After Action Reports 33

2ND BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32

THRU: Commanding Officer

2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

25th Infantry Division

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

APO U.S. Forces 96243

a. OPORD 25-66 (Operation FRESNO) Headquarters, 2nd Brigade, 10 June 1966

b. OPORD 57-66 (Operation FRESNO) Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry

1. NAME OR IDENTIRY AND/OR TYPE of OPERATION:

2. DATES of OPERATION: 130800 June through 150600 July 1966

3. LOCATION: Hau Nghia Province in designated areas as shown by Annex A (Op Overlay)

4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:

The control headquarters, 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div, issued Operation Order 26-66 on 101200 June 1966. The order gave the 2nd Bn, 27th Inf the mission of conducting S&D Operations in the vicinity of AP DONG HOA (2) (Annex A, Op.Overlay). The 2nd Bn, 27th Inf Operation Order 57-66 issued on 11 June 1966 further broke the mission down into more concise duties. In essence the battalion planned to conduct combat operations such as Search and Destroy missions, night patrols and ambushes, and combined ARVN-US operations with the 1/10 (M) and 4/49 ARVN battalions located at BAO TRAI. Also, and of equal importance, the battalion wished to conduct extensive Civil Affairs and Psychological Warfare programs. This would include road improvement operations, the supplying of materials, and advice on the construction of Popular Forces installations, and Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP) in the surrounding villages. All of these operations, conventional and unconventional, were to be coordinated through the Province and District levels of Hau Nghia Province in order to best support, whenever possible, the National Revolutionary Development Plan.

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Lt Col. Boyd T. Bashore (p133)

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

Co A, 2/27 Inf Bn Conrol

Recon Platoon 2nd Spt Plat 16th RRU

Co B, 2/27 Inf Arty Platoon Additional Interpreters

Mortar Platoon Helicopter (C&C Ship)

Co C, 2/27 Inf Gud Survl Sec Blm 125th Sig Bn

IWC Blm Co __1/5 (Mech) on order

17B/65 Engr Trp __3/ 4 Cav on order

Dim 25th MID 20 National Police

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. 13 June - 1/8 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde; attach one 155mm How Btry 3/13 Arty and one platoon 8” How 2/32 (-).

b. ARVN 105mm How and 155 mm How located at BAO TRAI

(a) Artillery will adjust missions where used extensively in support of daily operations. The primary targets were sniper locations. All missions fired successfully suppressed the sniper firing.

(b) A technique of dropping artillery rounds behind a suspected VC location was successfully utilized to deliberately push one VC into an area where a friendly stay behind ambush was employed and waiting for him. The ambush team killed one VC and captured his weapon.

(c) A technique of walking fires in front of the lead infantry elements was utilized with great success in the area of thick undergrowth close to the Oriental River. This technique not only provided accurate data immediately available for sudden fire missions, but it also discouraged close in snipers and served as a means of determining accurate map locations.

(3) Pre-planned artillery preparations were fired on many helicopter landing zones in conjunction with airmobile assaults.

(4) Use of artillery at night.

(a) H&I fires were utilized extensively at night throughout the entire AO to fire

on suspected VC locations, supply routes, and supply caches.

(b) Artillery concentrations were plotted in support of all night ambushes.

(c) Artillery was used in conjunction with the lightning bug. When this ship drew SA fire, the coordinates of this VC location were immediately fired upon.

(5) All “will-adjust” mission fired were accurate, timely and very satisfactory.

b. 25th Aviation Bn: (p134)

The unit provided the Bn with the mobility needed to move into a specific area with great speed and surprise. The aircraft were used for Night Airmobile assaults, early morning airlifts to designated LZ's, extractions from extremely small PZ's, resupply, command and control, prisoner evacuation, and medical evacuation. This unit maintained flexibility to deal with various changes and continued the mission, without delay. The gunships providing support for the airlifts did an excellent job in suppressing sniper fire around the PZ's and LZ's. Also the gunships provided excellent support in flying cover for our convoys.

c. 1/5 (M), 3/ 4 Cav (M):

These mechanized units provided the Bn with an immediate reaction force and conducted many missions serving as a screening force, a blocking force, convoy security, and flank security. The biggest asset provided to the Bn when operating as either platoon or company size force, was the ability to react quickly and move fast to affect any situation. Whenever the 3 /4 Cav platoon was used as a reaction force, there were two tanks which provided a reassuring punch. The mechanized elements were limited on occasions due to the heavy rains. Many areas were inaccessible to the tracked vehicles.

Operation FRESNO resulted in significant breakthroughs in the development and exploitation

of tactical intelligence by the battalion. Prior to Operations FRESNO, political and military conditions in southwest control HAU NGHIA Province had degenerated to the point that very little political control was exercised by GVN authorities in areas outside the province capital district headquarters, towns, and ARVN garrison towns. Despite a fairly well developed ARVN intelligence net centered in the provincial capital at BAO TRAI, and a developing net at the headquarters of USSF Det B-35 at DUC HUE, sufficient combat power and combat logistic support had been lacking for the exploitation of those intelligence sources available.

The VC political organization on the other land had been able to utilize its combat power to effectively isolate the people of the south and south-west portions of the province from GVN authority. This had been done by systematic destruction of all secondary roads, except those useful to the VC and of no value to the GVN. The VC then concentrated their strength along areas adjacent to the Oriental River, utilizing it and its highly developed adjacent network of canals, supplemented by light oxcart trains. The poor trafficability of the predominantly low-lying paddy-lands of the area, combined with the systematic destruction of the province secondary road network, tended to confine the ARVN 25th Division at DUC HOA and the 49th ARVN Regiment at BAO TRAI to areas within a half day's march of their garrisons, or those areas which lay directly astride the primary road network. The next step in the VC plan had been the attempt to conclude the isolation of the province capital and the ARVN garrison towns by systematically over-running the RF/PF outposts which protected the primary road network. Before the 25th Inf Division arrived in CU CHI it was necessary to supply the totally isolated RF/PF out post by battalion size convoys during midday which were subject to sniping, harassing mortar fires and command detonated mine, as well as full scale ambushes, all along their route.

The combat power available to the VC in the area generally was thought to consist of a main force regiment: The DONG TRAP II Regiment, which had two main force battalions - the 267th & 269th, each about 300 - 400 men. These battalions are heavily armed with modern weapons up to 82mm mortars. In addition, the 506th LONG AN Provincial Battalion and the district companies, the C2 and C120 companies, were thought to operate in the area. Besides these main force units, the system of local guerrilla forces combined with the political infrastructure was capable of maintaining control over the population, harassing and ambushing small ARVN contingents, and acting as guides, support troops and augmentations in concert with main force units for large-scale operations. Under this system each hamlet had to provide up to a squad (and each village one or two platoons) to the local effort. Thus in a relatively small area comprising three villages, the VC could mass in several hours at least one company. Besides the local guerrillas, the VC had drafted those hamlet and village males who showed less inclination to fight, into village militia forces whose mission was primarily to support larger VC operations with unarmed man-power for the construction of roadblocks, tunnels, secret holes, trenches, and the transportation of dead, wounded, and supplies. Other individuals and villages occupied political and financial positions in the hamlets and villages which were instrumental in maintaining daily political control of the population. The VC control of the countryside had existed long enough to effectively develop an illegal governmental infrastructure for south and southwest control HAU NGHIA Province which had supplanted GVN Political and economic authority in the area. In fact, perhaps GVN authority never ended in many parts of this area. VC forces in the region had thus built an effective political infrastructure which was protected by their capability of massing 6 battalions of armed troops, plus up to two battalions of laborers at any point in the province.

During the weeks prior to Operations FRESNO, the 49th ARVN Regiment had attempted to reverse this degenerative process by carrying out multi-battalion operations along the east bank of the Oriental River between DUC HUE and BAO TRAI. These operations were followed by a VC attack on the district capital of DUC HUE during the night of 26-27 May 1966. The VC easily succeeded in storming the town, killed a significant number of the RF/PF troops charged with guarding the fortified town, sank the boat platoon which had been charged with maintaining GVN authority on the Oriental River, killed or kidnapped many of the anti-VC citizens of the town, and carried off a sizable amount of weapons, including mortars, machine-guns, and BAR's. The only significant industry of the province, a large, fairly modern sugar mill was located in DUC HUE. Constant VC taxation of boats bringing the cane to the mill and trucks taking molasses and sugar along the primary road network to Saigon had rendered sugar mill operations barely profitable. There were reports that the mill was being moved piece-meal to the more secure BIEN HOA area. By storming the district capital and site of HAU NGHIA's only significant industry, the VC were able to effectively demonstrate their mastery over HAU NGHIA's political and economic life. (p135)

As the battalion entered Operation FRESNO, there was little hard intelligence information on the area. Fresh from Operation MAKIKI in the LOC GIANG - AU NINH area, the battalion set out initially to build a bank of information and familiarity with the area. During the first day battalion intelligence personnel interviewed nearly 20 local civilian detainees and VCS. Initial interrogations were directed towards several EBI: What had been recent VC activities in the area? What were the routes and LOC's used by the VC in the area? What were the most active VC hamlets and villages in the area? In what areas of the region did the VC units bivouac when moving through? Rapidly, information was gained identifying the major VC LOC which was used for the transportation of arms and ammunition from Cambodia to the HO BO - BOI LOI region. The LOC ran from the Oriental River, vic XT468039, up the RACH NHUM to landing at XT485048, then along a winding road lined with foxholes to AP GO SAO (2) (XT500072). The initial stopping point was located near a pagoda in AP TRAI BI (XT493077). From there, the material was transported across the major highway at AP GIONG VOI (XT515084), then to AP BAO CONG (1) (XT520091) and finally to one of two off-loading points. Either through TAN HY (XT520100) to AP BEN LONG (XT525112) or through AP RUNG DAU (2) (XT540102), to AP CAY QUEO (XT 548117) from where it was carried by sampan across the great swamp. The first night of the operations, ambushes were therefore laid along this route. One ambush laid by A Co. just south of TAN MY (XT504076) netted 6 VC KIA (BC) and 4 weapons. Agent reports later revealed that 8 VC had been killed and several others wounded. This group turned out to be a VC squad from AP BEN LONG. In days following this initial success, intensive Bn small unit operations, ambushes patrols, and S&D swoops were carried out to the north and south of the battalion perimeter along the previously indicated VC supply route. Extensive trench systems and bunker type shelters were found along this route to the north of the highway in the AP GIONG VOI - AP RUNG DAU (3) area, and a long line of fox-holes parallel to this route south of the highway and north of the Oriental River. Interrogation of civilians encountered by the battalion elements during their sweeps indicated that large enemy units had been located along the VC supply route north of the battalion perimeter, but had moved out on receiving news of the arrival of American troops in the area.

After the establishment of the battalion perimeter, the mission of the local guerrillas in the area appeared to have changed. Prior to the arrival of the battalion in the area, the mission of the local guerrillas had been to maintain VC domination of the hamlets, reinforce VC tax collections from the people, snipe at friendly troops who wandered into the area and lay booby traps in their path. After the arrival of the battalion, the mission of the local guerrillas changed, especially for those groups in the AP GIONG VOI - AP RUNG DAU (3) area north of the perimeter and in the AP GO SAO (1 & 2) - TAN PHU THUONG area east and southeast of the perimeter. The new mission appeared to include harassing fire and sniping incidents against both the battalion perimeter and the reconnaissance platoon reinforcement of the construction site of a new PF outpost north of AP SO DO (XT510078). Road-blocks and mines were also placed along the road between AP SO DO & BAO TRAI. Most incidents were a regular occurrence every two hours for three nights. More serious incidents of harassing fire by the VC tended to initiate from the south and southeast of the battalion perimeter. It is surmised that such incidents had two main purposes. The first was to recon by fire the Bn night defenses in an attempt to locate and identify US strong-points and crew-served weapons positions within the battalion perimeter. Another purpose may have been to distract US attention from the areas where large guerrilla force units were moving during those evenings. Incidents of construction of many road-blocks along the major roads, especially the highway from DUC HUE (XT430072) to the PF outpost at (XT496096) tended to coincide with movement of large VC elements across the roads. The construction of road-blocks may have been to insure the safe passage of the VC elements across these major highway danger areas, and to deny friendly elements a high speed approach to the flank of moving VC units. (p136)

Succeeding Bn operations north and south of the perimeter on 15 and 16 July established the fact that traveling VC psychological warfare teams had been working intensively in the area during the week prior to the arrival of the battalion. Propaganda shows were presented during the hours 2000 to 2400 by the team and were aimed at proselytizing local youth for the VC and obtaining financial contributions in addition to normal taxes. At least two areas where such performances were held were identified.

Succeeding operations by the battalion revealed the existence of a guerrilla platoon at XOH BAO TRAU (XT475117). The platoon was said to stay in the village during the day and withdraw to the AP AN HOI village area during the night (XT4314). This platoon probably had the responsibility of maintaining surveillance over the AP RUNG DAO (1) road intersection and PF outpost (XT496096). The operation also revealed a continuing use by a large number of VC units of the trail system passing from the AP AN HOI area (XT4314) through XOM RAO TRAU, then southeast to AP CU LAO TRE (1) XT497108, then to the BOH LONG - AP CAY QUSO area.

Operations by battalion element along the Oriental River vic AP GIONG SAO (XT480058) discovered warning signs which first identified the so-called “GO CAT” areas as being VC strongholds where the VC would lay mines and booby traps to prevent the penetration of friendly elements. A large cache of documents including VC reconnaissance maps of the entire area subsequently found by C Co in the RACH NHUM area XT464045, located the “GO CAT” areas at XT 483047 south of the RACH NHUM & XT482016 north of the RACH HOC THOM River. Both “GO CAT” areas appeared to be used extensively by the VC when they were approached by friendly elements. In both areas snipers and booby traps were encountered, and when penetration of the areas was finally realized, the areas were found to contain numerous bunkers. Interrogation of detainees and VCs from those areas revealed very large units of 100 to 300 men frequently bivouacked there. They tended to approach from the north using the trail network south from AP AN HOI area (XT4314) to HIEP HOA (XT466093), then slightly west of AP AH THUAN (XT475078) moving south to AP GIONG SAO (XT477062) and then to the RACH NHUM (XT470050). The TAN PHU THUONG (XT480023) area along the Oriental River was generally entered from the southeast vic XOM GOING NGANG (XT5400) and HOA KHAUH (XT520023). Units utilizing these areas frequently are probably the C2 and C120 Companies and the 267th VC main force battalion. These areas in the vicinity of the Oriental River along the RACH HOA THOM (XT470012) and the RACH NHUM (XT473045) and doubtless utilized continually for ref------------icousce for main force elements operating in the area. But because of intensive operation in this area, the main force VC elements in the area were said to have received orders on 22 June to commence withdrawal to an area 8 - 12 kilometers to the south on the west bank of the Oriental River.

On 20 June, A Co conducted a night airmobile assault. Once on the ground, the A Co elements received sniper fire from a lone sniper. Following the sniper fire, 60mm mortars were fired by the VC and mysteriously fell on the location of the source of their own sniper fire. It was felt that the night airmobile assault so confused the VC, that they were unable to coordinate their covering fires for a force of 50 - 70 VC which had been in the immediate area, and withdrew to the northwest on the arrival of A Co.

On 24 June, B Co elements, utilizing a stay behind ambush, killed a VC armed with an M-1 carbine at XT486066. Papers he was carrying identified him as a member of the DUC HOA district VC committee in charge of proselytizing. During the period of Operation FRESNO, significant efforts had been made by the battalion staff to develop effective liaison with the ARVN HAU NGHIA Province staff and their advisers. Particular efforts in this direction had been made in the field of intelligence. On 29 June, a breakthrough was made in intelligence when the ARVN Province S-2, Dai-uy Trieu, announced that he had a VC who wished to rally to the government and turn in the other members of his squad at the same time. Although efforts to exploit this intelligence were unsuccessful on June 29th, on June 30th the information was successfully exploited. The VC squad leader surrendered to battalion elements in his hamlet at AP RUNG DAU (2) (XT 520097). He then pointed out 4 VC from his hamlet working in the fields and led the battalion to 5 more hiding in a secret hole in a hedgerow. Two weapons and five grenades were captured with the VC. In addition, one VC fleeing from the objective area was shot and killed, and two others with him were captured on direction from an orbiting gunship. The success of this operation was due largely to close US coordination with ARVN intelligence personnel who went into the field with battalion elements. On 11 June a similar operation was carried out with province intelligence personnel acting on the basis of Chieu Hoi information. An airmobile assault of one company surrounded the hamlet o BAO CAHN HA (XT5601). Then battalion and sector intelligence personnel were airlifted into the hamlet and thoroughly searched it, uncovering 5 secret holes. One VC was killed in the first secret hole by a grenade which also caved in the hole. Three VC, including the VC hamlet finance chief and two VC district finance cadre were captured in another secret hole. Those two operations were examples of the successes possible when American combat power was used to exploit timely information provided by the well-developed ARVN agent net in the battalion AO. Up to that time, organized US intelligence sources had been rarely able to provide information of the requisite tactical freshness because of the lack of a developed agent net in the AO.

Significant strides seemed to be made also in the status of the populace, because of previous VC propaganda which had evoked imaginary fears. Those were rapidly dispelled by the conduct of the troops themselves, and at the end of the operation, local residents had begun to voluntarily inform battalion elements of the location of mines, booby traps and VC movements.

In addition, the small unit operations which saturated the AO seemed to have adversely affected the morale of the local VC guerrillas. The squad leader who gave himself up and turned in his squad stated that everywhere he went US troops were operating and he concluded that the most prudent course of action was to turn himself in before he was captured or killed.

Weather during the operation was initially favorable with rain only in the late afternoon. During the latter half of the operation, however, rain began falling at noon and continued intermittently into the night, which rendered the entire region non-trafficable to wheeled vehicles and gradually withdrew other large areas form the effective range of APC's.

a. 2/27 Inf (-) conducts tactical motor-coach 130800 Jun 66 to AO; establish camp vic AP DONG HOA (2) XT488097; conducts S&D operations in AO; conducts combat patrols and ambushes; conducts combined operations with local ARVN Forces; provides wire pickets and technical advice on installations to RF and PF units; conducts road improvement operations in sector from XT525048 to XT496097 and from XT 496097 to XT 438053; conducts ROAD RUNNER operations; conducts an extensive CA and Psy/War program in AO; and leaves one company in base camp to be rotated on order CO, 2/27 Inf; base camp company establish 2 AP's nightly.

b. Mission (Civil Affairs/PSYOP): To support 2nd Bn operations; to control movement of non-combatants; to assist in Revolutionary Development; minimize non-combatant casualties; to induce non-combatants to aid intelligence efforts; and to induce the enemy to rally or surrender.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

1. 2/27 Inf (-) conducts a tactical motor march 130800 Jun 66 to AO with Co A leading, followed by HHC elements and attachments, Co B rear, all escorted by elements of 1/5 (Mech): establish a base vicinity XT502087. Co C remains at CU CHI base camp to assume the perimeter responsibility from Co A&B at 121200 Jun 66 (Annex D Tactical Motor March; Annex B, Fire Support Plan.)

2. Co A&B 2/27 Inf : Conduct S&D ;operations, patrols and ambushes, combined US-ARVN operations, and pacification operations in Bn AO on order.

3. Co C, 2/27 Inf: Conduct tactical motor march to Bn Forward Base, vicinity XT 502087 on order.

4. Recon Platoon: Bn Res.

5. Scty Platoon: Bn Res.

6. Mortar Platoon: GS

7. Gnd Survl Sec: 2 AN/PPS 4 Radar sets will accompany Bn to fwd base vicinity XT 502087, sec (-) will remain at CU CHI base camp and man Bn perimeter radars.

8. 1/B/65th Engr: GS

10. 2nd Spt Platoon 16th RRU: GS

11. Elm 125th Sig Bn: GS.

12. Coordinating Instructions:

(a) Bde rules of engagement apply.

(b) Bn TAC SOP applies

(d) No vehicular movement after 1800 hrs daily

b. Civil Affairs / PSYOP:

(1) Attempt to keep non-combatants in place.

(2) Conduct civic action programs to the extent security and military operations permit.

(3) PSYOP will be employed primarily against civilian targets, both hostile and friendly.

(4) HHC: Attached 8 National Police effective 11 June 1966; 12 National Police effective 13 June 1966.

(5) National Police assigned to units on mission basis.

(6) Coordinating Instructions:

(a). Maximum effort will be made to minimize non-combatant battle casualties during tactical operations.

(b). Civilian dwellings will not be burned nor will private property including livestock be destroyed except as an unavoidable consequence of combat action.

(c). Wheeled vehicles will not be driven over planted rice fields except as a

(d). Refugee Control Points:

(e). Requests for propaganda leaflets, aerial loudspeaker missions, or Helping Hand materials will be submitted to bn S-5

(f). Curfews in effect in AO

1 District and Province Capitals (2200 - 0500)

2 Villages and Hamlets (2100 - 0600)

3 River traffic (2000 - 0600)

(g). Families are authorized 200 Kg of polished rice, or 300 Kg of paddy rice in residence.

(h). Captured food-stocks will be evacuated to the Division collection point through bn S-5

(i). Annex C, Pacification Overlay

1. Appendix 1, Propaganda Target Disposition Overlay

c. Indirect Fire Support:

(1) Air support - All air strikes will be on call.

(2) Artillery support: (p139)

(a) General - establish fire support base and support operations with on-call fires.

(b) Organization for combat:

1 1/8 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde; attach one 155mm How. Btry 3/13 Arty and one platoon 8” How 2/32 Arty (-)

2. ARVN 105mm How and 155mm How located at BAO TRAI.

1. Be prepared to mark air strikes with White Phosphorous as required

2. Maintain 6400 mil fire capability

3. Plan close in defensive concentrations for security

4. Be prepared to fire high angle fires during Dustoff.

5. Maintain aerial observation during daylight hours and be prepared to conduct aerial observation during the hours of darkness.

6. Appendix (Artillery Fire Plan).

d. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Fire planning and Control:

(a) Restrictions on Artillery Fires during heliborne operations - TBA

(b) All artillery and mortar fires must be approved by Artillery LHO and coordinated with Bde FSOC. Fires outside by AO must be approved by Bde FSOC.

(d) Emergency cancellation of fires in clear text.

(e) When possible defensive concentrations will be fired in prior to 2000 hrs daily.

(f) Unit CP and ambush sites to 1/8 Arty FDC NLT 1800 hrs daily. Report changes as they occur.

(g) Boundaries are Fire Coordination lines.

(h) All fire requests will go to 1/8 Arty Bn FDC.

(i) Arty and 4.2 mortar fire plans to 1/8 Arty FDC

(j) All calls for ARVN Arty support will be coordinated through Bde FSOC

(a) Mortar and arty units post guard during actual firing to insure no friendly aircraft are in

vicinity of direction of fire. Also no firing of VT fuses when friendly aircraft are

(b) Emergency signal to lift air strike, artillery fires, or termination of illumination - Red

(d) First round of all adjustment or close in fires will be WP.

The plan for the battalion for this day was to move to vicinity XT502087 and establish a base camp. The move was made in two phases: an airmobile assault by the Quartering party which consisted of 8 officers and 61 enlisted men, and a motor march by the bn (-) with attachments.

This element was made up of both the Reconnaissance and Security Platoons with representations from each of the major units, staff sections, and attachments. The mission was to clear and secure the new base camp, then designate locations for all the incoming elements. The airlift commenced at 0649 hrs at the CU CHI Army Airfield, and was completed at 0715 hrs. During the day, intelligence information concerning VC movements and dispositions was gained through the questioning of local residents. The MI Detachment questioned all civilians who moved along the road while the HQ elements questioned people living within the planned perimeter. The Reconnaissance and Security Platoons made sweeps approximately 300 meters outside the planned perimeter and found two signs indicating mines and booby traps at XT505085. After a thorough search of the area however, no mines were actually found. Signs telling the local populace to fight against all Americans were located at XT 50---2 and brought back to the by S2. A newly dug trench system was also located at XT 517083. At 0930 hrs the lead elements of the convoy began to arrive and were guided into position by their respective quartering party representatives.

Bn (-) With Attachments:

The motor march commenced at 0800 hrs. One platoon of 1/5 (M), along with the gunships, provided the escort while, ARVN artillery at BAO TRAI was prepared to fire indirect fire support. Also, the company of ARVN soldiers set up outposts along the route of march (Anp 2 to Annex D). The return convoy made up of those vehicles not needed for the operations left at 1140 hrs and arrived at CU CHI at 1300 hrs. No contact was made during the convoy phase either coming out or going back to CU CHI.

Battalion Headquarters Elements and Attachments:

The battalion perimeter with the CP located at XT508083 extended for approximately 300 meter radius around the CP. This included 150 meters of the road in order that daily traffic along this route could be better controlled. At 1330 hrs, a command and staff meeting, to include representatives from all attached units, was held to finalize the general concepts for Operation FRESNO. A thorough discussion of plans for Search and Destroy Operations, Civil Affairs, MEDCAP and Engineer projects was followed by a detailed S2/S3 briefing concerning the present Operational Area (AO). At 1445 hrs, 10 Counter-terrorists (CT's) from the ARVN camp at BAO TRAI were attached to the Bn. A and B (p141) Companies each received five CT's. The mission of the CT's was to aid the companies in handling indigenous personnel by means of interpretation and interrogation methods, and to provide the unit with a greater knowledge of the terrain, surrounding villages and local populace. The Recon and Security Platoons utilized the remainder of the day to prepare defensive positions for the inner perimeter with emphasis on securing the Bn Tactical Operation Center (TOC). The engineers cleared roadways within the bn perimeter, dug waste disposal pits for the mess halls, and aided in the preparation of defensive positions. The MI detachment interrogated a total of 11 detainees during the day.

A and B Co 2/22 Inf:

Since those two major units accounted for all of the bn defensive perimeter, (Annex A) (A Co to the northeast, B Co to the southwest), both units spent the majority of the day preparing defensive positions, conducting local sweeps to their front, and planning for the night's ambushes.

Indirect Fire Support:

The 105mm Artillery Battery located at BAO TRAI, as well as the 4.2 Mortar Platoon and both 81mm mortar sections within our perimeter, registered their defensive concentrations early in the day. A Fire Coordination Line (FCL) was established to prevent any firing into ARVN operations vicinity AP SO DO and TAN PHU TRUNG.

The battalion surgeon and his medical team examined and treated 31 civilians in the village of AP CU CAO TRE. This constituted the start of the MEDCAP which was to be continued on a daily basis. The S-5 team distributed toys to all the children of this village. The local populace within our perimeter were also visited and oriented on exactly what was expected of them while the Bn conducted operations in this area.

Three ambushes were employed to the southwest of the B Company perimeter vicinity XT490085, XT495080, and XT504075. No contact was made. At 2000 hrs B Company received sporadic sniper fire from the south of the perimeter vicinity XT504075. M79's were fired at this location, results unknown. Three ambushes were planned to the northeast of the A Co perimeter at XT510085 (ambush #1), XT505097 (ambush #2) and XT507087 (ambush #3). At approximately 2100 hrs when ambush #2 was going into position, 12 to 15 VC appeared 30 meters to their front. The 8 man patrol immediately opened fire and continued the fire while they withdrew to allow the area to be saturated with artillery. At approximately 2130 hrs, fifty 105mm HE rounds were fired mainly into XT 507096, while the patrol returned to the company CP to receive further instructions. Three very minor casualties were suffered (facial cuts) apparently from hand grenades. After a thorough evaluation of the situation, the decision was made to send out a new patrol to include the squad leader of the old patrol, and one other man from the old patrol. They were to go back to the scene of action (XT504096) to thoroughly search this area and reestablish the ambush and another close by. At 2230 hrs the new patrol arrived in position and found 6 VC (KIA) by body count, and 3 rifles along with grenades, ammunition, field gear, and documents. The weapons and other captured materials were brought to the new ambush site vicinity XT504088. At 2255 hrs this ambush reported a force of 15 VC moving from the north towards their position. Artillery was immediately fired into the area vicinity XT504096 using the last mission as a reference point. The results were 10 VC (KIA) possible. Ambush #1 and ambush #3 left for their locations earlier in the night at 2100 hrs. Ambush #3 had no contact during the night, but ambush #1 shifted its location at 2300 hrs to XT5075-0850 because A Co's radar picked up 2 to 3 VC moving at this location. Two more VC were spotted through a Starlight device north of the A Co Perimeter at XT405086. M79's were fired into the area with unknown results.

Plans for the day were to employ A &B Companies in S&D operations vicinity AP HIM DAU (3) and AP GIONG VOI (Appendix 1 to Annex A).

A and B Bde 27th Inf (Oral Order #1):

Prior to l---ing the day's operation through AP GIONG VOI, 2nd Plat A Co made another early morning sweep of the initial ambush site vicinity XT524096 to pick up the dead VC bodies. Only four of the original bodies were left. A new body was found approximately 150 meters from the scene of action (total of 5 recovered). At his time another VC rifle was found. At 1000 hrs A & B Companies left on their sweeps. Throughout the day both units ran into booby-trapped areas and occasional sniper fire. The Bangalore torpedo - Claymore mine method was used extensively to breach paths through the booby trapped hedgerows. Many signs were also encountered warning all people to stay away. One friendly WIA from A Co was suffered as a result of a booby trap at XT508094.

Along with mine clearing personnel from the engineers, this element cleared the road from BAO DRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). They also provided security for the S5, the Battalion surgeon, and the Engineer Platoon Leader who all went to AP GO DO to coordinate for PSYCAP, Civil Affairs activities, and the construction of an ARVN Popular Force outpost.

The 25th Div Commanding General, to Assistant Div Commander (support) and the Bde Commander were briefed on the previous night's ambush activities. A late agent report indicated that the A Co ambush actually accounted for eight (8) VC (KIA) by body count. The patrol leader was recommended for the PSMN with V. The S3, Security BO and the S5 went to BAO TRAI to discuss operations through 18 June. The ARVN “GO” team from BAO TRAI consisting of 11 National Police, 3 Medics, 4 intelligence specialists, and 7 Psychological Warfare specialists, were attached to A Co for the next day's operation. The mission of this team is to supply the Bn and the ARVN forces with the latest intelligence estimates and census accounts. Also the team supplies medical assistance to Vietnamese civilians, gives the working unit more interpreters, and aids in the control of civilian movements within designated areas. Our concept was to use the “Go Team” as a unit., It was attached to our company, rather than piece-mealing its resources between units in the battalion. This would assure unity of command, especially during the initial trial period. Should this concept prove effective, then it was planned to graduate the “Go Team” to more decentralized operations.

At 2031 hrs, 13 June, 3 VC with automatic weapons fired into the B Co perimeter from XT501080, XT502082, and XT503083. M79's were fired in return, and the enemy firing ceased. During the night, A Co employed three ambushes at XT507086, XT504088, and XT507078. B Co employed three ambushes at XT494088, XT496077, and XT494083. No contact was made by any of these ambushes.

The plan for today was to conduct a sweep to the northeast with A & B, 2/27 and 1/5 (M) emphasizing search and destroy missions through AP BEN LONG, AP BAO CONG (1), and AP GOING VOI (Appendix 2, Annex A). Also MEDCAP was planned for AP SO DO, and road clearing and securing missions were to be conducted by the Recon Platoon and the engineers.

A & B, 2/27 and A, 1/5 (M) conducted extensive search and destroy operations (Oral Order #2, Operation QUAKER) which included AP GIONG VOI, AP RUNG DAU (8), AP BAO CONG (1), TAN MY, and AP BEN LONG. During the sweep many complex tunnels and trench networks were located. Also those elements once entered, some booby trapped areas. Occasional sniper fire was received from the wood-lines. Throughout the day many civilians were encountered and questioned.

This unit located and where possible destroyed tunnels and trench systems at XT513085, XT513089, XT514086, XT512086, and XT513085. The Bangalore-Claymore technique was used at XT514083 and XT514084. Sniper fire was received from XT518095, but subsequent search failed to locate VC. The ARVN GO team proved valuable in handling the civilians in the area. However as time progressed, they became tired and less effective. Although the intelligence potential of the team seemed to be fairly effective, the value of the political and psywar members of the team were less easy to judge.

Sniper fire was received by this unit at XT512092 and XT521096. The snipers were engaged but could not be located positively. One man was wounded by a booby trap at XT518091 and was evacuated by the Command and Control helicopter (C and C ship) to CU CHI. An old sick man (civilian) was evacuated by the C and C ship to BAO TRAI for medical attention, and was returned to his home at XT519090. Villagers revealed that 200 VC were at XT519093 the night before.

This mechanized element had a splendid potential for moving fast and covering terrain. It received sniper fire from two locations (XT516097 and XT510098). However, subsequent engagement and search of these areas could not produce any VC.

Two visitors were briefed. Lt Col. Wood, the British Military Attache, came from Saigon to witness a few day's operations. Brigadier General PHAN TRONG CHINH the 25th Div (ARVN) commander also received a short briefing. The Bn CO with staff went to BAO TRAI for the daily planning meeting with ARVN leaders and US advisors.

The MEDCAP team examined and treated 91 civilians from the village of AP SO DO (XT514072). This was established as one of the permanent sites for future MEDCAP, which were to rotate between AP RUNG DAU (1) and AP SO DO every other day. The Bn S5 distributed 65 sets of men's clothes and 90 sets of women's clothes. Leaflets were distributed by the men of A and B, 2/27 warning the population of what will happen if the VC use their village to attack US troops. Work was continued on the ARVN outpost at AP SO DO.

Recon Plat and Engineers:

These elements worked clearing the road from BAO TRAP to AP RUNG DAU (1) while providing security and assistance for the MEDCAP and Civil Affairs teams.

Three ambushes were employed by A Co at XT509083, XT509093, and XT505077. B Co employed three ambushes at XT495089, XT506075, and XT495078. None of these ambushes received contact. Beginning on this night, a new method was utilized. Formerly curfew was at 2100 hrs. Many “civilians” were still moving after dark, most of these people seemed to be VC who were taking advantage of this administrative, no fire period of darkness. Thus the AP's moved out at 1945 hrs and stopped short of their assigned sites. Then at 2100 hrs they moved to their respective ambush position. This discouraged people from moving after 1930 hrs nightly.

Today's plans were to conduct a combined ARVN-US search and destroy operations commencing 150800 June. (Appendix 3, Annex A). Since this would be our first combined US-ARVN operations, the plan was purposely unambitious, and uncomplicated. The main purpose was to accomplish the first operation, instilling a maximum of mutual confidence and cooperation.

Operation QUAKER began at 0900 hrs with A, 2/27, B, 2/27, A, 1/5 (M) working in conjunction with the ARVN forces 1st Trp, 10th Cav (Mechanized), First Co 4/49 to conduct search and destroy operations to the northeast of the bn perimeter as per Oral Order #3. Throughout the day all units ran into booby traps, sniper fire, and tunnels.

This unit searched and destroyed tunnels at XT521090 and XT537093. Booby trap signs, but again no actual booby traps were discovered at XT512086. A heavily wooded area at XT542100 contained numerous signs warning all people to stay away. The area was also heavily booby trapped, thus the Bangalore-Claymore technique was utilized here. After breaching a path, however, nothing was found inside the area. The GO Team provided medical aid to two civilians in a house at XT529087. Three US soldiers and one ARVN counter-terrorist were wounded by booby traps at XT515088. The ARVN soldier was evacuated to BAO TRAI, while the US soldiers were evacuated to CU CHI. A flame APC belonging to the engineers was positioned on the right flank of the company perimeter near the road.

This unit had only one action during the day. Sniper fire was received from XT545119. The sniper was engaged. A thorough search of this area disclosed nothing.

The mission of this unit was to screen and secure the left flank of the advancing rifle companies (A & B, 2/27) (Oral Order #3). This was successfully accomplished. No contact was made at all during the day.

ARVN Forces, 1/10 (M) 4/49:

These two elements again worked together on their SOP road clearing operations from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). They also worked on and secured the ARVN outpost at AP SO DO. In addition, the Recon Platoon outposted and patrolled the road from base camp to BAO TRAI in order to secure resupply convoys.

The MEDCAP team examined and treated 120 villagers, from AP RUNG DAU (1). The Bn S5 team with the National Police set up a traffic control system to check on all Vietnamese vehicles and personnel passing through the perimeter. The primary control point (XT501081) was manned by two National Policemen. Two traffic control points are manned in the same way along the highway at XT508081 and XT504086. People began coming from the outlying area to get medical assistance from the bn aid station.

Plans for today were to conduct an airmobile assault in conjunction with the 4/49 ARVN (Appendix 4, Annex A). The MEDCAP team will continue treating civilians in AP SO DO while the engineers continue construction of the ARVN Popular Forces Outpost..

This day was marked with two major items of interest. Operation KEYSONE (Oral Order #4) a combined ARVN-US forces airmobile assault commenced at 0753 hrs. At 1120 hrs the Vietnamese Chief of State and his party arrived for briefings on the past actions of, and future plans for Operation FRESNO.

The full contingency of guests arrived on location in six helicopters at 1120 hrs and was met by a 10 man combat-ready rifle squad from C, 2/27. This squad acted as an honor guard initially, then moved out to provide all around security for the briefing area. The party to be briefed consisted of Lt Gen Nguyen Van Thieu, the President of the Republic of Vietnam and (Chairman of the National Revolutionary Council), Lt Gen Cao Van Vien, Chief JGS, RVNAF; Maj Gen Fred C,.Myand, 25th Infantry Division OG; Maj Gen Le Nghuyon Khang, OG III Corps; Brig. Gen Jones, Div COC, MACV; Col Mueller, Sr Advisor III CTZ. Also the Division IG, Lt Col Salvador escorted the USARV IG on a visit to the area. A host of others included aids, staff members, and reporters. The briefing consisted of plans and concepts for Operation FRESNO with a detailed progress report of our Civil Affairs actions and tactical successes. After being made an honorary “Wolfhound” by the Bn CO, Lt Gen Thieu passed out engraved lacquerware gifts to selected officers and NCO's in the battalion.

This unit employed three ambushes at XT508088, XT501089, and XT508082 during the night of 16 - 17 June. No contact was made. Operation KEYSTONE (Oral Order #4) began at 0753 hrs. This unit was the first to lift off from the pickup zone and land at LZ 1 on Obj A. The LZ was cold. As the company moved through their objective areas, they encountered many signs warning of booby traps, however no booby traps were actually found in those areas. The area around AP AN HISP especially at XT464128 was interlaced with many trenches. Some trenches were newly dug, and some were well camouflaged and fitted with punji stakes. At 0829 hrs a man was spotted about 300 meters from the unit, running towards a swampy area at XT511103. After giving chase and thoroughly searching the area, he could not be located. At 0920, well constructed fighting trenches were located at XT468123. The trenches were oriented to the west. At 0926 hrs a VCS was captured and evacuated to BAO TRAI in the C&C ship. The company continued the mission until they closed into base camp at 1310 hrs.

During the night of 16 - 17 June three ambushes were employed at XT5020095, XT498082, and XT497087. No contact was made. At 0813 hrs on the 17th , this unit commenced their portion of the airlift by filling five helicopters of the second lift and all ten helicopters of the third and last lift. The unit was flown to LZ 1 to secure the west half of Obj A. During the day no contact was made and the company returned to base camp at 1400 hrs.

At 0820 hrs 17 June, this unit conducted their portion of the air-mobile assault from the airstrip at BAO TRAI to LZ 2 where they secured Obj 1. During their sweep an ARVN Regional Forces soldier was found in a house at XT473135. He was bound in chains and was being imprisoned by the VC. This ARVN soldier had been captured by the VC one week before when the Hiep Hoa sugar mill was over-run. The soldier was picked up by our C&C ship and evacuated to the sector S-2 at BAO TRAI. An ARVN soldier was wounded from a booby trap at XT----20 and was evacuated by our C&C ship to BAO TRAI. The unit completed its sweep and returned to BAO TRAI at 1400 hrs.

This unit had a dual mission. First they were to search and destroy all around the bn perimeter until they extended 1000 meters out from the perimeter. Then they were to hold in place and aggressively outpost a new perimeter 1000 meters out. This mission was accomplished in order that the bn CP could be secure from mortar fire in case the VC had previous information that the Vietnamese Chief of State would be visiting the battalion.

At 0615 hrs the two-man demolition teams were attached to A and B Companies (a daily requirement). From 0715 hrs to 0820 hrs the road was cleared from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). Clearance was obtained from the ARVN authorities to cut timber for overhead cover within the bn perimeter and for emplacements at the Popular Forces Outpost at AP SO DO.

Reconnaissance Platoon:

This unit established a platoon defensive position near AP SO DO at XT510077 on 16 June 66. Motorized patrols and outposts were established along the road from base camp to BAO TRAI. Security was provided for the MEDCAP team in AP SO DO. This element was to remain in its defensive position until further notice.

1st Platoon, C, 2/27 and the Scty Plat established six ambushes during the night of 17 - 18 June. No contact was made. The 2nd Plat, B, 1/5 (M) was attached to the bn at 1820 hrs to act as reaction force when needed.

The plan for the day was to conduct a combined search and destroy operation with the ARVN 51ST Ranger Battalion located at DUC HUE. A&B Companies plus A, 1/5 (M) were to provide the US Forces punch (Appendix 5, Annex A).

1st Plat, C, 2/27 established three ambushes outside the A Co perimeter during the night of 17 - 18 June. Their locations were XT511085, XT508092, and XT514079. No contact was made. The Security Platoon established three ambushes outside the B Co perimeter at XT494090, XT456077, and XT503074. No contact was made. Because of intelligence information received during the night that the VC 506th battalion was located at XT466020, Operation EMPIRE (Oral Order #5) was canceled. Instead, Operation BUCKEYE (Oral Order #6) was initiated 180700 June. The mission was to locate this suspected VC force and destroy it or hold it in place until a larger force could arrive.

At 0700 hrs the company left base camp and moved along route WELL. One man was wounded by a booby trap at XT488077, at 0815 hrs. The wounded man was evacuated by a C& C ship to CU CHI. The area around XT488077 was very heavily booby trapped with CEU “butterfly bombs”. At 1029 hrs, two new chargers for a Carbine were found at XT483027. At 1152 hrs, carbine fire was received from XT482027. The unit deployed one element which returned the fire and engaged a sniper at approximately 100 meters. The sniper firing ceased, but the sniper could not be located. At 1323 hrs, one man stepped on a large mine which blew his leg off below the knee. He was evacuated to CU CHI at 1346 hrs by the C&C ship. Between 1515 hrs and 1532 hrs, 10 camouflaged VC shelters were destroyed; 4 at XT473018, 4 at XT472018, and 2 at XT471019. Because these had been recently occupied, (within a few hours), the intelligence report which initiated the operation was thereby confirmed. At 1800 hrs this unit was moved to base camp by an airlift utilizing 5 helicopters in each lift. After completion of the extraction, the company moved into its positions in the base camp perimeter. At 1930 hrs, sniper fire was received from XT511089. While the 2nd Plat, B 1/5 (M) was being readied for its role as reaction force, the A Co 81mm mortars fired 15 KE rounds at this VC location. When the mortars ceased firing, the APC's attacked out of the perimeter towards the woodline, utilizing their 50 cal machine guns to put the VC location in a crossfire. The sniper firing ceased. This also provided a good rehearsal for the Mech Platoon's role as the reaction force.

At 0700 hrs this unit led the S&D operation to the Oriental River with A Co following. At 0844 hrs the unit was located at XT498048. At this location they questioned some civilians living in the area, and found out that on an azimuth of 230 degrees at approximately 1000 meters, there was a suspected VC location. This information was immediately fed to higher channels for further disposition. More evidence that the VC were in this area was gained at 0925 hrs when a bunker was located, and destroyed at XT482042. At 0951 hrs a message was found which read “WE the VC warn all people to stay in their hamlets until 15 June. If the enemy attacks, we will struggle with all weapons available. If they are mopped up, we will attack GO CAT.” This again was turned in along with many other documents through intelligence channels. At 1147 hrs, 6 sheets of Pierced Steel Planking were picked up by the C&C ship at XT477023 and brought back to base camp to be used as overhead cover. At 1307 hrs, two VC boats were destroyed at XT478027. For most of the day this unit was frequently in water ranging from 1 foot deep to waist high. At 1800 hrs, an airmobile extraction took the unit back to base camp. Thus Operation BUCKEYE ended.

Airmobile Extraction:

Early in the day plans for an airmobile extraction of A&B Companies from the Oriental River area were tentatively made for 1800 hrs that evening. The big question was whether these two units would set up a defensive position in the river area, or whether they would be extracted back to base camp. Again, this depended on what was developed during the day. The decision was made at approximately 1500 hrs to extract. Because of the heavy undergrowth in the river area, it was difficult to find an adequate PZ. Two suitable PZ's were finally located at XT477026. However, each was only big enough for five helicopters to land at one time. A Co 25th Aviation Bn supplied 10 helicopters with two gunships as escort. The airlift commenced at 1800 hrs amid some sniper fire which steadily increased as less and less people remained on the PZ. The enemy fire was primarily aimed at the helicopters. The gunship managed to suppress the sniper fire with its rockets and machine-guns by the time the last elements were airborne. An agent report from BAO TRAI revealed that during the extraction, the gunships together with the C&C ship, accounted for 4 VC KIA (by body count) and 5 VC KIA (possible). All elements of A&B, 2/27 had returned safely to base camp by 1820 hrs.

When the friendly units entered the area around grid square 4804, they were moving in a southwesterly direction into an area of dense undergrowth. Since vision was limited at time to 30 meters, artillery fires were utilized in the following manner: to confirm friendly locations, to neutralize suspected VC locations along the axis of advance, and to have current firing data continuously available in order that immediate fires could be brought upon the enemy. Only loading elements used these methods at the average rate of one round every two minutes. From 1337 hrs to 1437 hrs, the artillery fired 7 rounds (3 HE & 4 WP) from XT472021 to XT47430138. From 1454 hrs to 1541 hrs the artillery fired 82 rounds (60 HE & 1 WP) from XT40450138 to XT46840106.

From 0615 hrs to 0850 hrs, elements from this unit provided security for the daily road clearing operation from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). A roadblock was found during the sweep at XT5199061. The blockade was made of bamboo and trees, and had signs on it warning of mines. The engineer's mine detectors, however, gave no indication of mines. Thus the roadblock was cleared away. During the day more work was done on the platoon's own permanent positions near the site of the Popular Force Outpost. In the afternoon, elements went with the MEDCAP team to AP RUNG DAU (2). Elements of the platoon also escorted the water supply vehicles and trailers from BAO TRAI to base camp.

The MEDCAP team visited the village of AP RUNG DAU (1) treating 91 civilians. English classes were given by the Bn Communications Platoon to 12 Vietnamese civilians living within the base camp perimeter. Arrangements were made for a Vietnamese barber from BAO TRAI to be in the battalion area on 19 June 66 to give haircuts to the members of 2/27. A price of 30 piasters had been agreed upon for each haircut. Coordination was made with the authorities at BAO TRAI to begin employing between 30 to 50 local villagers to fill sandbags for the battalion.

The plan for the day was to have two platoon sweeps in the bn AO. A&B Companies were to airlift to the same general area as 18 June, and conduct S&D operations in this area as per oral order #7 (Appendix 7, Annex A).

During the night of 18 - 19 June, six ambushes were employed around the battalion perimeter. Also, extensive artillery and mortar H&I missions were fired during the night at suspected VC locations. As per Oral Order #7, Operation LONESTAR commenced with the Security Platoon's sweep at 1200 hrs, followed by the 2nd Platoon, B Co, 1/5 (M) which moved out at 1200 hrs. A&B, 2/27 airlifted to Obj Zap at 1200 hrs. The concept for this day's operation was to return to the same area as Operation BUCKEYE. This time however, the area was to be saturated with artillery and mortar fires then units were to move in quickly with an air assault to search and destroy back to base camp.

Indirect Fire Support:

a. H&I fires 182000 June.

LOCATION NATURE OF TARGET

XT 530117 Suspected VC supply route

XT 518115 Suspected VC Co location

XT 469063 Suspected VC supply cache

XT464055 Suspected VC supply cache

2. Artillery (105mm)

LOCATION NATURE OF TARGET

XT 477022 Suspected VC supply routes

XT 468018 Suspected VC supply routes

XT472014 Suspected VC supply routes

XT 471008 Suspected VC supply routes