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After Action Reports 34
APO San Francisco 96225
ADCMD 19 May 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)
TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS CSFOR-65)
Location: Vicinity, CU CHI, CU CHI Base Camp (XT647153), RVN
Reporting Officer: Major General John C. F. Tillson III
Prepared by: Major Golfredo D. Sansalone, CO, 18th Military
1. (C) Significant Organizational Activities.
(1) General. There were 10 major operations involving battalions or larger size units, and 1,491 small unit actions conducted by the 25th Infantry Division (-) during this period. All major and 68 small unit actions resulted in contact.
(2) GADSDEN (2Feb - 21 Feb 67). This op employed 3rd Bde, 4th Div and 196th Bde (Lt) (Sep) in S & D and Blocking Ops along the CAMBODIAN border to prevent VC movement along routes crossing the border, and to destroy VC/NVA forces, supplies and base camps.
3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div 196th Bde (LT) (Sep)
2nd Bn, 12th Inf 2nd Bn, 1st Inf
2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech) 4th Bn, 31st Inf
3rd Bn, 22nd Inf 3rd Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech)
2nd Bn, 77th Arty (DS) 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty (DS)
Trp F, 17th Cav
The op was in four phases: In phase I, a fire support base was established at TRAI BAI. In Phase II, two Bns secured bridge sites to block VC infiltration routes through the area. Both phases were completed on 12 Feb 67. Phase III occurred on 3 Feb 67. There was light contact with an unknown VC force using SA, AW and recoilless rifles. Phase IV began on 4 Feb, with light contact with a VC squad and (missing) rounds of 82mm mortar fire received in the 2nd Bn, 1st Inf base area, resulting in light US casualties. Light contact continued on 5 and 6 Feb. Documents and equipment captured vic WT965762 indicated the units were in a training area used by COSVN main force units, specifically 1st and 2nd Bns, 70th Regiment. On 7 Feb, there was heavy contact with a VC platoon at WT972678 by 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech). With the help of supporting artillery and air strikes, 20 VC were killed (BC). On the same day, a VC training area was located.
A truce was observed for the Lunar New Year (Vietnamese TET) from 8 - 12 Feb. All elements occupied their bases astride VC supply and infiltration routes and conducted extensive patrolling within their AO's. The VC violated the truce six times to include firing on US forces from across the CAMBODIAN border, to include light contact with an unknown number of VC on 8 Feb 67, without results..
The final period of Operation GADSDEN consisted of an attack north to exploit intelligence gained about the 271st Regt, followed by a sweep south and southeast to disrupt VC activities in the area. On 13 Feb, the 1st Bn, 5th (Mech) destroyed an ordnance facility WT986624 containing bombs, arty rounds and grenades, as well as tools and molds for their fabrication. On 16 Feb, a rallier, LY VAN THU from Recon Squad, C21 Recon Co, 271st Regt was taken at XT033786 by 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech). He stated that 1st Bn, 4th Bn and Regt HQ and C21 Recon Co of 271st Regt had been in the LO GO area vic WT9780 - WT9882 since 6 Feb. Prior to that, they were in DAU TIENG District, BINH DUONG Province. On 18 Feb, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty and 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech) received 50 rds of 82mm mortar fire at XT020780. On 21 Feb, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf engaged an unknown number of VC at XT081828. Documents captured there identified the 1st and 3rd Bns, 70th Regt and 2nd Co, Gp 49, a medical unit subordinate to COSVN. Documents and information received from the above named rallier indicated the contacts made during GADSDEN were with elements of the 271st Regt and the 70th Regt assisted by local guerrilla units. The capture of vast amounts of supplies and destruction of base areas and major training sites caused severe losses to the VC in the LO GO and XOM GIUA areas. There were 35 VC KIA (BC) during GADSDEN.
Other results of Operation GADSDEN were: 1 Ordnance Factory, 1 Rocket Launcher (training model), 1 training area with 44 structures, 2 classrooms, 2 mess halls, 1 rifle range destroyed. Plus 1 CHICOM Hvy MG and numerous medical supplies were captured. Also 1 VC rallier.
(3) LANIKAI (15 Sep 66-13 Feb 67). This operation was terminated by 1st Bde on 13 Feb 67. Area Security Coordination Centers (ASCC) remained established at TAN AN (LONG AN Province Capital), BEN LUC and RACH KIEN. Second Battalion, 14th Inf conducted S & D Ops vic RACH KIEN (XS7670). Contact was limited to occasional sniper and SA fire from unknown numbers of VC until 4 Feb. On 4 Feb, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf conducted an airmobile assault with 3/10 Cav (ARVN), resulting in 60 underground fortifications being destroyed. An estimated VC platoon was engaged by artillery resulting in 5 VC KIA (poss). S & D operations continued. On 7 Feb, Co C, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf engaged 2 VC with SA fire, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 M1 rifle and 1 US Carbine captured. From 8 Feb through 13 Feb, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf, conducted security operations vic RACH KIEN, without contact. Results of Operation LANIKAI were as follows: 89 VC KIA (BC), 257 VC KIA (poss), 11 VC PWs, 119 detainees. Following items were captured: 3 - 60mm mortar rounds, 9 rifle grenades, 6 mines, 14 lbs documents, 1 transistor radio, 300 gals diesel fuel, 2.5 tons rice and 1 motor. Following items were destroyed: 15 - 81mm mortar rounds, 25 - 60mm mortar rounds, 389 - 12.7mm rounds, 7 claymores, 27 mines, 44 rifle grenades, 104 blasting caps, 1 tunnel, 157 underground fortifications, 221 foxholes, 20 sampans, 64 VC structures, 11.1 tons of rice, 600 lbs of salt and 1 bridge.
(4) ALA MOANA (1 Des 66 - (Continuing). This operation was conducted in HAU NGHIA Province to destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps near the Division base camp at CU CHI, and in the FILHOL Plantation. In Feb, an additional mission was undertaken to clear the road from CU CHI to PHU HOA DONG (XT709195) and clear the surrounding wooded area. The 2nd Bde performed this mission, assisted by 2nd Bn, 7th Regt (ARVN). Clearing was also done along the SAIGON River using RAG Boats, and further south to DUC HOA (XS593960) and along the ORIENTAL River. Assisting the 2nd Bde were the following ARVN units: CIDG, 2/49th Regt, 27th BNAT CO (RF), and the 38th Ranger Bn. Numerous caches were uncovered without enemy contact. On 22 Feb 67, 1st Bde assumed responsibility for Op ALA MOANA and dispatched Co A, 4th Bn, 9th Inf (MANCHU) to the FILHOL Plantation (XT701190) to clear the road from CU CHI to PHU HOA DONG, and to provide security for attached Engineer elements in clearing the wooded area. On 260030 Feb, Co A 4th Bn, 9th Inf (MANCHU) was attacked by an est VC battalion (probably 1st Bn MR IV), utilizing mortars, rifle grenades and human wave assault tactics. The attack was repelled by AW, Arty, Gunships and Airstrikes. The Division base reaction force (Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav and Co B, 4th Bn, 9th Inf) was committed at 260310 Feb and linked up with Co A, 4th Bn, 9th Inf, at 260410HG. Action terminated at 0800H, see Para (e) for results. There was no further contact in Feb.
In March, the 4th Bn, 9th Inf, assisted by the 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) continued local security operations vic the Division's base camp, in the FILHOL Plantation and vic TRANG BANG 9XT489195). On 16 Mar, they were relieved by 2nd Bn, 14th Inf. Throughout the month there were no significant contacts. Local operations continued in April by the 1st Bde through 22 Apr. On 6 Apr, Co B, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf assisted by a platoon of Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav conducted a Search and Seal Op at VINH CU (XT6815) resulting 1 VC KIA (BC) and 12 detainees. On 14 April, Co B, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) conducted a Search and Seal Op of VINH CU resulting in 13 detainees. On 23 April, 2nd Bde assumed responsibility for ALA MOANA. Second Bde employed 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) for this Op. On 29 April, Co B, 2nd Bn, 257th Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT4822 resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 2 POW's and captured 1 BAR, 280 rds SA ammo and 5 grenades. Significant results of ALA MOANA to date are: 371 VC KIA(BC), 551 VC KIA (poss), 6 VC PW's, 642 detainees. Destroyed were 300 structures, 1008 bunkers, 140 tunnels, 316 sampans, 12,968 rds of SA ammo, 155 mines, 356 grenades, 85.45 tons of rice; captured were 86 SA, 5 crew served weapons, 61,146 rds of SA ammo, 94 lbs of medical supplies, 5.85 tons of rice, 181 lbs of documents. National Police and Military Police were used in the Search and Seal Ops at VINH CU.
(5) MAKALAPA (18 Mar - 21 Apr 67). This operation was conducted in GIA DINH Province to interdict VC supply routes, to block the flow of men and material to and from SAIGON AND TAN SON NHUT AFB, and to drive the VC from their bases in the Pineapple area. On 18 March, 4th Bn, 9th Inf (MANCHU) established a forward CP vic XS728963. An ASCC was established at VINH LOC (XS7395). On 19 March, Bn (-) moved to vic XS715930. On 20 March, Co B, 4th Bn, 9th Inf helilifted to vic XS725993. The Bn conducted saturation patrolling vic its bases. On 23 March, Co B conducted an airmobile assault vic XS7291. On 24 March, Co C conducted an airmobile assault vix XS6691, with the 404th PF Platoon. Base on information supplied by a VC PW, on 26 March Co's A and C conducted a Search and Seal Op surrounding the hamlet AP TAY (XS705937), checking 176 persons, detaining 6. On 29 March, Co B conducted an airmobile assault into the pineapple area vic XS6689. They made no contact, but received 10 rounds mortar fire from outside their AO. VC forces were unidentified. The OP continued in April with 4th Bn, 9th Infantry operating as the 1st Bde force until 8 April, performing extensive patrolling, ambushes, and EAGLE FLIGHTS. On 8 April, 1st Bde (-) joined with 4th Bn, 9th Inf in its AO, and the 2nd Bde and ARVN units assumed responsibility for their AO's. Large scale S & D Ops were initiated. Co A, 1st Bn, 27th Inf engaged an unk number of VC vic XS567953, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (poss) and 3 VC PW's. Co B engaged an est VC company vic XS558945 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (poss) and 1 VC PW. Gunships supported the 1st Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 15 VC XS556954 resulting in 15 VC KIA (BC). On 18 April, 1st Bde returned to CU CHI base camp, following on 19 April by 2nd Bn, 27th Inf. ARVN units returned to their garrisons. First Bn, 27th Inf conducted EAGLE FLIGHTS 20 and 21 April and returned to CU CHI base camp at the end of 21 April. Results of Op MAKALAPA were 58 VC KIA (BC), 157 VC KIA (poss), 6 PWs, 144 detainees, of which 3 were classified Civil Defendants, and 3 HOI CHANH. Destroyed were 3,324 bunkers, 265 structures, 71 tunnels, 133 sampans, 223 booby traps, 121 large caliber rds, 3.7 tons of rice, 511 protective masks. Captured were 88 SA, 14 crew served weapons, 3 AN/ PRC-10 radios, 151 lbs of documents, 151 VC claymores, 10,854 rds SA ammo, 1,521 grenades, 30 lbs of clothing, 5.5 tons of rice, and 380 lbs of fish. ARVN Forces participating in MAKALUPA consisted initially of PF Platoons operating with US companies on S & D Ops. When the op was expanded to two Bdes, ARVN Forces were increased to include 51st Ranger Battalion, !/50 Inf, 3/10 Cav and 25th Recon Co. Thirty-fourth Ranger Bn continued S & D Ops with 2nd Bde. Other ARVN units screened flanks and provided blocking forces.
(6) MANHATTAN (23 Apr - Continuing). The 25th Inf Div as a part of II FFORCEV initiated Op MANHATTAN on 23 April with the objective of destroying VC elements (forces, supplies, bases) in the HO BO - BOI LOI Woods area and along the SAIGON River in coordination with other II FFORCEV units. The 1st and 2nd Bde conducted S & D Ops north and northwest toward the SAIGON River while 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div units conducted S & D Ops south and southwest toward the river. The 34th ARVN Ranger Bn established a blocking position vic XT5331. The 1st Bn, 27th Inf established a blocking position on the SAIGON River vic XT5732, while the 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf set up a block on the river vic XT4944. On 24 April, Co C, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf engaged 6 VC with SA, AW and claymores vic XT459439, resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). On 25 April, Co A, 4th Bn, 9th Inf, engaged an unk number of VC with SA and AW fire vic XT493340 resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). HQ, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf engaged 4 VC with SA and claymores resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC PW. Significant results to date are 43 VC KIA (BC), 19 VC KIA (poss), 2 VC PW;s, 17 detainees; 657 bunkers, 120 military structures, 33 tunnels, 52 AT mines, 106 APO mines, 73-81mm rds, 332-22mm rds, 14-60mm rds, 29-57mm rds, 9-75mm rds, 125 RPG-2 rds, 402 grenades, 43 claymores, 1,840 lbs of TNT, 15.7 tons of rice and 246,662 rds of SA ammo destroyed; 200 lbs of documents, 166 SA, 11 crew served weapons, 125.8 tons of rice, 100,690 rds of SA ammo and 2 printing presses captured.
(7) FORT INSQUALLY (28 Nov 66 - Continuing). The mission of this operation is to conduct operations to secure the area adjacent to the base camp of the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div at DAU TIENG and to eliminate VC influence in that unit's TAOR. Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav secured the road from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH. There were extensive S & D Ops patrols and clearing Ops in the AO, but contact remained light throughout Feb and Mar. From 1-15 March, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf (detached from 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div) secured the 2rd Bde base camp at DAU TIENG, while from 16-31 March the rear elements of the 3rd Bde assisted by Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav performed this mission. The operation was limited in April to patrols and ambushes vic the DAU TIENG base due to participation by 3rd Bde elements in Op JUNCTION CITY. There was no significant contact. Significant results to date are: 24 VC KIA (BC), 23 VC KIA (poss), 57 detainees, 26 PW's, Captured were: 5 rifles (type unk), 4 CHICOM carbines, 5 US carbines, 3 AK-47 rifles, 1 Cal .45 pistol, 2 Walther P .38 pistols, 1 homemade pistol, 1 M16 rifle, 1 M79 grenade launcher, 11 CHICOM 56 rkts launcher (82mm), 3 CHICOM LMG, 26 grenades, 2 claymores, 3-82mm rkts, 2 AP mines, 365 rds SA ammo, 2 FM radios, 200 ft electrical wire, 2 VC protective masks, 58 lbs medical supplies, 102.5 lbs documents, 300 lbs sugar, 120 lbs food, 69 tons of rice, 1 ton salt, 9 bicycles, 15 sets clothing, 50 yds cloth and 300 yds of mosquito netting. Destroyed were 111 VC structures, 276 bunkers, 12 tunnels, 7 sampans, 38 mines, 7 large caliber rds, 250 sheets of tin, 1650 gallons of pure oil, 44.875 tons of rice, 59 punji pits, 115 foxholes, 4-20 lb bombs, 1-750 lb bomb, 7 AT mines, 30 AP mines, 170 CBU's, 2-105mm rds, 2-81mm rds, 29 grenades, 5 lbs C4 explosive, 1000 lbs of beans, 1600 lbs of millet, 1700 lbs of peas and 125 lbs of meat.
(8) SABER THRUST (7 Apr - Continuing). Was conducted by 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry in five phases. All phases involved S & D and patrolling pps in the vic of the CU CHI base camp and along the Main Supply Route. Phase I on 7 and 8 April vic TRANG BANG (XT489194 was conducted by Trp A with Battery B, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty in direct support. An ambush patrol of Trp A engaged a VC squad resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). Phase II involved a squadron controlled sweep vic LOC THANH (XT438166) on 9 and 10 April. Squadron Task Force included Trp B and Trp D, Co C, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) (detached from 1st Bde) and Btry A, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty. With the PF Co from TRANG BANG in a blocking psn, the Sqdn detained 42 Vietnamese moving NW. Phase III was conducted from 13 - 15 April by Trps B and D, with an attached rifle platoon from Co B, 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech) with Btry A, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty in DS. On 14 April, an ambush patrol engaged an estimated VC squad, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Gunships in support of the op killed 5 VC (poss). Later an APC from Trp A was struck by an RPG-2 round at XT583157 (no US casualties, minor damage to vehicle). Results: 2 detainees, 1 VC KIA (poss). On 15 April at 0300, a Checkmate and encirclement of the hamlet of PHUOC MY (XT585153) was conducted. Results: 4 VC PW's and 12 Civil Defendants detained. Phase IV began on 17 April and concluded 19 April. It involved Trps A and D, and 1 rifle platoon of Co A, 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech) conducting S & D Ops vic TRUNG LAP (XT585198), with Btry A, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty in DS. On 19 April, an ambush patrol Trp A engaged an estimated VC squad. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (poss). Phase V of SABER THRUST occurred on 20 April. A Squadron Task Force operated in a sweep leading to AP BAU DUNG (XT370370). Forces involved were Trp A, Trp D, Co B, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) and Btry A, 7th Bn, 11th Arty. Three airstrikes were employed. Two gunships of Trp D accounted for 2 VC KIA (BC), and the Aero-Rifle Platoon, Trp D also killed 2 VC (BC). Trp A killed 11 VC (BC) and suffered two US WIA. Co B, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) killed 2 VC (poss) and captured extensive medical supplies. A sweep of the area by ARVN forces on 21 April reported finding 32 VC bodies, a result of this operation. A document found on one VC body identified the VC unit as the 401 Co, D-14 Bn.
Results of Operation SABER THRUST to date were: 51 VC KIA (BC), 10 VC KIA (poss), 4 VC PWs, 66 detainees. Captured were: 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 CHICOM Carbine, 10 lbs Medical Supplies. Destroyed were: 15 tunnels, 36 bunkers, 30 punji pits, 11,450 lbs rice, 1 blacksmith's forge, 2 - 15mm rounds, 2 company size base camps, 1 squad size base camp, 5 structures, 3 trench lines, 1 mess area.
(9) JUNCTION CITY (22 Feb - Continuing). The Div conducted offensive operations in Central War Zone “C” to destroy COSVN and VC/NVA Forces. The operation was in three phases, employing 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div, 3 Bde, 4th Div, 196th Inf Bde (Lt) (Sep) and initially the 11th Armored Cav Regiment. Airmobile assaults were used to secure forward base areas. In Phase I, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div remained in psn along the CAMBODIAN border after Op GADSDEN was terminated on 21 Feb and conducted S & D Ops. The 11th ACR occupied AO BOBCAT vic TRUONG MIT and conducted S & D Ops. ARVN participation included Bde Force Alpha of the Vietnamese Marine Bde Hq, with 1st and 5th Marine Bns. This force operated with the 25th Inf Div until 11 March. Phase I ended on 14 March. Phase II began on 15 March. Third Bde, 4th Inf Div and 196th Bde conducted ground and airmobile assaults in their AO's to block COSVN and VC/NVA forces along the CAMBODIAN border. Second Bde, 25th Inf Div attacked in Zone to destroy COSVN facilities and VC/NVA forces. On 21 March, a major engagement was fought by elements of 3rd Bde, 4th Div, the 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf and 2nd Bn, 77th Arty at SUOI TRE defending FSB GOLD. The 272nd VC Regt attempted to overrun the base, and engaged US forces there from 0600 to 1100H. They were thrown back by 2nd Bn, 77th Arty's direct fire using the “Beehive” round and by a relief column of 2nd Bn, 12th Inf, 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech) and 2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-) which arrived at 1100 H, causing the VC to withdraw. Extensive airstrikes, gunships and supporting artillery aided in preventing FSB GOLD from being overrun. Results of the battle were US 30 KIA, 109 WIA; VC KIA 647 (BC), 6 VC PWs. Captured were 42 RPG-2, 26 LMGs, 2-12.7 mm AA MG, 13 CHICOM Carbines, 39 AK-47 Rifles, 3 US shotguns, 1 BAR, 5 M14 rifles, 9 SKS Carbines, 1-P.38 Pistol, 13 CHICOM Rifles and 2 M79s. From 23 through 28 March, 3 Bde, 4th Inf Div units continued S & D Ops in War Zone “C” while the 196th Bde blocked to the west. On 8 April, the 196th Bde (Lt) (Sep) completed its participation in JUNCTION CITY. On 4 April, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div began an extensive sweep south of DAU TIENG (XT495473) and then north through the MICHELIN Plantation into the SW edge of War Zone “C”, destroying a VC base camp and capturing 40 tons of rice vic XT542607. On 12 April, 3rd Bde units moved into Central War Zone “C” and continued S & D Ops. Third Bde terminated Phase II of JUNCTION CITY on 15 April and immediately began Phase III. Significant results of Phase II were: 723 VC KIA (BC), 130 VC KIA (poss), 9 VC PWs and 21 detainees. Destroyed were: 859 bunkers, 292 military structures, 5 sampans, 5.7 tons rice, 586 RPG-2 rds, 66-60mm rds,30-81mm rds, 13-75mm rds, 8-82mm rds, 7-57mm rds, 30,749 rds SA ammo, 2,634 grenades and 2,200 lbs of field gear. Captured were 1 CHICOM Field Radio, 223 lbs documents, 90 large caliber rds, 69 crew served wpns, 150 small arms, 59.9 tons rice, 5.25 miles wire. Phase II of Op JUNCTION CITY continued through April with the same objectives. On 19 April, 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div became OPCON to the 25th Inf Div and moved to TAY NINH and SUOI DA, prior to assuming the mission of Op JUNCTION CITY. On 20 April, all elements of 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div terminated their participation in the op and returned to DAU TIENG. First Bde, 9th Inf Div continued the Op with one Bn conducting ops west from BAU CU (XT2770). Contact with a VC platoon on 27 April resulted in 4 VC KIA (BC). Significant results of Phase III through 30 April are 6 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC KIA (poss), 13 detainees; 270 bunkers, 54 structures, 16 mines, 9 tunnels and 14.5 tons rice destroyed. ARVN participation in this phase of JUNCTION CITY was limited to the 36th ARVN Ranger Bn, which conducted S & D Ops.
(10) FITCHBURG (25 Nov 66 - 8 Apr 67). The mission of this operation was to destroy VC forces, bases and supplies in areas of TAY NINH Province contiguous to the location of the 196th Bde (Lt) (Sep) base cap. This was performed until 18 Feb by 3rd Bn, 21st Inf. Highway 26 and the rock quarry at NUI BA DEN mountain vic XT267568 were secured. Extensive S & D Ops and ambush patrols were conducted in conjunction with PHILCAGV operations. On 18 Feb, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf performed this mission, and was relieved in turn by 2nd Bn, 34th Armor on 21 Feb which retained the mission until 5 March. There were no significant contacts in March or April. Beginning 5 March, 2/34th Armor was assisted by 4th Bn, 31st Inf. On 9 March, 2/1st Inf relieved the 4/31st Inf and was in turn relieved on 15 March by 3/21st Inf. The 3/21st Inf continued the op throughout March and until the operation terminated on 8 April 67. Results of the operation were: 55 VC KIA (BC), 155 VC KIA (poss), 148 detainees, 4 returnees, and 3 PWs; 280 structures, 169 bunkers, 45 tunnels, 55 sampans, 20 mines and 74.55 tons of rice were destroyed, and 49 SA, 116 lbs of documents, 27 mines and 9.2 tons of rice were captured.
(11) WAIALUA 98 March - 8 April 67). This operation was conducted by 2nd Bde in Western HAU NGHIA Province to destroy VC forces supplies and base camps and to interdict the flow of supplies on the SONG VAM CO DONG (ORIENTAL RIVER). Second Bde employed 1st and 2nd Bns, 27th Inf and the 34th Ranger Bn (ARVN). First Bn, 27th Inf conducted S & D Ops from FSB SCOTT (XT3208) while 2nd Bn, 27th Inf did the same from FSB TAYLOR (XT4195). On 10 March, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf captured 1 VC PW vic XS3396. On 11 March, Recon Plt, 1st Bn, 27th Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT3713, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC KIA (poss). On 14 March, Co A, 1st Bn, 27th Inf engaged 4 VC vic XS3096, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC). On 17 March, 27th Inf shifted its FSB to THO MO (XS5598) and 2nd Bn, 27th Inf shifted its FSB to TRA CU (XS4797). Airmobile assault sweeps and S & D Ops assisted by RAG boats were employed without contact until 21 March. On that day, Co A, 1st Bn, 27th Inf engaged 4 VC vic XS5694, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC PW's. From 22 through 25 March, the Bde conducted S & D Ops along the ORIENTAL River, supported by RAG boats from XS5591 to XS5693. On 25 March, Co C, 1st Bn, 27th Inf destroyed a VC dispensary at XS559934. An ambush by Co A, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf engaged an unk number of VC vic XS5593, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poss). There was no further contact in March. On 2 April, the 34th Ranger Bn (ARVN) engaged a VC squad at XS606997 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The operation terminated on 8 April without further contact. Significant results were: 67 VC KIA (BC), 56 VC KIA (poss), 52 detainees, 14 PW's. Destroyed were 813 bunkers, 181 structures, 22 tunnels, 54 sampans, 52 mines, 4000 rds SA ammo, 11.3 tons of rice. Captured were 26 SA, 1 AW, 500 lbs TNT, 83 lbs documents, 9 tons rice.
b. Artillery Support. During the quarter, Div Arty fired 122,125 rounds in direct support and 68,909 rounds on H and I missions. Results were: (number missing) VC KIA (BC) and 522 VC KIA (poss). Included in these fires were 2,443 rds fired in support of ARVN operations and/or outposts under attack.
c. Air Support. There were 4,160 air sorties during the quarter with the following results: 231 VC KBAF (BC) and 841 VC KBAF (poss). In addition, 470 VC structures, 1,853 bunkers, 72 sampans, 3 tunnels, 9 caches, (missing) oxcarts and one (1)1 1-1/2 ton truck were destroyed. There were 69 secondary explosions and 133 secondary fires.
d. Army Aviation. There were 42,660 sorties during the past quarter which resulted in 42 VC KBAA (BC) and 225 VC KBAA (poss), as well as 36 detainees captured for interrogation. In addition, 115 VC structures, 13 sampans, 2 oxcarts and 1 .30 Cal Machine Gun position were destroyed and 76 VC structures and 3 sampans damaged.
(1) VC Activity
(a) February 1967
1 General: VC activity remained at a high level of intensity due to Operation GADSDEN and JUNCTION CITY in War Zone C. This activity is attributed to the presence of elements of the 271st Regiment and 70th Regiment as well as elements of COSVN within the operational area. There has been an increase in enemy activity around the Division Base Camp area which is attributable to the absence of most of the Division on operations in War Zone C. Incidents of anti-aircraft fire by VC units decreased from 96 in January to 62 in February.
2 Significant Operations:
a On 8 February, Recon Plt, 4th Bn (M), 23rd Inf received SA and rifle grenade fire from the CAMBODIAN side of the river vic WT967715. Fire was returned.
b On 26 February, A Co, 4th Bn, 9th Inf, with elements of Co A, 6th Engrs attached, received heavy SA, AW, rifle grenade and mortar fire from an estimated 250 VC, at XT701191. Fire was returned with SA, AW, mortars and Arty. Area was illuminated by use of flare ships and the engagement was supported by airstrikes. A reactionary force consisting of Co B, 4th Bn, 9th Inf elements and Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav elements encountered an ambush en route to Co A, 4th Bn, 9th Inf's location, but penetrated it successfully. As a result of the complete action which began at 260030 February and terminated at approximately 260600 February, VC casualties were 113 KIA (BC) and 33 KIA (poss). Captured were 2 US BARs, 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 CHICOM carbine with grenade launcher, 1 Russian light machine gun, 2 RPG-2 rocket launchers with 18 RPG-2 rds, 1 M1 rifle and 1 .50 Cal tripod. A PW, HUYNH VAN HUYNH, captured in the area was identified as an Assistant Squad Leader, 2nd Plt, 5th Company, 1st Battalion, MR IV. Numerous documents captured on the battlefield made reference to the MR IV Bn, indicating that 1st Bn, MR IV was the unit that initiated the action.
3 The VC continue to be forced from their base and supply areas by friendly operations. The loss of major caches will continue to affect the tactical operations of the VC in the future.
4 The presence of US Forces in the Division area of operations continues to give the people confidence in their government and government's ability to protect them from the VC.
(b) March 1967
1 General: VC activity remained at a high level of intensity during the month of March. A significant increase in mortar attacks against U.S. unit command posts and base camps was noted. Approximately 700 mortar rounds of various types were received by Division elements during the period, including the employment of 120mm mortars against the 196th (Lt) (Sep) Inf Bde at BAU CO (XT2868). Most of the enemy contact which occurred during Operation JUNCTION CITY, WIALUA and MAKALAPA was with small enemy elements from 3 to 6 men, left behind to harass US forces. However, during Operation JUNCTION CITY, VC forces engaged US forces in platoon strength and higher when necessary to protect critical installations or when they had an apparent advantage which could be decisively exploited and used for propaganda purposes. The latter is believed to be the case in the VC Regimental attack of Fire Support Base GOLD which is narrated in detail in paragraph 1a (9) above. The attack coincided with President Johnson's arrival at GUAM and showed the VC forces' willingness to accept heavy casualties in an attempt to achieve a military and political victory.
2 Significant Operations:
a On 1 March, C Co, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor received heavy SA, AW, Mortar and RR fire from an estimated VC Battalion at XT414441. Enemy losses: 13 VC KIA (BC), 35 VC KIA (poss) (no unit identification), 4 AK-47 assault rifles, 3 RPG-2 launchers, 2 CHICOM carbines and 80 grenades were captured.
b On 12 March, Trp A, 1st Sqdn, 11th Cav located and evacuated 2 printing presses and one small generator at WT924785. One printing press, manufactured in Shanghai, China in 1965, measured 10' X 8' X 5', had cutting and folding attachments. The second printing press, made in Japan, was smaller in size and similar in construction. Document identified the printing section of the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section, COSVN.
c On 15 March at 2000 hours, the 25th Infantry Division Base Camp at CU CHI received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 25 rounds of 75mm RR fire. Fire was returned with artillery. Enemy losses: Unknown.
d On 21 March at 0640 hours, patrols from 3/22 Inf made contact with a VC force at SUOI TRE (XT385715). This contact triggered an attack against the 3/22 Inf and the 2/77 Arty by the 272nd Regt, supported by fire from 60mm and 82mm mortars, recoilless rifle and RPG-2 rocket launchers. The 2/12 Inf, 2/22 Inf (M) and 2/34 Armor (-) reinforced the units under attack. Contact lasted until 1100 hours and airstrikes and artillery pounded the area throughout the afternoon. Enemy losses: 647 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC PWs, 93 small arms ammunition, 579 RPG-2 rounds, 1900 stick grenades, and 20 recoilless rifle rounds. See Para 1a (9).
(c) April 1967
1 General: VC activity remained at a high level of intensity during the month. There were 130 reports of enemy contact, 57 reports of antiaircraft fire, 58 antitank mining incidents and 46 antipersonnel mining incidents. Eleven obstacles were cleared along the main supply route during the period. The majority of the enemy contact was with small size VC elements of ten men or less. A significant number of VC weapons were captured by US Forces.
2 Significant Operations:
a Operation JUNCTION CITY continued in War Zone “C” with the 1st Bde, 9th Div continuing Phase III of the operation on 20 April 1967. The only significant enemy contact occurred on 27 April 1967. Co B, 2nd Bn, 47th Inf (Mech), received small arms and automatic weapons fire from 2 VC squads. Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons and artillery. Results: 4 VC KIA (BC). Documents found on the bodies identified the 1st Bn, 70th Guard Regt.
b Operation MAKALAPA continued in the “Pineapple Area” until 21 April 1967. The only significant enemy contact occurred on 16 April 1967. First Bn, 27th Inf, on an EAGLE FLIGHT operation vic XS567915, engaged an estimated VC company with small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery, gunships and airstrikes supported the engagement. Results: 22 VC KIA (BC), 72 VC KIA (poss) and 2 VC PW. The PW's were from (a) HUUTHLANH Village Guerrilla Force and (b) GINH TAU Security Squad, BINH TAN District. On 15 and 16 April 1967, Co A, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf, located weapons caches at XS7631865 and XS633868. A total of 74 weapons were captured and included one 8mm mortar, two 60mm mortars, two 75mm recoilless rifles, two 57mm recoilless rifles and three light machine guns.
c Operation MANHATTAN began on 23 April 1967, in the vic of the BOI LOI Woods. A large number of mines and booby traps were encountered during the initial phase of the operation. Enemy contacts consisted mainly of harassing attacks by small groups of from 3 to 6 VC. On 27 April 1967, Co A, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf located a weapons cache at XT503347 consisting of 105 small arms weapons and 12 crew served weapons. In addition, over 100,000 rds of SA ammunition were destroyed.
d The 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav, conducted local Search and Destroy Operations in the vic of TRANG BANG and in the FILHOL Plantation. The most significant enemy contact occurred on 20 April 1967, during SABER THRUST. Co A and D Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav engaged an estimated VC Platoon at XT371370. Results: 12 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC KIA (poss). Documents found on one VC body identified the 401 Company, D-14 Bn.
3 US operations conducted during the month continued to force the VC from their base areas. Enemy losses in manpower, facilities and equipment are expected to reduce the effectiveness of VC units in War Zone “C”, the BOI LOI - HO BO Woods Complex and the Pineapple area.
4 The US/ ARVN Joint Operations Centers continue to operate efficiently, adding greatly to the overall intelligence effort of US/ARVN Forces.
5 VC Personnel and Equipment losses 1 February - 30 April 1967:
VC KIA (BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,588
VCKIA (poss) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,490
VC PW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Civil Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Returnees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
Small Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681
Crew Served Weapons . . . . . . . . . . 112
Grain (Tons) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,077.22
(2) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP)
(a) Operations. During the reporting period, 1 Feb 67 thru 30 Apr 67, the division LRRP conducted missions for the ACofS, G2, the Division and the 3/4 Cav. There were a total of 29 patrols conducted in HAU NGHIA, BINH DUONG and TAY NIN Provinces. The LRRP has the capability of operating at extended distances and for extended periods from the division base. The patrols gain information concerning enemy movement patterns, unit locations and installation locations. The LRRP has been utilized as an economy of force measure to screen the flanks of division units conducting operations.
(b) Training. There were two internal 3-week training programs conducted by LRRP. Twenty-seven members completed the course. Twenty-one members of the Division LRRP have attended the 5th SPG MACV RECONDO School.
(3) Counterintelligence. The Counterintelligence Section continued liaison to and with all echelons of local government and with counterintelligence counterparts of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam with which the 25th Infantry Division came in contact. Essential operations such as personnel security investigations, security inspections and security checks were continued. Files containing the infrastructure of the Viet Cong and files of “Black List”, “White List”, and “Grey List” personalities were expanded and revised. Counterintelligence operations have resulted in the capture of 27 Viet Cong from within the division's indigenous work force since July 1966. Of that number, 6 persons have been apprehended and neutralized during the period of 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967.
(4) Air Reconnaissance Missions. The G2 Air daily schedules Visual Reconnaissance missions throughout the Division area of responsibility to locate enemy troop movements, supply movements and installations. At the G3 (illegible) request, SLAR and RED HAZE missions are flown over the Division's areas by II FFORCEV to provide information during hours of darkness of the enemy's movements and locations. Divisional Fire Fly teams and aircraft Low Light Level Television flights have been utilized during hours of darkness to locate the enemy and to confirm or deny suspected enemy locations received from other intelligence sources.
(1) Class I Supply: (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)
(a) Status of rations at end of quarter:
A Rations C Rations
1 Stockage objectives (days) 5 10
2 On hand (days) 3 11
(b) Fresh fruits and vegetables were received through SAIGON from DALAT, RVN, and CONUS.
(c) Ice Cream:
Cycle of issues - every other day.
Gallons per week from SAIGON - 1,477.
Gallons per week from CU CHI - 903.
(d) Ice issues:
1 Average amount of ice received daily:
a Potable - 50,610 lbs (300 lb blocks).
b Non-potable - 80,000 lbs (100 lb blocks)
2 Average ice per man per day:
a Potable - 3 lbs.
b Non-potable - 5 lbs.
(2) Class II and IV Supply: (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)
Additions to ASL during quarter - 61.
Total lines on ASL - 790.
(3) Class III Supply - Issues during quarter: (25th S & T Bn)
Consumption Rates Daily (Avg Gal) Quarterly (Total Gal)
Mogas 11,694 1,037,923
Diesel 23,504 2,068,396
JP4 14,347 1,262,573
Avgas 1,505 132,451
In the Class II Yard, three more berms have been completed, bringing the total to 35. The maintenance and storage building has been completed.
(4) Grave Registration: (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)
Deceased U.S. personnel processed during the quarter: 78.
Deceased RVN personnel processed during the quarter: 13.
(5) Services: (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)
QM: 2,953 Wash loads.
Contract: 9,862 Bundles.
(b) QM Bath Unit:
Total showers for quarter: 17,043
2 Average number of showers daily: 191.
(6) Transportation: (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)
ACTIVITY TOTAL FOR QTR DAILY AVG
Mileage driven 200,452 2,145
Tonnage moved 6,523 70.9
Troops moved by convoy 14,168 157
Personnel moved locally by bus 10,190 117
(7) Maintenance: (725th Maintenance Battalion)
The number of job orders completed during the quarter was as follows:
COMMODITY NO. COMPLETED
Fire Control 580
Office Machines 373
Small Arms 2,260
Track Vehicles 358
Wheel Vehicles 889
(8) Services: (25th Medical Battalion)
This unit supported all Division units with medical services and supplies. In addition, non-divisional units were supported with medical supplies.
SERVICE NO. OF PATIENTS
Clearing Station 18,359
1 Disease 765
2 Non-Battle Injury 278
3 Injured Result Hostile Action 417
Sick-call patients seen 3,689
Dental Clinic 4,121
Lab Tests 5,503
(b) Supply and Service
Line items issued, Military 3,920
Line items issued, MEDCAP 910
Bulk pharmacy items issued 19,554
Prescriptions, individual, filled 3,423
Eye glasses orders 770
Maintenance Work Orders 117
(9) Transportation Office:
(a) Highways continued to be the primary mode of transportation for the resupply of the CU CHI, TAY NINH, and DAU TIENG base camps. Operations GADSDEN, JUNCTION CITY and MANHATTAN in the TAY NINH area have consumed great quantities of supplies. This is reflected by the volume of vehicles traveling to TAY NINH.
1 CU CHI - SAIGON
Total Convoys 448
Number of convoys per day 4
Total volume of vehicles 24,095
Average daily volume 268
Number of vehicles involved
In unit distribution 2,063
2 CU CHI - TAY NINH - DAU TIENG
Total Convoys 172
Number of Convoys per day 2
Total volume of vehicles 28,776
1st Log Command vehicles 18,187
CU CHI base camp vehicles 7,460
19th Inf Bde vehicles 945
4th Inf Div vehicles 1,211
PHILCAGV vehicles 688
1st Inf Div vehicles 285
(b) During April 1967, project OREGON required 351 G-130 sorties. The Division Transportation Office was on site at the departure airfield to provide technical advice and staff coordination.
(c) The large amount of personnel departing the division on PCS movement was reflected in the activity of the Baggage Section the past (3) months. During the quarter, the baggage section moved 3,090 pieces of baggage weighing 229,828 pounds for 2,053 personnel.
(10) Division Ammunition Office
(a) Stockage Objective:
1 Status at end of quarter - 1044.6
2 On hand - 1,854 tons
PERIOD AMOUNT (TONS/DAYS)
16 Jan - 15 Feb 49.9
16 Feb - 15 Mar 62.8
16 Mar - 15 Apr 88.5
(c) Average for quarter (tons/day) 63.0
(1) Personnel. During the past quarter, the personnel posture of the division has been excellent. Assigned strength (approximately 106%) exceeded the authorized strength. This average has been maintained in an attempt to keep the division PDY above 100%. There continues to be a shortage of Infantry and Artillery NCO's grades E5 and E6. Other MOS that this headquarters places in the critically short category are: 11D40; 11F20; 11F40; 26C20; 63E20; 82C10 and 91B20. These shortages have occurred as a result of lack of fill action against requisitions. Also, there are some instances where personnel in lower grades have been used to fill requisition of NCO's. The overall officer strength of the division has decreased considerably during this reporting period. Although assigned strength remains at 102%, the present for duty strength has dropped to 97%. This deficit is primarily due to diversions and the non-fill of valid requisitions, which accounts for a shortfall of 43 officers, but also includes 21 combat losses which have not been replaced.
(2) Key Gains/Losses
(a) 1 Feb 67: BG George G. O'Connor was reassigned as ADC, 9th Inf. Div.
(b) 6 Feb 67: LTC Hugh S. Wiley was appointed Div Surgeon.
(c) 11 Feb 67: Col Jasper J. Wilson was appointed Chief of Staff 25th Inf Div.
(d) 15 Feb 67: LTC Kelly G. Gregory departed PCS for CONUS. Maj Golfredo D. Sansalone was appointed Division Historian.
(e) 16 Feb 67: LTC Carrol D. Strider departed PCS for CONUS. LTC Avery S. Fullerton assumed command of 65th Engr Bn.
(f) 17 Feb 67: Col Thomas W. Mellen departed PCS for CONUS.
(g) 18 Feb 67: LTC Thomas U. Harrold was appointed ACofS G4.
(h) 20 Feb 67: LTC John K. Moffat departed PCS for CONUS.
(i) 21 Feb 67: BG Edward M. Flanagan Jr. was reassigned to HQ USMACV.
(j) 22 Feb 67: LTC Michael Barszcz departed PCS for CONUS.
(k) 23 Feb 67: LTC Alexander L. Paxson departed PCS for CONUS.
(l) 24 Feb 67: LTC Robert M. Ward was assigned as XO, 2nd Bde.
(m) 28 Feb 67: Col Robert C. Shaw was appointed Asst Div Commander. LTC Thomas H. Ball departed PCS for CONUS.
(n) 1 Mar 67: LTC Thomas J. Ferguson departed PCS for CONUS. LTC Louis G. Nathorn assumed command of 125th Sig Bn. LTC Billy B. Nicholas departed PCS for CONUS.
(o) 5 Mar 67: Col Daniel B. Williams departed PCS for CONUS. Col David E. Ott assumed command of 25th Inf Div Artillery. LTC John L. Barry was appointed Div Chaplain.
(p) 7 Mar 67: MG Frederick C. Weyand was reassigned as DCG II Field Force Vietnam. MG John C. F. Tillson III assumed command of 25th Inf Div. LTC Aubrey G. Norris was appointed ACofS G5.
(q) 8 Mar 67: Col Edward C. Kerker departed PCS for CONUS.
(r) 10 Mar 67: LTC Felix Salvador departed PCS for CONUS. LTC Alvin C. Hutchins assumed command 7/11 Arty Bn.
(s) 14 Mar 67: Col Herbert S. Lowe departed PCS for CONUS. Col Edwin W. Emerson assumed command of 25th Inf Div Support Command. LTC Robert Proudfoot departed PCS for CONUS. LTC Jere W. Sharp assumed command of 725th Maint Bn. LTC William S. Kittrell departed PCS for CONUS. LTC Robert Schwarz assumed command of 25th S & T Bn.
(t) 15 Mar 67: LTC Henry R. Shelton departed PCS for CONUS. LTC Edward C. Peter assumed command of 2/27 Inf Bn.
(u) 16 Mar 67: LTC Boniface D. McClung was appointed Div Finance Officer.
(v) 17 Mar 67: LTC Thomas A. Ware Jr. was appointed XO, 1st Bde.
(w) 18 Mar 67: LTC Jamie L. Aiken departed PCS for CONUS.
(x) 19 Mar 67: LTC Dwight L. Groninger departed PCS for CONUS.
(y) 24 Mar 67: LTC Duane W. Compton departed PCS for Japan. LTC Robert R. Hicks departed PCS for CONUS. Maj Bernard S. Rhees was appointed Div IO.
(z) 27 Mar 67: LTC Dennis V. Gentry Jr. was appointed ACofS G1.
(aa) 4 Apr 67: 4 Apr 67: LTC William A. Bearden assumed command of 25th Avn Bn.
(bb) 5 Apr 67: LTC William A. Ziegler was appointed Div SJA,
(cc) 11 Apr 67: LTC Edward P. Davis departed PCS for CONUS. LTC Robert S. Young was appointed Adjutant General.
(dd) 12 Apr 67: LTC William D. Brown departed PCS for CONUS. LTC David T. Bryant departed PCS for CONUS.
(ee) 16 Apr 67: LTC Robert M. Ward was appointed ACofS G3.
(ff) 19 Apr 67: LTC Harley F. Mooney Jr. departed PCS for CONUS.
(gg) 20 Apr 67: LTC Arthur W. Knoll was appointed Div Inspector General.
(hh) 25 Apr 67: LTC Guy K. Troy was appointed ACofS G2.
(ii) 27 Apr 67: LTC Louis J. North departed PCS for CONUS. LTC Bruce C. Young was reassigned to 18th MP Bde APO 96491. Maj Robert E. Stromfors was appointed Provost Marshal.
(3) The Division PX remains in operation. There are 4,000 square feet being used for sales with an additional 4,000 square feed under renovation, with a target operational date of 1 June 1967. Total sales from the Division Site Exchange were $2,045,135.89 for the quarter ending 30 April 1967.
(4) Division Strengths (-) as of 30 April 1967:
OFF WO EM AGG
Auth 752 149 11,014 11,915
Asgd 806 118 11,664 12,588
PFD 764 111 11,922 12,797
(5) Losses (1 Feb 67 - 30 Apr 67):
OFF EM AGG
KIA 8 108 116
WIA 97 1,142 1,239
MIA 0 0 0
Non-Battle Dead 1 7 8
Non-Battle Injury 2 44 46
(6) Gains (1 Feb 67 - 30 Apr 67):
OFF WO EM AGG
333 57 4,820 5,210
h. Revolutionary Development Support
(1) Significant Organization or Unit Activities.
(a) Regular liaison visits were made to MACV and (illegible) in the provinces of NAU NGHIA, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, GIA DINH and LONG AN. During the quarter, liaison was also made with IIFFORCEV.
(b) Two studies were written o the Combined Lightning Concept. These studies were designed to answer questions on command, commo, and support of the Combined Lightning concept. An information letter on the Combined Lightning concept was prepared for transmission to General CHINH, 29th ARVN commanding General to initiate staff planning by the 25th ARVN. In April, the CLC was transposed to draft form and final plans are now being completed.
(c) The departure of LTC Bashore (SARDS) caused a reorganization of the Division Revolutionary Development Staff Section. The Revolutionary Development Brand and its associated activities was placed under control of the ACofS G5.
(d) The Revolutionary Development Branch has adopted the New MACV Hamlet Evaluation Rating System to report status of hamlets in the 25th Inf Div's TAOR.
(e) The Revolutionary Development Branch provided Statistics and initial coordination for the ACofS, G3 to consider the possible use of US 25th Div resources to help provide security for the GVN village and hamlet elections in April.
(f) On 30 April, the Commanding General of the 25th Inf Div escorted Brigadier General W. A. Knowlton, Director of Revolutionary Development Support, accompanied by the G5 on a tour of the RD Team working in XOM HUE hamlet in CU CHI District. Prior to entering the hamlet, BG Knowlton was briefed on current and future RD projects and the status of the RD Teams in the 25th Inf Div's TAOR.
(2) Hamlet evaluation rating changes from initial report in Feb - Mar:
(a) HAU NGHIA Province:
1 DUC HOA District - TAN AN HOA Village - MUY LON (XT615110) changed from D to C rating.
2 CU CHI District - TAN AN HOA Village - AN LOI Hamlet (XT455210) changed from D to C Rating.
3 TRANG BANG District - AN HOA Village - AN LOI Hamlet (XT455210) changed from D to C rating.
(b) BINH DUONG Province:
1 LAI THIEU District - AN SON Village - AN PHU Hamlet (XT825080) changed from D to C rating.
2 LAI THIEU District - AN SON Village - AN HOA Hamlet (XT830095) changed from D to C rating.
3 BEN CAT District - AN DIEN Village - KIEN DIEN Hmlet (XT732323) changed from D to VC rating.
(3) Revolutionary Development operational factors or activities contributing to lessons learned.
1 The new MACV Hamlet Evaluation Rating System was first initiated during the month of February with the first results available in late March. The new system rates the hamlets from A to E or VC. The new report is completed by the MACV District Advisor and shows a more realistic evaluation of hamlet status than the old GVN system. Some problems have been discovered due to the subjectivity of the report. However, detailed guidance is available on the filling out of the report.
2 Each hamlet is evaluated on eighteen different points - nine involving security and nine community development points. After computation, the final ratings are furnished this office. If the ratings of these eighteen separate points could be provided, the information contained therein would give a clearer picture of the hamlet, i.e., that a hamlet with low overall hamlet rating was due to a lack if community development points versus security points. This information would be very useful at this level.
3 Due to the deletion of GIA DINH and LONG AN Provinces from the Division's TAOR, the RD and hamlet evaluation data is no longer kept by this office.
4 The Combined Lightning Concept was studied and a workable solution was proposed. Basically, the concept is one US squad, one ARVN squad, and one PF squad together in one outpost. Proposals for training and operational control have been finalized and now are awaiting final decision by ARVN and US commanders.
5 Village elections were held through the month of April and will continue through the next quarter. Elections were held in the secured villages only. The following number of village elections took place during the month of April. TAY NINH Province, 23; HAU NGHIA Province, 6; PHU HOA 7& TRI TAM Districts of BINH DUONG Province, 5. US units assisted the 25th ARVN Division when asked to provide additional security. The election turnout during April appeared to be favorable; reports will be available at the conclusion of the elections.
6 Liaison is being established at district level by the RD Officer and NCO with attention given to districts where RD teams are currently active. It was found that more specific information is available in reference to RD Teams and RD activities at this level. Emphasis will be placed in the future in visiting district advisors.
7 The last two months of the quarter have shown an upturn in RD Team effort; however, it appears that some of the teams will not accomplish all of their goals for 1967. The overriding cause for this seems to be weak team leadership.
i. Civic Action
(1) Significant Organization or Unit Activities.
(a) During the reporting period, the Division lost Operational control of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. The 8th AA Platoon of the (illegible) CA Company was attached to the 3rd Bde, 4th Division at DAU TIENG but remained in their present position at TAY NINH. The team assists the 1st Bde, 9th Division now located at TAY NINH.
(b) Statistical Summary:
FEB - APR TO DATE
Helping Hand Recipients 20,165 89,867
MEDCAP Patients 25,999 98,977
Health & Sanitation Projects 15 1,199
Construction 52 440
Education and Training 6 170
Community Relations 88 817
(c) MEDCAPS during this quarter showed a slight decline from 317 to 237 conducted. The number of patients treated also showed a slight decline from 34,500 to 31,671. Additional projects of training GVN medical personnel and conducting maternity clinic continued with approximately 50 people receiving some training.
(d) The helping Hand program provided commodities to needy individuals. Tents were provided to refugees at DAU TIENG in addition to clothing and other necessities required, such as carpenter kits, family kits and a midwife kit. Approximately 275 evacuees from the MANHATTAN Operational Area were affected. The following is a summary of Helping Hand issues during the quarter:
Books 1 “C” Box and 60 in English
Candy 80 Ind
Solatium Boxes 415 ea
Clothing 421 “C” Boxes, 136 “B” Boxes,
Canned Food 150 “C” Boxes, 230 Ind and 24
Cases of Soup
Refugee Kits 44 ea
Midwife Kits 8 ea
Paint 49 gallons
Paper Plates and Cups 2 “C” Boxes
Rice 8,375 lbs
School Supplies 7,819 ea
Soybean Oil 145 gallons
Sewing Machines 3 ea
Toilet Articles 19,700 ea
Shoe Tongs 91 Pairs
Toys 67 Ind
Keen Mix 50 cases
Wheat 10 Bags
(e) Construction: The division actively participated in 52 construction projects from repair of roads and bridges to school repair and painting. Emphasis was placed on schools and playgrounds. Construction projects during the quarter included:
1 Roads repaired: 7 (approx 35 km) 6 Latrines: 4
2 Bridges constructed: 1 7 Walls built: 3
3 Fences: 3 8 Dispensaries: 3
4 Playgrounds: 1 9 Miscellaneous: 18
5 Classrooms repaired: 9
(f) RF/PF Assistance: Assistance to RF/PF Forces continued during the quarter with two outposts being constructed, one at PHUOC VINH NINH and one at TAN THOI. A third outpost was repaired at HUI LON. Four hundred and eighty-nine members of the RD/PF forces were given medical assistance during the period and approximately 1,600 individuals received Helping Hand commodities. Housing for PF was constructed at TAY NINH and a playground adjacent to a PF nursery at DAU TIENG. Support with commodities and barrier material in the TRANG BANG District was carried on during this period. Drainage ditches were improved in the Dependent Housing area of HOC MON.
(g) Friendship Council Meeting: On 12 April 67, 2nd Bde conducted a Friendship Council meeting at TAN AN HOI (XT6412).
(h) There were no Civic Action activities during Operations GADSDEN, WAIALUA, MAKALAFA and JUNCTION CITY.
(i) During Operation MANHATTAN, approximately 275 refugees were evacuated to DAU TIENG Refugee Center. They were supported with tents, clothing, toilet articles and building materials.
(2) Civic Action operational factors or activities contributing to Lessons Learned.
1 Since February, the Division has participated in three major operations requiring a preponderance of forces to be employed in those operations. With these elements out of Civic Action, a general trend downward on accomplishments was noted.
2 There was a willingness on the part of the population to take part in Self-Help projects which is demonstrated in the construction of the PF outpost at TAN THOI. The entire project was completed by voluntary labor from the hamlet.
3 (this line illegible)
during Operation MANHATTAN as well as a RF/PF (balance of line illegible).
a Road and bridge construction continues to be a definite asset to Civic Actions. Opening of the road from PHUOC VINH NINH to TAN HOA allows transportation to flow freely from CU CHI to VAU DUONG.
(b) Recommendations: None
j. (C) Psychological operations (PSYOPS)
(1) Significant Organization and Unit Activities:
(a) PSYOP activities were directed primarily in support of operations conducted by division elements in HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, BINH DUONG and (illegible) DINH Provinces.
(b) A total of 22,463,900 leaflets were dropped and hand disseminated throughout the division operational area. Thirty-five (35) leaflets were originated by G5 PSYOPS and produced by the 246th PSYOP Co to exploit PSYOP opportunities.
(c) Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts conducted during the quarter totaled 225 missions for 142 hours of broadcast time. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts totaled 25 hours. An aerial loudspeaker set is presently being prepared to mount on an UH1D helicopter. This will replace the set previously used on the H-23 aircraft. The UH1D set will provide greater flexibility and consolidate the aircraft requirements for PSYOP as the UH1D will be utilized for both leaflet drops and loudspeaker appeals.
(d) During the quarter, the G4 PSYOP section supported the following division operations:
1 Operation GADSDEN.
2 Operation WAIALUA.
3 Operation MAKALAPA.
4 Operation JUNCTION CITY.
5 Operation MANHATTAN.
(e) During the month of March, an ARVN PSYOP Team from the 30th Political Warfare Bn was placed in direct support of G4, PSYOP Section. In April, a second ARVN PSYOP Team was released from the 196th Bde and placed in direct support of the 3rd Bde, 4th Div. These teams have been instrumental in helping carry out the division PSYOP missions. They have been used extensively in the following areas:
2 Interviewing HOI CHANH.
3 Preparing leaflets.
4 Loudspeaker announcements and appeals.
5 Hand distribution of leaflets and posters.
6 PSYOP support of MEDCAPS.
(f) A PSYOP campaign has been conducted along Highway #1 from CU CHI to GO DAU HA, offering rewards for information on VC mines. So far, 3 Vietnamese civilians have given information regarding the locations of mines and have been paid rewards.
(g) A bus mining incident occurred on 8 April 67 on Highway #1 between TRANG BANG and GO DAU HA, resulting in 18 civilians killed and 10 injured. The incident was exploited, utilizing the ARVN PSYOP Team to broadcast messages showing that the VC were responsible and hand distributing leaflets showing that medical care had been given to the survivors by the GVN/US Forces.
(h) Requisitions have been submitted by the G5 and each brigade within the division for a tape recorder and a Polaroid camera. These items will be utilized for preparing tapes and making pictures for leaflets, thereby increasing the timeliness and credibility of our PSYOP material.
(i) CHIEU HOI Program: The CHIEU HOI Program continues to show improvement. There is evidence that the program is beginning to affect the VC main force units. During the month of April, two (2) former VC acting company commanders from the D-14 Bn and a VC tax collector from the MICHELIN Plantation rallied. They cooperated by writing letters to be made into leaflets, allowing their pictures to be taken and recording tapes persuading their friends to rally. They also provided useful information for improving our CHIEU HOI PSOP Program. Most of the information listed under Para 2b (Lessons Learned).
(2) Psychological (PSYOPS) operational factors or activities contributing to Lessons Learned.
(a) Observations: The PSYOP Program continues to show more and more results as experience increases. The number of leaflets disseminated and the amount of loudspeaker time has increased. Effective themes are used to make our propaganda credible. More hard core VC are rallying to the GVN, indicating that our propaganda themes are effective. As more HOI CHANH are interviewed, the PSYOP efforts will be improved. Ground loudspeaker and leaflet operations face to face communication and personal letters written by HOI CHANH to VC families have proven to be the most effective means of propaganda dissemination.
(b) Recommendations: See Lessons Learned.
(1) Personnel and Supporting Medical Units.
(a) The Division at the end of the reporting period was short four (4) Medical Corp Officers and one (1) Medical Service Corps Officer. The shortage of physicians existed in the 25th Medical Battalion (2), and the headquarters and Headquarters Company, Division (2).
(b) The 7th Surgical Hospital terminated all support by its personnel (who were infused into the 12th Evacuation Hospital) and moved out of the CU CHI base camp to assume another support mission.
(c) The two primary medical facilities remaining in the CU CHI camp are the 12th Evacuation Hospital and the 25th Medical Battalion (-). In April, however, the 25th Medical Battalion sent C Company to CHU LAI as part of a provisional task force, and now has only Headquarters and A Company and C Company in CU CHI. B Company remains attached to the 4th Infantry Division at PLEIKU.
(d) In March 1967, the 196th Infantry Brigade began participation in Operation OREGON for an indefinite period. Medical support for garrison units at TAY NINH and combat units in the area was assumed by a clearing platoon (-) of the 25th Medical Battalion which was later replaced by a clearing company of the 9th Division.
The 25th Medical Battalion conducted refresher training for all newly assigned corpsmen and initiated a plan wherein these personnel were infused into the Infantry battalions for a period of fourteen (14) days. The instruction was met with enthusiasm and the plan was well received by the Support Command and the Infantry battalions as well.
(3) Preventive Medicine.
Health of the Command. The health of the command continues to be excellent. Malaria and Hepatitis cases remain at a low rate. Venereal disease remained relatively consistent. A rather high rate of diarrheal disease occurred in the month of April.
(4) Environmental Situation.
(a) Water Supply. The Division Preventive Medicine personnel consistently check the four water points in the CU CHI camp. Each of the water points is operational and chemical analysis indicates the water supply to be excellent.
(b) Waste Disposal. Plans are being drafted to move the sanitary fill to a new location and to intensify the supervision of disposal of edible garbage. The G4, in conjunction with the Post Veterinarian, is developing this program.
Medical support continues to be excellent. The influx of new personnel into all medical facilities during the reporting period has not resulted in a setback of quality support, but rather has resulted in fresh energy and new ideas which has led to better medical service for the 25th Infantry Division.
(1) On 9 March, the Division Signal Office made distribution of a Staff SOI to be used at brigade and division headquarters. To meet requirements of the respective staffs, the new staff SOI is on 8 X 10-1/2” sheets used in three-ring binders for ready reference and ease of understanding.
(2) On 13 April, the Signal Office presented to the USARV Signal Conference various topics of importance to this Division. These included problems encountered in the frequent changing of radio relay frequencies, requisitioning of major items of radio relay equipment, the need for additional personnel, and air conditioning requirements for communications equipment.
(1) February 1967. Training during the month of February 1967 continued, but at a slower pace due to the large number of units employed on Operation GADSDEN. The following number of personnel attended the below division schools:
Ambush Academy - No class in Feb Replacement Training 423
NCO Academy 138 Motor Officer Course 0
Mines and Booby Traps 265 Generator Operator Course 16
Explosives and Demolition 45 Military Justice Course 10
Small Arms Maintenance 12 Mess Management Course 1
(2) March 1967. The 25th Infantry Division Training Course has been increased with one additional course, Co Aidman course.
Ambush Academy 161 Motor Officer Course 10
NCO Academy 68 Generator Operator 12
Mines and Booby Traps 390 Military Justice 10
Explosives and Demolition 240 Mess Management 11
Small Arms Maintenance 12 Company Aidman Course 34
Replacement Training 1,657
(3) April 1967. An additional course was added to the 25th Infantry Division Training, Tunnel Training Course.
Ambush Academy 49 Motor Officer Course 0
NCO Academy 65 Generator Operator Course 3
Mines and Booby Traps 1,610 Military Justice Course 12
Explosives and Demolition 101 Mess Management Course 2
Small Arms Maintenance 1 Company Aidman Course 34
Replacement Training 1,876 Tunnel Training course 32
In addition, New Equipment Training has conducted classes in the month of May on the AN/PSR-1 ANTI INTRUSION DEVICE. Fifty-one personnel attended. Also on (illegible) which allocations are received from higher headquarters, listings are as follows:
Recondo Course 33
Orientation Course 3
Helicopter Maintenance Course 15
IACAF Jungle Survival School 9
These figures of Non-Division Schools represents February, March and April.
2. (C) Commanders Observations and Recommendations.
a. Observations (Lessons Learned)
ITEM: Turnover of personnel.
DISCUSSION: Due to the units initial movement to RVN in April 1966, the Battalions experienced a heavy turnover of personnel in March and April 1967. The units have had a hard time in keeping the combat effectiveness up and keeping the unit functioning smoothly due to this lack of experienced personnel.
OBSERVATION: Rotation should be spaced so as to preclude any large turnover of personnel. This can be done by:
(a) Adjusting the DEROS to allow rotation over a 2 - 3 month period.
(b) Inter-transfer of personnel between units to preclude both units having a large turnover; i.e., a Battalion with a heavy rotation of personnel in January could exchange 30 - 40% with a Battalion that has a heavy rotation in June or July.
ITEM: Need for additional personnel in the Aviation Battalion.
DISCUSSION: On 18 April, a Div Cir, 616-2, was received which stated that all outstanding MTO&E's requesting additional personnel had been disapproved and that the Battalion should prepare itself to function within the confines of the “E” series TO&E. Examination revealed dire need for additional people if the Bn was to continue to operate in an effective manner.
OBSERVATION: This unit, as far as can be determined, is not organized like any other aviation unit, either divisional or non-divisional, in RVN. A general rewrite of the Aviation Battalion TO&E is urgently needed to establish a logical structure from which the Aviation Battalion can continue to provide support for the Div without straining its existing assets.
ITEM: Replacement of Aviator Personnel to maintain combat effectiveness.
DISCUSSION: Aviators have been rotated prior to replacements being assigned to the unit. When new aviators are assigned, a period of approximately fifteen days is required to train personnel to assume the duties of those who have departed.
OBSERVATION: Replacement personnel should be programmed to arrive a minimum of 15 days prior to the departure of an aviator in order to maintain combat effectiveness.
ITEM: Availability of Operations personnel of proper MOS to replace personnel who are to depart.
DISCUSSION: During the last three months, all Company Operations personnel have rotated with no qualified personnel for replacements. At present, all personnel working in Operations, with the exception of one, are on-the-job trainees.
OBSERVATION: A concerted effort should be made to replace personnel in critical MOS's prior to departure to maintain a proper continuity in these slots.
ITEM: Deliberate versus Hasty Search.
DISCUSSION: Deliberate and Hasty Search Ops both have distinct advantages and disadvantages. Generally, the Hasty Search Op is planned to move through an AO quickly to catch VC off guard. The Deliberate Search is planned with the idea of destroying VC food, supplies, equipment, and fortifications.
OBSERVATION: The initial phase of an op should consist of Hasty Search of the entire AO, preferably by the use of highly mobile units such as Mech or Heliborne forces. Subsequent phases should employ phase lines which require units to do a thorough job prior to moving on.
ITEM: Detection of Mines.
DISCUSSION: A rain, especially a relatively hard one, will uncover mines laying near the ground surface, particularly in open areas and along roads.
OBSERVATION: Following heavy rains, maximum advantage should be taken of greater mine detection capability resulting from mines being uncovered to recon future routes, CP locations, etc.
ITEM: VC Contact.
DISCUSSION: Calling in Arty/Mortar fire and/or airstrikes against light contact even though some element of the unit may have heavy contact and several serious casualties, causes considerable delay to counterattack plans, usually resulting in loss of VC contact. These fires should be called for immediately, but at such distance that they seal off the objective area and initially serve as a block to withdrawing VC.
OBSERVATION: Light enemy contact must be met with aggressive action. Arty, mortar, and air fires should be called for immediately but at a distance which will seal off the area from VC reinforcements and block VC routes of withdrawal.
ITEM: Perimeter Defense.
DISCUSSION: A possibility exists that a vehicle (or vehicles) on a perimeter could be overrun and its .50 Cal MG turned on other carriers.
OBSERVATION: Each vehicle inside the outer perimeter must also be assigned a sector of fire which includes the friendly carriers within that sector in the event they are overpowered in an attack.
ITEM: Personnel Riding in Carriers versus on Carriers.
DISCUSSION: There are distinct advantages and disadvantages to both riding in carriers and on carriers. Generally, riding on carriers results in fewer casualties from RPG-2 rds and more rapid response to enemy contact; however, it also results in more casualties from command detonated claymores and sniper fire.
OBSERVATION: There should be a fixed policy on riding on/in personnel carriers. The local commander must determine whether the greater threat is from RPG-2 rds or from command detonated claymores and booby traps. Once he decides on the most probable threat, he should place his men accordingly.
ITEM: Mutually Supporting MO Bunkers.
DISCUSSION: In a human wave frontal assault, VC were able to overrun 2 - .50 Cal MG bunkers. These bunkers, despite their heavy fire power, are not capable of withstanding a heavy frontal assault.
OBSERVATION: MG Bunkers are the first objectives of a VC human wave attack. They must be heavily protected by concertina wire, sand bags and fortifications. MG bunkers must be mutually supporting and must have FPL's immediately in front of the adjacent MG bunker. MG bunkers must have M16 claymore mines at least 2 rows deep and 3 rows wide in front of them to break up assaults.
ITEM: Defensive Arty Concentration.
DISCUSSION: DEFCONS are an excellent means of providing rapid, close, and accurate arty fire w/o time consuming adjustments. When properly used, the DFEFCONS can provide instant support and first rd hits on advancing enemy force.
OBSERVATION: DEFCONS must be fired to within 100 meters of the FPL. To do this, trps must be in protective positions while firing. DEFCONS must be fired at all quadrants, a minimum of 4 or more, depending on the size of the unit involved, and should cover all avenues of approach and all dead space. DEFCONS must be fired in at different intervals, at a minimum every other day, to make allowance for difference in guns and movement of perimeter. Irregular firing of DEFCONS during the night insures that the VC cannot approach FPL.
ITEM: Small Unit Sweeps.
DISCUSSION: Slow ground sweeps in a single direction results in VC detecting the axis of advance and fleeing the zone of action.
OBSERVATION: Small unit sweeps should be a two phase op. The first phase is a fast violent attack to surprise the VC. The second phase should be a meticulous search of all likely hiding places after the zone of ops has been effectively sealed.
ITEM: Selection of a Defensive Position.
DISCUSSION: A major river is a dangerous obstacle on which to have a perimeter. Rivers are often bordered with heavy vegetation that limits observation. The obstacle hampers the movement of friendly troops and offers protection for snipers firing from across the river.
OBSERVATION: Select defensive perimeters with small obstacles with good visibility and fields of fire. The inside of the perimeter should afford cover and concealment.
ITEM: Canal Crossing.
DISCUSSION: Crossing canals at previously constructed sites often results in booby trap casualties.
OBSERVATION: Construct multiple crossing sites. Secure the far banks and flanks and cross well dispersed, with at least five meters between individuals. A good rule is one man on the far bank, and in the water, and one on the near shore.
ITEM: Helicopter Resupply.
DISCUSSION: Shuttling helicopters over long distance resupply routes from base camp to the forward combat units results in long turn-around times when the helicopter is not being profitably used. This also increases the time needed for resupply ops and forces the forward unit to halt combat ops early in the afternoon.
OBSERVATION: Moving supplies by convoy to the Fire Support Base early in the day cuts turn-around time to a minimum and permits maximum use of daylight hours for combat ops.
ITEM: Aviation Unit Standard SOP.
DISCUSSION: Small differences in aviation unit SOP on such things as formations, leading, signal, smoke, etc., can mean the difference between success and confusion on combat airlifts.
OBSERVATION: A Vietnam-wide SOP on heliborne Ops which spells out minor points but allows those points to be changed when the situation dictates would allow for more effective Ops with all aviation units.
ITEM: Hand Grenade Employment and Safe Distance When Destroying Bunkers.
DISCUSSION: Mines and booby traps in VC bunkers often create a larger explosion than expected when demolitions are employed to destroy the bunker.
OBSERVATION: Hand grenades should be thrown in all bunkers after visual inspection.
ITEM: Immediate action after an APC hits a Mine.
DISCUSSION: When a Mech unit remains in place after one of its vehicles hits a mine, it lays itself open to VC AW and anti-tank fire. Minefields are often covered by fire. If the unit halts in column, it is difficult for medical personnel to move their APC up to the mined APC.
OBSERVATION: Once an APC strikes a mine and receives fire, the remaining vehicles should bring fire to bear on enemy positions, maneuver toward those positions, and post dismounted security elements forward.
ITEM: Nightly firing of Final Protective Fires.
DISCUSSION: Controlled firing of the Co FPF just after dark, before the listening posts move into position, followed by a Bn critique proves to be very effective. The action: (1) Verifies weapons positioning, (2) clears the wood line of VC prior to patrol deployment, (3) gives the men confidence in their defensive fires.
OBSERVATION: Final protective fires should be fired nightly and adjusted as necessary.
ITEM: Satelliting of ARVN to US Units down to Platoon Level.
DISCUSSION: Twice during Op JUNCTION CITY, the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf operated with ARVN Units. Companies were satellited to US Companies, and Platoons worked together. The spirit of aggressiveness and cooperation far exceeded previous Ops where ARVN units worked toward the same mission but in separate areas. Results were gratifying.
OBSERVATION: When the VS Commander agrees, US-ARVN units should be paired down to Platoon level and controlled by a joint Headquarters at each level.
ITEM: Use of Wiretap Teams.
DISCUSSION: Several times in Ops of the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf, VC commo lines were discovered but high HQ8 indicated that only specially trained teams should be allowed to tap them for intelligence material. The time required for such teams to arrive in the area is long. The question remains unanswered on whether an inexperienced team tap would produce an audible click in the line, and if it did, would a VC operator recognize the sound.
OBSERVATION: A written policy should be published concerning wiretapping of enemy lines. Any evaluation of the problem should consider immediate tactical value of intelligence gained in relation to the chance of compromising the tap.
ITEM: Small VC Mines may be Augmented with Larger Explosive Charges.
DISCUSSION: On important roads, small exposed mines have been found to be connected with concealed large explosive charges. In many cases, if the apparently small mine is detonated, the supplementing explosion can cause craters, unexpected damage, and casualties.
OBSERVATION: In areas which should be preserved from damage, all mines should be carefully examined before destruction. Care must be taken in analyzing the resultant damage which might occur if the mine is, in fact, used as a detonator for a larger mine. Disarming and removal of mines should be accomplished whenever possible.
ITEM: Routes May be Mined Shortly After Use.
DISCUSSION: When units return on the same route previously used, they have found that mines have been laid in the interim. On a recent Op, one unit returned over a route they had cleared only six hours earlier and found that mines had been laid in the fresh tracks.
OBSERVATION: When feasible, exit an area over a route different from that used to enter. When this is not possible, use mine detectors and be alert to the likelihood of recent minings.
ITEM: Cross Country Mobility of M42 (Twin 40mm SP).
DISCUSSION: The M42 unit can be effectively employed with Mechanized and Armored Cav units operating in open areas of rice paddies and hedge rows. Their use in jungle areas or in dense undergrowth is not recommended. Optimum deployment is two M42's per platoon of supported units. The M42's direct fire capability for counter fire at night. Logistic support for POL and ammunition is critical. Maximum range of M42 cross country is (illegible) miles as fuel consumption is 2-1/2 gal per mile.
OBSERVATION: Direct support missions of Mechanized and Armored Cav units are within the capability of the M42 weapons system.
ITEM: Security of Disabled Vehicles.
DISCUSSION: An M55 (2-1/2 ton trk mtd Quad .50 Cal MG) was mined, resulting in 3 WIA and destroying the vehicle. Ten minutes after the incident, the crew received SA and AW fire from an est Sqd of VC. The alertness and aggressive action of the crew forced the VC to break contact.
OBSERVATION: The establishment of security must be done simultaneous with the care of wounded after a vehicle is disabled.
ITEM: Fire Coordination Lines.
DISCUSSION: Coordination of fires adjacent to other units requires extra precaution and coordination.
OBSERVATION: Direct VHF Communications between adjacent artillery clearing Hqs is imperative. There should be no middle man in the clearing process.
ITEM: Clearance of Fire Adjacent to Fire Coordination Lines.
DISCUSSION: During a recent Op, two Bdes shared a mutual boundary designated as an FCS. One Bde policy restricted fires within 500 meters of friendly position. They often refused to clear fires in the adjacent Bde area if those fires would fall within 500 meters of their positions.
OBSERVATION: FCL's should be treated as defined in PM 6-20-1, i.e., a coordination line, not a clearance line or permission line. No other units should have the authority to deny fires within another unit's area of Op, provided the effects of the fire will not go into the other unit's area.
ITEM: Employment of Artillery Searchlights.
DISCUSSION: The employment of searchlights in support of perimeter defense is new to many tactical units and their deployment and use require special techniques.
OBSERVATION: Searchlight missions require the same coordinating procedures as fire missions, i.e., adjacent units must be consulted. Also, the lights must be laid for direction with direct communication to a light DC. Lights should have alternate positions and be moved nightly.
ITEM: Flights near Defensive Fortifications.
DISCUSSION: On 14 Jan 67, an aircraft was assigned the mission to defoliate the perimeter of an ARVN compound. While flying at approximately 30 feet in performance of this mission, a friendly claymore mine was detonated. The mine was probably triggered by the aircraft rotor wash and resulted in the aircraft receiving approximately 30 holes through the skin and the crew chief being wounded slightly in the hand.
OBSERVATION: Careful consideration must be given to any mission which is to be performed in the vicinity of defensive fortifications.
ITEM: Obtaining Ground Clearance for Aviation Operations.
DISCUSSION: The amount of coordination required to obtain ground clearances to conduct Army Aviation Aerial Fire Support and Firefly type Ops takes up a considerable amount of time if accomplished on a day to day basis. Whenever possible, Ops of this type should be preplanned to cover longer periods of time and clearances obtained as much as a week in advance. In this matter, advance notice is available to all concerned and more effort can be directed to detailed planning.
OBSERVATION: In planning aviation support, mission type orders should cover longer periods of time. Clearances can then be obtained earlier, cover a longer period of time and require less time and effort to coordinate.
ITEM: Concertina Wire.
DISCUSSION: Triple concertina defense wire, when properly used and installed, is very effective in preventing infiltration and frontal assaults on friendly positions. A single strand of concertina can be easily breached and must be (illegible) to triple strand. Triple strand wire, if not properly secured, can be infiltrated by individuals.
OBSERVATION: Triple concertina defensive wire must be:
(a) Securely staked down with 8' and 4' (illegible) pickets and strung with barbed wire. This prevents the wire being lifted and infiltrated.
(b) Concertina must be minimum of 50 meters from the nearest friendly elements to prevent hand grenades being thrown in from in front of the wire.
(c) Concertina must be covered by AW fire at points of easiest access.
(d) Trip flares and noise making devices should be used to provide warning of any attempt to break the perimeter.
(e) Booby traps and mines can be employed in front of and under the concertina wire. Those areas must be covered with AW fire. Permission to booby trap must be received from 25th Inf Div CO.
(3) Training and Organization.
ITEM: Formation of provisional combat team within a support-type unit enhanced morale and improved efficiency.
DISCUSSION: Some soldiers in the Sqdn's Hq & Hq Trp did not feel that their administrative and logistical duties effectively contributed to the U.S. effort in RVN, and several had requested reassignment to line trps. The line units provide an ambush patrol outside the base camp's perimeter every night, along with other operational missions. Volunteers were assembled from the HHT and undertook additional training for three weeks. The twenty-five persons who persevered were formed into a provisional unit which participates in an ambush patrol at least once per week, relieving the line units that night. This unit is known locally as “McCormack's Raiders” after the HHT Commander.
OBSERVATION: Formation of volunteers from HHT into a provisional unit has afforded them the opportunity to actively participate against the VC, and has greatly increased unit pride and Esprit de Corps.
ITEM: Rotation of Bn Personnel.
DISCUSSION: Over 50% of the enlisted personnel and 80% of the officer personnel were rotated to CONUS in the past 90 days. This “rotational” hump was completed while the Bn was involved in Op GADSDEN and JUNCTION CITY. The program of cross training personnel, coupled with the prompt requisitioning and arrival of replacements was a major factor in the successful accomplishment of the Bn (illegible) in support of combat operations.
OBSERVATION: That continued emphasis be placed upon cross training of personnel and prompt requisitioning of replacements.
ITEM: Div MARS Station.
DISCUSSION: There exists the requirement for more frequencies to be made available for use by the 25th Inf Div MARS Station. This station operates a net which consists of five stations. At the present time, two frequencies are available that can be used daily and one additional frequency that can be used every other day.
OBSERVATION: If two more frequencies were made available, the number of phone patches could increase, resulting in a greater number of Div personnel receiving benefit from this facility.
ITEM: Division Signal School.
DISCUSSION: The Div Signal School makes available training classes on use of the codes and secure voice communications equipment to all units within the Div. The following are the number of classes conducted and personnel who attended:
(a) February: 4 Classes 7 attended
(b) March: 11 Classes 67 attended
(c) April: 11 Classes 74 attended
OBSERVATION: Attendance at this school is not mandatory but is provided for the benefit and convenience of the Div. Units send personnel to the Div Sig School when operational commitments permit.
ITEM: Destruction of Duds and Mines.
DISCUSSION: Much time can be lost by having the finding unit (usually the lead element) destroy duds and/or mines.
OBSERVATION: Mines and duds should be marked and prepared for demolition by the finding platoon, but actually blown by a following element.
ITEM: Use of Grappling Hooks.
DISCUSSION: Grappling hooks with long ropes can be used effectively to check enemy mines, equipment, road blocks, brush and trees from roads, etc., for possibly booby traps.
OBSERVATION: Grappling hooks with long ropes attached should be carried (1 per platoon) for use in blowing booby traps.
ITEM: Test Firing Weapons.
DISCUSSION: Patrols desire to test fire their weapons frequently but are not always provided with a range without request. This is also true of Hqs Personnel.
OBESERVATION: After due coordination with adjacent units an/or ARVN, a range and time can be established for test firing of weapons.
ITEM: Use of Claymore Mines.
DISCUSSION: Berms, ditches, folds in the terrain, etc., often preclude claymore mines from being effectively employed.
OBSERVATION: Dead space can sometimes be covered by placing claymore mines in trees, on poles, etc. The Lesson Learned is to use imagination in the placing of claymores.
ITEM: Gasoline Operated Chain Saws.
DISCUSSION: Due to restrictions on selection of Arty position areas, it is often necessary to remove trees and other obstacles to provide required fields of fire or to reduce site to mask.
OBSERVATION: Gasoline operated chain saws should be included as part of the Arty firing btry MTOE.
ITEM: Aviator Training.
DISCUSSION: During the month of Feb, this unit only participated in four combat Ops. This occurred during a period of maximum aviator change-over, so that when the end of Mar arrived, A/25 only had eleven fully qualified aircraft commanders out of a required total of twenty-five. To be considered fully trained by this unit's SOP, the aircraft commander must be signed off by an instructor pilot after he has successfully participated in a minimum of three combat assaults as an aircraft commander.
OBSERVATION: A minimum of fifteen combat assaults monthly is considered essential to maintain aviator proficiency and to train new aviators. When the turnover of personnel increases during a given period of time, consideration must be given to the unit's CA commitment so that aviator proficiency does not decrease.
ITEM: Lack of (illegible)-Secured Ranges for Gunnery Training.
DISCUSSION: The only available ranges have been over hostile territory, making it necessary to use two armed helicopters in these areas. The lack of flyable aircraft in sufficient numbers to accomplish this has made proper and continuous training impossible.
OBSERVATION: The availability of a range or a local secure area would facilitate the use of only one aircraft to accomplish gunnery training when two aircraft are not available.
ITEM: Flight Sections.
DISCUSSION: Under our present TOE, the General Support Company consists of a General Support Platoon, containing a (illegible) Section and a (illegible) Support Section. This causes some aviators to fly an excessive number of hours, while others fly a lesser amount.
OBSERVATION: By dividing the aviators into 4 flight sections, controls can be established governing the number of hours and types of missions that each aviator would fly, thus giving each aviator a chance to fly different type aircraft and a more rounded experience in different type missions.
ITEM: Organic Armed Helicopters.
DISCUSSION: Co A does not have the capability of immediately responding to airmobile lift requirements because of the lack of an organic armed helicopter platoon. The general support requirement placed on Co B by the Div scattered Ops precludes rapid response. The armed helicopters in B/25 provide fire support to ground elements, night surveillance and interdiction missions, convoy cover, counter mortar suppression and medical evacuation/resupply aircraft escort cover. Div requirements for gunship support on these missions presently tax B/25's capabilities to the fullest.
OBSERVATION: With an organic armed platoon, A/25 would not have to wait for the recall of B/25 gunships or the attachment of fire teams from other units in the Corps area. Teamwork between the lift aircraft and the gunships is absolutely essential for a successful airmobile op. At present, this team action must be coordinated for each and every assault. With organic gunships coordination would be a matter of standard operating procedure, and provide the (illegible) proven capability now employed by combat Avn Bn Airmobile Companies.
ITEM: Requirements for TO&E Augmentation.
DISCUSSION: This unit currently is organized under TO&E 1-75E as directed by (illegible), Hq, 25th Inf Div. No augmentation has been provided to allow for increased activities initiated by combat requirements.
(a) Under original Div TO&E, the maintenance Bn was staffed to provide E Co, DS maintenance for Aviation support. At that time, Div had only the general support company plus separate aviation sections to furnish aviation support to the Div. Co A, Airmobile (Lt) was added in May 65.
(b) US Army manning level augmentation criteria for establishing maintenance personnel requirements indicate far greater maintenance personnel strength is required to furnish the aircraft availability and utilization which the Inf Div has proven necessary for sustained Ops in RVN.
(c) Firm commitment for sufficient pilot strength is not available at company level, although the additional pilots required to fill both pilots seats in 25 aircraft appear on TO&E 1-77E as augmentation Para 08 Line 01.
(d) No action has been approved to allow 25 door gunner positions or to assign rank structure for those individuals.
OBSERVATION: Tactical necessity for increased maintenance capability has been proven for over 4 years by airmobile companies (Lt) thru flying hour programs, A/O availability and overall mission capability. Those units have assigned AO maintenance detachments as outlined in TO&E 29-5000.
RECOMMENDATION: Recommend procuring a like maintenance Det for Co A, 25th Avn Bn. Further recommend necessary action be initiated to provide complete operational TO&E with necessary augmentation approved thru CO.
ITEM: Innocent photographs can provide enemy intelligence with valuable information.
DISCUSSION: In Feb 67, three VC low level agents were captured on the 25th Inf Div Base Camp. Their apprehension was based on three photographs that were captured from an unidentified VC intelligence unit. The photographs contained the pictures of five indigenous laborers employed on the base camp whose features had been obliterated, apparently by being burned out with a cigarette. The background of the photographs contained figures listing distances in meters from Arty/registration points, as well as identification markings on various military equipment and structures. During interrogation, the three agents admitted that the photographs had been taken by their Bn supervisors to do a favor to the agents and that the measurements had been written in the photographs at the request of their handler, who had specified the point at which to take the measurements.
OBSERVATION: All personnel, and especially those assigned to duties supervising indigenous employees, should have the security risk inherent in even innocent photographs brought to their attention.
ITEM: The necessity for furnishing a complete, accurate Captive Card (MACV Form 340) with every detainee.
DISCUSSION: In many instances, detainees are evacuated for interrogation without a Captive Card or with one which contains fragmentary, incomplete or erroneous information. It is difficult to gain the upper hand during the initial interrogation when this occurs. It is, therefore, essential that capturing units complete individual Captive Cards IN THE FIELD, providing the DETAILS of the capture of every person detained. In some cases in the past, personnel of capturing units Hqs have attempted to complete capture tags after the arrival of the detainee at the Div PW Collecting Point. Naturally, the lack of first hand information concerning the circumstances of the capture of the individual leads to serious omissions of vital information.
OBSERVATION: Every member of the individual line units should carry and know how to complete Captive Cards of detained persons.
ITEM: Visits of Unit S2's.
DISCUSSION: Past experience has shown that timely visits by S2's to the Order of Battle (OB) Section, 25th (illegible) Det, have been valuable to both parties. The free exchange of intelligence information inherent in their visits eliminates the possibility that intelligence may not reach the S2 and allows clarification in detail of intelligence holdings. Extensive visual aids ((illegible) maps, photos, charts and overlays) maintained at the (illegible) Det enable the S3 to relate his information to the overall situation in the Div TAOR. All intelligence sources available to the (illegible) are analyzed and related to the specific area of interest of the S2's unit. The S2, in turn, provides detailed information on areas in which his unit has operated. This information plus the results of exploitation of intelligence provided by the OB Section are of significant value to the overall intelligence program.
OBSERVATION: Frequent visits of Bde and Bn S2's to the OB Section are of value to the overall intelligence program in general and the continued (illegible) in particular.
ITEM: H & Y Target Acquisition with SLAR Aircraft.
DISCUSSION: A moving SLAR return in the vicinity of a suspected VC base camp indicated that the camp might be occupied. Arty fire was placed on the base camp and large secondary explosion resulted. A moving return on a road or river can be engaged by firing along the road or river or by firing at known or suspected crossing of off loading sites in the vicinity. A return in the vicinity of a planned concentration can be fired upon almost immediately. SLAR returns which require comparison with other available intelligence to determine proximity to known installations or activities can generally be fired upon within 25 minutes after sighting.
OBSERVATION: In flight spot reports from Army MOHAWK SLAR aircraft can provide lucrative Arty H & I targets.
ITEM: Use of MI Teams at Bn Level.
DISCUSSION: Military Intelligence Personnel remain at Bde OP locations during Ops. MI Teams could collect more timely and accurate information if they were in the field with maneuver elements.
OBSERVATION: MI Teams should be available to company sized units on call for on-the-spot exploitation of captured documents, personnel, and materials.
ITEM: Rapid and accurate reporting of VC Structures and Materials.
DISCUSSION: Because of the nature of many Ops which require company elements to maintain their momentum, there is little time for Bn Intelligence Personnel to conduct on-the-spot investigation of discovered installations or materials; the company must move on. In order to obtain timely and accurate information about enemy structures and materials, the company should be prepared to conduct its own inventory of materials and to make diagrams of structures.
OBSERVATION: Each company should assign a team to sketch enemy fortifications; a second team could conduct an accurate inventory of captured material. This information could be quickly passed to Bn, and with little delay the company could continue to move.
ITEM: H & I Fires may prevent VC recovery of bodies.
DISCUSSION: When an ambush patrol engages VC during contact but does not subsequently leave its position and search the target area, the VC usually return before daylight and remove the bodies. Recently, a unit called frequent harassment and interaction (H & I) fires into the killing ground until daylight and then was able to move out and identify the VC losses.
OBSERVATION: VC knowledge. When H & I fires will fall on the killing ground they discourage recovery effort and enable an accurate body count.
ITEM: Aviation Spot Report Net.
DISCUSSION: Division Aviation Units fly all over the Div on routine missions daily. Continuous surveillance of the area by aircraft on routine missions can result in significant intelligence information which would otherwise go unnoticed. Currently, here is no central reporting facility for aviation spot reports. Each aircraft reports to its parent unit and the reports are then routed up through channels, delaying the arrival of this information at the (illegible). The aviation Bn used its flight following facility, Clipper Control, as an aviation spot report net monitored by the Bn S2, who, in turn, phones significant reports to the G2.
The usefulness of the system was pointed up when an aircraft on a courier mission reported sighting what appeared to be a mined bus in Hwy #1, diverted to the scene and successfully evacuated several seriously injured civilians.
OBSERVATION: An Aviation Spot Report Net or Intelligence Net monitored by Bn personnel would facilitate a much faster dissemination of timely valuable information reported by aircraft over the Division TAOR.
ITEM: Booby Traps.
DISCUSSION: In order to provide protection for base areas, caches, hospitals and LOC, the VC will heavily mine and booby trap an area or an avenue of approach into an area. The VC have been known to have an area prepared with (illegible) booby traps and, when forced to leave an area, will attach trip wires or otherwise arm the booby traps. Bunkers have been known to have mines or booby traps mounted just inside the entrance where an attempt to enter will cause detonations.
OBSERVATION: Engr mine detector and (illegible) teams can save much time and (illegible) casualties while traversing a mine field or booby trapped area. Mine detectors should be used in the entrances of all bunkers, fortifications and VC structures.
(a) (illegible) dispersion will lessen chances of large numbers of casualties from a single booby trap.
(b) Where practical, booby traps should be blown in place either with ammo or by use of a grappling hook to detonate the booby trap.
ITEM: Potable Ice Supply.
DISCUSSION: The Potable Ice supply at CU CHI is inadequate. Two 15 ton capacity ice plants at base camp are operational, but only produce 25 tons per day. Requirements are for approximately 66 tons daily. Because of lack of adequate potable ice and lack of adequate refrigeration equipment, 1st Log Comd supplements the potable ice produced at CU CHI with non-potable ice on government contract. This non-potable ice, contaminated with bacteria from human waste, is a constant health hazard as continual supervision is needed to prevent mixing of potable and non-potable ice at the user level.
OBSERVATION: Additional ice plants need to be built at Camp CU CHI for production of potable ice. Two are scheduled for construction within 4 to 5 months.
ITEM: Operation of ASP at CU CHI.
DISCUSSION: An ammunition supply point is presently operated at Camp CU CHI by the DAO, 25th Inf Div. The Inf Div (illegible) does not authorize personnel or equipment for purposes of operating an ASP. Due to the relatively isolated geographical location of the Div in relation to Class V stocks at depot, it is necessary that Class V be stocked at CU CHI to allow quick response to any operational necessity.
OBSERVATION: Operation to include providing of personnel and equipment of the CU CHI ASP should be taken over by elements of 1st Log Comd.
ITEM: Air Drop Resupply.
DISCUSSION: During the period 21 Mar - 7 April 67, the 196th Bde was largely dependent on air drop resupply while participating in its floating brigades operation during Operation JUNCTION CITY, Phase III. A total of 613.3 short tons of Class I, III, and V supplies were airdropped at eight different locations.
OBSERVATION: Inter-service cooperation was excellent. Response by Air Force crews to (illegible) changes in drop zones and their overall delivery accuracy and timeliness was exceptional. Though Air Force and Logistical assets were limited and stretched to the (illegible) during this period, the ground commander was successfully resupplied and in a position to devote his full energies to his tactical mission.
ITEM: Aircraft Refueling Capabilities.
DISCUSSION: During The logistical planning phase prior to the conduct of Op (illegible), (conducted 8 Apr - 22 Apr 67) it was established as a valid requirement that two (illegible)-ports were needed in the operational area. These (illegible)-ports were needed for (illegible) resupply. Detailed discussions and studies resulted in the conclusion that none of the units of the Div have the personnel or equipment capability to operate (illegible). (Illegible) refueling points at field locations. (Illegible) refueling points at field locations, (illegible). Aviation Bn and the aviation section of Bde Hqs do not provide the (illegible) to operate the (illegible)-ports in Bde trains area or (illegible). The problem was solved in this Op by the MACV advisory element located nearby to the operations are voluntarily operating the (illegible) refueling point by providing both personnel and equipment.
OBSERVATION: The (illegible) of the (illegible) was the concept of combat service support for the Div (illegible) aircraft refueling must be given detailed study with possible resultant requests for (illegible) of TOE's and combat service (illegible).
ITEM: Oil Analysis Program Reports.
DISCUSSION: Oil analysis reports indicate that gear box and engine (illegible) and (illegible) Aircraft are contaminated from dirt.
OBSERVATION: After extensive research, random sampling of the oils throughout the Div, it was decided that by reducing the time interval of oil changes required by applicable Technical Manuals the problem was largely solved.
ITEM: Div Photo Lab.
DISCUSSION: During the tactical combat photographic missions, experience has shown that certain photographic equipment currently being used by the Div Sig Bn is not satisfactory.
OBSERVATION: The (illegible) and MS-AA cameras are too complex and fragile for use in combat photography. The (illegible) rate for this equipment and lack of replacement parts reduces the capability of the Div Photo Section. There is a lack of working space in the dark room AA/(illegible), which materially inhibits the Op of this facility.
ITEM: Medium Size Jungle Fatigues.
DISCUSSION: Non-availability of medium jungle fatigues.
OBSERVATION: Due to the rapid turnover of personnel and high percentage of direct (illegible) due to (illegible) wear and tear, (illegible) overage of authorized storage of jungle fatigues, size medium, should be kept on hand.
ITEM: Resupply to Fwd Units.
DISCUSSION: Resupply to fwd units is at best time consuming process, rations, water, ammo and misc gear must be taken in every night and extracted in the morning. In addition, in inundated areas where no cover is available filled sandbags are required to provide (illegible) positions for the troops.
OBSERVATION: Where (illegible) and tactical situation allow (illegible) CH-47 is the fastest and easiest method of (illegible) resupply. One sortie of CH-47 carries as much as 5 - 8 times the load of a (illegible)-12. Loads can be slung and dropped into the area w/o causing a lot of loading and unloading problems. By using CH-47 resup time was cut by 2/3 and exposure of troops and equipment to enemy fire reduced to the min. To properly use the Ch-47 capabilities, additional slings and cargo nets are required in the basic TO&E equip.
ITEM: Dry-cell batteries no longer possessing full power can be re-used in equip required reduced quantities of energy.
DISCUSSION: The reason life of batteries occurring in RVN (illegible) it considered that they be used with (illegible) efficiency. When no longer powerful enough to operate the (illegible) switchboard, the BA200 six volt battery can still power (illegible) lantern. BA30 batteries no longer powerful enough to operate an AA/(illegible 35 (illegible) unit are still suitable for use in (illegible) flashlights.
OBSERVATION: While re-used batteries do not last as long as fresh ones, they perform satisfactorily for a reduced length of time and ensure the batteries complete use.
ITEM: Climate conditions in RVN indicate treatment of fungal dermatitis with GRISEOFULVIN.
DISCUSSION: The fungal dermatities are among the most common problems seen on rolling sick call. (illegible) in that category are tinea (illegible), tinea (illegible), epidermaphytic infections, and non-specific external otitis infections. Whereas local medications have in the most part proven to be useful in treating these conditions, the moist dusty climate encountered in VN has (illegible) to (illegible) treatment by this method both impractical and prolonged.
Consequently, all patients presenting any of the above problems are begun on Griseofulvin 100 mg (illegible), as well as local antifungal medications. On this combined regiment, there has been a remarkable increase in cure rate, and decrease in time of treatment necessary. The patient is put on a one week course of Griseofulvin and there have been no cases to date of toxic hematological reactions to this dose regimen.
OBSERVATION: Griseofulvin has proven to be a valuable first-line treatment of the fungal dermatitis encountered in RVN.
ITEM: Rough handling of 2.75 M.E. Rocket causes rocket motor explosions.
DISCUSSION: It has been determined that dropping 2.75 Rockets will separate the propellant, causing the propellant to burn to the separation and explode. Rough handling before or after the warhead and motor are assembled will cause the propellant to separate.
OBSERVATION: (Paragraph illegible)
ITEM: (Line illegible)
DISCUSSION: (Paragraph illegible)
OBSERVATION: One of the best ways to prevent the handset from becoming wet is to (balance of paragraph illegible).
OBSERVATION: By inserting a screw driver into the air pressure valve located on the rear of the set, the air pressure can be relieved, thus making set operable again.
ITEM: Supply Problems.
DISCUSSION: In too many cases it has been necessary to conduct a physical search of (illegible) warehouses to determine if a needed item is on hand. Once this is done, requisitions are then carried from one office to another and unit pick-up is effected. This (illegible) is usually caused when the requesting unit encounters incomplete or invalid advice codes on follow-ups, or when there are long delays in obtaining high priority items.
OBSERVATION: It appears that often it is necessary for more impetus to be provided at user level in order to cause the supply system to function.
ITEM: Mid-Day Water Resupply.
DISCUSSION: Due to the high temperature in late March and early April, it was found that the combat effectiveness of the trps was lowered if they were restricted to two canteens of water peer day.
OBSERVATION: (Paragraph illegible)
ITEM: Aerial Broadcast.
DISCUSSION: Aerial broadcasts have proven to be an effective way to reach VC for propaganda in support of GVN ops. To further the PSYOP program an aircraft equipped with loudspeakers and an aerial observer was employed for 4 nights at the FILHOL Plantation - PHU HOA DONG area. The “No-(illegible)” flights (illegible), oriental music and CHIEU HOI appeals. The aerial observer was included to call arty fires on any VC shooting at the acft.
OBSERVATION: The “No-(illegible)” flights proved eff in that they read sniper fire on a number of occasions and that the PHU HOA DONG residents were made very much (balance of paragraph illegible).
ITEM: Utilization of Jeep mounted loudspeakers.
DISCUSSION: Organic to every Inf Bn is one loudspeaker set capable of being mounted on a ¼ ton truck for mobile use. This equipment was used to make announcements of MEDCAPS and for PSYOPS. It was also used in support of seal and search missions and by village chiefs during PSYOPS.
OBSERVATION: The jeep mounted loudspeaker has proven to be the most effective way to reach large groups of people at the same time. Allowing the village Chief to use this equipment, with US driver and US personnel present, may increase his stature in the village and gain more willing cooperation from the village for US Forces.
ITEM: The use of cartoons and caricatures tends to reduce the effectiveness of propaganda.
DISCUSSION: Based upon interviews with several HOI CHANH, it was found that (illegible) cartoons or caricatures for illustration in larger than life figures, animated helicopters, etc., tends to discredit the entire leaflet even though the message itself may be a valid one.
OBSERVATION: When drawings are used for illustrations, they should conform as much as possible to true-to-life representation. Whenever possible, photographs should be used to add credibility to the propaganda message.
ITEM: Ground loudspeaker and leaflet ops have a greater degree of effectiveness than aerial ops.
DISCUSSION: Indications are that ground loudspeakers and leaflet missions continued along Hwy #1 have a greater impact and produce more response than aerial loudspeaker and leaflet drops. Although the area covered is considerably smaller, the message is more effective since it is more personalized. Ground mounted ops are very effective for offering mine rewards or exploiting VC atrocities which occur near populated areas.
OBSERVATION: A greater emphasis be placed on hand dissemination of printed material and vehicle mounted loudspeaker ops.
FOR THE COMMANDER
/S/Jasper J. Wilson
6 Incl JASPER J. WILSON
1 thru 6
1-ACofS Force Dev, DA (thru channels)
2-ACofS for Force Dev, DA (thru YYFFORCEV)
(illegible): Special 60 copies
(THIS PAGE ILLEGIBLE)
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
From 125th Signal Battalion
25th Infantry Division
For the Period 1 August - 31 October `967
PART I Narrative Report
PART II Tabs
* A TOC RM Radio Configurations
B Power Source for FM Radio Antenna
C Bonnet and Mast for FM Radio Antenna
D AT-214 Reflector AN/TRC-24
Mounted on AB-577
*E Secure FM Retransmission Station
* F Multi-channel VHF Diagram 25th Div
Monsoon Campaign 1967 as of 22 October
G Film Drying Cabinet
*H Photo “Hot Shelf”
Withdrawn, Hqs. DA
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
During the period starting 1 August 1967 and terminating 31 October 1967, this Battalion continued to support the 25th Infantry Division in all operations. Multi-channel VHF systems continued to provide a major portion of the communications for the Division as increasing use was made of this means to interconnect Fire Support Bases and Battalion Patrol Bases. The VRC-12 series radio remains the initial means of communications and the primary back-up for existing VHF systems. During the period, a detailed survey of FM radio operations, requirements and configurations was conducted. The more significant lessons learned during this period are contained in this report. This report supplements the 1 May to 31 July 1967 report. Lessons learned reflected in that report are not repeated in this one.
2. SECURE FM:
One of the findings made during the period will, I believe, have serious impact upon the planned program for the application of secure equipment to all FM nets. We have found that any interference on the frequency assigned for secure use will interrupt and make unreadable transmissions in process in the secure mode. For completely reliable secure transmission, free from continuous interruption, “totally discreet” frequencies are required. Based upon our experience, such a frequency is extremely rare. Therefore, reliable land responsive secure transmission over multiple nets does not appear to be feasible utilizing the KY-8 or similar device. Development of a security device which is not sensitive to interference is necessary in view of the requirement to “share” frequencies.
3. SHORTAGE OF FM RADIO EQUIPMEHNT:
Present TOE authorizations for FM radio equipment in the Headquarters and Headquarters Companies of the Infantry Division, Brigades and Battalions are inadequate to completely meet the communications requirement in the counter-insurgency effort in Vietnam. During combat operations in forward locations, the Battalions habitually establish small command posts from which to maintain tactical control of their maneuver elements. The FM radio equipment authorized by the TOR is adequate to meet this requirement. However, a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) must also be maintained at the Battalion's base camp for command, control and coordination purposes. Photograph 1 at Tab A shows the typical base camp TOCL FM radios in use by an infantry Battalion engaged in field operations. The same situation exists at Brigade Headquarters, since a Tactical Operations Center must be maintained at Base Camp while the Brigade operates a forward CP. Photographs 2 thru 5 at Tab A show the FM radio configurations in use in one Brigade Base Camp Tactical Operations Center. In the forward area, a like FM radio requirement exists.
The same general situation is also found in the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC). Photographs 6 and 7 at Tab A show 2 radio configurations installed in the DTOC. These radios must be maintained at all times for command and control purposes and for coordination between the staff planners at base camp. They must be duplicated at the tactical command post in a forward area.
Another serious drain on tactical FM communications is the requirement for radios for base camp defense nets. A significant number of RT-524's and AN/PRC-62's are “tied down” at base camp observation towers, listening posts, firing bunkers and command posts. Units man the base camp defenses as an “additional duty” while continuing their basic field missions. The radios employed for base camp defense are diverted from TOE assets that should be with the unit in support of their basic field mission.
To help meet this greatly expanded combat requirement for FM radio communications in tactical operation centers, radios have been taken from lower priority staff officers. This action leaves many personnel and sections without the communication equipment authorized to accomplish their assigned missions in a timely and efficient manner.
4. Power Source for FM Radios:
Quite often FM radio equipment must be operated for extended periods of time in a ground mount configuration, removed from the vehicles in which they are normally installed. The TOE configurations depicted in the previous paragraph exemplify this requirement. This requires a 24 volt DC source other than that provided by the vehicle. Usually, two 12 volt vehicle batteries wired in series are utilized for powering the equipment with a charger or rectifier to maintain the batteries in a charged state. These rectifiers are often hard to come by.
In the 125th Signal Battalion, another method has been utilized with excellent results to maintain the charge on the batteries. Certain AC generator sets, such as the 10 KW air-cooled generator SF-10 (MD) and 10 KW, water cooled FERRO I, are equipped with battery charging receptacles. The purpose of the receptacle is to permit a DC generator to be utilized to charge the batteries of the AC generator sets. Through the use of an adapter, a power cable can be connected to this receptacle (See Tab B) in order to use it as a source of DC for operating FM radios requiring 24 volts DC. This system is a highly reliable, efficient and effective method of providing power for the operations of FM radio equipment.
5. Masts for FM Radio Antennae:
To increase the effective range of the VRC-12 series of radios, this unit has utilized telephone poles at base camp for antenna masts. Telephone poles ranging in height from l48 to 90 feet have been used depending upon the required range and terrain. The added height over the standard 12.5 meter RC-292 antenna has greatly extended the range of base camp radio stations.
In areas where there is a requirement for several antennae, such as Brigade and Division Tactical Operations Centers, a “bonnet” constructed from an ammunition canister and engineer stakes (see Tab C, picture 1) may be mounted atop the telephone pole (Tab C, picture 2). This “bonnet” will mount as many as four RC-292 antennae. Tests have shown negligible interference among the antennae so mounted as long as a frequency separation of at least 3 MC, and preferably 5 MC, is maintained.
This field expedient also results in a significant savings in space in the CP in that the extensive area required to erect multiple antenna masts with associated buy lines is eliminated.
6. Antenna Masts for AN/MRC - 69's:
Erection of standard 45' antenna masts in areas with heavy tree growth or swamps is a problem.
The problem occurs when the antenna sections must be assembled on the ground before being “gin-poled” to a vertical position. Lowering the mast to trouble-shoot the antenna, or to change dipoles necessitated by a frequency change is awkward and time consuming.
The AB-557 antenna mast (depicted at Tab D) designed for use with the AN/GRC-50 radio, has been tested as a replacement for the standard TRC-24 mast by the 125th Signal Battalion in the Vietnam environment under combat conditions. Tests have proved tha the AB-577 is ideal to meet our requirements here. We have learned the AN/TRC-24 antenna reflector, AT-214, can be affixed to the AB-577 (shown in Tab D) without modification. Since the AB-577 is required for specialized conditions only, it is not felt that each AN/MRC-69 need be so equipped. A quantity of ten (10) of these antennae would be sufficient, as an example, for this unit operating in the current terrain. The AB-577's appear to be in short supply however, and we have been unable to obtain the quantity we feel desirable.
7. Secure VC Retransmission Station:
As utilization of the new VRC-12 series of radios with the secure voice equipment (TSEC/KY-8)
expanded, the requirement for a secure retransmission capability became evident. There is presently no standard equipment configuration available to meet this secure retransmission requirement. As an interim measure, the 125th Signal Battalion has devised a manual retransmission station which will allow retransmission of secure information utilizing the KY-8 and -RT-524. (P3)
First, two secure radio stations are established, one on each of the selected operating frequencies. The two radios are then inter-connected, utilizing a modified control radio set, C-2299/VRC. At this point, a locally fabricated control box is connected into the Radio Control Set. Tab E, picture 1, shows the secure retransmission station ready for operation.
The heart of the retransmission station is a two switch control box (see Tab E, picture 2). Positioning of one switch allows either automatic clear retransmission, separate utilization of each radio, or manual operated secure retransmission. When the first switch is set in the secure retransmission position, the operator at the secure retransmission station monitors the transmission and operates switch number 2 to connect one secure radio to the other when he hears “over” at the end of each transmission. Basically we utilize radio wire integration (RWI) operating techniques in the operation of the secure retransmission station.
Although the system described requires the presence of an operator when in use, it provides a vital link in the communication network for the Division and allows secure retransmission of combat essential information over extended distances when required.
8. Multi-channel VHF Diagram - 25th Div Monsoon Campaign as of 22 October 1967:
Multi-channel VHF links remain as the backbone of the Division communication system. Wide
Dispersion of Division elements during the period resulted in added emphasis being placed on the ability to support these elements with artillery fire. A marked increase in the number of Fire Support Bases (FSB) requiring Signal Battalion VHF support was experienced. A diagram depicting typical multi-channel VHF network during the period is attached at Tab F.
9. Drying of Photographic Film:
Difficulties have been encountered in providing adequate dust free facilities for the drying of photographic film. Even in areas where limited air-conditioning is available, dust still remains a major hazard to the production of high quality film negatives. Since standard air-tight film drying cabinets are not available, this Battalion has found a partial solution to this situation. Tab G, picture 1, shows a rough film drying cabinet approximately 2'x 3'x 2' which has been fabricated from plywood. Inside the cabinet, two light sockets are mounted. Each contains a 150 watt light-bulb. The end result is shortened drying time for the film with minimum exposure to dust.
Based on the success of this initial endeavor, the 125th Signal Battalion is in the process of constructing a larger, improved drying cabinet utilizing the same principle. A sketch of the new cabinet is attached at Tab G (picture 2).
10. Reduction of MOISTURE and DAMPNESS in Cameras:
During the rainy season in Vietnam, a constant problem is encountered in maintaining photographic equipment, especially cameras, in a dry, moisture free atmosphere. Moisture in the camera creates a maintenance difficulty along with general deterioration of the metal land fabric parts of the camera. Additionally, the rapid growth of mildew and fungus which results from the warm, moist climate in South Vietnam contributes greatly to camera operation problems.
The 125th Signal Battalion has combated this problem by building into a shelf system a sealed cabinet with light bulbs similar to a film drying cabinet. A picture of this facility is shown at Tab I. Storage of cameras and associated equipment in this cabinet keeps the moisture level down, thus retarding the growth of fungus and virtually eliminating mildew and moisture damages.
LOUIS G. KATHERN, JR.
LTC, Sig C
(3 pages of illustrations)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-p (m) (24 Apr 68) FOR OT RD 68X010 3 May 1968
Infantry Division, Period 8 December 1967 - 24 February 1968 (U)
1. Subject report is forwarded as inclosure for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:
/s/ Kenneth G. Wickham
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
1 Incl Major General, USA
as The Adjutant General
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Defense Documentation Center
Joint Action Control Office
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
US Army Weapons Command
US Army Flight Training Center
5th Infantry Division (Mech)
25th Infantry Division
US Army Aviation Test Activity
4th Brigade, 6th Infantry Division
1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery
US Army Limited War Laboratory
USAF Air Ground Operations School
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225
AVD CD(illegible) 3 April 1968
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report
TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
Combat Operation After Action Report for Operation YELLOWSTONE is forwarded for necessary action and/or information.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
7 Incl for J. D. ZEILER
1. INCL 1 - COAAR 1st Brigade 2LT, AGC
2. INCL 2 - COAAR 3rd Brigade Asst AG
3. INCL 3 - COOAR 2nd Bn, 12 Inf
4. INCL 4 - COAAR 2nd Bn, 22 Inf
5. INCL 5 - COAAR 3rd Bn, 22 Inf
6. INCL 6 - COAAR 3rd Sqdn, 17th Cav
7. INCL 7 - COAAR 3rd Brigade (Battle of SUOI CUT)
1-ACofS For Force Dev, DA
2-MACV, ATTN: (illegible)-J343
3-US(illegible), ATTN: AVUCS-MW
3-IIFFORCEV, ATTN: G-3 (DAT)
1-CG, USA Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga 31029
1-CG, USA Arm Sch, Ft Knox, Ky 40120
1-CG, USA Arty & Missile Sch, Ft Sill, Okla
1-CG, USA CG3C, Ft Leavenworth, Kan
1-USNA, ATTN: Librarian, West Point, NY 10996
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
25th Infantry Division
AVDCFB-C 21 March 1968
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation YELLOWSTONE)
TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
1. Name: Operation YELLOWSTONE
2. Dates: 080600 Dec 67 to 242400 Feb 68
3. Location: War Zone “C”
4. Control Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
5. (C) Reporting Officers:
1st Brigade: COL Edwin Marks (8 Dec 67 to 18 Dec 67)
LTC Fremont B. Hodson Jr. (19 Dec 67 to 24 Feb 68)
4-9 Inf: LTC John M. Henchman
2-14 Inf: LTC Alfred M. Bracy
TF 2-34 Armor: LTC Hal B. Rhyne (8 Dec 67 to 14 Feb 68)
LTC John H. Tipton (15 Feb 68 to 24 Feb 68)
TF 1-5 Inf (M): MAJ Ralph A. Hook (20 Dec 67 to 1 Jan 68)
LTC Henry B. Murphy Jr. (2 Jan 68 to 24 Feb 68)
2-12 Inf: LTC Ralph D. Tice (28 Dec 67 to 16 Jan 68)
6. (C) Task Organization
a. 8 Dec 67: HHC, 1st Brigade
4-9 Inf Bn
2-14 Inf Bn
1-49 ARVN Inf
TF 2-34 Armor
B Co, 1-5 Mech
A Co, 1-5 Mech
C Co, 2-34 Armor (-)
1-27 Arty (-) (Reinf 7-11 Arty)
C Battery, 23-32 Arty (8”)
7-11 Arty Bn (DS)
B Co, 65th Engr Bn (DS)
Signal Support Element (DS)
1st Plat, 25th MP Co
B Co, 725th Maint (SPT)
D Co, 25th Med Co
DISCOM Fwd Spt Element (SPT)
Sec, QM GRREG Plat (SPT)
Fwd Spt Sec, 25th S&T (SPT)
(1) 171200 Dec 67: 1-49 ARVN Inf Bn released OPCON 1st Brigade.
(2) 201400 Dec 67: TF 1-5 Inf (M) OPCON 1st Brigade.
(3) 271000 Dec 67: 2-22 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade.
(4) 281138 Dec 67: 2-12 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade.
(5) 281632 Dec 67: 2-22 Inf (M) OPCON 3rd Brigade.
281632 Dec 67: 2-14 Inf Bn OPCON 3rd Brigade.
(6) 300800 Dec 67: 2-14 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade
(7) 010700 Jan 68: TF 1-5 Inf (M) released OPCON 1st Brigade.
(8) 021115 Jan 68: 4-9 OPCON 3rd Brigade.
(9) 021631 Jan 68: 3-22 Inf (-) OPCON 1st Brigade.
(10) 050930 Jan 68: 3-22 Inf (-) OPCON 3rd Brigade.
(11) 160615 Jan 68: 4-9 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade.
(12) 160615 Jan 68: 2-12 Inf (-) OPCON 3rd Brigade.
(13) 230615 Jan 68: 1-5 Inf (M) (-) OPCON 1st Brigade.
(14) 270500 Jan 68: 1-5 Inf (M) (-) released OPCON 1st Brigade.
(15) 310600 Jan 68: 1-5 Inf (M) (-) OPCON 1st Brigade.
(16) 020700 Feb 68: TF 2-34 Armor released B Co, 1-5 Inf (M) to TF 1-5 Inf (M) and received OPCON C Co, 2-14 Inf.
(17) 100600 Feb 68: TF 1-5 Inf (M) OPCON 3rd Brigade
(18) 131800 Feb 68: A co, 2-22 Inf (M) OPCON 1st Brigade attached to TF 2-34.
(19) 171800 Feb 68: 2-27 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade.
(20) 180800 Feb 68: 2-27 Inf OPCON 3rd Brigade.
7. (C) Supporting Forces:
(1) The 7th Bn, 11th Artillery was airlifted to FSB CUSTER (XT 333896) on D-Day to provide close fire support for the 1st Brigade. During the operation, the following fire support bases were utilized.
(a) FSB KNOX XT 280 778
(b) FSB SCOTT XT 265 930
(c) FSB BEAUREGARD XT 380 855
(d) FSB HILL XT 278 680
(e) FSB WAINWRIGHT XT 282 528
(f) FSB WAINWRIGHT II XT 288 509
(g) FSB BAILEY XT 338 852
(2) Ammunition expended included 49,363 rounds HD, 775 rounds WP, 16 rounds smoke, and 191 rounds illumination. Artillery fires accounted for 102 enemy KIA (BC) and 99 KIA (POSS). GSR and reinforcing units were used extensively for firing TOTs, preparation of landing zones, large tactical targets, and the H&I program. The operation was characterized by almost total use of air movement for repositioning and resupply of the artillery units. Extensive and effective use was made of direct fire techniques utilizing fuze time for perimeter defense. Artillery support throughout the operation was excellent.
b. Tactical Air: Tactical air support was provided by the 7th USAF. The missions were controlled by the 1st Brigade TASP.
(1) Missions flown: 292
(2) Fighter sorties: 546
(a) Preplanned: 236
(b) Immediate: 194
(c) Diverts: 38
(d) Preplanned Diverts: 78
(3) Results: Bunkers destroyed - 589; bunkers damaged - 37; trenches destroyed - 2075 meters; trenches uncovered - 1550 meters; fighting positions (spider holes) - 45; structures destroyed - 91; structures damaged - 19; sampans destroyed - 5; VC KBA (BC) - 49; VC KBA (POSS) - 135; gun or mortar positions destroyed - 13; tunnel entrances uncovered - 22; secondary fires - 11; secondary explosions - 17; supply caches uncovered and destroyed - 2.
c. Army Aviation:
(1) Sorties UH1 aircraft. (Total 1,947)
(a) Gunships: 300
(b) Tactical troop lifts: 142
(c) Resupply: 855
(d) Air evac, C&C, Recon and Misc: 650
(2) Sorties CH-47 aircraft. (Total 650)
(a) Resupply: 645
(b) Evacuation: 5
(3) Sorties CH-54 aircraft for resupply: 0
(4) Sorties CH23G aircraft. (Total 2,250)
(5) Ammunition expended. N/A
8. (C) Intelligence:
a. Intelligence collection and studies, prior to the start of Operation YELLOWSTONE, indicated that War Zone “C” had long been a major VC/NVA base area for elements of COSVN HQ and subordinate units consisting of: 69th Artillery Regt, 1st Guard Bn, 680th Training Regt, 7th NVA Div, 82nd Rear Services Group and possible elements of the 9th NVA Div. The total strength of these units was estimated between 10,000 and 14,000; however, in late November 1967, the 9th VC Div moved into Northwestern Binh Long Province and other units were dispersed down to battalion-size units throughout War Zone “C”. Initially, their pattern of activity was to defend supply areas and to fight delay actions, allowing COSVN Hq to move north across the Cambodian Border. Once this was accomplished, enemy forces conducted counter sweep operations and attacks on friendly base camps.
b. War Zone “C” is characterized by extremely heavy jungle vegetation and occasional open areas. The hydrography of the area is restricted to two small streams which had little effect on friendly or enemy movement. The terrain was heavily dotted with trenches and fortifications. The largest concentrations appeared to be in headquarters and cache areas just south of the Cambodian Border.
c. In the first week of the Operation, friendly units met with little enemy resistance. Most of the contact was limited to indirect fire harassment and probing actions. Intelligence indicated that COSVN HQ and its security guard units were located due north of KATUM, probably moving across the border. Other unit dispositions and locations were unknown; however, it was suspected that elements of the NVA 7th Div were dispersed to the south and east of KATUM. There were no signs of a mass exodus of War Zone “C” upon the arrival of US troops.
d. Significant contacts during the operation were generally with company or smaller sized units defending base camps. There were a few instances of enemy units attacking ARVN or FWF during sweeps, but the majority of activity involved contact with VC/NVA units in heavily fortified base camps or forward defensive positions. Enemy tactics were to make the operation as costly as possible while committing a minimum of troops. He made extensive use of indirect fire, employing 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars and 122mm rockets. These attacks were generally used for harassing purposes, attempting to inflict casualties and destroy supplies rather than to support ground attacks. However, the enemy did no two occasions demonstrate a capability to conduct a multi-battalion attack on friendly FSBs.
e. The enemy employed AT mines on Route 4, but AP mines and booby traps were conspicuous by their absence.
f. Significant enemy losses:
(1) 08 and 09 Dec 67: 4-9 Inf Bn vic XT 299 938 located three caches containing 350 tons of unpolished rice. The rice was later evacuated.
(2) 200140-200500 Dec 67. The 4-9 Inf Bn FSB BEAUREGUARD (XT380 855) was attacked by estimated 1-2 NVA battalions from the 141st NVA Regt. Results: 6 US KIA, 12 US WIA; 40 VC KIA (BC), 33 KIA (POSS), 18 small arms, 9 crew-served weapons, and 1 PRC-10 radio captured.
(3) 041030 Jan 68. B Co 2-14 Inf located and destroyed 40 tons of polished rice vic XT 358 858.
(4) 171428-171700 Jan 68. 2-14 Inf engaged an estimated 2 VC companies vic XT 348 908. Results: 2 US KIA, 13 US WIA; 13 VC KIA (BC), 1 small arm and 5 heavy weapons captured.
(5) 251415-251620 Jan 68. 2-14 Inf engaged an estimated VC company vic XT 248 952. Results: 1 US KIA, 16 US WIA; 20 VC KIA (BC).
(6) 031513 Feb 68. A Co 4-9 Inf ambushed a VC squad vic XT 362 870 resulting in 7 VC KIA (BC), 2 pounds of documents and 1 machine gun.
(7) 070015 Feb 68. 1st Brigade CRIP ambushed an estimated VC company, vic XT 186 504. Results: 1 US WIA, 2 PF WIA; 26 VC KIA (BC).
(8) 161245-170900 Feb 68. 2-14 Inf engaged one VC battalion vic XT 242 483 entrenched in Tay Ninh City. Results: 4 US KIA, 25 US WIA; 81 VC KIA (BC).
(9) 19 Feb. 2-14 engaged an estimated VC company with all organic weapons and supporting fires vic XT 0754. Results: 3 US WIA; 66 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC POW, 81 rounds 107mm rockets, and 114 rounds 82mm mortar.
g. The heavy jungle in War Zone “C” made movement slow and tiring. Streams were for the most part an insignificant factor in effecting movement. The ground was hard, but the jungle restricted movement of tracked vehicles to the road.
h. Observation and fields of fire were extremely limited by the dense vegetation. The VC overcame this by making extensive use of observers in trees. In this manner, the VC were able to accurately adjust mortar fires on the FSBs.
i. The overall evaluation of the intelligence information gained from local and attached sources was considered to be C-3 (sometimes reliable, possibly true). In War Zone “C” there was a lack of local agents. Most intelligence was from the combat troops and aerial detection devices. Operational security of Operation YELLOWSTONE was considered fair.
E N E M Y L O S S E S
DATE: 8 Dec 67 - 24 Feb 68
Other Units TOTAL
1-9 2-14 2-34 Others In Operation LOSSES
KIA (BC) 100 287 19 84 Air Force 490
KIA (POSS) 123 159 10 45 2-22 Inf (M) 337
1-5 Inf (M)
Detainees 3 20 35 3-17 Cav 58
PW's 4 7-11 Bn Arty 4
1-27 Bn Arty
Civil Def 4 7 2-32 Bn Arty 11
3-13 Bn Arty
Inn CIV 16 27 2-77 Battery 43
SA Wpns 29 14 7 20 70
Heavy Wpns 9 17 2 6 34
SA Ammo 23,593 7,100 452 120 31,265
HE Ammo 262 937 80 272 1,551
Mines & BT's 30 37 145 24 236
Rice (ton) 11.5 39.5 475 526
Structures 81 92 19 11 203
Bunkers 500 616 67 129 1,312
Documents (LB) 17 47.5 1 5 70.5
Tunnels (M) 421 186 10 617
Sampans 4 3 7 14
Foxholes 248 167 12 38 465
Radios 1 1 3 5 10
Miscellaneous Items Captured/Destroyed
Commo Wire - 60 lb Protective Masks - 4
Scissors - 1 Pr Telephones - 1
Diesel Engine - 1 Knives - 3
Foot Bridges - 5 Canteens - 13
Fish - 2-1/2 Tons
Stoves - 8
Bayonets - 1
Sugar - 15 lb
Beans - 150 lb
Garden Plots - 3
Medical Supplies - 12 lb
Fish Traps - 6
Cows - 5
Miscellaneous Foods - 15 lb
Salt - 3 Tons
Fertilizer - 400 lb
Sandals - 10 pr
Aiming Stakes - 2
Sewing Kits - 1
Water Buffalo - 2
Miscellaneous Items - 5 lbs
Loudspeakers - 1 set
Hammocks - 1
Tables - 6
Bamboo Ladder - 3
Livestock Corral - 3
Lard - 50 lbs
Cabbage - 50 heads
Sleds - 2
Propaganda Leaflets - 12 lbs
Bicycles - 35
Cooking Areas - 6
Web Gear - 17
Weapon Magazines - 26
Ponchos - 18
Clothing - 80 lbs
Wells - 16
Cooking Equipment - 50 lbs
Tools - 59 lbs
Typewriter - 1
Pigs - 5
Chickens - 50
9. (C) Mission: The 1st Brigade received the mission to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in War Zone “C” and to complete the following engineer projects:
a. Construct USSF/CIDG camp and Type II C-123 airfield at Thien Ngon (vic (XT 0881).
b. Construct USSF/CIDG camp and rehabilitate airfield to Type II C-130 at KATUM (vic XT 3390).
c. Clear, improve and maintain the following roads for military convoy traffic:
(1) Route 4 (XT284 618 to XT 333 903)
(2) Route 243 (XT 284 618 to XT 335 575)
(3) Route 247 (XT 101 758 to XT 272 772)
10. (C) Concept of the operation: The 1st Brigade conducted combat operations with the 4-9 Inf, 2-14 Inf, and the TF 2-34 Armor constituting the major force. Combat Operations were designed to support the engineer effort at KATUM and PREK KLOK, THEIN NGON, and secure logistical convoys to KATUM, and to search out and destroy VC/NVA forces and bases. This operation was conducted in three phases.
a. Phase I. (D-Day to D+10) The 4-9 Inf, 2-14 Inf, 7-11 Artillery and the 588th Engineer battalion were airlifted into the CIDG secured LZ at KATUM, and conducted combat assault vic KATUM with the 4-9 Inf and 2-14 Inf. TF 2-34 Armor secured movement of the heavy engineer equipment to KATUM, artillery to PREX KLOK, and logistical convoys on Route 4 from MUI BA DAN to KATUM, and began improving the KATUM airstrip to receive C-130 aircraft.
b. Phase II. (D+10 to D+60) The 1st Brigade conducted methodical search and destroy operations within the TAOR, opened Route 4 for overland resupply to PREK KLOK and KATUM.
c. Phase III. (After D+60) YELLOWSTONE forces began phasing down. 2-14 Inf and HHC 1st Brigade returned to TAY NINH BASE CAMP 8 Feb 68 with the remaining elements closing TAY NINH 23 Feb 68.
11. (C) Execution: 1st Brigade received the 25th Infantry Division OPLAN 18-67 (Operation YELLOWSTONE) dated 281900H Nov 67. The 1st Brigade prepared and implemented OPORD 12-67 (Operation YELLOWSTONE) dated 031200H Dec 67. In executing D-Day of Operation YELLOWSTONE each battalion of the Brigade Task Force prepared their OPORD. The 2-14 Inf and the 4-9 Inf conducted a combat assault into LZ's in the vicinity of KATUM, securing objectives designed to provide security to the Task Force elements to be quartered at KATUM. The 588th Engr Bn from D-20 to D-1 cleared and opened roads required to support Operation YELLOWSTONE, and on D-Day convoyed to KATUM. On D-Day, the 7-11 Artillery Bn was airlifted from TAY NINH to KATUM (FSB CUSTER). TF 2-34 Armor from D-2 to D-1 occupied FSB BLISS (XT 287 642) and FSB HILL (XT 278680) while on D-Day the TF 2-34 Armor attacked north to establish a FSB at PREK KLOK (XT 288 815).
b. Significant contact:
(1) 11 Dec 67: 4-9 Inf in an ambush patrol vic XT 275 960 engaged 2 VC with small arms at 0135H. At 0218H, this AP received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in 1 KIA and 8 WIA. The mortar fire lasted 21 minutes. The AP requested a LFT, counter-mortar ship, and a Spooky. Artillery fire was provided from FSB CUSTER (XT 333 903). At 0313H, mortar fire began again with 10 rounds of 60mm from vic XT 268 975. At 0316H, 14 rounds of 60mm and 1 RPG were received from vic XT 265 966. Losses: 2 KIA and 22 WIA. VC losses unknown. NOTE: By engaging the 2 VC with unknown results, the 4-9 compromised their position but did not relocate.
(2) 120845 Dec 67: While the 1-49 ARVN Inf was combat assaulting to an LZ vic XT 378 858, one of the UHIHs carrying troops was shot down vic XT 334 915. The LZ was initially cold at 0836H but as the third lift to 1-49 Inf landed on the LZ at 0901H, they received 60mm mortar fire, indicating the LZ was hot. The mortar was spotted at XT 390 857 and was engaged with a gunship and artillery. Mortar contact was broken at 0937H. The LZ remained cold after 0937H.
(3) 121130 Dec. The CO HHC, 1st Brigade C&C ship received small arms fire from vic XT 343 913. Artillery was fired into the area. At 1130H also a CH-47 extracting an UH-1D from XT 342 913 from XT 342 913. At 1304H, FAC received fire from XT 342 913 resulting in no hits. At 1425H, B Company 2-14 Inf received small arms fire from XT 342 913, returning fire with artillery and organic weapons. At 1508H, B Company 2-14 Inf received additional fire from XT 342 913, again returning fire with artillery. At 1514H, FAC received BAR fire from XT 342 913 and again artillery fire was delivered into the area. Losses: no friendly; enemy unknown. NOTE: Artillery does not negate the necessity for the infantry to move through an area to clear the area of VC.
(4) 140827 Dec 67: A Company 2-14 Inf received SA and AW fire from vic XT 343 912 from an estimated 2 VC. Contact was broken at 0829H with no casualties. Contact was reestablished at 0844H, resulting in 1 KIA and 1 WIA. Contact was broken at 0910H and reestablished at 1035H with A Co receiving SA and AW fire and rifle grenades resulting in 2 WIA. Contact broken at 1038H and reestablished at 1056H from a bunker vic XT 343 913 with A Co receiving AW fire and RPG from an estimated 20 VC; 90mm fire was delivered point blank on the bunker and an airstrike delivered at XT 343 912. The airstrike resulted in 2 US WIA from A Co and one WIA from C Co who had maneuvered into the area to assist A Company. At 1540H, A Company continued to sweep to XT 338 909 while C Company swept to XT 342914 without contact. Friendly losses: 2 KIA, 15 WIA; enemy losses: 2 VC (BC).
(5) 140940 Dec: C Company 4-9 Inf received SA fire and claymore from vic XT 245 941 with sporadic fire continuing until 0950H. B Company moved in to block the trails vic XT 241 937. Contact was maintained until about 1100H. An airstrike was delivered at 1105H to XT 250 940. B Company moved to the north flank as the contact was reestablished at 1115H. Contact at 1120H was vic XT 245 944 with this contact broken at 1147H. Friendly losses: 6 KIA, 18 WIA; enemy losses: 7 KIA (BC), 10 KIA (POSS), and 3 RPG-2 rounds.
(6) 150640 Dec. KATUM Base Camp received 35-40 60mm mortar rounds. At first light when C Company 2-14 Inf examined the perimeter they found that one claymore mine had had the wires cut and one claymore had been turned around.
(7) 161024 Dec: B Company 4-9 Inf received AW fire from an estimated VC platoon vic XT 245 942. The VC platoon had 7 AW firing. D Company began moving from XT 241 944 at 1035H to assist B Company. VC contact with D Company was broken at 1049H and reestablished at 1103H as 3 AW began firing from XT 245 942, resulting in 1 US WIA. CSRCA was placed on the VC position at 1118H. Contact was broken at 1145H with B Company moving to XT 245 939. D Company established contact vic XT 246 944 at 1214H and breaking off at 1230H without casualties.
(8) 200140 Dec: The 4-9 Inf at FSB BEAUREGARD (XT 380 855) received 95 rounds 82mm and 60mm mortar. At 0230H, infiltrators were reported inside the perimeter. The infiltrator set fire to the artillery ammunition, resulting in 620 rounds 105mm burning. At 0346H, the FSB was surrounded by an estimated 1-2 NVA battalions. At 0405H, the land line communications with the FSB were cut. The mortar attack ceased at 0550H then began again at 0705H. Contact was broken at 0735H. Friendly losses: 6 KIA, 12 WIA; enemy losses: 40 KIA (BC), 33 KIA (POSS).
(9) 171428 Jan 68. C Company 2-14 Inf established contact vic XT 348 908 with an estimated 2 VC companies. The contact began with C Company receiving SA and AW from an estimated 3-10 VC. Fire was returned with SA, AW, artillery, and gunships. From this contact, C Company sustained 1 WIA. Contact remained until at 1515H A Company, who was maneuvering into the area, received fire at vic XT 5546 906, resulting in 1 WIA. Contact remained as C Company reported 2 KIA and 10 WIA at 1535H. At 1705H, the VC force was estimated to have a reinforced platoon in the woods, with 2 platoons in bunkers. Contact was broken at 1730H with sporadic fire remaining until about 1830H. Friendly losses: 2 KIA, 13 WIA; enemy losses: 13 KIA (BC), 14 KIA (POSS).
(10) 251402 Jan 68. B Company 2-14 Inf received SA fire at XT 248 952 from an estimated reinforced VC squad. The gunships on station supported B Company with fire. At 1430H, the FAC ship on station received 2 hits with negligible damage. At 1430H, A Company received SA fire at XT 248 953 which resulted in the CO of A Company being wounded. At 1443H, A and C Companies consolidated under the command of CO C Company. B Company moved into the area and at 1535H B Company was at XT 248 952 and A and C Companies at XT 248 954 with the VC force between the 2-14 Inf elements. Contact remained until 1715H. Friendly losses: 1 KIA, 16 WIA; enemy losses: 20 KIA (BC).
(11) 06 Feb 68. NVA/VC forces employed CS RCA AT PREK KLOK. The CS was in burlap bags, tied with rope and wire, and had an explosive charge attached to the outside of the bag. About 6 bags were placed adjacent to the perimeter. Three bags did not detonate. These bags were evacuated to Division. The bags which did detonate were placed downwind from PREK KLOK and were not effective against the camp.
(12) 11 Feb 68. KATUM Base Camp received 31 rounds of 82mm mortar. Some of the rounds contained “gas” which incapacitated 10 individuals. The casualties were reported to be nauseous and have headaches at 1002H. By 1330H, all of these casualties had been returned to duty.
(13) 150825 Feb 68: A Company 588th Engr Bn and 1 plastoon of A Company 2-22 Inf (M) en route to THIEN NGON were ambushed by an estimated VC company at XT 089 790. The VC fired AW and RPG, resulting in 10 KIA and 2 APC destroyed. The contact was broken at 0850H with unknown VC losses.
(14) 160115 Feb 68. PHU KOUNG, XT 234 746, began receiving mortar and 122mm rocket fire and ground attack. MACV requested and got ½ APC ARVN troop and 2 ARVN Inf companies to support MACV. Action broke at 0245H as it began at BIEN KEO, XT 231 435. At 0510H, the mortar fire began again at PHU KOUNG and BIEN KEO, but the ground attack had ceased. At 0345H, as both contacts continued, PHU KOUNG reported VC had entered the MACV compound. One VC POW, captured by MACV, stated that his unit was from NUI BA DEN and that the unit would continue the attack until after sunrise, then would return to NUI BA DEN. Contact was broken at PHU KOUNG at 0530H but continued at BIEN KEO. At 0545H, the VC CP was suspected to be located vic XT 245 485; and the TAY NINH Province Chief requested US forces to sweep the area XT 250 493 to XYT 250 495 to XT 270 493 to XT 270 470, giving clearance to fire any type ordnance the US forces required. By 1200H, 2-14 Inf was sweeping the area vic XT 27 49 and XT 28 50. The combined force at this time was 4 US companies and ARVN companies. Contact was established at 1245H and continued Vic XT 241 485 at 1905H and B and C Companies 2-14 Inf moved to support A Company 2-22 Inf (M). At 1959H, three airstrikes were delivered at St 244 486. Sporadic contact and mortar fire continued to 170425 Feb. At 170806 Feb, it was reported that the VC unit had withdrawn at 170300 Feb. Contact was not reestablished. Friendly losses: 4 KIA, 25 WIA; enemy losses: 81 KIA (BC). The VC force was estimated at 1 battalion.
(16) 190800 Feb 68. 2-14 Inf established contact with an estimated VC company firing all organic weapons and supporting fires vic XT 075 534. Sporadic contact was maintained all day. Friendly losses: 3 WIA; enemy losses: 66 KIA (BC), and 2 POW.
12. (C) Results:
(1) FRIENDLY KIA WIA NBC MIA TOTAL
4/9 20 154 1 175
2/14 13 194 18 225
1/5 ) 15 02 15 122
2/12 4 1 1 6
HHC 2 10 5 17
OTHERS 5 7 12
59 458 40 557
(2) ENEMY 4/9 2/14 1/5 2/12 HHC OTHERS
KIA (BC) 100 287 19 7 77
KIA (POSS) 123 159 10 13 32
(3) KILL RATIO FRIENDLY/ENEMY
4/9 1 - 5
2/14 1 - 11.9
1/5 ) 1 - 1.2
TOTAL 1 - 6
ACCESSORY OUTFIT, field 1 ea
ALARM SET, AN/GSS9 4 ea
ARMORER VEST, protective 80 ea
BAG, waterproof 105 ea
BAYONET KNIFE, w/scabbard 108 ea
BARBER KIT 2 ea
BELT, pistol 107 ea
BINOCULAR 6X30 MIL RET 1 ea
BLANKET, WOOL, bed olive green 61 ea
BOOT, tropical 105 ea
CANTEEN, plastic water 2 qt. 267 ea
CANTEEN, plastic 6 ea
COMPASS, magnetic lensatic 6 ea
CARRIER, personnel, M1 13A1 1 ea
COVER, canteen aluminum 111 ea
DRAWERS, men cotton OG109 40 ea
FORK, field mess 70 ea
GENERATOR SET, 3KW 1 ea
GLASSES, sun protection 10 ea
GLOVES, leather, work type 50 ea
HAMMOCK, jungle 105 ea
HANDKERCHIEF, cotton 60 ea
HEADNET, mosquito 70 ea
HELMET, steel 95 ea
KNIFE, field mess 105 ea
LAUNCHER, grenade 3 ea
LINER, helmet, soldiers 95 ea
LINER, poncho, nylon 122 ea
MACHINE GUN, 7.62mm M-60 11 ea
MACHETE, w/o sheath 8 ea
MASK, protective, field M-17 264 ea
MATTRESS, pneumatic 105 ea
PACK, combat field 105 ea
PAN, mess kit CRS 105 ea
PISTOL, .45 Cal 14 ea
PONCHO, nylon 119 ea
POUCH, ammunition 281 ea
PLOTTING BOARD, M-16 1 ea
RADIO SET AN/PRR 9 14 ea
RADIO SET AN/PRC 25 3 ea
RADIO SET AN/GRC 106 1 ea
RADIO, TRANSMITTING SET AN/PRT-4 9 ea
RECEIVER, TRANSMITTER RADIO RT524 1 ea
RIFLE, 5.6mm M-16E1 44 EA
RIFLE, RECOILLESS 90mm M6F 3 ea
RUCKSACK, nylon w/frame 107 ea
SIGHT UNIT 60mm 2 ea
SOCK, nylon w/olive green 109 200 ea
SHOVEL, entrenching tool 105 ea
SPOON, field mess CRS 70 ea
SUB-MACHINE GUN CAR 15 5.556mm 2 ea
SUSPENDERS, field pack 105 ea
TANK, combat M48A3 4 ea
TABLEWARE, OUTFIT field 1 ea
TENT, shelter half 105 ea
TOWEL, bath, olive green 200 ea
TROUSERS, men's tropical 727 ea
TRUCK, cargo ¾ ton 1 ea
TRUCK, utility ¼ ton 1 ea
TYPEWRITER, non-port, non-elect 1 ea
UNDERSHIRT, cotton, olive green 109 250 ea
13. (C) Administrative Matters:
a. PX facilities were not available to the troops in the field on this operation. A mobile PX was considered but deemed not acceptable in that this would automatically result in the discontinuance of sundry packs. Any desired items not included in these packs could be purchased by designated unit individuals at Tay Ninh and sent out on resupply. This is preferable to the certain inequities that would occur if a mobile PX was available at the forward base camp.
b. There was considerable difficulty in the rapid distribution of mail in the early and intermediate stages of the operation. This was largely due to the irregular air service. A regularly scheduled cargo plane eliminated this problem.
c. Difficulties were also experienced in getting replacements, returning R&R personnel, etc. from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh and Katum. Again, this was largely due not only to irregular aerial service but also insufficient flights. Getting soldiers back to their units was always slow. The problem would have been at incalculable proportions if it were not for the frequent ground convoys.
d. Supply: All classes of supply were drawn fron Tay Ninh LSA who operated a forward support area at Katum. Supply convoys were operated daily and controlled by DISCOM Forward. Water points were operated at Katum, Prek Kloc, and Bau CO by the 588th Engineers Bn. At Fire Support Base Knox all potable water was supplied by a water point operated by the 65th Engineers. Showers points at Katum were operated by Tay Ninh LSA and at Bau CO by 588th Engineers Bn. The greatest problem area of supply was ice, which seemed to be in limited supply at all forward camps.
(1) Class I:
“A” RATIONS 251,439 meals
“C” RATIONS 183,375 meals
LRRP RATIONS 680 meals
SUNDRY PACKS 1,079 ea
(2) Class II and IV: A total of 345 tons was used in support of the operation.
(3) Class III:
Mogas 46,490 gal
Diesel 73,800 gal
Lub oil OE-30 2,370 gal
Lub oil OE-10 1,159 gal
Lub oil OE-50 1,450 gal
Lub oil OE-90 325 gal
Grease AA 85 lb
Solvent 55 gal
Hydraulic fluid (brake) 84 gal
Hydraulic fluid (ramp) 87 gal
Aviation Gas 13,232 gal
JP-4 18,000 gal
(4) Class V:
Ctg, 5.56mm 41.3 tons
Ctg, 7.62mm 82.0 tons
Ctg, Cal .45 2.8 tons
Ctg, Cal .50 139.2 tons
Ctg, 40mm 16.9 tons
Ctg, 81mm 347.0 tons
Ctg, 90mm 808.4 tons
Ctg, 106mm 3.6 tons
Ctg, 60mm 210.0 tons
Ctg, 4.2” Mortar 279.5 tons
Hand Grenades 14.5 tons
Smoke Grenades 15.5 tons
Mine, claymore 5.7 tons
Miscel, (flares, demo, sig) 13.3 tons
e. Maintenance: Maintenance teams from the battalions were with their respective units. They were able to perform all 2nd echelon vehicular maintenance. The 725th Maintenance Battalion provided some maintenance facilities. No 3rd echelon maintenance was provided in the field. Problem areas for the 2/34 Armor were:
(1) Procurement of tank engines
(2) Availability of repair parts for M73 machine gun
(3) Support maintenance for fire control instruments, artillery and small arms.
f. Treatment of casualties, evacuation, and hospitalization: Dust Off support was provided by Cu Chi and Tay Ninh MEDEVAC units. Battalion aid stations treated patients for minor ailments and “D” Co, 25th Medical Clearing Station located at Katum handled all cases beyond the capabilities of the battalion stations.
g. Transportation: Transportation was provided by organic vehicles, CH-47, C-130, C-123, UHID.
h. Communications: Communications were provided by brigade and battalion sections; this consisted of FM and RTT. UHF was provided by 125th Signal Battalion.
i. Medical Evaluation: Personal health was general good throughout the operation. One significant problem area was that of rat control. Control measures included:
(1) Proper police of area, especially the mess area.
(2) Use of anti-coagulant poison.
(3) Use of traps and snares.
(4) Dapafane Malaria Prophylaxis was used in addition to the Chloroquins-Primacuin tablets. No malaria was reported during the operation. Common complaints included colds, minor cuts and scratches and, at first, sunburn. Skin irritations were a persistent problem with most resulting from the heat. These were minimized by the daily use of showering facilities.
14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques. None reported.
15. (C) Commander's Analysis:
a. All engineer projects assigned to the 1st Brigade were completed (USSF/CIDG camps at KATUM and THEIN NGON and improving the airstrip at KATUM to receive C-130 aircraft and constructing an airstrip at THEIN NGON to receive C-123 aircraft).
b. The roads were secured, cleared, and improved to support the Brigade operations within War Zone “C” and the Brigade located and destroyed many VC/NVA bases and forces. At about D+30, there was a substantial decrease in VC contact as the VC moved into the Saigon area for their TET offensive.
c. From 18 Jan 68 to 15 Feb 68, all contact with the VC was with very small units or scattered individuals. During this time, minor mortar attacks were the only VC offensive actions. Major contact was established on 15, 16, and 17 Feb 68 which suggested that some of the units which had moved to the Saigon area had returned. On 19 Feb 68, the 2-14 Inf located a VC company area which was suspected to have conducted the mortar attacks on the TAY NINH Base Camp.
d. Action continued throughout Operation YELLOWSTONE with sporadic contact almost daily.
e. The use of airmobile assets enabled the Brigade to assault a large portion of its TAOR. Without airmobile assets the Brigade was restricted to the immediate vicinity of its base camps. When restricted to assault entirely by ground movement, the effectiveness was minimal since the VC units began to move around the US installations and effective ground range.
f. Eagle flights were conducted infrequently because of the requirement to support US forces with artillery and the difficulty in moving and securing arty at temporary FSB's based on the dense jungles and lack of CH-47's to accomplish timely movements.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
/s/Joseph L Mc(illegible)
for THOMAS A. STOY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268
AVDCTB-C 19 March 1968
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
ATTN: ACOFS G3
1. Name of Operation: Operation YELLOWSTONE
2. Dates of Operation: 8 Dec 67-18 Dec 67, 27 Dec 67-24 Feb 68.
3. Location: Northern War Zone “C”.
4. Command Headquarters: 3rd Bde 25th Inf Div.
3rd Bde 25th Inf Div COL Leonard Daems
2nd Bn, 12th Inf LTC Raphael Tice (to 21 Feb 68)
2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (M) LTC Awbrey G. Norris (to 21 Feb 68)
LTC King J. Coffman (22 Feb to Pres)
3rd Bn, 22nd Inf LTC Thomas U. Harrold (to 2 Feb 68)
LTC Roy K. Flint (2 Feb 68 to present)
4th Bn, 9th Inf LTC John M Henchan
TF 1-5 Inf (M) LTC Henry B. Murphy Jr.
2-14th Inf LTC Allen Bracy
3-11th Cav LTC Neal Creighton
2-77th Arty LTC William L. Albright (to 5 Feb 68)
LTC Fred J. Merritt (5 Feb to present)
6. Task Organization:
2/12 Inf (-1 Co & Rcn Plt) Bde Control
3 Tms 44th IPSD 1 Co 2/12 Inf (OPCON)
1 Plt D/65th Engr (DS) Rcn Platoon 2/12 (OPCON)
2/77TH Arty (DS)
2/12 Inf (M) D/65th Engr (DS)
3 Tms 44th IPSD A-C-D 3/13th Arty (GSR)
1 Plt D/65th Engr (DS) Sig Spt Elm (SPT)
3D Plt 25th MP Co
3/22 Inf (-1 Co) DISCOM Fwd Commo Elm (SPT)
3 Tms 44th 1PDS Fwd Spt Sec, S&T (SPT)
1 Plt D/65th (DS) B/25th Med Bn (SPT)
D/725th Maint Bn (SPT)
Sec QM GRRFG Plt (SPT)
7. Supporting Forces
1. During the period of Operation YELLOWSTONE, the 2/77 Arty was in direct support of the 3rd Bde and attached maneuver battalions. From 10 Dec 1967 until 15 Dec 67, A/6/77 Arty was attached to 2/77 Arty and in DS role to 3rd Bde elements. From 29 Dec 67 until 31 Jan 68, A/3/13 was attached and in a GSB role to 2/77 Arty.
2. Normal use of preplanned and on call fires were used extensively during the operation. During Search and Destroy missions by maneuver battalions, effective use was made of blocking fires along routes of march. One highly effective technique, particularly during the occupation of FSB BURT, was the employment of close-in H&I's. These were fired in great volume at BURT and were believed instrumental in the suppression of VC mortar attacks.
3. During the battle of SUOI CUT (1-2 Jan 68), artillery played a highly significant role. Direct fire was employed upon attacking VC forces in large volume. During the battle, approximately 60 rounds of beehive ammunition were fired and were believed instrumental in stopping the VC human wave assaults. During the attack, interdiction fires were fired on withdrawing enemy forces from FSB BEAUREGARD (vic XT381856).
4. Positions occupied:
BTRY COORD DATES OCCUPIED MEANS OCC
A/2/77 XT 370 630 8-9 Dec 67 Convoy
A/2/77 XT 395 700 9-15 Dec 67 CH-47
A/2/77 XT 280 779 27-29 Dec 67 CH-47
A/2/77 XT 499 806 29 Dec - 27 Jan CH-47
A/2/77 XT 492 475 27 Jan - 24 Feb CH-47
B/2/77 XT 370 630 8-9 Dec 67 Convoy
B/2/77 XT 395 700 9-15 Dec 67 CH-47 B/2/77 XT 280 778 27-28 Dec 67 Convoy
B/2/77 XT 333 903 28 Dec - 11 Jan Convoy
B/2/77 XT 499 806 11-28 Jan 68 CH-47
B/2/77 XT 492 475 31 Jan - 10 Feb Convoy
B/2/77 FSB SIBRON 28-31 Jan 68 Convoy
C/2/77 XT 370 630 8-9 Dec 67 Convoy
C/2/77 XT 280 778 27-29 Dec 67 Convoy
C/2/77 XT 499 806 29 Dec - 25 Jan Convoy
A/3/13 XT 490 806 30 Dec - 28 Jan Convoy
A/3/13 FSB BURT 28-31 Jan 68 Convoy
A/6/77 XT 395 700 10-15 Dec 67 CH-47
5. Statistical Data:
A. Total Rounds Expended:
2/77 A/3/13 A/6/77
35,622 9,504 1,190
B. Missions by Types:
(1) H&I 15,324 3,152 421
(2) SPT 721 160 7
(1) Extensive use was made of tactical air to include preplanned immediate and combat proof missions with normal air request channels being used for all missions flown.
(2) Statistical Data:
1 Preplanned missions requested 140
2 Preplanned missions flown 133
3 Preplanned sorties 315
4 Immediate missions requested 100
5 Immediate missions flown 100
6 Immediate sorties 205
B. Results of tactical air.
1 VC killed by air (body count) 14
2 VC killed by air (poss) 64
3 Military structures destroyed 18
4 Military structures damaged 6
5 Bunkers destroyed 75
6 Bunkers damaged 34
7 Bunkers uncovered 192
8 Trenches destroyed (in meters) 245
9 Trenches uncovered (in meters) 1200
10 Tunnel entrances exposed 5
11 Tunnels collapsed (in meters) 30
12 Foxholes destroyed 4
13 Secondary explosions
A. White smoke 7
B. Black smoke 1
C. Gray smoke 4
C. Army Aviation:
(1) The brigade conducted numerous airmobile operations during Operation YELLOWSTONE by the 269th combat aviation battalion. Working with the same helicopter companies is highly desirous as coordination is greatly simplified. In addition, quick reaction insertions and extractions can be accomplished with minimum loss of time.
(2) The brigade aviation section flew a total of 825 hours and 1734 sorties in support of the operation. A total of 1626 passengers were transported during this period.
(3) The largest single event during Operation YELLOWSTONE in which Army Aviation was involved was the battle of SOUI CUT on 1-2 January, 1968. The Spartans from the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion arrived at 0330 hours with Class IV emergency resupply. They were joined by the Little Bears of the 188th AHC. Some of ammunition had been exhausted and others were critically low. While the battle raged around them and while drawing intense hostile fire, on each approach, the slicks continued to bring in ammunition, without which Fire Support Base BURT could not have been successfully defended.
(4) Fire Support Base BURT was located in the northeastern portion of War Zone C (XT500805). The ground was dry and had been ground into a fine powder, Due to the number of units occupying the area, air traffic was heavy and dust caused by the down wash of the rotors was a continuous problem. This problem was partially alleviated by the establishment of two helipads, one for CH47 resupply aircraft and the other for command and control of OH23's and UH1's. One pad would not suffice due to congestion and CH47 rotor wash. These pads were covered with Peneprine using a 600 gallon spreader daily. Air traffic control was achieved by utilizing pathfinders from the 25th Aviation Battalion. A direct line link was established between the pathfinder and the artillery FDC to coordinate check fires for arriving and departing aircraft. To avoid constant check fires, an air corridor was established through which all aircraft arrived and departed. Depending on the tactical situation, this corridor was often changed to meet requirements.
(5) Gunship support for the battle of SOUI CUT was provided by C Troop 3/17 Cavalry, 187th and 188th AHC's and Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion. These aircraft were effectively employed to assist in blunting the two regiment attack.
8. (C) Intelligence:
A. Intelligence concerning the Brigade AO was obtained from 25th Inf Div S-2, and through Liaison with advisory teams.
B. The AO extended from War Zone “C” to the vicinity of Saigon. Terrain varied from dense double canopy jungle to rice paddies and swampy lowland areas.
C. The following enemy initiated actions occurred:
(1) Sniper fire 41
(2) Mortar fire 57
(3) Mines 27
(4) Booby traps 10
(5) Engagements 60
(6) Fire against aircraft 14
D. The following major incidents occurred:
(1) 131445H December 67: B/3/22 Inf destroyed 6000 potato masher grenades and 9000 baseball grenades at XT429737. These grenades were protected by Cosmoline and stored in 55 gallon drums, which were buried in the ground.
(2) 012300H January 68: FSB BURT (XT500805) received a ground attack from an estimated VC regiment. The attack lasted from approximately 2300 to 0400, during which time the 3rd Brigade killed 355 VC, apprehended 500 PW's, and captured 75 AK-47's, 16 RPG-27's, 12 RPG-7's, 11 LMG's and 1 pistol. US losses were 19 killed and 111 wounded.
(3) 050902H January 68: B/4/9 Inf encountered heavy resistance on a landing zone at XT5 3093. In the ensuing engagement, 3rd Bde killed 65 VC (BC) and 200 VC (POSS), while losing 7 killed and 16 wounded.
(4) 0914301H January 68: B/3/22 discovered an arms cache at XT482792. They evacuated and destroyed a total of 11,650 rds of 7.62mm ammunition, 14,000 blasting caps and 66 cases of demolition.
(5) 300630H January 68: The 3rd Brigade base camp at Camp Ranier (XT495473) received 8X107mm rockets; 107 (illegible) rockets were received again on 31 January. This marked one of the first appearances of this Chinese Communist weapon in Vietnam.
E. Major VC personnel and equipment losses are listed in Para 12.
9. Mission: 3rd Bde 25th Infantry Division moves to northern War Zone “C” and conducts offensive operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, opens land lines of communications for friendly forces, and interdicts VC/NVA lines of communications.
10. Concept of Operation:
A. Maneuver: See OPORD 40-67 Para 3.
B. Fires: Maximum use was made of tac air and artillery throughout the operation.
(1) OPORD 37-67 HQ 3rd Bde 25th Inf Div dtd 3 Dec 67 w/ch 1.
(2) FRAGO 1 to OPORD 37-67 dtd 11 Dec 67.
(3) FRAGO 2 to OPORD 37-67 dtd 11 Dec 67.
(4) OPORD 40-67 HQ 33rd Bde 25th Inf Div dtd 26 Dec 67 with changes 1 & 2.
(5) FRAGO 1-67 to OPORD 40-67 dtd 27 Dec 67.
(6) FRAGO 2-67 to OPORD 40-67 dtd 13 Jan 68.
(7) FRAGO 3-67 to OPORD 40-67 dtd 19 Jan 68.
A. Chronological Summary:
(1) 8 DEC 67:
3rd Bde: Concluded Operation DIAMONDHEAD. Initiated Operation YELLOWSTONE. At 072221 hrs, DAU TIENG base camp received one rd S/A harassing fire. Fire was not returned as source of fire was undetermined. Results included no US casualties.
(B) 2-12 Inf: Remained DAU TIENG as Bde RRF. Prepared for future operations.
(C) TF 2-22: Conducted S&D operations to vic XT424664. At 1055 hrs, an APC hit a mine at XT416633 resulting in neg US casualties and moderate damage to the APC.
(D) 3-22 Inf: Co A conducted S&D operations in the Michelin to vic XT509497 and established a company size ambush. Bn (-) remained DAU TIENG as division reserve.
(E) TF Romeo: Detached from TF 2-22 effective 080700 hrs. Secured bridge site vic XT390628. Continued security of FSBPB GRANT vic XT382625.
(F) 3-49 ARVN: Arrived DAU TIENG. Prepared for future operations.
(2) 9 DEC 67:
(A) 2-12 Inf: Conducted CA and secured southern portion of FSPB HOOD vic XT389702. Co C(-) remained DAU TIENG as Bde RRF.
(B) TF 2-22 Inf: Conducted S&D operations in AO OTTER. Co A & C/2-34 Armor conducted operations to vic XT419707. Co. B, C, & CP conducted operations to vic XT410717.
(C) 2-22 Inf: Co A conducted S&D operation in the Michelin, closing DAU TIENG at 1300 hrs. Bn (-) remained in DAU TIENG and prepared for future operations.
(D) TF Romeo: Continued security of FSPB GRANT (XT382625). OPCON to 3-13 Arty.
(E) 3-49 ARVN: Conducted CA and secured northern portion of FSPB HOOD (XT3489702).
(3) 10 DEC 67:
(a) 2-12 Inf: At 091835 hrs, Co C was airlifted from DAU TIENG to FSPB GRANT (XT382625) for security; was returned to DAU TIENG at 100930 hrs by CH-47. Co C conducted sweep operations vic XT502465 to verify a report of 10 armed VC in the area. 1 Plt Co C remains OPCON TF Romeo. Co C (-) remained as Bde RRF. BN (-) conducted CA at 1300 hrs vic XT442686.
(B) TF 2-22: Conducted S&D operations to FSPB HOOD (XT389702). Relieved 2-12 Inf and 3-49 ARVN of security missions.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Conducted CA at 1000 hrs vic XT442686. Conducted S&D operations vic XT376718.
(D) TF Romeo: Continued security of FSPB GRANT (XT382685). Remained OPCON 3-13 Arty.
(E) 3-49 ARVN: At 091928 hrs engaged unk number of VC with S/A vic XT389702. VC did not return fire.
(4) 11 DEC 68:
(A) 2-12 Inf: At 102150 hrs, DAU TIENG ambush patrol vic XT509465 was sprung in reaction to movement around location with negative US casualties and unknown VC results. 1 Platoon Co C remained OPCON TF Romeo. Co C (-) remained at DAU TIENG as Bde reaction force. Bn (-) conducted S&D operations to vic XT461696.
(B) TF 2-22: Continued security of FSPB HOOD (XT389702). Conducted S&D operations vic FSPB HOOD.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Conducted S&D operations to vic XT415720.
(D) TF Romeo: Continued security of FSPB GRANT (XT382625). Remained OPCON 3-13 Arty.
(E) 3-49 ARVN: Conducted S&D operations to vic XT438688.
(5) 12 DEC 67:
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D operations from XT462696 to XT457679, XT470684, and XT476693 then return. Negative contact. Co C (-) remained DAU TIENG as Bde RRF.
(B) TF 2-22: TF (-) continued to secure FSB HOOD and conduct local S&D operations. Co B conducted S&D operations to XT3987533 and return. C/2-34 Armor moved to SOUI DA and became IOCIB 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. At 1230 hrs, the lead tank of C/2-34 Armor detonated a booby trap, causing 4 WIA among D/6t Engr troops with them.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D operations to XT434729. Negative contact. Co C continued OPCON 1-5 Inf (M).
(D) TF Romeo: Continued security of FSPB GRANT and the bridge site to the NE.
(E) 3-49 Inf (ARVN): Conducted S&D operations from St440683, XT436671, XT449671, and XT446690 and return. Negative contact.
(6) 13 DEC 67:
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) conducted local S& D operations vic XT463696 and conducted Eagle flights to XT333775, XT376757, XT375769, and XT377795. Co C (-) remained DAU TIENG as Bde RRF. At 121944 hrs Dec 67, the D Co Ambush Patrol vic XT467702 observed 3 VC digging in north of their ambush site. Artillery fire was called in and resulted in 3 VC KIA (POSS). A sweep of the area in the morning resulted in two bicycles, which were destroyed. At 1640 hrs, Recon Plt received two bursts of AK-47 fire vic XT374789 w/o casualties. Gunships and artillery were employed w/unknown results.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Bn (-) continued to secure FSPB HOOD. Companies B and C conducted S&D operations to XT383732 and XT400715 respectively then returned to FSB HOOD. Recon Plt continued as TF Romeo.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D operations to XT4818749. Co C remained OPCON 2-5 Inf (M). At 1400 hrs, both B and D companies received ineffective sniper fire vic XT432727 and XT428734 respectively. Artillery and SA fires were employed with unknown results. At 1445H, 6 55 gal drums were located vic XT425737. The drums were found to contain 15,000 hand grenades of various types which were destroyed (except for type samples which were evacuated).
(D) TF Romeo: Continued to secure FSB GRANT.
(E) 3-49 Inf (ARVN): Conducted S&D operations to vic XT418679. Negative contact.
(7) 14 DEC 67:
(A) 2-12 Inf: Co A conducted a combat assault into an LZ vic Xt359798 at 0945 hrs without contact. At 1008 hrs, the Bn (-) was ordered to move to DAU TIENG. Negative contact except for the first lift of returning troops to DAU TIENG received SA fire from XT470465 w/o loss or damage.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted S&D operations to XT384724 (neg contact). Continued to secure FSPB HOOD. Recon Plt continued as TF Romeo.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D operations to XT436735 and returned to XT418749. At 1405 hrs, A Co had a claymore mine detonated against them vic XT420736 causing 2 KHA and 8 WHA. Co C continued OPCON 1-5 Inf (M).
(D) TF Romeo: Continued to secure FSB GRANT.
(E) 3-49 Inf (ARVN): Conducted S&D operations to XT385675. From 1340 to 1345 hrs, the Bn engaged an undetermined sized VC delaying force vic XT390674. The Bn maneuvered against the enemy and artillery was called and employed with unk results. At 1410 hrs and continuing until close of the period, the Bn moved in an area (XT3867) with a high rate of booby traps and a small population of snipers. Results included 1 KHA and 7 WHA (all ARVN). At the close of the period, the Bn was located at XT385675 and moving to a laager vic XT383672.
(8) 15 DEC 67:
(A) 2-12 Inf: Remained DAU TIENG as 25th Div RRF> conducted S&D operations with C&D companies in the Michelin Plantation (XT5148 to XT5149). Recon Plt conducted mounted S&D opns throughout Ben Cui Plantation (XT4544). At 1425 hrs, Co C detonated a booby trap vic XT5(illegible)488 causing 23 US WHA. Negative contact.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued to secure FSPB HOOD until relieved by 3-49 Inf (ARVN) at 1315 hrs. Began movement from the FSPB to DAI TIENG at that time. The Bn laagered at 1730 hrs vic XT442655. At approximately 120 hrs, a hand grenade explosion at the FSPB caused 2 DOW and 5 WHA. An investigation continues to determine the cause of the incident.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted a combat assault into a cold LZ vic XT532702 at 0825 hrs and conducted S&D operations to XT532702 at 0825 hrs and conducted S&D operations to XT370679. Co C continued OPCON 1-5 Inf (M).
(D) TF Romeo: Continued to secure FSPB GRANT. Neg contact.
(E) 3-49 Inf (ARVN): Conducted an airmobile move to FSPB HOOD from XT385675, closing at 1315 hrs and assuming security of the FSPB at that time.
(9) 16 DEC 67:
(A) 2-12 Inf: Remained DAU TIENG aS Division RRF. Co A conducted a combat assault into a cold LZ vic XT455534 at 1400 hrs and moved to XT465525 by the close of the period.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Bn (-) moved from XT442655 to DAU TIENG, closing at 1532 hrs. Co's A & C closed TAY NINH at 1605 hrs. Recon Plt closed DAU TIENG at the close of the period.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted an airmobile move from XT532702 to DAU TIENG, closing at 1130 hrs. Co C remained OPCON 1-5 Inf (M). Negative contact.
(D) 3-49 Inf (ARVN): Secured FSPB HOOD until it closed at 1320 hrs. The Bn then conducted an airmobile movement to DAU TIENG, closing at 1538 hrs. Negative contact.
(10) 17 DEC 67
(A) 2-12 Inf: Continued as Division RRF in DAU TIENG. Co A conducted S&D operations from XT465525 to XT465500 where the company was extracted and returned to DAU TIENG, closing at 1504 hrs. At 0725 hrs, A Co engaged 2 VC vic XT463525. VC fled immediately and contact was not regained. At 1350 hrs, Companies B and C were Eagle flighted into an LZ vic XT519517 and conducted S&D operations w/o contact until 1627 hrs when extracted to DAU TIENG.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Bn (-) remained DAU TIENG and prepared for future operations. Companies A and C conducted convoy and route security operations in the TAY NINH-FRENCH FORT-SOUI DA complex and closed DAU TIENG at 1758 hrs. Scout platoon became attached 2-77 Arty for security of FSPB ALLEN. Negative contact.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) remained DAU TIENG and prepared for future operations. Co C remained attached to 1-5 Inf (M). Co D and Recon Plt secured movement of 2-77 Arty to FSPB ALLEN, returning to DAU TIENG at 1560 hrs.
(D) 3-49 Inf 9ARVN): Departed DAU TIENG for BAO DON at 0800 hrs, reverting to parent unit control.
(11) 1 8 DEC 67
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) conducted a combat assault into a cold LZ vic XT585419 at 0721 hrs. Co A (-) continued as DAU TIENG RRF. One platoon Co A continued OPCON 2-77 Arty for security of FSPB ALLEN. A Bn base camp was established vic XT570415 and interdictory operations initiated in assigned areas.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conduct road movement from DAU TIENG to XT546393, departing at 0405 hrs and closing at 1108 hrs. At 0828 hrs vic XT527423, a command detonated 8” artillery round was fired causing 2 KHA and 3 WHA to the Bn sweeping team. At 1035 hrs, B Co observed 10-15 VC vic XT552396. Artillery was employed and B Co pursued w/o gaining contact. Negative US and unknown VC losses. At 1147 hrs, Co C engaged 2 VC vic XT546393. VC broke contact and fled SE. Unk VC results. Company patrol bases were established by Co A (XT527400), Co B (XT562389), and Co C (XT546393). The Bn CP located with Co B. From 1517 hrs to 1525 hrs, Co C engaged 3 VC vic XT548399 with S/A, A/W, and M79 fire. VC returned fire with rifle grenades and AK-47's. Results included 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47. There were no US losses.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted a combat assault into a cold LZ vic XT585419 at 0907 hrs. A Bn base camp was established XT587417 and interdictory operations initiated.
(D) 3rd Bde terminated Operation YELLOWSTONE and initiated Operation CAMDEN at 180300 hrs Dec. 67.
(12) 3rd Bde terminated Operation CAMDEN and re-entered Operation YELLOWSTONE 270600 HRS Dec 67.
(A) 2-12 Inf: Remained DAU TIENG base camp and prepared for future operations.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Moved by motor march from vic THANH AN to DAU TIENG, closing 270048 Dec 67. Co A was reconning by fire vic XT519416 and fired into Co A 2-12 Inf 9OPCON 2-22 Inf), resulting in 8 US NBI. At 270830 Dec 67, departed DAU TIENG by motor march en route to XT285619. At 271200 Dec 67, Bn came under OPCON 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Remained DAU TIENG base camp and prepared for future operations.
(13) 28 DEC 67
(A) 2-12 Inf: (Bn (-) moved by fixed wing to KATUM. Came under OPCON 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div 271200 Dec 67.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Returned from OPCON 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div 271634 Dec. 67.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Remained DAU TIENG base camp and prepared for future operations.
(D) 2-14 Inf: Became OPCON 3rd Bde 271634 Dec 67.
(14) 29 DEC 67
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): At 2160 hrs, Co B detected unknown number of VC vic XT580858. Engaged them with S/A and claymore, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and one AK-47 CIA. No US losses.
(B) 3-22 Inf: Airmobile combat assault to vic FSPB BURT (XT500807). Neg contact.
(C) 2-14 Inf: (OPCON) continued to secure BO TUC.
(15) 30 DEC 67
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Continue security of FSPB BURT & Bde fwd op vic XT500807 & secured bridge site vic XT462819 until extraction of bridge. At 1845 hrs, Co A received RPG fire vic XT499819 resulting in (illegible) US WIA. At 1222 hrs, Co B received 1 RPG round vic XT478821 resulting in 1 US WIA.
(B) 3-22 Inf: Conducted sweeps & outposting operations along road from FSPB BURT (XT500807) to bridge site (XT462819). At 1953 hrs, Co A engaged 2 VC w/SA & M79 vic XT501798 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). At 0620 hrs, CP received 10 incoming 60mm rds vic XT500803. Neg casualties. At 0950H, Co A engaged 2 VC vic XT501798 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1310H, Co A rec'd AK-47 fire vic XT478820 resulting in 1 US KIA & 2 US WIA. At 1515H, patrol from DAU TIENG base camp swept area of contact. At 1953H resulted in 1 VC KIA (POSS).
(C) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) continued OPCON to 1st Bde. Co B continued as Bde RRF.
(D) 2-14 Inf: Released OPCON 1915H and reverted to 1st Bde.
(16) 31 DEC 67:
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON to 1st Bde. Co B continued as Bde RRF.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued security of FSPB BURT & Bde fwd CP. Co B secured bridge site vic XT462819 until 1018H when bridge was extracted. En route to FSPB BURT, Co B received 1 RPG round from vic XT478821 resulting in moderate damage to 1 APC & 1 US WIA.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Continued sweeps & outposting operations along road from FSPB BURT (XT500807) to bridge (XT462819). At 0600H, received approximately 10 rounds of 60mm mortar from the south. Rounds landed 75 meters short. Neg casualties. At 1305H, Co C received 3 RPG rounds & AW fire vic XT484820, resulting in (illegible) US KIA & 2 US WIA. Returned fire with SA. VC losses unknown.
(17) 1 JAN 68
(A) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) continued to secure FSPB BURT & conducted security patrolling.
(B) 2-22 Inf: Bn (-) continued OPCON 1st Bde. Co B continued as Bde RRF.
(C) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued to secure FSPB BURT & conducted security patrolling. Delayed entry: 310344 Dec 67, Co C engaged 1 VC vic XT496806 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) & captured 1 AK-47. Delayed Entry: 311035 Dec 67, Co A found 1 22 cal pistol vic XT 500790. Delayed entry: 311518 Dec 67, Co A found 1 bike & 1 VC KIA (BC) vic XT502793.
(D) 1-5 Inf (M): Conducted security patrolling vic XT520522 & maintained defensive posture. 311820H, 1 ½ ton trailer hit mine resulting in moderate damage to trailer. Neg casualties.
(18) 2 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) continued OPCON 1st Bde. Co B remained Bde RRF.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued security of FSPB BURT & conducted security patrolling. At 2235 hrs, Co A LP engaged 1 VC between LP position and perimeter. Bn came under intense ground attack from est VC Regt, attack continued until 0515H 2 Jan 68. Sustained 5 US KHA and 41 US WHA.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Continued security of FSPB BURT & conducted security patrolling. At 1844 hrs, AP vic XT503807 engaged 1 VC squad resulting in 2 US KHA & 1 US WHA. At 2235H, Bn came under intense ground attack from est VC regt. Attack continued until 0515 2 Jan 68, sustaining 17 US KHA and 93 US WHA. OPCON 1st Bde 021745H.
(D) 1-5 Inf (M): Conducted security patrolling vic XT520522 & maintained defensive posture. Released OPCON 3rd Bde 020700 Jan 68.
(E) 4-9 Inf: OPCON 3rd Bde 020700 Jan 68.
(19) 3 JAN 68:
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) continued OPCON 1st Bde. Co B remained Bde RRF.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued security of FSPB BURT & conducted local security patrolling.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Continued OPCON 1st Bde.
(D) 4-9 Inf: Continued security of FSPB BURT & conducted local security patrolling.
(20) 4 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) continued OPCON 1st Bde. Co B remained Bde RRF.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued security of FSPB BURT & conducted local S&D operations.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) continued OPCON 1st Bde. Co D remained attached 1-5 Inf (M).
(D) 4-9 Inf: Continued security of FSB BURT & conducted S&D operations.
(21) 5 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) continued OPCON 1st Bde. Co B relieved of Bde RRF and moved by fixed wing to join parent unit.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued security of FSB BURT (XT500807). Conducted local S&D operations. Neg contact.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Relieved from OPCON 1st Bde and returned to DAU TIENG base camp (XT492473) to act as Bde RRF.
(D) 4-9 Inf: At 0902 hrs, Co B conducted combat air assault into hot LZ. 2 helicopters were shot down. Results 1 US KHA. At approximately 1610 hrs, 1st Plt Co B was surrounded by unk number of VC vic XT533902. Air strikes have been called in in an attempt to extract the platoon. Re-enforcement not feasible due to limited space in LZ. Contact still in progress at end of reporting period.
(22) 6 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: OPCON 1st Bde.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued to secure FSB BURT (XT500807) and conducted local S&D operations.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) continued as Bde RRF. Conducted local S&D operations. A&B Co conducted S&D operations in Michelin Plantation. Co C acted as Bde RRF and prepared for future operations. Co D continued OPCON 1-5 Inf (M).
(D) 4-9 Inf: Bn (-) continued security of FSB BURT. Recon Plt secured NUI BA DEN rocket crusher. At 0729H, Co D found 1 dead VC (BC), coordinates unk. At 0845H vic XT503800, Co D found 1 dead VC (BC). At 1320H, Co D received 2 RPG 11 rounds vic XT501790. Neg casualties.
(23) 7 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Remained OPCON 1st Bde.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): At 0428H vic XT498809, Recon Plt rec 1 grenade. Fire returned with M79's. Neg US cas. Unk VC results. At 0428H vic XT498809, Co B detected movement in trees. Engaged with M16's. VC casualties unk. At 0930H vic XT530820, Co B found 3 partially completed bunkers with overhead cover and 1 table. All destroyed in place. At 1620 H vic XT546853, Co B found platoon size base camp.
(C) 3-22 Inf: At 0720H, Co A&B moved by CH-47 to FSB BURT (XT500807. Co C remained at DAU TIENG as Bde RRF. Co D continued OPCON 1-5 Inf (M).
(D) 4-9 Inf: Bn (-) Recon Platoon continued to secure NUI BA DEN and rock crusher. At 0155H vic XT502804, Co D received 3 grenades. Returned fire with grenades. Neg US casualties. VC casualties unknown. At 0150H, Co D received unk number hand grenades. Returned fire with grenades. Sweep revealed 1 shirt with blood on it. At 1006H, coordinates unk , Co C found 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1430H, Co C vic XT5903791 found 2 bicycles and destroyed them.
(24) 8 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) continued OPCON 1st Bde. Recon Plt continued as Bde RRF.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted S&D operations vic XT5485 & XT5289. At 0915H vic XT549865, Co B found several butterfly bombs and destroyed them in place. At 1410H, Co B received SA fire. Returned fire with LFT with unk results. At 0220H, CP received approx 50 rds 82mm mortar fire. Fire returned with 81mm mortars and Arty resulting in unk VC losses and 3 US WIA. At 1345H vic XT535483, Co C received SA & AW fire. Fire returned with SA & AW with unk results. At 1410H vic XT534483, Co C found 1000 lbs polished rice and 250 lbs unpolished rice.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D operations vic FSB BURT (XT500807). Co C remained Bde RRF. Co D continued OPCON 1-5 Inf (M). At 0215H vic XT498803, received 1 mortar round. Neg Cas.
(D) 4-9 Inf: Bn (-) conducted local S&D operations vic FSB BURT. At 2321H vic XT501803, Co D detected movement to the front. Engaged movement with grenades, with unk res. At 2312H vic XT502802, Co D received 1 grenade. Neg cas. At 1008H vic XT514821, Co D received SA fire. Fire not returned. Neg cas. Recon Plt continued to secure NUI BA DEN rock crusher.
(E) 1-5 Inf (M): Became OPCON 3rd Bde 1100H.
(25) 9 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 1st Inf Bde. Recon Plt continued as Bde RRF.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued S&D operations vic XT505895. At 2108H vic XT525803, Co A LP detected 1 VC with RPG launcher. Engaged with M-16 and 81mm mortar with unk results. At 0720H vic XT525892, Co A received 10 mortar rounds, taking no casualties. Co B swept the area with neg results. At 1049H vic XT504901, Co A found 1 RPG-2 launcher, 1 bag rice, bunker and assorted clothing. At 1103H vic XT504901, Co A found 75 60mm mortar rounds, 1 AK-47. At 1342H vic XT515907, Co A rec heavy SA & AW fire. Engaged with LFT, 4 US WIA dusted off. At 1355 H vic XT511906, Co A received SA and AW and RPG fire from est 30 VC. Engaged with SA & Arty, resulting in 10 VC KIA (BC).
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) continued to secure FSB BURT (XT500805) & conduct local S&D operations. Co C & D OPCON 1-5 Inf (M). At 1430H vic XT482792, Co B found 3 82mm mortar rounds, 136 60mm mortar rds, 38 cases of demolitions, 22 cases C-4, 4 cases of 7.62mm rounds and 7 cases of AK-47 rds.
(D) 4-9 Inf: Bn (-) continued to secure FSB BURT (XT500805) & conduct S& D operations. Recon continued to secure MUI BA DEN rock crusher. At 0839H vic XT503783, Co C found 14 bunkers with overhead cover. At 0830H vic XT498790, Co D found one ½ ton trailer. At 1015H vic XT498790, Co C called in air strike on VC base camp. At 1455H, Co A found VC base camp with 3 bunkers, 3 anti-aircraft positions and spider holes.
(E) 3-11 Cav: Became OPCON 1210H for S & D operations. At 1218H vic XT523924, Trp M rec SA fire resulting in 3 US WIA. At 1540H vic XT522920 Trp M destroyed 15 VC bicycles.
(26) 10 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: BN (-) remained OPCON to 1st Bde. Recon Plt continued as Bde RRF.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted S & D operations vic XT525893. At 0825H vic XT513903, Co A APC ran over mines. After passing, mine exploded resulting in 7 US WIA. At 0937H, Co A found small bunker & trench systems. At 1046H, Co A found 1 dead VC & documents (evac).
(C) 3-22 Inf: Continued to secure FSB BURT & conduct S & D operations. Co C&D continued OPCON to 1-5M. At 1653H vic XT500807, Co A suffered 3 US & 2 ARVN casualties resulting from fire caused by explosion.
(D) 4-9 Inf: Continued to secure FSB BURT & conduct S&D operations. Recon Plt continued to secure NUI PA DEN rock crusher. At 1922H, coordinates unk, Co A&D destroyed 2 bunkers. At 1250H, CP rec 16 60mm mortar rds. Neg cas.
(E) 3-11 Cav: Continued to conduct S&D operations vic XT490910. At 1630H vic XT513900, Trp L dest 2 military structures and cattle pen. At 1605H vic XT513900, Trp L rec 4-5 RPG rds. Returned fire with Aw with unk result.
(F) 1-5 Inf (M): conducted cordon & search operations vic XT520497. At 1145H XT510420, Co C sustained 3 WIA from booby trapped grenade. At 1444H vic XT520497, Co C searched hospital & store with neg results.
(27) 11 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf (M): Continued S&D operations vic XT5391. At 1118H, Co B found 2300 lbs polished rice, 2 rifles (German) & 11 bikes. Vic XT531915. This believed to be a resupply depot. At 1220H, Co A found 9 hand grenades, 2 US protective masks, 2 60mm rds and 15 military structures. Vic XT531015. At 1302H, Co B vic XT535910 dest'd 5 bunks 6'X8' w/ohc and 14 bnks 12'X14' w/ohc & 3 RPG rds, 30 sticks dynamite, 3700 lbs pol rice, 2 cases 7.62 ammo, 6 gas masks. At 1400H, Co B had 1 NBI from falling tree vic XT530910. At 1400H, Co A had vic XT53590 found 9 fresh graves w/9 VC KIA (BC) & 2 bikes. At 1659H, Co A found vic XT535910, 9 bikes, 4000 lbs bagged rice, 1 case 7.62 ammo, 1 case TNT, 3 cases rifle grenades & 3 RPG rds.
(B) 2-12 Inf: (Bn (-) continued OPCON 1st Bde. Recon Plt remained as Bde CRIP.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Continued S&D operations vic XT500805 at FSB BURT & conducted limited S&D to vic XT4875. Co D&C remained OPCON to TF 1-5 (M).
(D) 4-9 Inf: Continued security of FSB BURT (XT500805) & conducted limited S&D to vic XT4982, At 2150H, Co C sprung ambush vic XT503795 in reaction to movement with unk results.
(E) 3-11 Cav: Continued screening operations to the west along Cambodian Border from vic XT5490 to vic XT5192. At 0951H, Trp M found gravel mines vic XT515925. At 112H, Trp M engaged 2 VC vic XT476915 with unk results. At 1120H, Trp M engaged 2 VC vic XT472918 with unk results. At 1200, Trp M rec'd unk no RPG rds from vic XT472916 resulting in 2 US WIA & 1 US KIA.
(F) 1-5 Inf (M): Continued daylight patrol operations in Michelen Plantation. At 0932H, Co D 3/22 destroyed 1 82mm rd vic XT512493. At 1043H, Co D 3/22 engaged 1 VC with unknown results vic XT534475. A sweep found 1 shortwave radio, 2 clips AK47 ammo, 1 map with posns plotted, 1 bike, and misc documents.
(28) 12 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) continued OPCON 1st Bde. Recon Plt remained Bde rear reaction force. At 1550H, vic XT503447, CRIP rec SA & AW fire. Returned fire with SA. Neg US cas. VC cas unk. At 1755H vic XT500477, 1 EM of CRIP was (illegible) & during rescue attempt was shot in the thigh (friendly).
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued to S&D to vic XT5287. At 0300H, Co C received 5 RPG rds vic XT519891 resulting in 3 US WIA. At 0735H, Co C swept area from which received RPG rds from vic XT519891 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 RPG-2, 2 RPG rds. At 1147H, Co A found base camp vic XT481798 containing 10-20 bunkers, 4 cooking hooches, and 100M trench system. At 1515H, Co A found base camp vic XT544874 containing 40 bunkers & 5000 lbs of polished rice.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Conducted S&D operations to vic XT4779 & XT4780. At 1145H, Co A found base camp vic XT476810 containing 190 bunkers, and misc blood soaked black pajamas. At 1320H, Co B found base camp vic XT481798 containing 10 bunkers, 10 military structures, assorted cooking utensils, misc medical supplies, 2 bicycles & misc documents. At 1350H, Co B made contact with est 2 VC snipers vic XT478798. Contact broken 1300H. Neg US cas, VC cas unk.
(D) 4-9 Inf: Conducted S&D oper vic XT5179 & XT5177. At 0920H, Co B found 7 shallow graves vic XT504780. Results 7 VC KIA (BC). At 1254H, Co A made contact with VC platoon vic XT508776 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 4 US WHA. Recon Plt cont'd to secure NUI BA DEN rock crusher.
(E) 3-11 ACR: Continued to sweep to the east to vic 5292. At 0915H, Trp M received 2 RPG rds vic XT520923 resulting in 2 US KHA & 4 US WHA. At 1445H, Trp M found base camp with bikes parts & misc Chinese medicine vic XT521923. At 1552H, Trp 1 detonated mine vic XT524901 res in neg cas and heavy damage to vehicle. At 1707H, Trp L received 1 CHOI HANH vic XT545902.
(F) 1-5 Inf (M): Continued on Co size oper in the Michelin Plantation vic XT518518. Co C and # 3-22 Inf remained OPCON. At 0755H vic XT436448, Co A received 5 RPG-2 rds, AW and SA fire. Returned fire with SA, AW, 90mm and M-79 resulting in 1 US WHA, 1 tank and 2 APC's minor damage & unk VC casualties. At 1320H, Co C 1-5 and Co D 3-22 cordoned and searched AP 6 CHANH XT518518 with neg findings. At 1528H vic XT522518, Co C rec'd 5-6 rds 60mm mortar fire. Ret'd fire with mortars & LFT resulting in 1 US WHA & unk VC casualties. At 1759H vic XT512484, Co C dest 1 tilt road mine.
(29) 13 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Continued OPCON 1ST Bde, Recon Plt cont as BDE CRIP.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued S&D operations vic XT5480 with neg contact.
(C) 3-22 Inf: continued S&D operations vic XT4778 with neg contact. Co C&D continued OPCON to 1-5 Inf (M).
(D) 3-11 Cav: Continued to screen Cambodian Border vic XT5889. At 1220H, Trp L APC detonated mine vic XT445855 res in 1 US WHA and moderate damage to vehicle.
(E) 1-5 Inf (M): Continued S&D oper in Michelin Plantation vic XT563446 & XT510485 with neg contact.
(F) 4-9 Inf: Continued S&D oper vic XT5177 with neg contact.
(30) 14 JAN 68
(A) 2-22 Inf: Continued S&D operations vic XT4676. At 2228H vic XT543808, Co C LD detected movement and engaged with claymores with unk results. At 2254H, Co C observed 3-5 VC with surveillance scopes 75 mtrs from perimeter & engaged with AW with unk results. At 1114H, Co B found 4 bicycles (evac).
(B) 2-12 Inf: continued OPCON 1st Bde. Recon Plt cont'd as Bde CRIP.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Continued S&D oper vic XT4680 with neg res. Co D & C remained OPCON to 1-5 (M).
(D) 4-9 Inf: Continued S&D oper vic XT5380 with neg contact. Recon Plt continued to secure NUI BA DEN rock crusher.
(E) 1-5 Inf (M): At 1406H vic XT545487, Co C received sporadic AW fire. Ret fire w/Arty w/unk results.
(F) 3-11 Cav: Released OPCON 1825H.
(31) 15 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Continued OPCON 1st Bde. Recon Plt cont'd as Bde CRIP.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Continued S&D operations vic XT5374. At 1409H vic XT523773, Co A captured 1 VC with RPG-2 and 1 RPG rd. Earlier at 1150H, Co C found 1 dead VC with AK47. At 1424H vic XT528772, Co A found 4 VC KIA & captured 1 VC, 1 med bag, 3 AK47's & 1 bag of documents. At 1725H vic XT528772, Co A found 20 60mm mortar rds.
(C) 3-22 Inf: continued S&D operations vic XT4977. At 1210H, Co B engaged 1 sniper with SA with unk res. At 1240H vic XT488787, Co B received fire from claymore. Ret fire with SA with unk res. At 1329H vic XT488787, Co B rec fire from VC force of unk size. Ret fire with SA AW Arty, LFT & air strike res in 4 US KHA & 24 US WHA & unk VC casualties. At 1535 H, Co B detonated booby trp res in 6 US WHA. Co C&D cont'd OPCON to 1-5 (M).
(D) 4-9 Inf: Continued S&D oper vic XT5378. Recon Plt cont'd to secure NUI BA DEN rock crusher. At 0846H vic XT508794, Co C found 52 1-man bunkers with commo wire. At 0850H vic XT519795, Co C found 3 .50 cal gun positions & 4 1-man firing positions.
(E) 1-5 Inf (M): Continued S&D operations vic XT5554, XT5649, & XT5550. With Co C&D, 3-22 Inf OPCON. At 0840H vic XT554537, Co C received 4 60mm mortar rds and AW fire. Fire ret with Arty res in 1 US KHA & unk VC cas. At 1040H vic XT519529 L FT rec'd fire from AW. Neg cas. At 1150H vic XT557537, LFT received AW fire, returned fire with Arty, resulting in 1 US WHA. VC ca sunk. At 1248H vic XT557551, C&C ship engaged 2 VC with Arty with unk results.
(31) 16 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Returned OPCON 3rd Bde 1608H on Jan 68. Repositioned & improved fortifications within FSB BURT.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted S&D operations vic XT498755, XT525774, XT498755 & XT517757. At 1148, Co A found vic XT530776 25 bikes with spare parts & tires, 4 RPG-7 rds, 11 RPG-2 rds, 150 60mm rds. At 1205H, Co C found vic XT523773 70 82mm rds, 150 60mm rds, 4000 cal 30 rds, 2000 cal 32 rds, 50 M79 rds, 7 BOX-T telephones, 1 TA-1 & 1 TA-3-12 telephones, 2 (illegible)-10 radios, 1 US M1 carbine, 3 cases pull cords for grenades, 16 electric blasting caps, 162 RPG-2 rds.
(C) 1-5 Inf (M): Conducted S&D opers along axis from XT524537 to XT521546, returning to base camp on axis from XT524537 to XT503490.
(D) 3-22 Inf: Conducted daylight ambush patrols vic XT491798, XT506796, XT510810 & XT499817.
(E) 4-9 Inf: Released OPCON 3rd Bde eff 160934H Jan 68.
(32) 17 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Conducted Plt size sweep to vic XT5079. At 0915H, Co C vic XT506798 found 1 dead VC (BC). Also dest'd 3 mortar positions, 20 bunks, 50 82mm fuses.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted S&D opers vic XT5274 & 5374. At 1015H, gunships supporting Bn engaged 5 VC vic XT528740 res in 1 VC KIA (BC). 1319H, Co A vic XT520742 found 20 bunks. At 1435H, Co C vic XT518734 rec'd AW fire, 1 RPG rd resulting in 6 US WHA. 1435H, Co B vic XT523742 rec'd 1 RPG rd res in 1 US WHA
(C) 3-22 Inf: Conducted daylight ambush patrols to vic XT4980, XT5081, XT5079, XT5080. Co C&D continued OPCON 1-5 Inf (M).
(D) 1-5 Inf (M): Co C est block vic XT5347. Co C&D 3-22 conducted airmobile combat assault vic XT559495, XT564493, XT564496. At 0829H, troops securing downed aircraft rec'd AW fire from vic XT573500. This occurred after, at 0820H a lift ship was downed by AW fire from vic XT569503 causing 1 US WHA. Airstrike called with unk results. At 1029H, Co C made contact with 3 VC res in 3 VC KIA (BC), 1 RPG-2 & 1 AK47, sustaining 11 US WHA. 1248H, 3-22 Inf Co D vic XT567495 apprehended 1 VC (suspect) wounded.
(33) 18 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Cond S&D oper to vic XT525810. At 0945H, Co A dest 3 foxholes w/ohc vic XT515820. At 1320H, Co A suffered 1 NBI from leg cramps vic XT517820 (dusted off). At 1720H, Co A found 1 VC KIA (BC) in grave vic XT500810.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted S&D oper to vic XT542743. XT525730, 0719H A swept the area of contact revealed 1 VC KIA (BC) 1AK47. At 0905H, Co B located and dest 30 bnks, 100 mtrs trench vic XT518741. At 1025H, Co A found 3 VC in graves (BC) vic XT524737. At 1025H, Co B rec'd AW fire from unk no VC vic XT513736. At 1053H, Co C dest'd 6 AA positions, 6 bunks, 20 1-man foxholes w/ohc vic XT538739. At 1105H, Co C dest'd 4 ox cards vic XT539737.
(D) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) cond S&D oper to vic XT475755. Co C cont'd OPCON 1-5 Inf (M). Co D airlifted to FSB BURT & ret to parent unit OPCON. Co C airlifted to DAU TIENG became OPCON 1-5 Inf (M). At 1238H, Co A dest'd 12 bnks & 2100 mtrs of trench vic XT467682. At 1300H, Co A engaged 1 VC vic XT478792 w/unk res. At 1335H, Co A, in area of airstrike, vic XT476703 sustained 4 US WHA from butterfly bombs (3 dusted off) & 1 60mm rd was dest'd.
(E) 1-5 Inf (M): Conducted airmobile CA to vic XT5348, XT5440, & XT5650.
(34) 19 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: conducted S&D opers to vic XT5181 & XT5182.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted S&D opers to vic XT4973 & XT4974. At 1053H vic XT485755, Co C dest'd 4 bnks, 1 MG position, & 1 mortar position. At 1053H vic XT485755 Co C dest'd (illegible) AA posns.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D opns to vic XT4973, XT4982. Co's B & C continued OPCON 1-5 inf (M). At 1343H vic XT486826, Co A came into contact with 1 VC res in 1 VC KIA (poss). At 1524H vic XT491824, Co C dest'd 10 bnks.
(D) 1-5 Inf (M): Conducted S&D operations to vic XT5148 & XT5045. At 1723H, element escorting convoy hit mine vic XT463458. Damaged tire on 105mm, also found 2 30lb mines.
(35) 20 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Continued S&D opers to vic XT5178.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): cont'd to S&D vic XT5071, XT4873, & XT5073. At 1445H vic XT487725, Co B came into contact with unk size VC force. Contact was broken at 1518H. Res in 1 US KHA, 5 US WHA & 2 APC's damaged. All organic weapons employed against VC & Arty and Tac Air. VC Results 2 VC KIA (BC).
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) cont'd to S&D in vic XT4782. Co;s B & C remained OPCON to 105 Inf (M).
(D) 1-5 Inf (M): Conducted S&D opers to vic XT518486 & XT504453. At 0733H, 3-22 Inf Co C AP 46 returning to base camp, sighted 1 VC with 100 lb bag of rice, VC dropped rice and fled. Res in 1 100 lb bag of rice captured. At 1515H, Co C apprehended 1 21 yr old male detainee vic XT472463.
(36) 21 JAN 68
(A) 2-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D opers vic XT4669. Co C continued OPCON 3-22 Inf. At 1241H vic XT484727, Co C detonated mine resulting in 5 US WIA (no D/O) and moderate damage to APC's. At 0925H vic XT477709. Co B dest'd 1 ox cart & 2 L-shaped positions. At 1014H vic XT484735, Co C dest'd 5 bnks, 1 mil structure & evac 1000 lbs of rice. At 1241H vic XT497808, Co A detected movement & engaged with grenade with unk res. At 0815H vic XT488809, Co C 2-12 dest'd 8 bunkers & 1 foxhole.
(B) 2-12: Bn (-) conducted S&D operations vic XT5 380. Co C continued OPCON to 3-22 Inf. Recon Plt remained Bde CRIP. At 0925H vic XT524801, Co B dest'd 3 bnks. At 1517, Co A vic XT515804 found 17 bnks & 2 entrenching tools.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Conducted S&D opers vic XT4781 with Co C 2-12. Co B&C cont'd OPCON TF 1-5 Inf (M). At 2113H, Co A LP vic 497808 engaged 4-5 VC with claymore with unk res. At 2132H vic XT497808, Co A engaged movement with grenade with unk res. At 0915H vic XT488809. Cp C 2-12 dest'd 8 bnks & 1 foxhole.
(D) TF 1-5 Inf (M): Conducted S&D opers vic XT5348, XT5446 & XT5245.
(37) 22 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) conducted S&D opers vic XT5079 & XT5081. Co C cont'd OPCON 3-22 Inf. Recon Plt cont'd as Bde CRIP. At 0814H vic XT508805, Co D destroyed 15 foxholes. At 0845H vic XT507804 Co D found 4 bnks. At 1310H vic XT502709, Co D found 1 VC KIA (BC) & 2 RPG rds.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted S&D opers vic XT5377 & XT5275. At 030H vic XT495734, Co A LD heard explosions outside perimeter & engaged with counter mortar fire with unk results. At 1330H vic XT524776, Co B found 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1355H vic XT5277 Co C found 2 VC KIA (BC). At 1410H vic XT537776, Co A found 3 VC KIA (BC) & 6 rolls of commo wire, 3 Chicom telephones, 200 rds AK47 ammo, 7 bnks, 3 sets web gear, and 14 120mm rds. At 1316H vic XT(illegible) Co B APC detonated mine res in 3 US WHA (evac) and 1 APC damaged.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted platoon sized ambushes vic XT4881, XT4880 & XT4878 with Co C 2-12 Inf OPCON. Co B&C continued OPCON 1-5 Inf (M). At 0843H vic XT498798, Co D destroyed 4.2 mortar rounds (2). At 1010H vic XT493798, Co D dest'd 1 60mm mortar rd. At 1330H vic XT493793, Co D dest'd 15mm rd.
(D) TF 1-5 (M): Conducted cordon & search operations vic XT46449 & XT450450 with Co C & B 3-22 Inf OPCON. At 0525H vic XT450450, Co C apprehended 2 males and 1 female with 2 packs, 1 carbine & bicycles. At 0922H vic XT450455, Co C destroyed 1 tunnel. At 0950 vic XT464449, Co C 3-22 Inf apprehended 4 detainees.
(38) 23 JAN 68 (missing)
(39) 24 JAN 68 (missing)
(40) 25 JAN 68 (missing)
(41) 26 JAN 68 (missing)
(42) 27 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) conducted recon in force to vic XT5057, XT5150. Recon cont'd as Bde CRIP. Recon 3-22 (OPCON) cont'd as security for DAU TIENG-TAY NINH convoy.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): conducted recon in force to vic XT515796, XT437820, XT502787. At 0907 hrs vic XT504800, Co B engaged 1 VC with SA & grenades with unk results. At 0945 hrs vic XT515796, co A rec'd SA fire. Ret fire with SA res in 1 VC KIA (BC) & 1 AK47 captured. At 1255H vic XT503802, Co B APC received AW fire & RPG rds from unk number of VC. Ret fire with Aw with unk res. At 1357h vic XT495820, Co A received AW & RPG fire from unk number VC. Ret fire with AW & SA res in 1 US WIA (evac) & 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AK47 captured.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted operations under OPCON 2nd Bde. Recon cont'd OPCON 2-12 Inf for security of DAU TIENG-TAY NINH convoy.
(43) 28 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) conducted RIF to vic XT5346. Recon Plt cont'd as Bde CRIP. Recon Plt 3-22 Inf (OPCON) cont'd as sec for DAU TIENG - TAY NINH convoy. At 0810H vic XT519477, Co D dest'd 10 1-man foxholes. At 0915H, VBN C&C ship vic XT537484 rec'd hit from ground fire sustaining minor damage. Engaged with Arty with unk res.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Closed down FSB BURT at 1320H and conducted RIF to vic XT497734. At 1340 vic XT505795 Co C rec'd 1 60mm mortar rd res in neg casualties.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 2nd Bde. Recon OPCON 2-12 Inf.
(44) 29 JAN 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Bn (-) (DAU TIENG) conducted RIF from vic XT495736 to vic XT482702. At 0240H vic XT495736, Co A detected movement & engaged with M-79 w/unk results.
(B) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) (DAU TIENG) conducted airmobile assault to vic XT499577 LZ cold & RIF to vic XT519556. Recon cont'd as Bde CRIP. Recon 3-22 Inf (OPCON) cont'd to secure DAU TIENG - TAY NINH convoy. At 0929H vic XT460464, gunship supporting Bn sank 1 sampan.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 2nd Bde.
(E) TF 1-5 Inf (M): (XT385626) became OPCON 0500H. Secure FSB VIC XT384626 & prepared to link up with 2-22 Inf (M). At 0925H vic XT364600, Co C apprehended 2 detainees.
(45) 30 JAN 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) conducted defensive patrolling vic XT515454 & XT502503. Recon cont'd as Bde CRIP. Recon 3-22 Inf cont'd as security for DAU TIENG - TAY NINH convoy.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): (XT460496) provided security for engr work party at bridge site vic XT468702 & conducted defensive patrols (illegible) XT473713 & XT482702. At 0845H vic ST485709, Co B dest'd 4 bnks & 10 feet of trench. At 1130H vic XT498698, Co B found 30-40 bunkers & captured 21 RPG rds, 1 map & unk amount of documents. At 1430H vic XT460696 Btry A 3-13 Arty gun carrier detonated mine res in 6 US WIA (evac) At 1536H vic XT460696, Co B APC detonated mine res in 3 US WIA (evac) and heavy damage to APC.
(C) 33-22 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 2ND Bde. Recon Plt OPCON 2-12 Inf.
(D) TF 1-5 (M)_: (XT371630) provided logistical convoy security between TAY NINH & LOC NINH & conducted defensive patrolling vic XT391618, XT390628, & XT385635. At 0005H vic XT373610, Co D engaged unk number of VC with M79 with unk results. At 1015H vic (rest of line missing).
(47) 1 FEB 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) airlifted to CU CHI & became OPCON to 2nd Bde 1019H. Recon cont'd as Bde CRIP.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Closed DAU TIENG base camp 2220H and occupied positions to reinforce Bde perimeter.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 2nd Bde. Recon relieved OPCON 2-12 Inf and became OPCON 2-22 Inf (M).
(D) TF 1-5 (M): Released from OPCON 1925H.
(48) 2 FEB 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 2nd Bde. Rec Plt continued as Bde CRIP.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF vic XT5148 & provided sec for DAU TIENG - TAY NINH convoy. At 0852H vic 415443, Recon Plt found culvert site blown. Used AVLB for crossing. At 1230 H vic XT494466, Sweep Team dest'd 1 81mm rd & 2 flares. At XT517496, Co A dest'd 6 spider holes. At 1600H vic XT501488, Co B detonated 1 mine res in 1 US KIA.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) cont OPCON 2nd Bde. Recon cont OPCON 2-22 Inf (M).
(49) 3 FEB 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 2nd Bde. Recon Plt cont CRIP Bde.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF vic XT5148 & XT5249. At 1131H vic XT533481, Co B had 1 NBI (evac) from accidental lodgement of EM's foot between APC and tree. At 1205H vic XT516416, Co B found mortar position & dest'd 1 82mm mortar rd. At 1248H, Co A destroyed 2 foxholes. At 1302H vic XT523476 & XT523478, Co A dest'd 1 bunker in each location. At 1513H vic XT566503, C&C ship supporting the Bn rec SA fire. Ret fire w/Arty resulting in 1 US WIA (not evac) and unk VC losses. At 1439H vic XT537485, Co A dest'd 1 75mm round.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 2nd Bde. Recon Plt cont as CRIP.
(50) 4 FEB 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 2nd Bde.
(B) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF to vic XT5646, XT5747, & XT5650. At 1029H vic XT560496, Co B APC detonated a mine resulting in 2 US WIA (evac) and 1 APC destroyed. At 1120H vic XT562501, Co B dest'd 1 bnk. At 1130H vic XT568507, Co B rec AW fire. At XT522484, Co A dest'd AA position. At 1435H vic XT522484, Co A dest'd 1 bnk. At 1500H vic XT550475, Co A dest'd 1 bnk. At 1520H vic XT550475, Co A dest'd 1 bnk.
(C) 3-22 Inf: Bn (-) OPCON 2nd Bde.
(51) 5 FEB 68
(A) 2-12 Inf: Bn (-) cont'd OPCON 2ND Bde. Recon Plt cont'd as Bde CRIP.
(B) 2-22 Inf: Bn (-) conducted RIF in vic XT5448 & XT550, and cordon & searched AP 13 (illegible) vic XT5469. At 2105H vic ST546548, Co A LP engaged 3 VC with SA & AW. VC ret fire with SA res in 1 US WIA and unk VC cas. At 2230H vic XT546488, Co A rec'd SA fire and 1 RPC-2 rd. Ret fire with AW w/unk res and 1 US KIA & 8 US WIA (6 evac). At 0736H vic XT546492, Co A found 7 VC KIA (BC) and captured 2 RPG launchers, 2 RPG-11 rds, 1 grenade launcher, 2 wallets. At 1135H, Co's A & B FST cordon around AP 1 (illegible) (XT566485 ) & searched the village with neg res. At 1405H vic XT566584, Co B rec'd fire. Fire ret with SA, AW, & Arty with unk results.
(52) 6 FEB 57
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF to vic XT5150, XT5040, XT5247, XT5447, & XT5248. At 1107H vic XT540504, Co A destroyed 1 81mm mortar round. At 1202H vic XT538488, Co B destroyed 1 bunker.
(53) 7 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Bn conducted cordon & search vic XT462449 & RIF to vic XT4644. At 2345H vic XT504455, Recon Plt received SA fire. Fire returned with Arty & 81mm mortar with unk results. At 0105H vic XT483464, Co C APC received RPG fire resulting in 2 US WIA. At 1025H vic XT452450, Co B received command detonated mine resulting in 1 US WIA (evac) & APC lightly damaged. At 1330H vic XT462449, Co B apprehended 17 detainees. At 1513H vic XT471439, Co A destroyed 1 105mm round.
(54) 8 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF to vic XT4742 & XT4746. Also secured DAU TIENG - TAY NINH convoy. At 0825H vic XT384428 an AVLB detonated a mine resulting in AVLB damaged. At 0958H vic XT496416, Co A captured 900 lbs rice. At 1033H vic XT497415, Co A captured 600 lbs salt. At 1106H vic XT497415, Co A captured 600 lbs rice. At 1336H vic XT485425, Co C destroyed 1 sampan. At 1125H vic XT488422, Co A found 1 VC KIA. At 1145H vic XT492424, Co C captured 1 5-gal can fish, 1 5-gal can pickles & 200 lbs rice. At 1159H vic XT493410, Co A destroyed 8 bunkers, 1 foxhole & 1 well. At 1250H vic XT493406, Co a destroyed 20 foxholes. At same time vic XT495425, Co C destroyed 2 fishnets. At 1315H vic XT384428, Co B detonated fuze (mine did not detonate) resulting in 1 US WIA (not evac). At 1315H vic XT493407, Co A destroyed 50 foxholes, 1 kitchen & captured 200 lbs rice. At 1343 vic XT493407, Co A captured 7 RPG-2 rds, 7 AK47 magazines, & unk SA rds. At 1120H vic XT500418, Co C destroyed 5 bicycles, 1 bunker, 10 oxcarts.
(55) 9 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF to vic Xt4346 & XT4548. At 0814H vic XT436449, OPCON Plt destroyed 1 pressure type mine. At 1605H vic XT437449, Co B APC detonated a mine resulting in 1 US WIA (evac) & 1 APC moderately damaged.
(56) 10 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF to vic XT5145. At 0928H vic XT500452, Co C found numerous foxholes. At 1500H, Co A became OPCON 2-14 Inf, and Co A 2-14 Inf became OPCON 2-22 Inf (M).
(57) 11 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Bn (-) conducted cordon & search vic XT5044. Co A 2-14 (OPCON) was Bde RRF. At 1114H vic XT507442, Co B engaged 3 VC with SA & 81mm mortar with unk results. At 2122H vic XT505443, an OH-23 in support of the Bn received AW fire taking 2 hits, resulting in OH-23 lightly damaged.
(58) 12 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Bn (-) conducted cordon & search vic XT504472 with Co A 2-14 Inf OPCON. Co A continued OPCON 2-14 Inf. At 0702 vic XT524480, Bn laager site received approx 20 rds 82mm mortar fire. Fire returned with Arty resulting in 1 US WIA (evac) and unk VC losses. At 1528H vic XT524478, Co C engaged 3 VC with SA & 3 AP mines. At 0728 vic XT525478, Co C engaged 3 VC with SA & 81mm mortar fire with unk results. At 1551H vic XT514489, Co D destroyed 1 bunker. At 1621H vic XT510489, Co D detonated 1 booby trap resulting in 2 US WIA (evac). Also destroyed 3 booby traps and 1 105mm rd.
(59) 13 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Bn (-) conducted RIF in AO Samson and Delilah with Co A 2-14 Inf OPCON. Co A 2-22 Inf remains OPCON 2-12 Inf. Recon continued to secure DAU TIENG-TAY NINH convoy. At 1850H vic XT515484 Bn laager received approx 20 rds 82mm mortar fire. Fire returned with Arty with unk results. At 0855H vic XT413332, Recon Plt received command detonated mine and SA & RPG fire. Returned with Arty with SA & AW also and Tac Air resulting in 9 US WIA (evac) & 2 APC's damaged, and 4 VC KIA (BC), & 1 RPG-2, 1 RPG-7, 1 rifle, 3 AK47's captured. At (illegible)H vic XT415445, Co C received 1 RPG round. Fire returned with AW & SA resulting in 1 US WIA (evac) & unk VC losses.
(60) 14 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted sweeps along DAU TIENG-TAY NINH MSR from base camp to vic XT4142 with Co A 2-14 Inf OPCON. Co A continued OPCON 2-14 Inf. At 1345H vic XT462449, Co C captured 100 lbs of SA ammo. At 1445H vic XT(illegible), Co C captured 150 rds of .50 cal ammo.
(61) 15 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted sweeps of DAU TIENG-TAY NINH MSR to vic XT415413 & XT338458 & RIF to vic XT4744 & XT4646 with Co A 2-14 Inf OPCON. Co A continued OPCON 2-14 Inf. At 1950H vic XT502459 Co C received sniper fire. Returned fire with SA with unk results. At 1355H vic XT4555, Co B apprehended 1 detainee.
(62) 16 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 (INF (M): Co B conducted cordon & search of village vic XT4545. Co C conducted RIF to vic XT3346. Co A continued OPCON 2-14 Inf. Co A 2-14 continued OPCON 2-22 Inf (M) and provide Bde RRF. At 0950H vic XT414443, Recon Plt received SA fire, no casualties. At 1035H vic XT450450, Co B apprehended 5 detainees, also captured 5 lbs medical supplies, 1 set of fatigues & received 1 returnee. At 1138H vic XT414443, Co C engaged 1 VC with SA & Arty with unk results. At 1155H vic XT404437, Recon Plt destroyed 1 mine and 1 pressure type mine. At 1215H vic XT3041, Recon Plt received SA fire. Fire returned with SA & AW with unk results. At 1215H vic XT399437, Engineer crane detonated mine resulting in 1 crane moderately damaged. At 1525H vic XT346449, Recon Plt destroyed 1 pressure type mine.
(63) 17 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF to vic XT430449 to XT400439 and secured DAU TIENG-TAY NINH convoy, secured culvert at CP C, secured bridge over Saigon River on MSP and reinforced district. Co A 2-14 Inf released OPCON at 1400H and moved to TAY NINH. At 1145H vic XT3288468 Scout Plt destroyed 3 AT mines.
(64) 18 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted road convoy security and escort from TAY NINH to DAU TIENG.
(65) 19 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF along the road from DAU TIENG to vic XT475484 and secured DAU TIENG-TAY NINH convoy. At 0935H vic XT370242 Scout Plt detonated a booby trap resulting in 3 US WIA. At 1135H vic XT374448 Bn dest 1 AT mine.
(66) 20 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted convoy security and escort from TAY NINH to DAU TIENG.
(67) 21 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): A Company OPCON 1ST Bde. B&C Co's conducted RIF missions in Michelin Plantation. B Co conducted RIF out to vic XT533463 to XT545495 then to base camp. Recon continued as Bde RRF, security of bridge & District.
(68) 22 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted road security and convoy escort between DAU TIENG and TAY NINGH. At 0952H vic XT352442, a Scout Plt APC detonated an AT mine resulting in 3 US WIA (evac) and 1 APC destroyed.
(69) 23 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF vic XT713931.
(70) 24 FEB 68
(A) 2-22 Inf (M): Conducted RIF and convoy security on MSR from TAY NINH to DAU TIENG.
(B) GENERAL: 3rd Bde terminated Operation YELLOWSTONE at 241800H.
(A) US Losses:
(1) Personnel: 37 KIA, 358 WIA, 4 DOW, 6 NBI
(B) Enemy Losses:
(1) Personnel: 1087 KIA (BC); 337 KIA (Poss); 21 PW, 2 CHIEU HOI
(2) Equipment Captured and Evacuated
AK 47 119 Small arms 23830 rds
AK50 9 82mm Mortar 100 rds
M79 3 60mm Mortar 179 rds
M16 5 RPG-2 boosters 111
(illegible) 11 120mm Rocket 14 rds
Cal .50 MG 2 57mm RR 13 rds
12.7mm MG 2 75mm RR 38 rds
M60 3 RPG-2 30 rds
RPG-2 31 RPG-7 95 rds
RPG-7 16 RPG-7 boosters 12 rds
57mm RR 1 12.7mm MG 75 rds
60mm Mortar 3
Chicom Field Phones 8 Rice 24 tons
Chicom AM Radio 1
Chicom Transmitter 1
Chicom SW Receiver 4 PRC-10 1 MISCELLANEOUS
TR-25 1 Bicycles 23
TA-312 1 Documents 68
(3) Enemy Equipment Destroyed
RPG-7 2 Small Arms 19,300 rds
AK-47 2 Grenades 15,500
RPG-2 1 Blasting caps 14,000
AK-50 2 .50 Cal 8,800 rds
RPG-2 345 rds
FOOD 60MM Mortar 355 rds
Soybeans 1200 lbs 57mm RR 120 rds
Peanuts 300 lbs 82mm Mortar 90 rds
Grain 500 lbs Mines 51
Rice 12 tons Booby Traps 9
RPG-7 45 rds
MISCELLANEOUS Demolition 66
6 H.P. Generator 1
13. Administrative Matters
A. Personnel and Administration: During the operations the Brigade S-1 Section operated from DAU TIENG with reports being forwarded to and from the forward location.
B. Supply: Oper YELLOWSTONE was supported from DAU TIENG. All supplies were delivered by helicopter with no difficulties encountered.
C. Maintenance: Maintenance & Support services were adequate throughout the operation.
D. Status of each supply: All classes of supply were adequate throughout the operation.
E. Patient care and evacuation: Helicopters continued to be the primary means of evacuation of wounded personnel. Co B 25th Medical Battalion operated out of DAU TIENG.
14. Special Equipment and Techniques: None
15. Recommendations: None.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
/S/ Charles W. Clark
CHARLES W. CLARK
5-CG; 25th Inf Div
25-CO, 18th Mil Hist Det
2-2/22 Inf (M)