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After Action Reports 33
2ND BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32
THRU: Commanding Officer
2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
25th Infantry Division
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO U.S. Forces 96243
a. OPORD 25-66 (Operation FRESNO) Headquarters, 2nd Brigade, 10 June 1966
b. OPORD 57-66 (Operation FRESNO) Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry
11 June l966
1. NAME OR IDENTIRY AND/OR TYPE of OPERATION:
a. Operation FRESNO
2. DATES of OPERATION: 130800 June through 150600 July 1966
3. LOCATION: Hau Nghia Province in designated areas as shown by Annex A (Op Overlay)
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:
The control headquarters, 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div, issued Operation Order 26-66 on 101200 June 1966. The order gave the 2nd Bn, 27th Inf the mission of conducting S&D Operations in the vicinity of AP DONG HOA (2) (Annex A, Op.Overlay). The 2nd Bn, 27th Inf Operation Order 57-66 issued on 11 June 1966 further broke the mission down into more concise duties. In essence the battalion planned to conduct combat operations such as Search and Destroy missions, night patrols and ambushes, and combined ARVN-US operations with the 1/10 (M) and 4/49 ARVN battalions located at BAO TRAI. Also, and of equal importance, the battalion wished to conduct extensive Civil Affairs and Psychological Warfare programs. This would include road improvement operations, the supplying of materials, and advice on the construction of Popular Forces installations, and Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP) in the surrounding villages. All of these operations, conventional and unconventional, were to be coordinated through the Province and District levels of Hau Nghia Province in order to best support, whenever possible, the National Revolutionary Development Plan.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Lt Col. Boyd T. Bashore (p133)
6. TASK ORGANIZATION:
Co A, 2/27 Inf Bn Conrol
Recon Platoon 2nd Spt Plat 16th RRU
Co B, 2/27 Inf Arty Platoon Additional Interpreters
Mortar Platoon Helicopter (C&C Ship)
Co C, 2/27 Inf Gud Survl Sec Blm 125th Sig Bn
IWC Blm Co __1/5 (Mech) on order
17B/65 Engr Trp __3/ 4 Cav on order
Dim 25th MID 20 National Police
7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
a. 13 June - 1/8 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde; attach one 155mm How Btry 3/13 Arty and one platoon 8” How 2/32 (-).
b. ARVN 105mm How and 155 mm How located at BAO TRAI
(a) Artillery will adjust missions where used extensively in support of daily operations. The primary targets were sniper locations. All missions fired successfully suppressed the sniper firing.
(b) A technique of dropping artillery rounds behind a suspected VC location was successfully utilized to deliberately push one VC into an area where a friendly stay behind ambush was employed and waiting for him. The ambush team killed one VC and captured his weapon.
(c) A technique of walking fires in front of the lead infantry elements was utilized with great success in the area of thick undergrowth close to the Oriental River. This technique not only provided accurate data immediately available for sudden fire missions, but it also discouraged close in snipers and served as a means of determining accurate map locations.
(3) Pre-planned artillery preparations were fired on many helicopter landing zones in conjunction with airmobile assaults.
(4) Use of artillery at night.
(a) H&I fires were utilized extensively at night throughout the entire AO to fire
on suspected VC locations, supply routes, and supply caches.
(b) Artillery concentrations were plotted in support of all night ambushes.
(c) Artillery was used in conjunction with the lightning bug. When this ship drew SA fire, the coordinates of this VC location were immediately fired upon.
(5) All “will-adjust” mission fired were accurate, timely and very satisfactory.
b. 25th Aviation Bn: (p134)
The unit provided the Bn with the mobility needed to move into a specific area with great speed and surprise. The aircraft were used for Night Airmobile assaults, early morning airlifts to designated LZ's, extractions from extremely small PZ's, resupply, command and control, prisoner evacuation, and medical evacuation. This unit maintained flexibility to deal with various changes and continued the mission, without delay. The gunships providing support for the airlifts did an excellent job in suppressing sniper fire around the PZ's and LZ's. Also the gunships provided excellent support in flying cover for our convoys.
c. 1/5 (M), 3/ 4 Cav (M):
These mechanized units provided the Bn with an immediate reaction force and conducted many missions serving as a screening force, a blocking force, convoy security, and flank security. The biggest asset provided to the Bn when operating as either platoon or company size force, was the ability to react quickly and move fast to affect any situation. Whenever the 3 /4 Cav platoon was used as a reaction force, there were two tanks which provided a reassuring punch. The mechanized elements were limited on occasions due to the heavy rains. Many areas were inaccessible to the tracked vehicles.
Operation FRESNO resulted in significant breakthroughs in the development and exploitation
of tactical intelligence by the battalion. Prior to Operations FRESNO, political and military conditions in southwest control HAU NGHIA Province had degenerated to the point that very little political control was exercised by GVN authorities in areas outside the province capital district headquarters, towns, and ARVN garrison towns. Despite a fairly well developed ARVN intelligence net centered in the provincial capital at BAO TRAI, and a developing net at the headquarters of USSF Det B-35 at DUC HUE, sufficient combat power and combat logistic support had been lacking for the exploitation of those intelligence sources available.
The VC political organization on the other land had been able to utilize its combat power to effectively isolate the people of the south and south-west portions of the province from GVN authority. This had been done by systematic destruction of all secondary roads, except those useful to the VC and of no value to the GVN. The VC then concentrated their strength along areas adjacent to the Oriental River, utilizing it and its highly developed adjacent network of canals, supplemented by light oxcart trains. The poor trafficability of the predominantly low-lying paddy-lands of the area, combined with the systematic destruction of the province secondary road network, tended to confine the ARVN 25th Division at DUC HOA and the 49th ARVN Regiment at BAO TRAI to areas within a half day's march of their garrisons, or those areas which lay directly astride the primary road network. The next step in the VC plan had been the attempt to conclude the isolation of the province capital and the ARVN garrison towns by systematically over-running the RF/PF outposts which protected the primary road network. Before the 25th Inf Division arrived in CU CHI it was necessary to supply the totally isolated RF/PF out post by battalion size convoys during midday which were subject to sniping, harassing mortar fires and command detonated mine, as well as full scale ambushes, all along their route.
The combat power available to the VC in the area generally was thought to consist of a main force regiment: The DONG TRAP II Regiment, which had two main force battalions - the 267th & 269th, each about 300 - 400 men. These battalions are heavily armed with modern weapons up to 82mm mortars. In addition, the 506th LONG AN Provincial Battalion and the district companies, the C2 and C120 companies, were thought to operate in the area. Besides these main force units, the system of local guerrilla forces combined with the political infrastructure was capable of maintaining control over the population, harassing and ambushing small ARVN contingents, and acting as guides, support troops and augmentations in concert with main force units for large-scale operations. Under this system each hamlet had to provide up to a squad (and each village one or two platoons) to the local effort. Thus in a relatively small area comprising three villages, the VC could mass in several hours at least one company. Besides the local guerrillas, the VC had drafted those hamlet and village males who showed less inclination to fight, into village militia forces whose mission was primarily to support larger VC operations with unarmed man-power for the construction of roadblocks, tunnels, secret holes, trenches, and the transportation of dead, wounded, and supplies. Other individuals and villages occupied political and financial positions in the hamlets and villages which were instrumental in maintaining daily political control of the population. The VC control of the countryside had existed long enough to effectively develop an illegal governmental infrastructure for south and southwest control HAU NGHIA Province which had supplanted GVN Political and economic authority in the area. In fact, perhaps GVN authority never ended in many parts of this area. VC forces in the region had thus built an effective political infrastructure which was protected by their capability of massing 6 battalions of armed troops, plus up to two battalions of laborers at any point in the province.
During the weeks prior to Operations FRESNO, the 49th ARVN Regiment had attempted to reverse this degenerative process by carrying out multi-battalion operations along the east bank of the Oriental River between DUC HUE and BAO TRAI. These operations were followed by a VC attack on the district capital of DUC HUE during the night of 26-27 May 1966. The VC easily succeeded in storming the town, killed a significant number of the RF/PF troops charged with guarding the fortified town, sank the boat platoon which had been charged with maintaining GVN authority on the Oriental River, killed or kidnapped many of the anti-VC citizens of the town, and carried off a sizable amount of weapons, including mortars, machine-guns, and BAR's. The only significant industry of the province, a large, fairly modern sugar mill was located in DUC HUE. Constant VC taxation of boats bringing the cane to the mill and trucks taking molasses and sugar along the primary road network to Saigon had rendered sugar mill operations barely profitable. There were reports that the mill was being moved piece-meal to the more secure BIEN HOA area. By storming the district capital and site of HAU NGHIA's only significant industry, the VC were able to effectively demonstrate their mastery over HAU NGHIA's political and economic life. (p135)
As the battalion entered Operation FRESNO, there was little hard intelligence information on the area. Fresh from Operation MAKIKI in the LOC GIANG - AU NINH area, the battalion set out initially to build a bank of information and familiarity with the area. During the first day battalion intelligence personnel interviewed nearly 20 local civilian detainees and VCS. Initial interrogations were directed towards several EBI: What had been recent VC activities in the area? What were the routes and LOC's used by the VC in the area? What were the most active VC hamlets and villages in the area? In what areas of the region did the VC units bivouac when moving through? Rapidly, information was gained identifying the major VC LOC which was used for the transportation of arms and ammunition from Cambodia to the HO BO - BOI LOI region. The LOC ran from the Oriental River, vic XT468039, up the RACH NHUM to landing at XT485048, then along a winding road lined with foxholes to AP GO SAO (2) (XT500072). The initial stopping point was located near a pagoda in AP TRAI BI (XT493077). From there, the material was transported across the major highway at AP GIONG VOI (XT515084), then to AP BAO CONG (1) (XT520091) and finally to one of two off-loading points. Either through TAN HY (XT520100) to AP BEN LONG (XT525112) or through AP RUNG DAU (2) (XT540102), to AP CAY QUEO (XT 548117) from where it was carried by sampan across the great swamp. The first night of the operations, ambushes were therefore laid along this route. One ambush laid by A Co. just south of TAN MY (XT504076) netted 6 VC KIA (BC) and 4 weapons. Agent reports later revealed that 8 VC had been killed and several others wounded. This group turned out to be a VC squad from AP BEN LONG. In days following this initial success, intensive Bn small unit operations, ambushes patrols, and S&D swoops were carried out to the north and south of the battalion perimeter along the previously indicated VC supply route. Extensive trench systems and bunker type shelters were found along this route to the north of the highway in the AP GIONG VOI - AP RUNG DAU (3) area, and a long line of fox-holes parallel to this route south of the highway and north of the Oriental River. Interrogation of civilians encountered by the battalion elements during their sweeps indicated that large enemy units had been located along the VC supply route north of the battalion perimeter, but had moved out on receiving news of the arrival of American troops in the area.
After the establishment of the battalion perimeter, the mission of the local guerrillas in the area appeared to have changed. Prior to the arrival of the battalion in the area, the mission of the local guerrillas had been to maintain VC domination of the hamlets, reinforce VC tax collections from the people, snipe at friendly troops who wandered into the area and lay booby traps in their path. After the arrival of the battalion, the mission of the local guerrillas changed, especially for those groups in the AP GIONG VOI - AP RUNG DAU (3) area north of the perimeter and in the AP GO SAO (1 & 2) - TAN PHU THUONG area east and southeast of the perimeter. The new mission appeared to include harassing fire and sniping incidents against both the battalion perimeter and the reconnaissance platoon reinforcement of the construction site of a new PF outpost north of AP SO DO (XT510078). Road-blocks and mines were also placed along the road between AP SO DO & BAO TRAI. Most incidents were a regular occurrence every two hours for three nights. More serious incidents of harassing fire by the VC tended to initiate from the south and southeast of the battalion perimeter. It is surmised that such incidents had two main purposes. The first was to recon by fire the Bn night defenses in an attempt to locate and identify US strong-points and crew-served weapons positions within the battalion perimeter. Another purpose may have been to distract US attention from the areas where large guerrilla force units were moving during those evenings. Incidents of construction of many road-blocks along the major roads, especially the highway from DUC HUE (XT430072) to the PF outpost at (XT496096) tended to coincide with movement of large VC elements across the roads. The construction of road-blocks may have been to insure the safe passage of the VC elements across these major highway danger areas, and to deny friendly elements a high speed approach to the flank of moving VC units. (p136)
Succeeding Bn operations north and south of the perimeter on 15 and 16 July established the fact that traveling VC psychological warfare teams had been working intensively in the area during the week prior to the arrival of the battalion. Propaganda shows were presented during the hours 2000 to 2400 by the team and were aimed at proselytizing local youth for the VC and obtaining financial contributions in addition to normal taxes. At least two areas where such performances were held were identified.
Succeeding operations by the battalion revealed the existence of a guerrilla platoon at XOH BAO TRAU (XT475117). The platoon was said to stay in the village during the day and withdraw to the AP AN HOI village area during the night (XT4314). This platoon probably had the responsibility of maintaining surveillance over the AP RUNG DAO (1) road intersection and PF outpost (XT496096). The operation also revealed a continuing use by a large number of VC units of the trail system passing from the AP AN HOI area (XT4314) through XOM RAO TRAU, then southeast to AP CU LAO TRE (1) XT497108, then to the BOH LONG - AP CAY QUSO area.
Operations by battalion element along the Oriental River vic AP GIONG SAO (XT480058) discovered warning signs which first identified the so-called “GO CAT” areas as being VC strongholds where the VC would lay mines and booby traps to prevent the penetration of friendly elements. A large cache of documents including VC reconnaissance maps of the entire area subsequently found by C Co in the RACH NHUM area XT464045, located the “GO CAT” areas at XT 483047 south of the RACH NHUM & XT482016 north of the RACH HOC THOM River. Both “GO CAT” areas appeared to be used extensively by the VC when they were approached by friendly elements. In both areas snipers and booby traps were encountered, and when penetration of the areas was finally realized, the areas were found to contain numerous bunkers. Interrogation of detainees and VCs from those areas revealed very large units of 100 to 300 men frequently bivouacked there. They tended to approach from the north using the trail network south from AP AN HOI area (XT4314) to HIEP HOA (XT466093), then slightly west of AP AH THUAN (XT475078) moving south to AP GIONG SAO (XT477062) and then to the RACH NHUM (XT470050). The TAN PHU THUONG (XT480023) area along the Oriental River was generally entered from the southeast vic XOM GOING NGANG (XT5400) and HOA KHAUH (XT520023). Units utilizing these areas frequently are probably the C2 and C120 Companies and the 267th VC main force battalion. These areas in the vicinity of the Oriental River along the RACH HOA THOM (XT470012) and the RACH NHUM (XT473045) and doubtless utilized continually for ref------------icousce for main force elements operating in the area. But because of intensive operation in this area, the main force VC elements in the area were said to have received orders on 22 June to commence withdrawal to an area 8 - 12 kilometers to the south on the west bank of the Oriental River.
On 20 June, A Co conducted a night airmobile assault. Once on the ground, the A Co elements received sniper fire from a lone sniper. Following the sniper fire, 60mm mortars were fired by the VC and mysteriously fell on the location of the source of their own sniper fire. It was felt that the night airmobile assault so confused the VC, that they were unable to coordinate their covering fires for a force of 50 - 70 VC which had been in the immediate area, and withdrew to the northwest on the arrival of A Co.
On 24 June, B Co elements, utilizing a stay behind ambush, killed a VC armed with an M-1 carbine at XT486066. Papers he was carrying identified him as a member of the DUC HOA district VC committee in charge of proselytizing. During the period of Operation FRESNO, significant efforts had been made by the battalion staff to develop effective liaison with the ARVN HAU NGHIA Province staff and their advisers. Particular efforts in this direction had been made in the field of intelligence. On 29 June, a breakthrough was made in intelligence when the ARVN Province S-2, Dai-uy Trieu, announced that he had a VC who wished to rally to the government and turn in the other members of his squad at the same time. Although efforts to exploit this intelligence were unsuccessful on June 29th, on June 30th the information was successfully exploited. The VC squad leader surrendered to battalion elements in his hamlet at AP RUNG DAU (2) (XT 520097). He then pointed out 4 VC from his hamlet working in the fields and led the battalion to 5 more hiding in a secret hole in a hedgerow. Two weapons and five grenades were captured with the VC. In addition, one VC fleeing from the objective area was shot and killed, and two others with him were captured on direction from an orbiting gunship. The success of this operation was due largely to close US coordination with ARVN intelligence personnel who went into the field with battalion elements. On 11 June a similar operation was carried out with province intelligence personnel acting on the basis of Chieu Hoi information. An airmobile assault of one company surrounded the hamlet o BAO CAHN HA (XT5601). Then battalion and sector intelligence personnel were airlifted into the hamlet and thoroughly searched it, uncovering 5 secret holes. One VC was killed in the first secret hole by a grenade which also caved in the hole. Three VC, including the VC hamlet finance chief and two VC district finance cadre were captured in another secret hole. Those two operations were examples of the successes possible when American combat power was used to exploit timely information provided by the well-developed ARVN agent net in the battalion AO. Up to that time, organized US intelligence sources had been rarely able to provide information of the requisite tactical freshness because of the lack of a developed agent net in the AO.
Significant strides seemed to be made also in the status of the populace, because of previous VC propaganda which had evoked imaginary fears. Those were rapidly dispelled by the conduct of the troops themselves, and at the end of the operation, local residents had begun to voluntarily inform battalion elements of the location of mines, booby traps and VC movements.
In addition, the small unit operations which saturated the AO seemed to have adversely affected the morale of the local VC guerrillas. The squad leader who gave himself up and turned in his squad stated that everywhere he went US troops were operating and he concluded that the most prudent course of action was to turn himself in before he was captured or killed.
Weather during the operation was initially favorable with rain only in the late afternoon. During the latter half of the operation, however, rain began falling at noon and continued intermittently into the night, which rendered the entire region non-trafficable to wheeled vehicles and gradually withdrew other large areas form the effective range of APC's.
9. MISSION (p139)
a. 2/27 Inf (-) conducts tactical motor-coach 130800 Jun 66 to AO; establish camp vic AP DONG HOA (2) XT488097; conducts S&D operations in AO; conducts combat patrols and ambushes; conducts combined operations with local ARVN Forces; provides wire pickets and technical advice on installations to RF and PF units; conducts road improvement operations in sector from XT525048 to XT496097 and from XT 496097 to XT 438053; conducts ROAD RUNNER operations; conducts an extensive CA and Psy/War program in AO; and leaves one company in base camp to be rotated on order CO, 2/27 Inf; base camp company establish 2 AP's nightly.
b. Mission (Civil Affairs/PSYOP): To support 2nd Bn operations; to control movement of non-combatants; to assist in Revolutionary Development; minimize non-combatant casualties; to induce non-combatants to aid intelligence efforts; and to induce the enemy to rally or surrender.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:
1. 2/27 Inf (-) conducts a tactical motor march 130800 Jun 66 to AO with Co A leading, followed by HHC elements and attachments, Co B rear, all escorted by elements of 1/5 (Mech): establish a base vicinity XT502087. Co C remains at CU CHI base camp to assume the perimeter responsibility from Co A&B at 121200 Jun 66 (Annex D Tactical Motor March; Annex B, Fire Support Plan.)
2. Co A&B 2/27 Inf : Conduct S&D ;operations, patrols and ambushes, combined US-ARVN operations, and pacification operations in Bn AO on order.
3. Co C, 2/27 Inf: Conduct tactical motor march to Bn Forward Base, vicinity XT 502087 on order.
4. Recon Platoon: Bn Res.
5. Scty Platoon: Bn Res.
6. Mortar Platoon: GS
7. Gnd Survl Sec: 2 AN/PPS 4 Radar sets will accompany Bn to fwd base vicinity XT 502087, sec (-) will remain at CU CHI base camp and man Bn perimeter radars.
8. 1/B/65th Engr: GS
9. Elm 25th MID: GS
10. 2nd Spt Platoon 16th RRU: GS
11. Elm 125th Sig Bn: GS.
12. Coordinating Instructions:
(a) Bde rules of engagement apply.
(b) Bn TAC SOP applies
(c) HHC elm and attachments plan for 3 week op, Rifle companies plan for
2 week op. (p139)
(d) No vehicular movement after 1800 hrs daily
b. Civil Affairs / PSYOP:
(1) Attempt to keep non-combatants in place.
(2) Conduct civic action programs to the extent security and military operations permit.
(3) PSYOP will be employed primarily against civilian targets, both hostile and friendly.
(4) HHC: Attached 8 National Police effective 11 June 1966; 12 National Police effective 13 June 1966.
(5) National Police assigned to units on mission basis.
(6) Coordinating Instructions:
(a). Maximum effort will be made to minimize non-combatant battle casualties during tactical operations.
(b). Civilian dwellings will not be burned nor will private property including livestock be destroyed except as an unavoidable consequence of combat action.
(c). Wheeled vehicles will not be driven over planted rice fields except as a
(d). Refugee Control Points:
1 XT 495097
2 XT 513075
(e). Requests for propaganda leaflets, aerial loudspeaker missions, or Helping Hand materials will be submitted to bn S-5
(f). Curfews in effect in AO
1 District and Province Capitals (2200 - 0500)
2 Villages and Hamlets (2100 - 0600)
3 River traffic (2000 - 0600)
(g). Families are authorized 200 Kg of polished rice, or 300 Kg of paddy rice in residence.
(h). Captured food-stocks will be evacuated to the Division collection point through bn S-5
(i). Annex C, Pacification Overlay
1. Appendix 1, Propaganda Target Disposition Overlay
c. Indirect Fire Support:
(1) Air support - All air strikes will be on call.
(2) Artillery support: (p139)
(a) General - establish fire support base and support operations with on-call fires.
(b) Organization for combat:
1 1/8 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde; attach one 155mm How. Btry 3/13 Arty and one platoon 8” How 2/32 Arty (-)
2. ARVN 105mm How and 155mm How located at BAO TRAI.
(c) Artillery will:
1. Be prepared to mark air strikes with White Phosphorous as required
2. Maintain 6400 mil fire capability
3. Plan close in defensive concentrations for security
4. Be prepared to fire high angle fires during Dustoff.
5. Maintain aerial observation during daylight hours and be prepared to conduct aerial observation during the hours of darkness.
6. Appendix (Artillery Fire Plan).
d. Coordinating Instructions:
(1) Fire planning and Control:
(a) Restrictions on Artillery Fires during heliborne operations - TBA
(b) All artillery and mortar fires must be approved by Artillery LHO and coordinated with Bde FSOC. Fires outside by AO must be approved by Bde FSOC.
(c) All air strikes under control of Bde FAC.
(d) Emergency cancellation of fires in clear text.
(e) When possible defensive concentrations will be fired in prior to 2000 hrs daily.
(f) Unit CP and ambush sites to 1/8 Arty FDC NLT 1800 hrs daily. Report changes as they occur.
(g) Boundaries are Fire Coordination lines.
(h) All fire requests will go to 1/8 Arty Bn FDC.
(i) Arty and 4.2 mortar fire plans to 1/8 Arty FDC
(j) All calls for ARVN Arty support will be coordinated through Bde FSOC
(a) Mortar and arty units post guard during actual firing to insure no friendly aircraft are in
vicinity of direction of fire. Also no firing of VT fuses when friendly aircraft are
(b) Emergency signal to lift air strike, artillery fires, or termination of illumination - Red
(c) Units mark from on request with panels or colored smoke.
(d) First round of all adjustment or close in fires will be WP.
13 June 1966
The plan for the battalion for this day was to move to vicinity XT502087 and establish a base camp. The move was made in two phases: an airmobile assault by the Quartering party which consisted of 8 officers and 61 enlisted men, and a motor march by the bn (-) with attachments.
This element was made up of both the Reconnaissance and Security Platoons with representations from each of the major units, staff sections, and attachments. The mission was to clear and secure the new base camp, then designate locations for all the incoming elements. The airlift commenced at 0649 hrs at the CU CHI Army Airfield, and was completed at 0715 hrs. During the day, intelligence information concerning VC movements and dispositions was gained through the questioning of local residents. The MI Detachment questioned all civilians who moved along the road while the HQ elements questioned people living within the planned perimeter. The Reconnaissance and Security Platoons made sweeps approximately 300 meters outside the planned perimeter and found two signs indicating mines and booby traps at XT505085. After a thorough search of the area however, no mines were actually found. Signs telling the local populace to fight against all Americans were located at XT 50---2 and brought back to the by S2. A newly dug trench system was also located at XT 517083. At 0930 hrs the lead elements of the convoy began to arrive and were guided into position by their respective quartering party representatives.
Bn (-) With Attachments:
The motor march commenced at 0800 hrs. One platoon of 1/5 (M), along with the gunships, provided the escort while, ARVN artillery at BAO TRAI was prepared to fire indirect fire support. Also, the company of ARVN soldiers set up outposts along the route of march (Anp 2 to Annex D). The return convoy made up of those vehicles not needed for the operations left at 1140 hrs and arrived at CU CHI at 1300 hrs. No contact was made during the convoy phase either coming out or going back to CU CHI.
Battalion Headquarters Elements and Attachments:
The battalion perimeter with the CP located at XT508083 extended for approximately 300 meter radius around the CP. This included 150 meters of the road in order that daily traffic along this route could be better controlled. At 1330 hrs, a command and staff meeting, to include representatives from all attached units, was held to finalize the general concepts for Operation FRESNO. A thorough discussion of plans for Search and Destroy Operations, Civil Affairs, MEDCAP and Engineer projects was followed by a detailed S2/S3 briefing concerning the present Operational Area (AO). At 1445 hrs, 10 Counter-terrorists (CT's) from the ARVN camp at BAO TRAI were attached to the Bn. A and B (p141) Companies each received five CT's. The mission of the CT's was to aid the companies in handling indigenous personnel by means of interpretation and interrogation methods, and to provide the unit with a greater knowledge of the terrain, surrounding villages and local populace. The Recon and Security Platoons utilized the remainder of the day to prepare defensive positions for the inner perimeter with emphasis on securing the Bn Tactical Operation Center (TOC). The engineers cleared roadways within the bn perimeter, dug waste disposal pits for the mess halls, and aided in the preparation of defensive positions. The MI detachment interrogated a total of 11 detainees during the day.
A and B Co 2/22 Inf:
Since those two major units accounted for all of the bn defensive perimeter, (Annex A) (A Co to the northeast, B Co to the southwest), both units spent the majority of the day preparing defensive positions, conducting local sweeps to their front, and planning for the night's ambushes.
Indirect Fire Support:
The 105mm Artillery Battery located at BAO TRAI, as well as the 4.2 Mortar Platoon and both 81mm mortar sections within our perimeter, registered their defensive concentrations early in the day. A Fire Coordination Line (FCL) was established to prevent any firing into ARVN operations vicinity AP SO DO and TAN PHU TRUNG.
The battalion surgeon and his medical team examined and treated 31 civilians in the village of AP CU CAO TRE. This constituted the start of the MEDCAP which was to be continued on a daily basis. The S-5 team distributed toys to all the children of this village. The local populace within our perimeter were also visited and oriented on exactly what was expected of them while the Bn conducted operations in this area.
Three ambushes were employed to the southwest of the B Company perimeter vicinity XT490085, XT495080, and XT504075. No contact was made. At 2000 hrs B Company received sporadic sniper fire from the south of the perimeter vicinity XT504075. M79's were fired at this location, results unknown. Three ambushes were planned to the northeast of the A Co perimeter at XT510085 (ambush #1), XT505097 (ambush #2) and XT507087 (ambush #3). At approximately 2100 hrs when ambush #2 was going into position, 12 to 15 VC appeared 30 meters to their front. The 8 man patrol immediately opened fire and continued the fire while they withdrew to allow the area to be saturated with artillery. At approximately 2130 hrs, fifty 105mm HE rounds were fired mainly into XT 507096, while the patrol returned to the company CP to receive further instructions. Three very minor casualties were suffered (facial cuts) apparently from hand grenades. After a thorough evaluation of the situation, the decision was made to send out a new patrol to include the squad leader of the old patrol, and one other man from the old patrol. They were to go back to the scene of action (XT504096) to thoroughly search this area and reestablish the ambush and another close by. At 2230 hrs the new patrol arrived in position and found 6 VC (KIA) by body count, and 3 rifles along with grenades, ammunition, field gear, and documents. The weapons and other captured materials were brought to the new ambush site vicinity XT504088. At 2255 hrs this ambush reported a force of 15 VC moving from the north towards their position. Artillery was immediately fired into the area vicinity XT504096 using the last mission as a reference point. The results were 10 VC (KIA) possible. Ambush #1 and ambush #3 left for their locations earlier in the night at 2100 hrs. Ambush #3 had no contact during the night, but ambush #1 shifted its location at 2300 hrs to XT5075-0850 because A Co's radar picked up 2 to 3 VC moving at this location. Two more VC were spotted through a Starlight device north of the A Co Perimeter at XT405086. M79's were fired into the area with unknown results.
14 June 1966:
Plans for the day were to employ A &B Companies in S&D operations vicinity AP HIM DAU (3) and AP GIONG VOI (Appendix 1 to Annex A).
A and B Bde 27th Inf (Oral Order #1):
Prior to l---ing the day's operation through AP GIONG VOI, 2nd Plat A Co made another early morning sweep of the initial ambush site vicinity XT524096 to pick up the dead VC bodies. Only four of the original bodies were left. A new body was found approximately 150 meters from the scene of action (total of 5 recovered). At his time another VC rifle was found. At 1000 hrs A & B Companies left on their sweeps. Throughout the day both units ran into booby-trapped areas and occasional sniper fire. The Bangalore torpedo - Claymore mine method was used extensively to breach paths through the booby trapped hedgerows. Many signs were also encountered warning all people to stay away. One friendly WIA from A Co was suffered as a result of a booby trap at XT508094.
Along with mine clearing personnel from the engineers, this element cleared the road from BAO DRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). They also provided security for the S5, the Battalion surgeon, and the Engineer Platoon Leader who all went to AP GO DO to coordinate for PSYCAP, Civil Affairs activities, and the construction of an ARVN Popular Force outpost.
The 25th Div Commanding General, to Assistant Div Commander (support) and the Bde Commander were briefed on the previous night's ambush activities. A late agent report indicated that the A Co ambush actually accounted for eight (8) VC (KIA) by body count. The patrol leader was recommended for the PSMN with V. The S3, Security BO and the S5 went to BAO TRAI to discuss operations through 18 June. The ARVN “GO” team from BAO TRAI consisting of 11 National Police, 3 Medics, 4 intelligence specialists, and 7 Psychological Warfare specialists, were attached to A Co for the next day's operation. The mission of this team is to supply the Bn and the ARVN forces with the latest intelligence estimates and census accounts. Also the team supplies medical assistance to Vietnamese civilians, gives the working unit more interpreters, and aids in the control of civilian movements within designated areas. Our concept was to use the “Go Team” as a unit., It was attached to our company, rather than piece-mealing its resources between units in the battalion. This would assure unity of command, especially during the initial trial period. Should this concept prove effective, then it was planned to graduate the “Go Team” to more decentralized operations.
At 2031 hrs, 13 June, 3 VC with automatic weapons fired into the B Co perimeter from XT501080, XT502082, and XT503083. M79's were fired in return, and the enemy firing ceased. During the night, A Co employed three ambushes at XT507086, XT504088, and XT507078. B Co employed three ambushes at XT494088, XT496077, and XT494083. No contact was made by any of these ambushes.
15 June 1966
The plan for today was to conduct a sweep to the northeast with A & B, 2/27 and 1/5 (M) emphasizing search and destroy missions through AP BEN LONG, AP BAO CONG (1), and AP GOING VOI (Appendix 2, Annex A). Also MEDCAP was planned for AP SO DO, and road clearing and securing missions were to be conducted by the Recon Platoon and the engineers.
A & B, 2/27 and A, 1/5 (M) conducted extensive search and destroy operations (Oral Order #2, Operation QUAKER) which included AP GIONG VOI, AP RUNG DAU (8), AP BAO CONG (1), TAN MY, and AP BEN LONG. During the sweep many complex tunnels and trench networks were located. Also those elements once entered, some booby trapped areas. Occasional sniper fire was received from the wood-lines. Throughout the day many civilians were encountered and questioned.
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
This unit located and where possible destroyed tunnels and trench systems at XT513085, XT513089, XT514086, XT512086, and XT513085. The Bangalore-Claymore technique was used at XT514083 and XT514084. Sniper fire was received from XT518095, but subsequent search failed to locate VC. The ARVN GO team proved valuable in handling the civilians in the area. However as time progressed, they became tired and less effective. Although the intelligence potential of the team seemed to be fairly effective, the value of the political and psywar members of the team were less easy to judge.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
Sniper fire was received by this unit at XT512092 and XT521096. The snipers were engaged but could not be located positively. One man was wounded by a booby trap at XT518091 and was evacuated by the Command and Control helicopter (C and C ship) to CU CHI. An old sick man (civilian) was evacuated by the C and C ship to BAO TRAI for medical attention, and was returned to his home at XT519090. Villagers revealed that 200 VC were at XT519093 the night before.
A Co, 1/5 (M):
This mechanized element had a splendid potential for moving fast and covering terrain. It received sniper fire from two locations (XT516097 and XT510098). However, subsequent engagement and search of these areas could not produce any VC.
Two visitors were briefed. Lt Col. Wood, the British Military Attache, came from Saigon to witness a few day's operations. Brigadier General PHAN TRONG CHINH the 25th Div (ARVN) commander also received a short briefing. The Bn CO with staff went to BAO TRAI for the daily planning meeting with ARVN leaders and US advisors.
The MEDCAP team examined and treated 91 civilians from the village of AP SO DO (XT514072). This was established as one of the permanent sites for future MEDCAP, which were to rotate between AP RUNG DAU (1) and AP SO DO every other day. The Bn S5 distributed 65 sets of men's clothes and 90 sets of women's clothes. Leaflets were distributed by the men of A and B, 2/27 warning the population of what will happen if the VC use their village to attack US troops. Work was continued on the ARVN outpost at AP SO DO.
Recon Plat and Engineers:
These elements worked clearing the road from BAO TRAP to AP RUNG DAU (1) while providing security and assistance for the MEDCAP and Civil Affairs teams.
Three ambushes were employed by A Co at XT509083, XT509093, and XT505077. B Co employed three ambushes at XT495089, XT506075, and XT495078. None of these ambushes received contact. Beginning on this night, a new method was utilized. Formerly curfew was at 2100 hrs. Many “civilians” were still moving after dark, most of these people seemed to be VC who were taking advantage of this administrative, no fire period of darkness. Thus the AP's moved out at 1945 hrs and stopped short of their assigned sites. Then at 2100 hrs they moved to their respective ambush position. This discouraged people from moving after 1930 hrs nightly.
16 June 1966:
Today's plans were to conduct a combined ARVN-US search and destroy operations commencing 150800 June. (Appendix 3, Annex A). Since this would be our first combined US-ARVN operations, the plan was purposely unambitious, and uncomplicated. The main purpose was to accomplish the first operation, instilling a maximum of mutual confidence and cooperation.
Operation QUAKER began at 0900 hrs with A, 2/27, B, 2/27, A, 1/5 (M) working in conjunction with the ARVN forces 1st Trp, 10th Cav (Mechanized), First Co 4/49 to conduct search and destroy operations to the northeast of the bn perimeter as per Oral Order #3. Throughout the day all units ran into booby traps, sniper fire, and tunnels.
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
This unit searched and destroyed tunnels at XT521090 and XT537093. Booby trap signs, but again no actual booby traps were discovered at XT512086. A heavily wooded area at XT542100 contained numerous signs warning all people to stay away. The area was also heavily booby trapped, thus the Bangalore-Claymore technique was utilized here. After breaching a path, however, nothing was found inside the area. The GO Team provided medical aid to two civilians in a house at XT529087. Three US soldiers and one ARVN counter-terrorist were wounded by booby traps at XT515088. The ARVN soldier was evacuated to BAO TRAI, while the US soldiers were evacuated to CU CHI. A flame APC belonging to the engineers was positioned on the right flank of the company perimeter near the road.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
This unit had only one action during the day. Sniper fire was received from XT545119. The sniper was engaged. A thorough search of this area disclosed nothing.
A Co, 1/5 (M):
The mission of this unit was to screen and secure the left flank of the advancing rifle companies (A & B, 2/27) (Oral Order #3). This was successfully accomplished. No contact was made at all during the day.
ARVN Forces, 1/10 (M) 4/49:
These two elements again worked together on their SOP road clearing operations from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). They also worked on and secured the ARVN outpost at AP SO DO. In addition, the Recon Platoon outposted and patrolled the road from base camp to BAO TRAI in order to secure resupply convoys.
The MEDCAP team examined and treated 120 villagers, from AP RUNG DAU (1). The Bn S5 team with the National Police set up a traffic control system to check on all Vietnamese vehicles and personnel passing through the perimeter. The primary control point (XT501081) was manned by two National Policemen. Two traffic control points are manned in the same way along the highway at XT508081 and XT504086. People began coming from the outlying area to get medical assistance from the bn aid station.
17 June 1966:
Plans for today were to conduct an airmobile assault in conjunction with the 4/49 ARVN (Appendix 4, Annex A). The MEDCAP team will continue treating civilians in AP SO DO while the engineers continue construction of the ARVN Popular Forces Outpost..
This day was marked with two major items of interest. Operation KEYSONE (Oral Order #4) a combined ARVN-US forces airmobile assault commenced at 0753 hrs. At 1120 hrs the Vietnamese Chief of State and his party arrived for briefings on the past actions of, and future plans for Operation FRESNO.
The full contingency of guests arrived on location in six helicopters at 1120 hrs and was met by a 10 man combat-ready rifle squad from C, 2/27. This squad acted as an honor guard initially, then moved out to provide all around security for the briefing area. The party to be briefed consisted of Lt Gen Nguyen Van Thieu, the President of the Republic of Vietnam and (Chairman of the National Revolutionary Council), Lt Gen Cao Van Vien, Chief JGS, RVNAF; Maj Gen Fred C,.Myand, 25th Infantry Division OG; Maj Gen Le Nghuyon Khang, OG III Corps; Brig. Gen Jones, Div COC, MACV; Col Mueller, Sr Advisor III CTZ. Also the Division IG, Lt Col Salvador escorted the USARV IG on a visit to the area. A host of others included aids, staff members, and reporters. The briefing consisted of plans and concepts for Operation FRESNO with a detailed progress report of our Civil Affairs actions and tactical successes. After being made an honorary “Wolfhound” by the Bn CO, Lt Gen Thieu passed out engraved lacquerware gifts to selected officers and NCO's in the battalion.
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
This unit employed three ambushes at XT508088, XT501089, and XT508082 during the night of 16 - 17 June. No contact was made. Operation KEYSTONE (Oral Order #4) began at 0753 hrs. This unit was the first to lift off from the pickup zone and land at LZ 1 on Obj A. The LZ was cold. As the company moved through their objective areas, they encountered many signs warning of booby traps, however no booby traps were actually found in those areas. The area around AP AN HISP especially at XT464128 was interlaced with many trenches. Some trenches were newly dug, and some were well camouflaged and fitted with punji stakes. At 0829 hrs a man was spotted about 300 meters from the unit, running towards a swampy area at XT511103. After giving chase and thoroughly searching the area, he could not be located. At 0920, well constructed fighting trenches were located at XT468123. The trenches were oriented to the west. At 0926 hrs a VCS was captured and evacuated to BAO TRAI in the C&C ship. The company continued the mission until they closed into base camp at 1310 hrs.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
During the night of 16 - 17 June three ambushes were employed at XT5020095, XT498082, and XT497087. No contact was made. At 0813 hrs on the 17th , this unit commenced their portion of the airlift by filling five helicopters of the second lift and all ten helicopters of the third and last lift. The unit was flown to LZ 1 to secure the west half of Obj A. During the day no contact was made and the company returned to base camp at 1400 hrs.
At 0820 hrs 17 June, this unit conducted their portion of the air-mobile assault from the airstrip at BAO TRAI to LZ 2 where they secured Obj 1. During their sweep an ARVN Regional Forces soldier was found in a house at XT473135. He was bound in chains and was being imprisoned by the VC. This ARVN soldier had been captured by the VC one week before when the Hiep Hoa sugar mill was over-run. The soldier was picked up by our C&C ship and evacuated to the sector S-2 at BAO TRAI. An ARVN soldier was wounded from a booby trap at XT----20 and was evacuated by our C&C ship to BAO TRAI. The unit completed its sweep and returned to BAO TRAI at 1400 hrs.
B Co, 1/5 (M):
This unit had a dual mission. First they were to search and destroy all around the bn perimeter until they extended 1000 meters out from the perimeter. Then they were to hold in place and aggressively outpost a new perimeter 1000 meters out. This mission was accomplished in order that the bn CP could be secure from mortar fire in case the VC had previous information that the Vietnamese Chief of State would be visiting the battalion.
At 0615 hrs the two-man demolition teams were attached to A and B Companies (a daily requirement). From 0715 hrs to 0820 hrs the road was cleared from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). Clearance was obtained from the ARVN authorities to cut timber for overhead cover within the bn perimeter and for emplacements at the Popular Forces Outpost at AP SO DO.
This unit established a platoon defensive position near AP SO DO at XT510077 on 16 June 66. Motorized patrols and outposts were established along the road from base camp to BAO TRAI. Security was provided for the MEDCAP team in AP SO DO. This element was to remain in its defensive position until further notice.
1st Platoon, C, 2/27 and the Scty Plat established six ambushes during the night of 17 - 18 June. No contact was made. The 2nd Plat, B, 1/5 (M) was attached to the bn at 1820 hrs to act as reaction force when needed.
18 June 1966:
The plan for the day was to conduct a combined search and destroy operation with the ARVN 51ST Ranger Battalion located at DUC HUE. A&B Companies plus A, 1/5 (M) were to provide the US Forces punch (Appendix 5, Annex A).
1st Plat, C, 2/27 established three ambushes outside the A Co perimeter during the night of 17 - 18 June. Their locations were XT511085, XT508092, and XT514079. No contact was made. The Security Platoon established three ambushes outside the B Co perimeter at XT494090, XT456077, and XT503074. No contact was made. Because of intelligence information received during the night that the VC 506th battalion was located at XT466020, Operation EMPIRE (Oral Order #5) was canceled. Instead, Operation BUCKEYE (Oral Order #6) was initiated 180700 June. The mission was to locate this suspected VC force and destroy it or hold it in place until a larger force could arrive.
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0700 hrs the company left base camp and moved along route WELL. One man was wounded by a booby trap at XT488077, at 0815 hrs. The wounded man was evacuated by a C& C ship to CU CHI. The area around XT488077 was very heavily booby trapped with CEU “butterfly bombs”. At 1029 hrs, two new chargers for a Carbine were found at XT483027. At 1152 hrs, carbine fire was received from XT482027. The unit deployed one element which returned the fire and engaged a sniper at approximately 100 meters. The sniper firing ceased, but the sniper could not be located. At 1323 hrs, one man stepped on a large mine which blew his leg off below the knee. He was evacuated to CU CHI at 1346 hrs by the C&C ship. Between 1515 hrs and 1532 hrs, 10 camouflaged VC shelters were destroyed; 4 at XT473018, 4 at XT472018, and 2 at XT471019. Because these had been recently occupied, (within a few hours), the intelligence report which initiated the operation was thereby confirmed. At 1800 hrs this unit was moved to base camp by an airlift utilizing 5 helicopters in each lift. After completion of the extraction, the company moved into its positions in the base camp perimeter. At 1930 hrs, sniper fire was received from XT511089. While the 2nd Plat, B 1/5 (M) was being readied for its role as reaction force, the A Co 81mm mortars fired 15 KE rounds at this VC location. When the mortars ceased firing, the APC's attacked out of the perimeter towards the woodline, utilizing their 50 cal machine guns to put the VC location in a crossfire. The sniper firing ceased. This also provided a good rehearsal for the Mech Platoon's role as the reaction force.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0700 hrs this unit led the S&D operation to the Oriental River with A Co following. At 0844 hrs the unit was located at XT498048. At this location they questioned some civilians living in the area, and found out that on an azimuth of 230 degrees at approximately 1000 meters, there was a suspected VC location. This information was immediately fed to higher channels for further disposition. More evidence that the VC were in this area was gained at 0925 hrs when a bunker was located, and destroyed at XT482042. At 0951 hrs a message was found which read “WE the VC warn all people to stay in their hamlets until 15 June. If the enemy attacks, we will struggle with all weapons available. If they are mopped up, we will attack GO CAT.” This again was turned in along with many other documents through intelligence channels. At 1147 hrs, 6 sheets of Pierced Steel Planking were picked up by the C&C ship at XT477023 and brought back to base camp to be used as overhead cover. At 1307 hrs, two VC boats were destroyed at XT478027. For most of the day this unit was frequently in water ranging from 1 foot deep to waist high. At 1800 hrs, an airmobile extraction took the unit back to base camp. Thus Operation BUCKEYE ended.
Early in the day plans for an airmobile extraction of A&B Companies from the Oriental River area were tentatively made for 1800 hrs that evening. The big question was whether these two units would set up a defensive position in the river area, or whether they would be extracted back to base camp. Again, this depended on what was developed during the day. The decision was made at approximately 1500 hrs to extract. Because of the heavy undergrowth in the river area, it was difficult to find an adequate PZ. Two suitable PZ's were finally located at XT477026. However, each was only big enough for five helicopters to land at one time. A Co 25th Aviation Bn supplied 10 helicopters with two gunships as escort. The airlift commenced at 1800 hrs amid some sniper fire which steadily increased as less and less people remained on the PZ. The enemy fire was primarily aimed at the helicopters. The gunship managed to suppress the sniper fire with its rockets and machine-guns by the time the last elements were airborne. An agent report from BAO TRAI revealed that during the extraction, the gunships together with the C&C ship, accounted for 4 VC KIA (by body count) and 5 VC KIA (possible). All elements of A&B, 2/27 had returned safely to base camp by 1820 hrs.
When the friendly units entered the area around grid square 4804, they were moving in a southwesterly direction into an area of dense undergrowth. Since vision was limited at time to 30 meters, artillery fires were utilized in the following manner: to confirm friendly locations, to neutralize suspected VC locations along the axis of advance, and to have current firing data continuously available in order that immediate fires could be brought upon the enemy. Only loading elements used these methods at the average rate of one round every two minutes. From 1337 hrs to 1437 hrs, the artillery fired 7 rounds (3 HE & 4 WP) from XT472021 to XT47430138. From 1454 hrs to 1541 hrs the artillery fired 82 rounds (60 HE & 1 WP) from XT40450138 to XT46840106.
From 0615 hrs to 0850 hrs, elements from this unit provided security for the daily road clearing operation from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). A roadblock was found during the sweep at XT5199061. The blockade was made of bamboo and trees, and had signs on it warning of mines. The engineer's mine detectors, however, gave no indication of mines. Thus the roadblock was cleared away. During the day more work was done on the platoon's own permanent positions near the site of the Popular Force Outpost. In the afternoon, elements went with the MEDCAP team to AP RUNG DAU (2). Elements of the platoon also escorted the water supply vehicles and trailers from BAO TRAI to base camp.
The MEDCAP team visited the village of AP RUNG DAU (1) treating 91 civilians. English classes were given by the Bn Communications Platoon to 12 Vietnamese civilians living within the base camp perimeter. Arrangements were made for a Vietnamese barber from BAO TRAI to be in the battalion area on 19 June 66 to give haircuts to the members of 2/27. A price of 30 piasters had been agreed upon for each haircut. Coordination was made with the authorities at BAO TRAI to begin employing between 30 to 50 local villagers to fill sandbags for the battalion.
19 June 1966:
The plan for the day was to have two platoon sweeps in the bn AO. A&B Companies were to airlift to the same general area as 18 June, and conduct S&D operations in this area as per oral order #7 (Appendix 7, Annex A).
During the night of 18 - 19 June, six ambushes were employed around the battalion perimeter. Also, extensive artillery and mortar H&I missions were fired during the night at suspected VC locations. As per Oral Order #7, Operation LONESTAR commenced with the Security Platoon's sweep at 1200 hrs, followed by the 2nd Platoon, B Co, 1/5 (M) which moved out at 1200 hrs. A&B, 2/27 airlifted to Obj Zap at 1200 hrs. The concept for this day's operation was to return to the same area as Operation BUCKEYE. This time however, the area was to be saturated with artillery and mortar fires then units were to move in quickly with an air assault to search and destroy back to base camp.
Indirect Fire Support:
a. H&I fires 182000 June.
1. 4.2 Mortars
LOCATION NATURE OF TARGET
XT 530117 Suspected VC supply route
XT 518115 Suspected VC Co location
XT 469063 Suspected VC supply cache
XT464055 Suspected VC supply cache
2. Artillery (105mm)
LOCATION NATURE OF TARGET
XT 477022 Suspected VC supply routes
XT 468018 Suspected VC supply routes
XT472014 Suspected VC supply routes
XT 471008 Suspected VC supply routes
3. Artillery (155mm)
LOCATIONS NATURE OF TARGET
XT 46250223 Suspected VC anti-aircraft position
XT 46200210 Suspected VC anti-aircraft position
XT 46200185 Suspected VC AW position
XT 46260160 Suspected VC AW position
XT46360135 Suspected VC anti-aircraft position
* A total of 36 rounds were fired (HE and WP mixed)
b. Preparation on LZ in grid square 4804 ** (Time lapse 1150-1155 hrs)
1. 4.2 mortars - 24 HE and 24 WP
2. 105 Howitzer - 5 WP and 53 HE
3. 155 Howitzer - 6 WP and 30 HE
4. 8” Howitzer - 10 HE
** A total of 152 rds were fired in the preparation.
c. Walking fires - At 1350 hrs 3 WP and 5 HE were fired in grid square 4804.
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
During the night of 18 - 19 June, ambushes, manned by 1st Platoon, C, 2/27, were employed at the following locations: XT504099, XT511087, and XT518079. No contact was made. During the morning hours the company conducted maintenance on their weapons and equipment. A foot inspection was also held. At 1200 hrs the unit airlifted to Obj Zap, thus commencing Operation LONESTAR. The airlift was complete at 1203 hrs and the LZ was cold. As this unit moved back to the northeast, booby traps were encountered. At 1248 hrs, a booby trap was destroyed at XT478048. At 1256 hrs, two booby trapped grenades were destroyed at XT486049. At 1307 hrs, one booby trapped grenade and one booby trapped butterfly bomb were destroyed at XT487049. At 1315 hrs, two civilians were located and questioned at XT485050. They reported that when the “Bombs started dropping” (artillery and mortar prep fires), the VC fled to the north northwest. At 1544 hrs, 3 grenade type booby traps were destroyed at XT487047. The unit closed back into the bn base camp at 1600 hrs.
B Co. 2/27 Inf:
Again the Security Platoon manned the ambushes during the night of 18 - 19 June outside the perimeter. The ambushes were located at XT503075, XT95075, and XT494083. There was no contact during the night. Personal hygiene and care and cleaning of weapons and equipment in preparation for Operations LONESTAR to up most of the morning hours. At 1200 hrs, this unit was airlifted to Obj.W----. At 1315 hrs, two booby trapped butterfly bombs were destroyed at XT485050. At 1450 hrs, a wounded VC soldier was found at XT485048. Upon being questioned, he said he received fragments apparently from the rockets of the gunships that had fired around the LZ prior to the troops landing. Because he was seriously wounded, (lung puncture) he was evacuated by the C&C ship to the hospital at CU CHI where he would be both better cared for and further interrogated.
2nd Plat, B, 1/5 (M):
This element commenced their sweep at 1200 hrs (Oral Order #7). At 1400 hrs, signs were located at XT506054 which warned the civilian populace to stay away from that area as it was heavily mined and booby trapped. A subsequent search however, could not reveal any mines or booby traps. Civilians in the area seemed very friendly. At 1410 hrs a haystack with a hidden compartment was located at XT509046. A search produced 2 male personnel about age 40 years. One man had only one eye. Other items found with them were medicine in -----, booby traps, and various sorts of web gear. Also found were notebooks and other documents along with steel pots, and empty 60mm mortar canisters. At 1450 hrs three other male VC suspects were found at XT504046. At 1500 hrs, all five of these VCS were evacuated to the bn POW compound for further interrogation. The platoon closed into base camp at 1600 hrs.
This element began its sweep at 1000 hrs (Oral Order #7). At 1020 hrs, booby trap signs were located XT497076, but no actual booby traps could be located. At 1030 hrs at XT495074, a pistol belt with poncho, and a Chicom grenade were found in a haystack. These items were returned to the bn S2. The grenade was destroyed. At 1040 hrs at XT489074 four foxhole bunkers were located and destroyed.
The SOP early morning road clearing operation conducted from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1) was completed at 0910 hrs. At 0930 hrs, the flame APC was attached to the 2nd Plat, B, 1/5 (M) for their sweep. At 1100 hrs, the SOP demo teams were attached to A and B Companies. More construction materials for the ARVN outpost (barbed wire and pickets) arrived on the convoy at 1100 hrs. 30% of the materials needed to complete the outpost are presently at this location, and 60% of the clearing operations for fields of fire and a solid base have been completed. The grader has been continually improving the road to BAO TRAI.
The barber gave haircuts all day within the battalion perimeter. Arrangements were completed to have civilian villagers at the base camp to fill sandbags. The Communications Platoon conducted its daily English classes to the Vietnamese civilians living within the perimeter. MEDCAP was performed in the village of AP SO DO, (10 civilians were treated.)
The 2nd Platoon, D Co, 1/5 (M) conducted a sweep east of the bn perimeter at 1830 hrs. It was designed to accomplish a two-fold purpose. It was not only to discover any enemy activity to the east of the perimeter, but also to drop off a stay behind squad to establish an ambush site. The platoon (-) returned to the perimeter at 1900 hrs. The stay behind ambush squad returned at 2100 hrs with negative contact. At 2215 hrs the A Co radar picked up movement vicinity XT5063615. M79's were fired, but results were negative. 3rd Platoon, A , 2/27 departed the bn perimeter at 2020 hrs to establish an ambush site at XT496096. The platoon was in position at 2300 hrs. D Co established two squad sized ambush points at XT503076 and XT496076. These ambush sites were in position at 2320 hrs. The Security Platoon established a platoon sized ambush at XT516065. It was in position at 2305 hrs.
20 June 1966:
Plans for the day: A Co, B Co, and the Security Platoon were to conduct care and maintenance during the day in preparation for the night's ambush operations. The Recon Platoon was to continue its road clearance and security missions. 2nd Plat, B, 1/5 (M) was to conduct a sweep as per Oral Order #8 (Appendix 8 to Annex A).
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0610 hrs, the 3rd Platoon returned from its ambush site (no contact). AT 201000 the company commander and his platoon leaders made an aerial reconnaissance of the night ambush sites for 20 - 21 June, and the night air-mobile assault for 21 - 22 June. For most of the day the company engaged in care and maintenance of equipment and personnel, and preparation for the night ambush. Four Vietnamese barbers were cutting hair in the company all day. The concept behind this night's company-sized area ambush was not only to set up an ambush site to kill VC, but also to rehearse for the following night's airmobile assault. The area chosen for the A Co ambush was similar to the terrain and road --found in the area destined for the air-mobile assault. Thus, all elements of the company would be well rehearsed on the actions and techniques to be taken the following night. The company departed the bn sector at 2247 hrs, and moved to its assembly area per Oral Order #8 (Appendix 8 to Annex A). The move served as a training vehicle in that it allowed leaders at all levels to exercise maximum leadership capabilities in areas of control, practice night orientation techniques, and coordinate close ambush sites under a unified command. The ambush site was completely established at 210130 hrs.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
By 0645 hrs both combat patrols had returned to the company perimeter. No contact was made. During the day the company conducted care and maintenance of personal equipment. The CC and 3rd Platoon Leader made an aerial recon for the platoon-size night ambush. Vietnamese barbers were in the area all day cutting hair. At 1700 hrs the Security Platoon was attached to the company to man the 3rd Platoon sector while they were on patrol. The 3rd Platoon established nite ambush at XT501101. It was in position at 2315 hrs.
Recon Platoon, 2/27 Inf:
This element continued to man its defensive position in the village of AP SO DO during the night of 19 - 20 June. Together with the engineers they conducted the daily road clearing operation from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). They also secured the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO and the engineers building the A-N PF outpost. The platoon was given the mission to be prepared on order, to deploy to the bn perimeter if the bn's res-ion force, 2/B/1/5 (M), was committed to assist the A Co ambush.
Security Platoon, 2/27 Inf:
The platoon returned from its ambush site at 0745 hrs. No contact was made. The remainder of the day was spent in care and maintenance of personnel and equipment.
2nd Plat, B Co, 1/5 (M):
At 0800 hrs the 2nd platoon departed the Bn perimeter with the remainder of B 1/5 (M) to mark the area of the A Co night airmobile assault and area ambush, under the guise of a S&D op. (Appendix 8, Annex A). The purpose was to mark key terrain features and landing zones by the armored vehicle tracks, to facilitate identification from the air and on the ground,. The mission was completed at 1130 hrs. At 1400 hrs the 2nd platoon left for CU CHI, being replaced by the Art platoon. The 1st Platoon B, 1/5 (M) Co with A and IMC, 2/27 elements assured the A Co defensive perimeter effective 1700 hrs. The 1st Platoon B 1/5 (M) was also the Bn reaction force.
Artillery H & I (19 - 20 June) (155mm):
LOCATION TYPE OF EVENT
XT 45950178 Suspected VC supply route
XT 45200182 Suspected VC supply route
XT 46470458 Suspected VC location
XT 47310360 Suspected VC location
XT 47570315 Suspected VC location
XT 41100998 Suspected VC location
XT 40470937 Suspected VC location
S-4, 2/27 Inf:
The daily “ROAD RUNNER” convoy reached the bn forward base area at 1215 hrs. It brought the bn's rations, ammunition, ice, and refreshments. The return trip to CU CHI began at 1430 hrs. The convoy escort units were committed to other missions. Coordination was made to start resupplying the bn by air (UH10) until ground convoys could again be initiated.
The engineers continued the construction of roads within the bn perimeter and the improvement of the road between BAO TRAP and AP RUNG DAU. The engineer team worked on the ARVN PF outpost, and completed the platform around the outpost tower.
Civil Affairs, 2/27 Inf:
The MEDCAP team treated 102 civilians at AP GO DO. Coordination was made to obtain a cultural team and entertainment for the bn “Country Fair” operation scheduled for 23 June.
At 2015 hrs sniper fire was received from approximately 200 meters to the left and right flanks of the B Co perimeter, generally from the southwest. It was estimated that the VC were using six automatic weapons and six to eight small arms. M-79's and mortar began firing on the VC locations. The mortar fire resulted in three VC KIA (BC) and ten VC KIA (possible). At 2045 hrs the 1st Platoon, 1/5 (M) suffered one minor WIA from sniper fire. He wa treated by the battalion surgeon.
21 June 1966:
The plan for the day was for A Co to prepare for the night air-mobile assault, and for B Co to conduct a sweep as per Oral Order #9 (Appendix 9, Annex A). The Recon Platoon was to continue its road clearing and security mission for the engineers and MEDCAP team.
A Co., 2/27 Inf:
The company made no contact at their ambush site during the night, and returned to the bn perimeter at 0730 hrs. The company spent the remainder of the day conducting care and maintenance in preparation for the night airmobile assault. Operation Peach (Appendix 9 to Annex A) was the first night airmobile assault to be conducted by the 2/27th. At 1919 hrs the first lift consisting of five helicopters (Pathfinders and Security) left the PZ. The Pathfinders became disoriented flying at tree top level and marked the wrong LZ. Thus, this lift initially landed at the wrong LZ and had to be re-lifted to the correct LZ at XT474093. The airlift portion of the operation was completed at 1900 hrs. There was one minor injury when an RPC's radio straps got tangled with the seat straps in the helicopter. The RTO suffered a badly bruised forearm. He was evacuated to CU CHI with his radio, creating a gap in communications at ambush #7. The company commander canceled this ambush. By 2021 hrs, the company had reached the first ambush site (XT472096). The company dropped off the first ambush patrol and continued on in this manner until all ambush sites were established. The ambushes were established at the following times.
AMBUSH TIME LOCATION
#1 2030 hrs XT472096
#2 2104 hrs XT454103
#3 2136 hrs XT455105
#4 2155 hrs XT456109
#5 2210 hrs XT455124
#6 2215 hrs XT455116
#8 2159 hrs XT458111
#9 2230 hrs XT432111
During the move to the various ambush sites, the company received ineffective sniper fire from XT456104. The firing started at 2047 hrs and ceased at 2147 hrs. A total of 10 - 12 rounds were fired by the sniper. No fire was returned by the company. In fact, it appeared that the VC were completely confused by the operation. Apparently a VC mortar dropped about three rounds on the VC sniper firing at the company. The sniper was silenced.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
The platoon ambush returned to the base camp area at 0643 hrs. There was no contact. At 0900 hrs, as per Cmd. Order #10 (Operation ALOHA) (Appendix 10, Annex A), the company conducted a motor march to XT513028. At this point they began a northerly sweep to ---- perimeter. The ARVN Go team was attached to the company for the day. The team questioned all civilians they encountered during the sweep. At 1330 hrs, one civilian revealed information that a VC in a blue uniform had departed XT487061 at approximately 1320 hrs. The company returned to the bn perimeter at 1600 hrs. At 1840 hrs, their unit made a sweep of the woodline around the PZ for the A Co airlift. No contact was made. The company returned to the Bn perimeter at 2020 hrs. Three squad sized ambushes were established at XT94090, XT496007, XT503074. They were in position at 2115 hrs.
This element continued to occupy its defensive position in the village of AP SO DO. The platoon conducted its daily road clearing mission from BAO TRAP to AP RUNG DAU (1). At 0800 hrs a road block, consisting of bamboo and brush and containing two booby trapped CBU's were pointed out by Vietnamese children who had been attending classes conducted by the Battalion Command Platoon. The unit out-posted the road during the day from BAO TRAP to AP RUNG DAU (1) and secured the engineers and the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO during the day. Effective 1800 hrs, the platoon returned to AP SO DO and again was prepared to return to the bn perimeter to take the place of 1st 21st, b, 1/5 (M) if they were committed as the reaction force.
1st Plat, B, 1/5 (M):
This element continued to act as the Bn Reaction Force. At 1700 hrs, along with the Security Platoon, this unit manned the A Co. perimeter. Also it secured the PZ for A Co. from 1745 hrs to 2019 hrs.
The engineer platoon continued road construction within the bn base camp area, and improved the road from BAO TRAP to AP RUNG DAU (1). Also ----was continued on the ARVN PF outpost.
Heavy Mortar Platoon:
During the night of 20-21 June, this platoon fired four M&I missions (total of sixteen rounds
XT 47150423 Suspected VC position
XT47590484 Suspected VC position
XT47760372 Suspected VC supply route
XT48260361 Suspected VC supply route
The bn resupply for the day was completed utilizing sixteen PX1-D loads of rations, ammunition, etc. Fourteen vehicles were given a Technical Inspection, - no major deficiencies were found.
A total of 84 persons were treated by the bn MEDCAP team in the village of AP SO DO. Continued coordination was made to obtain all the supplies and entertainment needed for the bn “Country Fair” operation scheduled for 23 June. A leaflet drop was made in AO requesting that VC come into the Open Arms Program (Job Order ----01).
22 June 1965:
The plan for this day was to have A Co conduct care and maintenance after returning from the ambush. B Co. was to sweep the village of AP RUNG DAU (1) with 1st Plat, B 1/5 (M) as per Oral Order #10 (Operation A---A) (Appendix 10, Annex A).
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
The company began its return to base camp from the ambush site on feet at 0530 hrs. Questioning of civilians along the route at XT473103 indicated that 60 - 70 VC passed through the area on the 21st. The VC had warned the civilian population to stay in their houses because the area would be booby-trapped. The VC disseminated this information to the people by use of loud-speaker system. The company made a thorough search of the area, but could not find evidence of booby trapping. By 0305 hrs, the company had returned to the bn perimeter. Then conducted care and maintenance for the remainder of the day.
B Co, 2/27 Inf /1st Plat, B, 1/5 (M):
The ambush patrols for B, 2/27 returned to the company perimeter at 0615 hrs. No contact was made. B, 2/27 departed the bn perimeter at 1115 hrs, and moved to the village of AP RUNG DAU (1), thus commencing Operation ALOHA. At 1130 hrs the 1st Plat, B, 1/5 (M) left the bn perimeter to link up with B Co. The two units surrounded the village as planned. Then elements of B Co, along with the GO team searched through the village. The GO team emphasized its Psy / War capabilities. At 1342 hrs, four radio antennas were discovered on two houses. They were destroyed. Both units returned to the bn perimeter at 1615 hrs.
C, 1/5 (M):
At 1800 hrs C Co, 1/5 (M) was attached to the bn and 1st Plat B, 1/5 (M) was released to return to CU CHI. L C, 1/5 (M) was to have the mission of securing the entire bn perimeter during operation BLUEGRASS. (Appendix 11 to Annex A).
The platoon with the engineers completed the road sweep from AP SO DO to BAO TRAI then to HIEP HOA and DUC HUE at 1042 hrs. The platoon provided security during the day for the engineer advisory team at the AP SO DO outpost and the bn MEDCAP at AP RUNG DAU (1).
This element occupied three squad sized outposts during the day until 170-0 hrs on the road from AP RUNG DAU (1) to DUC HUE, (XT517063), XT483093, and XT471089). The unit then returned to base camp.
The engineers continued to improve the road network within the base area and work on the existing road from BAO TRAI to HIEP HOA. Work on the PF outpost was continued.
Final coordination was made for the entertainment, food, supplies, etc. for Operation BLUEGRASS, THE Battalion's COUNTRY FAIR operation. MEDCAP was conducted in AP RUNG DAU (A) during the afternoon. 92 civilians were treated at the village and 53 more were treated at the Battalion Air Station. The bn communications platoon made strides with its daily English classes. Not only were the Vietnamese children learning English, but they were learning to play baseball. They also were given new clothes from the 25th Div “Helping Hand” supplies.
At 2020 hrs the Recon Platoon received 7 SA rounds from XT503072. The 4.2 mortars fired 18 rounds at the VC location. The sniper ceased (At this time the entire platoon was at its night's secretive position (XT510277). The Security Platoon secured the northern portion of the Bn Co perimeter during the night. One ambush was dispatched to XT49695. At 1700 hrs. C 1/5 (M) assumed responsibility for the B Co perimeter. The B Co ambushes were in position, by 2130 hrs at XT496076 and XT503076.
23 June 1966:
The general concept behind Operation BLUEGRASS was that A & B 2/27 would be utilized to completely surround the village of AP SO DO early in the morning. The GO team would be utilized to maintain close check of all persons going out, coming in or staying in the village in the initial morning hours. The fair essentially consisted of a cultural team, a MEDCAP team, and the distribution of “Helping Hand” items. This was the first time this bn had attempted this type operation, and it was realized that many risks were involved should the VC attempt to sabotage the activities. The fair could possibly be misinterpreted, should anyone get hurt through VC actions, and civil affairs successes accomplished thus far could be nullified
Operation BLUEGRASS commenced at 0305 hrs when A & B, 2/27 moved from the bn perimeter on their way to AP SO DO. The encirclement of the village was complete at 0438 hrs. From this time on no one was allowed to leave the village. The ARVN GO team arrived in the village at 0640 hrs and moved all villagers to the village school house. The team then began checking the ID cards of all the people. This was done to discover any false ID card, and also to insure that all the inhabitants of the village did have ID cards. An ID card team was available at the village to issue cards to all authorized personnel who did not have one. The GO team conducted a thorough search of the village starting at 0645 hrs. The Psy/ War members of the team mingled with the people of the village attempting to get as much information as possible from them. At 0745 hrs the 2nd Brigade Band arrived and gave their concert until 0915 hrs. Immediately after the concert, the Vietnamese cultural team entertained the villagers with songs and stories of Vietnamese history, and culture until 1109 hrs. The Province Chief, Major IDIA, gave a speech urging the villagers to be loyal to the Government of Vietnam, and to give the authorities all information concerning VC activities. Upon completion of the speech, lunch was served to the 350 persons who were at the village. The free meal was provided by the Bn's combined efforts with GVN authorities. During the afternoon the bn surgeon treated 94 villagers for various illnesses. At 1330 hrs “Tropic Lightning” HELPING HAND supplies were distributed. This included 20 sets of men's clothing, 50 sets of women's clothing, and 20 toys. The operation ended at 1400 hrs and A & B Co, 2/27 withdrew from their security positions around AP SO DO and returned to the bn perimeter.
Together with the engineer, this element completed the daily road sweep from BAO TRAI to HIEP HOA. At 0825 hrs, the platoon returned to its defensive position to secure the engineer advisory team at the PF outpost. This element also worked with 4 National Policemen to control vehicular traffic from AP SO DO to BAO TRAI.
The one ambush patrol returned to the bn perimeter at 0630 hrs. The platoon established two outposts along the road from AP RUNG DAU (1) to HIEP HOA. The outposts returned to the bn perimeter at 1200 hrs.
C Co, 1/5 (M) after securing the bn perimeter all day while Operation BLUEGRASS was being conducted, left the bn AO to return to CU CHI. They left behind one platoon to be utilized as the bn reaction force. At 1930 hrs, the Bn received information from the recon Platoon that the residents of AP SO DO were leaving the village. Initially it was suspected that the VC might be planning a reprisal because of the tremendous success of the County Fair. Thus the 1st Plat, C, 1/5 (M) mounted their APC's and moved down the road through AP SO DO, not only as a feint to throw the VC off guard, but also as a show of force. The Mech Platoon returned to base camp at 2035 hrs using a different route. There was no further action during the night. Squad ambushes were located at XT50600865, XT50320880, XT50800805, XT491096, XT485094, XT517064, and XT510078.
24 June 1966 (P161)
The plan for the day was for A, 2/27 to airlift to a new AO for a two day S&D operation. B, 2/27 was to S&D to the southwest of the bn perimeter, and C, 2/27 was to airlift from CU CHI to DUC HUE and assist in the defense of the Special Forces camp there. 2nd Plat, C, 1/5 (M)was to conduct a sweep to the north to act as security force (south flanks for A/2/27). All units were to move in accordance with Operation GARDEN (Appendix 12, Annex A).
The operation commenced at 0629 hrs when C Co helilifted from the CU CHI Army Airfield to DUC HUE (XT430072). The lift was completed at 0700 hrs. C Co spent the day preparing positions around the sugar mill in order to accomplish the mission of defending the area. Because of enemy information received, Operation GARDEN was altered slightly. At 1035 hrs, A Co received sniper fire from XT529110. The fire was returned, but the VC fled. Civilians located at XT528112 reported that approximately one VC platoon with green uniforms and helmets had fled to the southwest when the US troops landed in the helicopters that morning. The company commander of A Co from an OH-23 spotted a man with a weapon, in uniform and steel pot, running at XT533110. As a result, B Co was airlifted at 1300 hrs to XT535104, and 1st Plat, A Co, 3/ 4 --- moved through AP BEN LONG to link up with B Co. Together they S&D throughout the area around XT535104.
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0720 hrs this unit airlifted to LZ -ST. The LZ was cold. The Airlift was completed at 0739 hrs. At 0924 hrs the unit appropriated 4 sampans to aid in checking all the canal systems. The company searched the entire day, but could not make contact with the VC reported earlier. At 1600 hrs, t e unit moved back to XT540120 to set up their night defensive positions. Three ambushes were set up around their perimeter at XT545120, XT5411--, and XT536113.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0800 hrs the unit commenced its sweep along Axis SIX. At 0845 hrs one VCS was pulled out of a hole at XT495080. At 0907 hrs, snipers could be heard firing at two C-130 airplanes flying low at XT462048. At 1030 hrs, a VCS with one eye was picked up at XT472055. At 1110 hrs, sniper fire was received at XT476058. Artillery and 4.2 mortar missions were fired on the sniper's location until the firing ceased. At 1246 hrs, B Co arrived back inside the perimeter and turned in the two VCS to the Bn POW compound for further interrogation. At 1300 hrs, they airlifted to XT535104 to aid A Co in finding the suspected uniformed VC platoon. At 1521 hrs, one soldier was wounded by a booby trap at XT526108. He was evacuated at 1525 hrs by C&C ship to the CU CHI hospital. At 1613 hrs, a booby trapped grenade was destroyed at XT526114. The company returned at 1700 hrs to the bn perimeter. Two ambushes were established by 2010 hrs, at XT498089 and XT499079. At 2140 hrs the southern flank of the B Co perimeter received five rifle grenades. The grenades fell approximately 50 meters short of the actual front line perimeter. Two snipers also fired from this general vicinity. M-79's were fired with unknown results.
The road from BAO TRAI to DUC HUE (XT435071) was cleared by 1048 hrs. Two roadblocks were found. The one at XT484094 was made up of branches. The other at XT465087 was made up of several dirt mounds. During the day more work was done on the base camp interior road system. The US Army advisors at BAO TRAI were assisted by advice on a better draining system for their area.
This element had the mission of securing the road from the bn perimeter to DUC HUE. At 1110 hrs one minor WIA was suffered by a booby trap at the bridge at XT473090. The injured man was evacuated back to the Battalion Aid Station. At 1155 hrs elements from the platoon found and destroyed 5 booby trapped grenades at XT472090. The entire platoon established an ambush at XT483093 at 2120 hrs. 4.2 mortar defensive concentrations were fired around the ambush site.
2nd Plat, C, 1/5 (M):
The platoon left on its sweep at 0700 hrs. They moved to Obj. FOX with no contact. At 1100 hrs they moved to a blocking position at XT505105 in conjunction with A Co's movement. At 1225 hrs the unit was released with 3rd Plat, A trp, 3/ 4 Cav arrived at the bn location.
3rd Plat, A Trp, 3/ 4 Cav:
This unit arrived with the resupply convoy at 1225 hrs at the bn perimeter. At 1300 hrs, the unit moved north towards AP BEN LONG to coordinate their sweep with B Co.
During the day the platoon continued its security mission with the engineers at the PF outpost, and on the morning sweep. Security was also provided the MEDCAP team. During the night the platoon continued to occupy its defensive position at XT510072. At 2110 hrs small arms fire was received from XT507073 from four or five snipers. Also, four rifle grenades hit around the platoon positions. The suspected VC location was fired on by the 4.2 mortars. The sniper firing ceased.
The bn surgeon examined and treaated 103 villagers from AP RUNG DAU (1). This brought the total treatments to 2030. Another “County Fair” was being planned for the 4th of July in HIEP HOA. The bn employed 50 civilian laborers from AP SO DO to fill sandbags for the bn perimeter.
PSYWAR operations continued in the area, (numerous leaflet drops and occasional broadcasts). Leaflet Job Order 3153 was dropped along the river today. Also Chiou Hoi leaflets were passe out in -n My (AP RUNG DAU).
25 June 1966:
As shown by Oral Order #13 (Appendix 13, Annex A) the plan for the bn on this day was for A Co to continue S&D operations in AO SWAMPY, but to be prepared for an airlift back to base camp late in the day. 3rd Plat, A, 3/ 4 Cav again provided security, (south flank for A Co.). B, 2/27 was to conduct S&D operations along Axis BAD and C, 2/27 was to conduct a sweep along Axis AMOS. The recon Platoon, medics, Security Platoon, and engineers were to conduct their daily SOP missions within the by AO.
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0800 hrs, the company began a sweep to the west in AO SWAMPY. At 1340 hrs a dud butterfly bomb was destroyed at XT515109. With no further action during the day, the company moved back to their CP area at XT540120. At 1925 hrs approximately, 7 small arms rounds were received into the A Co perimeter from XT544117. Immediately M-79 rounds were fired into the area and the sniper firing ceased. Three ambushes were established around the perimeter at XT543115, XT543120, and XT535115. The ambushes were all in position at 2010 hrs.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0900 hrs the company began their sweep along Axis BAD. At 1055 hrs, 4 civilians were questioned at XT475065. They provided information that a number of VC passed through the location moving south, they were on foot, and it took 15 minutes for them to pass. At 1232 hrs some expended carbine cartridges were found at XT477061. One male civilian was also picked up at this location and detained for further questioning. At 1301 hrs, sniper fire was received from XT487068. Artillery (103mm) and 4.2 mortars went into action and fired approximately 35 rounds on the sniper's location. The sniper firing ceased. At 1435 hrs, sniper firing was again received at XT49991078. This time the company commander ordered a stay behind ambush to go into effect. While the company moved on ahead, the artillery fired one round at a continuous rate behind the snipers position. With the artillery falling behind him, and the unit supposedly moving out of the area, the confused VC walked into the direction of the company and walked right into the stay behind ambush. The BC was killed, papers proved him to be a fairly important VC recruiting cadre member. At this same location, two VCS were picked up and used to carry the dead VC back to base camp. The captured materials consisted of 1 carbine, 1 pistol belt, a flashlight, a hammock, and some documents. At 2005 hrs, a platoon-sized killer team was in position at XT502073. The mission of the killer team was not to serve as an ambush, but to act as a reaction force to eliminate snipers.
C Co, 2/27 Inf:
C Co had no contact during their sweep along Axis AMOS. Three VCS were picked up at 1535 hrs at XT44208--. The company moved back at 1600 hrs to continue its defense of the sugar mill area.
The daily road clearing mission with the engineers was completed from DUC HUE to BAO TRAI at 0900 hrs. Security was given to the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO and the water trailer company going to BAO TRAI. A reconnaissance was made of the area from where the sniper firing was received the night before, but nothing could be found.
During the day this unit out-posted the road from DUC HUE to xt4959097. By 2100 hrs two ambushes were positioned outside the bn perimeter at XT494087 and XT498087.
The base camp interior road construction was completed. The improvement of the main road from the base camp to BAO TRAI was also completed.
The bn surgeon examined and treated 90 villagers in AP SO DO. A total of 1120 villagers had been treated up to this time during Operation FRESNO. The bn hired 51 civilian laborers to fill sandbags. Plans were made for the Vietnamese barbers (4) to come daily to cut hair in the bn vase camp. 5000 leaflets were dropped throughout the bn AO and more leaflet drops were scheduled for the 26th, 27th, and 30th of June. The 060 leaflet, offering money for information leading to the capture of weapons or soldiers, was dropped in the AO.
26 June 1966: (p164)
The plan for the day was in accordance with Appendix 14, Annex A. A, 2/27 was to continue to S&D in AO SWAMPY and be prepared to move by air to the bn forward CP. B, 2/27 was to sweep along Axis HOPELESS and be prepared for an air-move to bn forward CP to take the place of B Co.
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0900 hrs the unit commenced operations in AO SWAMPY by moving to the west of their CP location. At 0935 hrs a tunnel and a booby trapped grenade were found and destroyed at XT543119. At 1018 hrs, sniper fire was received from XT545118, a distance of 250 meters. The company employed fire and maneuver until they reached the sniper's area. The sniper could not be found, but expended M1 and carbine cartridges were lying around the area. Also trenches with overhead cover were found extending from XT547112 to XT547117. At 1113 hrs, two booby traps were found and destroyed at XT5-4116. In the same area a hut was found occupied by a woman with a child. Additional carbine and M1 expended cartridges were found. Civilians questioned at this location reported that 10 VC in green uniforms with steel pots were in the area earlier. Then a helicopter had flown over the area earlier, the VC hid in the schoolhouse and told the civilians to stay inside their homes or they would be shot. At 1444 hrs two WIA's were suffered from booby traps at XT556117. The wounded were evacuated by Dustoff at 1453 hrs. The company completed its sweep at 1530 hrs and prepared for the air extraction. The extraction began at 1600 hrs to base camp, and was completed at 1621 hrs. At 2312 hrs, 2 VC were sighted through the starlight device approximately 200 meters in front of the company perimeter. The VC were moving parallel to the company front. M-79's were fired at this location. The VC dispersed.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
The unit began its sweep to the south at 0800 hrs. At 0910 hrs four villagers were questioned at XT490076. They stated that six armed VC had passed through the area heading west to east at 1000 hrs on 25 June. The company returned to the bn perimeter at 1115 hrs and prepared for the air move back to CU CHI. At 1545 hrs B Co completed their airlift.
C Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0800 hrs the company commenced its sweep to the south of the sugar mill. The company captured one VCS at XT42920636. The VCS was turned over to the Special Forces at DUC HUE. The sweep was completed at 1045 hrs. The company commenced their airlift to the bn forward area at 1538 hrs, and completed it at 1545 hrs. They assumed the B Co portion of the perimeter.
3rd Plat, A Co, 3/ 4 Cav:
The platoon with the GO team attached moved through the AP GIONG VOI area beginning at 0800 hrs. Many civilians were encountered and questioned, but no enemy contact was made. The platoon returned at 1350 hrs. At 1430 hrs, four APC's from the platoon left for A Co's area to secure the PZ and to carry out some of the barrier material which could not be taken by helicopters. They returned at 1700 hrs.
The engineers with the Recon Platoon cleared the road from BAO TRAI to DUC HUE. Because of the heavy rains during the night, road construction and improvement operations were set back a few days, but the unit continued to advise the ARVN PF on construction of AP SO DO outpost. Security was provided by the Recon Platoon.
During the day this element secured the bn CP area, and conducted care and maintenance. A platoon ambush was established at XT475088 at 2255 hrs.
The bn surgeon initiated a sick call for the local civilians living within the perimeter. Twenty civilians were treated. Five women and six children walked into the A Coi CP area requesting medical aid. After treatment, they gave out information about VC activities. Secured by the Recon Platoon, the MEDCAP team went to AP RUNG DAU (1) and treated 14 civilians. The Battalion Communications Platoon continued its English lessons to the 15 Vietnamese children who attended daily. The platoon fed the children every noon meal. Leaflets were passed out to the indigenous population within the local area telling them not to let the VC use their houses and farms to fight the US from. If so, their houses would be fired upon.
27 June 1966:
The plan for this day was to have a combined ARVN-US operation as per Order #15. Two Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) companies with Special Forces Advisors were to establish a blocking position while A and C Co's, 2/27 made a sweep to trap any VC in the area. 3rd Plat, A Trp, 3/ 4 Cav was to establish a blocking position on the northeast flank to catch any VC fleeing in this direction.
Operation SUNFLOWER commenced at 0500 hrs when the engineer platoon out-posted the A Co perimeter, HHC out-posted the C Co perimeter, and A, 2/27 and C, 2/27 moved to the PZ. At 0505 hrs two mortar/artillery preparations were fired on LZ 2-A and LZ-1-C. Twelve white
phosphorous rounds (155mm) were fired on the west bank of the Oriental River to proceed a smoke screen for the airmobile assault. This proved extremely effective. At 0611 hrs, C Co was lifted from PZ YE to LZ 1-C. A Co lifted off PZ YE at 0617 hrs and landed at LZ 2-A at 0622 hrs. At 0634 hrs the two companies were linked up and prepared to move forward in their S&D operations. At 0700 hrs the Cav Platoon swept around a marked mine field at XT483078. At 0707 hrs A & C, 2/27 began detailed search of the RACH NHUM area. At 0820 hrs a camouflaged house capable of holding 10 - 15 people was searched and destroyed by A Co at XT471045). At 1015 hrs, C Co found three 5 gallon cans and two ammo cans containing VC documents. One homemade pistol was also found at this location (XT467045). At 1106 hrs, A Co destroyed two houses at XT468052. At 1143 hrs some well built bunkers with firing positions were destroyed at XT468051. At 1159 hrs the CIDG units were fired on from XT464045. Artillery was fired on thuis location and the sniper firing ceased. --------- (p165)
-----rounds and 12 butterfly bombs at XT464045. Everything was destroyed. At 1216 hrs 20 VC were spotted by the CIDG units. An artillery mission was called in on the VC location. The VC could not be located again. At 1228 hrs, 3rd Plat, A Trp, 3/ 4 Cav questioned local civilians in their blocking position (XT487045) and ascertained that 20 VC had been operating in the area vic XT456047. At 1240 hrs, A Co destroyed a well constructed bunker at XT456049. At 1500 hrs, A & C, 2/27 reached the CIDG blocking position . At this time A & C, 2/27 reversed their direction and moved back towards their respective PZ's for the air extraction to base camp. Due to the non-availability of aircraft, A & C, 2/27 had to walk back to the bn base camp. The companies completed this movement at 1920 hrs without contact. Four squad-sized ambushes were established around the bn perimeter by 2155hrs. Throughout the day grenades were periodically dropped into the water along the canal bank to flush out any VC hiding there. There were no direct results determined.
Indirect Fire Support:
Rounds fired during the preparation (0550 - 0555)
32nd Arty (8 in) 11 HE rounds
13th Arty (155mm) 12 NP 12 HE
8th Arty (105mm) 30 NP
2.27 4.2 mortar 12 NP
This unit completed its road clearing mission from DUC HUE to BAO TRAI at 0930 hrs. The engineers at the PF outpost and the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO were given security by this element.
The bn surgeon treated 93 villagers in AP SO DO. Plans for the Country Fair to be held at HIEP HOA on 4 July commenced. The Bn Commo Platoon continued its English classes.
Chieu Hoi leaflets were distributed from coordinates XT4701 to XT4704 to XT4606 and from XT4511 to XT4375. Also the 969 was dropped from XT4609 to XT4613. These leaflets seemed to be paying off as the bn has had several Chiou Hoi's come in during this operation.
28 June 1966:
In accordance with Oral Order #16, Operation CENDER was planned so that the bn could conduct a combined S&D operation with the ARVN 51st Ranger Bn. The 51st Bn was to hold in a blocking position to the west of HUEP HOA. 3/A/3/ 4 Cav moved out at 1200 hrs and reached their position at 1240 hrs. At 1155 hrs, C & A, 2/27 moved to the objective area along with the GO team. C & A companies began their sweep at 1350 hrs. At 1455 hrs, 3/A/3/ 4 Cav picked up 4 VCS. A Co located 400 lbs of rice at XT469062. It was left in place. At 1511 hrs a badly burned VC was located at XT476099. He was evacuated to the bn base camp along with his wife and sister. After he was given medical aid, all of them were interrogated. At 1555 hrs, booby trap signs, but no actual booby traps, were located at XT461101. The operation ended at 1645 hrs at which time the 51st Ranger Bn was released. All 2/27 elements closed back into base camp at 1745hrs. By 2145 hrs, four ambush points and one platoon size ambush were located around the bn perimeter. The Security Platoon ambush was located at XT489075.
Recon Platoon: (p166)
This unit completed its SOP road clearing mission from DUC HUE to BAO TRAI at 1120 hrs, then proceeded to secure the engineer advisory team at AP SO DO and the MEDCAP team at AP RUNG DAU (1).
81 villagers were treated at AP RUNG DAU (1). The bn S-5 made a reconnaissance of the HIEP HOA area in order to submit plans for the Country Fair scheduled there on 4 July 1966.
3000 of the 969 leaflet were distributed from XT5003 to XT4807. This leaflet has been distributed over the entire AO at least once.
29 June 1966:
The plan for this day was to conduct care and maintenance with specific emphasis on improvement of the bunkers and wire barrier along the bn perimeter. Night operations were planned for as per Oral Order #17.
The Recon Platoon, along with an engineer team, conducted its daily road clearance mission beginning at 290800 hrs. At 0834 hrs, the Recon Platoon located a road block (XT5175062). The road block was checked for mines. None were discovered and the road block was cleared. By 1158 hrs, the Recon Platoon and the engineer team had completed clearing the road from DUC HUE to BAO TRAI.
During the morning the companies conducted care and maintenance of equipment, improved defensive positions, and prepared for night operations. Emphasis was placed on the improvement of individual fighting positions. The engineers continued construction of the triple concertina wire barrier around the battalion perimeter. At 1215 hrs, the battalion received a report from the Sector TOC that a woman reported that her husband, a VC platoon leader, wanted to turn himself in. At 1215 hrs, the battalion requested two helicopters for use in exploiting the woman's information. At 1233 hrs, C Co was given a warning order to prepare three platoons for a mission. A Co was told to be prepared to assist C Co. At 1240 hrs a request was made for two gunships to support the operation. At 1245 hrs the Bn CO and S3 went to the Sector TOC to be briefed on the woman's information, and to coordinate the exploitation of this information. At 1310 hrs A & C Company and 3/A/3/ 4 Cav were briefed on the execution of the operation.
The plan was to airlift a platoon from A & C Co to blocking positions on the east and west of AP CU LAO TRE (1): A on the east, C on the west. The remainder of each company was to follow on foot to reinforce the platoon blocking position. 3/A/3/ 4 Cav was to move north along the road and establish a block to the north of AP CU LAO TRE (1). XT501105 to XT504104. At 1320 hrs the 1st lift of the C Co platoon left the Bn, reaching the LZ at 1323 hrs. The 2nd lift of the C Co platoon was completed at 1329 hrs. The A Co platoon airlifted out at 1335 hrs, reaching the LZ at 1339 hrs. At 1340 hrs A/3/3/ 4 Cav departed the bn perimeter to move to its blocking position. At 1346 hrs the remainder of A & C Co's departed to reinforce the airlifted platoons.
The wife of the VC platoon leader was brought from BAO TRAI to the Bn CP and was transferred to an APC. The APC moved out at 1408 hrs toward the location of her house. The AP CU LAOTRE (1) village was surrounded at 1423 hrs and all escape routes were sealed. At 1410 hrs A/3/3/4 Cav reported the possibility of an ambush located at XT493133. Investigation by helicopter disclosed a number of persons in the reeds along the road. Gunships were requested, but when they flew over the are, no persons were sighted. The area was to be subjected to H & I fires during the night. The units were instructed to start moving south to the new location that the woman recognized as her home. At 1530 hrs, C Co picked up two VCS vicinity XT502104. The two VCS were brought to the Battalion IPW compound when the companies returned to the battalion perimeter.
At 1540 hrs, the two gunships supporting the operation sighted four men on bicycles at XT514078. The ships fired two warning bursts, but the four men failed to stop. The third burst of fire hit the lead man, the other three continued on. An element of the bn Recon Platoon picked up the wounded VC and brought him back to the Battalion Air Station where he died. The remainder of the platoon pursued the three fleeing VC and captured two of them when they attempted to join a funeral procession at XT521063. As the companies moved south, A Co captured 1 VCS at XT513091 at 1633 hrs. He was taken to the IPW compound when the company returned to the battalion perimeter. The companies surrounded the village of TAN MY from the 10 grid line south with A Co on the south, C Co on the north, the two companies swept through the village. C Co captured another VCS at 1727 hrs at XT521102. The companies prepared to air extract to the bn perimeter at 1800 hrs, with the A Co PZ located XT552120 and the C Co PZ at XT519099. The extraction began at 1800 hrs and was complete at 1833 hrs.
The MEDCAP team treated a total of 206 persons at HIEP HOA. Security was provided by the Security Platoon. A total of 15 villagers from outlying areas were treated at the bn aid station. The bn AO was covered with leaflets (aerial drop) asking the residents to turn in information pertaining to the capture of VC weapons. Money was offered as a reward for this information.
30 June 1966:
During the day training; and preparation was to be the key for the night offensive operations. (Appendix 18, Annex A).
While A & C Co, 2/27 were conducting care and maintenance, the 3rd Plat, A Trp, 3/ 4 Cav continued the search in LAO TRE for the VC platoon leader who wished to give himself up. At 0900 hrs the VC platoon leader had given himself up and gave his weapon to the Cav platoon leader. He indicated that there were four VC in tunnels in the area. At this time one platoon from A Co was airlifted to the objective area to assist in the search of the VC. The VC platoon leader pointed out four VC who were captured and airlifted back to the Bn base camp at 1027 hrs. At 1200 hrs a tunnel system was searched and found to contain some documents. At 1212 hrs one bolt action rifle and five VC were taken from a tunnel at XT523098. At 1240 hrs they were airlifted back to the Bn PW compound. At 1310 hrs, one AT mine and one AP mine were destroyed at XT527103. Five grenades and assorted items of web gear were captured in XT523098. The elements then returned to the Bn perimeter.
A composite group made up of the engineers, the GO team, and the Security Platoon had the mission of filling in trenches to the east of the Bn perimeter. The engineers provided the bulldozer, the GO team obtained and controlled civilian laborers for the project, and the Security Platoon provided the security for the whole group. The Bn utilized two platoon sized ambush patrols at XT489076 and XT515083.
The Bn aid station treated 24 civilians. 1250 lbs of rice were received from USMED for distribution during the 4 July Country Fair. 2000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were distributed from XT4500 to XT4310. These leaflet drops are married up with the operation as much as can be. So far, during the operations, propaganda has proved to be a successful weapon.
The plan for this day is as shown in Appendix 20, Annex A.
C Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0924 hrs one platoon left the bn perimeter to conduct S&D operations in the village of AP DONG VOI. (2) and the CAV RACH DEIM canal to the west of the village. At XT406098 a large hole was discovered camouflaged under a haystack, but it contained nothing. At 1545 hrs after a thorough search of this canal and village areas, the platoon returned to base camp.
This element together with the Security Platoon and an engineer bulldozer departed the bn area at 0904 hrs and moved to the village of AP CAY PUSO Their mission was to fill in the trench systems in the area. As the Cav Platoon moved along route Castle, elements of the Security Platoon were dropped off to ensure continual security of this route. By 1330 hrs 700 meters of trenches had been filled, and it was decided that this time to bring this element back to base camp.
Indirect Fire Support (H & I Fires) (Suspected VC locations):
Artillery (105mm) 2 rounds per target.
A Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0850 hrs one platoon of A Co departed the bn perimeter to continue searching the southern flank of TAN MY. At 0930 hrs the platoon reached the objective area just as a VC emerged from the woods with his hands up at XT517097. This VC gave the names of 11 other VC, some of which had already been captured on 30 June. At 1008 hrs, the platoon located approximately 5000 lbs of rice concealed beneath a false floor. The rice was bagged and evacuated to the HQ's for use in the Civil Affairs program. At 1415 hrs a three level tunnel system was located and destroyed at XT521109. At 1546 hrs, a school used for training VC was located and destroyed at XT52110. The platoon returned to the bn perimeter at 1725 hrs.
94 civilians were treated by the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO.
2 July, 1966:
The plan for this day was to conduct operations as shown in Appendix 21, Annex A. Essentially a great deal of emphasis to be placed on improvement of the bunker / barrier line around the bn perimeter, and care and maintenance of weapons, vehicles, and equipment. Elements conducting S&D operations were to continue emphasis on filling in all trenches and foxholes encountered in the Bn AO.
(p169 - p170)
At 0700 hrs, C Co departed the base camp and at 0740 hrs an injured boy was found at XT472075 and evacuated to the bn aid station for treatment. At 1040 hrs this unit filled in foxholes along a possible VC withdrawal route. 30 foxholes were filled in at XT476076. The rest of the day was spent searching for mines with the mine detector teams from the engineers.
At 0900 hrs the Security Platoon departed base camp with the GO team to go to the village of AP TAN HOI (2). The platoon surrounded the village while the TO team conducted Psy/war activities. The Recon Platoon was shown a dud 60mm mortar round at XT518061 by some children from AP SO DO. The round was destroyed in place. The road clearing mission and security for the engineer advisors and MEDCAP team were accomplished as planned.
The 3rd Platoon, A Trp, 3/ 4 Cav. With a rifle platoon from A Co, 2/27 attached (and a bulldozer) departed base camp to fill in more trench systems. The rifle platoon out-posted the return route for the Cav platoon. At 1117 hrs, one AT mine was destroyed at XT542100. One minor WIA was suffered from a booby trap (XT542100). Trafficability of tracked vehicles in this area was very limited. At 1200 hrs artillery (20 HE delay rounds) was fired at a suspected VC ammo cache (XT56160497).
71 persons were treated by the MEDCAP team in the village of AP RUNG DAU (1) Five bags of rice and 10 sets of women's clothing were distributed to families living within the battalion perimeter.
Five ambush points were employed around the bn perimeter. The Bn utilized three
Lightning Bug missions (2100 hrs, 2200 hrs, and 0100 hrs.). Around 2200 hrs small arms fire was received from XT4899174, XT460190, XT480133, and XT550127. The gunships engaged these targets, results unknown.
3 July 1966:
For this day, as on 2 July, work was continued on the concertina and bunkers along the bn perimeter. Emphasis was placed on training on day and night ambush and counter-ambush techniques, tunnel running, and the Bangalor-Claymore technique for clearing paths through booby trapped areas.
Because of the heavy rain fall during this period, the capabilities of the Cav Platoon and the bulldozer teams were limited to only the higher areas. Also much of the heavy equipment and many of the vehicles were sent back to CU CHI in anticipation of more flooded areas at the bn forward base camp. One platoon from A Co filled in 300 meters of trenches in the TAN MY area. One platoon from C Co filled in 50 foxholes at XT482063. Local villagers in this area were questioned and it was determined that 30 VC had passed through the village of AP GIONG VOI moving south during the night of 2 - 3 July. The Security Platoon spent the day at AP MOI with the GO team conducting a search, a census, and gathering information.
The Recon Platoon conducted its SOP missions of road clearing and security for the engineers and the MEDCAP team. At 1315 hrs, while the platoon was escorting the MECAP team to HIEP HOA, a command detonated mine exploded between two of the Recon vehicles (XT484094). The Recon Platoon began a thorough search of the area and located the wires used to detonate the mine. While following the wires, one man was injured by a booby trap attached to the wire (XT4830995). The wire led to a house XT483095 in which there were two women. They were brought to the IPW compound for questioning. At 1345 hrs the Recon Platoon was joined by one platoon from A Co to help in the search. A total of 7 more detainees were brought back to the Vn IPW compound for questioning. At 1450 hrs one man was injured by a booby trapped grenade. As he picked up the one grenade, there was another one underneath.
MEDCAP was held in AP SO DO, with 146 villagers being treated. This brings the total number of villagers on Operation FRESNO to 1736. Leaflet (Job Order ##46) drops were made from XT4909 to XT5411. This leaflet explains to the people about the better GVN life as compared to the VC.
4 July 1966:
Operation INDEPENDENCE (Appendix 22, Annex A) was to be the second “County Fair” Operation in the bn AO, and was to be a combined ARVN-US effort. This time it was to be conducted at HIEP HOA much in the same manner as the last county fair on 23 June (Appendix 11, Annex A).
Earlier in the day at 0210 hrs the Lightning Bug technique was being utilized in the bn AO./ The ship with the lights drew fire at XT448101. Artillery (12 HE) was fired on the target.
At -634 hrs the 4/49 (ARVN) commenced its airmobile assault to surround and seal off the village of HIEP HOA. The village was sealed off at 0736 hrs. At 0630 hrs the 2nd Plat B, 1/5 (M), with the engineer teams, commenced to clear the road to HIEP HOA. At 0715 hrs, a grenade was found and destroyed at XT485096 (on the road).
One platoon from A Co and one platoon from C Co out-posted the road from the bn perimeter to HIEP HOA. At 0715 hrs the GO team along with the Security Platoon and the bn S-5 went to HIEP HOA. The GO team spent the day taking a census of the village, checking ID cards, and questioning the local populace on VC activities in the area. They also distributed 150 GVN agricultural instruction pamphlets. The Security Platoon was on hand to control the people and prevent any VC terrorist activities from taking place. At 1000 hrs the GVN cultural team made their presentation. Two bands played continuously in different places in the village. A speech was given by Major NHA, the HAU NGHIA Province Chief. The MEDCAP team treated 219 villagers. The 25th Div “Helping Hand” items consisting of four boxes (3 x 4 x 4) of clothes, two boxes of toys, 500 tons of food, and 1200 lbs of rice, were distributed to the villagers. While the County Fair was going on in HIEP HOA, one platoon from A Co filled in 400 meters of trenches and filled in a tunnel one hundred meters long in the TAN MI area. One platoon from C Co destroyed one bunker and filled in 20 foxholes at XT488050.
H & I Fires:
Coord Type Rounds Target
XT448101 105mm 12 HE Suspected VC position
XT420087 105mm 18 HE Suspected VC position
XT513120 4.2 in 12 HE Suspected VC position
XT484108 105mm 9 HE quick Suspected VC position
9 HE delay
XT 487049 4.2 in 6 HE quick Suspected VC position
6 HE delay
XT447098 155mm 2 HE Suspected VC position
XT 436081 105mm 4 HE Suspected VC position
5 July 1966: (p172)
During the night of 4 - 5 July, a total of five ambushes were employed around the bn AO. Each company utilized two ambushes and the Security Platoon employed one ambush to the front of the artillery bn. The A Co ambushes departed between 2030 hrs; and 2045 hrs: C Co ambushes departed between 2024 hrs and 2100 hrs; the Security Platoon departed at 2050 hrs; all were in position by 2115 hrs. There was negative enemy contact during the night, and they returned to the bn perimeter at 050630 July.
At 2010 hrs the C Co perimeter received approximately 20 SA sniper rounds from the southwest of their position. Illumination and HE mortar fire was fired on the suspected VC location. At 2012 hrs the Recon Platoon, in its defensive position vic XT510077, sighted approximately 12 VC moving west XT509061. The platoon also received 50 to 60 sniper rounds. The platoon returned the fire with M-79's and mortar fire. A Co also received two rifle grenades short of their perimeter, the rounds were fired from XT505080. This area was immediately taken under fire by the company 81mm mortars, results unknown.
On 5 July the 2/27 Inf extracted from its forward base camp by motor convoy. The moving of vehicles from their protected positions was overcome by utilizing VTR's and APC's to extract the vehicles from the mud. The convoy was assembled 1620 hrs and started moving at 1625 hrs. The convoy made the move from the forward base camp to the CU CHI base camp without incident, and closed at 1802 hrs. All elements started care and maintenance activities and a platoon of B Co prepared for an eagle flight on 6 Jul 66.
6 July 1966:
Although the entire Bn had moved back into base camp at CU CHI, Operation FRESNO was to continue. The reason for moving back to CU CHI were: vehicular difficulties due to mud, need to man the perimeters (CU CHI and forward base), shortage of forces which could be committed at night due to manning two perimeters, and health and welfare of the troops (most of forward area was under water).
On this day, the 3rd platoon of B Co conducted an airmobile assault at 0800 hrs into LZ 1 (XT505085) (Appendix ---, Annex A). At 0830 hrs the GO team was airlifted from BAO TRAI to link up with the Bde platoon. The entire element swept through the old forward base camp area. Questioning of the local populace revealed that a large VC force (possibly company size) had passed through the area moving in a southwesterly direction. At 1200 hrs the 3rd platoon with the GO team airlifted from LZ 1 to the village of AP CAY QUO (XT541115). The platoon swept east then south through the village area. From all indications the VC trench systems that had previously been filled in by the bn had not been touched by the VC. One booby trap was located and destroyed at XT538110.
At 0800 hrs the bn MEDCAP team airlifted to the Special Forces camp at DUC HUE. From there the team was escorted by the Special Forces to HIEP HOA. 409 persons were treated (the largest daily total). The mission was flown in the BAO TRAI area informing the population of unlawful deeds committed by the VC. Also it explained the goals and purposes of the GVN and why the US is here.
7 July 1966: (p173)
In compliance with Oral Order #25, one platoon from C Co departed CU CHI Airfield at 0620 hrs for LZ RED. At 0651 hrs the platoon was on Obj 1. At 0733 hrs two VCS were captured at XT462109. At 0830 hrs the platoon picked up three VCS at XT463109. At 930 hrs a helicopter transported them all to BAO TRAI for further questioning. At 1144 hrs the unit moved to Obj #3 and conducted a thorough search. At 1315 hrs they airlifted back to CU CHI.
8 July 1966:
The MEDCAP team along with the Security Platoon conducted operations in AP SO DO and AP RUNG DAU (1). (Appendix 26, Annex A). The MEDCAP team arrived at AP SO DO at 0900 hrs and worked until 1200 hrs, treating 164 people. At 1200 hrs they moved to AP RUNG DAU (1) where they treated 150 villagers. At 1500 hrs they were airlifted back to the Division helipad.
9 July 1966:
In accordance with Oral Order #27 the Recon and Security Platoons airlifted to HIEP HOA at 1230 hrs. While the division MEDCAP team (to include one dentist) treated civilians in HIEP HOA, the Security Platoon together with the GO team from BAO TRAI conducted S&P missions through Objective HORSE (Appendix 27, Annex A). All units had returned to CU CHI by 1630 hrs.
10 July 1966:
For today the combined forces of C Co, the Security Platoon, the Recon Platoon, and the GO team were to conduct S&D operations as shown by Appendix 28, Annex A. The units were airlifted into LZ's 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 from the CU CHI Army Airfield in three lifts at 0603 hrs, and 0649 hrs. The three lifts were on their respective LZ's by 0658 hrs. Sniper fire was received at LZ3. The gunships suppressed this fire. All elements were on Obj FOX at 0714 hrs. The GO team conducted its operations throughout the area. At 0845 hrs the GO team picked up one VCC at XT485055. At 0850 hrs C Co received sniper fire from XT485055. This resulted in one WIA. Dustoff evacuated the man to CU CHI. At 0900 hrs an agent report was received that a VC platoon was located at XT483037. Two gunships were sent to this location to check it out. The gunships drew fire at 1051 hrs from XT472029 and XT478037. Both areas were taken under fire. At 1030 hrs C Co picked up one VCC and 6 VCs at XT478057. They were returned to BAO TRAI for further interrogation. At 1600 hrs C Co suffered one KIA at XT479048 from sniper fire. By 1647 hrs all elements had airlifted back to CU CHI.
234 villagers were treated at XOM DUC HANH, A (XT575075) and B (XT567065) by the MEDCAP team. The battalion surgeon controlled a convoy to DUC HANH, and after setting up his security, he began treating patients. MEDCAP has proved and is proving to be a valuable aid to the US forces in their pacification mission.
11 July 1966: (p173)
The combined ARVN-US operations for today was to take place as shown in Appendix 29, Annex A. At 0605 hrs A Co began their airlift to the objective area. After two lifts at 0644 hrs, the airlift was complete. At 0713 hrs the objective area was encircled. At 0830 hrs, A Co linked up with the (ARVN) 51st Ranger Bn. The Ranger Bn completed the sweep through the objective area at 1052 hrs. After this the 51st Ranger Bn returned to the sugar mill while A Co conducted S&D operations XT485115. Extraction of A Co commenced at 1404 hrs and was complete by 1503 hrs.
12 July 1966:
This day's operation was to be in accordance with Appendix 30, Annex A. At 0540 hrs, B Co with attachments (Recon Platoon, Security Platoon, 4 National Police, 8 interpreters, 2 engineer demo teams) departed for the Division Helipad. The units were airlifted into LZ's 1 - 7 in three lifts commencing at 0624 hrs. All lifts were on their respective LZ's by 0655 hrs. This operation was conducted, based on the report at 1501 hrs 11 July, from a Rallier from BAO CHANH HA who had turned himself into the ARVN units at BAO TRAI. The information was that the Rallier was willing to lead them to a tunnel and VC houses in the village. B Co began to exploit the information by S&D on Obj PASEY. At 0750 hrs, the wife of a VC soldier was detained at her home for questioning. The Rallier led B Co to a tunnel located at XT561008. The tunnel was destroyed. The wife of the VC soldier divulged that there were six VC operating within the village. Three additional tunnels were located at XT561004 and were destroyed. At 0914 hrs, B Co received 5 to 6 rounds of carbine fire at XT573003. ARVN troops with Cap----THIEW the S---S2 from BAO TRAI, located the VC leader's home and a tunnel located at XT561006. Three VCC's were taken from the tunnel by elements of B Co. They were interrogated and found to be a VC district cadre member, a local VC guerrilla, and a VC district Finance Corps member. Three 5 gallon cans of documents were also taken from the tunnels. B Co began extraction at 1449 hrs and completed at 1544 hrs.
13. July 1966:
The Recon Platoon provided security for the MECAP team at AP SO DO and AP RUNG DAU (1). A total of 234 people were treated by the bn surgeon.
14 July 1966:
The plan for this day was to implement Oral Order #32 as shown in Appendix 32, Annex A.
B Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0700 hrs, this element landed at LZ 2. As they moved off to the northeast, two minor WIA's were suffered from booby traps at XT415142. Villagers questioned in the immediate area said that the VC had been there earlier in the morning and had told all villagers to stay in their homes as the entire area was going to be booby trapped. All the booby traps that were found during the day were new and freshly dug. At LZ 2, at the same time, an OH-23 took one small arms hit from XT409142. A total of five more booby traps were located and destroyed on the LZ by 0908 hrs. At 1025 hrs, the unit located what appeared to be a 100 lb bomb, with no fuse, underwater at XT414135. The bomb was lifted out of the water and destroyed. At 1133 hrs, 9 booby traps were destroyed along the road running from XT409144 to XT408140. Three more booby traps were destroyed at XT414135. At 1226 hrs, B Co had 2 armed VC trying to sneak up on their position at XT414134. Two personnel were taken under fire with an M-60 machine gun. The VC were actually located approximately 50 - 100 meters away. A search was immediately begun of the wood-line around XT414134. Three more booby traps were found and destroyed at this location as the unit tried to enter the wood-line heading southeast. As this search was going on, (1256 hrs) 12 sniper rounds were fired on the unit from XT420130. Artillery was called in on this location, but a thorough search could not produce any VC. At 1350 hrs, one man received fragments from a booby tap at XT414143. At 1358 hrs, some documents were found at XT413143. The documents included the name and picture of a VC squad leader who had stepped on his own booby trap and who according to the villagers was at the CHOLON Hospital. The bn S2 took all the information necessary for possible capture of this man. At 1455 hrs the unit was extracted from LZ 1 by airlift back to the Division Helipad. Two of the three minor WIA'S were evacuated back to CU CHI by C&C ship The other WIA remained with the unit.
C Co, 2/27 Inf:
At 0615 hrs this element departed the Division Helipad and by 0651 hrs all elements were on LZ 3 (two lifts). At 1019 hrs a tunnel was found at XT417159. It was searched then destroyed. Throughout the entire 4115 grid square, approximately 50 foxholes were found. Each was destroyed. At 1219 hrs, the unit found one 55 gallon drum of diesel fuel right on the borderline at XT408160. It was destroyed in place. At 1430 hrs, 12 sampans were destroyed along the canal (RACH BY THAY) from XT410154 to XT420154. This element was airlifted back to CU CHI beginning at 1552 hrs and ending at 1627 hrs.
The platoon was airlifted at 0815 hrs to Obj D. At 0845 hrs a U-shaped tunnel 25 feet long was located at XT411173. It was destroyed. At 1010 hrs, 5 booby traps were destroyed at XT408175. The booby traps appeared to be placed around a tunnel and house in the area. Both house and tunnel were destroyed. At 1124 hrs one WIA was suffered from a booby trap. A Dustoff evacuated the man to CU CHI. At 1305 hrs 6 booby traps were destroyed at XT408175. At 1420 hrs, while the platoon was located at XT412178, two VC with weapons were spotted at XT415175. The platoon opened fire and chased them for about 300 meters before they were lost in the wood-line. The platoon was airlifted back to the Division Helipad from LZ 4 at 1643 hrs.
The Bn MEDCAP team airlifted at 0915 hrs to DUC HUE and with security provided by the Special Forces, they moved to HIEP HOA Market Place (XT440056). 209 villagers were treated during the day. The MEDCAP returned to base camp at 1430- hrs. There was a leaflet drop throughout AO FRESNO. Leaflets re-emphasized that a reward will be given for any information about VC activities. 540 (5”x 8”) lined tablets were received and will be taken to AP SO DO for use in the school there. MEDCAP and distribution of school supplies was accomplished at TAN PHU TRUNG. (p175)
(1). 27 personnel were casualties (see section G).
(2) 1 vehicle damaged (see 13 (b) Maintenance).
(1) 15 VC KIA (BC); 14 VC KIA (Possible); 40 VC detainees
C. Captured armament
1 Rifle M-1
2 Hawsers -Model 98 (German)
3 -o------belt action (ru-ion)
5100 lbs rice
60 lbs documents
3 combat packs
2 web gear
17 Hand Grenades
20 Rifle Grenades
14 CVC doublets
12 M-79 rounds
76 Booby traps
16 AT mines
4 AP mines
2823 tunnels, trenches, foxholes
1 (55 gal) drum with diesel fuel
13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:
Convoys, 21 to Forward area (2 received light sniper fire)
21 to CU CHI
19 Motor convoys to BAC HAN and return (3-4 water trailers per convoy).
Cumulative miles traveled: 3,378 miles, (no accidents)
Direct support resupply by chopper: 3 days, 21 lifts, 25,200 mi.
Class I: “B” rations for entire battalion (forward) were delivered daily by convoy.
Companies supplemented these rations with coke and beer ration.
“C” rations: A 3 day supply of C-rations on hand throughout the operation:
450 cases (supplied).
Ice: Potable 23,000 lbs (p176) Non-potable 69,000 lbs (p177)
Sundry Packets: 60 pkts and forward.
Socks 1000 kpr
--------------- resupplied as necessary
--------------- Supplies - 7 “C” boxes
-------------- p---,----, weather balloons
1. ---------4,975 gal
2. ---------9,260 gal
3. ---------gallons 3---------
Barrier materials delivered:
Barbed wire 100 rolls
Concertina wire 500 rolls
Fence posts 1200
Scrty----- PSP 48 sheets
1. CTG, 5.5-- -ball 73,075
2. CTG, 7.6---- ball 14,310
3. CTG, 7.62---ball & tracer 27,680
4. CTG, cal. 45 ball 658
5. CTG, cal. 50 ball/tr 5890
6. CTG, cal 50 spotter/tr 492
7. CTG, 40 ---- 2809
8. CTG, 8-mm------/PD 206
9. CTG, 8 mm-------- 40
10. CTG, 81---- 40
11. CTG, 9 ------(RA) 40
12. CTG, ------------green 50
13. Gren, hand ---red 32
14. Gren, hand ---yellow 40
15. Gren, hand----violet 40
16. Gren, hand frag 500
17. Bangalore torpedo 20
18. Cratering charge 14
19. Gren, hand snk WP 54
More when double the bn basic supplies of ammunition was kept on hand at all times.
b. Maintenance: (p177)
(1) Although many vehicles were intended to move the bn to the forward base camp, most of these were sent back to CU CHI the first day of the operation. The recon Platoon and the resupply vehicles in the transportation section were the only vehicles that were used consistently. A 4 man maintenance team was sent on location throughout the operation. Because of the extremely wet and muddy road condition, winches were used often to pull out stuck vehicles.
(2) Following is a list of repairs made:
½ ton generators replaced
¼ ton distributors repaired
water pump replaced
fuel pump repaired
voltage regulators repaired
brake adjustment made
2-1/2 ton 1 air powered ----der repaired
1 master cylinder replaced
2 brake adjustments made
4 winch shear pins replaced
(3) 7 services were performed.
(4) One ½ ton ----damaged by a mine.
c. Treatment of casualties - The bn forward aid station consisted of the bn surgeon and 8 medics. During the operations 199 patients were examined and treated at the bn station. Most of these were for minor wounds, miscellaneous sickness and non-hostile injuries. All were returned to duty. 15 patients were evacuated by helicopter to CU CHI. The Dustoffs were called for and evacuated a total of 2 patients to CU CHI.
d. Medical evacuation - Because of the seriousness of some of the wounds, many casualties were evacuated directly to CU CHI without stopping at the bn aid station. However, a minor WIA was taken directly to the aid station in order that he could be returned to duty as soon as possible. It is essential that a bn aid station be with the bn at all times, especially at night. One night it took 47 minutes for a Dustoff to come to the bn area for a seriously wounded man. Greater reliability was placed on the-------------throughout the problem to evacuate all types of casualties.
e. Air Transportation: The primary means of transportation was by helicopter (air assaults) except for going out to the AO when on resupply convoys, and when returning to CU CHI. It was necessary for all convoys to have mechanized rifle platoon and 2 gunships providing escort. Resupply for a short period (3 days) was done by helicopter.
f. Communications: There were no major problems encountered in this problem. The communications set-up consisted of wire for primary communication within the bn base camp. However, whenever the bn must operate two base camps, there is a distinct need for AO additional TA-312's in order not to disrupt garrison operations. The bn maintained radio and -ff contact (125th Signal) with bdc. VHF hotlines went from the bn to Bde located at CU CHI, the 1/8 artillery located at BAC MAY, and the 1/27 vic XT575035. (p178)
14. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS AND CRITIQUES: (p179)
a. The bangalore torpedo - Claymore mine technique used to enter enemy booby-trapped and mined areas, first devised and utilized during OPERATION --------
again proved valuable. This method was used extensively ---------through booby trapped hedgerows. This method allowed ----------
(This whole page too spotty to make sense of )
15, COMMANDER ANALYSES: (p180)
Operation FRESNO was this battalion's first experience with the extended period, area and people oriented mission which emphasized pacification, as differentiated from previous operations, which used usually search and destroy missions of short duration in continually changing areas. These latter operations virtually were conducted in a people and intelligence vacuum. The concept proved most promising, and has been the source of many reports indicating its potential for future operations. The key to counter-insurgency operations at battalion or any level needs valid tactical intelligence on which the units can react as appropriate. Lacking this intelligence and discounting pure blind luck, countless man-hours and resources are wasted alternately “using a steamroller to crush an egg in the dark” or committing inefficient resources to do the job. The only reliable formal intelligence or ability in the FRESNO area is the one conducted by the Sector S2 at BAO TRAI. The alternative is for the unit to develop its own intelligence, as it always has in the past, by becoming more familiar with an area and its people the longer it operates there. In effect, the unit becomes area-oriented through countless trials and errors in a specific sector. The pacification concept combines these two, and for the first time this battalion was able to react to valid tactical intelligence, tailor its forces as appropriate, and accomplish its mission with relative ease. The sources were as varied as any complicated act. By combining the intelligence gained from Chieu Hoi's, agents, prisoners, etc. this battalion was able to get tangible results: captured Viet Cong with their weapons, and equipment (in theory at least much more important than dead VC body count), weapons, cadres, documents, etc. This was done with considerably less casualties and expenditure of resources than our previous operations have produced. We are enthusiastic about the technique. It holds greater potential than our previous methods of operations.
a. It is essential that at least one engineer platoon be attached to any Battalion Task Force conducting area pacification missions. Road improvement and building of PF outpost, and advice to the ARVN forces and Vietnamese people about engineering projects proved vitally important not only for civil affairs, but to construction on the forward base camp. The minimum needed is one bulldozer, a grader, a front loader, and two dump trucks.
b. An armored or mechanized infantry element should be attached to any Battalion Task Force on their search and destroy missions to allow greater flexibility, a quick reaction force, and shock action.
c. Close coordination must be maintained with appropriate GVN and ARVN authorities and US advisors in order that tactical as well as civil affairs operations can be run smoothly and successfully. Daily meetings should be conducted to insure close coordination.
d. The MEDCAP as well as other civil affairs activities such as county fairs, leaflet drops, loudspeaker runs, engineer aid, and the distribution of 25th Div. “Helping Hand” items should be greatly emphasized during a pacification operation. (p180)
(p181 = GRAPHIC)
Appendix 1 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to (Op FRESNO). (P182
Oral Order #1 14 June 1966 Operation JOURNAL
1. A. No Change
B. No Change
2. 2/27 conducts S&D ops in AO.
3. A Co cross LD 1000 hrs, conduct detailed S&D throughout Obj A.
B Co cross LD 1000 hrs, conduct detailed S&D throughout Obj B.
Recon Plat provide security for engineer team on road clearing mission, provide security for.
MEDCAP, S5, and Engineers to AP SO DO.
Security Plat outpost bn perimeter.
HHC be prepared to assist Scty Plat in outpost of bn perimeter.
Engr / Medics / S5 coordinate civil affairs activities, AP SO DO
4. No Change
5. No Change (p182)
Appendix 2 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #2, 15 June 1966, Operations LAKES
1. A. Current INTSUM
B. No CHANGE
C. Go Team (Green Tm) A/1/5 (M)
2. 2/27 w/A/1/5 (M) - conducts S&D sweep
3. A/1/5 (M) - crosses LD 150830 Jun, sweep to
Obj 1, conducts detailed S&D Obj. 1, on ord
Assist A or B 2/27.
A/2/27 - crosses ID 150900 Jun, S&D Obj 3, on
ord assist A/1/5 (M), in Obj 1.
B/2/27 - crosses LD 150900 Jun, S&D Obj 3, on
ord assist A/1/5 (M) in Obj 1
Recon Plat - assist B/65 Engr to clear rd to
AP SO DO, outpost road to BAO TRAI, secure engr const tm, secure MEDCAP
Scty - Plat-outpost bn perimeter.
HHC Be prepared to assist Scty Plat in scty of
(GRAPHIC) bn perimeter.
Medic/25 - conduct MEDCAP, AP SO DO
Engrs. Assist PF's const outpost north of AP SO
4. No Change
5. No Change
Appendix 3 to Annex A, to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #3, 16 June 1966, Operation QUAKER
2/27 conducts combined S&D op w/ARVN units
2/27 conducts sweep along axis Blue, ARVN forces S&D Obj 1 & on order S&D OBJ 2,3,&4.
A/2/27 with attached demo tm & ten ARVN counter-terrorists, crosses LD 160900, moves along axis Blue ---route Red
B/ --27 -w/ attached demo tm & Go tm, crosses LD 160915, follows A Co & provides secty for Go tm, return route white.
A/1, 5 (M) secures left flank of axis Blue
1/10 & 4/49 conduct S&D sweep to Obj 1, & on order seize Obj 2, 3 & 4
Recon & Engr clear road from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1)
Secty - secure base camp
Plat - on order assist Sety Plat in bn sety.
Medics -conduct MEDCAP, AP RUNG DAU (2)
Appendix 4 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (OP FRESNO)
Oral Order #4, 17 June 1966, Operation KEYSTONE
1. No Change
2. 2/27 & 4/49-conduct airmobile S&D assaults into LZ 1&2, conducts op assigned AO.
3. 2/27- conducts airmobile assault into LZ-1 starting 170755; conducts S&D in Obj 1,2,&3
A/2/27-conducts airmobile assault into LZ-1, 170755; secures east half of Obj A, on order S&D Obj B & C
B/2/27-with Go Team conducts airmobile assault LZ-1 170812, secure west half of Obj A, on order S&D Obj B & C
Recon & clear road to BAO TRAI, then to AP RUNG DAU (1), secure engr & MED team AP SO DO.
Scty, security for base area.
HHC-1 enforce Scty Plat on order
Engr - attach one demo tm A&B, eff 170600, const PF outpost AP SO DO.
4/1- Conduct airmobile assault 170820, -----airstrip to LZ 2, seize Obj 1, order S&D Obj 2&3.
Appendix 5 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op. FRESNO) Oral Order #5, 18 June 1966, Operation EMPIRE
0700 - B 1/5 cross LD
0700 - A & B 2/27 cross LD
0730 - 51st Rn Bn est blk psn
0730 - B 1/5 encircle Obj G.
0800 - A & B 2/27 S&D Obj Go
Graphic Page CANCELLED
1. No Change
2. 2/27 - conducts coordinated S&D with B/1/5 (M) & 51st -n Bn.
3. 2/27 - conducts S&D sweep along Axis S-y, encircles Obj Go tying in with 51st Bn Pn blocking force.
A/2/27 - sweep left along Axis Sally, S&D left of Obj Go, secure attached Go Team, cross LD 180700.
B/2/27 - sweep right along Axis Sally, S&D right of Obj Go, cross LD 180700
GRAPHIC PAGE CANCELLED
2/27 - conducts coordinated S&D with B/1/5 (M) & 51st Rn Bn.
2/27 - conducts S&D sweep along Axis Sally, conduct S&D op in Obj Go. B/1/5 (M) sweeps along Axis Able, encircles Obj Go tying in with 51st Rn Bn blocking force.
A/2/27 - sweep left along Axis Sally, S&D left of Obj Go, secure attached Go Team, cross LD 180700.
B/2/27 - sweep right along Axis Sally, S&D right of Obj Go, cross LD 180700.
Recon - conduct sweep of road to BAO TRAI then to AP RUNG DAU (1), outpost road from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1), secure MEDCAP & Engr construction teams AP SO DO.
Scty - secure base camp area.
HHC - Be prepared to reinforce Security Platoon.
Medics - conduct MEDCAP in AP SO DO.
B/1/5 (M) - sweep along Axis Able, encircle Obj Go, trying in with the 51st Rn Bn. Cross IO 180700.
51st Rn Bn - sweep along Axis Roger, est blocking psn southwest portion Obj Go, tying in with B/1/5 )(M)
Appendix 6 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #6, 18 June 1966, Operation BUCKEYE (replaces Op. DIXIE)
1. No Change
2. 2/27 conduct sweep along route WELL, on order
deploy and S&D Obj Story & Black
3. 2/27 sweeps along route WELL, A Co leading,
B Co trailing, on order A Co S&D Obj Black,
B Co S&D Obj Story.
A/2/27 - cross LD 180700, sweep route WELL,
On order S&D Obj Black, be prepared to est co
def pan or extract on order.
B/2/27 - cross LD 180710, trail A 2/27 along route
WELL, on order S&D Obj Story, be prepared to est
co def pan or extract on order.
Recon conduct road sweep to BAO TRAI, then to
AP RUNG DAU (1), secure engr tm AP SO DO & Eng
MEDCAP tm AP RUNG DAU (1).
Setcy - secure bn base area.
HHC on order reinforce Scty Plat.
Medics - conduct MEDCAP, AP RUNG DAU (1)
Engr. continue const of AP SO DO Popular Forces
Outpost, conduct road improvement op.
Appendix 6 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #7, 19 June 1966, Operation
1. No Change
2. 2/27 conducts 2 sweeps & an airmobile assault.
3. Scty sweeps route Elke, B/1/5 (M) sweeps route
Sommers, A&B 2/27 conduct airmobile assault to
GRAPHIC A/2/27 - conducts airmobile assault to Obj.
Zap, land LZ's 1 & 2, on order S&D Obj Zap.
B/2/27 - conducts airmobile assault to Obj.
Zap, land LZ's 3 & 4, on order S&D Obj Zap
B/1/5 (M) - sweep route Sommers, LD 191200
Recon - secure MEDCAP & Engr Teams,
Scty - sweep route Elke, LD 191020
Medics - conduct MEDCAP, AP SO DO.
Appendix 6 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #8, ----------------------------
1. No Change
2. 2/27 conducts a sweep and recon of route Gilbert in preparation for A 2/27
night airmobile assault. Establish base and co size ambush to rehearse
night airmobile assault, and est two squad (+) night ambushes.
A 2/27 - conducts a recon w/2B 1/5 (M) to check LZ Dark and determine location
of ambush site for airmobile assault night of 21 Jun, cross LD 200800
establishes night ambush on terrain comparable to area of its airmobile
assault, conducts care and maintenance of equipment during day 20 Jun and
prepares for night operations.
B 2/27 - care and maintenance of equipment, and establish 2 long range patrols
Vic XT500105 and 522081.
Recon - continue daily road clearance operations, secure MEDCAP & Engr. tm,
maintain its defensive position vic XT510077.
Scty - security of the Bn CP area.
HHC - reinforce 2B 1/5 (M) in the defense of the A Co perimeter off 201800.
2B 1/5 (M) - conduct sweep of route Gilbert, mark LZ Dark for A 2/27 night
airmobile assault 21 June, cross LD 200800. Assume A Co perimeter,
reinforced by HHC elements, eff 201800.
Medics - conduct MEDCAP in village of AP SO DO.
Engr - continue construction of AP SO DO Popular Forces Outpost in AP SO DO,
continue road improvement on main road within the base area.
4. SOP (p190)
Appendix 9 to Annex A, Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO) (p191)
Oral Order #9, 21 June 1966, Operation PEACH
1. No Change
2. 2/27 continues S&D, and area pacification operations during Op. FRESNO.
A Co conducts night airmobile assault, B Co conducts a sweep.
3. B Co 210900 conducts sweep, A Co conducts night air-mobile assault to LZ
Dark, - attachments continue preset missions.
A 2/27 - conducts night airmobile assault on LZ Dark, landing LZ 212000 hrs
and establishes co size area ambush, returns 2200 along Axis Home.
B 2/27 - conducts sweep, a/atch Go Team along route Bound, departing 210900,
using atch Go Tm to interrogate civilians along route Bound
Recon-conduct daily road sweep to BAO TRAI then to AP RUNG DAU (1)
Secure Engr & MEDCAP teams AP SO DO, continue to man the platoon
defensive position vix XT510077.
Scty - defense of the CP area, assist in def of A Co area off 211700.
HHC - reinforce Scty Platoon in def of A Co perimeter off 211700.
Engr - continue road construction base area, continue road improvement
BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1), continue construction of Popular Forces
Outpost AP SO DO.
Medics - conduct MEDCAP, AP SO DO
1st Plat B 1/5 (M) Bn reaction force, defense of A Co perimeter off 211700.
Appendix 10 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #10, 22 June 1966, Operation ALOHA
1. No Change
2. 2/27 (-) conducts A&D area pacification ops during Op FRESNO
3. 2/27 (-) conducts sweep of AP RUNG DAU (1), conducts care & maintenance
A 2/27 - rtn by perimeter 220630, conducts care & maintenance.
B 2/27 - with attached B 1/5, Go Team & MEDCAP tm surround AP RUNG DAU (1)
221200 - Conduct MEDCAP & Go tm activities.
Recon - scty for engr in road clearance BAO TRAI to HIEP HOA (vic XT462067).
Scty - outpost road as Recon & engr clear road.
Engr - clear road, continue construction of outpost AP SO DO.
Go Team - attached to B 2/27, eff 221000.
MEDCAP - attached B 2/27, eff 221000.
B 1/5 (M) - attached B 2/27, eff 221000
Appendix #11, Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #11, 23 June 1966, Operation BLUEGRASS.
23030 - A Co depart base area
00040 - A Co
00630 - Go team------------------------
00730 - -------------------------
00800 - Cultural team depart DUC HUE
00830 - Cultural team arrive AP SO DO
00900 - Cultural activities
1200 - Chow
1300 - --Cav Team & band activities
1500 - Helping Hand activities
1600 - Release civilians, unit return
1. No Change
2. 2/27 conducts a “County Fair” type operation in the village of AP SO DO.
3. A & B 2/27 surrounds the village of AP SO DO, moves villagers to an open area and
provides entertainment and food, ARVN Go Team conducts census, questioning of
villagers, sos---- village and conducts psywar operations.
A 2/27 - departs base are 230300, surrounds village HLT 0400, secures village area
during “County Fair” operation.
B 2/27 - depart base area 230300, arriving village HLT 0400, secure village area during
“County Fair” operation.
Recon - occupy defensive psn AP SO DO, conduct road clearance with attached engr tm
from BAO TRAI to HIEP HOA.
Security - security of base area
C 1/5 (M) - attached to 2/27 eff 221800, secty perimeter during Operation BLUEGRASS
Engr - continue road construction in base area, road improvement and advising and
material supply for Popular Forces Outpost AP SO DO.
Go Team - conduct census, psywar ops during Operation BLUEGRASS.
Bde Band - attached to 2/27 for entertainment of Vietnamese during Operation
Medics - conduct MEDCAP during Operation BLUEGRASS.
Appendix #12 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op. FRESNO)
Oral Order #12, 24 June 1966, Operation GARDEN
1. No Change
2. 2/27 conducts S&D and area pacification in AO.
3. 2/27 conducts S&D, area pacification & secty of DUC HUE sugar mill.
A 2/27 - land LZ Wet 240736, conduct search of streams & canals in Co. AO.
extract 251700, area one ------UH10, prepare for 2 day op.
B 2/27 - cross LD 240800, Secure along axis Six, establish two night
ambushes from AP RUNG DAU (1) to AP ---
C 2/27 - conduct airmobile assault to DUC HUE mill,
vehicle convoy to DUC HUE, prepare for 3 day operation
Recon - conduct road clearance BAO TRAI to HIEP HOA, secty of engr &
MEDCAP teams, occupy def open vic XT510077.
Security - CP area scty.
Medics - MEDCAP - AP RUNG DAU (1) 241400.
1 Plat, C, 1/5 (M) - S&D Obj Fox 240800, secure A Co southern flank,
match one Mail Police, one interpreter & one demo tm
5. SOP (p194)
Page 195 ALL GRAPHIC.
Appendix #13 to Annex A to COAAR (Operation FRESNO) Oral Order #13 (p196)
25 June 1966, Operation ----
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. a. 2/27 conducts S&D opn, area pacification of DUC HUE Sugar Mill
b. A. 2/27 - Search AO SWAMPY, air -ve from PZ -----1700 to LZ DAY.
c. 2/27 - S&D on axis MAD, est. 2 night ambushes along road to DUC HUE
d. C, 2/27 - Def Sugar Mill, search RACH TRAI on Axis AMOS.
e. Plat, 3/ 4 Cav - Secty force, A Co south flank, Bn Reaction Force.
f. Recon Plat - connect ----vic 510077, clear road from BAO TRAI to DUC HUE,
Scty for Engr & MEDCAP teams
g. Secty Plat - Outpost road during day until 1700 hrs, defense of portion A Co
Sector, Bn perimeter.
h. Med Plat - Conduct MEDCAP - AP SO DO
i. HHC - Assist in def of Bn perimeter.
j. AO team - Care & maintenance. Critique of opn by Bn staff.
5. SOP (p196)
Appendix 14 to Annex A to COAAR (OP FRESNO) Oral Order #14, 26 June 1966,
Operation GOLDEN GATE.
Appendix 14 to Annex A to COAAR (OP FRESNO), Oral Order #14, 26 June 1966
Operation GOLDEN GATE
Appendix 14 to Annex A to COAAR (OP FRESNO), Oral Order #14, 26 June 1966 (p199)
Operation GOLDEN GATE
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. a. 2.27 conducts S&D area pacification Bn AO
b. A, 2/27 S&D AO SWAMPY, be prepared to air move to Bn Fwd CP,
PZ DAY (1600 hrs) to LZ SWAMPY.
c. B, 2/27 S&D axis REPEAT, be prepared to air move to CU CHI or
convoy, if convoy along route Blue (time PBA)
d. C, 2.27 Sweep Axis XO O, be prepared to air move or convoy to Bn Fwd CP
if convoy along route Red. Assume B Co perimeter.
e. Recon Plat - Occupy plat def psn vic XT510077, sweep rd BAO TRAI to
DUC HUE, secure MEDCAP & Engr team.
f. Scty Plat outpost rd DUC HUE to AP RUNG DAU (1)
g. Med Plat MEDCAP, AP RUNG DAU (1) 1400.
h. 3,A,3/ 4 Cav sweep Axis HOME.
i. HHC assist def bn perimeter
j. GO Team atch B, 2/27
Appendix 15 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #15, 27 June 1966, Operation SUNFLOWER
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. A 2/27 - conduct airmobile move from PZ Ye 0605, Land LZ 0610, S&D in zone,
air extract 1740 from PZ 1A to LZ Thee. Mech 1 mine detector, 1 demo tm.
C 2/27 - conduct airmobile move from PZ No 0555, land LZ 0600, S&D in zone,
air extract PZ 1C 1730 land LZ thee,
atch 1 mine detector & 1 demo tm.
3A3 /4 - sweep Axis Big, LD time 0600, est blk pan northeast flank,
rtn base camp after air extraction, atch one interpreter, one National Police.
Recon - secure engr & MEDCAP tm. Run road BAU TAI to DU CHU,
occupy plat def pen..
Special Forces - Move along Axis BLUE, Est Blk pos 0630 hrs vix XT450050 to XT459055
Scty - 0900 scty engr wood cutters, est night ambush.
Engr - clear road DUC HUE 0700 then to BAO TAI, 0900 cut timber for Special Forces,
improve roads, advise PF on outpost construction.
Medics - MEDCAP, AP SO DO, 0900.
Go Team - return base camp from BAO TRAI.
Appendix 16 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #16, 28 June 1966, Operation CENTER:
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. 2/27 conducts combined operation w/51st Rn Bn, conducts are pacification in bn AO
A 2/27 moves along Axis Boom, trailing “A” 2/27, searches right half Obj. LD time 0700
C 2/27 - moves along Axis Boom, leading “A” 2/27, search left half Obj, LD time 0700
B, A 3/ 4 Cav - moves along Axis Boom, secures northeast flank Obj, tying in with
51st Rn Bn, Ld time 0700.
51st Rn Bn - move along Axis Bang, est blk pan, mark flanks with yellow smoke to
coordinate joining with 3A 3/ 4 Cav, LD time 0600
Recon - clear road to BAO TRAI then to DUC HUE, scty MEDCAP & engr.
Security - secty base camp
Go Team - truck to HIEP HOA, conduct census / Psywar ops rtn base camp by truck,
follow Recon 0800.
MEDCAP - AP RUNG DAU (1), 1400
Engr - road clearance with Recoin Plat, road construction & improvement.
Appendix 17 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #17, 29 June 1966, Operations OPPORTUNITY
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. 2/27 continued S&D and area pacification in Bn Ao
A 2/27 - 2 plat sweep along Axis Black, LD time 1915, drops off plat size ambush
loc to be determined
C 2/27 - 2 plat sweep along Axis Night, LD time 1945, drop off plat size ambush,
loc to be determined.
3A 3/ 4 scty engr road clearance, scty Go Team AP MOI (1)., moves to AP MOI (1)
by route 1, scty Obj A, def A Co perimeter during plat sweeps, by reaction force.
Recon - occupy def psn, scty MEDCAP tm HIEP HOA
Security - CP scty, scty MEDCAP tm HIEP HOA
Medics - MEDCAP, HIEP HOA 1000 hrs.
Go Team - AP MOI for census & psywar ops,.
move by truck 1300H following 3A - 3/ 4 Cav,
Engr - road clearance DUC HUE to DAO TRAI, road const & improvement
Appendix 18 to Annex A, to Combat Operation After Action Report (Op. FRESNO)
Oral Order #18, 30 June 1966, Operation V-UNTERN.
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. 2/27 conducts area pacification & night ambushes in bn AO
A 2/27 - est two squad (+) site ambushes, LD time 1945 hrs.
C 2/27 - est two squad (+) size ambushes, LD time 1930 hrs.
3A 3/ 4 - conducts road sweep along Route Bold, 2000 hrs.
secure false LZ 2030 hrs, rtn 2200 hrs.
51st Rn Bn - est two squad (+) size ambushes HLT 2000 hrs
Avn Bn - airlift to false LZ for false air extraction 2030 hrs.
Recon - occupy plat def psn, sety engr & MEDCAP
Scty - bn CP scty.
MEDCAP - HIEP HOA 1400 hrs
Engr - road clearance, construction & improvement
Appendix 19 to Annex Z to Combat After Action Report (Op FRESNO) (p204)
Oral Order #19, 1 July 1966, Operation GRAND CANYON
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. B - 2/27 continues to operate in AO conducting pacification and S&D operations
A - 2/27 - moves along Axis 3 with LD time of 0800. Move into Obj B and conduct
S&D op. Send advisor along with 3A 3/ 4 to show tunnels.
Use CS in trenches and tunnels
C - 2/27 - moves along Route 2 to Obj 3. LD time 0800, conduct S&D op in Obj area
and 1 sqd moves to Obj A. Area is suspected to have caches of ammo &
logistical items. Have extra medics conduct MEDCAP ops if necessary.
immediate reactionary forces.
Recon - escort engr, secure MEDCAP at 1000 hrs.
Security - post road along Route 2 with 3 A 3/ 4.
3 A 3 /4 - move along Route 2 to Obj C to secure area for use of bulldozer.
Engr - advise Popular Force, bn reserve clear routes in this priority:
(1) Rt 2, (2) BAO TRAI (3) DUC HUE
Go Team - return from BAO TRAI
MEDCAP - conduct operation at 1000 hrs.
5. SOP (p 204)
Appendix 20 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op. FRESNO) (p205)
Oral Order #20, 1 July 1966, Operation BIG RIVER (Replace Op. GRAND CANYON)
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. 2/27 continues to conduct S&D and S&P operations in Op FRESNO
A 2 /27 - secure Route Castle, Bn reaction force for rallier information and C Co.
Provide guide to 3 A 3/ 4, secure rt for withdrawal of bulldozer from Obj A
Man 3 AP's, two in co-sector and one in 8th Army area.
Fill in trench system along Rt to Obj C.
C 2/27 - conduct S&D and S&P operation in AO Amos. at 0700 and then in AO
Bryant three day operation. Man two AP's
3 A, 3/ 4 - secure engr on Route Castle to Obj A. Reaction force for Recon at night.
Engr - clear Route Castle, BAO TRAI, DUC HOA in this priority:
Fill in trenches, work on concertina, roads and advise PF.
Recon - secure engr on road clearing BAO TRAI, DUC HUE, secure MEDCAP at
AP RUNG DAU at 1400, continue work at PF out post.
Security - secure Go tm on Obj Brave 0900
HHC - be prepared to man perimeter
Go team - search and pacify Obj B 0900
Appendix 21 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO) (p206)
Oral Order #21, 2 July 1966, Operation ----------
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. 2/27 continues to operate, conducting S&D and pacification in Op FRESNO
A 2/27 - bn reactionary force for C Co and Rallier information,
provide one guide to 3 A 3/ 4 to point out trench systems.
C 2/27 - move at 0530 to PZ and from there to Obj VC and LZ 1, 2, 3,
Surround Obj VC and give thorough search, move back to base on Axis Bee
B A, 3/ 4 - secure engr on Route Castle to Obj Echo, reactionary force for Recon tonight
Engr - clear Route Castle, BAU TRAI, DUC HUE, in this order: Bulldozer will accompany
along Route Castle to fill in trenches at Obj Echo, concentrate on triple concertina
and internal roads, bn reserve.
Recon - secure engr on road clearance operations to BAO TRAI, DUC HUE, secure
MEDCAP at RUNG DAU at 1400, continue to work with Popular Forces.
Security - secure Go team on Obj F.
HHC - be prepared to man perimeter
Go team - search and pacify Obj Foxtrot
5. SOP (P206)
Appendix 22 to Annex A to Combat Operations, After Action Report (Op. FRESNO)
Oral Order #22, 3 July 1966 Operation ANGRY
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. 2/27 continues to operate with S&D and S&P missions in Op FRESNO
A 2/27 - move Axis 1 to Obj A at 0730 hrs, secure engr bulldozer in Gap A,
secure route and return, 2 AP's
C 2/27 - conduct S&D and S&P in AO, Ames at 0700 and AO Bryant,
2 day operation, max 2 AP's at night.
3, A 3/ 4 - Reactionary force for Rallier information and co's, care and maintenance,
reserve force for Recon Plat.
Engr - clear rt to Obj A for bulldozer, clear rd to BAO TRAI & DUC HUE,
bulldozer fill in trenches in Obj A. Concentrate on concertina and internal
roads, advise Popular Force Outpost, bn reserve.
Recon - secure engr on road clearing operation to BAO TRAI & DUC HUE,
secure MEDCAP at 1300 HRS. Continue to work with PF Outpost
Security - secure Go Team in Obj B at 0900
HHC - be prepared to man perimeter
MEDCAP - at HIEP HOA
Go Team - S&P Obj B at 0900
Appendix 23 to Annex A in Combat Operations After Action Report (Op. FRESNO) (p208)
Oral Order #22, 4 July 1966, Operation HOME BASE.
(Oral Order is on next page)
Appendix #24 Annex A to COAAR (OP FRESNO) (p209)
Oral Order #24, 5 July 1966, Operation HOME BASE
Appendix 23 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO) (p210)
Oral Order #23, 4 July 1966, Operation INDEPENDENCE
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. 2/27 continues to conduct S&D and S&P missions in AO in Op FRESNO
A 2/27 - conduct S&D operations in AO Day, LD time 0700, 1 day op,
demo team attached, 2 AP's.
C 2/27 - conducts S&D and S&P at 0700 in AO Bryant, 1 day op,
10 laborers and demo team attached, 2 AP's.
4/49 - 200 spaces, picked up at PZ Liberty at 0615. Move to LZ Bell,
surround Obj Freedom from east, north, and west. Coordinates
XT462087 and XT 473089. Secure wood-lines to prevent sniper fire.
Advisor on left flank to use yellow smoke to tie in with 1/5.
C, 1/5 (M) - move along Route 4 at 0630 hrs, secure south of HEIP HOA,
control traffic on road, sweep Obj Freedom on order. Secure
County Fair area, man 1 AP, reaction force for Recon Plat at night.
Recon - 0600 secure engr on road clearing to DUC HUE & BAO TRAI,
escort vehicles & traffic thru County Fair area,
defend Popular Forces outpost at night
Security - move along Route 4 at 0700 to Obj Freedom, secure County Fair area.
Controlled by S5, at night attached to C, 1/5 (M) for perimeter.
Engr - at 0600 clear road to DUC HUE & BAO TRAI, continue internal road, concertina.
Advise PF, bn resource, provide dump trucks to assist in transporting 4/49 back
to their compound.
Go Team - Operate with S5 in Country Fair area. Move along route 4 at 0700 to Obj
Freedom, Return to BAO TRAI at night.
MEDCAP - operate at Country Fair and continue to conduct local MEDCAP activities.
HHC - man perimeter on call.
Country Fair Schedule
a. Three UH1-D helicopters will deliver performers.
b. Gunships for protection.
c. Time schedule:
0800 throughout day MEDCAP will be conducted.
0730 - 0830 band
0830 - 1000 Cultural show.
1000 - 1015 Message by District & Province Chief
1015 - 1030 Taped message
1030 - 1230 Country music and movie
1230 - Helping Hand.
5. SOP (p210)
Appendix 24 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO) (p211)
Oral Order #24, 5 July 1966, Operation HOME BASE
3. 2/27 will conduct air assault on East side of -ORIENTAL RIVER in vicinity of coordinates
XT459202 with A & C Companies. The remainder of the Bn and attached units will
move in convoy to CU CHI.
a. A Co -9C spaces will be provided, move from PZ 0600 hrs to LZ B, search LZ & area,
S&D axis RED to PZ C with emphasis on thorough search of PZ C.
Extracted from PZ C at 1530 hrs for move to CU CHI.
b. B Co - Be prepared, on call, to reinforce A & C on order. Conduct air assault from
Div Heli-pad to execute this mission.
c. C Co - 90 spaces will be provided to conduct air assault. Move from PZ 0600 hrs to
LZ B, search LZ B area, S&D Axis RED to PZ C with emphasis on thorough search of
PZ C. Extracted from PZ C at 1500 hrs for move to CU CHI.
d. 2,B,1/5 (M) - Convoy escort on route Home to CU CHI
e. Engr -Clear road BAO TRAI, move by convoy along route Home to CU CHI
f. Recon Plat - Secure Engr bn rd clearance to BAO TRAI, move along route
Home to CU CHI.
g. Security Plat - Move by convoy along route Home to CU CHI
h. HHC - Move by convoy along route Home to CU CHI
.i A/49 - Sweep Axis WHITE to PL 1, S&D Axis WHITE from PL 1 to PZ.
Extracted from PZ D. Time to be announced.
j. CID - S&D Axis WHITE
k. Coordinating Instructions:
(1) In S&D mission, C Co on L, A Co on Right
(2) S-4 Convoy Commander
(3) SP time for Bn convoy 1200 hrs.
(4) Report crossing of CP's and RP's and closing time
(5) A, C and 4/49 report crossing PL.
(6) Gunships on convoy route.
(7) Tactical air on C-11
5. Command - ---CC, ALS, B ---, and B-3 in C & C ship during operation. (p211)
GRAPHIC ONLY (p212)
Enclose to Appendix 24 - to Annex A to COAAR (OP FRESNO), (p213)
Oral Order #24, 5 July 1966, Operation HOME BASE
Enclosure to Appendix 24 - to Annex A to COAAR (OP FRESNO), (p214)
Oral Order #24, 5 July 1966, Operation HOME BASE.
3. 2/27 will move along route Home at 1200 hrs in motor convoy to CU CHI.
a. A Company will move along route Home at 1200 hrs in Bn convoy.
A Company will be third element in order of movement. Assume respective
sector, Bn Per 060700. Care and maintenance upon reaching CU CHI.
b. B Company is reaction---for convoy movement. Psn perimeter until 060700.
Continue to work on designated projects in CU CHI base camp
c. C Company will move along route Home at 1200 hrs in Bn convoy. Conduct
Care & maintenance upon return to CU CHI. Fifth in order of movement. Resume
Respective sector of Bn perimeter 060700.
d. Engr - Clear road to BAO TRAI at 0700 hrs. 24 element in order of movement.
e. Recon Platoon - Escort engr in road clearing operation to BAO TRAI at 0700 hrs.
Stop trucks and escort at SO DO at 1100 hrs.
f. HHC - Move along route Home to CU CHI at 1200 hrs. Fourth element in order
g. Security Platoon - Move with HHC element (4th) along route Home to CU CHI at
h. Artillery - Move along route Home to DUC LAP at 1200 hrs. Sixth element in
order of movement.
i. 1/5 Mech - Secure artillery battery and rear of column. Escort convoy to CU CHI
at 1200 hrs along route Home.
j. Coordinating Instructions:
(1) Gunships to escort convoy
(2) Artillery pre-planned concentration
(3) Report crossing CP's and release point.
(4) Thorough police of area conducted prior to operation
(5) Medical evacuation - Dustoff on call
(6) Medics and Medical vehicles dispersed throughout convoy
(7) Convoy SOP for vehicles.
5. Command - Bn CO, S-3, and ALO in Cmd C ship controlling convoy.
Appendix 25 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op. FRESNO (p215)
Oral Order #25 6 July 1966 Operation CLARE
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. 2/27 will continue to conduct S&D and S&P operations in AO FRESNO
The ----will be conducted by air assaults into respective areas of operation
A Co -----care and maintenance and continue to progress on bunker and
Bunker at 0700 hrs in respective areas of operations.
(very bad copy!)
C Co conduct care and maintenance and take over respective area of bn
Perimeter ---at 0700 hrs.
Recon conduct care and maintenance
Security conduct care and maintenance
HHVC conduct care and maintenance.
MEDCAP operate in sugar mill area at 0730 hrs, Operate in TAN HOA area
0830 hrs. Security wil be provided by Go Team.
Appendix 25 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO) (P216)
Oral Order #25, 6 July 1966 Operation CLARK
(p217 REALLY MESSED UP) (p217)
Appendix 28 to Annex A to Combat Operation After Action Report to Op. FRESNO (p218
Oral Order # 28, 8 July 1966, Operation HELP
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. No Change
Recon conduct air assault at 1230 hs in to LZ 1. Secure division MEDCAP team in
HIEP HOA extraction from PZ 1 at 1630 hrs.
Security conduct air assault from div ---at 1240 hrs, search and pacify Obj HORSE.
Provide security MEDCAP
Go Team air ---- to LZ 1 at 1240 hrs, conduct S&P on Obj 1 HORSE,
Extration from PZ 1 at 1530 hrs.
MEDCAP -----MEDCAP team leave division pad 1300 hrs to conduct MEDCAP in
HIEP HOA. Security furnished by Recon & Security Platoons.
Air ----- to LZ 2, extraction PZ 1 1600 hrs for return to base camp.
5. SOP (p218)
Appendix 28 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO) (P219)
Oral Order #28 -- July 1966 Operation HELP
1. No Change
2. 2/27 continue to conduct S&D and S&P operations in AO FRESNO,
Be prepared to reinforce 1/27 on order.
3. 2/27 will conduct S&D. S&P in AO by use of organic elements.
A Co division reaction force 1700 hrs prepare for operation 9 July 66
B Co prepare for operation 9 July. Continue to progress on bunker and barrier line.
C Co man 1/27 perimeter at 1700 hrs, division reaction force 1700 hrs.
Recon recon route to XOI MOI along Axis Jack 0730 hrs. Return Axis Jill upon completion.
Security secure MEDCAP team at AP SO DO and AP RUNG DAU (1), move by air
From div pad to LZ 1 at 0900, move from PZ 1 to LZ 2 at 1200 hrs,
Extracted from LZ 2 at 1600 hrs.
Mortars & Radar general Support.
HHC responsible for 2/27 perimeter 1700 hrs.
MEDCAP move to AP SO DO & AP RUNG DAU by air 0900 to LZ 1 from
div pad. 1200 hrs move from PZ 1 to LZ 2.
At 1600 hrs extracted from LZ 2 to base camp
A. Support requirements
(1) 1 C&C ship 0900 - 1700 hrs.
(2) 1 Light fire team 0800 - 1700 hrs
(3) 4 slicks for MEDCAP & Security 0800 - 1700 hrs.
(4) Airstrikes 1000 (XT615174 - XT619172)
(XT621267 - XT 6-1169)
B. 0800 to awards ceremony
C Aviation meeting, div pad, S-3 (0830)
D. 1300 coordination meeting BAO TRAI, S-3
E. 1500 briefing for Bn CO at BAO TRAI
4. No Change
5. No Change (p219)
(p220 REALLY MESSED UP GRAPHIC) (P220)
Appendix 29 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to (Op. FRESNO) (p221)
Oral Order #29, 10 July 1966, Operation JOYNER
1. No Change
2. 2/27 will
3. 2/27 will
C Co (Very Fuzzy)
Security continue work in base camp on CU CHI defense plan blocking positions.
Bn reaction force.
4/49 make an air assault from PX JIM at 0515 hrs to LZ DELTA. S&D Obj FOX
and provide security for MEDCAP team. Extraction from PZ BOB AT 1530 hrs
Go Team attached to 4/49 for air assault to LZ D at 0625 hrs. Conduct S&P in Obj FOX
Extraction at 1530 hrs from PZ BOB
HHC be prepared to man bn perimeter on order.
MEDCAP air move from division pad to LZ - at 1300 hrs
Conduct MEDCAP in DUC HANH B at 1300 hrs., and DUC HANH A at 15oo hrs.
Extraction from PZ 1 at 1700 hrs for return to base camp
A. Support requirements
(1) C&C ship 0545-2800 hrs.
(2) 1 Heavy fire team 0545-2800
(3) Airlift ----to 100 spaces 4/49-250 spaces MEDCAP 7 spaces
Go Team 16 spaces, Recon 23 spaces
(4) 6 ---------00 hrs on order
(5)--------Go team 0730 - 1700 hrs for alternate positions in ----------
(6) ---------police, 4 interpreters, SOP medics and FO.
(7) Go team attached 4/49 0600 -00hrs.
(8) 2 dozers & 1 truck on barrier brace 0730 - 1700 hrs.
4. No changes
5. No Changes (p221)
Appendix 30 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to Operation FRESNO (p222)
Oral Order #30 11 July 1966 Operation TRA--
(Very bad copy on top of graphic)
Appendix 31 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op FRESNO (p223)
Oral Order #31 12 July 1966, Operation FLORIDA
(VERY SKETCHY, Graphic & Text)
Appendix 32 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op FRESNO (p224)
Oral Order #32 13 July 1966, Operation UTAH
1. No Change
2. No Change
3. 13 July 2/27 will continue to operation in AO FRESNO. Be prepared to reinforce
1/27 if still in operation
A Co continue work on bunker / barrier line, man perimeter, 1 AP
B Co division reaction force 130700, work on bunker / barrier line,
Man perimeter, 1 AP
C Co --division reaction force 130700, until 1307 hrs, conduct air assault into
LZ 2,3,4, 130702. Block Obj OARS, extract LZ 3 at 1500 hrs,
Man perimeter A--------------3 interpreters effective 121700.
Recon Plat- conduct air assault 130430, LZ 1, S&D Obj BOYD, secure Go Team
---------attached National Police, 1 interpreter 121700
Security - move along Rt 1m 100730, S&D Obj BOYD, secure Go team,
-----------National Police, 1 interpreter official ----.
Mortar - CS
Radar - CS
Engr repair road CU CHI to BAO TRAI, secured by 4/49 130600 - 151700.
4/19 secure engr plat on road from CU CHI to BAO TRAI, S&D 131700
a. 1 C&C 130700 - 131900
b. 1 Heavy fire team 130700 - 131800
c. Airlift Recon 25, Sety 25, C Co 125 spaces.
d. Engr Platoon
e. 3 engr saw teams 130730 - 131700 for alternate positions
f. dozers 130730 - 131700 for bunker / barrier -trace
g. 5 National Police, 3 interpreters
h. Arty remain at sugar mill
5. SOP (p224)
Appendix 33 to Annex A of Combat Operations After Action Report to Op FRESNO (p225)
Oral Order #33 15 July 1966 Operation --MAI--
Annex D to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO) (p226)
1 - Target List (p226)
Appendix 1 to Annex B to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO) (p227)
CONC NO COORD NATURE REMARKS
FR 704 5138 0734 Bend in Road On Call
FR 705 4950 0972 Road Jct On Call
FR 706 4802 1050 Pond On Call
Annex C (Pacification Overlay) (Civil Affairs / PSYOP) to Combat Operations (P228)
After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
GI - Government Influences
P - Pacification
D - Disputed
VC -Viet Cong Control
1 - Propaganda Target Disposition (p228)
Appendix 1 to Annex C (Civic Affairs / PSYOP) to (p229)
Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Annex D (Tactical Motor March) to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op. FRESNO)
Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000
1. Formation: Appendix 1, Formation of Vehicles
2. Route: Appendix 2, Route Overlay
3. Preparation & Loading of vehicles: SOP
4. Briefings: SOP
5. Immediate Actions: SOP
6. Coordinating instructions:
a. Rate of march: 25 MPH
b. Interval: 10 meters between vehicles.
c. When convoy stops, dismount and take up security.
d. Disabled vehicle pull off road and signal rest by.
e. Trail element follow up with B Co.
f. Cos A Co, HHC, and B Co report crossing SP, CP's, and RP.
g. Air panels on lead and last vehicle of each company,
Pink - lead, Orange - last
1. Formation of Vehicles
2. Route Overlay (p230)
Appendix 1 (Formation of Vehicles) to Annex D (Tactical Motor March) to (p231)
Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
1. Form up at 130700 Jun 66, conduct last minute checks and briefings.
2. Order of March: A Co, HHC, & Atch, B Co.
3. Move out in order of march with A Co commencing the move at 130745 Jun 66.
4. SP at intersection of Schofield & Taro Roads at 1300800 Jun 66, convoy
Picked up at SP by 1/5 (M) escort
Appendix 2 (Route Overlay) to Annex D (Tactical Motor March ) to (p232)
Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Appendix 2 (Route Overlay) to Annex D (Tactical Motor March) to (P233)
Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
LIGHTNING BUG Overlay 3 - 5 July 1966 (p234)
1. (Upper LH print unreadable) PA 197-8020 S- complete body
2. --------- 0484 FW (R) arm
3 ---------- 147 FW (R) arm
4 -------- 642 GSW in buttocks
5 -------- 306 AMP (R) foot SW (R) leg
6 --------- 1130 GSW (R) side head
7. US --70296 FW (L) leg
8 P-----, Raymond 2848 SW buttocks
9. ,William 702 FW (R) arm (L) leg
10. Webster, 58715 FW (R) arm
11. Locl--, 0398 Bruised muscle forearm
12. 2d Lt. Twisted ankle
13. Cole, James 5895 FW (L) leg
14. Dupensky, Charles 8320 FW (L) thigh
15. Bryce, Lloyd-- US 515-533 KIA rifle gren. Complete body
16. Gamzy, Alfred US 51550690 WIA GS abdomen
17. Lee, Sto------ RA 258---485 Internal Bleeding (non bat)
18. Scott, Gilbert RA 55603695 FW (R) leg
19. ---, Willie RA 14920504 FW ( ) ent chest
20. Baker, John W RA 14855194 GS ( ) shoulder
21. US 54370-43 FW ( ) side
22. Conroy, St---- US 51561691 FW (L) forearm
23. Amery, Samuel 0-322488 1st Lt RW (L) arm & leg
24. Stevenson, Harry US 53402817 FW (R) thigh (R) forearm
25. Gilmore, Freddie US 53385893 FW (R) shoulder, forearm
& both legs
26. Mandlon. Corey US 5584237A FW face, chest (L) leg KIA