After Action Reports 31

Operational Report for Quarter Ending 31 Oct 66

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO, San Francisco 96225

AVDCMHD 18 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,

TO: See Distribution

Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS CSFOR-65)

Location: Vicinity, CU CHI (XT647153), RVN

Reporting Officer: Major General Fred C. Weyand

Prepared by: Major George J. Martin, CO 18th Military History

1. Significant Organizational Activities.

(1) General. There were 10 major (Bn or higher) operations and 1211 small unit actions conducted by the 25th Inf Div (-) during this quarter. All major and 113 small unit actions resulted in enemy contact.

(2) KOKO HEAD (22 July - 6 Aug). The 2nd Bde Task Force (1st Bn, 27th Inf (-); 2nd Bn, 27th Inf (-); 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf and 1st Bn, 8th Arty (+)) conducted airmobile assaults and S&D operations in conjunction with ARVN forces. Joint US/ARVN Operations Centers at BAO TRAI (XT545049) and TRANG BANG (XT490195) were operational. Fire support bases were established at DUC HUE, BAO TRAI, TRANG BANG, and TRUNG LAP. From 23-25 July, the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf conducted a reconnaissance in force and S&D operation vic XT699108. They destroyed several VC structures in which covered bunkers were located. In response to intelligence information, elements of the 3rd Bn, 49th Regt (ARVN), and the 2nd Bn, 27th Inf conducted airmobile assaults to XT6003. On 1 August, two B52 airstrikes were flown in support of the operation. There was extensive damage to tunnels and underground fortifications in both areas. In the follow-up operation, a VCC was captured who spoke fluent English. This individual disclosed the location of his unit headquarters at XT642243. A search of the area revealed a large tunnel complex with concrete walls. Results of the operation were 11 VC KIA (BC), 31 VC KBA (BC), 92 VC KIA (poss), 82 VC KBA (poss), 25 VCC, 113 VCS. In addition, 25 small arms, 3400 lbs of rice, 35,955 rounds of ammunition and 101 grenades were captured. Two hundred and eight VC structures, 152 bunkers, 34 tunnels, 12 sampans and other miscellaneous items were destroyed. (App 1)

(3) OAHU (1-31 August). The 1st Bde Task Force (4th Bn, 9th Inf (-); 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (-); 2nd Bn, 14th Inf and 7th Bn, 11th Arty) conducted operations in TAY NINH Province to locate and destroy VC forces and supplies, and to support Operation BLUE JAY. They secured and defended the 196th Bde base camp vic TAY NINH Airfield (west). Extensive S&SD operations, patrols, and ambushes were conducted by the 1st Bde TASK FORCE from the TAY NINH Airfield with only light enemy contact occurring in the northwest sector. On 14 Aug, the 1st Bn (m), 5th Inf was attached to the 1st Bde Task Force and the 4th Bn, 9th Inf was detached. The 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf established a base camp vic TROUNG MIT (XT4034) and conducted S&D and screening missions north of Hwy 22 to prevent VC forces from interdicting the LOC to TAY NINH. On 25 Aug, the 4th Bn, 23rd Inf was placed under the OPCON of the 1st Div and deployed to LAI KHE. Results of Operation OAHU were 14 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC KBA (BC), 69 VC KIA (poss), 16 VC KBA (poss), 12 VCC and 110 VCS. In addition, 16.3 tons of rice and 4 small arms were captured. Seventy-eight VC structures, 33 underground fortifications, 1 trench and 5 tunnels were destroyed. (App 2)

(4) LAHAINA (7 Aug - 1 Sep). The 2nd Bn, 27th Inf conducted S&D operations in HAU NGHIA Province. Eagle flights of platoon and company size were found to be the fastest and most reliable means of reacting to intelligence provided by the Joint Operations Center at BAO TRAI. Results of Operation LAHAINA were 29 VC KIA (BC), 51 VC KIA (poss), 40 VCC, 57 VCS. In addition, 18 small arms, 25 lbs of medical supplies, 763 hand grenades, and 42 lbs of documents were captured. Twenty-nine VC structures, 14 underground fortifications and 40 tunnels were destroyed. (App 3)

(5) AIEA (8 Aug - 1 Sep). The 1st Bn, 27th Inf established a base camp vic XT526188 astride the major VC infiltration route to the BOI LOI Woods. Five BUDDY operations were conducted with the 2nd Bn, 49th Regt (ARVN), and TRANG BANG RF/PF Companies. Results of Operation AIEA were 20 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KBA (BC), 35 VC KIA (poss), 46 VC KBA (poss), 18 VCC, and 206 VCS. In addition, 79 punji pits, 33 tunnels, 48 underground fortifications, 223 VC structures, and 5 sampans were destroyed. (App 4)

(6) KIPAPA (31 Aug - 12 Sep). This operation was conducted in the FILHOL Plantation (XT;6720. Initially, two company S&D operations (Co A and Co B, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf) resulted in limited VC contact. On 2 Sep, the 4th Bn, 9th Inf and 4th Bn, 23rd Inf began separate operations in the east and west portions of the plantation. On 3 Sep, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf (-) was attached to the 1st Bde and conducted operations in the northern portion of the plantation. Three BUDDY operations were conducted with the 7th Regt, 5th Div (ARVN). The ARVN forces ranged from a platoon to two battalions. Results of Operation KIPAPA were 8 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KBA (BC), 24 VC KIA (poss), 8 VC KBA (poss). In addition, 2 VCC, 43 VCS, 52 AT mines, 47 grenades, 9 82mm mortar rounds, 36 105mm rds, and 4 weapons were captured. Five punji pits, 121 VC structures, 30 foxholes, 171 mines and booby traps, 15 tons of rice, 47 underground fortifications and 65 tunnels were destroyed. (App 5)

(7) SUNSET BEACH (2 Sep - 11 Oct). The 2nd Bde conducted operations in HAU NGHIA Province to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and bases, and interdict VC LOC's. The operation, conducted in three phases, initially employed 2 infantry battalions (1st Bn, 27th Inf and 2nd Bn, 27th Inf) and a mechanized platoon in areas contiguous to population centers and election polling places. In Phase II, the 2nd Bde employed the two infantry battalions in areas removed from election polling places and population centers. The 1st Bn, 27th Inf established and operated from a forward combat base vic TRANG DAU (XT5319) during Phases I & II. The 2nd Bn, 27th Inf operated from CU CHI base camp in Phase I and by the use of airmobile assaults extended their influence into the AO. In Phase II, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf also worked from a forward combat base. Both units made the US presence known by use of eagle flights, search and destroy operations, MEDCAPS, and BUDDY operations. Phase III was a continuation of Phase II. The 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf conducted reconnaissance in force along the periphery of the BOI LOI Woods, and assisted in the destruction of VC forces flushed by 1st Bn, 27th Inf eagle flights. Intelligence was processed through the Joint Operations Centers at TRANG BANG and BAO TRAI. A total of 22 BUDDY operations were conducted with elements of the 25th Inf Div (ARVN) and RF/PF forces. Quick reaction to CHIEU HOI information and agent reports process through the Joint US/ARVN Operations Centers at TRANG BANG and BAO TRAI was instrumental in capturing or destroying VC forces and supply caches in the area of operations. Total VC losses for the operation were 80 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KBA (BC), 128 VC KIA (poss), 7 VC KBA (poss), 46 VCC, 220 VCS. In addition, 19 small arms, 2 LAW's, 11 AP mines, 20 grenades, 2,409 blasting caps, 296 lbs of TNT, 5 cameras with photographic supplies, 43 lbs of documents, 161 lbs of medical supplies, 11,400 lbs of rice, 200 lbs of salt and other supplies were captured. Ninety-seven tunnels, 151 VC structures, 20 sampans, 47 underground fortifications, 2 underground storage areas, 164 foxholes, 20 punji pits, 14,525 lbs of rice, 4 rolls of tin and miscellaneous munitions were destroyed.

(8) LANIKAI (15 Sep - Continuing). For the first time, a US battalion is conducting operations in LONG AN Province. The 4th Bn, 9th Inf is conducting S&D operations, interdicting VC LOC's, supporting the revolutionary development program of the province, and conducting BUDDY operations with ARVN forces. The operation is in 4 phases. During Phase I-III, the battalion moved by air and vehicle to BEN LUC (XS629765) and established a battalion base. Phase IV consists of S&D operations in support of revolutionary development, aiding RF/PF forces in construction of local outposts, and the conduct of joint US/ARVN S&D operations. A Joint Operations Center has been established at BEN LUC. On 10 Oct, the Bn (-) conducted a waterborne S&D BUDDY operation with the 3rd Bn, 50th Regt (ARVN) and one ARVN GO-team, resulting in a VC weapons and ammo cache being captured. On 14 Oct, another BUDDY operation was conducted with the 3rd Bn, 50th Regt (ARVN). While Co B, 4th Bn, 9th Inf moved by land to a blocking position, the 3rd Bn, 50th Regt (ARVN) moved by boats to another blocking position. Co A and Co C, 4th Bn, 9th Inf then made a combat assault and S&T toward these blocks. Results of the action were 4 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC KIA (poss) and 3 weapons captured. The battalion has conducted 15 BUDDY operations with ARVN forces in the BEN LUC area. Both aerial assault and River Assault Group (illegible) boats have been used as a means of transporting troops to an objective area. The battalion continues with its MEDCAP program. They have also distributed JUSPAO school kits to the local school, and helped in the construction of two footbridges in the BEN LUC area. Results to date are 22 VC KIA (BC), 33 VC KIA (poss), 4 VCC and 36 VCS. In addition, 2 60mm mortars (complete), 10 small arms, 9 rifle grenades, 25 blasting caps, 1 demolition kit, 1 lb of documents and other supplies have been captured. Also, 15 81mm rds, 24 60mm rds, 6,180 rds of small arms ammo, 29 mines, 234 grenades, 11 VC structures, 3 underground fortifications, 5 trenches, 23 foxholes, 2,750 lbs of rice, and other supplies have been destroyed.

(9) KALIHI (17 Sep - Continuing). The 4th Bn, 23rd Inf conducted S&D operations in the FILHOL Plantation. Company size units were employed throughout the area utilizing both ground and air assaults in an attempt to locate VC forces. On 21 Sept, a BUDDY operation was conducted, resulting in limited VC contact. On 3 Oct, Co B, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf with Trp B, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav conducted a two day S&D BUDDY operation in the vic XT701182 with one company of the 1st Bn, 7th Regt (ARVN). Between 4 and 11 October, airmobile assaults, S*D operations, ambushes and patrols continued throughout the FILHOL Plantation. On 12 Oct, the 2nd Bn, 14th Inf conducted an airmobile assault and with 1 plat Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav conducted S&D operations in the northeastern sector of the FILHOL Plantation along the SAIGON River. The battalion has conducted 3 S&D BUDDY operations with the 1st Bn, 7th Regt (ARVN). On 17 Oct, Co B and Co C, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf attacked toward a block established by the 1st Bn, 7th Regt (ARVN) encountering an unknown VC force. Between 15 and 19 Oct, the 4th Bn, 23rd Inf conducted 5 S&D BUDDY operations with the 4th Bn, 7th Regt (ARVN). On 22 Oct, working on information supplied by a CHIEU HOI, the BN(-) conducted an S&D operation toward an attached Cav plat which was holding a blocking position. Light small arms fire was received. Upon reaching their objective area, 1 VC (illegible) was apprehended and a cache of rice, assorted tools, medical equipment, movie projector, 10 reels of movies, and other miscellaneous (illegible) were captured. Results of the operation to date are 37 VC KIA (BC), 103 VC KIA (poss), 3 VCC and 60 VCS. In addition, 11 small arms, 667 rounds of small arms ammo, 6 lbs of documents, 1 movie projector, 10 reels of film, and 1 tube tester were captured. Also 2 mortars (est 60mm), 177 VC structures, 43 tunnels, 40 underground fortifications, 51 foxholes, 9 tunnels, 31 punji pits, 26 sampans, 4.85 tons of rice and other supplies were destroyed.

(10) KAMUELA (20 Sep - 4 Oct). The 2nd Bn, 14th Inf conducted S&D operations along the eastern edge of the BOI LOI Woods vic XT5042. The battalion conducted combat assaults into the AO to cover the maximum area possible and develop the enemy situation. Shall penetrations were made along the eastern edge of the woods. On 26 Sep the battalion, acting on information obtained from a rallier, located over 280 tons of rice in seven separate locations. The 2nd Bn, 1st Inf was placed under OPCON of the 1st Bde on 27 Sep to secure the cache. Upon their arrival in the rice cache area, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf continued on the S&D operation while 2nd Bn, 1st Inf prepared to evacuate the rice. On 23 Sep, 50 laborers arrived from DAU TIENG on 5 ships to pick up and evacuate the rice to DAU TIENG. By 4 Oct, all edible rice has been evacuated (126.25 tons), and the remainder, having been inspected and declared inedible because of varying stages of decay, was destroyed. The two battalions then conducted an S&D operation to DAU TIENG and returned to their respective bases at CU CHI and TAY NINH. Results of the operation were 5 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC KBA (BC), 32 VC KIA (poss), 41 VC KBA (poss0, 3 VCC and 28 VCS. In addition, 1 CHICOM carbine, 35lbs of documents, 126.25 tons of rice, 2500 lbs of salt and other miscellaneous supplies were captured. Forty-four tunnels, 184 VC structures, 14 underground fortifications, 5 trenches, 14 spider holes, 157.90 tons of rice, 100 lbs of salt and other supplies were destroyed. (App 6)

(11) KAILUA (12 Oct - Continuing). 2nd Bde is conducting operations in the HAU NGHIA Province to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps, and to interdict VC LOC's. This operation began with Co B, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf conducting saturation ambushes and security operations vic XT695096. Both the 1st and 2nd Bn, 27th Inf conducted airmobile assaults and S&D operations resulting in limited VC contact. Between 13 and 15 Oct, the three battalions established forward combat bases. Over 20 operations have been conducted to date based on information received through the TRANG BANG and BAO TRAI Joint Operations Centers. The operations have resulted in numerous VC caches being discovered, and on several occasions contact with VC forces. Scout dogs have proven useful to the Bde forces. On 23 Oct at 0200 hours, a scout dog attached to the 2nd Bn, 27th Inf alerted the unit to VC presence in the area. The battalion engaged the VC force resulting in 7 VC KIA (BC). Numerous firing positions were located for both 60mm and 81mm mortars. The Brigade has participated in several BUDDY operations and have conducted both CHECKMATE and BUSHMASTER operations. MEDCAPS have been conducted throughout the operational area. To date, over 1500 personnel have been treated. Results to date are 51 VC KIA (BC), 118 VC KIA (poss), 34 VCC, and 112 VCS. In addition, 7 small arms, 38 lbs of documents, 71,710 $VN; 26 grenades, 3 transistor radios, and 3 sampan motors were captured. Also, 600 lbs of TNT, 35 booby traps, 140 VC structures, 7 tunnels, 63 underground fortifications, 8 bridges, 2 boat docks, 33 sampans, and 3.2 tons of rice were destroyed.

b. (C) Artillery Support. During the quarter, 159,847 rounds of artillery were fired with the following results: 107 VC KIA (BC), 650 VC KIA (poss).

c. (C) Air Support. There were 2927 tactical air sorties during the quarter with the following results: 41 VC KBA (BC), 229 VC KBA (poss), 683 VC structures and 120 bunkers destroyed, and 45 secondary fires started, 12 secondary explosions, and 41 sampans destroyed.

d. (C) Army Aviation. There were 9102 army aviation combat sorties and 32,035 aviation support sorties resulting in 35 KBAA, 6 VCC, 27 structures and 8 sampans destroyed.

e. (C) Intelligence.

1 VC initiated activity decreased within the 25th Inf Div's TAOR and other areas in HAU NGHIA Province in which division elements operated. The number of anti-aircraft incidents decreased by approximately 25% from those reported in July. The decrease of 65% in the number of road obstacles during the period is attributed to the presence of the 1st Bn, 27th Inf in the TRANG BANG area astride Route 1 where roadblock activity has been heaviest in the past. Reports indicate that the amount of VC movement within HAU NGHIA Province remained approximately the same as that reported in July. One major unit, the 273rd VC Regt, reportedly moved into the BOI LOI Woods at the beginning of August, but later moved to its present location north of the MICHELIN Plantation vic XT5458. Reports indicated the 273rd VC Regt was on a resupply and training mission.

2 One of the most significant indications of the VC's internal deterioration is the marked increase in CHIEU HOI returnees. Records at the Provincial CHIEU HOI Center indicate that 91 CHIEU HOI's rallied during August. This is the highest monthly figure for the year and represents an increase of 86% over July. Most returnees complained of the constant hardships and hazards they endured as VC soldiers. The VC's fear of the division's eagle flight operations was reflected in a recent captured document which indicated they could not defend against the operations, and their efforts were greatly affected by the operations.

3 Quick reaction to intelligence provided by the National Police Headquarters and thru the Joint US/ARVN/NP Operations Centers in HAU NGHIA Province resulted in numerous highly successful operations. Examples follow:

a On 4 Aug, this headquarters was notified that 100 VC were located in an orchard vic XT516006. Reacting rapidly to this intelligence, an immediate TAC air strike was called. The intelligence source returned to the area and reported that VC losses were 20 VC killed to include a VC Company Commander. Two mortars and 2 machine guns were also reported damaged during the strike.

b On 11 Aug, a joint operation by division elements, ARVN forces, and elements of the National Police was mounted. The intelligence source, a captured VCC, was made available for the operation by the TRANG BANG National Police Headquarters. He located hidden VC rice caches in AP AN PHY Hamlet (XT496173) containing a total of 24.25 tons. Residents indicated that the rice was left there by the VC for storage and subsequent recovery. Also during the operation, 8 VCS were apprehended and turned over to TRANG BANG District officials for further processing.

c On 17 Aug, intelligence received from Sector Headquarters, BAO TRAI, revealed the location og an ammunition cache at XT4017. An aerial reconnaissance was made, and on 18 Aug a company was airlifted into selected areas to search for the cache. Two separate caches that contained the following were uncovered: 136 booby traps, 732 hand grenades, 13 rifle grenades, 583 rounds of SA ammo, 1-60mm homemade mortar with base plate and bipod, 40-60mm mortar rounds, 1-57mm RR round, and 7 bangalore torpedoes.

d Based on intelligence provided by the TRANG BANG Joint Operations Center, division elements conducted a search and destroy operation vic XT521214 on 29 Aug. A VC platoon was encountered and immediate reaction combined with skillful tactical maneuvering resulted in 6 VC KIA (BC), 2 KIA (poss), 1 VCC, and 11 VCS apprehended. Fifteen bottles of medicine and 47 rounds of SA ammo were captured. Twenty-nine foxholes, 15 lbs salt, 11 VC structures, 1 tunnel, and 7 underground fortifications were destroyed.

e Based on intelligence provided by the CU CHI District National Police chief, a joint US/ARVN operation was launched against an assassination group known as the CU CHI Sapper Unit vic XT605061 on 29 Aug. The source, a member of the assassination group, furnished a detailed sketch of his unit's hideout. The sketch was confirmed by map study, detailed visual reconnaissance, and aerial photography conducted by the 25th MI Det. According to the source, the unit numbered 17 to 22 men. Based on the evaluation of the source and the study of the area, the mission was undertaken; results were 8 VC KIA (BC), 13 VCC, 4 VCS, and 7 small arms captured. Destroyed in the same area were 19 tunnels, 5 grenades, 1 booby trap, and 4 sampans. Evacuated were miscellaneous documents, clothing, and 303 rounds of small arms ammunition. The source accompanied the 2nd Bn, 27th Inf into the area of operations. Through his personal efforts, at least three VCC were captured together with their weapons. His detailed briefing enabled out forces to utilize most effectively a 140 man airmobile group as a “Quick Drop” force to head of VC escaping from the area of operations. Three of the VC body count included in the total were attained through this “Quick Drop” technique. The operation highlights the results that can be attained from a rapid evaluation and response to intelligence generated by joint US/ARVN collection efforts.

4 The VC continue to be forced from their base and supply areas, and have had an ever increasing problem of preventing ralliers from returning to the government. The presence of US forces continues to motivate the populace into offering information concerning VC activities. Rapid reaction by division elements in responding to agent reports and information provided by returnees has denied the VC the freedom of movement they previously enjoyed.

5 Total VC personnel, positions and equipment losses 1-31 Aug 66.

VC KIA (BC) - 81 Returnees - 91

VC KIA (poss) - 475 Small Arms - 30

VCC - 52 Rice - 46 tons

VCS - 305 Tunnels - 97

Trenches - 31 Underground

Fortifications - 200

1 VC initiated activity during the month of September continued at relatively the same level as that of August within the 25th Inf Div's TAOR and HAUGH NGHIA Province. The exception was an increase of anti-aircraft incidents from 42 to 50. Roadblock incidents dropped from 12 to 11, continuing a downward trend initiated in August. VC movement reported within the division's area of operations also remained relatively constant with those reported for the previous month. The majority of reports placed confirmed units within their normal operational areas. The one exception was the movement of the 9th VC Div Hq to an area south of DAU TIENG, vic XT548385. Reports indicated that the division headquarters remained in the area for approximately 2 weeks before it displaced to the South Vietnam-Cambodian border, vic XT560900. The location of the division headquarters and its subordinate regiments prompted the movement of US forces to the DAU TIENG area to counter the threat. The area which was the subject of the largest number of reports concerning VC movement was along the ORIENTAL River from the LOC GAIN area, vic XT4077, to the HORSESHOE area, vic XT5592.

2 Intelligence provided division units by the Joint US/ARVN/NP Operations Center in HAU NGHIA Province resulted in 6 successful operations.

a On 1 Sep 66, a joint heliborne operation was conducted vic XT577035 in response to intelligence received from the MSS concerning the exact location of a VC propaganda activity associated with the DUC HOA District Committee. The operation, involving 2 companies of the 2nd Bn, 27th Inf and elements of the 49th Regt (ARVN), resulted in 9 VC KIA (VC), 22 VCC and the capture of 10 individual weapons, 10 lbs of medical supplies, 210 rds of SA ammo, and 40 lbs of documents.

b On 5 Sep 66, based on information provided by the Joint Operations Center at BAO TRAI, an airmobile operation was conducted vic XT526114, to locate 2 VC squads reported operating in the area. Contact was made and results of the operation included the capture of 4 VCC, 3 individual weapons and 110 rds of SA ammo. Interrogation of the VCC revealed the location of 2 large mines which were buried in a road and wired for command detonation.

c On 15 Sep 66, a heliborne assault was conducted by 2nd Bn, 27th Inf vic XT611061 to exploit intelligence indicating an estimated 20 VC in the area. The CU CHI National Police Chief accompanied assault elements along with 3 recently captured VCC who had knowledge of the general locale. Results of the operation included the capture of 4 VCC, 7 VCS, 2 weapons, 800 lbs of peanuts, 300 lbs of rice, 100 lbs of tobacco, 6 dry cell batteries, and 3 rolls of WD-1 wire.

d On 23 Sep 66, a joint operation was conducted vic XT6106 by the 2nd Bn, 27th Inf and the HAU NGHIA Province Intelligence Platoon. This operation was based on intelligence developed by the BAO TRAI Joint US/ARVN/NP Operations Center indicating the presence of a 12 man VC squad located in the area. Results of the operation included 4 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (poss) and the capture of 3 weapons, 20 hand grenades, 400 rds SA ammo. Fifteen VCS were also apprehended in the immediate area.

e On 24 Sep 66, the 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, utilizing intelligence provided by the BAO TRAI Sector S2 and MSS, together with on the spot assistance of 2 CHIEU HOI's, conducted an operation in search of a reported VC aid station and ordnance cache. While searching the area, 2 VC were engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (poss) and 1 weapon captured. The aid station was located at XS497972 and 145 lbs of misc medical supplies were captured. VC were engaged with artillery resulting in 9 more VC KIA (poss). The arms cache was located vic of XS506970 resulting in the capture of 377 rds SA ammo, 100 lbs rice, 2 grenades, and 14 ammo magazines.

f On 27 Sep 66, the 1st Bn, 27th Inf and a PF platoon from TRANG BANG District conducted an operation vic XT463243 based on information provided by the TRANG BANG Joint Operations Center indicating a VC platoon was located at the above coordinates. A series of small engagements and a thorough search of the area resulted in 14 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC KIA (poss), and the capture of 3 VCC, 3 weapons, 1 lb of documents, and the apprehension of 22 VCS.

3 The VC continue to be forced from their base and supply areas and still have the serious problem of ralliers returning to government control and assisting Free World Forces by providing information on VC activities. An example of this was illustrated on 26 Sep 66 when the 2nd Bn, 14th Inf, reacting to information volunteered by a rallier, captured 281 tons of rice.

4 On 11 Sep 66 at XT432172, thorough search techniques utilized by division troops resulted in the significant capture of VC photographic equipment. The 2nd Bn, 27th Inf located a 55 gal drum which had been carefully concealed in a thicket and covered with mud. The contents, which included 3 expensive movie cameras, 2-35mm cameras, 24 rolls of 35mm film, printing paper and development chemicals, probably were utilized by a relatively sophisticated VC propaganda or proselytizing activity operating in the area.

5 The presence of US forces continues to motivate the populace into offering information concerning VC activities. Rapid reaction by division elements in responding to agent reports and information provided by returnees has denied the VC the freedom of movement they previously enjoyed at the beginning of the year.

6 VC Personnel positions and equipment losses 1-30 September 1966:

Underground Fortifications - 152

1 VC initiated activity during the month of October remained relatively the same as that of September. Roadblock incidents remained the same. Anti-aircraft incidents increased from 50 to 59 for an 18% increase. VC movement within the division's area of operations remained stable, with no significant movement noted. VC units operated in their normal area of operations.

2 Significant Operations:

a On 4 Oct, 4th Bn, 9th Inf discovered a VC arms/ammo cache vic XS676692. Information was provided by a CHIEU HOI, who led the unit to the operational area. Included in the cache were 3 CHICOM carbines, 2 French Carbines, 1 BAR, 1 Thompson SMG, 1-60mm mortar sight and assorted amount of grenades, rifle grenades, 81mm and 60mm ammunition, AT mines and demolition equipment. This was a joint US/ARVN operation. The close cooperation between the US and ARVN forces was instrumental in the success of the operation.

b On 5 Oct, a well organized and smoothly functioning US/ARVN Joint Operations Center in BAO TRAI proved its value again. Reacting quickly to an agent report giving the location of a VC squad, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf conducted a heliborne operation into the vic XT480048 - XT495055. The results of the operation included 3 VC KIA (BC), 6 VCC captured, 3 VCS apprehended and 1 Thompson SMG and misc documents captured.

c On 7 Oct, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, with the assistance of CHIEU HOI searched the area vic XT489067. The operation resulted in 4 VCC, 3 VCS and 5 lbs of medical supplies located and evacuated.

d 4th Bn, 9th Inf, with the assistance of the CHIEU HOI who led them to the cache of 10 Oct, found another cache vic XS675676. The cache included 1 CHICOM carbine, 6 turtle mines, 8 cylindrical mines, 150 AR magazines, 39 rifle grenades, 8-60mm mortar rounds, 400 rounds of 12.7 MLB, assorted communications equipment, SA ammunition and weapons parts.

e On 13 Oct, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf contacted a VC company vic XT652227. Results of the engagement were 5 VC KIA (BC), 7 VC KIA (poss), 1 VCS, and 2 CHICOM type 56 SMGs, 2 CHICOM type 56 carbines and 1 grenade launcher captured. The VCC revealed, under interrogation, that the company was the C4 Co, 7th Bn, 165A regiment which had a strength of 37 men. The under-strength company illustrates the fact that the division is taking a toll of the 165A Regt.

f D Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav gunships observed 6 VC and 2 mortars (est 60mm) vic XT645238 on 16 Oct. Gunships and TAF engaged the VC and suspected VC locations resulting in 9 VC KIA (BC), 13 VC KIA (poss); 2 mortars (est 60mm), 23 VC structures, 2 mortar positions, 2 underground fortifications, and 1 tunnel destroyed.

g On 22 Oct, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf captured an RCA 16mm projector, 10 reels of 16mm propaganda film, a microphone and other assorted signal equipment and parts vic XT753203. The equipment belonged to the SAIGON-GIA DINH Special Region Propaganda and Training Section.

h On 23 Oct, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf forward base area was attacked by an estimated VC company vic XS563986. The attack consisted of SA, AW, claymore, 60mm and 81mm mortar fire. A well executed counter mortar plan resulted in breaking the VC attack, and 7 VC KIA (BC), 20 VC KIA (poss), 7 VCC, 1 VCS, 1 CHICOM assault rifle, 2 hand grenades, 11 rifle grenades, 5 CHICOM claymore mines, 13 mortar rounds and misc SA ammunition were lost by the VC.

i On 24 Oct, a CHIEU HOI who rallied to TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center, voluntarily led 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf to a demolitions cache vic XT604258. The cache included 600 lbs of TNT, 1 large shape charge, AT mines and 1 hand grenade. Twenty-five booby traps surrounding the cache were destroyed, along with the cache itself. The intelligence value of the CHIEU HOI was again exploited in the operation when he led the unit through a booby trapped area to the cache.

3 The VC continued to be forced from their base and supply areas by US operations. The loss of major supply caches will definitely affect the tactical capabilities of the VC in the near future. The VC also continue to have a serious problem of ralliers returning to government control and assisting Free World Forces with information on VC activities, supply and base areas.

4 The presence of US forces continues to motivate the people. An excellent example of this occurred on 30 Oct when a female villager pointed out a mail pick-up to 2nd Bn, 27th Inf. The unit located several VC letters in the area vic XT476059. The presence of US forces in the area of operations has given the people new confidence in their government and in the US effort to assist them. One good example of US influence occurred in LONG AN Province where the CHIEU HOI rate nearly tripled from September.

5 VC Personnel and Equipment Losses 1-31 October 1966:

(2) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP):

(a) Operations. During the reporting period, the division LRRP conducted 26 patrols in HAU NGHIA, TAY NANH, and LONG AN Provinces. The LRRP has conducted missions for the ACofS, G2, the Brigades, and the 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav. In doing so, the patrol has acquired the capability of operating at extended distances from the division base. When proper coordination and support is provided, the LRRP can obtain for units preoperational information concerning enemy movement patterns, troop concentration, and installations. During operations, the LRRP has acted as point reconnaissance and screening force for infantry battalions and cavalry troops. After operations, the LRRP has operated as a stay-behind force to monitor traffic of personnel and equipment that has returned to the operational area.

(b) Training. During the period, the LRRP has conducted a 92 hour water-borne training program. At the end of the instructional period, the patrol conducted 2 water-borne operations. On both operations sampans were used for the transportation of the LRRP. In addition to the water-borne training program, members of the division LRRP attended the 5th SFG (Project Delta) MACV RECONDO School. Of the 11 division personnel who attended the first course, one became the Honor Student. Presently the LRRP has an additional 11 personnel attending the course.

(3) Liaison: The G2 Section has increased its liaison capability within HAU NGHIA and TAY NINH attempting to insure that all intelligence information originating within these provinces is made available to the CG of the 25th US Division. In addition to the daily visits to the 25th ARVN Div HQ, Province Capital at BAO TRAI, and subsector headquarters, two officers are strategically positioned at key locations to assist in the reporting of intelligence. One is at TAY NINH Province and the other is positioned at the subsector headquarters at TRANG BANG. The value of this close liaison has proven itself on numerous occasions when perishable information was received and then relayed to division, thus enabling a rapid and effective division response.

(4) Counterintelligence: The influx of approximately 1200 daily hire laborers into the division base has required intensive and continuous counterintelligence measures to neutralize VC espionage. These measures have included maintaining personal data files on all indigenous personnel having access to the base, name checks against records of known or suspected VC or VC sympathizers, investigation of information concerning VC alleged to be in the division work force, and development of informants who can report on possible espionage attempts. Counterintelligence measures to date have resulted in the apprehension of 9 persons on the division base who have admitted to conducting activities for the VC. In addition, approximately 50 individuals have been detected with improper or false identification documents.

(a) The division CHECKMATE program of establishing check points at random locations along major transportation arteries in HAU NGHIA Province has been continued during this reporting period. It has denied to the VC the freedom of movement he once enjoyed by covertly moving personnel and equipment through our TAOR. These check points were manned by elements of the 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav, CI agents of the 25th MI Detachment, and National Police.

(b) Twenty-six CHECKMATES were conducted during the period and a total of 28,757 personnel, 2874 vehicles, and 15 sampans were screened. Results of these operations included 1 VCC, 21 VCS, and 3 AP mines captured.

(6) Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility (TIIF):

(a) The TIIF has been received by this division and is utilized by the Targeting Section. Its primary function is to afford the imagery interpreter a highly sophisticated capability of interpreting photos.

(a) Status of rations at end of quarter.

TYPE RATION STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE (DAYS) O/H (DAYS)

(b) Fresh fruits and vegetables were received through SAIGON, from DALAT, RVN, and CONUS. A substantial percentage of fruits and vegetables have been received in an inedible condition.

1 TYPE ICE AVG NO LBS/DAY MAN/DAY

Non-Potable 78,300 6.0

2 One ice plant has been completed at CU CHI. Capacity will average 14 tons per day. Three more of these plants are needed to provide proper allowance of potable ice to troops in CU CHI.

(e) The Class I yard has been partially surfaced with laterite. At the end of the quarter it is still not usable for issue or storage.

(f) Close monitoring of unit periodic logistic reports by Division supply personnel and liaison with the supporting supply activities in SAIGON has kept critical shortages to a minimum.

(2) Class II & IV Supply.

(a) The number of items in critical demands has been reduced.

(b) The ASL has been increased by 204 line items. Total ASL is now 709 line items.

(3) Class III Supply - Issues during quarter:

COMMODITY DAILY (AV GAL) QUARTERLY (TOTAL GAL)

Mogas 12,000 1,042,828

Diesel 13,000 774,517

JP-4 17,000 1,188,420

(4) Graves Registration.

(a) Deceased US personnel processed during the quarter - 128.

(b) Deceased RVN personnel processed during the quarter - 6.

2 1,837 washer loads

2 Average daily - 1,753

2 Average daily - 31

2 Average daily - 88

(d) Personnel moved locally by bus:

2 Average daily - 77

(7) 725th Maintenance Battalion.

(a) The number of job orders completed during the quarter were as follows:

COMMODITY NO. COMPLETED

(b) Certain vehicles were modified with steel plating for protection of drivers and passengers.

(8) 25th Medical Battalion. This unit supported an average of 23 division units with medical service and supplies, as follows:

SERVICE NO OF PATIENTS

A total of 4,783 medical supply items were issued during the quarter.

(9) Transportation Office.

(a) Convoys were operated between CU CHI and SAIGON to supply the CU CHI Base Camp and between CU CHI and TAY NINH to establish and re-supply the base camp for the 196th Infantry Brigade and the Philippine Civic action Group.

Total volume of vehicles 20,955

Average daily volume 235

Number of vehicles involved 1,464

In unit distribution

Total vehicles 9,379

1st Log Comd vehicles 5,198

CU CHI base camp vehicles 2,820

196th Inf Bde vehicles 837

PHILCAG vehicles 524

(b) Air Force Airlift requirements - The transportation office coordinated Air Force airlift requirements for the 196th Infantry Brigade. Eighteen missions were requested and flown. Total cargo delivered was 832,604 pounds.

(c) Baggage Section. The Division Transportation Office established the Division Baggage Section in September. During the first six weeks of operation, this section has processed baggage for 211 personnel. Total baggage weight processed to date is 18,781 pounds.

(1) Division Ammunition Office.

(a) Stockage Objective.

1 Stockage objective - 1,600 tons (7 days)

2 On hand - (illegible) (illegible) days)

PERIOD AMOUNT (TONS/DAY)

16 Jul - 15 Aug 91.4

16 Aug - 15 Sep 92.3

16 Sep - 15 Oct 32.7

Average for quarter - 72.1 tons/day

(1) Personnel. During this period the personnel posture of the division has been excellent. Assigned strength (approximately 100.2%) slightly exceeds the authorized strength. There is a shortage of infantry NCO's (MOS 11B40) in the grades of E-5 and E-6. The casualty rate of NCO's has created a shortage in greater proportion than the rate of fill. A shortage also exists in armor intelligence NCO's (MOS 11D40) in grades E-5 and E-6. The fill action received in relation to the unprogrammed losses has not been sufficient to maintain a good strength picture in this area. Other critical shortages are Infantry Operations and Intelligence Specialist (MOS 11F20), General Cryptographic Repairman (MOS 31K20), and Artillery Mechanic (MOS 45F20). These shortages are the result of lack of fill action on requisitions. In a majority of the above instances personnel in lower grades, lower skill level MOS, and OJT categories are performing in these positions. Although it does not show in the overall personnel picture as reported to higher HQs, this necessary type of action results in malassignments, misutilization of personnel, and tends to present a false strength picture in lower grades and MOS skill levels. The overall officer strength picture within the Division is excellent. However, there still remains a grade imbalance between officers and warrant officers. This imbalance, for the most part, falls within the 25th Aviation Battalion. The non-availability of WO aviators and the subsequent fill of these positions with officers has caused this. Currently, that battalion has 37% of its authorized strength in WOs and 175% of its authorized strength in officers.

(2) Key losses/gains:

(a) 3 August 1966, Major Guy S. Maloy III assumed command of 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.

(b) 10 August 1966, BG Edward H. DeSaussure, Jr. assumed command of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

(d) 24 August 1966, Lt Colonel Felix Salvadore assumed command of the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery.

(e) 24 August 1966, Lt colonel William D. Brown appointed Division IG.

(f) 16 September 1966, BG George G. O'Connor appointed ADC to 25th Infantry Division.

(g) 19 September 1966, Colonel Aaron E. Walker departed for 1st Log Command.

(h) 21 September 1966, Lt colonel John W. Vessey, Jr. appointed Division Artillery Executive Officer.

(i) 23 October 1966, Lt Colonel Kenneth R. Hass, Division Transportation Officer, departed for Hq USARV.

(3) The Division PX remains in operation with 4,000 square feet of floor space and 4,000 square feet of storage space. Total sales from the Division Site Exchange was $1,840,681.01 for the quarter ending 31 October 1966.

Division (-) as of 31 October 1966:

Auth 727 163 10,838 11,728

Asgd 788 105 10,997 11,890

PDY 746 97 10,725 11,568

(5) Losses. (1 Aug - 31 Oct)

OFF WO EM ACG KIA 5 0 74 79

Non-Battle dead 0 0 3 3

Non-Battle injured 0 1 64 65

(6) Gains (1 Aug - 31 Oct).

(7) Provost Marshal Activities.

(a) General. The Provost Marshal section and the 25th Military Police company have continued to provide military police support to elements of the 25th Infantry Division engaged in combat operations while simultaneously supporting the base camp operations.

(b) Base Camp Operations.

1 Due to the static semi-permanent nature of the division base camp operations, many military police functions normally associated with garrison type duties have been established for the proper control of personnel, military traffic and installation security to include: motorized patrols, both on and off post; gate guards at the installation entrances; security guards at key facilities and headquarters within the cantonment area; and the processing of all indigenous laborers employed within the base camp.

2 Processing Indigenous Personnel. Approximately 1200 indigenous personnel are processed in and out of the base camp daily except Sundays. Specific working areas within the base camp have been designated for indigenous laborers, and military police prohibit their access into unauthorized areas. Indigenous personnel desiring to conduct official business with units or staff sections are receipted for by US military personnel at the Main Gate and remain under their supervision while inside the cantonment area.

3 PW Collecting Point. A semi-permanent facility consisting of one perimeter fence and eight individual enclosures capable of housing 120 personnel has been completed. A total of 262 detainees were processed through the collecting point and subsequently classified as follows: PW's - 16; Civil Defendants - 146; Returnees - 21; Innocent civilians - 79. All detainees are fed three hot meals daily while at the PW Collecting Point. All foods, except for purely American type dishes are well received by the detainees, particularly meats, as it is a rare item in their diet. There have been no disciplinary or control problems concerning detainees, nor do they appear to be hostile toward the US Military. Detainees subsequently classified as innocent civilians are given “Helping Hand boxes” and solatium payments for each day detained prior to release to civil affairs personnel for return to their villages or place of capture.

4 Convoy Escorts. Military police have escorted 365 convoys, consisting of 23,707 vehicles for a total of 428,106 vehicle miles in support of Division tactical and re-supply operations. No significant problem areas were encountered.

5 Registration. For the purpose of identification and control of third national and local national personnel permanently employed at the base camp, and the control of privately owned weapons, war trophies, motor vehicles and pets, a registration section has been established within the Office of the Provost Marshal. Seventy-two identification cards were issued to ARVN interpreters attached to units of the Division, 60 identification cards were issued to third nationals employed by PA&E, and 197 privately owned weapons, 19 war trophies, 5 motor vehicles and 23 pets were registered with the Provost Marshal.

6 Discipline, Law, and Order. A total of 54 Class I and 73 Class II offenses have been reported resulting in the initiation of 43 Class I and 6 Class II criminal investigations, and the identification of 73 offenders. A total of 51 motor vehicle accidents have occurred resulting in 3 traffic fatalities, and a total property damage of $2,910.00. Other routine investigations involving division personnel were conducted with no serious incidents or unusual problems.

(c) Division Tactical Support. During the period 1-31 August 1966, the 1st platoon, 25th Military Police Company, was attached with the 1st Brigade for movement to TAY NINH to establish a base of operation for the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. Support provided to the 1st Brigade included: convoy escorts, checkpoint operations, TCP's, town patrolling, base camp patrolling, VIP escorts and security, processing of 118 detained personnel, and operation of an indigenous laborers checkpoint.

h. (C) Civic Action.

(1) A special Assistant to the commanding General for Revolutionary Development was designated. This adviser coordinates the overall GVN program of long term national growth (Revolutionary Development) with division activities.

(2) Statistical Summary.

August-October To Date

Helping Hand Recipients 31,000 56,000

MEDCAP Patients 28,500 54.400

Health & Sanitation 380 750

Construction 168 303

Transportation 41 88

Commerce & Industry 22 69

Agricultural & Natural Resources 6 10

Education & Training 51 118

Community Relations 210 554

Communications 35 107

Refugee Assistance 19 31

Public Affairs 46 107

(3) This quarter marked the expansion of the division's original civic action program into a larger area of influence on a recurring basis. Significant changes were:

(a) 1st Bde now has CA responsibility for one village, the 7th ARVN Regt dependent area in PHU HOA District, BINH DUONG Province, and the 50th ARVN Regt dependent area in LONG AN Province.

(b) 2nd Bde conducts its civic action programs in three villagaes, and for all 25th ARVN dependents in three additional villages.

(c) Division Artillery now provides civic action support for two large villages, and the dependents of two artillery Bns of the 25th Inf Div (ARVN).

(d) Other division elements are currently active in three other hamlets.

(e) The civic action program was extended to PHU HOA District, BINH DUONG Province and LONG AN Province.

(4) MEDCAP II. The division MEDCAP program has seen an expansion from 210 to 271 MEDCAPS and from 18,927 to 28,971 patients as compared with the last quarter. This expansion is due to increased use of ARVN medics, interpreters, doctors and nurses. MEDCAPS are using loudspeakers to announce MEDCAPS, and other communication devices to keep personnel occupied while waiting. There were two preventive medicine projects during the quarter. One consisted in administering smallpox and cholera immunization to school children in TAY NINH. The other consisted of administration of eye drops to all children in TAN THOI when the MEDCAP surgeon felt there was a possibility of an eye infection. Additionally, a prenatal clinic is being conducted by Division MEDCAP officers in TAY AN HOI.

(5) Helping Hand. The Helping Hand program became more diversified during the last quarter. On two occasions, a need was generated for living essentials. Once for 143