forward of position vic XT514196 at 140740 June 66.
(14 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #9) civic action and helping hand operations vic XT530195 (AP TRANG DAU) (1).  C 2/14 moved on foot to block from North and East vic XT535201, XT539198 at 140830 June 66. 3/4 Cav moved from Bn base 140945 June 66 to block obj from West vic XT530196. B 2/14 with civic action teams attached moved from XT534184 North to XT532199. Objective area was without people except approximately 20 old ladies and old men and about 50 children that followed B 2/14 into obj area. TF 2/14 elements closed Bn base 141355 June 66. TF 2/14 141940 June 66 dispatched 4 ambush patrols.  Radar (PPS-5) reported Plat VC (20-25 men) vic XT522199 at 142250 June 66. VC element taken under fire with small arms and direct fire from 2 tanks w/cannister rounds in conjunction with azimuth reading from radar.  Radar reports after firing only 8 persons moving. Estimate 15 VC KIA or WIA 142330 June 66. All patrols closed Bn base 150615 June 66 with negative contact.
(15 June 66)
   TF 2/14 executed (Frag order #10) S&D mission vic XT502206, B 2/14 moved by foot to establish 10 picket stations on North and East end of obj area from XT500216 to XT510216 to XT508218 at 150400 June 66. PD and RF elements blocked obj area from West from XT498216 to XT495208 at 140630 June 66. S&A Plat was reaction force at XT510217 150630 June 66.  C 2/14 with 3/4 Cav Plat attached S&D from South to North (XT500205 to XT504213) beginning 150630 June 66. 150750 June 66, S&A Plat received sniper fire and rifle grenades XT508218 returned fire and VC withdrew North.  C 2/14 discovered tunnel complex XT506512 at 151019 June 66.  Tunnel complex destroyed with demolitions by C 2/14 151545 June 66. All elements closed Bn base 151615 June 66. TF 2/14 dispatched 4 ambush patrols at 152000 June 66.  One patrol returned to Bn base reported hearing many VC XT519217.  Artillery fired in location: results unknown. 142145 June 66 1 60mm mortar landed in Bn base, one 2 1/4 ton trk slightly damaged. No casualties reported.   C 2/14 received sniper fire XT514197. Artillery directed fire in vic VC positions silencing VC fire. All patrols closed Bn base 160607 June 66.  VC constructed small dirt mounds on Hi-way #1 vic XT525186: reported by air recon element 160720 June 66. TG 2/14 airlanded one squad of Recon Plat attached, moved mounted from West to East on both sides of Hi-Way #1 to cut off any VC in area.  Road block was cleared and traffic continued 160845 June 66. National Police found 155 shell wired for command detonation on East end of road block XT528184. Mine destroyed in place by National Police.
(16 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducts (Frag order #11) armed reconnaissance in XA ONG DAM (XT535231), and XA BAO TRAM (XT500235) 160955 June 66. C 2/14 moved by foot to XT500235 160730 to conduct armed reconnaissance of obj area.  C 2/14 captured 1 VCS vic XT510226 160955 June 66. C 2/14 discovered 2500 lbs of rice cache buried in cemetery XT506226 at 161035 June 66. Rice burned and spread into water.  B 2/14 moved by foot to conduct armed reconnaissance vic AP ONG DAM (XT520230) 150850 June 66.  B 2/14 received sniper fires 161125 June 66 from XT516199. B 2/14 returned fire and VC withdrew Northwest.  3/4 Cav moved from Bn base 161100 June 66 to conduct armed reconnaissance vic XA ONG DAM (XT535231), 3/4 Cav Plat reported suspected mortar position XT525232 recently occupied in freshly dug ground.  3/4 Cav reported locating an attachment (grenade launcher) for a carbine and a home made gun at XT525232. C 2/14 captured 2 VCS at XT500230 at 161303 June 66. B 2/14 sighted 4 BC with weapons at XT519238, and 3 VC with weapons at XT523241.  161310 June 66, the VC moved north into wooded area. TF 2/14 dispatched 3 ambush patrols at 162000 June 66. C 2/14 reported red and white lights flashing vic XT521203 162130 June 66. Lights taken under fire with 81mm mortar, 4.2 mortar, and 155 artillery from Cu Chi. Lights disappeared. All patrols closed Bn base 170645 June 66 with negative results.  170716 June 66 S&A Plat cleared road to Hi-way #1.
(17 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #12) daylight ambushes vic XT530203 and XT515214 with negative results.  TF 2/14 conducted mine clearing and S&D operations vic XT515208 (AP AN THOI) with the Recon Plat. Recon Plat found tunnel at XT514208 and destroyed same with demolitions at 170945 June 66. Recon Plat found 200 bags of rice, 50 lbs each bag, at XT510208. Rice was scattered over ground and into nearby wells. Recon Plat found 2 lbs medical supplies and 1 grenade XT515204 171055 June 66. B 2/14 reported a bomb at XT525186, yield unknown (estimated 250 lbs bomb).   Bomb destroyed in place 171125 June 66. Recon Plat discovered tunnel system with 18 entrances vic XT518208 and destroyed it in place 171345 June 66. C 2/14 captured 1 VCS and 1 VCC vicinity XT525213 at 171935 June 66.  TF 2/14 dispatched 4 ambush patrols with negative results. All patrols closed Bn base 180543 June 66.  TF 2/14 moved Recon Plat, mounted on 3/4 Cav elements, to clear mounds of dirt across Hi-way #1 at XT522187 and XT542178 - at 180650 June 66.  1st location of dirt mounds cleared 180722 June 66. 2nd location of dirt mounds was cleared with mine detector and flanks checked for command detonated wires. All signs of mines or booby traps were investigated and believed cleared.  A detail shoveled dirt off to the side of road, a shovel of dirt set off a mine wounding 7 US soldiers at XT538180 180749 June 66. All wounded evacuated by air to Cu Chi. 2nd mounded area cleared 180858 June 66.
(18 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #13) pacification, civic action and MEDCAP vic AP TINH PHONG (XT536218) 181148 June 66. C 2/14 blocked on North from XT535213 to XT530210, 3/4 Cav blocked East end of obj vic XT541212 with Recon Plat and S&A blocking South vic XT535206 and XT540207. B 2/14 moved on foot with civic action teams and conducted civ actions with Vietnamese Information Service Personnel presenting speeches. Prepared leaflets (3,000) preceded the movement of B 2/14 by air drops into obj area. B 2/14 moved from West to East through obj area 181230 June 66.  B 2/14 secured LZ, and MEDCAP personnel landed and conducted MEDCAP vic XT539209 at 181430 June 66. All elements closed in Bn base 181630 June 66.  1 US soldier wounded seriously by friendly artillery WP round vic Bn base (XT518198) at 181730 June 66.  Man air evacuated to Cu Chi. TF 2/14 dispatched 4 ambush patrols 182000 June 66.  All patrols closed Bn base 190555 June 66, with negative results. S&A Plat cleared road to Hi-way #1 190728 June 66.
(19 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #14) S&D in XA LAM VO (2) XT550220 with 3/4 Cav Plat blocking from South vic XT551218 and B 2/14 S&D from XT540230 to XT550110 at 190830 June 66. 3/4 Cav Plat destroyed a command detonated 105 arty shell mine vic XT526227 at 190905 June 66, leaflets air dropped in obj area 191015 June 66.  B 2/14 had 5 WIA from VC small arms and rifle grenade vic XT514223 at 191227 June 66. B 2/14 maneuvered and returned fire. VC withdrew to Southeast.  All elements closed Bn base 191510 June 66.  TF 2/14 dispatched 3 ambush patrols 191930 June 66, with negative results.
(20 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #15) fire flush and S&D operation vic AP LONG MUC (XT527246) 200300 June 66.  B 2/14 and C 2/14 blocked south of obj area vic XT52238? and XT526238 at 200611 June 66. B 2/14 made contact with 1 VC vic XT524240. VC moved West. B 2/14 reported freshly dug holes vic XT524241 at 200700 June 66.  Recon Plat cleared road to Hi-way #1 at 200720 June 66.  Artillery fired from North to South towards B 2/14 and C 2/14. Artillery continued firing from South to North while troops moved North 200630 June 66.   S&A Plat with 3/4 Cav Plat attached as reaction force vic XT528238, received sniper fire from XT525237. Fire was returned and VC moved West. All elements closed Bn base 201237 June 66. TF 2/14 dispatched 4 ambush sites at 202000 June 66.   B 2/14 ambush patrol was ambushed by 5 VC with auto wpns. Patrol returned fire and broke contact XT529195 at 202015 June 66 and continued mission. No casualties reported for VC or friendly troops. B 7/11 Arty sighted 3 people 210102 June 66 with starlight device vic XT525199. M79 fired at target and target disappeared. B 2/14 moved to Hi-way #1 on North side from XT518190 to XT527186, at 210400 June 66, to prevent VC from setting road block on Hi-Way #1.  Recon Plat cleared road from Bn base to Hi-way #1 210615 June 66. B 2/14 210640 June 66 reported 2 VCS vic XT520192 moving East. All ambush elements closed Bn base 210720 June 66.
(21 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted search and Civic Action in AP AN PHU (XT510168) at 210730 June 66. (Frag order #16).  S&A elements blocked on South vic XT511161 and XT515161 and 3/4 Cav Plat blocked on West and positioned themselves as reaction force at XT518174 at 210800 June 66. 7,000 leaflets were airdropped prior to opns. S&A Plat received sniper fires 210830 June 66 at XT520161. One medic wounded from S&A Plat air evacuated to Cu Chi. Artillery was fired at XT518161 and silenced VC snipers. Artillery killed two water buffalo.  B 2/14 and C 2/14 moved (East to West) and moved all civilians to a central location so District Chief could conduct speeches and explain the leaflets.  The reception was good, and through the entire operation the District Chief spoke to approximately 385 people.  Bn base received sniper fires from XT515198. B 2/14 returned fire with small arms and mortar fire. VC silenced.  B 2/14 received sniper fire vic XT514284 at 211840. B 2/14 returned fire with small arms and 60mm mortar. Results unknown.  All elements closed Bn base 211930 June 66. TF 2/14 dispatched 4 ambush patrols 211930 June 66 with negative results.  C 2/14 moved from Bn base 220400 June 66 to secure Hi-way #1 from XT527186 to XT516190. No contact and no road blocks encountered. All elements of ambush patrol and road security closed Bn base at 220840 June 66.
(22 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #18) Security and ARVN element assisted in construction of FR outpost XT495295.  Heavy equipment was utilized (dozer, bucket loader, 5 ton trk, Engr sqd and civilian laborers) to build outpost.  C 2/14 received sniper fire from XT495208 at 231152 June 66. Returned fire and VC moved North.  Recon Plat found 10 bags of rice, 25 lbs per bag, at XT518216; returned rice to Bn base. All elements closed Bn base at 231811 June 66. TF 2/14 dispatched 2 ambush patrols and 3 listening post to secure Hi-way #1 from road blocks.  No contact made and no road blocks on Hi-way #1 as of 240845 June 66.
(24 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #19) Search and Civic Actions operation in AP AN PHU (XT510160) at 240730 June 66 with B 2/14, 3/4 Cav Plat and attachments from Tran Gang District Chief. B 2/14 moved into obj area clearing area and securing the District Chief as he conducted speeches to people.  7,000 leaflets were airdropped for a 20 minute period prior to arrival of district chief. 3/4 Cav Plat received sniper fire from XT538177 at 240845 June 66. Returned fire and silenced VC.  One Plat, C 2/14, moved on foot to XT495205 to secure outpost construction at 240807 June 66. B 2/14 received sniper fire at XT513168 241115 June 66 - one US soldier KIA. District Chief spoke to 472 people in obj area.  A large percentage were adult males (approximately 25%). 35 persons received MEDCAP treatment and 42 families received helping hand materials. All elements, TF 2/14, closed Bn base 241743 June 66.  TF 2/14 established 2 ambush sites and 3 listening posts 242000 June 66. Recon Plat cleared road to Hi-way #1 240633 June 66. All ambush patrols closed Bn base 240720 June 66 with negative contact and no road blocks reported.
(25 June 66)
    TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #20) security for outpost construction (XT495205) and Search and Stay behind ambush vic XT520213. B 2/14 moved one Plat by foot to secure outpost construction site at 240700 June 66.  Same element returned to Bn base 240945 June 66 because equipment was unable to move in muddy area. B 2/14 moved one Plat from Bn base to XT520213 at 240800 June 66. No contacts made and all elements closed Bn base 241812 June 66. TF 2/14 dispatched 2 ambush patrols and 3 listening posts to secure hi-way #1 at 252000 June 66. C 2/14 captured 1 VCS vic XT522189 at 252205 June 66.  All patrols closed Bn base 260630 June 66 - with negative results except 1 captured VCS turned over to MID at Bn base.
(26 June 66)
    TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #21) heliborne opns vic AP LONG MUC (XT530248) and AP TRUONG GIAI (XT515247) 260830 June 66. S&A Plat cleared road 260700 & secured LZ vic XT519197 at 260815 June 66. B 2/14 and C 2/14 airlifted in two lifts into non-prepared LZ at XT532247 at 260830 June 66. B 2/14 and C 2/14 moved east to west 260900 June 66. C 2/14 received sniper fire vic XT520243.  Returned fire and moved forward. VC fires silenced.  C 2/14 & Recon Plat closed Bn base at 261520 June 66. B 2/14 with 3/4 Cav Plat attached remained vic XT525248, oriented north for stay behind ambush.  261708 June 66 two tanks damaged by antitank mine vic XT516193, no injuries reported and one tank able to move without assistance. TF 2/14 dispatched 3 ambush sites to secure Hi-way #1.  C 2/14 ambush patrol reported 270620 June 66 2 mounds of dirt vic XT511189. Mounds cleared and all patrols closed Bn base 270753 June 66. S&A Plat cleared road to Hi-way #1 270801 June 66.
(27 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #22) S&D missions with B 2/14 and 3/4 Cav Plat, leaving stay behind ambushes 270800 at XT525243, XT525237, XT525321, XT530218, and XT525210. B 2/14 received sniper fire from XT523237. Returned fire and silenced VC.  B 2/14 received sniper fire from XT518252 and directed artillery fire on VC and silenced VC. B 2/14 reported 1 US soldier KIA [PSG Ed Paresa] by anti-personnel mine 270955 June 66 at XT525237.  Search of area revealed 2 grenade booby traps which were destroyed in place. Fresh punji pits covered with fresh banana leaves in same location reported by B 2/14 at 271100 June 66.  A 2/14 and C 2/14 exchanged positions from Cu Chi effective 271300 June 66. TF 2/14 ambush patrol received 4 rounds sniper fire vic XT515293. Patrol returned fire with negative casualties reported.  Patrols returned to Bn base with negative contact and no road blocks reported at 280710 June 66.
(28 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #23) heliborne operations and initiated civic actions vic AP LONG MUC (XT525245), AP TRUONG GIAI (XT515246), AP BOA ME (XT510226) at 280300 June 66. B 2/14 moved on foot to block with picket stations west side of 1st obj from XT520249 to XT520240 - at 280715 June 66. A 2/14 airlifted to LZ (XT525251) 280705 June 66.  3/4 Cav positioned vic XT530246 at 280900 June 66.  A 2/14 moved from North to South without contact. S&A Plat reported road to Hi-way #1 cleared 280915 June 66.  3/4 Cav reported 2 VCS captured vic of command detonated mine (XT540239) at 281050 June 66. Obj area received 10,000 leaflets prior to operation via air drop. B 2/14 received rifle grenade fire from XT511210 at 281620 June 66.  B 2/14 returned fire and maneuvered. VC escaped in trench line moving south east. All elements closed Bn base 281748 June 66. TF 2/14 dispatched 3 ambush patrols and 3 listening post.  Ambush site at XT536180 fired upon a VC ambush site that had initiated fire on a ARVN ambush patrol. ARVN patrol was caught between friendly and VC fires. Results 1 KIA and 1 WIA (ARVN).  US patrol relocated, and District Chief assisted in returning WIA and KIA to hospital at Trang Bang. S&A Plat cleared road to Hi-way #1 290815 June 66. Patrol closed Bn base at 290730 June 66.  District Chief transported to LOC HUNG to register and handle relocation of 236 families that desired to move into his new life hamlet as a direct result of US operations in area.
(29 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #24) search and destroy and daylight ambush vic AP AN THOI (XT519205). A 2/14 moved 291200 June 66 on foot to clear area of civilians. There were no people in the area. B 2/14 followed A 2/14 to obj area and passed through and returned to Bn base without contact at 291530 June 66.   3/4 Cav Plat sent to PHUOC HIEP (XT560170) 291700 June 66 to assist American Advisor and 30 ARVN ambushed with 4 KIA and 8 WIA (ARVN). TF 2/14 dispatched 3 ambush patrols and 3 listening post at 292030 June 66 with negative results.  S&A Plat cleared road to Hi-way #1 300825 June 66.
(30 June 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted night firing proficiency training vic Bn base, following training circular 350-12 HQS 2d Bn, 14th Inf dtd 13 June 66, beginning 301330 June 66. Night firing phase from 301930 June 66 to 302330 June 66.  302000 June 66, TF 2/14 dispatched 3 ambush sites and 3 listening post with negative results.  All patrols returned Bn base 010650. 010750 July 66 S&A Plat reports road to Hi-way #1 cleared.
(01 July 66)
   TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #25). Stay behind ambush positions during daylight for instruction and actual emplacement. B 2/14 moved by foot to obj area vic XT520214. B 2/14 captured 5 VCS at XT518217 010950 July 66.  A 2/14 in heliborne mission on 30 minute notice. S&A Plat secured LZ 011100 July 66.  A 2/14 picked up at LZ in two (2) lifts to secure west end of road at blocking positions at XT580195 and XT566173 for 1/5 mech move at 011125 July 66.  A 2/14 completed lift to LZ 011155 July 66.  A 2/14 picked up by 3/4 Cav Plat and returned Bn base 011610 July 66. TF 2/14 dispatched 3 ambush patrols 011935 July 66 with negative results. All patrols closed Bn base 020650 July 66.
(02 July 66)
    TF 2/14 conducted (Frag order #26) heliborne operations with RF and PF forces and conducted S&D operations AP AN PHU (XT505170) 020700 July 66. PF and RF blocked on north west and east vicinity XT495172, XT500180 and XT524173 at 020700 July 66.  3/4 Cav Plat blocked on north vic XT512187 at 020645 July 66. A 2/14, B 2/14 and District Chief with troops landed at LZ 020700 July 66. PF Forces reported 2 VC fired on them 020651 July 66 at XT495175. Fire was returned & VC moved south.  3/4 Cav Plat reported sniper fire from XT508180 at 020705 July 66.  3/4 Cav returned fire and silenced VC. Villagers remained in homes and in their fields. Only few families evacuated (10%).  Villagers spoke freely to District Chief and interpreters about VC. Villagers pointed out area that VC put booby trap grenades and possible mines. B 2/14 reported 3 grenade booby traps in hedgerow where villagers pointed out to District Chief (XT505417). US Advisor with RF force reported 7 draft dodgers caught vic XT524174 at 020849 July 66. B 2/14 received one rifle grenade XT505175. Returned fire and results are unknown.   S0-3 found 105mm (HE) command detonated mine vic XT509179 and destroyed it in place. 100 meters of wire turned over to District Chief. B 2/14 stay behind ambush vic XT503163 engaged 5 VC with weapons. 1 VC KIA (BC) 2 VC KIA (poss).   VC body had pistol belt w/black PJ's: no weapon found. VC had returned fire and either crawled away or were dragged away. Area was searched and no weapons were found. 3/4 Cav Plat hit one mine and damaged one track XT514181.  Three more anti tank mines found and destroyed in place (same area). All elements closed Bn base 021430 July 66. B 2/14 returned by air to Cu Chi 021700 July 66. TF 2/14 dispatched 3 ambush sites 021945 July 66 - with negative results.  A 2/14 reported 3 VC XT517196, taken under small arms fire and mortar fire at 022030 July 66, VC moved North.
(3 July 66)
   TF 2/14 coordinated movement of wire, pickets, sandbags and timber to Trang Bang District Chief.  All elements closed Cu Chi 031835 July 66.
12. Results:
VC LOSSES
VC KIA (BC)
12
Mine AP
1
VC KIA (poss)
21
Mine AT
11
VCC
8
Other: (bomb unk. origin)
1
VCS
36
Rice (lbs)
2400
Detainees
24
Salt (lbs)
24
Rifle (.98 Mauser)
1
Buildings
12
Home made weapon
1
Tunnels
6
Claymore
4
Uniforms (fatigue pants)
1
Grenade Launcher Adapter
1
Civilian clothing (lbs)
9
Magazines (unk. origin)
2
Medical supplies (lbs)
9
Ammo (small arms, rds)
775
Farm prod. (tobacco, lbs)
1
Mortar shells (60mm)
13
Facilities (1st aid stat)
1
Grenade
17
Booby Trap
5
FRIENDLY LOSSES
KIA
6
Dozer
1
Damaged and repaired
Tanks
3
Damaged and repaired
APC
1
Destroyed
1/4 ton jeep
1
Destroyed
13. Administrative Matters:
   a. Supply.
      (1) Class I - C ration were used for 2 meals per day and A ration for supper meal.
      (2) Class III - POL was provided by two 1200 gallon tankers. One was filled with gasoline and the other diesel fuel.
      (3) Class IV - A large amount of barrier materials were sent to the field to support the forward Bn base camp.
      (4) Class V - A small ASP was maintained in the field to take care of emergency needs.
      (5) Water - Water was initially a great problem. It is impossible to support 4 field messes by flying water in jugs on a helicopter.  All battalions moving to the field for an extended period should have a 5000 gallon tanker or an engineer water point attached.
   b. Maintenance. Vehicular maintenance was supported by a 2d echelon contact team along with a wrecker.  When an armor element is attached they should also provide a mechanic.  Maintenance of M16 rifles was difficult because of critical shortage of cleaning rods.
   c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation and hospitalization:
       A battalion aid station was located in the forward base camp. Casualties were evacuated to this point if they occurred close to base camp. If not, they were taken by helicopter to the 25th Medical Bn at Cu Chi.  Some of the minor casualties were able to be treated at the aid station and returned to duty. Others were evacuated by air to Cu Chi.
   d. Transportation. Transportation for resupply and troop movement was provided by UH1D helicopters and medium trucks. A daily resupply by helicopter was effected.  Every few days a land convoy was sent to resupply bulk items such as POL, water, barrier materials and PX supplies. All road convoys were protected by armed escorts.
   e. Communications. FM radio communication was excellent throughout the conduct of the operation. UHF worked 99% of the time and provided positive communications to Bde. AM/RTT was slow due to a large volume of traffic.  The 16th RRU provided an excellent monitor system to police our own FM communications.
14. Special Equipment and Techniques:
   a. Starlight devices and sniperscope sights were taken by combat elements and effectively utilized by patrols and elements defending the Bn perimeter.
   b. Dozer and tank dozers were utilized to dig bunkers, build berms, and clear fields of fire for the perimeter.
   c. Vietnamese from local areas (soldiers) were provided by District Chief to assist ambush patrols in identifying VC and guiding patrols at night into farmers homes for ambush sites from homes.
   d. Establishment of a "Kiddie Korner" coordinating point. A location centrally located where signs pointed out where sales people can assemble to sell. All other areas surrounding Bn base (within 500 meters) was off limits by posted Vietnamese signs.  This coordinating point allowed sales people and children to come and pass on information of VC in area or any intelligence information available.  A Bn representative who spoke Vietnamese was in this location to pass out C rations and candy and receive information. It did assist in control of people and some intelligence information was received from children.
   e. The utilization of "Picket Stations" with a strong mobile reaction force enabled the TF to cover area with fire and observation to block and restrict VC attempts at escaping.  The "Picket Stations" consist of small elements (4-6 men) that are spaced to block with observation and fire over an extended area. These stations checked villagers attempting to leave the area and encouraged them to return to their homes.  The picket station exemplifies the principle of economy of force, and the reaction force the principle of mass and surprise, allowing the commander to develop a situation.  The key to the employment of the "Picket Station" is knowing the enemy situation and having excellent communications. The utilization of picket stations provided excellent results in observing the VC killing the VC, and turning back or controlling villagers. Previously the VC just disappeared through routes in areas not covered.  "Picket Stations" enabled us to cover and block off an objective area more effectively.
15. Commander's Analysis:
   a. An infantry Bn reinforced with a mechanized element can conduct pacification operations for long periods effectively; especially if coordination can be effected between government representatives and the Bn Task Force Commander.
   b. Operation FORT SMITH can be considered a success, in that the areas in which operations were conducted were part of an overall plan to pacify the Trang Bang District.  The District Chief must be complimented for his professional competency, his personal courage, and his prompt response to suggestions. He assisted the TF 2/14th Inf in its operations completely and was a reliable ally in combat operations.  The relations established with the District Chief Trang Bang District were established through the American Advisory personnel and the Commander and Staff of the TF 2/14th Inf.  There was complete trust and understanding between the District Chief and the TF Commander. This was due to two members of the TF 2/14th Inf staff being able to speak Vietnamese at daily coordination meetings with the District Chief.  These meetings were brief and allowed for maximum flow of information to one another.
   c. Coordination meetings with the District Chief gave a complete current picture of the local enemy and friendly situations; and the freedom of action given the Battalion Commander allowed him to react to situations in the area of operations without restrictions.
   d. Pacification operations can be accomplished with greater success over a minimum of four weeks in AO. The Vietnamese should initiate the pacification actions and we support it.
16. Recommendations:
   a. That engineer support with a dozer be attached to any Bn TF conducting area pacification missions. This machinery enables TF to work on defensive construction and road networks for internal defenses rapidly.  It also enables the TF to build and repair local installations and improve or build road networks important to the Vietnamese people.
   b. That armored infantry or mechanized elements be attached to any Bn TF on area pacification missions. This attachment allows the TF greater flexibility and gives the TF a quick reaction force.
   C. That liaison be established through US Advisors to appropriate Vietnamese representatives to enable coordination meetings in the early stages of the operation and through the entire period of the pacification operation.
   FOR THE COMMANDER:
1 Incl                              RIHO VAHTEL
 Civic Action Report              Captain, Infantry
                                   Adjutant
Inc
Civic Action Report (Combat After Action Report Opn FORT SMITH dtd 3 June 3 July 1966)
No of
Trips Description                  Area    
 3   Medcap & Helping Hand        Ap An Phu      XT514190
 2   Medcap & Helping Hand        Xa Cay Chua   XT505193
 1   Medcap & Helping Hand        An Duc         XT532181
 1   Medcap & Helping Hand        Lorraine       XT478488
 1   Medcap & Helping Hand        Ap An Phu      XT506169
 1   Medcap & Helping Hand        An Tinh        XT53210
 1   Road Construction 450 meters XA Cau Chua    XT508213
 3   RF Outpost Construction      X Loc Du       XT494205
Narrative Description of Projects:
1. Nine visits were made to six villages in the Trang Bang District to conduct Helping Hand and Medcap during Operation FORT SMITH, 3 June 66 to 3 July 66.  In addition to Medcap and Helping Hand and other civic action progects and services were undertaken. Total Civic Action results for operation FORT SMITH are as follows:
Visits to Village            9
Medcap patients treated    904
People receiving helping
hand items               2,205
Chewing gum                650 sticks
Cigarettes                 430
Can openers (P-38)         50
Sugar                      200 lbs
Wheat                       80 lbs
Rice                        210 lbs
Toothbrushes               425
Toothpaste                 425 tubes
Soap                     1,455 bars
Cans of Food            1,652
Toys                     1,185 items
Candy                      140 bars
Clothing                 1,533 lbs
Cans of Milk             1,104
Propaganda leaflets     17,950
Road Construction         450 m completed
Outpost Construction        1 - 35% completed
Relocated Families        238
Political Indoctrinees    851
Damage Claims processed      1
Analysis:
   1. As stated in weekly reports for operation FORT SMITH pacification should be in every operation where the tactical situation and terrain permit.
   2. Medcap, Helping Hand, and Propaganda leaflets contributed immensely to counter-acting VC propaganda and instructions, winning friends, and instilling faith and trust in the Vietnamese government and the American Soldier.
   3. Civic Action wherever possible warrants the full support of every individual. Many soldiers have skepticism toward Civic Action and an orientation program should be conducted to educate the individual soldier in the area of Civic Action operations.
   4. Recommendations:
       a. Visit to a village should not exceed 2 hrs. After 2 hrs people become impatient and unmanageable.
       b. Minimum support for a Civic Action operation should be 3 APC's and 25-30 riflemen to secure and control people where medcap team is located.
       c. District Chief and/or American Advisor consulted for recommendation as to what area should have priorities for civic action.
 Battle Of Dau Tieng
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION (MECH) 22D INFANTRY
APO  96268

1.  IDENTIFICATION AND TYPE OF UNIT:  2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry

2.  TIME:  222330 Feb to 230800 Feb 69
3.  LOCATION;  Dau Tieng Base Camp

4.  COMMAND AND CONTROL: Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
5.  TASK ORGANIZATION:  2d Battalion (Mech) 22d lnfantry

6.  SUPPORTING FORCES:  a. USAF (TAC Air)
                        b. Artillery
                        c. Gun Ships
                        d. Flare Ships

7.  INTELLIGENCE:  Various reports had been received that the enemy was grouping in the area with
the mission of attacking the Dau Tieng Base Camp and fire support bases throughout the 3d Brigade
 area of operation.
8.  MISSION:  2d Bn (M) 22d Inf was to have one platoon of Co B and the scout platoon present in
Dau Tieng as the base camp reaction force,  2d Bn 22d Inf was also to occupy 12 bunkers along the
north and east of the perimeter and 2 on the south side of the perimeter.  The personnel occupying
the bunkers were members of the rear detachment to include cooks, supply personnel, clerks, and
mechanics. Co A was to remain ready to react from Fire Support Base Wood II and Company B
from their night defensive position.

9.  CONCEPT OF OPERATION;  The rear detachment of 2d Bn (M) 22d Inf would occupy 12 bunkers
covering the north and northeast of the base camp perimeter.  They would also occupy 2 bunkers on the
 south.  Companies A, B, and C would be prepared to move into blocking positions and to react to the
 base camp.
10.  EXECUTION:  At 2330, Dau Tieng came under extremely heavy mortar and rocket attack.  Within
15 minutes, the enemy shifted their indirect fires inside the perimeter and made a ferocious attack on
the berm line.  Although almost the entire perimeter was receiving very heavy RPG, recoilless rifle,
 machine gun, and small arms fire, the main attack came from the southeast and south.  Moving into the
 wire in waves, the enemy was able to breach the wire on the east end of the active runway.  At the outset
 of the attack  the scout platoon from Co B was alerted and was ordered to reinforce the perimeter at the
east end of  the runway Arriving only minutes later, three of the APC's moved on line 100 meters north of
the runway  and began placing heavy fire to the area of the breach.  The other two tracks in the platoon
moved directly to the runway to attempt to reinforce the bunkers on each side. Bunker 65 was on the north
 and 66 on the south. The enemy had managed to breach the wire in front of bunker 65 and were in the drainage ditches along the sides of the runway and were attacking the bunkers from the rear.  As the
 tracks approached, the enemy in the ditches were firing RPG's.  As the APC'S arrived at bunker 65
 it was struck with an RPG round and was on fire. The wounded men who were on the tracks were
pinned down by enemy fire.  Those who were able returned fire and on one occasion a man who had
 been blown off the
                         Page 1

tracks had jumped two of  the enemy in the ditch. As his weapon had been destroyed in the explosion,
 he fought them with his hands.  He was mortally wounded in the fight but he delayed the enemy long
enough for his fellow soldiers to move out of the open. The personnel of the track at bunker 66 seeing
this immediately assaulted across the runway. Receiving RPG fire from both front and rear they placed suppressive fire on the enemy long enough for the men of the disabled track to get their wounded to
safety. Despite 2 RPG rounds that had pierced the APC it was able to pull back with the remainder of
 the platoon and support by fire.  Bunker 66 was still in need of assistance.   Disregarding a warning that
 it would be suicidal to take another track back across to bunker 66 the men volunteered and moved one
 track across the runway to bunker 66.  Braving extremely heavy fire fron both front and rear the APC was
 able to hold off the enemy until it was hit with an RPG round and burned. The driver of the track although wounded and shaken was able to locate a 3/4 ton truck with three of the tires flat.  Knowing the necessity
of getting medcal care for the wounded he drove the truck to the vicinity of bunker 66 and transported the wounded to the hospital. Throughout the night he drove to and from the airstrip evacuating the wounded.
At this time gunships were firing rockets down the runway and artillery was firing beehive to attempt to
keep the enemy out.
  While the above was taking place the mechanics who were in the bunkers on the south edge of the
perimeter were under  heavy  attack,The wire had been breached on both of the mechanic's flanks;
however they prevented a break in their sector and they attempted to keep the breach closed with fire
 even though some of the enemy had managed to break through and were attacking bunkers 86 and 88
 from the rear. The mechanics knowing the importance of maintaining their position held out under overwhelming odds. Many of the men were wounded and one man had been killed by an RPG which
 hit the rear of the  bunker. The platoon of Co B which had  been moved to the airstrip was ordered
 to  reinforce. Co B was ordered to send another platoon to reinforce the Dau Tieng Bridge and Co
A was ordered to move to the vicinity of the Ben Cui along Route 19 to block.
  Braving intense fire the reaction platoon inside the base camp was able to reinforce the bunkers.
The perimeter was once again restored.  As the platoon from Co B approached the Dau Tieng Bridge
they were met with heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire. Breaking through the enemy positions they
were able to reach the bridge and help drive the enemy off.  The bunkers  in the vicinity were becomming extremely low on ammunition;  seeing this, the men began to resupply them from the ammunition on the
tracks.
  Throughout the night all elements bravely fought in the face of overwhelming odds and were able to hold.
  At first light a Chinook  which was to evacuate casualities was unable to land because the LZ was
 not secured.  Learning of this, mechanics, clerks, and supply personnel volunteered to take a VTR,
a 3/4 ton truck and a 2 1/2 ton, all with machine guns mounted  to the LZ. Moving through heavy sniper
 fire they were able to secure the LZ and the wounded were evacuated.
  Throughout the night countless deeds of heroism and valor went almost unnoticed as the aggresseveness, devotion to duty, professionalism and complete disregard for personal safety appeared to be the rule
 rather than the exception.
From the moment of contact all the medics volunteered to assist in the area of contact although it was
 outside of the battalion area of responsibility.  Braving almost impossible odds they crawled, ran, and
drove through enemy fire to assist and evacuate the wounded.
   Shortly after BMNT Co A was ordered to move from its blocking position and conduct a RIF around
the outside of the perimeter while the platoon of Co B at the bridge was moved into the base camp to
help find and destroy the enemy still remaning inside the wire. At the same time Co C was ordered to
move from
                             Page 2

Fire Support Base Wood II, through Dau Tieng and into the Michelin. Five hundred meters east of
Dau Tieng, Co C began pushing north along the Michelin  truck route. Receiving fire from snipers
which the enemy had employed in an effort to delay the mechanized company, Co C. courageously
braved the fire and passed on to establish contact with the withdrawing enemy, eliminating the snipers
as they passed. Co C's actions drove the enemy into friendly blocking forces in the northern Michelin.
  All elements were extremely successful in completing their mission and by 1000 hours the base camp
was once again secure.

11.  RESULTS:  The enemy had attempted to overrun the base camp; however they were once again
 handed defeat.  Although the wire was breached in two separate locations only about 25 enemy soldiers
were able to get through.

12.  ADMINISTRATION:
     a.  Enough cannot be said for the courage and valor of all elements that participated in the defense
of Dau Tieng that night. The coordination was perfect in deploying men and equipment.

b  Medical treatment could not have been better. All medics of the battalion who were at Dau Tieng volunteered to assist. The enemy had broken into the perimeter and the medics had to move under fire
 from all directions. They did a fantastic job,

13.  VALOR AWARDS

     a.  Medal of Honor - 1
     b.  Silver Star - 6
     c.  Bronze Star - 15
     d.  Army Commendation Medal - 7

       DAVID M. NORRIS
Major, AGC
Adjutant General




 Operation Makiki

               HEADQUARTERS 2ND BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
                             APO  US  FORCES  96225

AVTLPDB-T                                                                                                                         15 June 1966

SUBJECT:  Combat After Action Report  (TCS /J3 / 32)

TO:           Commanding General
           25th Infantry Division
           ATTTN:  G3
           APO US Forces  962251. (Operation MAKIKI)  OPORD  25 - 66

1.   031000 June '66 - 091000  June '66

2.   2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div, In conjunction with the 49th Regt, 25th ARVN Div, conducted
      search and destroy operations in the central portion of HAU NGHIA Province in the area bounded by XT3818, XT4505, XT4718, XT5204.  This was a joint US - ARVN operation with forces participating as indicated below.

3.   Control Headquarters:  2nd Bde,  25th Inf Div.

4.   Reporting Officer:     Colonel Thomas M. Tarpley

5.   Task Organization and commanders were as follows:

      Tf 1/5 (M) Lt Col. Greer Cmd.                    Bde Corp

     1/5  (M)  Inf                         Co C 1/27 (Base security)
     Sqd B/65  Engr                         Co C 2/27  (Bde Fwd Base Security)
     Helicopter                         1/8 Arty DS
                                   Engr Plat (-)  B/65  Engr
      TF 4/23  Inf  (Lt. Col Barszaz (Cmdg)               2nd FASC Plat (-)  B/125 Sig
                                   MP Plat 25th MP Co
     4/23 Inf (-)                         Elm 25th MED
     Sqd  B/65  Engr                         2nd & 3rd Plat, 16th  RRU
     Helicopter                         ARVN PSYOP Team
                                   Co A 25th Med Bn
      TF 1/27  Inf  (Lt Col O'Neal Cmdg)               118  Ambl Co  (Lt)

     1/27  Inf (-)
     Sqd  B/65  Engr
     Helicopter

      TF  2/27  Inf  (Lt Col Basboro  Cmdg)

     2/27  Inf (-)
     Sqd  B/65  Engr
     Helicopter                                 
            (p1)

6.   Supporting Forces:

a.   Artillery Support:

(1)   Organization for Combat:

(a)   1/8th Arty - DS  2nd Bde.

(b)   3/13  Arty:

1.   3/13 Arty (-)  GS 25th Inf Div.
2.   B  3/13  Arty:   GSR  1/8  Arty.
3.   Plat  (8” How)  D  3/13:  GSR  1/8  Arty

(2)   How and when artillery employed:

(a)   Artillery supported from  two locations during the operation.  3 - 9 June 1966,
the artillery base was located vic TRANG BANG, (XT484196).  On 6 June 1966, Battery C returned to
CU CHI to support the 1st Bn (Mech),  5th Inf operations on 7 June 1966.

                (b)   Fires were utilized primarily to suppress sniper fire, flush VC from inundated hiding areas,
                       and suspected VC positions.

                (c)   On-call artillery fires were available throughout the operation.

      (d)   A total of 555 missions and 4049 rounds were fired in support of the operation.

(3)   Results, Effectiveness and Timeliness:

(a)   Due to the fact that no large VC force was encountered during the operation, it
is difficult to measure the results of the artillery fire.  A total of 5 VC KIA (Poss) were a
 direct result of artillery fire.

(b)   All fires requested were accurate and timely throughout the entire operation.

       (c)   Well planned H&I fires denied the VC freedom of movement during the hours
of darkness.

b.   US Air Force:

(1)   Eight air strikes were flown in support of the operation, all of which were pre-planned

(a)   Of the eight (8) strikes, four (4)_ were by the US Air Force, one (1) by the US Navy,
and three (3)  by VNAF.

                (b)   All strikes were requested by telephone (Hot Line) through 25th Inf Div G3.

(2)   Results of Air Strikes:   A total of nine (9) structures were destroyed and one (1) damaged.

c.   Army Aviation:

(1)  Army Aviation flew a total of 510 sorties and moved 160 tons of supplies during the operation.

(p2)


(2)  2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div Aviation Section provided OH23 support during the operation.

(3)  On 031000 Jun, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (1), 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-), and 2nd Bn, 27th Inf (-) were
airlifted in six flights by 37 UH1D's, escorted by 17 UH1B (gunships) into respective
AO's.Aircraft support was provided by the following units:   68th Airmobile Co,  116th
Airmobile Co,  118th Airmobile Co,  173rd  Airmnobile Co, Co A (Airmobile) 25th Avn Bn,
and 197th General Support Co.

          (4)   On 070900 Jun, 4th Bn 23rd Inf was extracted from AO by 30 UH1D's and returned to base camp.

          (5)   On 080900 Jun, 1st Bn 27th Inf was extracted from AO by 30 UH1D's and returned to base camp.

          (6)   On 090900 Jun, 2nd Bn 27th Inf was extracted from AO by 30 UH1D's and returned to base camp.

          (7)   All lifts were conducted as planned with no significant problems.

7.   Intelligence:

a.  Analysis of terrain and vegetation in which operation was conducted:

The terrain in the area of operations was generally low and flat with the highest elevation being 5 Meters.  The vegetation consisted of bamboo hedgerows, rice fields, and tall trees with underbrush, all of which afforded good concealment to the enemy for harassing operations and evasive actions.  The immediate rice fields and non-trafficable roads precluded the
use of wheeled vehicles.  Terrain and vegetation did not affect the use of APC's.

b.  Intelligence prior to operations:

The area of operations is completely VC controlled and dominated.  VC units in this area have
eluded contact with friendly forces except for harassing type actions.  The C120 LF Company was reported in the area.  Additionally, the 267th and 269th MF Battalions, Deng Thap II Regiment have been known to operate in this area.  
The area has been used as a VC logistical and transfer point.

           c.   Enemy situation during operation:

     The most significant enemy contact was made by the Recon Plat, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf when an
estimated VC platoon was engaged vic XT466155 on 3 June 66.

     Results:   12 VC KIA (BC) and 19 VCC.  Subsequent to this action, TF elements encountered
Squad-sized VC units.  The VC made extensive use of mines and booby traps throughout the area.  On
7 Jun 66, Co A, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf discovered a weapons and grenade factory vic XT415164.  
Also on 7 June 66, Co C 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf discovered a large weapons and ammunition cache vic XT520104.  Upon inspection
by a MACV Tech Intel Team, the cache of  Russian ammunition was  estimated to be one of the largest discovered to date.
 The detail breakdown of weapons and ammunition are included in paragraph 12.
9.   Mission:   The 2nd Bde Task Force was to conduct search and destroy operations for period
5 - 9 Jun in TRANG BANG district vic XT5818, XT4505, XT4218 and XT5204, in conjunction with the 49th Regt, 25th ARVN Div to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies, and base camps.

     10.   Concept of Operations:   The 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div conducted an airmobile and ground move to AO commencing 021000
 Jun 66 to conduct search and destroy operations.  The operation was conducted in four phases.                                                                

 (p3)

Phase I:       (2 Jun)  The Bde Fwd Support base moved to vic TRANG BANG (XT4819) to conduct coordination with the 49th Regt (ARVN).

Phase II:   (3 Jun)   TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf conducted a mechanized attack and TF 4th  Bn, 23rd Inf, TF 1st Bn, 7th Inf, TF 2nd Bn,
27th Inf conducted an airmobile assault into objective 1.  Upon arrival in the AO all elements moved rapidly to establish blocking positions to completely encircle the area prior to commencing search and destroy operations in their respective zones.  C 2/27,
2nd Bde reaction force, established two blocking positions, XT452194 and XT488185.  The entire airmobile assault and ground
attack was preceded by and in conjunction with the 49th ARVN Regt airmobile assault into objective 2.

Phase III:   (4 - 9 Jun)  All elements conducted search and destroy operations in zone.

Phase IV:   (7 - 9 Jun)  TF 4th Bn, 23rd Inf was extracted from AO 7 Jun.  TF 1st Bn, 27th Inf continued search
and destroy operations in zone until 8 Jun at which time they were extracted.  TF 1st Bn (M) 5th Inf and 49th ARVN Regt
conducted a joint US Mechanized and ARVN attack 7 - 8 June 66 with the 1st Bn (M) 5th Inf extracting from the AO on 8 June 66.
 TF 2nd Bn 27th Inf continued to search and destroy in AO and were extracted on 9 June 66.  The Bde fwd headquarters elements closed base camp on 9 June 66.

     11.   Execution:   Div OPORD 12 - 66 was received on 28 May.

                         D-Day  (3  Jun  66)

          1st Bn  (Mech), 5th Inf

     At 0700 the Bn commenced movement and by 0925 lead elements had penetrated the area of operations and were located
vic XT470127.  At 1030 Co A reported that the attached Recon Plat had killed two (2) VC and run over two more as they drove
 through the water filled rice paddies.  A detailed and systematic search of the area resulted in 12 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (Poss)
and 19 VCC.  Many of the VC were submerged in holes, underwater and breathing through hollow reeds.  By 1100 all blocking positions in the AO were occupied.  At 1112, Co B shot and killed 1 VC (BC) and captured another in the same general area vic XT453165.  During the afternoon hours, company size sweeps were conducted throughout the AO with negative contact.  A total
 of eleven (11) night ambushes were established.  Co C's ambush vic XT431181 killed one (1) VC at 1851 and two (2) more VC at 1950.  At 2005 Co B's ambush made contact prior to arriving at its position.  However, the VC broke contact, 1 VC killed (Poss)
and captured 1 Thompson SMG.  At 2400 the same ambush killed 1 VC (BC) vic XT464160.

          4th  Bn  23rd  Inf

     At 1104 the Bn conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 2 vic XT423130.  The assault was completed at 1250 with negative
contact.  By 1355 two blocking positions were occupied, Co A and the Cmd Group vic XT436135 and Co C vic XT420125.  At
1458, Co A received two (2) WIA and HHC received one (1) WIA from booby traps vic XT432134.  Co A captured one (1) VCS
 vic XT426128.  A total of five night ambushes were established with the ambush vic XT430124 capturing two (2) VC, one of
which was wounded and later died.

          1st  Bn,  27th  Inf.                                      

  (p4)

     At 1125 the Bn conducted an airmobile assault into the AO.   The assault was completed at 1350 at which time the Bn
CP was established at XT408177.  Co B commenced S&D opns vic XT402179, XT463168, XT408170 and XT406178.  At 1335
Co B received 6 WIA from booby traps vic XT408170 and at 1423 two personnel from the 8th Arty were wounded by booby
traps vic XT408183.  At 1445 Co B located 1,500 lbs of rice vic XT407172, and the AT Plat located 4,000 lbs of rice vic XT407170,
 all of which was evacuated.  At approximately 1430 the AT Plat and Engr squad located and destroyed 19 booby traps and
 one bunker vic XT407178.  At 1435, two sampans vic XT406183 were destroyed.  A Co conducted S&D opns vic XT419185, XT419183, XT411180 and XT 411183 with negative contact.  At 1730 Co B received 4 WIA's'from booby traps vic XT406177
and destroyed one (1) AT mine vic XT407176.  Five (5) night ambushes were established.


               2nd Bn.  27th Inf

     At  1130 the Bn conducted an airmobile assault into their AO, completing it at 1430 with negative contact.  Co's A and B, immediately upon completing their airmobile assault, commenced local sweeps, established blocking positions and conducted reconnaissance for night defensive positions with neither company meeting any resistance during their operation.  Co B
 received one WIA from a booby trap vic XT410138 at 1758.  The Recon Plat established a blocking position vic XT406157
 at 1610.  Six night ambushes were established.
                         D + 1  (4  Jun  66)

               1st Bn  (M),  5th  Inf

     At 0730, Co A (-) was placed under OPCON of 4/23 and Co C (-) was placed under OPCON 1/27 to assist in the clearing of
the above units AO's.  Co B conducted a thorough search of its AO and captured one (1) VC vic XT467157 at 1145.  Co A
returned to Bn control at 1226 and commenced a thorough search of its AO, capturing one (1) VC vic XT482135  at 1315.  
At 1330 one (1) APC from Co B hit an AT mine vic XT445160 receiving light damage.  A thorough search of the surrounding
area produced two (2) AT mines and 35 booby traps.  Co base areas were established along with 12 night ambushes.  At 2015
Co B ambush observed five (5) VC at long range vic XT448168.  Mortar fire was placed on the target resulting in 2 VC KIA  (Poss).

               4th  Bn.  23rd  Inf

     The Bn continued to conduct S&D operations in their AO with Co A, 1/5 (M) under OPCON to assist in rapidly searching
 the area.  At 0900 Co A captured and evacuated 4,800 lbs of rice from XT433139.  At 0900 Co A received six (6) WIA from
booby traps vic XT433127 and destroyed one (1) tunnel vic XT424127.  At 1630 Co C received one (1) WIA from a booby
trap vic XT424124 and at 1700 Co C captured one VC hiding in a house vic XT425125 along with one (1) CHICOM grenade.  
During the day, the Bn captured a total of 19 VCS.  A total of four (4) night ambushes were established.

               1st Bn,  27th  Inf

     At 0035 Co  B received two (2) incoming rifle grenades and SA fire from vic XT406175.  The Co returned fire with SA and
 M-79.  A search of the area in the morning disclosed one (1) VC KIA, one (1) German 7.62 Mauser rifle, and misc. documents.
  At 0815 Co B destroyed five (5) sampans vic XT406181 and nine (9) grenade booby traps vic XT397183.  C 1/5 (M) under
OPCON 1/27 hit an AT mine and an AP mine vic XT407174 while enroute to the Bn CP, resulting in two (2) WIA and minor
damage to the APC.  C 1/5 commenced S&D opns with Recon Plat at 0935 vic XT407176, XT410178, XT410174 and
 XT408172.  Recon Plat located and destroyed one (1) tunnel three (3) bunkers and 28 booby traps vic XT410176.  At 0945
Co A destroyed 17 booby traps vic XT408179.  At 1059, the Bn S5 captured 2,200 lbs of rice vic XT409173 and 2,000 lbs of
rice vic XT409171.  A total of seven (7) night ambushes were established.
 (p5)

               2nd Bn,  27th  Inf.

     The Bn continued to conduct slow and thorough S&D opus in their AO.  Co B, upon questioning civilians in the area,
was told of two groups of VC - one of 200 and one of 50 - that had passed through the area recently.  Co A received two (2)
WIA's from booby traps at approximately 1010 vic XT417159.  At 1130, elements of Co B destroyed four (4) booby trapped
CBU bomblets vic XT435148 and XT431148.  At 1220 Co A located several booby trap warning signs vic XT426152 and at
XT425155.  At 1314 Co B destroyed two (2) booby traps vic XT416147.  At 1315 a platoon from Co B received SA fire from
vic XT412133.  The VC broke contact when the plat placed fire on the suspected VC position and commenced to maneuver.  
Upon sweeping back towards the base area, Co B destroyed two (2) tunnels, four (4) bunkers and a camouflaged dock vic
XT409148.  A total of five (5) night ambushes were established.

                         D + 2 (5 Jun 66)

               1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf

     At 0648 an APC from Co A was damaged by an AT mine vic XT471132.  At 0730 Co A departed to conduct S&D opns in
reported VC controlled areas vic XT45120, XT471118, XT439119, XT493107 and XT483097.  Co B departed for 2/27 AO to be
placed under OPCON of Co 2/27.  At 1020 Recon Plat received one (1) WIA from a booby trap vic XT453127.  Co A completed
the search of all objective areas south of the AO at 1203.  Returning to 1/5 AO, an APC from Co A hit an AT mine causing
extensive damage to the vehicle and wounding 11 men, 10 of which were immediately returned to duty.  Co C, continuing to
search in its area received two (2) WIA from booby traps at 3445 vic XT454155.  Co B was released by the 2/27 at 1553.  A
total of 13 night ambushes were established.

               4th Bn,  23rd  Inf

     The Bn continued S&D opns in its AO with Co A destroying two (2) bunkers and two (2) tunnels vic XT432125 at 1000.  
At 1630 Co A captured one (1) VCC vic XT417124.  At 1700 Co C received one (1) WIA from a booby trap vic XT417124, and
the Recon Plat received two (2) WIA from booby traps vic XT419123.  Four (4) night ambushes were established.

               1st Bn.  27th Inf

     Operations commenced at 0700 with Co A conducting S&D opns vic XT402168, XT409176, XT405164, and XT413165,
and Co B conducting S&D opns vic XT409176, XT416177, XT413165, and XT418165.  At 0815 Co A located and destroyed
 three sampans hidden in thick brush vic XT415168.  At 0957, Recon Plat located a grenade factory vic XT412178.  Among
items in the factory was gun oil, hacksaw blades, nuts, valves, an 8 foot heavy duty vise, large wooden work table, a mold
and a forge.  The surrounding area was heavily booby trapped, as a total of 31 were located and destroyed by the Recon Plat.
  At 1025 Co B located and destroyed three (3) sampans vic XT403168.  At 1145 HHC found a house at XT412174 containing
85 expended cartridges (Cal .30, 7.62mm, 9.62mm, Cal 31).  The entire complex was destroyed at 1500.  Throughout the
day, elements of HRC bagged 4,500 lbs of loose rice found vic XT411174.  A total of seven (7) night ambushes were established.

               2nd Bn,  27th  Inf.                                  
 (p6)

     With B 1/5 (M) under OPCON, CO 2/27, the battalion commenced S&D opns in their AO to thoroughly search a heavily
 wooded area vic XT425155.  Gunships sweeping the area received AW fire from vic XT422161 and XT425159.  Both gunships
and artillery placed fire in these areas with unknown results.  While B 1/5 (M) and B 2/27 conducted a detailed search of the
area, B 1/5 (M) detonated a total of 18 booby traps.  Six (6) WIA were sustained in Co B 2/27 from booby traps.  Co A remained
 in a blocking position to conduct a sweep vic XT423161 on order.  B 1/5 (M) was released to return to 1/5 (M) at 1553.  B 2/27, completing its sweep, returned to the company base at 1700.  Co A, moving to its objective at 1600 had three (3) men wounded
 by booby traps vic XT422156.  The company continued its sweep and closed into the base perimeter at 1735.  A total of six (6)
 night ambushes were established.

                         D + 3  (6  Jun  66)                    

               1st  Bn  (M),  5th  Inf

     The Bn conducted maintenance and local searches in zone on 6 Jun.  Sixteen booby traps were destroyed vic XT446180
and XT455155.  A five gallon container of medical supplies was captured vic XT473156.  The Bn CO received a Frag order
extending the AO o the 1/5 for a joint US mechanized and ARVN airmobile assault commencing on 7 June.  During several
joint meetings conducted with the CO, 49th ARVN Regt plans involving two ARVN battalions attacking on an axis adjacent
to and in coordination with the 1/5 (M) were finalized.  Recon Plat was ordered to establish five stay behind ambushes vic
XT431180, XT434179, XT440174, XT464156 and XT471147.  A total of 17 night ambushes were established.

               4th  Bn,  23rd  Inf

     The Bn continued to S&D in the AO.  At 0945 Co A destroyed one (1) reinforced bunker with firing ports at XT415125 and
 two (2) camouflaged sampans, one vic XT414127 and one at XT413126.  At 1225 Co A destroyed four (4) camouflaged
sampans at XT416127.  At 1700 Co A captured 8,400 lbs of rice at XT425124.  The rice was distributed to the local civilians
 upon the advice of National Police.  All elements closed into a battalion perimeter.  A total of six night ambushes were
established.

               1st  Bn,  27th  Inf

     At 0730, Co B commenced S&D opns in vic of XT410183, XT410170 and XT402177.  Co A with an attached ARVN
PSYWAR  Team conducted a sweep of the area vic XT403168, XT403176, XT405164 and XT13165.  At 0814 Co A located
and destroyed three (3) sampans and one (1) tunnel 30 meters long vic XT403171.  Co A received one WIA from a booby trap.  
Also five (5) grenade booby traps were located and destroyed in the same area.  At 0920 the Recon Plat destroyed five (5)
grenade booby traps and three (3) CBU's vic XT402170.  At 1130 A Co discovered 900 lbs of rice, four booby trapped 60mm
mortar rounds, and 12 grenade booby traps in an abandoned house.  At 1145 the AT Plat burned a house in the booby trapped
 area vic XT402170 and three small explosions resulted.  Eleven more booby taps and five (5) more CBU's were destroyed in
the same area.  At 1230, Co B destroyed four sampans vic XT403171 and four (4) sampans vic XT403173.  At 1600, the AT
Platoon located a building believed to be utilized for making booby traps since it contained black powder, fuse taps, fuses,
thread, bits of scrap metal and torches.  Some documents were found in the area and eight booby traps were destroyed.  
A total of six (6) night ambushes were established.

               2nd bn,  27th  Inf

     The Bn continued to conduct S&D opns in its AO.  At 0820 Co A found and destroyed a camouflaged sampan vic XT415154.
 At 1045, Co B located and destroyed a small tunnel vic XT413150.  At1157, Co A located and commenced evacuation of 4,800
lbs of unhusked rice vic XT412162.  Co B received three (3) WIA from booby traps vic XT423148 where four bunkers were
discovered.  The bunkers, which were destroyed, contained approximately 20 lbs of medical supplies which were evacuated.
  Co A closed into the Bn CP at 1500 and Co B closed at 1600.  A total of six (6) night ambushes were established.
 (p7)

                         D + 4  (7  Jun  66)

               1st  Bn  (Mech),  5th Inf

     At 0630, the battalion commenced its move to the new AO (Encl. 2) with Co A leading, followed by Co B at 0650 and Co C
 at 0700.  Co A's lead vehicle hit a mine vic XT498092 resulting in minor damage to the vehicle, and four (4) WIA, two (2) of
which were returned to duty.  1/5 (M) elements commenced a detailed search of the area.  Co C received rifle grenade fire in
 its sector with two (2) WIA vic XT542118.  At 1400 the Recon Plat which was occupying stay behind ambush points in the
old AO, assembled vic XT466155 and extracted 3400 lbs of rice located by one of the ambushes.  At 1530 Co C discovered
a cache vic XT518110 consisting of 116 weapons and several tons of ammunition and explosives.  In view of the size of the
cache, Co A and Co C established their bases around the cache.  Co C effected link-up and coordination with elements of
the 49th ARVN Regt on their right flank.  Co B, with Recon Plat attached, established a company base vic XT360081.  A
total of ten night ambushes were established.  Three 60mm mortar rounds landed outside the Co B perimeter and several
harassing small arms rounds were received during the night with no friendly casualties.

               4th  Bn,  23rd  Inf

     At 1030 the battalion commenced their airmobile extraction from a loading zone vic XT425130.  One platoon remained
 as a stay behind force vic of the loading zone.  The Bn (-) received sniper fire from vic XT427136 as the last helicopter
departed the area.  At 1700 the stay behind force which had negative contact during the day, was extracted from the AO.  
The battalion was released from operational control of the 2nd Bde at 1720.

               1st  Bn,  27th  Inf.

     At 0800 the battalion continued S&D operations with Co A sweeping vic XT420380, XT420180, ST410173, and XT420175,
 and Co B vic XT416166, XT426168, XT422177, XT419173 and XT416173.  At 0930 Co B destroyed three (3) booby traps vic
XT417168 and seven (7) booby taps vic XT419175.  At approximately 1100, the AT Plat destroyed 10 booby traps, two (2) 2.75
 in bunkers, and a five gallon booby trapped container of black powder vic XT412171.  At 1120 the AT Plat destroyed four (4)
more booby taps vic XT41317-.  During the day, artillery fire was called in on a heavily booby tapped area vic XT419175 and
during the mission 28 small explosions were observed in the area.  A total of five (5) night ambushes were established.  
Co B's ambush sustained three (3) WIA when it encountered a heavily booby tapped area vic ST404169.

               2nd Bn,  27th  Inf

     The battalion continued its S&D opns in the AO commencing at 0830.  Co B in vic XT415147 located and destroyed a
tunnel containing sleeping quarters for three personnel at 1031.  Co A located a booby trapped hut at 1345 vic XT415164.  
The booby traps were destroyed and the items extracted from the hut included 800 lbs of parts and tools obviously utilized
to make grenades and booby traps.  Co B completed operations and closed into the Bn base at 1645, with Co A closing at
1745.  A total of eight (8) night ambushes were established.

                         D + 5  (8 Jun 66)

               1st Bn (Mech),  5th Inf.

     At 0730 the battalion continued to search in the AO.  Co C continued to search in the vic of the area and ammunition cache.
 Co A assumed the mission of searching the remainder of Co C's sector and Co B continued to search in their assigned sector.
 At 1143 Co C wounded and captured one (1) VCC vis XT501117.  By 1410 all units had completed the search and their sectors
and commenced movement to effect lineup with two 49th ARVN Regts.  At 1545 the battalion was ordered to return to base
camp and at 1642 all elements closed into the 1/5 (M) base camp area.
 (p8)

               1st Bn,  27th  Inf

     At 0715 Co A moved from the battalion base to secure the LZ vic XT407175 for the airmobile extraction of the battalion.  
The LZ was secured at 0800 and the extraction commenced at 0900.  By 1000 hours the Bn TF less a stay behind force
of one platoon closed into base camp.  The stay behind platoon observed three (3) VC vic XT407169 at approximately 1100
and called in artillery fire with unknown results.  At 1235 the platoon was extracted from the area.

               2nd Bn,  27th  Inf.

     Co A initiated S&D operations at 0807 and Co B initiated operations to complete searching the entire area at 1100.  At
1403 Co B called in mortar fire on two (2) VC resulting in two (2) KIA (Poss).  At 1520 Co A destroyed two (2) AT mines vic
 XT419165.  Co B completed its operations and closed into the Bn perimeter at 1600.  At 1650 Co A discovered a cache of
rocket propellant powder, rocket motors, paint and miscellaneous other supplies vic XT419165.  The company completed
its sweep and returned to the Bn perimeter at 18030.  Between 2130 and 2330 there was some minor activity such as SA
fire, flashlights and sounds beyond the perimeter.  Indirect fire was placed on the area with undetermined results.  A total
of nine (9) night ambushes were established.

                         D + 6  (9 Jun  66)

2nd Bn,  27th  Inf

     At 0815 the battalion commenced its airmobile extraction from a LZ vis XT418166.  The battalion closed into base camp
at 0900.

               BDE  CP  and  1/8  ARTY

     The Bde CP, 1/8 Arty and C 2/27 escorted by a plat from the 3 /4 Cav moved by convoy from TRANG BANG to base camp
closing at 1020 hrs.  Barrier material including 10,000 sandbags, 80 rolls of barbed wire, 460 long pickets, 600 short pickets
and 160 rolls of concertina wire were given to sub-sector for use in improving defense of ARVN and PF elements.

     12.   Results:   (VC Losses)

          VC KIA  BC            21          57mm RR Rd -             5
          VC KIA (Poss)             8          5 gallons of black powder - 1
          VCC                28          Rice               26 tons
          VCS                49          Building destroyed     23
          Weapons                    121          Tunnels -                           35 (destroyed)
          SA Ammo -     55,804 rounds          Bunkers -                          23 (destroyed)
          AP mines           29          Well -                                   1 (destroyed)
          AT mines           21          Trench                                  1 (destroyed)
          Grenades          64          Uniform                 1
          Booby traps                  230          1 gal can gun-oil            1
          TNT               2150 lbs          Trip wire            30 feet
          CBU Bombs            2          Supplies for making grenades 1080 lbs
     2.75 rocket duds             2          Sampans            44
           RPG 2               18          Supply point              1
          Desk                 1          
          Medical Supplies          11 lbs          
          Plasma                 4 bottles
          Medicine          16 bottles
          Flashlight            1

            Friendly losses:

          KIA   -   1
          DOW     1
          WIA      50                                       
 (P9)

The following is a recapitulation of combat damage to vehicles:

          1st Bn  (Mech)  5th Inf:

               Six (6) APC's damaged
               Three (3)  evacuated
               Three (3)  repaired in the field

          4th Bn  23rd Inf:          None

          1st Bn.  27th  Inf:          None

          2nd Bn.  27th  Inf:          None

13.  Administrative  Matters:

a.   Supply:

(1)   All resupply was effected by air from base camp.   Support Command maintained normal operations in
 the base camp area.  Units drew necessary supplies in base camp for dispatch to the forward area.

(2)  One 5000 gal water tanker was positioned at the Bde forward CP and one 5000 gal tanker was positioned
at the resupply helipad in base camp.

(3)  A water point was established by B Co, 65th Engr. at the Bde forward CP.  A total of 3600 gal of water was processed per day during the operation.

(4)  The 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf consumed 5529 gal of MOGAS.  A total of 2300 gal AVHGAS was consumed in support of the operation.

(5)  A total of 359 resupply missions were flown, air-lifting 160 tons.  The following is a breakdown by class of supply:

Class I     34.4 tons          POL - 19.2 tons
Class IV     12.1 tons          Misc.   62.0 tons
          32.3 tons

b.   Combat Loads:  Upon departing base camp, personnel carried two containers of water, and two c-ration meals.  Ammunition load were as follows:

               M1     200 rds               M60     1500 rds          
               M16     300 rds               M14E2       300 rds
               M79       36 rds               ------W's per platoon
               4 Claymores per platoon
               2 Hand Grenades per man
               2  CS/CA grenades per fire team.

          c.   Maintenance:

(1) The 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf had six (6) APC's inoperative due to AT mines of which three had to be towed back to base camp on the last day of the operation.

(2)   Maintenance of all equipment was stressed throughout the operation and thorough maintenance inspections were conducted by all unit commanders upon return to base camp.
           d.  Treatment of casualties and evacuation:

(1)  Bn aid stations accompanied the Bn forward command posts.

(2)  The Bde surgeon remained at the Bde forward CP               

(p10)

(3)  The 25th Medical Bn provided a clearing platoon and continued “dustoff” stand-by during daylight hours at the Bde forward CP.  A total of 115 patients were treated at the clearing platoon of which 54 were evacuated for further treatment.

(4)  Resupply helicopters were sometimes utilized to evacuate wounded back to the clearing platoon as the tactical situation and availability of “dustoff” aircraft dictated.     

             e.  Communications:

(1)  Types utilized:

(a)  FM radio
(b)  AM radio

1.  Point to point (Hot Line) telephone
2.  Switchboard to switchboard (common user) telephone
3.  Teletype  (on-line crypto).

(c)  Courier  (Liaison officers).

(d)  Wire.

(2)  Courier remains the fastest and easiest method of transmitting classified reports with tight deadlines over short distances.  During the operation, the IHTSUM and SITREP were transmitted by teletype without difficulty.

14.  Special Equipment and Techniques:

 Starlight devices were carried by all units and used extensively during night operations.

15.  US - ARVN  Joint Operations:

           a.   General:  Joint Operations between US and ARVN troops on Operation MAKIKI were characterized by close
coordination, cooperation, and an extreme willingness to share experience and knowledge exhibited by both units.  The
following phases of the operation are considered noteworthy.

           b.   Coordination Meetings between Commanders:  Daily coordination was effected between the commanders and
staff of the 2nd Bde and the 49th (ARVN) Rets.  The meetings dealt not just with specific details of current operations, but
 also general information and suggestions for tactical operations were exchanged.  The prevailing attitude of friendly
cooperation contributed to the over-all success of the operation.

          c.   Liaison Officers:   A joint tactical operation center was set up in the 2nd Bde CP area.  The 49th (ARVN) Regt was represented by a liaison team headed by an ARVN Captain and his US advisor counterpart.  The advisability of co-locating
the liaison team with their counterparts in the TOC was demonstrated by the rapid reaction to requests for artillery and air
strikes.  Troop locations could be easily and quickly exchanged, reducing the delay from time of request to fire on target to a minimum.  Having eye-to-eye contact with the ARVN element virtually eliminated the possibility of misunderstanding tactical  changes due to a rapidly developing situation, and again providing rapid reaction by ARVN elements to exploit these situations.
  (p11)

          d.   Joint Civil Affairs:   Working in conjunction with the S5 49th ARVN Regt, the Bde S5 conducted Psyops, Helping
Hand, and Medcap throughout the Bde AO.  In all cases the “teams” concept was most successful and was of great
assistance in carrying out the mission.  

16.  Commander's Analysis:

a.   The term most descriptive of combat operations on operation MAKIKI is “teamwork”.
Teamwork as exhibited throughout the operation by both US and ARVN commanders, staffs, and troops.  And also
 teamwork between the Mechanized Infantry elements and ground troops lifted into an area of operation.

                   b.   The joint US-ARVN operations have been discussed elsewhere in this report, and I can only add that I look forward
with pleasure to he next opportunity to work with the 49th ARVN Regt.  Staff co-ordination, especially in the S2, S4, and S5
areas, was most beneficial.  Civil Affairs and Psy War operations, conducted in conjunction with Psy War teams from the 49th  
Regt., ARVN  were very effective.

                   c.   The use of Army Aviation to rapidly move a large number of troops into an operational area is not a new idea.  
On Operation MAKIKI, however, this was very effectively combined with a drive by the 1/5 (M) into its AO.  This maneuver
netted the largest single-day body count of the entire operation.  There has been much conjecture and speculation as to
the ability of mechanized units to operate in the local terrain during the southwest monsoon period.  No appreciable loss
of maneuverability was suffered during this operation as the tracks found ample solid footing on which to travel.

                 d.   Bangalore torpedos were effectively used as a method of clearing booby trapped areas, employing the same
 principles as has been used to clear minefields.

                e.   Special planning is required to employ stay-behind forces in conjunction with aerial extractions.  In order to have successful stay behind patrols or ambushes, safer positions must be selected sufficiently far from the LZ or base camp so
as to prevent compromise by local villagers who move into areas vacated by US troops.

                f.   The following civil affairs and Psy War activities were conducted:

(1)  Approximately 496 civilians were treated by unit doctors under MEDCAP.

(2)  523 bars of soap, 50 toys, 75 toothbrushes and 75 tubes of toothpste were given to friendly villagers.
 A demonstration was conducted to teach the proper method of using these health items.

(3)  26 tons of captured rice were evacuated from the operational area and turned over to G5, +Helping Hand”
 for storage.

(4)  Several loudspeaker and 5 leaflet missions were flown by S5 personnel.  A total of 100,000 leaflets were
dropped including 60,000 requested by S5, 45th ARVN Regt.

     g.   All units performed in an outstanding manner during operation MAKIKI.  It was most rewarding not only from
 the mission accomplished standpoint, but also in the friendships and harmonious relationships which wee developed
 with members and advisors of the 25th ARVN Division.


FOR THE COMMANDER:        
                                                                                                                                          A.R. KNIGHT, JR.
                                                                                                                                          Major, Infantry
                                                                                                                                         Adjutant


(12)