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 HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225


ADCMD                                                                                                            19 May 1967
SUBJECT:      Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
                        30 April 1967  (RCS  CSFOR-65)



TO:     SEE DISTRIBUTION

     Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS  CSFOR-65)
     Location:  Vicinity, CU CHI, CU CHI Base Camp (XT647153), RVN     
     Reporting Officer:  Major General John C. F. Tillson III
     Prepared by:  Major Golfredo D. Sansalone, CO, 18th Military
     History Detachment



1.     (C)     Significant Organizational Activities.

          a.     Operations.

               (1)     General.  There were 10 major operations involving battalions or larger size units, and 1,491 small unit actions conducted by the 25th Infantry Division (-) during this period.  All major and 68 small unit actions resulted in contact.

               (2)     GADSDEN (2Feb - 21 Feb 67).  This op employed 3rd Bde, 4th Div and 196th Bde (Lt) (Sep) in S & D and Blocking Ops along the CAMBODIAN border to prevent VC movement along routes crossing the border, and to destroy VC/NVA forces, supplies and base camps.

Task Organization

               3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div              196th Bde (LT) (Sep)
   2nd Bn, 12th Inf                     2nd Bn, 1st Inf
    2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech)       4th Bn, 31st Inf
    3rd Bn, 22nd Inf                    3rd Bn, 21st Inf
             4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech)        1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech)
                2nd Bn, 77th Arty (DS)         3rd Bn, 82nd Arty (DS)
                              Trp F, 17th Cav

The op was in four phases:  In phase I, a fire support base was established at TRAI BAI.  In Phase II, two Bns secured bridge sites to block VC infiltration routes through the area.  Both phases were completed on 12 Feb 67.  Phase III occurred on 3 Feb 67.  There was light contact with an unknown VC force using SA, AW and recoilless rifles.  Phase IV began on 4 Feb, with light contact with a VC squad and (missing) rounds of 82mm mortar fire received in the 2nd Bn, 1st Inf base area, resulting in light US casualties.  Light contact continued on 5 and 6 Feb.  Documents and equipment captured vic WT965762 indicated the units were in a training area used by COSVN main force units, specifically 1st and 2nd Bns, 70th Regiment.  On 7 Feb, there was heavy contact with a VC platoon at WT972678 by 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech).  With the help of supporting artillery and air strikes, 20 VC were killed (BC).  On the same day, a VC training area was located.

     A truce was observed for the Lunar New Year (Vietnamese TET) from 8 - 12 Feb.  All elements occupied their bases astride VC supply and infiltration routes and conducted extensive patrolling within their AO's.  The VC violated the truce six times to include firing on US forces from across the CAMBODIAN border, to include light contact with an unknown number of VC on 8 Feb 67, without results..

     The final period of Operation GADSDEN consisted of an attack north to exploit intelligence gained about the 271st Regt, followed by a sweep south and southeast to disrupt VC activities in the area.  On 13 Feb, the 1st Bn, 5th (Mech) destroyed an ordnance facility WT986624 containing bombs, arty rounds and grenades, as well as tools and molds for their fabrication.  On 16 Feb, a rallier, LY VAN THU from Recon Squad, C21 Recon Co, 271st Regt was taken at XT033786 by 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech).  He stated that 1st Bn, 4th Bn and Regt HQ and C21 Recon Co of 271st Regt had been in the LO GO area vic WT9780 - WT9882 since 6 Feb.  Prior to that, they were in DAU TIENG District, BINH DUONG Province.  On 18 Feb, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty and 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech) received 50 rds of 82mm mortar fire at XT020780.  On 21 Feb, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf engaged an unknown number of VC at XT081828.  Documents captured there identified the 1st and 3rd Bns, 70th Regt and 2nd Co, Gp 49, a medical unit subordinate to COSVN.  Documents and information received from the above named rallier indicated the contacts made during GADSDEN were with elements of the 271st Regt and the 70th Regt assisted by local guerrilla units.  The capture of vast amounts of supplies and destruction of base areas and major training sites caused severe losses to the VC in the LO GO and XOM GIUA areas.  There were 35 VC KIA (BC) during GADSDEN.

     Other results of Operation GADSDEN were:  1 Ordnance Factory, 1 Rocket Launcher (training model), 1 training area with 44 structures, 2 classrooms, 2 mess halls, 1 rifle range destroyed.  Plus 1 CHICOM Hvy MG and numerous medical supplies were captured.  Also 1 VC rallier.

               (3)     LANIKAI (15 Sep 66-13 Feb 67).  This operation was terminated by 1st Bde on 13 Feb 67.  Area Security Coordination Centers (ASCC) remained established at TAN AN (LONG AN Province Capital), BEN LUC and RACH KIEN.  Second Battalion, 14th Inf conducted S & D Ops vic RACH KIEN (XS7670).  Contact was limited to occasional sniper and SA fire from unknown numbers of VC until 4 Feb.  On 4 Feb, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf conducted an airmobile assault with 3/10 Cav (ARVN), resulting in 60 underground fortifications being destroyed.  An estimated VC platoon was engaged by artillery resulting in 5 VC KIA (poss).  S & D operations continued.  On 7 Feb, Co C, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf engaged 2 VC with SA fire, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 M1 rifle and 1 US Carbine captured.  From 8 Feb through 13 Feb, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf, conducted security operations vic RACH KIEN, without contact.  Results of Operation LANIKAI were as follows:  89 VC KIA (BC), 257 VC KIA (poss), 11 VC PWs, 119 detainees.  Following items were captured:  3 - 60mm mortar rounds, 9 rifle grenades, 6 mines, 14 lbs documents, 1 transistor radio, 300 gals diesel fuel, 2.5 tons rice and 1 motor.  Following items were destroyed:  15 - 81mm mortar rounds, 25 - 60mm mortar rounds, 389 - 12.7mm rounds, 7 claymores, 27 mines, 44 rifle grenades, 104 blasting caps, 1 tunnel, 157 underground fortifications, 221 foxholes, 20 sampans, 64 VC structures, 11.1 tons of rice, 600 lbs of salt and 1 bridge.

               (4)     ALA MOANA (1 Des 66 - (Continuing).  This operation was conducted in HAU NGHIA Province to destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps near the Division base camp at CU CHI, and in the FILHOL Plantation.  In Feb, an additional mission was undertaken to clear the road from CU CHI to PHU HOA DONG (XT709195) and clear the surrounding wooded area.  The 2nd Bde performed this mission, assisted by 2nd Bn, 7th Regt (ARVN).  Clearing was also done along the SAIGON River using RAG Boats, and further south to DUC HOA (XS593960) and along the ORIENTAL River.  Assisting the 2nd Bde were the following ARVN units:  CIDG, 2/49th Regt, 27th BNAT CO (RF), and the 38th Ranger Bn.  Numerous caches were uncovered without enemy contact.  On 22 Feb 67, 1st Bde assumed responsibility for Op ALA MOANA and dispatched Co A, 4th Bn, 9th Inf (MANCHU) to the FILHOL Plantation (XT701190) to clear the road from CU CHI to PHU HOA DONG, and to provide security for attached Engineer elements in clearing the wooded area.  On 260030 Feb, Co A 4th Bn, 9th Inf (MANCHU) was attacked by an est VC battalion (probably 1st Bn MR IV), utilizing mortars, rifle grenades and human wave assault tactics.  The attack was repelled by AW, Arty, Gunships and Airstrikes.  The Division base reaction force (Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav and Co B, 4th Bn, 9th Inf) was committed at 260310 Feb and linked up with Co A, 4th Bn, 9th Inf, at 260410HG.  Action terminated at 0800H, see Para (e) for results.  There was no further contact in Feb.

     In March, the 4th Bn, 9th Inf, assisted by the 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) continued local security operations vic the Division's base camp, in the FILHOL Plantation and vic TRANG BANG 9XT489195).  On 16 Mar, they were relieved by 2nd Bn, 14th Inf.  Throughout the month there were no significant contacts.  Local operations continued in April by the 1st Bde through 22 Apr.  On 6 Apr, Co B, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf assisted by a platoon of Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav conducted a Search and Seal Op at VINH CU (XT6815) resulting 1 VC KIA (BC) and 12 detainees.  On 14 April, Co B, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) conducted a Search and Seal Op of VINH CU resulting in 13 detainees.  On 23 April, 2nd Bde assumed responsibility for ALA MOANA.  Second Bde employed 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) for this Op.  On 29 April, Co B, 2nd Bn, 257th Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT4822 resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 2 POW's and captured 1 BAR, 280 rds SA ammo and 5 grenades.  Significant results of ALA MOANA to date are:  371 VC KIA(BC), 551 VC KIA (poss), 6 VC PW's, 642 detainees.  Destroyed were 300 structures, 1008 bunkers, 140 tunnels, 316 sampans, 12,968 rds of SA ammo, 155 mines, 356 grenades, 85.45 tons of rice; captured were 86 SA, 5 crew served weapons, 61,146 rds of SA ammo, 94 lbs of medical supplies, 5.85 tons of rice, 181 lbs of documents.  National Police and Military Police were used in the Search and Seal Ops at VINH CU.

               (5)     MAKALAPA (18 Mar - 21 Apr 67).  This operation was conducted in GIA DINH Province to interdict VC supply routes, to block the flow of men and material to and from SAIGON AND TAN SON NHUT AFB, and to drive the VC from their bases in the Pineapple area.  On 18 March, 4th Bn, 9th Inf (MANCHU) established a forward CP vic XS728963.  An ASCC was established at VINH LOC (XS7395).  On 19 March, Bn (-) moved to vic XS715930.  On 20 March, Co B, 4th Bn, 9th Inf helilifted to vic XS725993.  The Bn conducted saturation patrolling vic its bases.  On 23 March, Co B conducted an airmobile assault vic XS7291.  On 24 March, Co C conducted an airmobile assault vix XS6691, with the 404th PF Platoon.  Base on information supplied by a VC PW, on 26 March Co's A and C conducted a Search and Seal Op surrounding the hamlet AP TAY (XS705937), checking 176 persons, detaining 6.  On 29 March, Co B conducted an airmobile assault into the pineapple area vic XS6689.  They made no contact, but received 10 rounds mortar fire from outside their AO.  VC forces were unidentified.  The OP continued in April with 4th Bn, 9th Infantry operating as the 1st Bde force until 8 April, performing extensive patrolling, ambushes, and EAGLE FLIGHTS.  On 8 April, 1st Bde (-) joined with 4th Bn, 9th Inf in its AO, and the 2nd Bde and ARVN units assumed responsibility for their AO's.  Large scale S & D Ops were initiated.  Co A, 1st Bn, 27th Inf engaged an unk number of VC vic XS567953, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (poss) and 3 VC PW's.  Co B engaged an est VC company vic XS558945 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (poss) and 1 VC PW.  Gunships supported the 1st Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 15 VC XS556954 resulting in 15 VC KIA (BC).  On 18 April, 1st Bde returned to CU CHI base camp, following on 19 April by 2nd Bn, 27th Inf.  ARVN units returned to their garrisons.  First Bn, 27th Inf conducted EAGLE FLIGHTS 20 and 21 April and returned to CU CHI base camp at the end of 21 April.  Results of Op MAKALAPA were 58 VC KIA (BC), 157 VC KIA (poss), 6 PWs, 144 detainees, of which 3 were classified Civil Defendants, and 3 HOI CHANH.  Destroyed were 3,324 bunkers, 265 structures, 71 tunnels, 133 sampans, 223 booby traps, 121 large caliber rds, 3.7 tons of rice, 511 protective masks.  Captured were 88 SA, 14 crew served weapons, 3 AN/ PRC-10 radios, 151 lbs of documents, 151 VC claymores, 10,854 rds SA ammo, 1,521 grenades, 30 lbs of clothing, 5.5 tons of rice, and 380 lbs of fish.  ARVN Forces participating in MAKALUPA consisted initially of PF Platoons operating with US companies on S & D Ops.  When the op was expanded to two Bdes, ARVN Forces were increased to include 51st Ranger Battalion, !/50 Inf, 3/10 Cav and 25th Recon Co. Thirty-fourth Ranger Bn continued S & D Ops with 2nd Bde.  Other ARVN units screened flanks and provided blocking forces.

               (6)     MANHATTAN (23 Apr - Continuing).  The 25th Inf Div as a part of II FFORCEV initiated Op MANHATTAN on 23 April with the objective of destroying VC elements (forces, supplies, bases) in the HO BO - BOI LOI Woods area and along the SAIGON River in coordination with other II FFORCEV units.  The 1st and 2nd Bde conducted S & D Ops north and northwest toward the SAIGON River while 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div units conducted S & D Ops south and southwest toward the river.  The 34th ARVN Ranger Bn established a blocking position vic XT5331.  The 1st Bn, 27th Inf established a blocking position on the SAIGON River vic XT5732, while the 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf set up a block on the river vic XT4944.  On 24 April, Co C, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf engaged 6 VC with SA, AW and claymores vic XT459439, resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC).  On 25 April, Co A, 4th Bn, 9th Inf, engaged an unk number of VC with SA and AW fire vic XT493340 resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).  HQ, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf engaged 4 VC with SA and claymores resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC PW.  Significant results to date are 43 VC KIA (BC), 19 VC KIA (poss), 2 VC PW;s, 17 detainees; 657 bunkers, 120 military structures, 33 tunnels, 52 AT mines, 106 APO mines, 73-81mm rds, 332-22mm rds, 14-60mm rds, 29-57mm rds, 9-75mm rds, 125 RPG-2 rds, 402 grenades, 43 claymores, 1,840 lbs of TNT, 15.7 tons of rice and 246,662 rds of SA ammo destroyed; 200 lbs of documents, 166 SA, 11 crew served weapons, 125.8 tons of rice, 100,690 rds of SA ammo and 2 printing presses captured.

          (7)     FORT INSQUALLY (28 Nov 66 - Continuing).  The mission of this operation is to conduct operations to secure the area adjacent to the base camp of the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div at DAU TIENG and to eliminate VC influence in that unit's TAOR.  Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav secured the road from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH.  There were extensive S & D Ops patrols and clearing Ops in the AO, but contact remained light throughout Feb and Mar.  From 1-15 March, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf (detached from 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div) secured the 2rd Bde base camp at DAU TIENG, while from 16-31 March the rear elements of the 3rd Bde assisted by Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav performed this mission.  The operation was limited in April to patrols and ambushes vic the DAU TIENG base due to participation by 3rd Bde elements in Op JUNCTION CITY.  There was no significant contact.  Significant results to date are:  24 VC KIA (BC), 23 VC KIA (poss), 57 detainees, 26 PW's,  Captured were:  5 rifles (type unk), 4 CHICOM carbines, 5 US carbines, 3 AK-47 rifles, 1 Cal .45 pistol, 2 Walther P .38 pistols, 1 homemade pistol, 1 M16 rifle, 1 M79 grenade launcher, 11 CHICOM 56 rkts launcher (82mm), 3 CHICOM  LMG, 26 grenades, 2 claymores, 3-82mm rkts, 2 AP mines, 365 rds SA ammo, 2 FM radios, 200 ft electrical wire, 2 VC protective masks, 58 lbs medical supplies, 102.5 lbs documents, 300 lbs sugar, 120 lbs food, 69 tons of rice, 1 ton salt, 9 bicycles, 15 sets clothing, 50 yds cloth and 300 yds of mosquito netting.  Destroyed were 111 VC structures, 276 bunkers, 12 tunnels, 7 sampans, 38 mines, 7 large caliber rds, 250 sheets of tin, 1650 gallons of pure oil, 44.875 tons of rice, 59 punji pits, 115 foxholes, 4-20 lb bombs, 1-750 lb bomb, 7 AT mines, 30 AP mines, 170 CBU's, 2-105mm rds, 2-81mm rds, 29 grenades, 5 lbs C4 explosive, 1000 lbs of beans, 1600 lbs of millet, 1700 lbs of peas and 125 lbs of meat.

               (8)     SABER THRUST (7 Apr - Continuing).  Was conducted by 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry in five phases.  All phases involved S & D and patrolling pps in the vic of the CU CHI base camp and along the Main Supply Route.  Phase I on 7 and 8 April vic TRANG BANG (XT489194 was conducted by Trp A with Battery B, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty in direct support.  An ambush patrol of Trp A engaged a VC squad resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).  Phase II involved a squadron controlled sweep vic LOC THANH (XT438166) on 9 and 10 April.  Squadron Task Force included Trp B and Trp D, Co C, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) (detached from 1st Bde) and Btry A, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty.  With the PF Co from TRANG BANG in a blocking psn, the Sqdn detained 42 Vietnamese moving NW.  Phase III was conducted from 13 - 15 April by Trps B and D, with an attached rifle platoon from Co B, 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech) with Btry A, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty in DS.  On 14 April, an ambush patrol engaged an estimated VC squad, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).  Gunships in support of the op killed 5 VC (poss).  Later an APC from Trp A was struck by an RPG-2 round at XT583157 (no US casualties, minor damage to vehicle).  Results:  2 detainees, 1 VC KIA (poss).  On 15 April at 0300, a Checkmate and encirclement of the hamlet of PHUOC MY (XT585153) was conducted.  Results:  4 VC PW's and 12 Civil Defendants detained.  Phase IV began on 17 April and concluded 19 April.  It involved Trps A and D, and 1 rifle platoon of Co A, 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech) conducting S & D Ops vic TRUNG LAP (XT585198), with Btry A, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty in DS.  On 19 April, an ambush patrol Trp A engaged an estimated VC squad.  Results:  1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (poss).  Phase V of SABER THRUST occurred on 20 April.  A Squadron Task Force operated in a sweep leading to AP BAU DUNG (XT370370).  Forces involved were Trp A, Trp D, Co B, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) and Btry A, 7th Bn, 11th Arty.  Three airstrikes were employed.  Two gunships of Trp D accounted for 2 VC KIA (BC), and the Aero-Rifle Platoon, Trp D also killed 2 VC (BC).  Trp A killed 11 VC (BC) and suffered two US WIA.  Co B, 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech) killed 2 VC (poss) and captured extensive medical supplies.  A sweep of the area by ARVN forces on 21 April reported finding 32 VC bodies, a result of this operation.  A document found on one VC body identified the VC unit as the 401 Co, D-14 Bn.

     Results of Operation SABER THRUST to date were:  51 VC KIA (BC), 10 VC KIA (poss), 4 VC PWs, 66 detainees.  Captured were:  1 AK-47 rifle, 1 CHICOM Carbine, 10 lbs Medical Supplies.  Destroyed were:  15 tunnels, 36 bunkers, 30 punji pits, 11,450 lbs rice, 1 blacksmith's forge, 2 - 15mm rounds, 2 company size base camps, 1 squad size base camp, 5 structures, 3 trench lines, 1 mess area.

               (9)     JUNCTION CITY (22 Feb - Continuing).  The Div conducted offensive operations in Central War Zone “C” to destroy COSVN and VC/NVA Forces.  The operation was in three phases, employing 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div, 3 Bde, 4th Div, 196th Inf Bde (Lt) (Sep) and initially the 11th Armored Cav Regiment.  Airmobile assaults were used to secure forward base areas.  In Phase I, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div remained in psn along the CAMBODIAN border after Op GADSDEN was terminated on 21 Feb and conducted S & D Ops.  The 11th ACR occupied AO BOBCAT vic TRUONG MIT and conducted S & D Ops.  ARVN participation included Bde Force Alpha of the Vietnamese Marine Bde Hq, with 1st and 5th Marine Bns.  This force operated with the 25th Inf Div until 11 March.  Phase I ended on 14 March.  Phase II began on 15 March.  Third Bde, 4th Inf Div and 196th Bde conducted ground and airmobile assaults in their AO's to block COSVN and VC/NVA forces along the CAMBODIAN border.  Second Bde, 25th Inf Div attacked in Zone to destroy COSVN facilities and VC/NVA forces.  On 21 March, a major engagement was fought by elements of 3rd Bde, 4th Div, the 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf and 2nd Bn, 77th Arty at SUOI TRE defending FSB GOLD.  The 272nd VC Regt attempted to overrun the base, and engaged US forces there from 0600 to 1100H.  They were thrown back by 2nd Bn, 77th Arty's direct fire using the “Beehive” round and by a relief column of 2nd Bn, 12th Inf, 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech) and 2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-) which arrived at 1100 H, causing the VC to withdraw.  Extensive airstrikes, gunships and supporting artillery aided in preventing FSB GOLD from being overrun.  Results of the battle were US 30 KIA, 109 WIA; VC KIA 647 (BC), 6 VC PWs.  Captured were 42 RPG-2, 26 LMGs, 2-12.7 mm AA MG, 13 CHICOM Carbines, 39 AK-47 Rifles, 3 US shotguns, 1 BAR, 5 M14 rifles, 9 SKS Carbines, 1-P.38 Pistol, 13 CHICOM Rifles and 2 M79s.  From 23 through 28 March, 3 Bde, 4th Inf Div units continued S & D Ops in War Zone “C” while the 196th Bde blocked to the west.  On 8 April, the 196th Bde (Lt) (Sep) completed its participation in JUNCTION CITY.  On 4 April, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div began an extensive sweep south of DAU TIENG (XT495473) and then north through the MICHELIN Plantation into the SW edge of War Zone “C”, destroying a VC base camp and capturing 40 tons of rice vic XT542607.  On 12 April, 3rd Bde units moved into Central War Zone “C” and continued S & D Ops.  Third Bde terminated Phase II of JUNCTION CITY on 15 April and immediately began Phase III.  Significant results of Phase II were:  723 VC KIA (BC), 130 VC KIA (poss), 9 VC PWs and 21 detainees.  Destroyed were:  859 bunkers, 292 military structures, 5 sampans, 5.7 tons rice, 586 RPG-2 rds, 66-60mm rds,30-81mm rds, 13-75mm rds, 8-82mm rds, 7-57mm rds, 30,749 rds SA ammo, 2,634 grenades and 2,200 lbs of field gear.  Captured were 1 CHICOM Field Radio, 223 lbs documents, 90 large caliber rds, 69 crew served wpns, 150 small arms, 59.9 tons rice, 5.25 miles wire.  Phase II of Op JUNCTION CITY continued through April with the same objectives.  On 19 April, 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div became OPCON to the 25th Inf Div and moved to TAY NINH and SUOI DA, prior to assuming the mission of Op JUNCTION CITY.  On 20 April, all elements of 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div terminated their participation in the op and returned to DAU TIENG.  First Bde, 9th Inf Div continued the Op with one Bn conducting ops west from BAU CU (XT2770).  Contact with a VC platoon on 27 April resulted in 4 VC KIA (BC).  Significant results of Phase III through 30 April are 6 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC KIA (poss), 13 detainees; 270 bunkers, 54 structures, 16 mines, 9 tunnels and 14.5 tons rice destroyed.  ARVN participation in this phase of JUNCTION CITY was limited to the 36th ARVN Ranger Bn, which conducted S & D Ops.

               (10)     FITCHBURG (25 Nov 66 - 8 Apr 67).  The mission of this operation was to destroy VC forces, bases and supplies in areas of TAY NINH Province contiguous to the location of the 196th Bde (Lt) (Sep) base cap.  This was performed until 18 Feb by 3rd Bn, 21st Inf.  Highway 26 and the rock quarry at NUI BA DEN mountain vic XT267568 were secured.  Extensive S & D Ops and ambush patrols were conducted in conjunction with PHILCAGV operations.  On 18 Feb, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf performed this mission, and was relieved in turn by 2nd Bn, 34th Armor on 21 Feb which retained the mission until 5 March.  There were no significant contacts in March or April.  Beginning 5 March, 2/34th Armor was assisted by 4th Bn, 31st Inf.  On 9 March, 2/1st Inf relieved the 4/31st Inf and was in turn relieved on 15 March by 3/21st Inf.  The 3/21st Inf continued the op throughout March and until the operation terminated on 8 April 67.  Results of the operation were:  55 VC KIA (BC), 155 VC KIA (poss), 148 detainees, 4 returnees, and 3 PWs; 280 structures, 169 bunkers, 45 tunnels, 55 sampans, 20 mines and 74.55 tons of rice were destroyed, and 49 SA, 116 lbs of documents, 27 mines and 9.2 tons of rice were captured.

               (11)     WAIALUA 98 March - 8 April 67).    This operation was conducted by 2nd Bde in Western HAU NGHIA Province to destroy VC forces supplies and base camps and to interdict the flow of supplies on the SONG VAM CO DONG (ORIENTAL RIVER).  Second Bde employed 1st and 2nd Bns, 27th Inf and the 34th Ranger Bn (ARVN).  First Bn, 27th Inf conducted S & D Ops from FSB SCOTT (XT3208) while 2nd Bn, 27th Inf did the same from FSB TAYLOR (XT4195).  On 10 March, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf captured 1 VC PW vic XS3396.  On 11 March, Recon Plt, 1st Bn, 27th Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT3713, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC KIA (poss).  On 14 March, Co A, 1st Bn, 27th Inf engaged 4 VC vic XS3096, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).  On 17 March, 27th Inf shifted its FSB to THO MO (XS5598) and 2nd Bn, 27th Inf shifted its FSB to TRA CU (XS4797).  Airmobile assault sweeps and S & D Ops assisted by RAG boats were employed without contact until 21 March.  On that day, Co A, 1st Bn, 27th Inf engaged 4 VC vic XS5694, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC PW's.  From 22 through 25 March, the Bde conducted S & D Ops along the ORIENTAL River, supported by RAG boats from XS5591 to XS5693.  On 25 March, Co C, 1st Bn, 27th Inf destroyed a VC dispensary at XS559934.  An ambush by Co A, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf engaged an unk number of VC vic XS5593, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poss).  There was no further contact in March.  On 2 April, the 34th Ranger Bn (ARVN) engaged a VC squad at XS606997 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).  The operation terminated on 8 April without further contact.  Significant results were:  67 VC KIA (BC), 56 VC KIA (poss), 52 detainees, 14 PW's.  Destroyed were 813 bunkers, 181 structures, 22 tunnels, 54 sampans, 52 mines, 4000 rds SA ammo, 11.3 tons of rice.  Captured were 26 SA, 1 AW, 500 lbs TNT, 83 lbs documents, 9 tons rice.

          b.     Artillery Support.  During the quarter, Div Arty fired 122,125 rounds in direct support and 68,909 rounds on H and I missions.  Results were:  (number missing) VC KIA (BC) and 522 VC KIA (poss).  Included in these fires were 2,443 rds fired in support of ARVN operations and/or outposts under attack.

          c.     Air Support.  There were 4,160 air sorties during the quarter with the following results:  231 VC KBAF (BC) and 841 VC KBAF (poss).  In addition, 470 VC structures, 1,853 bunkers, 72 sampans, 3 tunnels, 9 caches, (missing) oxcarts and one (1)1 1-1/2 ton truck were destroyed.  There were 69 secondary explosions and 133 secondary fires.

          d.     Army Aviation.  There were 42,660 sorties during the past quarter which resulted in 42 VC KBAA (BC) and 225 VC KBAA (poss), as well as 36 detainees captured for interrogation.  In addition, 115 VC structures, 13 sampans, 2 oxcarts and 1 .30 Cal Machine Gun position were destroyed and 76 VC structures and 3 sampans damaged.

          e.     Intelligence.

               (1)     VC Activity

                    (a)     February 1967

                         1     General:  VC activity remained at a high level of intensity due to Operation GADSDEN and JUNCTION CITY in War Zone C.  This activity is attributed to the presence of elements of the 271st Regiment and 70th Regiment as well as elements of COSVN within the operational area.  There has been an increase in enemy activity around the Division Base Camp area which is attributable to the absence of most of the Division on operations in War Zone C.  Incidents of anti-aircraft fire by VC units decreased from 96 in January to 62 in February.

                         2     Significant Operations:

                              a     On 8 February, Recon Plt, 4th Bn (M), 23rd Inf received SA and rifle grenade fire from the CAMBODIAN side of the river vic WT967715.  Fire was returned.

                              b     On 26 February, A Co, 4th Bn, 9th Inf, with elements of Co A, 6th Engrs attached, received heavy SA, AW, rifle grenade and mortar fire from an estimated 250 VC, at XT701191.  Fire was returned with SA, AW, mortars and Arty.  Area was illuminated by use of flare ships and the engagement was supported by airstrikes.  A reactionary force consisting of Co B, 4th Bn, 9th Inf elements and Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav elements encountered an ambush en route to Co A, 4th Bn, 9th Inf's location, but penetrated it successfully.  As a result of the complete action which began at 260030 February and terminated at approximately 260600 February, VC casualties were 113 KIA (BC) and 33 KIA (poss).  Captured were 2 US BARs, 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 CHICOM carbine with grenade launcher, 1 Russian light machine gun, 2 RPG-2 rocket launchers with 18 RPG-2 rds, 1 M1 rifle and 1 .50 Cal tripod.  A PW, HUYNH VAN HUYNH, captured in the area was identified as an Assistant Squad Leader, 2nd Plt, 5th Company, 1st Battalion, MR IV.  Numerous documents captured on the battlefield made reference to the MR IV Bn, indicating that 1st Bn, MR IV was the unit that initiated the action.

                         3     The VC continue to be forced from their base and supply areas by friendly operations.  The loss of major caches will continue to affect the tactical operations of the VC in the future.

                         4     The presence of US Forces in the Division area of operations continues to give the people confidence in their government and government's ability to protect them from the VC.

                    (b)     March 1967

                         1     General:  VC activity remained at a high level of intensity during the month of March.  A significant increase in mortar attacks against U.S. unit command posts and base camps was noted.  Approximately 700 mortar rounds of various types were received by Division elements during the period, including the employment of 120mm mortars against the 196th (Lt) (Sep) Inf Bde at BAU CO (XT2868).  Most of the enemy contact which occurred during Operation JUNCTION CITY, WIALUA and MAKALAPA was with small enemy elements from 3 to 6 men, left behind to harass US forces.  However, during Operation JUNCTION CITY, VC forces engaged US forces in platoon strength and higher when necessary to protect critical installations or when they had an apparent advantage which could be decisively exploited and used for propaganda purposes.  The latter is believed to be the case in the VC Regimental attack of Fire Support Base GOLD which is narrated in detail in paragraph 1a (9) above.  The attack coincided with President Johnson's arrival at GUAM and showed the VC forces' willingness to accept heavy casualties in an attempt to achieve a military and political victory.

                         2     Significant Operations:

                              a     On 1 March, C Co, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor received heavy SA, AW, Mortar and RR fire from an estimated VC Battalion at XT414441.  Enemy losses:  13 VC KIA (BC), 35 VC KIA (poss) (no unit identification), 4 AK-47 assault rifles, 3 RPG-2 launchers, 2 CHICOM carbines and 80 grenades were captured.

                              b     On 12 March, Trp A, 1st Sqdn, 11th Cav located and evacuated 2 printing presses and one small generator at WT924785.  One printing press, manufactured in Shanghai, China in 1965, measured 10' X 8' X 5', had cutting and folding attachments.  The second printing press, made in Japan, was smaller in size and similar in construction.  Document identified the printing section of the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section, COSVN.

                              c     On 15 March at 2000 hours, the 25th Infantry Division Base Camp at CU CHI received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 25 rounds of 75mm RR fire.  Fire was returned with artillery.  Enemy losses:  Unknown.

                              d     On 21 March at 0640 hours, patrols from 3/22 Inf made contact with a VC force at SUOI TRE (XT385715).  This contact triggered an attack against the 3/22 Inf and the 2/77 Arty by the 272nd Regt, supported by fire from 60mm and 82mm mortars, recoilless rifle and RPG-2 rocket launchers.  The 2/12 Inf, 2/22 Inf (M) and 2/34 Armor (-) reinforced the units under attack.  Contact lasted until 1100 hours and airstrikes and artillery pounded the area throughout the afternoon.  Enemy losses:  647 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC PWs, 93 small arms ammunition, 579 RPG-2 rounds, 1900 stick grenades, and 20 recoilless rifle rounds.  See Para 1a (9).

                    (c)     April 1967

                         1     General:  VC activity remained at a high level of intensity during the month.  There were 130 reports of enemy contact, 57 reports of antiaircraft fire, 58 antitank mining incidents and 46 antipersonnel mining incidents.  Eleven obstacles were cleared along the main supply route during the period.  The majority of the enemy contact was with small size VC elements of ten men or less.  A significant number of VC weapons were captured by US Forces.

                         2     Significant Operations:

                              a     Operation JUNCTION CITY continued in War Zone “C” with the 1st Bde, 9th Div continuing Phase III of the operation on 20 April 1967.  The only significant enemy contact occurred on 27 April 1967.  Co B, 2nd Bn, 47th Inf (Mech), received small arms and automatic weapons fire from 2 VC squads.  Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons and artillery.  Results:  4 VC KIA (BC).  Documents found on the bodies identified the 1st Bn, 70th Guard Regt.

                              b     Operation MAKALAPA continued in the “Pineapple Area” until 21 April 1967.  The only significant enemy contact occurred on 16 April 1967.  First Bn, 27th Inf, on an EAGLE FLIGHT operation vic XS567915, engaged an estimated VC company with small arms and automatic weapons.  Artillery, gunships and airstrikes supported the engagement.  Results:  22 VC KIA (BC), 72 VC KIA (poss) and 2 VC PW.  The PW's were from (a) HUUTHLANH Village Guerrilla Force and (b) GINH TAU Security Squad, BINH TAN District.  On 15 and 16 April 1967, Co A, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf, located weapons caches at XS7631865 and XS633868.  A total of 74 weapons were captured and included one 8mm mortar, two 60mm mortars, two 75mm recoilless rifles, two 57mm recoilless rifles and three light machine guns.

                              c     Operation MANHATTAN began on 23 April 1967, in the vic of the BOI LOI Woods.  A large number of mines and booby traps were encountered during the initial phase of the operation.  Enemy contacts consisted mainly of harassing attacks by small groups of from 3 to 6 VC.  On 27 April 1967, Co A, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf located a weapons cache at XT503347 consisting of 105 small arms weapons and 12 crew served weapons.  In addition, over 100,000 rds of SA ammunition were destroyed.

                              d     The 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav, conducted local Search and Destroy Operations in the vic of TRANG BANG and in the FILHOL Plantation.  The most significant enemy contact occurred on 20 April 1967, during SABER THRUST.  Co A and D Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav engaged an estimated VC Platoon at XT371370.  Results:  12 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC KIA (poss).  Documents found on one VC body identified the 401 Company, D-14 Bn.

                         3     US operations conducted during the month continued to force the VC from their base areas.  Enemy losses in manpower, facilities and equipment are expected to reduce the effectiveness of VC units in War Zone “C”, the BOI LOI - HO BO Woods Complex and the Pineapple area.  

                         4     The US/ ARVN Joint Operations Centers continue to operate efficiently, adding greatly to the overall intelligence effort of US/ARVN Forces.

                         5     VC Personnel and Equipment losses 1 February - 30 April 1967:

                              VC KIA (BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      1,588
                              VCKIA (poss)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     1,490
                              VC PW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      44
                              Civil Defendants  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      63
                              Returnees  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      444
                              Small Arms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     681
                              Crew Served Weapons  . . . . . . . . . .     112
                              Grain (Tons) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     1,077.22

               (2)     Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP)

                    (a)     Operations.  During the reporting period, 1 Feb 67 thru 30 Apr 67, the division LRRP conducted missions for the ACofS, G2, the Division and the 3/4 Cav.  There were a total of 29 patrols conducted in HAU NGHIA, BINH DUONG and TAY NIN Provinces.  The LRRP has the capability of operating at extended distances and for extended periods from the division base.  The patrols gain information concerning enemy movement patterns, unit locations and installation locations.  The LRRP has been utilized as an economy of force measure to screen the flanks of division units conducting operations.

                    (b)     Training.     There were two internal 3-week training programs conducted by LRRP.  Twenty-seven members completed the course.  Twenty-one members of the Division LRRP have attended the 5th SPG MACV RECONDO School.

               (3)     Counterintelligence.  The Counterintelligence Section continued liaison to and with all echelons of local government and with counterintelligence counterparts of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam with which the 25th Infantry Division came in contact.  Essential operations such as personnel security investigations, security inspections and security checks were continued.  Files containing the infrastructure of the Viet Cong and files of “Black List”, “White List”, and “Grey List” personalities were expanded and revised.  Counterintelligence operations have resulted in the capture of 27 Viet Cong from within the division's indigenous work force since July 1966.  Of that number, 6 persons have been apprehended and neutralized during the period of 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967.

               (4)     Air Reconnaissance Missions.  The G2 Air daily schedules Visual Reconnaissance missions throughout the Division area of responsibility to locate enemy troop movements, supply movements and installations.  At the G3 (illegible) request, SLAR and RED HAZE missions are flown over the Division's areas by II FFORCEV to provide information during hours of darkness of the enemy's movements and locations.  Divisional Fire Fly teams and aircraft Low Light Level Television flights have been utilized during hours of darkness to locate the enemy and to confirm or deny suspected enemy locations received from other intelligence sources.

          f.     Logistics

               (1)     Class I Supply:  (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)

                    (a)     Status of rations at end of quarter:
                                        A Rations     C Rations
                         1     Stockage objectives (days)     5     10
                         2     On hand (days)     3     11

                    (b)     Fresh fruits and vegetables were received through SAIGON from DALAT, RVN, and CONUS.

                    (c)     Ice Cream:

Cycle of issues - every other day.
Gallons per week from SAIGON - 1,477.
Gallons per week from CU CHI - 903.

                    (d)     Ice issues:

                         1     Average amount of ice received daily:

                              a     Potable - 50,610 lbs (300 lb blocks).
                              b     Non-potable - 80,000 lbs (100 lb blocks)

                         2     Average ice per man per day:

                              a     Potable - 3 lbs.
                              b     Non-potable - 5 lbs.

               (2)     Class II and IV Supply:  (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)

Additions to ASL during quarter - 61.

Total lines on ASL - 790.

               (3)     Class III Supply - Issues during quarter:  (25th S & T Bn)

               Consumption Rates          Daily (Avg Gal)     Quarterly (Total Gal)
               Mogas                    11,694     1,037,923
               Diesel                    23,504     2,068,396
               JP4                         14,347     1,262,573
               Avgas                       1,505     132,451

                    In the Class II Yard, three more berms have been completed, bringing the total to 35.  The maintenance and storage building has been completed.

               (4)     Grave Registration:  (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)

Deceased U.S. personnel processed during the quarter:  78.

Deceased RVN personnel processed during the quarter:  13.

               (5)     Services:  (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)

                    (a)     Laundry:

QM:  2,953 Wash loads.

Contract:  9,862 Bundles.

                    (b)     QM Bath Unit:

Total showers for quarter:  17,043

                         2     Average number of showers daily:  191.

               (6)     Transportation:  (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)

                    ACTIVITY     TOTAL FOR QTR     DAILY AVG

                    Mileage driven     200,452     2,145
                    Tonnage moved     6,523     70.9
                    Troops moved by convoy     14,168     157
                    Personnel moved locally by bus     10,190     117

               (7)     Maintenance:  (725th Maintenance Battalion)

                    The number of job orders completed during the quarter was as follows:

                    COMMODITY     NO. COMPLETED
                    Aircraft               225
                    Artillery               309
                    Chemical               90
                    Engineer               599
                    Fire Control          580
                    Office Machines          373
                    Signal               4,900
                    Small Arms          2,260
                    Track Vehicles          358
                    Wheel Vehicles          889

               (8)     Services:  (25th Medical Battalion)

                    This unit supported all Division units with medical services and supplies.  In addition, non-divisional units were supported with medical supplies.

                    (a)     Services:

                         SERVICE     NO. OF PATIENTS

                         Clearing Station          18,359
                         Admissions          1,460

                              1     Disease     765
                              2     Non-Battle Injury     278
                              3     Injured Result Hostile Action     417

                         Sick-call patients seen     3,689
                         Dental Clinic     4,121
                         Lab Tests     5,503
                         Immunizations     3,764

                    (b)     Supply and Service

                         Line items issued, Military     3,920
                         Line items issued, MEDCAP     910
                         Bulk pharmacy items issued     19,554
                         Prescriptions, individual, filled     3,423
                         Eye glasses orders     770
                         Maintenance Work Orders     117

               (9)     Transportation Office:  

                    (a)     Highways continued to be the primary mode of transportation for the resupply of the CU CHI, TAY NINH, and DAU TIENG base camps.  Operations GADSDEN, JUNCTION CITY and MANHATTAN in the TAY NINH area have consumed great quantities of supplies.  This is reflected by the volume of vehicles traveling to TAY NINH.

                         1     CU CHI - SAIGON

                              Total Convoys     448
                              Number of convoys per day     4
                              Total volume of vehicles     24,095
                              Average daily volume     268
                              Number of vehicles involved
                              In unit distribution     2,063

                         2     CU CHI - TAY NINH - DAU TIENG

                              Total Convoys     172
                              Number of Convoys per day     2
                              Total volume of vehicles     28,776
                              1st Log Command vehicles     18,187
                              CU CHI base camp vehicles     7,460
                              19th Inf Bde vehicles     945
                              4th Inf Div vehicles     1,211
                              PHILCAGV vehicles     688
                              1st Inf Div vehicles     285

                    (b)     During April 1967, project OREGON required 351 G-130 sorties.  The Division Transportation Office was on site at the departure airfield to provide technical advice and staff coordination.

                    (c)     The large amount of personnel departing the division on PCS movement was reflected in the activity of the Baggage Section the past (3) months.  During the quarter, the baggage section moved 3,090 pieces of baggage weighing 229,828 pounds for 2,053 personnel.

               (10)     Division Ammunition Office

                    (a)     Stockage Objective:

                         1     Status at end of quarter - 1044.6
                         2     On hand - 1,854 tons

                    (b)     Issues

                         PERIOD     AMOUNT (TONS/DAYS)

                         16 Jan - 15 Feb          49.9
                         16 Feb - 15 Mar          62.8
                         16 Mar - 15 Apr          88.5

                    (c)     Average for quarter (tons/day)          63.0

          g.     Administration

               (1)     Personnel.  During the past quarter, the personnel posture of the division has been excellent.  Assigned strength (approximately 106%) exceeded the authorized strength.  This average has been maintained in an attempt to keep the division PDY above 100%.  There continues to be a shortage of Infantry and Artillery NCO's grades E5 and E6.  Other MOS that this headquarters places in the critically short category are:  11D40; 11F20; 11F40; 26C20; 63E20; 82C10 and 91B20.  These shortages have occurred as a result of lack of fill action against requisitions.  Also, there are some instances where personnel in lower grades have been used to fill requisition of NCO's.  The overall officer strength of the division has decreased considerably during this reporting period.  Although assigned strength remains at 102%, the present for duty strength has dropped to 97%.  This deficit is primarily due to diversions and the non-fill of valid requisitions, which accounts for a shortfall of 43 officers, but also includes 21 combat losses which have not been replaced.

               (2)     Key Gains/Losses

                    (a)     1 Feb 67: BG George G. O'Connor was reassigned as ADC, 9th Inf. Div.

                    (b)     6 Feb 67: LTC Hugh S. Wiley was appointed Div Surgeon.

                    (c)     11 Feb 67:  Col Jasper J. Wilson was appointed Chief of Staff 25th Inf Div.

                    (d)     15 Feb 67: LTC Kelly G. Gregory departed PCS for CONUS.  Maj Golfredo D. Sansalone was appointed Division Historian.

                    (e)     16 Feb 67: LTC Carrol D. Strider departed PCS for CONUS.  LTC Avery S. Fullerton assumed command of 65th Engr Bn.

                    (f)     17 Feb 67: Col Thomas W. Mellen departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (g)     18 Feb 67: LTC Thomas U. Harrold was appointed ACofS G4.

                    (h)     20 Feb 67: LTC John K. Moffat departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (i)     21 Feb 67: BG Edward M. Flanagan Jr. was reassigned to HQ USMACV.

                    (j)     22 Feb 67: LTC Michael Barszcz departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (k)     23 Feb 67: LTC Alexander L. Paxson departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (l)     24 Feb 67: LTC Robert M. Ward was assigned as XO, 2nd Bde.

                    (m)     28 Feb 67:  Col Robert C. Shaw was appointed Asst Div Commander.  LTC Thomas H. Ball departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (n)     1 Mar 67: LTC Thomas J. Ferguson departed PCS for CONUS.  LTC Louis G. Nathorn assumed command of 125th Sig Bn.  LTC Billy B. Nicholas departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (o)     5 Mar 67: Col Daniel B. Williams departed PCS for CONUS.  Col David E. Ott assumed command of 25th Inf Div Artillery.  LTC John L. Barry was appointed Div Chaplain.

                    (p)     7 Mar 67: MG Frederick C. Weyand was reassigned as DCG II Field Force Vietnam.  MG John C. F. Tillson III assumed command of 25th Inf Div.  LTC Aubrey G. Norris was appointed ACofS G5.

                    (q)     8 Mar 67: Col Edward C. Kerker departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (r)     10 Mar 67: LTC Felix Salvador departed PCS for CONUS.  LTC Alvin C. Hutchins assumed command 7/11 Arty Bn.

                    (s)     14 Mar 67: Col Herbert S. Lowe departed PCS for CONUS.  Col Edwin W. Emerson assumed command of 25th Inf Div Support Command.  LTC Robert Proudfoot departed PCS for CONUS.  LTC Jere W. Sharp assumed command of 725th Maint Bn.  LTC William S. Kittrell departed PCS for CONUS.  LTC Robert Schwarz assumed command of 25th S & T Bn.

                    (t)     15 Mar 67: LTC Henry R. Shelton departed PCS for CONUS.  LTC Edward C. Peter assumed command of 2/27 Inf Bn.

                    (u)     16 Mar 67: LTC Boniface D. McClung was appointed Div Finance Officer.

                    (v)     17 Mar 67: LTC Thomas A. Ware Jr. was appointed XO, 1st Bde.  

                    (w)     18 Mar 67: LTC Jamie L. Aiken departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (x)     19 Mar 67: LTC Dwight L. Groninger departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (y)     24 Mar 67: LTC Duane W. Compton departed PCS for Japan.  LTC Robert R. Hicks departed PCS for CONUS.  Maj Bernard S. Rhees was appointed Div IO.

                    (z)     27 Mar 67: LTC Dennis V. Gentry Jr. was appointed ACofS G1.

                    (aa)     4 Apr 67: 4 Apr 67: LTC William A. Bearden assumed command of 25th Avn Bn.

                    (bb)     5 Apr 67: LTC William A. Ziegler was appointed Div SJA,

                    (cc)     11 Apr 67: LTC Edward P. Davis departed PCS for CONUS.  LTC Robert S. Young was appointed Adjutant General.

                    (dd)     12 Apr 67: LTC William D. Brown departed PCS for CONUS.  LTC David T. Bryant departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (ee)     16 Apr 67: LTC Robert M. Ward was appointed ACofS G3.

                    (ff)     19 Apr 67: LTC Harley F. Mooney Jr. departed PCS for CONUS.

                    (gg)     20 Apr 67: LTC Arthur W. Knoll was appointed Div Inspector General.

                    (hh)     25 Apr 67: LTC Guy K. Troy was appointed ACofS G2.

                    (ii)     27 Apr 67: LTC Louis J. North departed PCS for CONUS.  LTC Bruce C. Young was reassigned to 18th MP Bde APO 96491.  Maj Robert E. Stromfors was appointed Provost Marshal.

               (3)     The Division PX remains in operation.  There are 4,000 square feet being used for sales with an additional 4,000 square feed under renovation, with a target operational date of 1 June 1967.  Total sales from the Division Site Exchange were $2,045,135.89 for the quarter ending 30 April 1967.

               (4)     Division Strengths (-) as of 30 April 1967:

                                   OFF     WO     EM     AGG
                    Auth               752     149     11,014          11,915
                    Asgd          806     118     11,664          12,588
                    PFD               764     111     11,922          12,797     

               (5)     Losses (1 Feb 67 - 30 Apr 67):

                                        OFF     EM     AGG
                    KIA                    8     108     116
                    WIA                    97     1,142     1,239
                    MIA                    0     0     0
                    Non-Battle Dead     1     7     8
                    Non-Battle Injury     2     44     46

               (6)     Gains (1 Feb 67 - 30 Apr 67):

                    OFF          WO          EM     AGG

                    333           57          4,820     5,210

          h.     Revolutionary Development Support

               (1)     Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

                    (a)     Regular liaison visits were made to MACV and (illegible) in the provinces of NAU NGHIA, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, GIA DINH and LONG AN.  During the quarter, liaison was also made with IIFFORCEV.

                    (b)     Two studies were written o the Combined Lightning Concept.  These studies were designed to answer questions on command, commo, and support of the Combined Lightning concept.  An information letter on the Combined Lightning concept was prepared for transmission to General CHINH, 29th ARVN commanding General to initiate staff planning by the 25th ARVN.  In April, the CLC was transposed to draft form and final plans are now being completed.

                    (c)     The departure of LTC Bashore (SARDS) caused a reorganization of the Division Revolutionary Development Staff Section.  The Revolutionary Development Brand and its associated activities was placed under control of the ACofS G5.

                    (d)     The Revolutionary Development Branch has adopted the New MACV Hamlet Evaluation Rating System to report status of hamlets in the 25th Inf Div's TAOR.

                    (e)     The Revolutionary Development Branch provided Statistics and initial coordination for the ACofS, G3 to consider the possible use of US 25th Div resources to help provide security for the GVN village and hamlet elections in April.

                    (f)     On 30 April, the Commanding General of the 25th Inf Div escorted Brigadier General W. A. Knowlton, Director of Revolutionary Development Support, accompanied by the G5 on a tour of the RD Team working in XOM HUE hamlet in CU CHI District.  Prior to entering the hamlet, BG Knowlton was briefed on current and future RD projects and the status of the RD Teams in the 25th Inf Div's TAOR.

               (2)     Hamlet evaluation rating changes from initial report in Feb - Mar:

                    (a)     HAU NGHIA Province:

                         1     DUC HOA District - TAN AN HOA Village - MUY LON (XT615110) changed from D to C rating.

                         2     CU CHI District - TAN AN HOA Village - AN LOI Hamlet (XT455210) changed from D to C Rating.

                         3     TRANG BANG District - AN HOA Village - AN LOI Hamlet (XT455210) changed from D to C rating.

                    (b)     BINH DUONG Province:

                         1     LAI THIEU District - AN SON Village - AN PHU Hamlet (XT825080) changed from D to C rating.

                         2     LAI THIEU District - AN SON Village - AN HOA Hamlet (XT830095) changed from D to C rating.

                         3     BEN CAT District - AN DIEN Village - KIEN DIEN Hmlet (XT732323) changed from D to VC rating.

               (3)     Revolutionary Development operational factors or activities contributing to lessons learned.

                    (a)     Observations:

                         1     The new MACV Hamlet Evaluation Rating System was first initiated during the month of February with the first results available in late March.  The new system rates the hamlets from A to E or VC.  The new report is completed by the MACV District Advisor and shows a more realistic evaluation of hamlet status than the old GVN system.  Some problems have been discovered due to the subjectivity of the report.  However, detailed guidance is available on the filling out of the report.

                         2     Each hamlet is evaluated on eighteen different points - nine involving security and nine community development points.  After computation, the final ratings are furnished this office.  If the ratings of these eighteen separate points could be provided, the information contained therein would give a clearer picture of the hamlet, i.e., that a hamlet with low overall hamlet rating was due to a lack if community development points versus security points.  This information would be very useful at this level.

                         3     Due to the deletion of GIA DINH and LONG AN Provinces from the Division's TAOR, the RD and hamlet evaluation data is no longer kept by this office.

                         4     The Combined Lightning Concept was studied and a workable solution was proposed.  Basically, the concept is one US squad, one ARVN squad, and one PF squad together in one outpost.  Proposals for training and operational control have been finalized and now are awaiting final decision by ARVN and US commanders.

                         5     Village elections were held through the month of April and will continue through the next quarter.  Elections were held in the secured villages only.  The following number of village elections took place during the month of April.  TAY NINH Province, 23; HAU NGHIA Province, 6; PHU HOA 7& TRI TAM Districts of BINH DUONG Province, 5.  US units assisted the 25th ARVN Division when asked to provide additional security.  The election turnout during April appeared to be favorable; reports will be available at the conclusion of the elections.

                         6     Liaison is being established at district level by the RD Officer and NCO with attention given to districts where RD teams are currently active.  It was found that more specific information is available in reference to RD Teams and RD activities at this level.  Emphasis will be placed in the future in visiting district advisors.

                         7     The last two months of the quarter have shown an upturn in RD Team effort; however, it appears that some of the teams will not accomplish all of their goals for 1967.  The overriding cause for this seems to be weak team leadership.

          i.     Civic Action

               (1)     Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

                    (a)     During the reporting period, the Division lost Operational control of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.  The 8th AA Platoon of the (illegible) CA Company was attached to the 3rd Bde, 4th Division at DAU TIENG but remained in their present position at TAY NINH.  The team assists the 1st Bde, 9th Division now located at TAY NINH.

                    (b)     Statistical Summary:

                                             FEB - APR     TO DATE
                         Helping Hand Recipients     20,165     89,867
                         MEDCAP Patients     25,999     98,977
                         Health & San