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After Action Reports 35
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BATTALION, 12TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96268
AVDOTB-F-SC 15 March 1968
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)
TO: Commanding Officer
3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div
APO San Francisco 96268
1. Name or Identity and/or Type of Operation: Operation Yellowstone.
2. Date of Operation: 7 December - 16 December 1967
28 December 1967 - 31 January 1968
3. Location: Southern Portion AO HOOD, Eagle Flights into AO OTTER (XT3677), Michelin Rubber Plantation, Katum, FSB BURT.
4. Control or Command Headquarters: 3rd Bde, 25th Infantry Division
1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division
5. Reporting Officer: LTC R. D. TICE
6. Task Organization: Co A 2/12
Co B 2/12
Co C 2/12
Co D 2/12
7. Supporting Forces: 7th Air Force
a. Intelligence concerning the Battalion TAOR for Operation Yellowstone was obtained from the 3rd Bde, 25th Infantry Division and from the 1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division.
b. Information received indicated that vic (XT279934) was site of large rice cache for enemy forces operating throughout the area.
c. Intelligence information was sent to 2/12th from 3rd Bde that Dau Tieng may be subjected to enemy attack and was consequently airlifted back as security force.
d. Operations in AO OTTER produced several enemy bunkers with overhead cover, but no significant offensive actions by enemy forces.
e. On 8 January at (XT340884) contact made with squad size element. Web gear captured from one of the two enemy KHA's identified him as NVA regular.
f. On 12 January located 8 graves (XT345867), bodies of 8 males uncovered dressed in light green uniforms. Enemy unit unknown.
g. On 20 January Bn (-) found base camp approximately one week old, with stakes tied to trees (probably trail markers) ( XT509799), and nearby were 25 foxholes probably used as staging area.
h. On 22 January a reconnaissance patrol from Camp Rainier at (XT505470) found VC sandals, scissors, medical gauze, and approximately one pound propaganda leaflets.
i. Other VC encounters were as follows:
(1) Sniper fire 6
(2) Mortar fire 6
(3) Booby traps 2
(4) Engagements 5
(5) Mining 2
(6) Fire against aircraft 3
j. Enemy Communications:
(1) In the base camps located, communications wire was found throughout, indicating use of land line communications.
(2) On 20 January while searching a base camp at (XT503797), found one radio battery case indicating enemy was using radio communications.
k. Enemy Operations:
(1) Throughout the operation at Katum, FSB BURT and in the Michelin Rubber Plantation, enemy units made no attempts at offensive operations. Enemy forces encountered used basic guerrilla tactics.
(2) On 14 December 1967, 2/12th airlifted back to Dau Tieng due to possible enemy offensive action. Base camp received 45 rounds enemy mortar fire, scattered small arms fire, but no major offensive action.
l. Weather and Terrain:
(1) Weather throughout the operational period was dry and hot, and had no adverse effects on operational capability. Terrain trafficability was adequate for armor employment.
9. Mission: During Operation Yellowstone, 2/12th was called on to perform missions in several different areas.
a. On first mission, 9 December 1967, commencing H-Hour, D+1, 2/12th Inf (-) conducts combat assault into LZ 1, secures southern portion of FSB HOOD (Bde Base). On D+2, effects link-up with TF 2/22 and conducts offensive operations in assigned AO to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations until D+7. On D+8, 2/12th (-) conducts airmobile move to FSB RENO and continues to contact and destroy VC/NVA Forces until D+15. From D+15 to D+60, 2/12th conducts detailed Reconnaissance in Force Operations in assigned AO.
b. On 2nd mission, 28 December 1967, commencing 0700H, 2/12th Inf (-) conducts airlift by fixed wing aircraft to Katum, became OPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. Conducts combat assault in vic (XT2893) and secures rice cache for extraction. Conducts patrols in assigned AO to locate and destroy VC/NVA Forces and installations until 2 Jan 68. On 2 Jan 68, returns to OPCON to 3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div and conducts missions to be announced.
c. On 3rd mission, 26 January 1968, 2/12th to airlift to Dau Tieng to reinforce and/or counterattack the following areas and employ two (2) companies in the Michelin on Reconnaissance in Force Operations, also provide security for vehicle convoy between Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh:
(a) District Headquarters
(b) 369th RF Company
(c) Ben Do Outpost
(d) CRIP and Nguyen Van Than Outpost
(e) Cau Cat Outpost
(f) Dau Duc Outpost
(h) Cau Sinh Outpost
(i) Ben Cui
(j) Local Ambush patrols
10. Concept of Operation: The first mission of Operation Yellowstone was to be executed in three phases:
a. Phase I: D+1 2/12 Inf (-) conducts combat assault and secures southern portion of FSB HOOD. Effects linkup with TF 2/22 and begins offensive operations in assigned AO to the south and southwest.
b. Phase II: D+8 2/12 (-) conducts airmobile move to FSB RENO and conducts offensive operations to the west and northwest in sector.
c. Phase III: D+15 to D+60 2/12 (-) conducts detailed Reconnaissance in Force Operations to locate and destroy VC/NVA Forces and installations in assigned AO.
The second mission of Operation Yellowstone was to be executed in four phases:
a. Phase I: 00700-1000H 28 Dec 2/12 Inf (-) conducts airlift by fixed wing to Katum, becomes OPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div.
b. Phase II: 1000-1430H 28 Dec 2/12 Inf (-) conducts combat assault to vic (XT2393) and secures rice cache for extraction.
c. Phase III: 28 Dec 67 - 2 Jan 68 2/12 Inf (-) establishes battalion petrol base and conducts offensive operations in assigned AO.
d. Phase IV: 2/12 Inf returns OPCON to 3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div and conducts missions TBA.
The third mission of Operation Yellowstone was to be executed in three phases:
a. Phase I: 27 January 1968 two companies to conduct Eagle Flights into Michelin Rubber Plantation to destroy VC/NVA Forces and installations.
b. Phase II: 2/12th will counterattack and/or reinforce Camp Rainier and friendly units within their sphere of responsibility.
c. Phase III: 2/12th will provide security for vehicle convoy between Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh.
d. In all phases of above three mentioned missions, maximum use of TAC air and artillery throughout the operations.
(1) OPORD 33-67, HHC, 2/12th Inf, 25th Inf Div, dtd 06 Dec 67.
(2) FRAGORD 1 to OPORD 33-67, dtd 15 Dec 67.
(3) FRAGORD 2 to OPORD 33-67, dtd 16 Dec 67.
(4) FRAGORD 3 to OPORD 33-67, dtd 27 Dec 67.
(5) FRAGORD 4 to OPORD 33-67, dtd 26 Jan 68.
(6) FRAGORD 5 to OPORD 33-67, dtd 27 Jan 68.
(7) FRAGORD 6 to OPORD 33-67, dtd 28 Jan 68.
(8) FRAGORD 7 to OPORD 33-67, dtd 29 Jan 68.
(9) FRAGORD 8 to OPORD 33-67, dtd 30 Jan 68.
07-08 Dec 67
2/12th Inf prepared for future operation. Co C (-) continued mission as Bde Ready Reaction Force.
09 Dec 67
2/12 (-) began operations with combat assault at 0935H. It was completed by 1100H landing at (XT387704). Bn (-) proceeded to secure southern portion of the LZ (FSB HOOD) while 3/49th ARVN secured northern portion. Co C (-) was airlifted at 1825H to FSB GRANT (XT380620) for additional security purposes. Co D found 2 Bouncing Betty mines on LZ and destroyed.
10-12 Dec 67
2/12th (-) continued Reconnaissance in Force operation in AO OTTER, on 12 Dec Recon at 0950H located and destroyed 7 bunkers with overhead cover at (XT472691). The bunkers were 10” x 15' x 5'. Inside were a table, chairs, canteen and two entrenching tools. Laager site for the Bn is (XT464498).
13 Dec 67
2/12 (-) conducted Eagle Flights into 4 areas of AO Otter, (XT3677), XT3877), XT3978) and (XT3478). At 1625H Recon drew sniper fire from (XT3478). Laager for the night (XT340785).
14 Dec 67
2/12 on Eagle Flight lifted to (XT3279). They then returned to Dau Tieng because of Intelligence Report. Last element arrived 1525H. Bn went on Red Alert at 1800H for possible attack. Base camp came under mortar attack at 2130H until 2330H. Approximately 45 mortar rounds fell in Bn area. 2/12th suffered 3 WHA's.
15 Dec 67
Recon went on mounted patrol in Ben Cui Rubber departing 0905H. They closed base camp at 1430H. Co's C & D departed base camp 0700H to establish two ambushes in Michelin. Co D established their ambush at (XT512483) and C at (XT510496). As C Co prepared to leave the ambush site they hit two booby traps wounding 2 at (XT510488). Co's C & D closed camp at 1535H. One platoon from C Co remains at FSB GRANT, OPCON to Task Force Romeo.
16 Dec 67
Co A combat assaulted to (XT55530) then started moving to night ambush site. At 1540H at (XT435522), they found 10 bunkers. At 16(missing) at (XT463522) located 3 bunkers 10' x 24' x 8'. All bunkers were destroyed. At 1720H at (XT645524), they located 2 bicycles along the river, also one submerged boat and one sampan. Co A's ambush site for the night established at (XT465523). Bn (-) remained at Camp Rainier with mission of Bde Reaction Force. Two platoons from Co C returned to Dau Tieng from FSB GRANT 0930H. Recon ambush patrol at 1845H was in contact at (XT509461) on all sides. Artillery, gunships and firing from checkpoint was used to get patrol back to base camp at 2000H. Checkpoint at Post #1 at 2330H received incoming grenade with negative casualties.
17 - 26 Dec 67
2/12th participated in Operation Camden.
28 Dec 67
2/12th resumed Operation Yellowstone. They were airlifted by fixed wing to Katum (XT333897). Last lift completed at 1100H. Bn came under OPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. From Katum, they will combat assault to (XT282925) and will recn in force from laager site until 2 Jan 68. Co B and Rec Platoon are in Dau Tieng as 3rd Bde, Ready Reaction Force.
29 Dec 67
2/12 Inf (-) located 3 caches of rice in their immediate area in AO MITCH. Bn (-) laager site for the night was (XT279934).
30 Dec 67
2/12 Inf (-) continues OPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. Bn is currently running Recon in Force operations from their laager site at (XT279934) in AO MITCH.
31 Dec 67
Began extraction preparations for large rice cache. Approximately 7 tons were extracted on the 30th of Dec and another 30 tons today.
1 - 4 Jan 68
Continues OPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div, extracting rice and conducted recon in force operations.
5 Jan 68
Bn (-) relocated to FSB KATUM (XT333898). Replaced 3/22 at FSB and assumed FSB security requirements. Bravo Co airmobile from Dau Tieng to Katum, last element departed Dau Tieng 1235H.
6 - 7 Jan 68
Bn (-) remains OPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div providing security for forward resupply base at Katum.
8 Jan 68
!-2-12 while providing security for Rome Plow operations, made contact with squad size enemy element at coord (XT340884). Contact was broken at 1005H with the following results: two enemy KHA. Web gear taken from one enemy KHA proved he was member of NVA Force. At 1600H, sniper fire was received at coord (XT349886) resulting in one US KHA, two US WHA and one US NBI. Enemy losses unknown. Bravo Co at 1100H found four graves at (XT346386) with 4 male bodies uncovered.
9 Jan 68
Sniper fire at coord (XT341884) on Delta Company resulted in one US KHA. At 1425H, continuing sniper fire inflicted two US WHA and one US KHA. Enemy casualties unknown.
10 Jan 68
Combat assault conducted at coord (XT274864) sweeping to coord (XT267895) then to PZ at coord (XT275885). Mission completed at 1530H. Alpha had one NBI.
11 Jan 68
2/12th continues security mission of Katum. At 1815H, received 10 rounds 82mm and 15 rounds 60mm mortar fire. Negative Flame casualties. Alpha departed Katum 0745H sweeping east to (XT359901), north to (XT359920), west to (XT346920) then southeast back to Katum. Bravo provided security for Rome Plow Operations working the perimeter.
12 Jan 68
Charlie Company at coord (XT345887) located 8 graves, bodies of 8 males were uncovered dressed with light green uniforms.
13 - 14 Jan 68
On 13 Jan conducted local recon in force missions. On 14 Jan, a combat assault was conducted by Co's A, B, and C into (XT279972) and a recon in force operation began. Gunships covering the assault receiving fire vic (XT279978). They returned fire and an airstrike was called in. Co C received small arms fire (XT298978) from approximately 3 VC. Returned fire and swept the area. Co B located minefield and 10 VC bodies in shallow graves. Three companies continued sweep to PZ vic (XT282958) where they were extracted back to Katum.
15 Jan 68
Secure Route 246 with Co's A, B, & D to Bo Tuc where they were met by the 2/14th Inf. 2/12th located and destroyed 3 anti-tank mines while clearing the road. Returned to Katum 1730H.
16 Jan 68
Bn (-) moved by CH-47 from Katum to FSB BURT. Relieved the 4/9th Inf. Came under control of 3rd Bde, 25th Inf. There was US NBI.
17 - 18 Jan 68
Conducted local patrolling on the 17th of Jan and improved positions around the perimeter. On the 18th, continued perimeter sweep 100 meters from FSB BURT. Alpha at (XT515830) found three freshly dug foxholes 4' x 3' x 5, two had overhead cover. At 1315H, dust-off required for one US NBI, paralyzed legs due to cramps. At 1615H, a stay behind force from Alpha discovered grave with male dressed in black pajamas.
19 Jan 68
Conducted local Recon in Force operations vic FSB BURT. Delta Company at 0749H found 1 VC body (XT504808). Returned to perimeter 1700H.
20 Jan 68
Conducted local recon in force vic FSB BURT (5080) sweeping southeast to (XT515784) southwest to (XT513782), then northwest to (XT504797). Returned to BURT 1600H. Alpha at (XT507796) found stakes tied to trees. Stakes were probably used as trail markers. Also Alpha discovered 4 bunkers 3' x 4' x 5' with overhead cover. Estimate they were three days old. Destroyed them. At 0850H vic (XT509799), found 8 huts, 17 bunkers, two with overhead cover. All bunkers and huts destroyed by fire. At 0940H vic (XT511791), found six foot bunker with overhead cover which was approximately one week old. At 1020H vic (XT517787) found 7 freshly dug unused graves, 4 foxholes 3' x 4' x 4', 2 incomplete, 6 freshly dug bunkers without overhead cover approximately 1 week old. At 1225H vic (XT511792) located 1 foxhole and hut with tunnel 8' long. At 1410H vic (XT503797) found probable staging area with approximately 30 foxholes having overhead cover. Alpha also discovered 1 radio battery case, rucksack, bandages and approximately 100 pounds of rice. Located 6 graves at same location with 6 males. At 1530H, found 1 bicycle and extracted. Delta Company at 0755H vic (XT515784) found VC bridge 3' wide tied with vines. Also found 1 AK47 with magazine at (XT504800). All elements closed BURT 1600H.
21 Jan 68
Conducted local recon in force vic BURT, (XT5080) sweeping east to (XT524800), north to (XT524809), then southwest to (XT504806). Alpha at 1510H vic (XT515805) found 17 bunkers with overhead cover 3' x 4' x 4', constructed of one (illegible) of logs with one foot of dirt on top. Also found some bloody rags and two VC entrenching tools. Close FSB BURT 1620H. Bravo was trailing element of Bn (-). At 1045H vic (XT524801) found 3 bunkers with overhead cover and 3 foxholes. Bunkers were partially destroyed and very old. Found 1 bandolier AK/47 ammo.
22 Jan 68
Continued sweeps near FSB BURT perimeter. Bravo Company at 0815H vic (XT505805) found 15 one man foxholes with no overhead cover. They were approximately two weeks old, destroyed same. At (illegible)H vic (XT507804) found 4 VC bodies about 3 weeks old. Returned to perimeter 1600H. Delta Company at 0815H vic (XT505805) found 35 one man foxholes with no overhead cover about two weeks old, destroyed same. At 0953H vic (XT512805) found small base camp having 15 bunkers with overhead cover 3' x 4' x 4', destroyed same. At 1255H vic (XT503798) found 1 VC body approximately three weeks old, 2 RPG-2 rounds with charges, and 1 CHICOM grenade. Delta returned to BURT 1600H with captured ordnance.
23 - 24 Jan 68
2/12 Inf (-) continued security mission of FSB BURT. Conducted cloverleaf type operations near Hill 495 (XT504833).
25 Jan 68
All companies 2/12th participation in local sweeps near BURT. Bravo at 1500H near (XT503805) found 2 RPG-2 rounds with boosters.
26 Jan 68
FSB BURT at 0800H received 25 82mm mortar rounds. This action resulted in 4 US KHA and 29 US WHA. Extraction operations from FSB BURT began at 0850H. Bn closed Camp Rainier at 1157H.
27 - 31 Jan 68
Bn (-) conducted Reconnaissance in Force operations in and around the Michelin Rubber Plantation. They cloverleafed each day and would return near laager site and set up ambush sites. During this time, the 2/12th (-) had negative contact, negative findings. 31 Jan 68 was the last day of Operation Yellowstone for the 2/12th.
a. US Losses
(1) Personnel: 5 KHA, 47 WHA.
b. Enemy Losses:
(1) Personnel: 35 VC killed (BC), 1 VC killed (poss).
(2) Enemy Equipment Captured and Evacuated.
Individual Weapons Food Medical Supplies
Bandolier w/AK47 ammo 129,040 pounds rice 1 pair scissors
2 RPG-7 rounds w/boosters 1 box bandages
2 RPG-2 rounds w/boosters
1 AK47 magazine
20 rounds AK47
Fortifications (destroyed) Miscellaneous
1 12' trench 4 pair sandals
1 8' tunnel 4 entrenching tools
53 1-man foxholes w/overhead cover 1 rucksack
8 small huts 2 bicycles
176 bunkers 1 table
3 anti-tank mines
2 Bouncing Betty mines
13. Administrative Matters: None
14. Special Equipment and Techniques: The use of chain saws was quite effective in clearing laager sites and cutting timber for bunkers.
15. Commanders Analysis: None
16. Recommendations: None
FOR THE COMMANDER:
/s/Spencer R. Haddock
DISTRIBUTION SPENCER R. HADDOCK
1 cy - 2/22 CPT, Infantry
1 cy - 3/22 Adjutant
25 cys - 3rd Bde
1 cy - File
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEAQUARTERS, 3RD BATTALION, 22ND INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96268
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Operation Yellowstone II) (U).
THRU: Commanding Officer
3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96268
TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96225
1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation Yellowstone II, a 25th Infantry division offensive operation conducted in its Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI).
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 29 December 1967 to 25 January 1968.
3. (U) LOCATION: FSB BURT (XT498804), Katum (XT333900), and Michelin Plantation.
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. (U) COMMANDERS:
3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry LTC Thomas U. Harrold
Company A, 3-22 Infantry Cpt Herbert C. Chancey
Company B, 3-22 Infantry Cpt Robert L. Hemphill
Company C, 3-22 Infantry Cpt Elliot Fishburne
Company D, 3-22 Infantry Cpt William A. Curtis
(29 Dec 67 to 17 Jan 68)
Cpt William J. Monahan
(18 Jan 68 to 25 Jan 68)
Reconnaissance Platoon 2Lt Steven A. Wilder
Heavy Weapons Platoon 1Lt Philip J. Hallisy
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
Company A, 3-22 Infantry
Company B, 3-22 Infantry (19 Jan thru 22 Jan OPCON 1/5 Bn (M))
Company C, 3-22 Infantry (On 31 Dec OPCON 1/5 Bn (M))
Company D, 3-22 Infantry (2 Jan thru 17 Jan OPCON 1/5 Bn (M))
Reconnaissance Platoon, 3-22 Infantry
Heavy Weapons Platoon, 3-22 Infantry
7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:
Artillery support for 3-22 Infantry during Operation Yellowstone II was provided by 2-77 Artillery. At various times during the operation, the following batteries provided direct support for the battalion.
C Battery 2-77 Artillery (105mm)
A Battery 2-77 Artillery (105mm)
B Battery 2-77 Artillery (105mm)
1-27 Artillery (155mm)
(e) Additional fire support was provided by the Battalion Heavy Weapons Platoon in general support, while all weapons platoons provided direct support at company level. All supporting artillery fires were extremely responsive and accurate.
b. United States Air Force: Extensive effective use was made of Tactical Air to include preplanned and immediate missions. All 3-22 Infantry requests for air support when through 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; this was accomplished by forwarding all requests to the Brigade Liaison Officer.
c. Army Aviation:
(1) Operation Yellowstone II began on 29 Dec 67 with a combat assault of 3-22 Infantry (-) into a cold LZ. The LZ was prepared by artillery and gunships prior to the combat assault. The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion provided 3 lifts of 20 ships to conduct the combat assault.
(2) Daily resupply and extraction sorties were flown by CH-47 helicopters. A severe rotor wash problem existed because of the powder conditions of the soil at the FSB. This problem was partially solved by the use of Pena Prime on two helipads at the FSB.
(3) On the morning of 2 Jan 68, during the Battle of Soui Cut, Army Aviation played a major role. At 0330, an emergency resupply of Class V was resupplied to 3-22 Infantry (-) by 145th Aviation. In addition, 25th Aviation, 187th and 188th Combat Aviation Battalions provided direct support with gunships and emergency resupply.
(4) During Operation Yellowstone II, 3rd Brigade Aviation Section provided OH-23's for the 3-22 Infantry on immediate and preplanned requests. Maximum extensive use was made of these resources for Reconnaissance/Command Control of the maneuver elements.
8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:
a. Intelligence concerning the battalion TAOR for Operation Yellowstone II was obtained from 25th Division G-2, 3rd Brigade S-2, 25th Inf Detachment, VR sightings, and past operations.
b. On the night of 1 January-2 January 1968, during the New Years truce, FSB BURT (XT5080) was attacked by elements of the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments. Interrogation of POWs after the battle revealed that on approximately 25 December these two regiments moved from or through the Cambodian Salient to staging areas within several hours walking distance of FSB BURT. On the night prior to the attack, movement was engaged outside the perimeter and the following morning two bodies were discovered with documents indicating they belonged to the 271st (one body was possibly identified as the Company Commander of C.16 Mortar Company, 271st Regiment). This was the first indication that this unit was in the area. The next night, the 271st, supported by at least two Battalions of the 272nd, attacked FSB BURT. It appeared that the battle plan included four battalions attacking with two battalions in reserve. Documents found on one body indicated that he was the Commander of the 2nd Battalion, 271st regiment, although positive identification was impossible. A Hoi Chanh who rallied on 12 January 1968, stated he was a member of the 271st. His company had been held in reserve and at 020400 hours they began withdrawing into Cambodia. His unit later moved out of Cambodia to vicinity XT5191 where they were hit by a B/52 strike. They then moved back into Cambodia (XT5691).
c. During the remaining period of Operation Yellowstone II, 3-22 Infantry experienced light enemy contact. Intelligence reports during the later stages of Operation Yellowstone II indicated that the VC were planning to conduct major offensive operations during the TET holiday period. It was assumed from those intelligence reports that the light contact we were experiencing was the result of the VC troop buildup in unknown staging areas.
d. Significant Incidents:
(1) 291945 Dec - At XT501798, A16 sprung their ambush on two (2) VC resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC), 3 AK-47 magazines w/ammo, 1 old bayonet, 1 pistol bolt, 1 plastic rope, 1 pair pliers and 1 bicycle.
(2) 300620 Dec - Falcon forward received 10 60mm mortar rounds outside of perimeter.
(3) 301305 Dec - At XT474820, D Co had contact with unknown number of VC. The VC used RPG and S/A fire resulting in one (1) US KIA, 2 US WIA. VC casualties unknown.
(4) 311305 Dec - At XT505816, A 26 engaged one (1) VC with S/A with negative results.
(5) 312000 Dec - D Co perimeter received 10 rounds of mixed RPG and 60mm mortar fire resulting in one (1) US WIA.
(6) 312130 Dec - At XT500805, A 16 sprung their ambush resulting in two (2) VC KIA (BC), 1 POW, 1 9mm pistol, 1 pair of field glasses, assorted documents and 1 US compass. A 16 received one (1) RPG resulting in three (3) US WIA. Also found was 1 M-16 with blood on it.
(7) 011850 Jan - A 36 AP received RPG and S/A fire at XT502805.
(8) 011855 Jan - Falcon perimeter received sporadic 60mm and S/A fire.
(9) 012130 Jan - Sporadic firing continued resulting in 2 US KIA and 2 US WIA.
(10) 010130 Jan - FSB BURT came under heavy attacks of RPGs, 60mm mortars, MGs and S/A followed by ground attack in Falcon A and Falcon C area of perimeter. Ground attack lasted until 0500 and contact was broke at 0630 hours.
(11) 020800 Jan - Falcon made a sweep in front of their perimeter resulting in 171 VC KIA (BC) and 5 POWs. Documents from dead VC indicate the VC were from 271st and 272nd VC Regiments which had joined to form a single reinforced regiment.
(12) 071225 Jan - Falcon received 32 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in 2 US WIA.
(13) 071400 Jan - Falcon received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar with negative casualties.
(14) 091915 Jan - Falcon received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in 2 US WIA.
(15) 101245 Jan - Falcon received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar with negative casualties.
(16) 111050 Jan - Falcon received 8-10 rounds of 60mm mortar with negative casualties.
(17) 121355 Jan - At XT478798, B Co received approximately 25 rounds of incoming M-16. Returned fire and swept area finding one (1) bunker with OHC and expended M-16 casings, VC web gear, and protective mask.
(18) 121430 Jan - At XT474796, B Co left flank started receiving M-16 sniper fire. Sporadic firing continued until 1500 hours with negative casualties.
(19) 151232 Jan - Lead element of B Co received RPG and claymore fire from an estimated VC squad.
(20) 151250 Jan - B Co shot 1 VC out of a tree, 1 VC KIA (BC), no weapon.
(21) 151615 Jan - B Co EM tripped a booby trap resulting in 3 US WIA.
(22) 151700 Jan - Calling air strikes in support of B Co, also using artillery and gunships. Results of enemy action: 4 US KIA and 26 US WIA.
(23) 181331 Jan - A Co had a US butterfly bomb explode, resulting in 4 US WIA.
(24) 240950 Jan - At Xt512484, A Co had 1 US WIA as a result of a booby trapped grenade.
(25) 251335 Jan - At XT543466, B Co reported receiving 4-8 incoming AK-47 rounds with negative casualties. Returned fire with unknown results.
9. (C) MISSION: 3-22 Infantry (-) on 29 December 1968, combat assaulted into FSB BURT to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, open land lines of communication for friendly forces, and to interdict VC NVA lines of communication from Michelin Plantation to northern War Zone C.
10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:
(1) Phase I: (290856 Dec 67-300645 Dec 67) 3-22 Infantry (-) combat assaults into FSB BURT (XT498804), secures the area for subsequent airmobile introduction of 2-77 Artillery (-), assists in the security of FSB BURT. (See Inclosures I and II)
(2) Phase II: (300645 Dec 67-311800 Dec 67) 3-22 Infantry provides daylight close in security for the FSB and conducts night ambush patrolling around the FSB. (See Inclosure II)
(3) Phase III: (011800 Jan 68-021600 Jan 68) Proposed New Years Truce period. 3-22 Infantry participating in increased local security measures, patrol and ambush plans. (See Inclosure II)
(4) Phase IV: (021600 Jan 68-050800 Jan 68) 3-22 Infantry (-) conducts airlift to Katum (XT333900) and conducts reconnaissance in force operations in that area.
(5) Phase V: (050800 Jan 68-070700 Jan 68) 3-22 Infantry (-) conducts airlift back to Dau Tieng Base Camp and conducts reconnaissance in force operations in the Michelin Plantation. (See Inclosure III)
(6) Phase VI: (070700 Jan 68-230815 Jan 68) 3-22 Infantry (-) is airlifted back to FSB BURT (XT498804) and conducts local reconnaissance in force operations in that area and provides security for FSB BURT. (See Inclosure IV)
(7) Phase VII: (230815 Jan 68-252400 Jan 68) 3-22 Infantry (-) is airlifted back to Dau Tieng Base Camp, regains control of 3-22 Infantry units in Dau Tieng Base Camp and conducts local reconnaissance in force operations in the Michelin Plantation. (See Incl V; See Incl VI, refer paragraph 11, item (26); See Incl VII, refer paragraph 11, item (27))
b. Fires: Artillery support from FSB BURT, 1-27 Artillery and 2-77 Artillery (-) vicinity XT498804.
c. References: 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division OPORD 40-67, dated 26 Dec 67 and 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry OPORD 18-67, dated 27 Dec 67. FRAG ORDERS 1 thru 3 to OPORD 40-67, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and FRAG ORDERS 1 thru 5 to OPORD 18-67, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry.
11. (C) EXECUTION:
a. 29 Dec - At 0835 hours, 3-22 Infantry (-) was airlifted to LZ BURT (XT498804). At 1400 hours, Company B, conducted a sweep of the area, found six (6) anti-tank mines (8x10) which were destroyed. At 1610 hours, Company B found one (1) anti-tank mine (8X10) while conducting perimeter sweep. At 1715 hours, Company B had one (1) EM dusted off with (illegible) wound. At 1945 hours, A 16 AP sprung ambush (XT501798) resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC).
b. 30 Dec - At 0620 hours, 3-22 Infantry (-) received ten (10) 60mm mortar rounds that landed outside of perimeter. At 1305 hours, Company D had contact with unknown size VC force (XT474820) who used RPGs and S/A resulting in one (1) US KIA and two (2) US WIA and unknown VC casualties. Companies A, B, and D provided road security for FSB BURT from XT499804 to XT478820 where they were married up with 2-22 Infantry (M). At 1200 hours, Company A found nine (9) anti-tank mines (XT499819) (8x8) which were destroyed. At 1607 hours, all elements of 3-22 Infantry (-) closed FSB BURT. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
c. 31 Dec - At 0745 hours, 3-22 Infantry began reconnaissance in force in the area around FSB BURT. At 1157 hours, Company B (XT494806) found three (3) Chicom grenades, two (2) 105mm rounds, 24 trip flares; all were destroyed. At 1305 hours, A26 (XT505816) engaged one (1) VC with S/A; negative results. At 1310 hours, A 26 (XT505816) found five (5) bunkers 20x20x4 with 2' OHC, two (2) 14x15x4 with 2' OHC, one (1) 12x12x4 with 2' OHC, one (1) 12x10x4 with no OHC. All had connecting tunnels. Also found were three (3) pounds of documents, four (4) OD uniforms, spices and liquor (all was destroyed except uniforms and documents). All 3-22 Infantry (-) elements closed FSB BURT by 1645 hours. At 2000 hours, Delta perimeter received 10 rounds of mixed RPG and 60mm mortar fire, resulting in one (1) US WIA. At 2100 hours, A 16 AP XT506808 received one (1) RPG resulting in three (3) minor US WIA. At 2130 hours, A 16 (XT506808) had movement to their front and blow three (3) claymores, resulting in two VC KIA, and 1 VC POW, one (1) 9mm pistol, one (1) pair field glasses, assorted documents, and one (1) US compass. Negative further contact as of 2400 hours.
d. 01 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remains at FSB BURT and conducts reconnaissance in force operations in that area. At 1015 hours, A 16 (sweep element) found one (1) M-16 with blood on it (XT500805). At 1855 hours, A 36 en route to AP location made contact with unknown VC force (XT502805) receiving S/A and RPG-2 fire with negative results. FSB BURT began receiving sporadic RPG and 60mm mortar fire. As of 2400 hours, Company A reported two (2) US KIA and one (1) US WIA, and FSB BURT came under heavy ground attack at this time, mainly from the northwest and southeast.
e. 02 Jan - The VC used RPGs, heavy and light machine guns, and 60mm mortars. The initial ground assault lasted until 0100 hours. At 0100 hours, the VC regrouped and continued to attack with companies A and C taking the main force of the attack. The VC penetrated the southeastern perimeter being defended by Company C; at 0230 hours, 105mm direct fire and air support repulsed the attacking VC at the perimeter. The VC regrouped at approximately 0330 hours and the heavy ground attack continued. Friendly forces continued receiving support from 105mm and 155mm direct fire and air support. At 0500 hours, the VC began their initial retreat. By 0630 hours, contact was completely broken with the exception of sporadic sniper fire. At 0600 hours, 3-22 Infantry (-) made a sweep 80 meters in front of their perimeter, counting 171 VC KIA (BC), 5 VC POW accredited to 3-22 Infantry (-). 3-22 Infantry (-) captured 14 AK-47s, 6 RPG-2 launchers, 4 RPG-7 launchers, 51 RPG-2 and RPG-7 rounds, 12 US pistol belts. 7 US ponchos, 12 canteens with covers, 20 VC soft caps, 12 machine gun drums of ammo, 30 AK-47 magazines with ammo. US weapons destroyed or unaccounted for were 7 M-79s, 1 M-60 machine gun, and 15 M-16s. At 1600 hours, 3-22 Infantry (-) began airlift to Katum (XT333900). At 1650, airlift to Katum was completed. At 1810 hours, 3-22 Infantry (-) became OPCON to 1st Brigade 25th Infantry Division. Negative further contact as of 2400 hours.
f. 03 Jan - 3-33 Infantry (-) remains at Katum (XT333900) and conducted reconnaissance in force in that area. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
g. 04 Jan - At 1530 hours, Company B (XT342882) found and destroyed eight (8) tons of polished rice. At 1845 hours, Company A at Katum (XT333900) received one (1) grenade, negative casualties. At 2140 hours, Company A received automatic weapons fire, negative casualties.
h. 05 Jan - At 0800 hours, 3-22 Infantry (-) began airlift back to Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT497472). At 1026 hours, the airlift was complete. At 2130 hours, bunker #46 spotted eight (8) individuals, engaged with M-79, negative results. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
i. 06 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remains at Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT497472). At 0800 hours, Companies B and C departed for mission in the Michelin Plantation. At 0825 hours, Company B reported that the bridge at XT512474 had been blown. At 0900 hours, Company A detained seven (7) Vietnamese with a truck. One had a map of the Michelin, one woman had 7,400 piasters (XT507493). At 0930 hours, Company B (XT516477) destroyed two (2) oxcarts. At 1000 hours, Company A detained one (1) Vietnamese with Cambodian money in his possession. Companies A and B closed Dau Tieng Base Camp by 1530 hours. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
j. 07 Jan - At 0720 hours, 3-22 Infantry (-) began airlift back to FSB BURT (XT498804). At 0915 hours, the airlift was complete. At 1225 hours, FSB BURT received approximately 32 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in two (2) US WIA. At 1400 hours, FSB BURT received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire with negative further contact as of 2400 hours.
k. 08 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT and conducted local reconnaissance in force operations. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
l. 09 Jan - At 1430 hours, Company B (XT482792) found three (3) 82mm mortar rounds, 156 60mm mortar rounds, forty-one (41) cases TNT (80 blocks per case), twenty-five (25) cases C4, eleven (11) cases 7.62mm rounds (1100 rounds per case), and three (3) cases of blasting caps (1400 caps). At 1915 hours, FSB BURT received ten (10) 60mm mortar rounds resulting in two (2) US WIA from 3-22 Infantry (-). Negative further contact as of 2400 hours.
m. 10 Jan - 3-22 Infantry remained at FSB BURT (XT500805) with negative contact as of 2400 hours.
n. 11 Jan - 3-33 Infantry (-) at FSB BURT (XT500805) received approximately 16-20 incoming 60mm mortars between 0735 and 1135 hours. Negative casualties. At 1600 hours, Battalion (-) established a laager position at coordinate (XT500805). Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
o. 12 Jan - At 0751 hours, Company A departed FSB BURT on a sweep mission. At 1135 hours, Company A found an old VC base camp (XT475810) containing 150 foxholes (4x3x3) with 2' OHC, one (1) AK-47 magazine, one (1) VC canteen, 40 AK-47 ammo boxes, 50 meters of commo wire, one (1) well, five (5) documents, old clothes with blood stains. Company A returned to FSB BURT. At 0751 hours, Company B departed on sweep mission. At 1335 hours, Company B (XT478798) received approximately 25 rounds of M-16 sniper fire resulting in negative casualties. Found one (1) bunker with expended M-16 casings (4x6x3) with 2' OHC, contained one (1) set VC web gear complete. At 1430 hours, Company B (XT474796) received M-16 sniper fire resulting in negative casualties. Company B returned to FSB BURT. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
p. 13 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT (XT500805) with negative contact as of 2400 hours.
q. 14 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT (XT599795) with negative contact as of 2400 hours.
r. 15 Jan - At 1000 hours, Company B found a VC base camp (XT488787) containing five (5) bunkers (6x8x5) with 2' OHC, eight hootches (7x9), one (1) kitchen (10x8x4), 1000 rounds of AK-47 ammo, eight bicycle frames, 6,325 pounds of rice, two (2) wells, one (1) table, cooking equipment, sleeping area for eight (8), one (1) gas mask and documents. At 1200 hours, Company B (XT488787) began receiving AK-47, RPG-2 fire and claymore fire. At 1250 hours, Company B shot one (1) VC out of a tree. At 1310 hours, Company B began receiving RPG-2 fire again (XT488787). Company B remained pinned down and at 1530 hours Company B 2-22 Infantry (M) arrived at XT488787 as reinforcements. At 1615 hours, Company B 3-22 Infantry (-) tripped a booby trap resulting in three (3) US WIA. Company B 3-22 Infantry suffered a total of 4KIA, 26 WIA, and lost one (1) M-16 rifle.
s. 16 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT and conducted local reconnaissance in force operations in that area. Negative contact as of 24 hours.
t. 17 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT and conducted local reconnaissance in force operations in that area. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
u. 18 Jan - At 1240 hours, Company A 15 XT488787 found twelve (12) bunkers (4x6x4) with 2' OHC, two (2) trenches, 100 meters long running north and south. At 1331 hours, Company A (XT488787) hit a booby trapped butterfly bomb resulting in 4 US WIA. At 1340 hours, Company A (XT488787) found and destroyed two (2) 60mm mortar rounds booby trapped. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
v. 19 Jan 3 - 22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT and conducted local reconnaissance in force operations. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
w. 20 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT (XT500805) with negative contact as of 2400 hours.
x. 21 Jan - At 0800 hours, Company D, 3-22 Infantry (-) and Company C, 2-12 Infantry (OPCON to 3-22 Infantry) departed FSB BURT for reconnaissance operations. Companies C and D at 0855 hours found seven (7) bunkers 3x8 with 1' OHC and 100 meters of trench line (XT489809). At 0920 hours Companies C and D found two (2) bunkers 2x6 with 1' OHC (XT486809).
y. 22 Jan - Company D, 3-22 Infantry (-) at 0800 hours began reconnaissance in force operations from FSB BURT, with negative contact as of 2400 hours.
z. 23 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) was airlifted by CH-47 from FSB BURT (XT500805) and returned to Dau Tieng Base Camp to conduct operations in the Michelin Plantation. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
aa. 24 Jan - At 0700 hours, Recon element departed Dau Tieng Base Camp as security for Tay Ninh convoy. At 0815 hours, Companies A and D departed Dau Tieng Base Camp to conduct civil operations at Ap 6 Dis and Xa Dinh Phouc. At 0938 hours, Companies A and D were at Ap 6 Dis. At 0950 hours, Company A suffered one (1) WIA as a result of a booby trap. At 1115 hours, Company A and D departed Ap 6 Dis en route to Xa Dinh Phouc. At 1445 hours, Company A (XT526485) found two (2) old spider holes 2x2x4 containing two (2) Chicom mortar round boxes. At 1503 hours, Recon element with convoy closed Dau Tieng Base Camp. At 1545 hours, Company D closed Xa Dinh Phouc. At 1635 hours, Company D detained one (1) VC suspect (XT534482) who had two (2) 60mm mortar rounds, one (1) M-79 round, and three (3) M-1 magazines. Companies A and D closed Dau Tieng Base Camp by 1800 hours. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.
bb. 25 Jan - At 0700 hours, Recon element departed Dau Tieng Base Camp as security for Tay Ninh convoy. At 0815 hours, Companies B and D departed Dau Tieng Base Camp for local reconnaissance in force operations in the Michelin Plantation. At 1335 hours, Company B (XT543466) received 4-8 rounds of AK-47 fire, negative casualties. At 1455 hours, Recon element with convoy closed Dau Tieng Base Camp. At 1610 hours, Companies B and D closed Dau Tieng Base Camp. Negative further contact as of 2400 hours.
12. (C) RESULTS:
a. US Losses: Personnel: 22 KIA, 98 WIA, 2 WIA (NHA).
b. Enemy Losses:
(1) Personnel: 175 KIA, 6 POW, 9 Detainees.
(2) Enemy Equipment Captured and Evacuated:
ORDNANCE OFFICE SUPPLIES
1 9MM Pistol 3 lbs Documents
14 AK-47 MISCELLANEOUS
6 Light Machine Guns 4 AK-47 Magazines
1 RPG-7 Launcher 1 M-1 Magazine
CLOTHING 1 Pr Pliers
1 US Compass
13 Pistol Belts 2 Pr Field Glasses
4 OD Uniforms
7 (US) Ponchos
12 (US) Canteens
1 VC Canteen
20 VC Soft Caps
1 VC Web Gear
2 VC Protective Masks
(3) Enemy Equipment Captured and Destroyed:
184 Bunkers 1 Bicycle
300 Meters Trench 8 Bicycle Frames
3 Spider Holes 2 Ox Carts
16 AT Mines 1 Plastic Rope
6 Chicom Grenades 50 meters Commo Wire
4 105mm Rounds
54 RPG Rounds
12 MG Drums of Ammo
30 AK-47 Magazines w/ammo
1 81mm Mortar Round
3 82mm Mortar Rounds
3 155 mm Rounds
163 60mm Mortar Rounds
31 Cases TNT
25 Cases C4
13,650 AK-47 Rounds
3 Cases Blasting Caps
24 Trip Flares
13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:
a. Personnel: During the operation, the Battalion S-1 Section operated from Dau Tieng with reports being forwarded from the forward location.
(1) Maintenance of Unit Strength: Average daily strength for the twenty eight (28) day period (29 December 1967-25 January 1968) were:
ORGANIZATION REAR AREA FORWARD AREA
HHC 200 111
Co A 34 100
Co B 33 103
Co C 42 103
Co D 40 109
BATTALION TOTAL 349 526
(2) Development and Maintenance of Morale.
(a) Throughout the duration of this operation, the Battalion “Regulars Club” was able to provide an adequate supply of cold refreshments. This was accomplished by aerial resupply whenever the situation permitted. There were very few occasions during the period that free beer and soda could not be supplied from the rear area.
(b) Incoming mail was transported daily from Dau Tieng Base Camp to the forward area by air, during resupply. Outgoing mail was transported daily from the forward area during extraction.
(c) Catholic and Protestant religious services were conducted in the forward area by 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Chaplains.
b. Supply: The logistical support for this operation was two-fold. Class II and IV came from Dau Tieng, Class I and III came from Katum, with all resupply conducted by helicopter CH-47.
The principal “Supporting Agencies” for the sources of resupply and services are as follows:
(1) Battalion S-4, Dau Tieng
(2) Support Battalion (Prov) Dau Tieng and Battalion S-4 (FWD), Katum.
(a) Company A, 25th S & T Battalion
(b) Company B, 725th Maintenance Battalion
(c) 125th Signal Company
(3) 226th Service and Supply Battalion, Tay Ninh
(4) Company C, 588th Engineer Battalion, Dau Tieng
(5) Company D, 6th Engineer Battalion, Dau Tieng
c. Maintenance: Maintenance and Maintenance Support Services proved adequate throughout the operation.
d. Status of Each Class of Supply:
(1) Class I QUANTITY
Combat Rations 23,505
“A” Rations 18,345
Sundry Packs 120
Ice 12,000 lbs
(2) Class II
Trouser, Jungle 150
Shirt, Jungle 150
Poncho Liners 200
Helmet, Steel 15
Air Mattress 70
Boots, Protective, Jungle 60
Socks 150 pr
Host Tablets 1,500 bars
Paper Plates 20,000
Knifes, Forks & Spoons 80,000
Cups, Paper 20,000
Batteries BA-30 170
Batteries BA-386 254
Batteries BA-200 12
Batteries BA-1100/U 30
Batteries BA-42 40
Batteries BA-28 40
Insect Repellant 1,000 bottles
Foot Powder 4 cases
Cleaning Patches 10 cases
Sand Bags 50,000
(3) Class III
Oil OP 40% 10 cases
LSA, Lub oil, 4 oz tube 8 cases
Diesel 2,683 gal
Mogas 2,247 gal
Oil 220 gal
(4) Class V
50 cal. 3,700
81 L11 45
81mm HE 1,512
90mm C 10
4.2 HE 3,453
Frag Grenade 1,565
LAW M-72 73
Trip Flares 144
Total Vehicle Mileage 37,605
c. Combat Losses:
Pistol Cal. 45 1
Rifle 5.56mm 7
Plotting Board 1
Receiver, AN/PRT-9 1
Transmitter, AN/PRT-4 1
Wrist Watch (illegible) 2
Alarm Set Anti-Intrusion 1
Binoculars 6x30 2
Launcher Grenade M-79 1
Bayonet M7 18
Radio Set AN/PRC-25 2
Mask, Protective M17 20
Surgical Instrument Set 2
(1) The proximity of the Battalion to Dau Tieng Base Camp did not permit the use of direct radio communications without the use of a retrans station, located at Nui Ba Den.
(2) Land line communications were established to FSB BURT and were highly effective; however, there were occasional breaks caused by APCs crossing the lines. This problem was solved by either burying the cable or rerouting the lines around problem areas.
(3) In general, communications were excellent. Terrain occasionally interfered with radio transmission; however, long antennas nearly always eliminated the problem.
(a) Maximum personnel utilized by Battalion Commo Section at any one time during all phases:
1 1 Communications Officer
2 4 Wiremen
3 3 Radio Operators
4 3 Radio Chiefs
5 3 Radio Mechanics
6 5 Switchboard Operators
7 1 Generator Operator
(b) Equipment used during all phases of operation:
1 3 292 Antennas
2 6 TA312 Telephones
3 (illegible) miles wire WD-1TT
4 (illegible) radio equipment
5 1 ¼ ton vehicle
6 1 Switchboard SB22
7 2 TA-1 Telephones
8 1 10KW Generator
9 2 Lighting Sets
(1) The medical operation continued its three phase concept which consists of primary care by line medic at company level, referral to senior medic with command group and, finally, evacuation to Dau Tieng for more extensive care.
(2) In addition, an underground aid station staffed by two medical specialists and Battalion Surgeon was established at FSB BURT after the Battalion returned to that location on 7 January 1968.
(3) No medical problems were encountered during this operation.
14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUE: None
15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:
a Comments: None
b. Lessons Learned:
(1) The well built bunker, using a deep foxhole with heavy overhead cover contributed to the ability of the positions to withstand mortar rounds, RPG hits and S/A fire.
(2) LPs proved to be a valuable asset in the detection of VC movement and activity. Likewise, the AP could be utilized as a RECON element along with the ability to engage small enemy forces, thus disrupting much of the VC's plans and activities.
(3) The use of Pena Prime helped to reduce the dust problem on LZ's. It proved of great value in landing, unloading and boarding of helicopters.
(4) Employing the 105mm (canister) in conjunction with the “Clock System” thus allowing the battery free traverse movement and being able to full cover the perimeter was of great help. This allowed personnel time to construct defensive positions who otherwise would have been used to man the perimeter.
16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: None
FOR THE COMMANDER:
/s/Gerald T. Brown
GERALD T. BROWN
Incl 7 CPT, INF
(Incl 1 to Incl 5)
(Incl II to Incl 5)
(Incl III to Incl 5)
(Incl IV to Incl 5)
(Incl V to Invl 5)
(Incl VI to Incl 5)
(Incl VIII to Incl 5)
3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry
AVOC-BC 20 Mar 68
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
TO: See Distribution:
1. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation YELLOWSTONE
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 7 December 1967 thru 24 February 1968
3. LOCATION: War Zone “C”
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry (-)
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Christopher B. Sinclair, LTC, Commanding
6. TASK ORGANIZATION
A Trp, MAJ Nathan M. Pulliam, Commanding, 7 December 1967 thru 24 February 1968
B Trp, MAJ Wayne T. Shehorn, Commanding
C Trp, MAJ Gary E. Luck, Commanding, 16 December thru 24 February 1968
D Trp, CPT Russell W. Mangal, Commanding
7. SUPPORTING FORCES: None
a. Prior to Operation, War Zone “C” is a historical enemy stronghold, it was known to have extensive base camps and large caches of ammunition, weapons and food. Recent intelligence strongly indicated that COSVN headquarters, the combat elements in direct support of COSVN and at least one VC division were located in War Zone “C”.
b. Terrain and Weather.
(1) General: The area of operation was bounded by the Cambodian border on the north, route TL22 on the west, the east/west grid XT63 on the south and the Saigon River on the east. The AO encompassed the entirety of War Zone C.
(2) Terrain: The area is flat to gently rolling, with two prominent features. Nui Ba Den and the hill mass Hui Tha La and Nui Ong. The terrain slopes from north to south, creating north/south patterns of movement, parallel to the stream flow. Aerial observation is very good in the open southern third of the area and poor in the crescent of jungle along the Cambodian boarder. Ground observation is poor due to dense vegetation. Fields of fire in most areas are restricted by the vegetation.
(3) Weather: The weather during Operation YELLOWSTONE was typical of the dry season. The average temperature was 88 degrees and there was only one day of rain. In the morning hours, fog reduced the visibility, conditions improved at approximately 0930 and continued to improve throughout the day.
c. Intelligence During the Operation.
The area of operation contained important enemy base areas for logistical and command operations as well as a protected and concealed commo liaison and supply corridor between War Zone “C” and Cambodia. Enemy units identified in the AO were 271st VC Regiment, 272nd VC Regiment and 141st VC Regiment. The 1st Guard Battalion was also identified. During Operation YELLOWSTONE, numerous bunker complexes were discovered which could have supported the above units.
9. MISSION: Conduct operations in assigned areas in War Zone “C” with two air cavalry troops and one ground cavalry troop to find and fix the enemy; be prepared to secure route 4 from Tay Ninh to Katum; secure fire Support Base Soui Da from enemy attack; secure downed aircraft and dropped loads anywhere in the area of operations.
10. Concept of Operation:
Maneuver - Operation will be conducted in two phases:
Phase I: Movement to Soui Da
Phase II: 3-17th Cav will conduct recon in force with two air cavalry troops in assigned zones. Trp D provides base camp security. Squadron will be prepared to assist 1st Bde. 25th Inf Div in assigned AO to find and fix known enemy units. Maximum effort in initial phases. Limited night recon will be conducted.
a. Movement. On 7 December 1967, the squadron (minus C Trp) moved by organic ground and air vehicles from Di An to FSB Soui Da (XT340583). The Squadron Field Trains remained in Di An while the Combat Trains moved forward and co-located with the Squadron Command Post at FSB Soui Da. The move was completed by 071800H December 1967.
b. 8 December 1967 thru 16 December 1967.
Operations during this period were characterized by a day and night program of armed visual reconnaissance with frequent insertions of the aerorifle platoons. D Trp conducted reconnaissance in force operations within AO Soui Da and convoy escort between Tay Ninh and Soui Da. As enemy mortar attacks increased in the vicinity of the FSB at Katum, the squadron was tasked to perform night counter-mortar security for the FSB. This mission was hampered by the lack of a secure landing area at or near the FSB. The squadron was forced to conduct the mission based out of FSB Soui Da, which increased the reaction time by 15 minutes and reduced station time to 1 hour. Armed reconnaissance missions produced a constantly growing picture of the enemy situation. It soon became evident that the initial intelligence estimate was correct. Sightings of previously unlocated base camps were reported daily. As each sub-area was searched in detail, large bunker complexes were located along every large stream in the jungle area. Enemy lines of communication interlacing the fortified base camps were found and plotted, while many of the base camps were vacant and showed no signs of recent use. A large percentage proved to be occupied and the aeroscouts were drawing automatic weapons fire on every mission. During these initial stages of the operation, the squadron was averaging one aircraft hit per day. Upon locating an occupied base area, all available fires were brought to bear on the target. Aeroweapons immediately engaged the target, followed by TAC air and artillery adjusted by the aeroscouts. As a composite picture of the enemy location became clear, B-52 strikes were programmed on the larger concentrations. The squadron was soon requesting a B-52 strike a day with devastating results on the enemy. At 0445 hours on 14 December 1967, following nightly probes and harassing fire, FSB Soui Da was attacked with small arms and RPG rockets. This resulted in 2 US WIA, two aircraft damaged and one destroyed. Fire was returned immediately and a sweep at first light revealed 1 VC KIA, 2 RPG rockets and 1 RPG launcher captured. Operations continued as normal with no reduction in combat effectiveness as a result of the attack. On 15 December 1967, while suppressing a mortar attack on the FSB at Katum, a B Trp UH1C was downed by enemy fire. The aircraft crashed in the jungle amid 60 to 100 ft trees. An OH6A of B Trp attempted to pick up the crew but was unable to make a safe approach to the area. A second OH6A with a lighter fuel and ammunition load succeeded in reaching the downed gunships. While extracting two crewmembers, the OH6A was also downed by enemy fire. The surviving crewmembers formed a perimeter of defense and with the support of aeroweapons ships were able to hold off the enemy until a friendly ground force reached them and extracted them. US losses were 2 KIA. The following morning, B Trp aeroscouts and aeroweapons escorted elements of the 2nd Bn, 14th Inf into the area to secure the aircraft for extraction. The scouts, preceding the infantry, counted 50 VC bodies. On 16 December 1967, C Trp, which had been OPCON to the 199th LIB, reverted to squadron control and A Trp was released to the OPCON of the 199th LIB. This changeover was conducted while continuing to accomplish both assigned missions.
c. 17 December 1967. C Trp aerorifles were inserted at Xt577357 to perform a Bomb Damage Assessment following a B-52 strike. During the reconnaissance, enemy contact was made resulting in 1 NVA POW, 3 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47 and two 9mm pistols captured. Assorted medical supplies and web gear were also evacuated. Interrogation of the POW revealed that he was a member of a previously unidentified battalion which had just entered South Vietnam and had not yet been committed. Based on this and other intelligence, the 25th Inf Div initiated operation CAMDEN with one Brigade.
d. 18 December 1967 thru 1 January 1968. The squadron continued its primary mission of armed visual reconnaissance; however, several major modifications were made in both the mission assignment and the squadron's mode of operation. It was realized that portions of the initial mission were detrimental to the overall effectivness of the squadron; for example, in order to secure downed aircraft and dropped loads, it is necessary to provide continuous aerial coverage and, in most cases, insert an aerorifle platoon for ground security. To accomplish the mission, the squadron is required to divert at least one air cavalry troop from their primary mission of reconnaissance, thus greatly reducing the effectiveness of the squadron in its primary role. In some cases, when dropped loads were in isolated areas, an air cavalry troop would be diverted for a day at a time. When this was fully realized, the 25th Inf Div released the squadron from that portion of the original mission statement. At that time, it was also realized that the areas of operation assigned the squadron were too restrictive and that the squadron's capabilities were not being taken advantage of. It was decided that, rather than assign areas of operation, the squadron should have a free reign throughout the division TAOR. This was accomplished by placing a liaison team with each brigade command post to coordinate activities within the brigade's area of responsibility. This close coordination allowed a more rapid dissemination of information and the brigades were able to react directly to information collected by the aeroscouts. Within a short time, joint operations with aeroscouts and aerorifle elements leading the infantry units into previously located enemy areas and with aeroweapons supporting became commonplace. As the units became accustomed to working together and the ground elements gained confidence in the credibility of the intelligence furnished by the aeroscouts and the accuracy of the fires of the aeroweapons, a smooth and efficient team came into existence. This greatly increased morale as well as the efficiency of both elements. The air cavalry elements became more enthused as they saw tangible results being produced from the reconnaissance they had performed. For the ground elements, prior knowledge of what to expect and pinpoint location of the enemy lead to a number of successes. Large caches were located and either destroyed or evacuated. The enemy will not be capable of restocking the rice, weapons and ammunition lost in those sweeps for a considerable length of time.
e. 1 January 1968 thru 6 January 1968. At 2400 hrs 1 January 1968, the
enemy broke the New Years truce by a multi-regimental attack on FSB Burt, XT499800. Aeroweapons teams were immediately dispatched to help relieve the besieged infantry and artillery. As the ammunition supply of the defenders grew short, it was decided that an aerial re-supply and reinforcement must be attempted. To accomplish this, the 25th Inf Div pooled the lift assets of the 25th Avn Bde, D Trp of 3/4 Cav and B & C Trps of the 3/17th Cav under the command of the C Trp Commander. The provisional airlift company moved to the FSB at Katum to await further missions. An aerial re-supply of FSB Burt was accomplished and the provisional company was released to the parent units upon arrival of elements of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. B & D Trp continued saturation reconnaissance of the area surrounding FSB Burt. Movement was detected along two main routes of withdrawal and fire was brought to bear on the retreating enemy. The scouts and weapons continued to engage the enemy until darkness afforded him a means of escape. At the end of the day, the squadron had accounted for 26 VC KIA (BC). Since most of the engagement was in dense jungle, it is reasonable to assume that the actual number was many times the body count. At 022058 Jan 68, the enemy began a mortar attack on FSB Soui Da, a total of 11 rounds fell with no friendly losses. At dawn 3 Jan 68, the aeroscouts picked up the trail of the retreating VC and continued the actions of the preceding day. The northern escape route was traced to a regimental base camp complex in a dense jungle, vic XT556910, XT561910, XT555905 and XT561905. Apparently, the VC had thought this area safe from detection and had planned to regroup and re-supply there. Numerous air strikes were directed into the base camps throughout the day. The artillery provided continuous fires between air strikes and throughout the night. Resuming operations at first light on 4 Jan 68, a definite pattern of movement north towards Cambodia was detected. Automatic weapons fire directed at the aeroscouts continued to be heavy as in the past three days. Here again, the pattern was definitely shifting north. On the 5th of January, groups of VC were detected moving north on the trails, carrying wounded. A group of 11 VC were caught in the open at XT542902 and killed by aeroweapons elements. One of the 11 was a messenger carrying a pouch of documents. A platoon from the 4th Bn, 9th Inf was inserted to recover the pouch but came under heavy automatic weapons fire. The aeroweapons covered the extraction of the platoon. It was certain by this time that the remnants of the attacking force were fleeing north and into Cambodia. Aeroweapons ships at high altitude were able to detect 3 battalion sized base camps and numerous smaller camps inside Cambodia in the “Fish Hook” area. One of these camps overlapped the border and a B-52 strike was placed at XT535907. A ground insertion at Xt533901 was attempted to follow up the strike but the enemy had not been weakened enough to allow the exploitation to be successful. The aerorifles were pinned down by automatic weapons fire from bunkers surrounding the landing zone. The lift returned and, under the cover of the aeroweapons platoon, successfully extracted the aerorifles. The coordination of fires and teamwork enabled the aerorifles to be extracted with minimum friendly losses. One UH1N was destroyed by ground fire; however, the crew suffered only minor injuries.
f. 7 January 1968. The squadron was ordered to close out FSB Soui Da and establish a new base at Tay Ninh. While the distance to move was short, the move was to be conducted without a break in mission or a reduction in combat effectiveness. The squadron combat trains moved in two phases. The second element maintained full operational capabilities while the first displaced. The entire operation went smoothly and the support of the combat elements continued.
g. 8 January 1968 thru 30 January 1968. The squadron continued to operate in the manner described in para d. With the release from the mission of securing FSB Soui Da, more of the combat power of the squadron became available. D Trp was able to conduct more extensive operations and began to conduct troop sized reconnaissance in force daily. C Trp, in coordination with the 3rd Bde, inserted the aerorifle platoon on a daily basis. The aerorifles would be inserted in blocking positions for the 2nd Bn, 22nd Mech. After the units converged, the aerorifles would act as a point element leading the ground force into known enemy bases under the direction of the aeroscouts. On 24 January, D Trp was released to the operational control of the 1st Bde and OPCON was further delegated to the 1st Bn, 5th Mech.
h. 31 January 1968 thru 24 February 1968. The squadron was diverted from Operation YELLOWSTONE to Operation SARATOGA.
Officers 0 3
Warrant Officers 1 8
Enlisted Men 5 40
(1) VC/NVA (BC) - 209
(2) VC/NVA KIA (POSS) - 192
(3) Detainees - 36
(4) Military Structures Destroyed - 464
(5) Military Structures Damaged - 88
(6) Sampans Destroyed - 61
(7) Sampans Damaged - 13
(8) Rice Destroyed - 4,889 lbs
(9) Individual Weapons Captured - 15
(10) Crew Served Weapons Captured - 5
1 Chicom Claymore captured
5 Chicom Claymores destroyed
2 Enemy 2-1/2 Ton Trucks destroyed
2 VC elephants destroyed
13. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES:
(1) Class I. Daily average strength supplied from ration breakdown was 500 persons. No problems were encountered.
(2) Class II. Critical TOE shortages of communication equipment have not been solved. Antennas for radio AN/ARC-102 are still short (10 ea), also 4 ea AN/VRC - 24 radios and 4 ea AU/PRC - 41 radios. The three items mentioned above are essential for extending communication capabilities of squadron aircraft and would increase the mission capability considerably.
(3) Class III. Support was outstanding throughout the operational area.
(4) Class IV. Support of the squadron at FSB Soui Da was outstanding.
(5) Class V. The following is the daily average expenditure and should be used as a planning figure in the future.
WEAPON DENSITY DAILY AVERAGE
M79 Grenade Launcher 215 49
M5 40mm Grenade Launcher 12 387
2.75 Rocket Systems 38 217
7.62 All Types 112 26,230
Smoke Grenades -- 50
Mortar 81mm 3 19
Initially, the troop and squadron maintenance platoons were located with the squadron combat trains at FSB Soui Da. It was decided early in the operation that this was an unsatisfactory location. At least 50% of the aircraft maintenance must be performed at night. Utilization of the aircraft maintenance lighting sets in a forward combat base is impossible due to light discipline. It was decided that the maintenance platoons should be based in a more secure area. On 10 December 1967, the platoons moved to and established a maintenance facility at Tay Ninh.
c. Treatment of Casualties:
During Operation YELLOWSTONE, all serious casualties were evacuated directly to the nearest suitable hospital. The success of this method is borne out by the fact this squadron has not had one casualty die of wounds subsequent to evacuation.
14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:
The need for an organic aircraft mounted night-lighting device was realized during the operation. The Squadron's ability to perform its mission at night is limited at this time. The addition of an infrared device would increase the squadron's ability to interdict enemy movement and to provide close fire support during the hours of darkness. The squadron obtained a Xenon searchlight to accomplish this; however, the necessary controls are not available in country.
15. COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS:
a. ITEM: Initial General Reconnaissance
DISCUSSION: The enemy's means of travel in the jungle is by trails. Since all troop movements and re-supply take place on these trails, it is impossible to camouflage them completely.
OBSERVATION: When operating in an area for the first time, a general high recon should be made of the area to determine the trail pattern, direction of trails and trail terminal points. This initial survey, when properly analyzed, will provide an excellent base of information on which plans for detailed reconnaissance can be formulated.
b. ITEM: Aeroweapons Supporting Ground Units
DISCUSSION: Many times, ground commanders were guilty of faulty marking of friendly positions or giving confusing directions on the locations of enemy positions.
OBSERVATION: Due to faulty marking of friendly locations and confusing directions as to the location of the enemy, suppressive fire has been placed dangerously close to friendly ground units. Ground commanders at all levels should be thoroughly familiar with the proper procedures of marking friendly locations. It is equally important to stress the need for clear, concise instructions as to the location of enemy elements.
c. ITEM: Use of Mirrors
DISCUSSION: Several operations have been conducted supporting small units. In almost every instance, it has been necessary for the ground unit to positively identify its location.
OBSERVATION: Although smoke is an excellent means of marking the position, it reveals the location to the enemy on the ground as well as the friendly aircraft. A few flashes from a signal mirror have proven equally effective, without revealing the friendly positions. Panel markers have also been used effectively.
d. ITEM: Aeroscouts Conducting Trail Reconnaissance
DISCUSSION: Aeroscouts have conducted extensive trail reconnaissance during Operation YELLOWSTONE.
OBSERVATION: It has been found that using slow air speed allows the enemy ample time to find concealment and, at a rapid speed, it is impossible to detect enemy personnel on the trail. By flying at 60 knots and criss-crossing the trail, the scouts are able to detect enemy personnel and are relatively safe from ground fire.
e. ITEM: Aeroscouts Screening for Ground Units
DISCUSSION: After contact has been made by a ground unit, the enemy increases his efforts to shoot down scout aircraft.
OBSERVATION: Once contact has been made, scouts should move to the flanks of the friendly unit and work to contain the enemy or canalize him by using artillery and air assets.
f. ITEM: Baby Sitting
DISCUSSION: Air to ground communication with aeroscouts is very poor due to their constant use of “Nap of the Earth” flying techniques.
OBSERVATION: This problem has been solved by teaming an aeroweapons ship with the aeroscout, extending his communications range as well as providing the scout with heavy weapons protection. This method, called “Baby Sitting” by the aeroweapons, has increased the efficiency of the aeroscouts by assuring them immediate support if downed by ground fire.
WILLIAM W. BRANNON Jr
25 cy 25th Inf Div
2 cy 12th CAG
2 cy II FFV
1 per Staff Sect
1 cy ea Troop
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3RD BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268
AVDCTB-C 9 January 1968
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: ACOFS, G3
1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: Battle of Suoi Cut - Operation YELLOWSTONE, conducted by 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 012230 Jan 68 to 020500 Jan 68.
3. (U) LOCATION: FSB BURT (XT500 805).
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. (U) COMMANDERS:
3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div - COL Leonard R Daems, Jr
2nd Bn, 22 Inf (M) - LTC Awbrey G Norris
3rd Bn, 22 Inf - LTC Thomas Harrold
2nd Bn, 77th Arty - LTC William L Albright
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
2-22 Inf (M) Bde Control
3 Tms 44th IPSD 2/77th Arty (DS)
1 Plt D/65 Engr (DS) 6/65th Engr (DS)
A, C, & D Btry, 3/13 Arty (GSR)
2-77 Arty 3rd Plt, 25th MP (SPT)
Btry A & C DISCOM Fwd Comd (SPT)
Fwd Spt Sec S&T (SPT)
3-22 Inf (-1 Co) B/25 Med Bn (SPT)
3 Tms 44th IPSD D/725 Maint Bn (SPT)
1 Plt D/65 Engr Sec QM GRRC Plt (SPT)
7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:
(1) Preplanned and on call direct and indirect artillery fires were used during the operation to cover enemy routes of advance and withdrawal. Artillery was always available and was considered extremely effective and timely. The use of direct fire artillery, 105mm HE and beehive and 155mm HE, proved to be particularly effective in holding enemy assaults at the FSB perimeter. Artillery fire was initially used during the early stages of the attack, primarily in a counter-mortar role. Preplanned counter-mortar targets were attacked by all firing batteries located at FSB BURT and FSB BEAUREGARD. As the attack progressed and listening posts and ambush patrols located outside the perimeter reported contact with enemy forces, calls for indirect fire were received and delivered by the Artillery. As it became evident that a full scale enemy attack was in progress, numerous calls for fire were received. Adjust fire and preplanned defensive concentrations were fired. At one point, the battery fire direction center of Battery C, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty reported handling 8 missions simultaneously. Perhaps the most effective use of artillery was made in a direct fire role. As the perimeter reported heavy contact, the artillery men leveled their tubes and, after coordination with Infantry elements, began delivering HE direct fire into locations just forward of the perimeter. A large volume of direct fire was delivered around the entire perimeter during the battle. Highly instrumental in stopping the enemy forces attempting to breach the perimeter was the use of the APERS (Beehive) round. This fire was delivered to the northeast, southeast and southwest portions of the perimeter. Particular volume was concentrated to the southeast and south down the road where large masses of enemy forces were attempting to penetrate. During the middle and latter stages of the attack, effective use was made of blocking fires to the west by batteries from FSB BEAUREGARD. These fires served a two-fold purpose in preventing not reinforcements but withdrawal in that direction. As the enemy began withdrawing to the south, fires were placed along and just off the road in an interdiction role.
(2) Position Occupied: FSB BURT (XT500 805).
(3) Statistical Data:
(a) Artillery Ammunition Expended:
A/2/77 A/2/77 A3/13 C/3/13 D/3/13
1 HE 936 1000 413 171 218
2 BH 13 45 - - -
3 PD 824 900 98 171 218
4 MTSQ 112 50 - - -
5 VT - 50 - - -
1 HE 630 325 - - -
2 BH 10 50 - - -
3 PD 200 885 - - -
4 GB - - 574 - -
5 WB - - 100 - -
(1) Extensive use was made of tactical air immediate strike missions, with the normal air request channels being used for all missions flown. Air strikes were employed in assembly areas and on heavy enemy attacking troop concentrations to within 150 meters of the FSB perimeter, utilizing all ordnance. It is considered that napalm and CBU's were particularly effective in breaking the attack formations of the massed enemy. Spooky was utilized to provide illumination for the air strikes and fire support during lulls between air strikes. It is considered that Tac Air provided the overwhelming fire superiority that eventually broke the enemy attack.
(2) Statistical Data:
1 Immediate missions requested: 32
2 Immediate missions flown: 32
3 Results of Tactical Air: It is not possible to determine precise damage done to the enemy by air strikes due to the fact that the battle was fought in darkness and extensive use of all available weapons made exact determination of the cause of death of recovered enemy bodies difficult. Though the enemy attack was halted by ground forces at the perimeter, Tac Air appears to be responsible for breaking the attack. Though it is impossible to determine when fire parity was attained - superiority was gained by use of Tac Air.
c. Army Aviation:
(1) Extensive use was made of Army gunships. Prior to employment of Tac Air, gunships provided close-in direct fire support to the perimeter. Subsequent to Tac Air initiation, Army Air was utilized to provide interdictory fires on escape routes and direct fires on suspected enemy reinforcements moving toward the FSB from the north. An Army Air flareship was used to great advantage during periods when Spooky was not available. Additionally, gunships were utilized to escort resupply aircraft; their suppressive fires were absolutely necessary as the FSB was ringed with enemy anti-aircraft automatic weapons.
(2) Emergency ammunition resupply began at 020330 Jan 68 utilizing 5 Spartans (189th AHC) from Bien Hoa with ammunition for 2/22 Inf and 3/22 Inf.
(3) Five Spartans (189th AHC), Black Widows (188th AHC) and Little Bear (A/25th Avn) resupplied the artillery out of Katum.
(4) Following Army Aviation units participated in the battle:
(a) UH-1D: 189 AHC (Spartans), 188th AHC (Black Widows) and A/25th Avn (Little Bear).
(b) General Support: C/3/17 Air Cavalry, 188th AHC (Black Widows), 187th AHC (Rat Pack), 189th AHC (Spartans), 25th Avn (Little Bears) and flare ship (Wildcat).
(c) Ammunition was resupplied as follows:
From Dau Tieng From Katum
M-79 3374 1008
4.2 250 360
81mm 350 360
.50 cal 18000 40000
5.56 89600 65000
7.62 30400 13440
8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:
a. Information concerning the Suoi Cut area for Operation Yellowstone (Continued) was obtained from 25th Division G-2 sources, 11 Field Force PERINTREP, visual reconnaissance missions and long range reconnaissance patrols.
(1) Northeastern War Zone “C” was being used by VC main force units as a safe haven due to the absence of friendly large scale operations in that area since the battle of Soui Tre in March 1967.
(2) Routes 244 and 246 were being used as main supply routes in northeastern War Zone “C” and into central Binh Long province.
(3) Units located in the area of Suoi Cut were believed to be two battalions of the 141st NVA Regiment with the possibility of a third battalion unlocated in the area. Contact with these elements by the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry US Division on 16 and 20 December in the vicinity of Katum and Bo Tuc confirmed the presence of this unit. In addition, elements of the 271st VC Regiment were also believed to be located in the vicinity of XT3976.
b. Enemy Activity:
(1) During the month of December, enemy activity took the form of counter-sweep activities against elements of the 1st Brigade, 25th US Infantry Division in the vicinity of Katum and Bo Tuc. In addition, friendly base camps in that area received mortar attacks almost nightly.
(2) The cessation of friendly H and I firing during the New Year's truce brought about increased enemy activity in the vicinity of Suoi Cut and from this activity evolved the heavy mortar and ground attack on FSB Burt (XT 500 807). It is quite obvious that the enemy planned to use the cease fire to move his troops safely to within striking range of the FSB.
(3) Readouts of captured enemy documents and interrogation of PW's indicate that the entire 271st VC Regiment and the 5th and 6th Battalions, 272nd VC Regiment were employed in this attack.
(4) The attack of FSB Burt took the form of what appeared to be harassing mortar fire into the FSB during early evening hours. As the evening progressed, ambush patrols began observing increasing movement at various points completely encircling the perimeter of the FSB. At approximately 2100-2200 hours, ambush patrols began receiving “probing attacks” which developed into heavy contact by small enemy elements. At approximately 2230 hours, mortar rounds (both 60mm and 82mm) and RPG rounds began “raining” into the FSB from a number of enemy mortar sites and RPG positions around the periphery. The mortar attack was followed immediately by a ground attack of small arms, automatic weapons, grenades and rifle grenades completely encompassing the base. The brunt of the attack was placed first in the southeast sector while a secondary attack was directed at the northwest and northeast sectors. The attack from the southeast shifted to the south and then back to the southeast. The attacks continued throughout the night, terminating at approximately 020500H. At this time, the enemy began withdrawing to the south and southeast and to the northeast.
9. (C) MISSION: 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division moves to northern War Zone “C” and conducts offensive operations to destroy VC/NVA forces & installations, opens land lines of communications for friendly forces and interdicts VC/NVA lines of communications.
10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division defended FSB Burt with one Infantry and one Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Positions were dug in and listening posts were established by each line platoon. Ambush patrols and listening posts were established by each line company. Two batteries of 105mm and one battery of 155mm howitzers supported the defense utilizing indirect fires and fully integrating direct fires. (References: OPORD 40-67, HQ, 30 Bde, 25th Inf Div, with changes 1 and 2 dated 26 Dec 67; FRAGO 1-67 to OPORD 60-67, dated 27 Dec 67.)
11. (C) EXECUTION (Chronological Summary)
a. 01184Jan 68: An ambush patrol made contact with an unknown sized VC force 200 meters east of the perimeter.
b. 012010H Jan 68: Movement noted around the perimeter with light enemy probing or patrolling actions directed toward the perimeter. (illegible) mortar attacks directed toward the FSB.
c. 012330H Jan 68: FSB Burt (XT 500 805) came under heavy mortar attack followed by RPG, SA and AW fire mostly from the southeast and northwest, although all sectors of the perimeter were subjected to all types of fire. A light fire team, FAC and Tac Air, in addition to Spooky and Arty were called for and employed as they became available. All of the six ambush patrols became engaged to varying degrees.
d. 012400H Jan 68: Mortar and RPG fires slackened and ground attacks were launched against the perimeter from all directions with secondary attacks coming from the northwest and northeast. The main VC effort came from the southwest and shifted to the southeast.
e. 020100H Jan 68: VC elements had succeeded in reaching bunker line positions in the south (C/2-22 Inf (M) ) and southeast (C/3-22 Inf). Beehive artillery rounds were employed along with direct fire artillery and gun and flare ships. Local battalion reserves were committed to secure the perimeter. An additional reserve of two provisional infantry squads was reconstituted from Headquarters elements of the 2-22 Inf and committed in support of the 3-22 Inf in the southeast.
f. 020145H Jan 68: VC fire and contact slackened.
g. 020200H Jan 68: VC fires increased and all areas were engaged. Weight of attack was to the south (C/2-22 Inf (M) ) and southeast (C/3-22 Inf). Once again, beehive and direct fire artillery was employed along with ground and flare ships. The south and southeast portions of the perimeter were under pressure of the heaviest attack.
h. 020248H Jan 68: Tac Air is employed in the south, allowing additional artillery to be placed in other areas of the perimeter. Army air support continues.
i. 020311H Jan 68: Fire and contact slackens and ceases except in the south and southeast where Tac Air is being employed.
j. 020327H Jan 68: All VC efforts are directed at the south and southeast portions of the perimeter with only sporadic fires directed to other portions of the FSB. Artillery direct and indirect fire, beehive, gun and flare ships and tactical air continues to be employed.
k. 020500H Jan 68: VC begin withdrawal to south and southeast and to the northeast, leaving delaying forces to screen their movement. All available fires continued to interdict withdrawal routes.
12. (C) RESULTS:
(a) US Losses:
(1) Personnel: 23KHA, 146 WHA.
(2) Equipment: 3 APC's, 1 40mm gun (SP) destroyed. 2 APC's moderate damage, 1 cal .45 pistol, 3 .50 cal machine guns, 9 M-60 machine guns, 14 M-16 rifles, 3 M-79 grenade launchers, 1 starlight scope, 1 sight 81mm mortar.
(b) VC Losses:
(1) Personnel: 379 KIA, 8 POW (WIA).
(2) Enemy equipment captured and evacuated: 75 AK-47 rifles, 11 Chicom LMG's, 1 cal .45 pistol; 12 RPG-7 launchers, 16 RPG-2 launchers, 2 TA-1 telephones and 5 lbs documents.
(3) Enemy equipment destroyed:
ORDNANCE MISCELLANEOUS CLOTHING
50 Chicom grenades 2 miles electrical wire 100 sets web gear
180 RPG rockets 72 canteens 12 pistol belts
2 rds 75mm recoilless 56 entrenching tools 7 ponchos
4000 rds AK-47 ammo
1000 LMG ammo
10 propellant charges
RPG 2 and 7
30 AK-47 magazines
13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:
a. Personnel: During the engagement, the Brigade S-T section operated from Camp Rainier with reports being forwarded from forward locations.
b. Supply: Notification to be prepared to effect emergency resupply of Class V from Katum to FSB Burt was received by the Brigade S-4 at approximately 020130H at Katum. It was determined that all aircraft would be controlled on the Brigade Admin and Logistics frequency. Units being resupplied were 2/22 Inf (M), 3/22 Inf and 2/77 Arty. Aircraft were controlled by the Brigade S-4 for resupply of 2/22 Inf and 3/22 Inf. Aircraft utilized by 2/77 Arty were controlled by S-4, 2/77 Arty sharing the same frequency.
c. Medical: Medical evacuation of wounded personnel from FSB Burt was accomplished initially by resupply aircraft and subsequently by dustoff crews stationed in Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh with backup coverage providing secondary evacuation by ships from Cu Chi and Long Binh. The primary routes of evacuation were: (1) D Company, 25th Medical Battalion located in Katum, (2) B company, 25th Medical Battalion in Dau Tieng, and (3) the 45th Surgical Hospital located in Tay Ninh. Secondary evacuation was accomplished to the 12th Evacuation Hospital, Cu Chi, the 24th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals in Long Binh, as well as emergency cases to the 45th Surgical Hospital.
14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None
15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: NVA forces encountered during this engagement appeared to be well disciplined and were very well equipped, including new weapons. The success of the defense is attributed to the determination of the individual soldier, superior infantry firepower, devastating artillery fire, beehive, direct & indirect fires, and decisive, overwhelming tactical air power. The ground defenses were deliberate and mutually supporting and, while still being fully developed, were adequate to meet the threat posed the night of 1-2 January 1968.
16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:
a. The integration of direct artillery fires in the defense of a FSB is a primary consideration. Planning of perimeter installations must include overhead and rear protection to permit its uninhibited employment.
b. Ambush patrols are vital to providing information as to enemy courses of action. AP's should be constituted in sufficient strength to protect themselves, but not so large as to be unable to take evasive action while continually reporting enemy information.
c. Tac Air can be used very effectively at night. A visible reference point is absolutely necessary in vectoring Tac Air onto precise target areas.
d. Spooky illumination is necessary for Tac Air; however, should be delayed until the last possible moment prior to employing Tac Air as it illuminates defensive installations to the advantage of the enemy. Once the Tac Air starts, the enemy's advantage provided by the illumination is negated by the fires from the aircraft.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
/S/Donald K. Weise
DONALD K. WEISE
OPORD 40-67 with changes 1 & 2 (Withdrawn, Hqs, DA)
Sketch of FSB BURT and enemy attacks
After Action Report, 2-22 Inf (M) (INCL 4)
After Action Report, 3-22 Inf (INCL 5)
5-CG, 25TH Inf Div
20-CO, 18th Mil His Det
(PAGE 1, PARAGRAPHS 1 THRU 8 MISSING)
9. (C) INTELLIGENCE: Intelligence received during Operation YELLOWSTONE proved to be timely and generally accurate. During much of this operation, the Bn CP was located close to the Bde CP, facilitating quick exchange of intelligence information. The Bn interpreters proved a great asset in initial interrogation of PWs and initial readout of captured documents. Greater use could have been made of STAR, RED HAZE, and PEOPLE SNIFFER missions to aid in detecting the buildup and movement of enemy forces.
10. (C) MISSION:
(1) 2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf moved to Northern War Zone “C” to conduct offensive operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, open land lines of communication for friendly forces and interdict VC/NVA trails and routes.
(2) From 1-24 February, 2-22 Inf (M) provided Base Camp Security for Camp Rainier, cleared Hwy 239 and 26 between Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng daily, then secured the convoy and conducted Reconnaissance In Force in areas adjacent to Camp Rainier.
11. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: On 27 Dec 67, 2-22 Inf (M) moved from Camp Ranier to Prek Klok, Katum and Bo Tuc, arriving and establishing, in conjunction with 3-22 Inf, Fire Support Base BURT on 31 Dec 67. Until 27 Jan 68, in conjunction with Fire support Base security, 2-22 Inf (M) conducted operations north to the Cambodian border and to the south a distance of about 10 km. On 28 Jan 68, 2-22 Inf (M) departed FSPB BURT en route to Camp Rainier, arriving at about 2230 hours, 31 Jan 68. From 1-24 Feb 68, 2-22 Inf (M) conducted Reconnaissance in Force from Camp Rainier while, at the same time, providing Base Camp Defense.
12. (C) CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY:
(1) 27 Dec 67: At 0048, all elements of the 2-22 Inf (m) had closed into Camp Rainier. At 0834, 2-22 Inf (M) began to move enroute to Prek Klok, XT275786, to initiate Operation YELLOWSTONE. At 1540, 2-22 Inf (M) became OPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. At 1540, 2-22 Inf (M) had closed into Prek Klok, where they laagered for the night.
(2) 28 Dec 67: At 1100, 2-22 Inf (M) departed Prek Klok, XT275786, enroute to Bo Tuc, vic XT3848353. At about 1700, 2-22 Inf (M) had closed into Bo Tuc and laagered there for the night. The entire move was made without incident. At 1940, Co B, at XT383658, reported movement on a 190 degree azimuth and placed it under fire.
(3) 29 Dec 67: At 0700, vic XT383858, a sweep was made by Co B, resulting in a find of one AK-47 and 2 VC KIA (BC). Approximately 0800, 2-22 Inf (M) departed for Bo Tuc enroute to FSP BURT. At 0834, Co C reported finding and destroying 3 bunkers at vic XT394853. At 0849, Co C located and destroyed six AT mines about 25 meters apart at XT401845. At 0940, vic XT421839, two more AT mines were found about 50 meters apart, and destroyed. At 0957, Co C located and destroyed another AT mine, vic XT410839. At 1155, Co C, vic XT442819, located and destroyed another AT mine, vic XT410839. At 1558, Co C located 9 AT mines 25-50 meters apart vic XT466819. Some of them had been recently planted and were pressure-release stick type. At 1830, vic XT99810, an APC from Co C hit an AT mine, resulting in moderate damage to the APC but no casualties. At 1853, Co A had an APC hit by an RPG vic XT484819. At the same time, the CP Op and Co A received incoming small arms and automatic weapons fire from both sides of the road. At 1900, the contact was broken. Results of the contact were 3 US WHA, 4 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC WIA, and 1 APC with minor damage. At 1955, Co A and the CP Op closed into FSPB BURT, XT498804. Co B and C/3-13 Arty laagered for the night at a separate location from the FSPB.
(4) 30 Dec 67: At 0622, about 10 rounds of 60mm mortars landed outside the southern portion of the FSPB BURT perimeter. There were no casualties. At 11 55, Co C linked up with 3-22 at XT482820. At 1223, an APC from Co B, vic XT478820, was hit by an RPG, causing moderate damage and 1 US WHA. At 1445, Co B and 3-22 closed into FSPB BURT. 2-22 continued to secure FSPB BURT. At 2100, FSPB BURT received approximately 30 60mm rounds, resulting in one US WHA and damage to 10 Claymore mines.
(5) 31 Dec 67: At 0300, Co C had movement to their front and took it under fire. A sweep at first light revealed 1 VC KIA (BC)), and one AK-47 rifle. At 1005, Co A found an old rusty .22 cal pistol, vic XT500790. At 1025, Co A, vic XT500789, found and destroyed five L-shaped bunkers. At 1202, Co C vic XT502798, located and destroyed a mortar site with two fuse walls and fresh soil, indicating they were recently used. AT 1237, Co C found and destroyed 6 foxholes, vic XT509706. At 1500, Co C, vic XT502793, found a bicycle and one dead VC, approximately 24 hrs old. The VC was apparently killed by a mortar. At 1921, FSPB BURT received 20-30 60mm mortar rounds, with no casualties.
(6) 1 Jan 68: At 0925, vic XT496795, Co C located and destroyed a rice bin 5' x 10'. At 0945, vic XT491809, Co A found an old M-16 rifle with magazine and ammo, which had jammed and was discarded. At 1220, all elements had closed into the perimeter of the FSB. 2-22 Inf (M) and 3-22 Inf continued to secure FSPB BURT. From 2010 to about 2335, the LPs on Co's A, B, and C were receiving sporadic rifle grenade and RPG fire. At 2335, the 2-22 received 100-150 rounds of 60mm mortar from an azimuth of 1000 mils. At 2341, the entire perimeter began receiving small arms, machine gun, RPG, recoilless rifle, and rifle grenade fire.
(7) 2 Jan 68: At 0007, Co C, at the southern end of the perimeter, was in heavy contact. By this time, Co C had five casualties and had lost one M113 APC by RPG fire. Three M113 APCs, with crews, were sent from the Bn Recon Platoon to reinforce Co C. At 0031, several 60mm mortars were fired into the perimeter. At 00400, Co B had a track hit with an RPG and requested reinforcements. Elements of the Recon Platoon were dispatched to the Co B area. By 0120, Co B was in need of a total resupply of 81mm mortar ammo. At 0125, Co A, on the West side on the perimeter, reported heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire. By 0128, the Bn Recon Plt requested a basic resupply of M-79, cal .50, and M-60 machine gun ammo. At 0131, a Duster, which moved to reinforce Co C, was hit and destroyed by RPG fire. At 0145, Co A's western sector of the perimeter was quiet. The northern sector, secured by Co B, was still receiving moderate amounts of enemy fire. Co C, on the southern side of the perimeter, was receiving heavy amounts of 60mm mortars. They were fired from 400 meters south of the Co C AP, vic XT500790. The AP reported that at that time they had sustained 3 US KHAs, and that large numbers of VC were still moving down the trail towards FSPB BURT. By 0245, 2-77 Arty was adjusting its guns in order to fire direct Beehives in support of Co C. At 0247, a request was received for immediate reinforcement for Co C 3-22 Inf which was on the east side of the 2-22 Inf perimeter. Two M113 APCs with crews were immediately deployed to fulfill this request. At about 0250, ammo resupply was being received at BURT, and casualties were being evacuated. By this time, all cal .50 and M-60 machine gun ammo available from the CP Op had been given to Co C. The Co C commander requested that Tactial Air, to include napalm, be employed to within 150 meters of his sector of the perimeter. By 0310, massive air strikes were being employed as requested. By 0545, the battalion had 5 M113 APCs immobile due to hostile fire. At this time, Co C was still receiving 60mm fire in their area. Resupply and evacuation aircraft received heavy ground fire from .51 cal and other Chicom machine guns. The fire was being received from about 300 - 400 meters out of the perimeter from the South and Southwest. Contact ended about 0640, and initial close-in sweeps of the area began. At 0841, Co C elements linked up with their Blue 1 ambush patrol. The remainder of this period was spent sweeping the contact area, resupplying and applying maintenance to vehicles and weapons. 2-22 Inf (M) continued to secure FSPB BURT, sweep the area of battle, restock ammo, and maintain vehicles and weapons. Through the evening of 2 Jan, all companies reported movement and observation of VC outside of their sectors.
(8) 3 Jan 68: At 0315, the southern portion of FSPB BURT received 20-30 60mm mortar rounds, resulting in 1 US WHA from Co C. At 1212 vic XT498490, Co C found 1 female body. At 1400, General Westmoreland visited the battalion. At 1437, Co A located, vic XT487407, a base camp with one bunker, 2'x4'x4' with 2 ½' overhead cover, 800 lbs of rice, a mess hall, 12'x'20', 2 bunkers, 6'x'4'x4', and 50 meters of trench line. All was destroyed. During the morning, numerous bodies and many weapons were found, results of the previous day's battle.
(9) 5 Jan 67: At 0907, Co C, at XT494796, located an area where numerous personnel had gathered at a main avenue of approach. At 1015, at XT502837, Co A located and destroyed a mine bomb. At 1045, Co C, at XT486796, located heavily used trails with fresh footprints on bicycle tracks. At 1241, at the south end of FSPB BURT, the battalion received 10-12 60mm rounds of mortar fire with no casualties. The mortars were fired from an azimuth of 2800 mils. At 1358, Co A, at XT507819, located and destroyed 15 spider holes. At 1545, the northeast sector of FSPB BURT received 15 rounds of 60mm mortars from an azimuth of 15-20 degrees. The Mortar Platoon had one man slightly wounded as a result of the attack.
(10) 6 Jan 68: MPs and APs reported irregular movement through the night at FSPB BURT. At 1345, the northwest sector received 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortars from an azimuth of 0200 mils and at a distance of 300 meters. Counter mortar fire was immediately initiated. Results of the attack was one EM WHA. At 1500, vic XT505790, a patrol from Co C (Blue 1) received approximately 20 60mm mortars. There were no casualties. At 1535, the northeast sector of FSPB BURT received 5-7 rounds of mortars. There were no casualties. At 2210, Co C received an incoming rifle grenade from the southern portion of their perimeter.
(11) 7 Jan 68: At 0732, 2-22 Inf (M) departed FSPB BURT for a new night's laager at XT547850. The Bn closed at 1331. At 1605, Co C, vic XT546856, located and destroyed a platoon size base camp. At 1725, a resupply aircraft received automatic weapons fire 1000 meters from the perimeter.
(12) 8 Jan 68: At 0220, the Bn received 50-875 82mm mortar rounds in the center and northeast sector of the perimeter. There were 3 US WHAs, of which 2 DOW. Counter-mortar and Arty fire was initiated with unknown results. At 0745, the 2-22 Inf (M) departed for a new night laager vic XT515099. At 0907, Co A, vic XT544069, located and destroyed 2 butterfly bombs. At 0950, Co B, vic XT541875, located a base camp with 40-50 bunkers, 8'x12', and some foxholes. The camp showed signs of recent activity. Located in the camp were 2 100 lb bags of rice. At 1230, Co A, vic XT544084, received 1-2 rounds of sniper fire. Fire was returned. At 1350, the Bn entered a new night laager, vic XT524893. Several rounds of sniper fire were received in camp with negative casualties.
(13) 9 Jan 68: All LPs reported heavy movement during the night. At 0720, the western portion of the laager received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar. There were no casualties. At 1053, vic XT504901, Co A located a base camp. The camp contained 5 bunkers, 8'x12'. Within the camp were found 2 RPG-7 rounds wrapped in plastic, 2 Chicom hand grenades, fresh fish and clothing, 78 60mm mortars, 1 AK-47 rifle, 8 huts, and 2 lbs of documents. At 1335, Co A, vic XT511906, made contact with about 1VC platoon which was firing RPGs, small arms and automatic weapons. Co A employed .50 ca machine guns, M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns, and artillery. Contact ended at 1420, resulting in 4 US WHAs, 10 VC KIA (BC), and 1 RPG rocket launcher. By 1600, all elements closed into the Bn laager at XT515899.
(14) 10 Jan 68: At 0830, Co A, at XT513903, hit a mine with an APC, resulting in 5 US WHA and moderate damage to the APC. The mine was command detonated. At 1103, Co A, at XT513903, located 4 bunkers and 4 spider holes containing bloody rags. Also found were 1 Chicom claymore mine, 1 AK-47 magazine, and several spent cartridges. At 1230, the Bn closed its night laager at XT507914.
(15) 11 Jan 68: At 1016, Co B uncovered 40 meters of ammo wire at XT519915. Also found were footpaths and a machine gun position. At 1037, Co B, at XT529915, located 2 huts and 2300 lbs of rice. One of the huts was used for cooking. At 1113, Co B at XT531915, located 900 lbs of rice, 1 RPG round, and an old German Mauser rifle along with 11 bicycles. At 1123, Cos A and B, at XT532914, found a trail junction lined with several bunkers and huts. All were destroyed. At 1253, at XT535910, Co B located a machine gun position and 14 bunkers. They were destroyed. At 1332, vic XT7537909, Co B located 6 100 lb bags of rice, 3 cases of dynamite, 3 cases of rifle grenades, 3 RPG rounds, 2 cases of small arms ammo, and 6 gas masks. At 1340, 1 EM from the Bn Mortar Platoon crushed his hand under a falling tree. At 1440, vic XT537909, Co B located 9 fresh graves, approximately 2 days old. 9 VC (BC) were claimed. At 1625, vic XT518892, the Bn closed its night laager.
(16) 12 Jan 68: LPs reported movement during the hours of darkness. At 0320, the western side of the perimeter received 5 RPG rounds. Fire was returned and the RPGs ceased. At 0712, Co C conducted a sweep to the front of their perimeter and located 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 RPG rocket launcher, and three RPG rounds. At 0730, Cos A and C departed for RIF. At 1036, vic XT522872, Co A found an animal trap. It was destroyed. At 1106, Co A, vic XT522672, located a base camp. It contained 20 bunkers, 4 huts and a trench system. At 1453, vic XT544874, Co's A and C found a base camp containing 40 bunkers, 17 200 lb bags of rice. The rice was evacuated and the bunkers were destroyed.
(17) 13 Jan 68: LPs reported sporadic movement during the hours of darkness. Co's A and B searched the areas to the east and southeast during the day and by 1530 all elements had closed the laager vic XT541808. From 2060 to 2355, all LPs reported movement in their areas.
(18) 14 Jan 68: At 0811, Co B departed for RIF. At 1020, Co's A, C, and the CP Gp departed, following Co B. At 1110, Co B, vic XT503700, found 4 bicycles. At 1112, Co C, at XT517803, located and destroyed two butterfly bombs. At 1113, Co B, at XT503782, located 4 bicycles. By 1315, all elements had closed the laager, vic XT505768.
(19) 15 Jan 68: At 1133, Co A, at XT532770, was sweeping to the east to encounter VC who had been spotted by a recon helicopter. At 1143, Co C, at XT532773, located 1 VC who had been KIA with a .50 cal. Also found was 1 AK-47 rifle. At 1305, Co B, at XT505764, located 8 bunkers and 2 anti-aircraft positions which were destroyed. At 1315, Co B 3-22 Inf, was in contact at XT488789. Co B 2-22 became OPCON to 3-22 at 1320 and proceeded to the contact area. At 1405, Co A was sweeping into a base camp area at XT5238772. Co C was moving in on the left of Co A. Co A immediately made contact and pushed into the base camp. Results were 6 VC KIA (BC), 1 POW, 3 AK-47 rifles, 1 RPG launcher, a medical bag and a bag of documents, to include a diary and pictures. There were no friendly casualties. By 1605, Co's A and C had closed the Bn laager at XT506768. Co B, which was OPCON to 3-22, sustained 3 US WHAs. Co B closed into the Bn laager and reverted back to Bn at 1953.
(20) 16 Jan 68: By 0924, all Co's had departed for RIF. At 1035, at XT529775, Co A located a base camp containing 50 bunkers. At 1040, Co A located a Chicom claymore mine rigged for detonation and 3 ½ lb blocks of TNT. At 1045, Co C, at XT523773, located a tunnel containing 70 82mm mortar rounds, 150 60mm mortar rounds, 50 82mm fuse caps, 25 60mm fuses, 8000 .51 cal rounds , 165 RPG-II rounds, 4000 rounds .32 cal ammo, 2000 rounds of .30 cal ammo, 50 M-79 rounds, 2 box type telephones, 101 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 1 TA-1 telephone, 3 cases of pull cords for grenades, and 14 electrical blasting caps. At 1200, at XT550776, Co A located 25 bicycles. At 1430, at XT527766, Co A located an underground storage area. By 1623, all companies had closed the Bn laager, XT505768.
(21) 17 Jan 68: At 1027, Co B linked up with a platoon from 3-27 Air Cav at XT523740. The Cav platoon had become OPCON to the 2-22 Inf (M). At 1056, Co C moved to XT530736 to set up a temporary laager and send out probing patrols. At 1137, At XT523713, an air observer located a base camp which was in very good condition, with 300-500 meters of trench line, 4 huts, several machine gun positions and some foxholes. Two personnel were spotted wearing khaki uniforms. At 1210, Co A and the CP Co arrived at the new laager site at XT524742. At 1326, Co A located 4-5 bunkers and a trench system with fresh diggings. All were destroyed. At 1415, Co C, at XT530738, made contact with 3-5 VC. They received AK-47 small arms fire and 1 RPG round. Results of the contact were 1 VC KIA (BC) and 6 US WHAs. At 1435, the CP Gp received one RPG round resulting in 1 US WHA. 4 air strikes were called in during the day. At 1630, C/3-17 returned to parent control. At 2159, at XT538737, an AP from Co B observed several VC about 50 meters from their position and took them under fire. The enemy returned fire with AK-47s. There were no friendly casualties.
(22) 18 Jan 68: At 0800, a platoon from C/3-17 Cav became OPCON to the battalion. At 0849, Co C, at Xt503742, located a small base camp with 7 bunkers which were destroyed. At 1020, Co A, at XT524737, located 3 graves with VC bodies 3-5 days old. Three body count were claimed. At 1021, Co B, at XT513736, received 6-8 incoming rounds of sniper fire. There were no casualties. At 1053, from XT539737 to XT541739, Co C located and destroyed 2 oxcarts, 10 bunkers, 6 .51 cal machine gun positions, and 20 foxholes. At 1214, Co A, at XT525749, located and destroyed two oxcarts. At 1250, Co B and the C(illegible) Gp departed for a new night laager at XT498761. At 1600, the Aero Rifle platoon returned to its parent unit's control.
(23) 19 Jan 68: At 0830, Co's A, B, and C departed for RIF. At 0846, a platoon from 3-17 Cav landed at XT497750 and became OPCON to 2-22 Inf (M). At 1000, the above platoon, at XT498740, received a rocket from one of their gunships resulting in 5 US WIAs. At 1050, Co C, at XT405755, located and destroyed 4 rectangular type anti-aircraft positions. At 1255, Co A, at XT503777, located and destroyed 4 bunkers, one machine gun position, and several mortar fuse caps. The site appeared to be 5-7 days old. At 1315, Co B, at XT462738, checked out an area of a previous air strike and found 150 meters of trench line and 6 bunkers which were destroyed. At 1330, the platoon of C/3-17 Cav was lifted out and control was returned to the parent unit.
(24) 20 Jan 68: At 1015, Co B located an 81mm mortar dud at XT503755. It was destroyed. At 1115, Co B, at XT495730, found an oxcart. It was extracted. At 1315, Co B and the CP Gp moved to a new laager at XT495732. At 1316, At XT511727, Co C located and destroyed 6 bunkers, a trench system and on old sewing machine. At 1445, at XT485725, Co B received 1 round of RPG fire. At 1503, they received another RPG round. Fire was returned and contact broken at 1515. There were 5 US WHA, 1 US KHA, and 3 VC KIA (BC). There was slight damage to an M113 APC.
(25) 21 Jan 68: At 0952, Co B, at XT484735, located and destroyed 1 hut and 5 bunkers. Also found was 1000 lbs of rice which was evacuated. At 1333, Co C, at XT484727, hit a pressure type mine causing heavy damage to the APC and 5 US WHA. By 1555, all Co's were in the Bn laager at XT495732.
(26) 22 Jan 68: At 0305, about 10 60mm mortars landed 400 meters east of the Battalion perimeter. They were fired from an azimuth of 175 degrees from 1300 meters. There was no damage nor were there any casualties. At 1150, Co A, at XT525776, located 5 lbs of documents, 1000 AK-47 rounds, and 6 bicycles. The documents were extracted and all other equipment was destroyed. At 1212, at XT525775, Co A located 2 graves about 1 week old from which 2 body count were claimed, and 800 lbs of rice in a steel container. It was destroyed. At 1355, Co A engaged 3 VC in a bunker and killed all three. In the area, they also located 7 bunkers, 6 rolls of commo wire, 3 Chicom phones, web gear, 8 chicom grenades, and 14 120mm mortar rounds in a case. At 1519, Co B, at XT515772, had an APC hit a stick mine resulting in 3 US WHAs and the total destruction of the APC. At 1531, Co C, at XT532769, located 12 40mm grenade rounds and a “Walkie-Talkie” type radio.
(27) 23 Jan 68: At 0815, 2-22 Inf (M) departed their night laager at XT501762 en route to FSPB BURT, closing at 1040.
(28) 24 Jan 68: 2-22 Inf (M) remained at FSPB BURT. At 1545, 10 rounds of 60mm mortar landed 100 meters outside the eastern perimeter. There were no casualties.
(29) 25 Jan 68: At 1000, FSPB BURT received 10-15 rounds of 60mm mortar. They were fired from an azimuth of 120 degrees and landed 100-200 meters outside the perimeter. At 1411, Co C, at XT500700, spotted 1 VC preparing to fire an RPG at an APC. He was taken under fire and he fled. A sweep resulted in the capture of a backpack containing 3 RPG rounds. There were no casualties among the friendly forces.
(30) 26 Jan 68: At 0750, the FSPB received 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortar in the center sector. They came from an azimuth of 130 degrees. The Bn suffered 1 US WHA who DOW. At 1415, the battalion received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar, rifle rounds, RPGs and small arms fire. The Bn returned fire with automatic weapons fire, mortars and Arty. Contact was broken at 1425. The Bn had 1 WHA and enemy casualties were unknown. 2-12 Inf and 3rd Bde Hq completed extraction from FSPB BURT at 1400.
(31) 27 Jan 68: At 0907, Co B at the southeast portion of the perimeter, sighted 1 VC with an RPG. Grenades and small arms were employed and automatic weapons fire was received from the contact area. Contact was broken at 0910. There were no friendly casualties. At 0947, Co A at XT496819, engaged and killed 1 VC. Sniper fire was still coming in so a defensive perimeter was set up and fire was returned. The above VC was armed with an AK-47. He possessed normal web gear but his height was approximately 6 feet. Co A remained in the above position and killed 2 more VC. There were no friendly casualties. At 1257, At XT503802, Co B received sniper fire and RPG rounds. Fire was returned with organic weapons. At 1300, Co B moved out to sweep the area of contact and received two more RPG rounds which resulted in 2 US WHA. By 1600 all elements had returned to FSPB BURT.
(32) 28 Jan 68: At 0210, the Bn received approximately 15 rounds of 82mm mortar from an azimuth of 350 degrees at 600 meters. The attack resulted in 4 US WHA. At 0800, the Bn began movement to a new laager vic XT498735. At 0900, trail elements who had not departed the FSB received 15-20 rounds of 82 mortar inside the perimeter. Air observers indicated the mortars were fired from XT500821. An immediate air strike was placed into the above location. There were 3 US WHA resulting from the attack. At 1150, the Bn trail elements again received 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortar. The attack resulted in 1 US WHA. At 1300, the last element of the Bn departed FSPB BURT and it was officially closed out. At 1603, an attached self-propelled 155 howitzer hit a mine at XT497745. The artillery piece sustained moderate damage. At 1710, all elements had closed a new laager at XT498735.
(33) 29 Jan 68: 2-22 Inf (M) departed the laager at 0754. Co A led. Movement was slow due to vegetation and trees. At 1336, all elements closed a new laager vic XT481701.
(34) 30 Jan 68: At 0747, Co C had arrived at the bridge site at XT468702 to secure engineers while they installed the bridge. At 0830, at XT489705, Co B located and destroyed 2 bunkers. At 0952, at XT438682, Co B located a small base camp with 60 meters of trench line and 6 bunkers. At 1030, word was received from 3rd Bde that the New Years Tet Truce was cancelled, effective at 0945. At 1115, at XT498698, Co B located a base camp with 30-40 bunkers which showed signs of recent use. Found within the base camp were cooking utensils, 20 rounds of RPG-II, 1 RPG-VII, a number of AK-47 rounds, some clothing, 3 lbs of documents, and a map. At 1315, the bridge had been completed and Co A began crossing. At 1427, a 155 howitzer from 3-13 Arty hit a mine at the entrance to the new laager at XT460626, resulting I 1 US WHA and moderate damage to the track. At 1536, Co B, at XT460695, had an APC hit a mine resulting in 3 US WHA and a total loss of the APC. At 1651, all elements had crossed the bridge and were in the new laager at XT460696. At 1743, the bridge had been extracted.
(35) 31 Jan 68: At 0703, Co A found a Chicom mine at XT460694. It was blown in place. At 0734, two more mines were found by Co B. They were believed to be pressure detonated AT mines. They were blown in place at XT459693. At 0803, A Co found a mine and blew it in place. At 0850, the Bn laager received, at XT460696, incoming 60mm mortars from the east. There were approximately 20 rounds, resulting in negative casualties. Co A, at XT453678, at 0857, found a Chicom mine which they blew in place. Co A was lead element for securing a bridge crossing and, at (illegible), reported that they were fired on by RPG rounds at XT453678. The enemy also set off a claymore mine. Damages were repaired and there were no casualties. At 0939, Co A found a mine at XT453674. It was blown in place. At 1005, at XT453673, Co A found 3 mines (Chicom) which were blown in place. At 1007, at XT458672, Co A found 1 Chicom mine. It was blown in place. At 1028, Co A, at XT493671, found a Chicom mine. It too was blown in place. At 1040, the Bn received incoming mortars from the East. Approximately 15 rounds landed outside the perimeter. There were no casualties. Co A, at XT453676, at 1152, received AK-47 sniper fire. There were no casualties. Word was received from 3rd Bde to road march to Camp Rainier instead of going to a laager. Co A, at XT447636, found 2 Chicom mines which were blown in place. The last element closed Camp Rainier at 2132.
(36) 1 Feb 68: 2-22 Inf (M) performed convoy security to Tay Ninh from Camp Rainier, base camp defense and patrolled adjacent areas. At 1335, the Bn received from 3rd Bde a possible mission to Ap 6 Dis. At 1725, the Bn went on a modified Amber Alert which changed to a full Amber Alert at 1738.
(37) 2 Feb 68: At about 0857, Co's A, B, and the 4-24 mortar platoon moved over to the Michelin Rubber Plantation, vic XT511409. Co C was alerted to move into the town of Dau Tieng. Large crowds of villagers were gathering and there were reports of VC in the town. At 1223, Co C found an 81mm mortar dud and 3 unknown type flares at bunker 22. At 1435, Co A detained one person and extracted him back to Camp Rainier. At 1530, Co A found a spider hole at XT517486. The hole was destroyed. At 1555, Co B, at XT510488, had a man step on an AT mine. The mine was 5-10 meters off the road. The man was KHA.
(38) 3 Feb 68: Co's A, B, and the 4-24 mortar platoon continued to operate in the vicinity of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. At 1134, Co B, at XT520447, found a dud 81mm mortar round. It was blown in place. At 1143, at XT520472, Co B had a man injured when he caught his ankle between a track and a tree. He was evacuated by CH-23 aircraft. At 1155, at XT516476, Co B found a mortar site. In the mortar site were found 6 empty fuse caps and 1 live 82mm round. The round and fuse caps were blown in place. At 1240, at XT532480, Co A found 8 fresh punji pits. They were destroyed. At 1345, Co A found a bunker at XT523476. The bunker consisted of bags of dirt. It was destroyed. At 1430, Co A found a 75mm RR round in a case. The round was destroyed at XT524478.
(39) 4 Feb 68: Co's A, B, and the 4.2” mortar platoon continued to operate vic the Michelin Rubber Plantation. At 0910, Co A found 2 anti-aircraft positions at XT540486 and XT545494. Both positions were destroyed. At 1020, at XT5460496, a B Co track hit a mine. The track was totally destroyed. A dustoff was completed at 1046. At XT562501, at 1115, Co B found 1 bunker which was destroyed. At 1140, at XT564503, a man from Co B stepped on a mine. A dustoff was requested at 1141 for 3 cases. At 1155, the dustoff was completed. At 1200, Co B reported that the AT mine that was stepped on was set off by a smaller, more sensitive pressure type mine or booby trap. The crater, 30 meters off the road, was 3'x4'. At 1204, at XT567506, Co B found 3 AT percussion type mines. They were destroyed. At 1419, at XT551486, Co A found and destroyed 2 bunkers. At 1420, at XT498484, Co A found and destroyed a bunker. At 1505, at XT565475, Co A found and destroyed another bunker. At 1603, at XT533483, both Co's A and B closed into a new laager. At 2145, Co A's Red 2 AP, at XT546488, made contact with an unknown number of VC. The AP had one WHA. At 2234, at XT546488, Co A moved to reinforce their AP. As they were pulling into position, they received RPG rounds, resulting in 6 WHA and 1 KHA. At 2336, Co A, at XT456488, found 1 VC pack, 2 RPG rounds, and 1 VC body.
(40) 5 Feb 68: At 0734, at XT546488, Co A found 2 RPG launchers, 1 US M-79, 2 wallets with ID cards, NVA money, and numerous blood trails leading towards the village. At 0921, at XT546488, Co A found 1 prop(illegible) and cup and 1 cleaning rod for an RPG VII. At 1200, at XT566484, Co's A and B sealed off the village. The NI team also arrived and 8 male individuals were interrogated. The National Police were called to question villagers without ID cards. At 1405, Co A found 2 NVA flags which they confiscated. At 1447, both elements had departed for their new laager at XT535400.
(41) 6 Feb 68: At 1100, at XT540504, Co A found an 81mm mortar dud which was destroyed. At 1200, at XT538488, Co B found and destroyed 1 bunker. At 1530, all elements had closed Camp Rainier.
(42) 7 Feb 68: At 0113, Co C, at XT486462 (District Hq) received sniper fire and mortar rounds. There were 2 US WHA but no dustoff was required. At 0930, Co's A and D moved to XT463450 to seal and search a village. Co B's 16 platoon had taken up security for the Dau Tieng-Tay Ninh convoy. At 1030, at XT452450, Co B's 16 platoon struck a mine resulting in 1 US WHA and moderate damage to the APC. At 1425, at XT463350, Co C turned over to the MPs a total of 17 detainees who were picked up during the search of the village. At 1503, Co C, at XT461439, found and destroyed a dud 105mm round. At approximately 1600, Co's A and C closed into their night laager vic XT47145.
(43) 8 Feb 68: 2-22 Inf (M) continued to Recon in Force in areas adjacent to Camp Rainier with elements assuming base camp defense. The Bn Recon Platoon continued to secure the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy. At 0930, at XT478435, Co C at the stream found 2 rafts made of logs and the banks showed signs of recent activity. At 0948, Co A, at XT496416, found 9 100 lb bags of polished rice in US bags. The rice was on a platform 6” off the ground. At 1110, Co C, at XT468424, located and destroyed 1 sampan. At 1130, Co A, at XT468422, found 1 VC wearing black pajamas in a grave. He appeared to have been dead about one week. At 1145, Co C, at XT492424, found 3 5-gallon cans of fish, 1 5-gallon can of pickles, 2 100 lb bags of polished rice, and a small amount of peanuts. At 1155, Co C, at XT493410, located 4 bunkers, an L-shaped foxhole, about 50 one-man foxholes, 2 100 lb bags of polished rice, recent fires and pans that were still hot, a trench line, and a five foot section of a Bangalore Torpedo. At 1217, Co C, at XT493426, located 2 bunkers that had been recently used. Also located was a garden and two wells. At 1415, Co C at XT500418, located 2 bicycles, 1 bunker, a concrete tunnel, 50 lbs or rice and one oxcart. Co C laagered at XT478440.
(44) 9 Feb 68: 2-22 Inf (M) continued to Recon in Force and Seal and Search villages in areas adjacent to Camp Rainier. In addition, it continues the missions of the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy. The base camp defense was still operated by the 2-22 Inf (M). At 1040, Co C, at XT453471, checked out a trail and found a poncho with blood on it which appeared to be about 5 days old. A VC shirt, still wet with perspiration, was also found. A further search resulted in no further findings. At 1505, at XT437499, one of Co B's APCs hit an AT mine. The explosion resulted in 1 US WHA and moderate damage to the APC. At 1640, 3rd Bde reported that an OH-23 aircraft was down at XT400438. The 3rd platoon of Co A was dispatched to secure it. At 1737, the downed aircraft was airborne again and the security elements returned to rejoin Co A. At 1800 Co's A and B were closed at Camp Rainier.
(45) 10 Feb 68: At 0920, the 2nd platoon of Co C found, at XT500452, 10 foxholes and destroyed them. At 1445, Co A departed for Tay Ninh to become OPCON to the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. At 1500, Co A, 2-14 Inf arrived at Camp Rainier to become OPCON to 2-22 Inf (M).
(46) 11 Feb 68: At 1105, at XT413442, the Recon Platoon reported that a trailer being pulled by a mess truck hit a mine. The trailer was a total loss. At 1114, at XT507442, Co B spotted 3 VC and took them under fire with negative results. Co's B and C closed into their new night laager at 1535 at XT522478.
(47) 12 Feb 68: At 0900, at XT415448, a Recon APC was hit with a command detonated mine, resulting in a total loss to the APC, with 2 attached engineers WHA. At 0910, at XT415445, the Recon Platoon, while conducting security for the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy, came under attack. Two Recon tracks were hit by RPG rounds, resulting in 9 US WHA. At 0945, Co C moved out from Camp Rainier to reinforce the Recon Platoon, vic XT415445. At 1005, Co C had an APC hit a mine at XT410435, which resulted in 2 US WHA. At 1112, Co C made contact at XT415415, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC). Co C also captured 1 RPG round and two RPG rocket launchers and 1 AK-47. Co C had 1 US WHA. Wounds were caused by an M-79 fired at a foxhole. At 1415, at XT415445, Co C reported finding 4 VC KIA (BC), 1 RPG-VII, 2 AK-47s and 1 Chicom rifle with a rifle grenade launcher attached. Recon platoon closed Camp Rainier.
(48) 14 Feb 68: Co C and the Recon Platoon continued to secure the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy. At 0900, the Recon Platoon found a sign at the east end of Ben Cui village at XT452450. The sign was brought to Camp Rainier for interpretation. At 1145, at XT(illegible), the Bn S3 reported a barricade of logs and trees had been removed by engineers and the road was clear. Co B and the Recon Platoon closed Camp Rainier at approximately 1837. Co C laagered at XT445545, at approximately 1900.
(49) 15 Feb 68: At 1334, at XT453445, Co B picked up one detainee, a male, 60 years old with no ID card, who was turned over to the MI. At approximately 1400, 2-22 Inf (M) received word that their A Co, which was OPCON to the 2-14 Inf, had made contact north of Tay Ninh. Co A reported 4 US KHA and 3 WHA. No further information was available. Co C and the Recon Platoon closed Camp Rainier at approximately 1535. Co B laagered at 1649, at XT463459.
(50) 16 Feb 68: At 0530, Co B reported that their seal of Den Cui 3 village was complete, and that the search would begin at 0600. At 0930, the Recon Platoon, as security for the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy, found at XT420425, four VC hand grenades on the ground. They were blown in place. At (illegible), Co B, at Ben Cui village 3, found 5 lbs of medical supplies, penicillin, hypodermic needles, 1 set of jungle fatigues, and took 5 detainees and a Hoi Chanh and all the equipment to the Dau Tieng bridge for turnover to the MPs. At 1215, the Recon platoon, at XT408440, reported that a crane in the convoy had hit a mine, which resulted in minor damage to the crane and no casualties. The Recon platoon also reported receiving sniper fire. Fire was returned. There were no casualties. Due to the amount of road blocks on Route 239, the convoy to Tay Ninh was unable to proceed. Recon platoon laagered at XT492479. Cp B at XT4814760. and Co C at XT403438, all at approximately 1750.
(51) 17 Feb 68: At 0830, at XT389433, Co B found 6 1-man fighting positions and destroyed them. At 1143, the Recon platoon found two mines at XT(illegible). The mines were blown in place. Co's B and C and the Recon platoon closed Camp Rainier at 1747. Co A 2-14 went back to parent control in the 1st Bde.
(52) 18 Feb 68: At 0943, at XT369425, the Recon platoon reported that a booby trap on the road exploded, resulting in 3 US WHA. At 1135, the Recon platoon found a mine which was blown in place. Co's B and C and the Recon platoon closed Camp Rainier at 1715.
(53) 19 Feb 68: At 0652, at XT506480, Co C's 1st platoon spotted 1 VC and opened fire, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), the capture of 1 pineapple-type grenade, drafting paper, and paper plates. At 0915, at XT525477, Co B found and destroyed 1 bunker. At 0920, at XT525479, Co B found 3 bunkers and destroyed them. At 0938, Co C, at XT516486, found a dud 81mm mortar which was blown in place. At 1000, at XT517486, Co C found and destroyed a bunker. At 1053, at XT545485, Co B found a cave containing 8 cases of 60mm mortar rounds, 2 cases of RPG rounds, one mine, and 3 boxes of AK-47 ammo. At 1126, at XT515495, Co C found 3 booby traps. They were destroyed. At 1136, at XT537457, Co B found 1 VC hut and an oxcart. They were destroyed. At 1525, at XT511488, Co C found and destroyed a mine. At 1605, Co's B and C closed Camp Rainier.
(54) 20 Feb 68: 2-22 Inf (M) continued to Recon in Force in the vicinity of the Ben Cui and Michelin Rubber Plantations. Co A remained OPCON to the 2-14 Inf of the 1st Bde. The Bn Recon platoon continued to secure engineers and the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy. At 0658, Co C departed Camp Rainier. Both companies assisted in securing sweep teams on Route 239 and 26 and Reconned in Force in the adjacent areas. At 0817, the Recon platoon located and destroyed a US hand grenade on the east side of Ben Cui village 3, vic XT453449. At 0900, Co C, at XT375424, found beer cans buried in the road. At 1635, Camp Rainier received 20 82mm mortar rounds. There were no casualties. Counter mortar fire was immediately employed. By 1730, all units had closed Camp Ranier.
(55) 21 Feb 68: At 0907, Co C found a mortar site vic XT518496. The mortar site was destroyed. At 0925, at XT531470, Co C found a mortar site and destroyed it. At 1111, Co C, at XT531470, found and destroyed an L-shaped bunker. At approximately 1530, all elements closed into Camp Rainier. At 2345, vic Bunker #22, there were incoming mortar rounds resulting in 1 US WHA. LTC King J. Coffman, Inf, 0662595, assumed control of the battalion, replacing LTC Awbrey G. Norris, Inf, 071848.
(56) 22 Feb 68: At 0950, at XT352442, Recon had a track hit a mine, resulting in 3 US WHA and total loss to the APC. At 1225, Co C, at XT450450, fired on 2 VC. One of them dropped an AK-47 and 2 magazines. At 1349, at XT450450, Co C reported that a female worker in the rubber plantation had said that “one of the VC shot at was wounded.” Co C was unable to locate the VC. At 1540, the Recon platoon and the Tay Ninh convoy closed Camp Rainier. At 1645, Co B closed their laager at XT500458. At 1725, Co C closed Camp Rainier.
(57) 23 Feb 68: At 1101, a call came from 3rd Bde that Camp Rainier was receiving incoming mortar rounds. At 1211, HHC/2-22, reported one minor casualty due to the attack. At 1555, Co C moved to a new laager at XT486454. At 1700, the Recon platoon and Co B closed Camp Rainier with the convoy. At 1750, Camp Rainier (Co B 2-22 Inf (M)) had a 107mm rocket hit their mess hall, resulting in 8 US WHA. The mess hall suffered minor damage.
(58) (This paragraph illegible.)
13. (C) RESULTS:
a. Friendly Losses:
(1) KHA: 12
(2) WHA: 130; 4 3-17 Cav; 10 attached engineers
(3) DOW: 3
b. Friendly Equipment Losses:
(a) APCs: 6 (3 of which w/all TO&E and (illegible) equipment)
(b) Trailer: 1
(c) .50 cal mg: 3
(d) M-60 mg: 8
(e) M-16 rifle: 14
(f) M-79 grenade launcher: 2
(g) Starlight Scope: 2
(h) Sight, 81mm mortar: 1
(a) APCs: 10
(b) Crane: 1
(c) B Co mess hall, minor damage from rocket
c. Enemy Personnel Losses:
(1) KIA: 312
(2) WIA: 2; 6 (POW)
(3) KIA (Poss): 13
(4) Detainees: 25
(5) POW: 1
d. Enemy Equipment Captured:
(1) AK-47, 50: 31
(2) Chicom light mg: 5
(3) M-16 rifle: 1 w/magazine and ammo
(4) M-79 grenade launcher: 1
(5) German bolt action rifle: 1
(6) Chicom bolt action rifle: 1
(7) .45 cal pistol: 1
(8) .22 cal pistol: 1 (very old, unserviceable)
(9) RPG-7 launcher: 7
(10) RPG-2 launcher: 13
(11) RPG-2 rounds: 22
(12) 120mm mortar rounds: 14
(13) 60mm mortar rounds: 84
(14) (illegible) ammo: 7 boxes, 60 rounds
(15) 40mm M-79 grenades: 12
(16) AK-47 magazine: 2
(17) RPG-7 propellant charge: 1
(18) RPG-7 cleaning rod: 1
(19) (illegible)-1 telephone: 2
(20) Bicycle: 21
(21) Pack: 1
(22) Wallet: 2
(23) ID card: 2
(24) Cigarettes: 200 packages
(25) Soap: 40 bars
(26) Sardines: 50-1/2 lbs
(27) Medical Supplies: 5 lbs, 1 bag
(28) Gas masks:
(a) US type: 2
(b) Non-US: 6
(29) Commo wire: 6 rolls
(30) Chicom telephones: 3
(31) Walkie-Talkie radio: 1
(32) Rice, 11,600 lbs
(33) Documents: 18 lbs
(34) Map: 1
(35) NVA money: unknown amount
(36) Oxcart: 1
e. Enemy Equipment Destroyed:
(1) AK-47 ammo: 5050 rounds
(2) Small arms ammo: 2 cases, 1 box
(3) Light mg ammo: 1000 rounds
(4) .51 cal ammo: 8000 rounds
(5) RPG-7 rounds: 33
(6) RPG-2 rounds: 292
(7) 82mm mortar rounds: 70
(8) 81mm mortar rounds: 4
(9) 60mm mortar rounds: 232
(10) 82mm fuses: 50
(11) 60mm fuses: 25
(12) Propellant charge, RPG-2, 7: 10
(13) Bangalore Torpedo: 1 (5' section)
(14) 75mm RR rounds: 7 (with case)
(15) 57mm RR rounds: 101
(16) 15mm round: 1
(17) Booby traps: 3
(18) Butterfly bombs: 4
(19) Chicom claymores: 2
(20) 500 lb bombs: 2
(21) AT mines: 49
(22) Mine bomb: 1
(23) Grenades: 71
(24) Rifle grenades: 45
(25) .30 cal ammo: 4000 rounds
(26) .32 cal ammo: 2000 rounds
(27) M-79 rounds: 50
(28) Blasting caps, electric: 14
(29) Pull cords for grenades: 3 cases
(30) Electrical wire: 2 miles
(31) Commo wire: 400 meters
(32) Bunkers: 251
(33) Foxholes: 97
(34) Spider Holes: 11
(35) Punji pits: 8
(36) Trench: 675 meters
(37) Tunnels: 2 (30 ft)
(38) Huts: 21
(39) .51 cal positions: 17
(40) Wells: 3
(41) Oxcarts: 6
(42) Sampan: 1
(43) Rafts: 2
(44) Rice: 800 lbs
(45) 5 gal cans: 3 - fish, 1 - pickles
(46) Cooking utensils
(47) Animal trap: 1
(48) Canteens: 60
(49) Entrenching tools: 50
(50) Web gear: 100 sets
(51) Road blocks: 5
(52) Clothing: 10 lbs
(53) Assorted fish and clothing
(54) Bicycles w/assorted spare parts: 31
(55) Sewing machine: 1 (old)
14. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:
a. Personnel: The influx of new personnel has improved in recent weeks, and throughout Operation YELLOWSTONE, no major personnel problem areas existed.
b. Routine Reports: No difficulty.
c. Supply: There were no problems encountered in support of operational units during this period. Supply for the month of January was effected from a forward support base at Katum, and also Dau Tieng, with timely and efficient coordination. After the Battle of Suoi Cat, some delay was experienced in receipt of 40mm ammunition to replenish the battalion basic load.
d. Maintenance: limited availability of major assemblies such as power packs, transmission and transfer cases continue to present a major problem in the maintenance of M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers.
c. Treatment of Casualties: (Evacuation and Hospitalization)
(1) Evacuation of personnel was accomplished in a highly efficient manner and no problems existed in this area.
(2) Identification of deceased personnel, although greatly improved, is still posing some problems, which can be eliminated by position action taken in battle areas:
(a) Responsible personnel at the site of evacuation insure that all personnel evacuated are properly tagged.
(b) Responsible personnel at Field Hospitals receiving evacuated personnel should not relay information to inquiring agencies pertaining to the identity of evacuees until positive identification is determined in the manner outlined in existing regulations.
(c) Continual command emphasis that each individual soldier possess and properly wear and carry identification tags and cards, in addition to marking of boots, belts and headgear as required by current regulations.
(3) Some difficulty was experienced in location of personnel by the parent unit after evacuation from the field. Hospitals are not notifying units when patients are received, thereby causing units to contact various field hospitals by telephone to determine the location of patients.
f. Communications: Communication throughout Operation YELLOWSTONE was excellent due to outstanding support from the Division Signal Maintenance agencies.
15. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None.
16. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:
Operations in War Zone C during this period were characterized by light contact with the exception of the Suoi Cut Battle. The VC/NVA personnel contacted during this period also seemed to be green and untrained as evidenced by several weapons captured that had never been fired and were relatively new. Also noted were random groups of VC/NVA personnel who were wandering about seemingly disorganized and with a complete disregard for the use of cover and concealment. It is felt that all key personnel had displaced to the south and that the remaining stragglers were either replacements or rear-area type caretaker personnel.
Also noteworthy was a complete absence of newly emplaced mines or booby traps in the area of operations. All mines located were several months old and many had become uncovered by erosion.
Operations around the Dau Tieng base camp and adjacent to the NSR from Dau Tieng to Tay Ninh were characterized by an increase in harassment of the convoy route and in an intensified mine and booby trap effort in this area. It is felt that this harassment was coordinated to complement the Tet Offensive effort to canalize in mobile units to the road net, to weaken our forces by attrition at little cost to himself, and to restrict the deployment of personnel and equipment from Dau Tieng to support operations in the south. The best counter action to the enemy's design is to continue and increase, if possible, the temp of offensive sweep operations in order to break out of regular patterns of dependence upon road networks.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
/s/Malcolm G. Waitt
MALCOLM G. WAITT
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
Washington D.C. 20510
FOR OT RD
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned
Defense Documentation Center
ATTN: DDC -TC
Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia 22314
The attached documents are forwarded for entry into your system as discussed with the Chief of Accessions, DDC, Ext. 4-.6824
FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT:
2 Incl P.J. CAMP, Jr.
1. (S) Report 660293 (1 CY) Brigadier General, GS
Control No.l 2614511 (CY 7) Director of Organization
2. (S) Report 670600 (1 CY) Unit Training & Readiness, OACSPOR
Control No. 2714998 (RB 7)
ROBERT E. HAMMERQUIST
Chief, Readiness Division
2. Narrative, Significant Organizational Activities 1
a. Mission 1
b. Operations 2
1. General 2
2. MAILI 7
3. LIHUE 7
4. AKRON 7
5. ASHVILLE 7
6. WAHIAWA 8
7. FORT SMITH 8
8. MAKIKI 8
9. JOLIET 8
10. UNIONTOWN 9
11. FARGO 9
12. FRESNO 9
13. SANTE FE 9
17. COCO PALMS 10
18. KAHANA I & II 10
19. EWA 10
20. POAMOHO 10
21. MOKULEIA 10
22. KOKO HEAD 11
c. Artillery Support 11
d. Other 12
e. Chemical 12
f. Intelligence 13
1. VC Activity 17
2. Counter-intelligence 17
3. Checkmate 18
4. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol 18
5. Liaison 18
g. Logistics 19
1. Supply 19
2. Maintenance 19
3. Transportation 19
4. Operations 20
h. Administration 20
1. Personnel 20
2. Key Losses / Gains 20
3. Division IX 21
4. Strengths 22
i. Civic Action 23
j. Psychological Operations 24
k. Medical 25
l. Signal 26
m. Training 27
3. Commanders Analysis / Recommendations 28
a. Observations 28
1. Personnel 28
2. Operations 28
3. Organization and Training 35
4. Intelligence 37
5. Logistics 42
6. Other 47
a. Civic Action 48
b. Psychological Operations 50
b. Commanders Recommendations 51
APPENDIX 1. Roster of Key Personnel
5. (Fort Smith Omitted)
9. SANTE FE
10. COCO PALMS
12. Revolutionary Development Staff
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO, San Francisco 96225
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
(RCS CSFOR - 65) (U)
TO: See Distribution
1. Operational Report for Quarterly Period 9RCS CSFOR - 65)
Location: Vicinity, CU CHI (XT647153) RVN
Reporting Officer: Major General Fred C. Weyand
Prepared by: Major George J. Martin, CO, 18th Military History Detachment
Key Personnel: Appendix 1
2. Significant Organizational Activities:
a. (S) Mission.
(1) Eliminate organized VC / NVA forces in sector, destroy VC installations, and capture supplies. Special emphasis will be directed toward destruction of the 165th “Coup Regiment” which threatens GIA DINH Province.
(2) Clear sector with priority to populated areas, and conduct saturation patrolling of selected areas.
(3) Be prepared to secure BIEN HOA, RFK rock quarry, and LONG BINH Logistical Area with a minimum of one battalion on order.
(4) Be prepared to maintain a main-force infantry battalion on six hour alert as a reserve / reaction force. In the event the battalion is employed, the remainder of the brigade will assume a six hour alert status.
(5) Conduct FIREALL Operations (Artillery support to ----US / ARVN outposts) in 31 (?) as requested-
(6) Coordinate ----and operations with 25th Inf Div (ARVN---appropriate.)
(7) Organize ---- and employ quick reaction air-mobile to exploit targets of opportunity.
(8) In coordination and conjunction with 25th -------------deny to the enemy the rice harvest in
LONG BINH, BAO TRAI, and TAY NINH Provinces.
b. (C) Operations:
(1) The 25th Infantry Division (-) conducted 22 major and 1290 small unit actions. 22 major and 176 small unit actions resulted in VC contact.
(2) Operation MAILI (27 April - 12 May), an area pacification operation, was highly successful. The 1/27th Inf. established a base of operations northeast of BAO TRAI (XT5204) on 27 April. Operating from the battalion base, the 1/27 Inf. conducted several company size air-mobile assaults, local S&D operations, aggressive patrolling and ambushing, and extensive civic action projects. These operations were coordinated and conducted in conjunction with the 49th Regiment (ARVN), province and sector officials. A daily meeting was held at Province Headquarters at which the Province Chief and his staff, the Sector Advisor and his staff, and the CO, 1/27 Inf. and his staff attended. A critique of the day's operations and plans for the next day's operation were discussed. This proved to be a highly successful method of conducting such operations. With the existing terrain and enemy situation in the HAU NGHIA Province, it was determined that a U.S. infantry battalion can effectively influence a circular area 12 kilometers in diameter. Since this operation, it has been noted by this headquarters, that the Vietnamese forces in this area are planning and executing operations with more vigor. (App 2 combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALILI).
(3) During Operation LIHUE (1 -11 May), the 1/5 (M) Inf. with Co. C, 1/69 Arm provided security for the 588th Engr Bn (-) during a road maintenance and construction effort on Highway 1 and 22 bypass. By escorting engineer work parties during the day and establishing company strong points and numerous ambushes during darkness, the battalion secured the logistical LOC for the 1st Infantry Division throughout Operation BIRMINGHAM. In conjunction with its mission, the 1/5th (-) Inf. made a thorough terrain analysis of the area to ascertain the feasibility of mechanized operations in the western portion of HAU NGHIA and the eastern sector of TAY NINH Province. Ambushes and mounted operations in the surrounding area accounted for 20 VC KIA (BC) and 27 VC KIA (poss).
(4) Operation AKRON (8 - 11 May) and S&D operations, was conducted in the FILHOL
Plantation (XT6720) by the 1st Brigade (4/23rd Inf, 2/14th Inf., A/1/5th (M) Inf and C/4/9th Inf). The 7th Regt. 5th Inf. Div (ARVN) occupied a blocking position along the outer edge of the Filhol Plantation (Appox. Grid line 70, on the Saigon River, south to road------------ infiltration into BEN CO (XT7119). --------conducted a night attack upon a ---------objective. This was a---size operation conducted by the 1st Brigade Task Force. (App. 2 Combat After Action Report , Operation AKRON). (p7)
(5) Operation ASHVILLE (12 - 13 May) was a Search and Destroy in the vicinity of XT6912 to destroy VC positions, troops and equipment
southeast of CU CHI. The result of this operation were 4 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (poss), ten VC structures, 2 tunnels, numerous rounds of small arms ammunition, and many grenades destroyed.
(6) Operation WAHIAWA (16 - 27 May) was a Division (-) S&D; operation in the FILHOL plantation (XT6720), HO BO WOODS (XT6228) and BOI LOI WOODS (XT5630). Forces penetrated deep into the BOI LOI WOODS, a known VC sanctuary. Army aviation was used initially to airlift two battalions into the vic XT5234. From there, the units swept south. Concurrently, two battalions attacked north from the division base camp through the FILHOL Plantation. The 1/5th (M) Inf was used to block the western and southern portions of the BOI LOI WOODS. VC caches captured or destroyed consisted of 847.4 tons of rice, 615 tons of other edibles (peanuts, dried fish, etc.), 98,699 yards of cloth , ammunition, 4000 lbs of medical supplies, and sampans. Five base camps, 1 fortified village, 1 training center, and 54 bicycles were destroyed. There were 144 VC KIA (BC), 13 KBA (BC), 175 VC KIA (poss) and 10 VCC, ( App 4 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation (WAHIAWA).
(7) Operation FORT SMITH (3 June - 3 July) was a S&D and pacification operation conducted by 2/14th Infantry. The efforts of US, ARVN, RF and PF units were closely integrated to create a favorable rapport with the population who had little previous contact with ARVN or American forces. The 2/14th Inf. maintained a working relationship with the District Chief of TRANG BANG. An atmosphere of trust and cooperation resulted in the exchange of intelligence, combined use of personnel, joint ambushes on Hwy #1, reconstruction of a PR outpost, MEDCAP, and Helping Hand operations. Primary emphasis was on civic action and psychological operations in order to counteract VC propaganda efforts and bolster government control over the people. Results of this operation were 19 VC KIA (BC), 51 VC KIA (poss), 6 VCC, 32 VCS, 2 rifles and 7,290 lbs of rice captured. (App. 5 Combat Operations After Action Reports, Operation FORT SMITH).
(8) Operation MAKIKI (3 - 9 June). The 2nd Bde, in coordination with elements of the 25th Inf Div (ARVN), conducted an S&D operation in the DUC HUE District. A Combat Support Coordination Center was established at Bde/Regt and Div level. On 3 June, 1/5th (M) Inf encountered a VC platoon. The VC attempted to break contact and dispose of their weapons in streams and canals. Several VC went under water by breathing through reeds. In a fine display of the versatility of the APC, M113, the enemy was actually over-run and routed with a loss of 11 VC KIA (BC), 19 VCC and 2 weapons captured. On 7 June the 1/5th (M) Inf discovered an under-water weapons and ammunition cache vic XT520104. The cache contained 105 small arms, 57mm and 75mm RR arms, AT rockets, TNT and approximately 55,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. Total enemy losses for the operation were 20 VC KIA (BC), 12 VC KIA (pos), 32 VCC, 53 BCS, 26.4 tons of rice, 110 small arms, RR ammo, SA ammo, AT mines, AT rockets and miscellaneous supplies. (App 6 Combat Operations After Action Reports, Operation MAKIKI.)
(9) Operation JOLIET (6 - 10 June) was a battalion (4/9th Inf) S&D operation in the vic of PHOUC VINH NINH (XT6813) and AP DONG SAO (XT7010). Results of this operations were 3 VCKIA (BC), -----KIA (poss). Numerous grenades, booby traps, and tunnels were destroyed.
(10) Operation UNIONTOWN (9 June - 14 July). The 4/23rd Inf was employed as a security force by HQ, IIFORCEV in vic BINH HOA Airfield, RVN rock quarry, and LONG BINH Logistical Area. Light VC contact was encountered.
(11) Operation FARGO 12 - 14 June) was a two-battalion S&D operation controlled by the 1st Bde in the vic of PHUOC HEM (XT5617). The operation was initiated to reduce road blocks and tax collection points, ground fire at aircraft, and harassment of RF / PF units. Light contact was made with the VC with results of 1 VCKIA (BC), 2VC KIA (poss), 1 VCC, 5VCS. (App. 7 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARGO).
(12) Operation FRESNO (13 June - 14 July) was a S&D and pacification operation conducted by 2/27th Inf west of BAO TRAI. The battalion established a base at XT502087 from which they conducted a series of operations in conjunction with ARVN, Province and District forces. MEDCAPS had been conducted on a daily basis in nearby hamlets. Helping Hand materials were distributed. A County Fair was conducted in the hamlet of AP SO DO on 23 June. ARVN Civic Action Teams were used in village search operations. Results were 20 VC KIA (BC), 30 VC KIA (poss), 18 VCC, 41 VCS, 7 small arms, 5,100 lbs rice captured, 222 VC structures destroyed, numerous tunnels, bunkers and SA ammunition destroyed. (App. 8 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FRESNO)
(13) Operation SANTE FE (13 June - 4 July). This operation was conducted in HAU NGHIA Province bounded by coordinates XT5808, XT6303, XT5204, and XT5800. Operating from a battalion base, the 1/27th Inf conducted an area pacification program consisting of local S&D operations, aggressive patrolling and ambushing, and extensive civic action projects. These operations were coordinated at daily joint meetings with the Province Chief, and were supported by the 49th Regt (ARVN). Children pointing out booby traps, mortar rounds and mines are indicative of the salutary effects operations of this nature are having on the local populace. Results were 2 VC KIA (BC), 23 VC KIA (poss), 14 VCC, 78 VCS. (App. 9 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SANTE FE.)
(nos.14 - 15 - 16 Blanked out)
(17) Operation COCO PALMS (25 June - 1 July) was conducted the 1/5th (M) Inf in the vic of the BOI LOI WOODS and HO BO WOODS. On the first day 20 - 30 VC were observed in a trench system and were fired upon by artillery. When the battalion over-ran the area, the VC had withdrawn. Numerous bunkers and tunnel complexes were found and destroyed by a special tunnel team from the 65th Engr. Bn. A combined ARVN - US operation was initiated when the 3rd Bn, 49th Regt (ARVN) conducted an air-mobile assault into the AO on 29 June. Results were 6 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KBA (BC), 6 VC KBA (poss), 4 VC KIA (poss), 2 VCC, 6VCS, 22 rifles, 1 Czech MG, 72 bunkers, 41 tunnels, 2 sampans and 5 trenches destroyed. 39,640 lbs rice and 100 lb salt captured or destroyed. (App. 10 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation COCO PALMS
(18) Operation KAHANA I & II (3 July - 1 Aug). Operation KAHANA I & II were conducted by the 1st Brigade with elements of the 10th Div ARVN. The purpose was to locate VC forces responsible for an ambush against ARVN forces south of GIA RAY on 30 June, and to prevent an increase of VC incidents in the GIA RAY - VO DAT - VO XU area. The 1st Brigade controlled this operation from the vic of XUON LOC (YT460091). On 5 July 4/9th Inf (+) was committed in vic GIA RAY. On 15 July the 4/23rd Inf was employed in the VO DAT - VO XU area (vic XT7232). As a result of the brigade's operations, loggers and charcoal workers were able to return to work, logging trucks were able to move logs cut as long as two years ago, and produce trucks and civilian buses resumed daily trips to SAIGON and other market places. Results were 4 VC KIA (BC), 17 VC KIA (poss), 1 VCC, 5 VCS, 5 KBA (poss).
(19) Operation EWA (8 - 13 July). This operation was conducted by 1/27th Inf in the area west of the ORIENTAL River to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and bases. Airmobile assaults and Eagle Flights were utilized to saturate the area. A total of 353 refugees were voluntarily evacuated from the VC controlled area of HIEP HOA. Province officials will relocate them in DUC HUE District. Results of the operation were 14 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KBA (BC), 16 VC KIA (poss), 8 VCC and 8 small arms. (App. 11 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EWA.)
(20) Operation POAMOHO (10 July). This was a S&D operation in the FILHOL Plantation to reduce activity on the northern edge of the base camp area. The operation was controlled by the 2/14th Inf. and included 1 Rifle Co, 1 Mech Co, and 1 Cav Trp. A VC booby trap factory was destroyed as well as numerous rifle grenades,. (App. 12 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation POAMOHO)
(21) Operation NOKULEIA (15 - 22 July). This operation was conducted in the western portion of HAU NGHIA Province by elements of the 2nd Bde. It was determined that the 3rd Bn, 49th Regt (ARVN) did not have an immediate reaction capability to take advantage of intelligence information being evaluated by the Joint Operations Center in BAO TRAI. The 25th Inf Div responded by providing helicopters. Results of this contact were 1 VC KIA (BC), 9 VCC, and 14 VCS. Eagle Flights were conducted in the area adjacent to the ORIENTAL River. In one such operation, 2 VC main forces companies were engaged. The VC wore camouflaged uniforms, steel helmets and field equipment. Gunships, armed CH-47 aircraft (GO-GO teams) and tactical air were employed against the VC. Results of this contact from ground and air were 34 VC KIA (BC), 39 VC KIA (poss). Results of the complete operation were 38 VC KIA (BC), 24 VC KBA (BC), 34 VC KBA (poss), 101 VC KIA (poss), 5 VDD, 40 VCS, 23 small arms captured, and a VC arms factory destroyed.
(22) Operation KOKO HEAD (23 July - Continuing). This is an S&D and pacification operation, being conducted west and north of base camp. Results to date are 5 VC KIA (BC), 26 VC KBA (BC), 1 VC KIA (poss), 49 VC KBA (poss), 24 VCC, 99 VCS, 12 small arms and numerous ammunition captured, and 118 buildings, 53 bunkers, 12 tunnels, 16 sampans destroyed.
c. (C) Artillery Support: (Operation FIREBALL)
(1) Artillery Support for month of May: Appropriate exchanges of artillery liaison officers were made between the 25th Inf Div Arty and units of the 25th Inf Div (ARVN) on a permanent basis. This facilitated clearance of fires and provided U.S. arty support for ARVN units. Also, the 25th Inf Div Arty assumed responsibility for artillery fire support of RVNAF units within CU CHI District. This allowed sufficient ARVN 105mm pieces to be released from static defense to form a mobile battery in support of combat operations. The U.S. artillery support for Operation MAILI was phased to support the above mission. Upon completion of Operation MAILI, a rapid reaction 4.2 inch mortar platoon was deployed under operational control of the 25th Inf Div Arty to demonstrate the division's capability to provide rapid reinforcement to any pacified area threatened by the Viet Cong. During Operation WAHIAWA, the artillery support (light, medium and heavy) was used to assist in the destruction of a major logistical base of the VC. Use of indirect 155mm fires in direct support of infantry advancing in heavy undergrowth proved effective in this operation.
(2) Artillery support for month of June: The 25th Div Arty continued development of support for units of ARVN. Defensive fires were increased for the 7th Regt of the 5th Div (ARVN). Of 2200 rounds fired in support of ARVN forces, 400 rounds were fired in 15 missions to support small outposts. Operations of the month consisted primarily of single artillery batteries supporting individual infantry battalions on pacification missions. The direct support battalions worked with an ASR if 20 rounds for this period with no serious degradation of capabilities. In addition to normal U.S. support, one special mission, Operation FIREBALL, was undertaken. A 25th Inf Div Arty Task Force consisting of one 105mm battery (B/2/13th Arty, II FFORCEV unit), one infantry company (B/4/9th Inf) and a command group from 3/13th, were deployed to a remote area of TAY NINH Province. The task force provided artillery support for a province force employed in establishing a CIDG campsite.
(3) Artillery support for month of July: The 25th Div Arty continued to provide artillery support to RVN units within effective artillery range of CU CHI Base Camp. Artillery support was also provided to RVN units at BAO TRAI, DUC HUE, DUC HOA and TRANG BANG from forward artillery positions. Beginning 12 July an artillery denial program was undertaken in the FILHOL Plantation to counter increased VC activity in that area. During the period two “FIREBALL” Operations were (p12) conducted. The mission of these operations was to lend direct artillery support to a CIDGSF Camp in a remote area north of TAY NINH City. Operation FIREBALL I which began 21 June, was successfully concluded on 15 July. B/2/13th Arty from II FFORCEV was detached from the 25th Div Arty. Operation FIREBALL II commenced on 25 July, when a task force consisting of a command group from 1/8th Arty, B/1/8th Arty (-), and B/2/14th Inf were airlifted to a remote area north of TAY NINH City. FIREBALL II was concluded on 29 July.
The success of both FIREBALL operations is demonstrated by the fact that no serious VC activity was encountered during the periods when the artillery task forces were in the area. During July, Operations MOKULEIA and KOKO HEAD required direct artillery support over the major portion of HAU NGHIA Province. To accomplish this, three provisional four-gun batteries were formed from the 1/8th Arty with a six-gun battery remaining at CU CHI Base Camp. C/1/8th Arty (-), was airlifted to TRUNG LAP Ranger Camp on 20 July and 23 July to support one day infantry operations in the area. The unit was air extracted each day. On Operations KAHANA I & II, 7/11th Arty (-) moved by convoy to the XUAN LOC-GIA RAY-VO DAT area to support S&D and pacification operations of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. The 25th Div Arty fired 37706 rounds of artillery the evening of 26 July, and the morning of 27 July in counter mortar fires for defense of the CU CHI Base Camp. During the quarter, 26,048 rds of artillery were fired. Results by artillery were 117 VC KIA (BC), 325 VC KIA (poss).
d. Other Combat Support: Results of Air Forces strikes were 85 VC KBA and 156 KBA (poss), from 1264 air sorties. There were 21,397 army aviation sorties during the quarter.
e. (FOUO) Chemical:
(1) Perimeter Defoliation.
(a) During the period 26 June - 5 July, the Division Chemical Section provided technical supervision to division troop units for the dispersal of 2, 4-D Defoliant on the perimeter of CU CHI Base Camp. At the same time, under the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officers, the 1st and 2nd Bdgs defoliated their portions of the perimeter.
(b) The mixture used was two parts diesel and one part 2,4-D.
(c) Method of dispersion was the use of the M106 Portable Riot Control Agent Dispenser (Mity-Mite) loaded on a vehicle. In areas that could not be traversed by vehicles, the M106 was back-packed. The most effective vehicle utilized was the M113 Personnel Carrier since it was able to penetrate areas untenable to wheeled vehicles.
(d) The operation was considered effective in those areas covered by defoliant. A total of 22 barrels were dispersed. Subsequent evaluation of this operation indicates that an insufficient quantity was dispersed by this method to cover the entire perimeter and recurring applications will be required to defoliate new growth.
(2) CS Seeding of XOM MOI Woods
(a) On 11 July the mission of the Division Chemical Section was to seed an area along the road through the XOM MOI Woods (XT608174 to XT615165) with Riot Control Agent CS.
(b) The mission was carried out in the following manner:
1. The CS was to be dispersed in package form from four M113 APC's provided by A/3/4 Cav.
2. Two 8 pound bags of CS were tied together with heavy twine forming a 16 lb package of CS. A blasting cap with ¼ lb of C-4 and a 45 second time fuse was used to explode the bags. The blasting caps, time fuse, and fuse lighters were carried in a separate APC from the C-4. Upon arrival at the target area the detonators were assembled and placed between the CS bags; a piece of tape was used to secure the charges.
3. The APC's were lined up four abreast at fifty meter intervals. The platoon leader acted as controller for the drop. One package was to be dropped from each of the APC's every 50 meters; the command to drop being given by the platoon leader.
4. At the command, drop, one man in each APC held the package while a second man pulled the fuse lighter pin. The first man then dropped the armed package out the ramp door of the APC.
(c) This method of dispersing CS proved to be very effective. By this method, large areas can be seeded in short periods of time, and use of the APC, affords personnel a great deal of protection.
f. (C) Intelligence:
(1) VC Activity.
(a) May 1966
1. (C) During the month of May, enemy activities were characterized by acts
of harassment and sabotage directed against friendly operations, the CU CHI Base perimeter, and movement on National Routes 1 and 22. Incidents involving anti-aircraft fire and mines increased during the month. This is attributed to the increase of friendly operations. There was also a marked increase in the number of reports concerning large numbers of VC moving in the area between Route 1, the HO BO WOODS, and BOI LOI WOODS. A mortar attack on a forward CP occurred 27 May, when the fie support elements of the 1st Bde CP received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.
2. (C) The majority of the VC actions involved forces of platoon or smaller size. However, there were two incidents involving VC forces of company size. On 3 May, an ambush patrol from C/1/27th Inf was attacked, vic XT5640446, by a company composed of local guerrillas and elements from the 506th LP Bn. On 7 May, a patrol from B/1/5th (M) engaged elements of the 403rd Co, 320th LF Bn vic XT505316.
3. (C) The VC lost large quantities of rice, cloth and medical supplies as a result of friendly operations conducted during May. In addition, the VC were forced to abandon base camps and supply areas. VC movement on supply and liaison routes, was again hampered by friendly operations, patrols and aerial observation.
4. (C) With the advent of the rainy season and increased combat activities by U.S. and ARVN forces, the VC will be hard pressed to replace the rice and medicine lost as a result of Operation WAHIAWA. Due to the number of KIA's suffered by the VC and the large amount of ammunition lost, the combat effectiveness of the VC units in the division TAOR have been a reduced considerably. The losses could disrupt VC plans for operations in the early stages of the monsoon season.
5. (U) Results of all operations during May 1966 were:
VC KIA (BC) 211 Small Arms 41
VC KIA (poss) 372 Rice 901.8 tons
VCC 13 Other edibles 619 tons
VCS 57 Cloth 98,698 yds
(b) June 1966
1. (C) During the month of June, VC activities continued to be characterized
by acts of ;harassment and sabotage directed against friendly units, the CU CHI Base perimeter, and movement on LOC's within HAU NGHIA Province. The number of anti-aircraft incidents doubled from those reported in May, while mining incidents decreased from the previous month. The large number of AA incidents can be attributed to increased heliborne activity in connection with friendly operations. During the month of June, agent reports, CHIEU HOI reports, and SPAR activity indicated that the VC had returned to the HO BO WOODS area. Operation “COCO PALMS” conducted by the 1/5 (M) Inf during the period 25 June - 1 July confirmed these reports. Documents captured indicated that elements of the SAIGON - GIA - DINH Special Region Committee were located in the extensive tunnel system in the area. There was a sharp decline in the number of reports of large numbers of VC moving in HAU NGHIA Province. Numerous reports continued to be received during the month concerning large VC units moving into the BO LOI WOODS area from the vicinity of MICHELIN Plantation.
2. (C) The majority of enemy activity during the month involved forces of platoon size or smaller. The VC continued to withdraw when contacted in force by friendly elements. There were numerous significan contacts which captured
or killed an entire VC guerrilla platoon. The final count was 11 VC KIA (BC) and 19 captured. The capture of 19 marked one of the largest single captures of VC in the III Corps Area. The VC suffered another serious setback when C/1/5 (M) discovered a large weapons cache on 7 June. The cache, which included 105 small arms, was one of the largest arms caches discovered by Free World Forces in Vietnam, and was the first time Russian ammunition had been captured in any large quantity. Another significant action occurred on 7 June, when elements of the 2/27 Inf discovered a grenade factory which was capable of producing 400 to 500 grenades per week. The month of June also marked the first time the VC utilized the RPG-2 grenade launcher with successful results. The action took place on 18 June, when A/!/5 (M) Inf encountered an unknown size VC force in a heavily fortified position in the FILHOL Plantation. The VC utilized the grenade launchers to damage 3 APC's and inflict casualties on the occupants.
3. (C) Division operations continue to force the VC to abandon base camps and supply areas. His movement is becoming more restricted as a result of the division's pacification operations throughout HAU NGHIA Province. The presence of US forces has motivated the civilian populace into offering information concerning VC activities in the area. This information has not only led to the discovery of weapons and ammunition, but in a few cases, several VC have been apprehended as a result of information provided by fellow platoon members. The presence of US forces has also hampered VC movement on supply and liaison routes.
4. (C) The enemy's loss of supplies and war materiel during the month has been detrimental to his war effort. With many of their supply routes interdicted, the resupply of war materiel will become more difficult. The loss of a possible headquarters in the HO BO WOODS area could have an effect on the command and control of VC Forces in the HO BO WOODS, and the destruction of their extensive tunnel system could force the VC out of an area they have long considered a safe haven. Harassment of US base areas will continue, and the enemy will continue to seek targets of opportunity. Although the loss of war materiel and base areas have disrupted their plans for the monsoon season, the VC can be expected to take advantage of increasing periods of inclement weather to conduct their harassing tactics.
5. (U) Major VC Losses during the month:
VC KIA (BC) 133 Small arms 250
VC KIA (poss) 326 Heavy weapons 2
VCC 73 Rice 217.4 tons
(c) July 1966
1. (C) During the month of July, VC initiated activity increased within the 25th Division's TAOR, and other areas in HAU NGHIA Province. An increase in harassing and probing incidents and actual assaults on RF and PF outposts were noted in the entire 31st DTA. The number of anti-aircraft incidents increased by approximately one third from those reported in June, while mining incidents decreased approximately 75%. The large number of AA incidents can be attributed to wide use of Eagle Flights during friendly S&D operations. There was an increase in the number of reports from various sources concerning the movement of large numbers of VC throughout HAU NGHIA Province. These movements of VC forces were reported most frequently in the vic of BAO TRAI (XT526044), DUC HUE (XT440057), and DUC HOA (XS597966). These three towns were consistently reported as targets for VC attacks to take place on 20 July, Geneva Accord's Day, and on 26 July.
The reinforcement of BAO TRAI by 25th Div elements, plus the numerous air-strikes and artillery missions fired in the immediate vicinity were believed to be instrumental in deterring the attack plans of the 506th LF Bn, and the 267th Bn DT2 Regt in the HAU NGHIA Provincial capital area. The attacks were believed to be planned in conjunction with the mortar and recoilless rifle attack on the 25th Div Base Camp on 26 July. The reactions to the mortar attacks on PHUOC HIEP and the TRUNG LAF Ranger Training Center, plus the encounter with the 1st Bn, 165A Regt on 19 July, were also believed to have prevented a larger scale attack on the division base area. It is also believed that the artillery fire in response to the TRUNG LAP mortar attack deterred a possible attack on the training center.
2. (C) There were numerous incidents of significant enemy contact during the month. The most significant action was the 75mm recoilless rifle and 82mm mortar attacks on the division base camp on 26 and 27 July. There were indications that elements of the Z41st Arty Bn, U80 Arty Regt. Had taken part in the attack. This heavy weapons unit normally supports VC main force regiments in the War Zone C area. Another significant action took place on 19 July when elements of A/1/27 Inf were airlifted into two objectives on the edge of the HO BO WOODS and immediately engaged elements of the 1st Bn, 165A Regt. The VC, who in some cases wore camouflaged uniforms and steel helmets, maintained continuous contact with friendly elements for 4 ½ hours using mortars, grenades, SA and AW. The length of the encounter indicated once again that the VC will fight tenaciously when surprised or forced to fight in their base areas.
The 165A Regiment also figured prominently in the 19 July attack in the PHUOC MIEN outpost located on Route 1, nine kilometers northwest of CU CHI. This action demonstrated the VC capability to strike quickly with a superior force and rapidly withdraw when confronted by division reaction forces. Concurrent with the attack on PHUOC HIEP, the VC also fired 40 - 50 rds of 82mm mortar into the TRUNG LAP ARVN Ranger Training Center, resulting in friendly losses of 3 KIA and 14 WIA. This clearly demonstrated the capability of VC main force units to successfully conduct simultaneous attacks on separate targets. Large quantities of VC arms and ammunition continued to be located by friendly forces, the most significant being an arms factory located by C/2/27th Inf on 19 July, near the ORIENTAL River at XS513988. The FILHOL Plantation and HO BO WOODS, in spite of their proximity to the base camp, constant harassment by artillery, and frequent S&D operations, continue to be the scene of occasional intense fighting. Aircraft flying over these areas are routinely subjected to AA fire, and ground elements continually encounter mines, booby traps, and VC fortifications. Many of the firing positions utilized during the 26/27 July attack on the base were located along the southern edge of the FILHOL Plantation.
3. (C) The VC continue to be forced from their base and supply areas. VC activities are also becoming more restricted because of our numerous operations in various areas of the HAU NGHIA Province. Operation CHECKMATE which is designed to deny to the VC the clandestine use of major LOC's in the area, is also having an impact on VC supply and liaison activities. The presence of US forces continues to motivate the local population into offering information concerning VC activities in the area. Numerous arms/weapons caches have been located during the month as a result of this information. There are indications that the VC no longer feel secure in villages and hamlets which they once controlled. This is in part due to the rapid reaction by division elements in responding to agent reports, and information provided by voluntary informants. Another example of diminishing VC influence is reflected in the number of refugees during “Operation EWA”. A total of 353 persons requested evacuation from a VC controlled area in DUC HUE District west of the ORIENTAL River, and were accommodated by aviation elements supporting the 2nd Bde. The mortar and recoilless rifle attack against the division base area will undoubtedly be exploited by the enemy for propaganda purposes in an attempt to reassert their former position of influence among the people. Harassment of outposts, roadblocks, and general VC activity will probably increase during August and the VC may attempt another attack on the base camp or one of the district capitals.
4. (C) VC personnel and equipment losses 1 -31 July 1966:
VC KIA (BC) 194 Small arms 49
VC KIA (poss) 434 Rice 36.9 tons
(2) (C) Counterintelligence:
(a) The major emphasis in counter-intelligence during the reporting period has been the identification of VC infrastructure in the TAOR, and the detection and neutralization of the VC espionage and sabotage effort against the 25th Infantry Division. The major counter-intelligence project presently underway by the division is called Operation KLEEN. This program involves screening and investigation of approximately 1000 Vietnamese laborers employed daily on construction projects in the base camp. Most of these laborers have been under VC domination for several years, and are therefore susceptible to both active and passive collaboration with VC agents. It is also recognized that these laborers form a pool of potential informants who might for mercenary, retaliatory or opportunistic motives collect information for us concerning VC activities in their village and hamlets. Since the most logical assessors of this potential among the work force are the US military supervisors and interpreters, these people are briefed and debriefed on a continuing basis by CI agents of the 25th MID. The first phase of Operation KLEEN, which was to photograph the ID cards and other identity papers of all indigenous laborers, has been completed and it is now estimated that the files are 95 percent complete allowing for new arrivals and those absent when the ID cards were photographed.
(b) This file will be utilized to check against National Police files, comparison against black and gray lists, and screening by local and provincial MSS officials and sources to detect false ID papers, and to identify known or suspected VC. This file will also provide information concerning the number of persons from the various villages in the area, and groups in each village and hamlet in our area. It is hoped that by continuation of this positive CI effort we can minimize the espionage and sabotage threat to the base camp while continuing the practice of employing indigenous help in non-critical areas.
(3) (C) Checkmate:
(a) On 6 July, the division initiated a program of establishing check points at random locations along major highways in HAU NGHIA and TAY NINH Provinces. The purpose of this operation called CHECKMATE, is to deny the VC the use of land LOC's to covertly move personnel and equipment through our TAOR. These check points are manned by elements of the 3 /4 Cav, CI agents of the 25th MI Det, and National Police. The Cav. Element provides security for the area utilizing 4 - 5 armored personnel carriers and occasionally a tank, depending on the area security situation. Two checkpoints are then established approximately 150 meters apart enabling traffic checks in two directions. Two National Policemen and one CI agent normally conduct the screening process at each location. The 3/4 Cav aero- rifle platoon is also prepared to assist the roadblock element if necessary and aerial scouts search out the surrounding area for other targets of opportunity which might warrant the relocation of the ground element.
(b) Twelve CHECKMATES were conducted in July and a total of 2,007 vehicles and 7,665 persons screened. Results of these operations include 4 VCC, 19VCS, 7 draft dodgers, and 14 people of National Police interest detained. Numerous contraband items of CHICOM and CAMBODIAN manufacture were also confiscated by the police.
(4) (C) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol 1 (LRRP):
During the period a Div LRRP of 3 officers and 38 EM were organized, manned and equipped. The patrol was attached to the 3 /4 Cav for support and placed under the AC of S, G2 for operational control. A cadre was chosen from the initial volunteers and sent to NHA TRANG for approximately 3 weeks training with the 5th Special Forces Group. Upon return to base camp additional training was conducted by the entire patrol with emphasis on operating in 5 man teams. To date, the patrol has conducted four patrols in HAU NGHIA, TAY NINH and LONG KHANH provinces with the mission of locating VC base camps and detecting VC movement. The patrol has proven itself a valuable addition to our intelligence acquisition capability.
(5) (FOUO) Liaison:
The G2 section, in order to insure that all intelligence information originating in HAU NGHIA Province is made available to the OG of the 25th Div, has greatly increased its liaison with adjacent and subordinate US and ARVN intelligence agencies. In addition to daily visits to HQ, 5th Inf Div (ARVN), HQ, 25th Div (ARVN), and the province capital at BAO TRAI, personal liaison is also maintained with the sub-sector HQ's in our TAOR, the TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center, and the Special Forces Det's. On numerous occasions during the reporting period, perishable information was received during one of these liaison visits enabling a rapid and effective division response. It is anticipated that this closer contact with those agencies will improve the intra-province intelligence flow to the benefit of all concerned.
g. (FOUO) Logistics:
(1) Supply and Services:
(a) During the quarter, the supply and services within the division generally improved. All personnel have received an issue of jungle fatigues and boots. The remainder of the new family of radios materially assisted in communications and reduced the previous high deadline rate of unit radios. The Division also received the new light vehicle retrievers (M578), over 300 anti-intrusion devices and 600 shotguns. With the assistance of Saigon Support Command, the construction of prefabricated refrigerators has established a satisfactory static refrigeration capability. On 1 June, 4800 cubic feet were completed, 9000 cubic feet were available 1 July, and 14000 cubic feet were com0pleted by 1 August 1966. The ice cream plant completed 28 June has operated successfully and increased morale throughout the Division.
(b) By 31 July, the Class III yard was 85% completed. Twenty of the 35 berms required for the 10,000 gallon collapsible storage tanks had been completed. These berms proved effective during July when they absorbed mortar and recoilless rifle shrapnel and prevented serious damage to tanks and loss of fuel.
(a) During the quarter, the division deadline rate was well below the average Army
standard rate with the exception of engineer (general and heavy equipment) and aircraft. However, the July flyable rate was above Army Standard.
(b) The Red Ball system has been responsive with the execution of certain engineer heavy equipment and HHE items. In these cases, Red Ball often runs over 30 days. There has been little noted change in the over-all supply system. Maintenance is becoming dependent upon the Red Ball system with little increase in the available ASL attacks. In the aircraft field, the lack of receipt of requisitioned PLL and stockage items forces undue reliance on the Red Ball system. This in turn decreases tactical helicopter availability. If the zero balance trend continues as reflected during this quarter, and the initial deployment stockage is deleted, the deadline rate of all equipment will increase and create additional dependency and demands upon the Red Ball system.
(3) Transportation: A total of 431 convoys were run between SAIGON and CU CHI with a total volume of 22,538 vehicles. The last cargo of operations NOONLIGHT arrived in the base camp area on 3 June 1966. This completed the movement of equipment and accompanying supplies of the Division units. The 1st Log Comd provided assistance in the movement of POL products and for some operational ammunition. The remaining cargo was transported from LONG BING and SAIGON with unit transportation.
(4) Operations: In order to meet requirements within a responsive time frame, a “Forward Support Command” was established during the brigade size operations. In operation WAHIAWA and KAHANA, all classes of supply were furnished at the brigade train sites. Elements of a forward maintenance company, a medical company and the supply and transport battalion were attached to the brigade. Both air and wheel convoys were successfully utilized for resupply. These forward operations centers proved to be the solution for complete resupply when a unit operates away from base camp areas.
h. (FOUO) Administration:
(1) Personnel: During this period the personnel posture of the division has been excellent. The present for duty strength, both officer and enlisted, currently exceeds the authorized strength. There is a shortage of infantry NCO's (MOS11B40) in the grades of E5 and E6. The casualty rate of NCO's has created a shortage in greater proportion than the rate of fill. This shortage is recognized as an Army wide problem, and is not considered as a critical shortage. The lower grade replacement fill in enlisted combat MOS's has been excellent with the exception of field artillery crewmen, MOS 13A10, and pioneers, MOS 12A10. The fill on these two MOS's has been accelerated during the month of July substantially reducing shortages in Division Artillery and the 65th Engineer Battalion. During May and June 1966, the division had a shortage of single engine, single rotor observation helicopter mechanics, MOS 67M, and single engine, single rotor turbine utility helicopter mechanics, MOS 67N. This shortage still exists. However, through an OJT program and an exceptionally good rate of fill during July, the shortage is no longer considered critical. The division has received an adequate number of company grade infantry officer replacements. In fact, at the present time there is a slight overage in infantry captains. As of 31 July 1966, the division was short 9 company grade artillery officers. There is an officer grade imbalance in the division aviation battalion in that the battalion has only 40% of the authorized warrant officer aviators and 200% of the authorized commissioned officer aviators. Some commissioned officers are filling warrant officer slots. However, the aviator infusion program being conducted in Vietnam will assist in reducing this problem.
(2) Key Losses / Gains:
(a) 14 May 66: Col Lynnwood Johansen, CO, 2nd Bde, medical evacuated.
(b) 17 May 66: Col Thomas N. Tarpley assumed command of 2nd Bde.
(c) 20 May 66: LTC Robert W. Walker, CO 1st Bn, 8th Arty medically evacuated
(d) 1 June 66: LTC James W. Cannon assumed command of 1st Bn, 8th Arty
(e) 1 June 66: LTC Harley F. Mooney appointed a Co fS, G2
(f) 1 June 66: LTC Alvin L. O'Neal assumed command of 1st Bn, 27th Inf.
(g) 18 June 66: Col Lynnwood Johnson assigned to MACV.
(h) 4 July 66: LTC Milton Hamilton, Executive Officer, 2nd Bde, assigned to HQ USARV
(i) 5 July 66: LTC Michael Barcz assigned as Executive Officer, 2nd Bde.
(j) 5 July 66: LTC Louis J. North assumed command of 4th Bn, 23rd Inf.
(k) 12 July 66: LTC John Moffat appointed A CofS, G4
(l) 12 July 66: LTC William E. Davis assumed command of 2nd Bn, 14th Inf.
(m) 15 July 66: LTC Charles M. Busbee, Executive Officer Division Artillery, assigned to HQ MACV.
(n) 15 July 66: LTC Aaron E. Walker assigned as Executive Officer Division Artillery
(o) 15 July 66: LTC Billy B. Nicholas assumed command of 3rd Bn, 13th Arty.
(p) 22 July 66: LTC Alvin B. O'Neal Co 1st Bn, 27th Inf medially evacuated.
(q) 24 July 66: LTC Robert D. Gamble Division Surgeon departed for reassignment in CONUS
(r) 24 July 66: Major Kelly G. Gregory Appointed Division Surgeon.
(s) 30 July 66: LTC John M. Schulton reassigned to HQ
(t) 31 July 66: LTC Victor F. Diaz assumed command of Bn (M), 5th Inf.
(3) The Division PX opened for operations on 25 July 1966. It contains 4000 sq. ft. of floor space and 4000 sq. ft. of storage space. Total sales from the Division Site Exchange was $1,025,328.73 for the quarter ending 31 July 1966.
Division (-) as of 31 July:
OFF WO EM AGG
AUTH 727 163 10,838 11,728
ASGD 769 98 11,641 12,508
PDY 733 98 11,068 11,899
(5) Losses: (1 May - 31 July)
KIA 4 0 128 132
WIA 86 0 1153 1239
MIA 0 0 0 0
DOW 1 0 23 24
Non-Battle Dead 0 0 11 11
Non-Battle 2 0 32 34
(6) Gains: (1 May - 31 July)
74 18 1064 1156
i. (FOUO) Civic Action:
(1) A Revolutionary Development branch has been established to coordinate the overall GVN program of long term national growth (Revolutionary Development) with division activities. (App. 12, Div Dir 581-2, Revolutionary Development Staff.)
(2) Statistical Summary (May - July)
Helping Hand Recipients - 26,839
MEDCAP patients - 12,927
Health and Sanitation - 313
Construction - 89
Transportation - 39
Commerce and Industry - 39
Agricultural and Natural Resource - 4
Education and Teaching - 47
Community Relations 278
Refugee Assistance - 8
Public Affairs - 37
(3) Subordinate units have been assigned CA responsibility for seven separate villages or hamlets. Additionally, the 1st Bde supports the 49th Regt (ARVN) and the 2nd Bde sponsors all 25th Inf Div (ARVN) units at DUC HOA and BAO TRAI.
(4) MEDCAP II: The division MEDCAP program is directed towards medical and dental treatment, improvement of sanitary standards, operation of first aid stations, dispensaries, small hospitals, and training of indigenous personnel in first aid, sanitation, and other medically related fields with an aim towards eventual assumption of many of the medical duties by the Vietnamese themselves. MEDCAPS are conducted in the assigned areas of CA responsibility twice a week. During the reporting period 310 MEDCAPS provided medical treatment to 18,927 patients.
(5) Helping Hand: During the reporting period the Helping Hand storage point became fully operational. The 350 tons of Civic Action material donated by the citizens of the state of HAWAII have been stored. On three occasions involving the support of hundreds of refugees, Helping Hand was able to respond rapidly and effectively. To date Helping Hand items consisting of health and sanitation items, toys, clothes, educational materials and basic work items have been distributed to 26,839 needy villagers.
(6) A standard Helping Hand solatium box has been developed to be given to personnel and their dependents who are accidentally killed or injured under any circumstance by US forces. It is also given to dependent survivors of victims of VC terrorist attacks. The box is relatively standard with its contents tailored by sex and age of the recipients, and includes such items as rice, food, mild, clothing, toys, shower clogs, etc.
(7) Summary of issues: (approximate)
Canned goods 21,000
Shower Shoes 412 pr.
Dental Kits 3,130
(8) The division held its first meeting of the Division Friendship Council in CU CHI during the first week of July. It was attended by division officers, VC District Chief and his staff, American sub-sector advisors, and the ast-province USAID representative. Items discussed included security communications, enlargement of regional and national police station and joint work on road repairs. Additionally, personal friendship---------------------
(9) A Disaster Relief SOP was drafted during the month of July which standardizes procedures for treatment of VN civilians who sustain accidental injury or death as a result of action by US forces. This SOP provides for medical evacuation, claims assistance, and solatium for the individual.
(10) A major effort in English instruction is taking place each week with an English education program sponsored by all subordinate units. Instructional material was obtained from JUSPAO and classes are purposely kept small to increase the quality of learning.
(11) The division has conducted four specific operations designed and tailored for pacification purposes. On these operations, a reinforced infantry battalion was located in an insecure area for a three to four week period. The purpose was to use joint US - Vietnamese civic action and limited combat operations to improve the security of the area while providing Vietnamese officials an opportunity to explain to the people the policies and intentions of the government.
(12) The division conducted three County Fairs during the quarter in villages controlled by the VC. The division band conducted a concert which was enthusiastically received. The VC cultural team also entertained the villagers with songs and stories. These teams continually prove to be very popular. The people were well treated and in addition to the entertainment, they were fed and given a MEDCAP. (App 13, Div Reg 525-1, Country Fair Operations.)
j. (FOUO) Psychological Operations:
(1) A total of 90 hours of airborne loudspeaker support was provided by the 146th PSYOP Co. Forty-two vehicular loudspeaker missions were conducted in coordination with the division PSYWAR effort. Operational Activity has shown a steady increase each month as the division implemented its PSYWAR plans.
(2) A portable loudspeaker frame with four speakers on each end of the frame is being developed for use on helicopters. An adapter assembly for power input, is being fabricated by electricians of the 3 /4 Cav. The adapter will consist of a male and female plug to accommodate otherwise incompatible fittings, and enable the broadcast system to utilize standard 28 volt outlets in the UH/ 1 & OH/23 aircraft.
(3) While PSYWAR plans call for more activity in all fields, emphasis will be to increase loudspeaker missions. It is felt that the advantages of the loudspeaker approach merit this new emphasis. Literacy rate and area coverage are problems often encountered with leaflet drops, but not with loudspeaker missions.
(4) CHIEU HOI ralliers continue to provide an excellent source of tactical and psychological information. At the request of the CU CHI CHIEU HOI Center, Division PSYWAR branch has supplied the center with several thousand National Safe Conduct Passes, and CHIEU HOI leaflets. Enemy propagandists have come up with the VC equivalent of our CHIEU HOI appeal, heralding the benefits for those who rally to the National Liberation Front, and assuring them of good treatment. When notification is received that a rallier has been received, the PSYWAR section attempts to interview the rallier as soon as possible. A Polaroid photograph is taken, a tape recording made, and all applicable information noted. The photographs taken will be used as part of the leaflet. The tape recording can be played almost immediately over airborne loudspeakers. When exploitable evidence is obtained, it may be used to produce tapes, add leaflets at division level, or it may be forwarded to the 246th PSYOP Co. Since these ralliers are good sources of propaganda, the direct support PSYOP unit is requested to produce these leaflets on a priority basis. Maximum time allowed on these priority requisitions is 48 hours. Local facilities are used when time is more important than quantity or professional preparation. Local Vietnamese officials are used as often as possible to record tapes and sign leaflets.
k. (FOUO) Medical:
(1) Personnel and Supporting Medical Units.
(a) The division at the end of the report period was short eight MC officers, one officer,
and one MSC officer. The MC shortages were in the two Brigade Surgeon slots, and six slots within the 25th Medical Battalion. We now have seven MCs on orders with four arriving in August, two in September, and one in November. At present, we have a KA (Surgical Team consisting of three MC officers) team from the 68th Medical Group attached to the 25th Medical Battalion.
(b) The 40th Dental Detachment (KJ) consisting of 12 Dental Corps Officers, one MSC Officer, and 20 enlisted men became operational at CU CHI on 23 May 1966.
(c) The 7th Surgical Hospital became semi-operational on 31 July at CU CHI. X-ray, surgical, and a 30 bed holding capability now exists.
(2) Aero-medical Evacuation:
(a) On 11 July 1966, a liaison visit was made by the 25th Aviation Battalion S-2 to the
Medical Company (Air Ambulance) (Prov) in SAIGON. The purpose of this visit was to discuss the high incidence of ground fire in the 25th Inf Div TAOR. It was learned that the medical unit does not maintain a ground fire chart, and since it is a logistical organization, it is not in the normal intelligence distribution channels. Therefore, the primary emphasis during the visit was directed toward familiarizing the unit commander and operations officer with our entire TAOR. The best routes, LZ's and areas to avoid were covered in detail. Areas where enemy ground fire must always be expected were posted on the unit operations map for further reference. Arrangements were made that future liaison visits between units would update these areas as information became available.
(b) On 28 July, two classes were conducted by the Medical Company (Air Ambulance) (Prov) at CU CHI. The classes included the techniques and capabilities of the air ambulance unit and demonstrations of new equipment.
(3) Preventive Medicine
(a) Disease: The spectrum of disease has not varied significantly. The rainy season to date has had no impact on the incidence of malaria, with only one case occurring. Six cases of infections hepatitis hae been diagnosed including four from HHB, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty. No reservoir for this cluster of cases has been determined, but a number of personnel within the battery have been prophylactically inoculated with gamma globulin. The VC rate has continued to increase during the three months from 230/1000 men/yr to 260/1000 men/yr, to 280/1000 men/yr.l Heat injury has not been a problem. The average of five cases per month is minimal. Two cases of immersion foot were reported in May and none since. A survey of disease of the feet indicated that no severe problem exists within the infantry units.
(b) Inoculation of animals against rabies is a monthly recurring program averaging approximately 20 animals. However, most animal bites and scratches occur from monkeys and rats which have not been inoculated against rabies and number 5/month.
l. (C) Signal:
(1) (U) May: During the last week of May, the 2nd Sig Group assumed responsibility for the lateral communication between the 25th (US) and15th (ARVN) Divisions, relieving the 125th Sig Bn of the task. The 232nd Sig Co of the 2nd Sig Cp supplied both equipment and operators.
(2) (U) June: On 7 June 1966, the 25th Infantry Division MARS Station ABBAJ commenced operation in the LMARS network, RVN. Operating on 1388.5 kes, “phone patch” service is available to MARS Hawaii on a 5 day week basis, Tuesday through Saturday. This service is available to all members of the 25th Infantry Division, with priority to WIA confined in hospital wards.
(3) (U) July: A New Equipment Introductory Team visited the division during the first two weeks of July to provide instruction on the Voice Cipher Device TSEC KY-8. They qualified a repairman and an instructor from the Division Crypto Section in addition to qualifying approximately 80 operators. During the first part of July, arrangements were completed to rebroadcast AFRS Vietnam at CU CHI. The programming was transmitted from SAIGON over one voice channel on the VHF, and rebroadcast at 1330 kc from a 50 watt transmitter on a temporary antenna beginning 7 July. The station operates 24 hours a day with 5 minutes of 25th Infantry Division News being broadcast at 2105 hours.
(4) (C) During the last half of July, the Division Signal Office worked with the signal officer of the 196th Inf Bde, made liaison visits to Corps and Army signal sections, and to the 1st Sig Bde to obtain necessary radio frequencies call-signs to incorporate the 196th Bde units into the Div SOI. Arrangements were also made to have the 1st Sig Bde provide base camp signal support to the 196th Bde because of the lack of signal resources within the 196th Bde, and the 125th Sig Bn.
m. (C) Training
(1) 1 -31 May 1966: Normal replacement and refresher training was conducted at small unit level by all units. Infantry units emphasized platoon level training and classes on detection and destruction of VC mines and booby traps. 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div also received training from the 2nd Bde on ambush techniques and tunnel search and destroy procedures. A/3/4 Cav trained on low-level aerial reconnaissance techniques. Training in night flying techniques continued to be conducted by the 25th Avn Bn and 3 /4 Cav in preparation for night airmobile operations. A “Lightning Bug” team of aircraft with searchlights and cal .50 machineguns has been developed by the 25th Avn Bn to interdict waterways at night. Combat support units have been given instruction on basic defense measures to allow them to reinforce the base camp perimeter. This allows more combat troops for major unit operations.
(2) 1-30 June 1966: Due to the training of pathfinder personnel, the airmobile capability of this division was improved. Night airmobile capability was expanded to include night combat assaults. Night firing techniques were emphasized in all phases of training. Special classes were conducted for generator operators. Cross-training of support troops in infantry duties was accomplished so as to relieve more maneuver elements for operations. Construction was initiated on two ranges for individual and crew served weapons. Replacement training was expanded. Training of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was completed on 30 June.
(3) 1-31 July 1966: Refresher training emphasizing fire adjustment, communications, booby traps and mines, and counter-ambush techniques continued throughout the month. A special training program was initiated to train selected individuals in mess management, military justice, explosives and demolitions, motor, signal and weapons maintenance, land flame thrower operations. Aviation units continued training on formation flying and night airmobile techniques. During this period the Lightning Ambush Academy began operations. Located in the northwest sector of the 25th Inf Div base camp, the Ambush Academy facilities were completed on 13 July 1966, and formal instruction began on 15 July 1966. The academy's staff and facilities can accommodate three TOE rifle platoons concurrently, and provide billet and messing accommodations for both students and cadre. The academy's staff consists of a captain commandant, 2 lieutenant instructors, and 12 assistant instructors, and administrative personnel. All instructors are combat veterans highly skilled in the conduct of ambush and counter-ambush techniques. The four and one-half day course trains the rifle platoon in ambush techniques emphasizing all available lessons learned. Normal attachments to the platoon such as forward observers and medical-------
3. (C) Commanders Observations and Recommendations:
(1) Personnel. None
(2) (G) Operations:
ITEM: Stay Behind Ambush.
DISCUSSION: The employment of a squad sized or larger element as a “Stay Behind” force has proven to be most effective after a company or battalion departs an area of operations. The VC will habitually move into an area after a unit departs to follow that unit or scavenge the area.
OBSERVATION: “Stay Behind” ambush techniques have proven to be especially valuable after a unit has occupied an area for a period of 24 hours or more. A “stay behind: ambush should be positioned by a unit prior to its departure from an area of operations.
ITEM: Employment of “Picket Stations” (small blocking forces).
DISCUSSION: The “picket stations” are small elements (fire team size) that are spaced throughout an operational area or along roads and trails to observe, direct fire, and interdict enemy LOC's. The key to the successful employment of the “picket station” is knowing the enemy situation, and excellent communications.
OBSERVATION: The utilization of “picket stations” provides excellent results in observing the VC, killing the VC, and controlling villagers. It also enables an infantry battalion to cover a large area with fire, and to prohibit VC efforts to move or escape.
ITEM: 105mmHowitzer Battery'
DISCUSSION: Mobility limitations in RVN dictate use of “light” maneuver forces which are deployed into operational areas by helicopters. A substantial number of successful airmobile operations were conducted during the period employing four-gun 105mm howitzer batteries. In addition to providing adequate fire support, a four-gun battery can be lifted in approximately one-half the time required to move a six-gun battery. Howitzer crews can be rotated within a battery as the situation dictates, and the two remaining howitzers can be effectively employed to defend the base camp or provide fire support for squad or platoon size patrol operations, near the base camp.
OBSERVATION: The four-gun 105mm howitzer battery with limited mission. Essential equipment can provide fire support to the maneuver battalion in airmobile operations.
ITEM: Counter-mortar Defenses:
DISCUSSION: To adequately counter a mortar attack requires a plan that will achieve wide coverage. A small volume of fire on many locations is preferable to a large volume of fire on a small number of locations. This can best be achieved by laying artillery by platoons on pre-planned targets. 4.2 inch and 81mm mortars can be profitably integrated into the early counter-mortar fires. In the event an attack is mounted, all tubes fire fuse VT at likely locations. As the situation develops and hostile positions are detected, the volume of fire in these areas are increased. Counter-fire planning must also take into consideration possible enemy withdrawal routes.
OBSERVATION: Counter-mortar plans should provide for instant broad coverage in the initial phase of a hostile mortar attack.
ITEM: Shell WP.
DISCUSSION: Experience has proven that close adjustment with shell HE is dangerous. Maneuver elements often mistake their true location on the ground, and maps in some areas have been found to be inaccurate. Firing with WP on initial rounds reduces the probability of friendly casualties, and allows air and ground observers to quickly spot their rounds. If HE is to be fired, in effect it is advisable to complete the adjustment with HE since weight difference between projectiles will normally cause HE to fire as much as 75 meters beyond WP. Adjustment with WP is also necessary when adjusting in dense vegetation. The use of WP during periods of unfavorable humidity and wind conditions should be controlled to prevent limiting visibility
OBSERVATION: The use of WP in adjustments should be included in SOP's, and FC's should be specifically trained on its use.
ITEM: Ammunition Lots:
DISCUSSION: Several lots of ammunition will normally be on hand in a battalion. In firing, it has been found that variations in range between lots will often exceed 100 metes. This variation becomes critical if a lot change is effected when firing defensive concentrations close to friendly troops.
OBSERVATION: Lots used in adjusting defensive concentrations must also be used to fire for effect.
ITEM: Air-Ground Communications.
DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that FM radios installed in light observation helicopters at times encounter difficulty in communication with ground stations employing the new series of FM radios. This situation can be off-set if the aerial observer carries an AN/PIC-25 radio set. Better communication with the aircraft radio will result if the ground station sets squelch control in the “old squelch off” position.
OBSERVATION: Aerial observers should always be equipped with the AN/PRC 25 radio set.
ITEM: Field Fortifications.
DISCUSSION: “Digging in” become impractical in many areas during the monsoon season. Adequate protection requires that bunkers be constructed above the surface. When loading for a move, consideration must be given to space allocation for shoring and bunker construction materials. Additional vehicles may be necessary in order to transport the proper amount of materials that are needed to adequately fortify a position.
OBSERVATION: Procurement of fortification materials and the means of hauling them must be considered well in advance of operations, especially during the monsoon season.
ITEM: Helilift of 105 Howitzer Battery:
DISCUSSION: Movement of 105mm howitzer batteries overland during the monsoon season is frequently impossible. Roads are impassable and suitable positions, of which there are few in number, are often accessible only by air. 105mm howitzer batteries must therefore develop proficiency in air movement. Each 105 battery should have a complete set of rigging equipment. By fully preparing loads in advance, a lift can be completed with minimum delay thereby permitting much more efficient aircraft utilization. Training of personnel in path-finder techniques will also promote a more efficient airlift operation.
OBSERVATION: All 105 howitzer batteries should be equipped with helilift rigging gear, and specialized pathfinder training should be given to selected personnel.
ITEM: Use of mechanized forces for search and destroy operations.
DISCUSSION: During search and destroy operations, two techniques are used, both of which are satisfactory. The first method has the APC's on line with the infantry mounted. A mounted sweep through the area is conducted followed by a second sweep dismounted. During the second sweep, the infantry and the scouts dismount and search individual huts, tunnels, and other hiding places. Each suspect area is thoroughly cleared and/or destroyed before moving to the next location. In the second method, the tracks are again placed on line, but they move forward at the pace of the infantry in a manner similar to that for operations in built-up areas. This dismounted infantry and scouts ferret out the enemy as the seep moves forward.
OBSERVATION: Of the two techniques, the former seems more satisfactory. This method costs fewer lives because of the armor protection against mines and booby traps. Additionally, the initial sweep provides a valuable reconnaissance of the area. This permits a concentration of infantry effort during the dismounted search, the time committed to search and destroy operations.
ITEM: Truck - Infantry Team Employment:
DISCUSSION: The VC make maximum use of anti-personnel mines and booby traps. Whenever possible, tracked vehicles should lead dismounted infantry. Tracked vehicles are less susceptible to damage and tend to hold personnel injuries to a minimum by exploding booby traps and mines with a minimum of exposure to personnel. Track commanders must be alert to booby traps and command mines suspended from trees, while the following infantry must stay for enough behind to avoid being injured when detonation occurs.
OBSERVATION: That tanks and APC's preceded infantry on operations through areas where enemy AP mines and booby traps are expected.
ITEM: Road Obstacles:
DISCUSSION: The VC often establish booby trapped and mined road obstacles. Aerial observers can detect and locate such obstacles so early movement of the clearing force would ensure uninterrupted movement of the main body. In clearing the obstacles, the surrounding area should be secured to insure that the roadblock is not covered by enemy fire. The area should then be checked for the presence of command detonated mines. If nothing is found, caution must still be exercised and only the minimum essential personnel should reduce the obstacle.
OBSERVATION: To insure uninterrupted flow of traffic the following procedures should be followed:
(1) Use aerial observers to detect road obstacles.
(2) Dispatch a clearing force.
(3) Secure the area around the obstacle.
(4) Check for command detonated mines.
(5) Check for mines in the obstacle.
(6) Use minimum personnel to reduce the obstacle.
(7) Make maximum use of earth moving equipment when available.
ITEM: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) techniques for entry into an area of operations.
DISCUSSION: It is essential to preserve secrecy in placing the LRRP into an operational area. Landing by helicopter at last light and entry by foot march have been used. The former has been the least successful technique unless the LZ was at a distance from the operational area, and located in an area of little VC activity.
OBSERVATION: To insure undetected entry, fast march is favored for the final approach to the area of operations.
ITEM: The necessity for employment of the air cavalry troop's maintenance and recovery helicopter on all unit missions has proven to be of paramount importance.
DISCUSSION: In order to make timely assessment of damage incurred to aircraft and to assure prompt repair or evacuation, it is highly desirable to have the maintenance aircraft on station, and employed in its primary role when a troop mission is taking place. It is very unrealistic to utilize the maintenance and recovery aircraft as a troop carrier backup, and expect it to function effectively in its primary role. Damaged aircraft assessments are accomplished rapidly, and the helicopter is either flown out or expeditiously evacuated in order to reduce vulnerability to enemy actions. Having this aircraft readily available during operations also increases the capability to immediately evacuate wounded personnel.
OBSERVATION: The use of the maintenance and recovery helicopter assigned to the maintenance section of the troop should be confined to its primary role.
ITEM: The use of OH aircraft in the aerial reconnaissance role is effective and reduces the valuable flight time of armed helicopters.
DISCUSSION: The use of light scout (OH-23) for reconnaissance and surveillance missions is
realistic and effective. The tendency has been to utilize the armed UH-1B helicopter in observation
roles because of its greater survivability in the event it is fired upon. Limitations on the OH-23 are
ineffective armament sub-systems, low survivability, and incompatibility of the old and new series of
OBSERVATION: Increased use should be made of the light scout aircraft (OH-23G) of the air cavalry troop for reconnaissance.
ITEM: Road trafficability during the monsoon season.
DISCUSSION: Units have experienced difficulty with trafficability on secondary roads and within operational base areas. This situation was not experienced prior to the monsoon season. This problem is normally encountered with vehicles carrying supplies such as ammunition, repair parts, barrier materials and similar items. Trafficability can be increased to a great extent by squad location and ----------and equipment among organic vehicles.
ITEM: Combined Combat Support Coordination Center (OSCC).
DISCUSSION: A OSCC, jointly operated by ARVN and US personnel, was recently employed by the 25th Inf Div during the period 3 9 June 1966. The OSCC functioned well, and contributed to mutual understanding between US and ARVN forces. Rapid reaction to various situations was made possible by close and continuous ARVN - US coordination. In the planning phase of joint operations, consideration must be given to the physical layout of the OSCC facilities.
(1) Billeting of ARVN personnel must be a responsibility of the headquarters setting up the OSCC. Because the ARVN is short of equipment, US personnel must make every effort to be good hosts and provide comparable facilities for them.
(2) ARVN personnel should be briefed on the area surrounding the DTOC to include all facilities and specific location of guards. Guards in turn should be briefed on the number of ARVN personnel in the area, and when they work and sleep.
(3) US personnel should, whenever possible, escort their ARVN counter-parts to meals to preclude any misunderstandings.
OBSERVATION: Consideration given to the above will eliminate misunderstandings and promote a much more efficient and harmonious working relationship between US and ARVN forces.
ITEM: Attached airmobile company.
DISCUSSION; On extended operations, the attachment of the same airmobile company for the duration of the operation would eliminate repeated orientation of the crews on enemy and friendly dispositions. In addition, mutual confidence and training would be greatly enhanced.
OBSERVATION: In allocation of airmobile assets, consideration should be given to attaching the same airmobile company to a unit for the duration of their operation.
ITEM: Joint utilization of tactical assets.
DISCUSSION: The confidence and professionalism of ARVN has been markedly improved by providing them with resources to react to current intelligence, i.e., tactical air, artillery, and army aircraft. Frequently the brigades will release their assets to the RVN for short periods of time in order for them to conduct limited operations.
OBSERVATION; This technique must be exploited in order to insure continued ARVN participation in pacification efforts.
ITEM: Early identification and coordination with supporting airmobile units is essential to proper aviation planning and the satisfactory execution of airmobile operations.
DISCUSSION: The identification of supporting non-divisional airmobile companies is frequently delayed until the evening before a scheduled combat operations. Such delays precipitate numerous unnecessary problems in coordination, planning and execution of airmobile operations.
OBSERVATION; Supporting non-divisional airmobile companies should be identified a minimum of 18 hours prior to an operation.
ITEM; Air traffic congestion: The control of all air traffic in the objective area in an airmobile assault
is vested in the Air Mission Commander.
DISCUSSION: Repeated instances of unauthorized aircraft intruding into the objective area during an airmobile assault continues to cause collision hazards to aircraft participating in the assault. These aircraft interrupt or delay supporting fires, and result in the unnecessary maneuvering of assault aircraft.
OBSERVATION; The flight of observer aircraft into the objective area of an airmobile operation must be coordinated and cleared with the Air Mission Commander. He will assign routes, altitudes and communications necessary to insure control.
ITEM: Communication support for tactical operations.
DISCUSSION; The signal equipment utilized in support of tactical operations for the 25th Inf Div in RVN has been reduced. The airmobile concept employed by division eliminated the use of signal equipment mounted in 2 ½ ton truck, and required a similar signal element for support. The equipment affected by this concept is the Radio Terminal (AN/MRC -69), Manual Telephone Central (AN/MTC -3), and Telegraph Terminal (AN/MSC - 29). The signal battalion has used the TO &E Manual Control Office (AN/MTC -7) and Teletypewriter Central Office set (AN/MGC - 17) which are mounted in ¾ ton trucks, to replace the AN/MTC -3 and AN/MSC - 29 respectively. To replace the AN/MRC-69 with a piece of equi0pment that would be airmobile, an AN/MRC 34.5 (so designed by the Signal Battalion) was improvised. This set consists of equipment from an AN/MRC-69 mounted in a ¾ ton trailer. It provides 4 to 12 channels of VHF communications. The accessory equipment to include: TE-75 generators, is stored in a ¾ ton truck. In addition, this equipment has a reduced height of 72 inches enabling it to be airlifted by the OH-47.
OBSERVATION: The reduced signal element provides adequate communications for tactical operations. The AN/MRC 34.5 has been on three operations: EWA, KAJANA I & II. Results were outstanding.
(3) (FOUO) Organization and Training:
ITEM: TO&E Changes
DISCUSSION: The 125th Signal Battalion is preparing changes to the TO&E requesting additional equipment and personnel. The following items will be requested.
(1) Additional photographic equipment and personnel to augment the present photographic service.
(2). Special lightweight VHF Radio Terminals (AN/MRC-112's) to support the airmobile concept.
(3). Additional machine-guns for the signal elements supporting tactical operations.
OBSERVATION: Because of the geographical location and operational commitments, the additional equipment and personnel are necessary.
ITEM: Pathfinder assistance is necessary in the conduct of airmobile operations.
DISCUSSION: The 25th Aviation Battalion has learned through the conduct of airmobile operations over a four month period, that the assistance of pathfinder personnel is essential to the efficient accomplishment of airmobile assaults and extractions. Operations conducted during the hours of darkness require pathfinder assistance both in the staging area and in the landing zone. Night airmobile assaults cannot be effectively conducted without them.
OBSERVATION: Due to the large number of airmobile operations being conducted by divisional units, recommend that a pathfinder detachment be provided each division size unit in RVN.
ITEM: A division aviation battalion must have the capability to exercise adequate control over both organic and attached operational aircraft.
DISCUSSION: A division aviation battalion must have a flight following capability. This would enable the unit to recall aircraft for rapid reaction operations, provide flight and mission information, and to initiate search and rescue operations. A flight control center, equipped with both FM and UHF radios, and manned by sufficient personnel for continuous 24 hour operations, is required to give the aviation battalion this capability.
OBSERVATION: Current TO&E's do not provide this capability for division aviation battalions operating in RVN. Recommend that personnel and equipment be authorized to implement a flight following center.
ITEM: An Airfield Command Section is required to control and coordinate airfield activities at division level.
DISCUSSION: The activity generated by organic and attached aircraft operating from a division base airfield is beyond the present control capability of the division aviation battalion. The additional activity of refueling and rearming during the conduct of airmobile operations, together with traffic control for the numerous flights operating from the division base airfield, necessitates a control and coordinating agency for efficient functioning of airfield activities.
OBSERVATION: In the absence of an Airfield Operating Detachment, it is recommended that an Airfield Command Section be authorized the aviation battalion to control airfield activities.
ITEM: Additional helicopter maintenance personnel are required to maintain the desired availability rate of aircraft in RVN.
DISCUSSION: Increased aircraft maintenance requirements caused by operating in unfavorable
climatic conditions, and by combat damage, severely increases the normal workload of assigned maintenance personnel.
OBSERVATION: Recommend that sufficient additional helicopter maintenance personnel be authorized the aviation battalion in order to be able to implement a 24 hour maintenance operation.
ITEM: Door gunners are essential for in-flight security of aircraft during both combat and administrative flights in RVN.
DISCUSSION; During all flights of UH-1D helicopters, both the helicopter crew chief and a door gunner armed with M60 machine-guns provide in-flight security for the aircraft. The need for armed door gunners is especially great when operating at low level. Their worth has been proven during 5 years of helicopter operations in RVN.
OBSERVATION: Current TO&E's do not provide for door gunners for each assigned UH-1 aircraft. Recommend that they be authorized the aviation battalion to provide necessary in-flight security.
ITEM: The aviation battalion has determined in conducting airmobile operations over a period of 4 months, that it is necessary to provide the Commanding General, each Brigade Commander, and the Aviation Battalion Commander with a UH-1D helicopter equipped with the Airborne Command Console AH/ASC-6.
DISCUSSION: To provide the ground commander with adequate communication facilities with his subordinate units and supporting agencies, the airborne command control aircraft should be equipped with the Airborne Command Console AN/ASC-6. The AN/ASC-6 also provides the Aviation Battalion Commander (Air Mission Commander) the communications capability with which to control airmobile operations.
OBSERVATION: Recommend that sufficient aircraft equipped with the AN/ASC-6 console be provided the aviation battalion to fulfill operational needs.
ITEM: Untrained aviation replacements are an unnecessary burden on a tactical organization.
DISCUSSION: It is presently necessary to transition aviators by both type and model aircraft, and conduct aerial gunnery training for armed helicopter pilots. This places a burden on aircraft availability, and reduces combat effectiveness. It requires 25 hours of valuable UH-1 time to train in this model. Training in gunnery and armed helicopter tactics is required by all aviators assigned to armed helicopters. This requires a minimum of an additional 10 hours of aircraft time prior to combat.
OBSERVATION: That individual aviator replacements be assigned according to their aircraft qualifications, or training be conducted prior to assignment to a tactical unit.
ITEM: Generator Classes:
DISCUSSION: Generators are the life-blood of a signal battalion. Climatic conditions and their continued use require that all generator operators be familiar with the basic fundamentals of generators. A generator class, examination, and critique has been conducted to determine what areas of instruction should be intensified.
OBSERVATION: These classes have increased the operator's efficiency, and decreased generator down time.
(4) (C) Intelligence.
ITEM: Close liaison with RVN intelligence collection agencies.
DISCUSSION: Close liaison with Sector and Sub-sector advisors, Special Forces detachments, and village chiefs has provided this headquarters with timely intelligence that would have been received too late for immediate reaction.
OBSERVATION: Maintaining close liaison with the above mentioned agencies is necessary in order to maintain a timely and current intelligence system.
ITEM: Red Haze missions.
DISCUSSION: Red Haze missions are being flown over areas recently fired on by artillery. Many reported emissions are, in fact, fires started by artillery fire.
OBSERVATION: Coordination between Division G2 Air and Division Artillery operations will considerably reduce, if not eliminate, Red Haze missions over areas being subjected to artillery fire.
DISCUSSION: Information collected by SLAP has been slow in reaching units which have an immediate reaction capability. In many instances SLAR information gathered at night has not reached a firing unit until the following morning.
ITEM: H & I Program:
DISCUSSION: G2 Air conducted an extensive aerial reconnaissance over the area of operations during Operation FIREBALL I. As a consequence, much target information was gathered thereby permitting the artillery unit to immediately initiate an effective H & I program. The success of this endeavor can be adjudged by the fact that an enemy mortar attack was not mounted on the artillery battery or supported unit even though both occupied VC dominated territory for three weeks.
OBSERVATION: Development of a sound H & I plan prior to occupation of strange territory will considerably reduce the possibility of mortar attacks.
ITEM: Intelligence furnished by RVN children.
DISCUSSION: On 2 August 1966, several small children informed members of an armored cavalry platoon of the location of several mines which were located in a parking area adjacent to highway 1, southeast of CU CHI. As a result of this information, three anti-tank mines were located and destroyed.
OBSERVATION: Sincere efforts of US personnel to befriend the Vietnamese people often yield tangible results.
ITEM: Quick reaction to perishable intelligence.
DISCUSSION: The use of quick reaction forces that have reacted to perishable intelligence reports from agents and other collection agencies has been very successful. If there is any delay in the reaction to this intelligence the target usually has disappeared.
OBSERVATION: Quick reaction forces such as Eagle Flights are needed in order to react to timely intelligence.
ITEM: The use of returnees (CHIEU HOI) as an important source of intelligence.
DISCUSSION: Recent experience has proven that one of the most profitable sources of intelligence is a returnee (CHIEU HOI). Many times the returnees have led US and ARVN troops to secret tunnels where weapons and supplies have been located. The returnee also provides US/ARVN intelligence agencies with names of VC in the different villages. Immediate operations to exploit this intelligence with the returnee accompanying the unit has proven most successful.
OBSERVATION: One of the best sources of information concerning VC activities and supply routes has been the returnee (CHIEU HOI).
ITEM: Interrogation teams at battalion level.
DISCUSSION: The use of interrogation teams by battalions while operating as a separate mission has proven highly successful. The information fathered by the team is immediately available tot the S2 and in some cases the captives have shown US forces the location of supplies and weapons.
OBSERVATION: When battalions are on separate operations, interrogation teams at battalion level can provide the commander with timely intelligence.
DISCUSSION: Only recently have pictomaps of our AO been made available to combat units. Prior to that time, the standard 1:50,000 map and aerial photos were used for operations. Now that pictomaps are available, the requirement for aerial photos has been greatly reduced.
OBSERVATION: The use of pictomaps, scale 1:25,000 have proven extremely valuable to combat units.
ITEM: Intelligence net.
DISCUSSION: The use of a brigade intelligence net when two or more battalions are operating in the field provides the S2's with a means to transmit and receive intelligence details without congestion of the brigade command net. In order to effectively operate an intelligence net, the requirement exists for each battalion to have a PRC-25 authorized for the S2. With this capability there would be an improvement in the intelligence flow.
OBSERVATION: Battalion S2's should be authorized a PRC-25 and RTG since the jeep mounted radio is not available for heliborne operations.
ITEM: Indigenous labor.
DISCUSSION: Many of the same members of the labor force return to unite on a recurring basis. Many guards, who are assigned to the duty frequently, become too friendly with the civilians. The possibility of infiltration of the labor force by VC is an ever present threat. Laxness or carelessness by the guards could have disastrous results.
OBSERVATION: Guards must remain attentive and alert while in charge of the labor force. They must be cautioned not to become too friendly with the civilians.
ITEM: Aerial reconnaissance.
DISCUSSION: Aerial reconnaissance of proposed LZ's is normally conducted in conjunction with airmobile assaults. An aerial reconnaissance conducted jointly by the Airmobile Commander and the Troop Commander is highly desirable. However, recent experience has shown that too many separate recons are being made by various elements. The practice of over-reconning an objective area or LZ is highly detrimental to the airmobile assault, in that the enemy seems to be aware of our intentions and is prepared to deliver heavy volumes of ground fire. Continuous orbiting of the proposed LZ by numerous aircraft, is certain to compromise the tactical plan
OBSERVATION: Reconnaissance must be held to a minimum when planning airmobile operations. Devious flight routes and avoidance of the objective area must be employed to prevent direct enemy observation and possible compromise of the tactical plan.
ITEM: Ground fire.
DISCUSSION: The incidence of ground fire directed at aircraft within the TAOR ha increased in total numbers of rounds delivered and accuracy. More automatic weapons are apparently being employed by the VC, especially in certain areas. Hits are being sustained at higher altitudes which indicates the VC are developing more sophisticated techniques in leading the target. Reports of heavy caliber automatic weapons are received in several INSUMS. .50 caliber fire has been received by aircraft on two occasions in the TAOR.
OBSERVATION: Aviators are instructed to vary flight path and altitude when repeatedly flying over known danger areas. The use of low level (nap-of-the-earth) tactics is implemented when heavy caliber automatic weapons fire is encountered.
ITEM: Ground Fire Charts.
DISCUSSION: The ground fire chart is a valuable tool, by which routes, LZs, and dangerous areas can be pre-determined. A 60 day presentation on the chart, sometimes races the path of an enemy force and provides valuable intelligence on enemy patterns of habit. The chart is also used to brief new aviators, or those not familiar with the AO/
OBSERVATION: Recommend that all units having organic aircraft maintain a ground fire chart. Pilots must report all incidents of ground fire to their parent unit as soon as possible so that the chart can be constantly updated.
ITEM: Interrogation, Prisoners of War. It is the policy of some VC units to have all their soldiers carry CHIEU HOI leaflets for use in the event of capture.
DISCUSSION: Through interrogation of a VCC who belonged to the D14 Bn, Mobile Force, TAY NINH Province, it was learned that each soldier in that unit carries a CHIEU HOI leaflet. He is instructed that in case of capture, he is to present the document and claim that he was on his way to rally. The captive who furnished this information also used this tactic and only after several days of interrogation did he admit that he had no intention of rallying prior to his capture.
OBSERVATION: A man who is captured automatically loses any rights he may have had under the CHIEU HOI Program. He is a VCC and should be treated as a prisoner of war until proven otherwise.
ITEM: The majority of the VCC who are captured, while not actually bearing arms, are almost always implicated by documents found on his person or those found near his place of capture.
DISCUSSION: When a Vietnamese is apprehended in an operational area and he has no incriminating evidence on his person to prove he is a VC, the interrogation amounts to “his word against the interrogator's”. Most persons whose names appear on VCC documents have difficulty explaining the circumstances. To date, the following types of VC have been captured and confessed to being VC simply because the prompt evacuation of the person's documents or documents found in the immediate vicinity of the place of capture produced evidence which the VC could not deny.
(1) VC medic for DUC HUE District, HAU NGHIA Province.
(2) Village finance cadre, DUC HUE District
(3) A member of the DUC HOA District Military Provisions Section.
(4) A member of G-20 Reconnaissance Company, SAIGON-GIA-DINH Special Region.
OBSERVATION: It is imperative that documents captured on the person of a VC or near the place of capture accompany the VC during evacuation.
ITEM: Approximately 1000 indigenous laborers are employed daily at the division base camp which presents an ideal vehicle to the VC for infiltration of espionage agents and saboteurs inside the division perimeter. This local labor pool is constantly screened by the CI Section, 25th MI Det as part of Operation KLEEN, to detect any espionage or sabotage threat. (p41)
DISCUSSION: The known and suspected VC elements, their families, and their sympathizers comprise a substantial segment of the civilian population in the area contiguous to the division base. The following actions are currently in effect to minimize the risks inherent in such a labor force.
(1) A daily search and shakedown of all laborers prior to entering or leaving the base, with close supervision by noncommissioned US personnel to prevent the introduction or removal of contraband, espionage, or sabotage devices. Women are hired in order to more effectively search women laborers.
(2) A continual screening of ID Cards, with periodic assistance by the National Police to detect bearers of false ID Cards in the division labor force.
(3) A continual collection and photocopying during the workday of laborer's ID cards provides a growing base of personnel data for comparison with current black and gray list holdings and for counterintelligence investigation.
(4) Informants have been, and are being, developed at various levels within and without the base
camp to report on suspects within the labor force.
OBSERVATION: Current search procedures reduce VC espionage potential to a minimum. The ID Card checks hamper attempts to gain access with false documentation; developed informants and other counterintelligence measures have resulted in the detection and apprehension of six self confessed VC espionage agents, and the elimination of other known or suspected VC found in the division labor force.
ITEM: Collection and recording of personnel data on known and suspected hostile personalities in positions to affect the mission of the division is one of the necessary functions of the Counterintelligence Section, 25th MI Detachment. The growing compilations become a basic tool of division investigation and intelligence operations.
DISCUSSION: At the onset of division operations in the current TAOR, local agencies furnished data on approximately 150 known or suspected VC. At the close of the current quarter, division intelligence activities had increased the black and gray list holdings to nearly 1600 known or suspected VC personalities plus a listing of over 1500 employees and other individuals of intelligence interest. These had initially been compiled in a conventional card file, but the requirements of the CHECKMATE program to include airmobile raids, dictated a greater flexibility in access to this centrally located card file. The following actions were taken to meet operational needs:
(1) It was determined that Division AG Machine Records Branch could provide technical and automated assistance to reproduce old data and integrate new and additional data to the present black list and other intelligence personalities holdings.
(2) An alpha-numeric code was devised by personnel of the Counter-intelligence Section, 25th MI Det, to translate current files into a format usable by AG Machine Records Branch.
OBSERVATION: The resultant machine records roster provide for a ready reproduction of current intelligence holdings in their entirety by geographic or populated area; by military unit or by types of personalities. This form of automation permits simultaneous and instant use of the local division intelligence personalities assets by several elements of the division and in varied operational areas. It also provides for ready dissemination of information to other headquarters. The system has been accomplished with currently authorized personnel and equipment
ITEM: Aerial photos of selected ambush sites have provided several advantages to ambush patrols.
DISCUSSION: Then ambush patrols are furnished large scale aerial photos of ambush sites, the following advantages occur:
(1) Thorough orientation of all patrol members regarding terrain features is possible prior to departure.
(2) Best areas of concealment are revealed
(3) Avenues of approach and escape are identified.
(4) Any enemy defense within the kill zone such as trenches, AW positions, or possible bunkers can usually be identified by imagery interpreters over-printing these positions directly on the photograph.
OBSERVATION: Units should exploit this asset to the fullest extent. Personnel attending the 25th Inf Div Ambush Academy are presently schooled in this technique.
ITEM: Tactical use of aerial photography in County Fair operations.
DISCUSSION: Large scale aerial photographs of selected areas such as hamlets or villages, can be put together as a photo-mosaic to portray a specific area, with identifying data posted thereon, which can be successfully used as follows:
(1) When County Fair operations are planned, squad leaders are equipped with photos of the specific area with the exact houses or buildings marked that his squad is to search or exploit. Complete coverage is assured beforehand.
(2) When used by interrogators, large scale aerial photos of a selected area enables a person being questioned to point out to the interrogator each individual house or position of interest being discussed. This is an excellent aid to communication and understanding. (p43)
OBSERVATION: The above technique is being employed on a continuing basis by elements of the 25th Inf Div with considerable success.
ITEM: Use of Special Imagery Interpretation Reports.
DISCUSSION: Special imagery interpretation reports can be utilized to depict the enemy situation in a given area by portraying the information contained in the report directly on 1:25,000 picto-maps, thereby providing commanders with a graphic display of the terrain in an objective area.
OBSERVATION: This technique should be applied during small unit actions utilizing the latest imagery interpretation reports that cover the objective area. Special Imagery Interpretation Reports are distributed to battalion level on all aerial photo missions flown.
ITEM: Targeting section at division level.
DISCUSSION: The organization of the division level targeting section has proven extremely valuable in the collation and intelligence data. This data is developed into a daily target list which provides FSR with a list of lucrative, active, target areas. Additionally, for each planned operation, a supplemental target list is provided to the maneuver elements and supporting units. Data collected includes but is not limited to the following:
(1) Imagery interpretation reports.
(2) SPAR reports
(3) Red Haze land SLAR reports
(4) Incidents of aircraft receiving fire.
(5) Agents reports
(6) All Order of Battle information.
(7) Roadblocks, ambushes and attacks by the enemy.
(8) Intelligence estimates and special studies.
(9) Visual aerial reconnaissance reports.
(10) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol reports.
(12) IPW reports
OBSERVATION: The full utilization of this section has resulted in a continuous flow of lucrative targets to be exploited by TAC air, artillery, gunships and ground maneuver elements. All units should continue to exploit this valuable resource. In this connection, unit reports of defenses encountered and destroyed prove extremely valuable in keeping targeting data current and valid.
ITEM: VC letter box numbers.
DISCUSSION: Letter box numbers are one of the most positive means used to identify VC units. It has been found that VC units may have several code/cover names, and the unit may switch cover names frequently to confuse friendly intelligence efforts. Letter box numbers on the other hand are usually adhered to for an extended period of time.
OBSERVATION: Units should catalogue VC letter box numbers for easy identification of units.
ITEM: Leaflets utilized for possible informant recruitment.
DISCUSSION: Several reward type leaflets have been published and distributed which instruct any person with information concerning the VC to write this information on the backside of the leaflet and mail it ot Box 12 at CU CHI, the District Headquarters. The leaflet has one corner ticked which he is instructed to tear off and retain as a receipt. The leaflet and the corner are both stamped with the same number. He is instructed to report at a later date with his receipt to the District Office to ascertain if his information has been of intelligence value.
OBSERVATION: This provides any Vietnamese with the anonymity he needs and desires while reporting information about VC activities, and offers an opportunity to recruit informants, either permanently or temporarily, through this screening system.
ITEM: CHLIEU HOI Enticement.
DISCUSSION; Psywar leaflets to date concerning CHIEU HOIs consist mainly of written enticements which the average VC cannot read, or cartoons which he does not accept. The interrogation of CHIEU HOIs show a high illiteracy rate, and indicates that several of the major reasons for rallying consist of the following:
(1) Constant hardships such as living in trenches and constantly on the move.
(2) Constant fear of artillery fire and air strikes.
(3) Constant hard work and lack of compensation.
(4) Loneliness, separation from their families (p45)
(5) Lack of, or scarcity of food.
(6) False promises by the VC cadres regarding compensations and rewards. Utilizing these reasons, an approach is being made to have photographs of actual scenes of CHIEU HOIs and even ARVN families in a comfortable home with ample food and clothing, happy children, and a close knot happy family depicted in leaflet form. Each photograph would include a caption in simple Vietnamese which they can understand.
OBSERVATION: Leaflets of this type would have a greater psychological impact on the average VC as he will be able to observe the photos and more importantly, understand them, thereby increasing the possibilities of his rallying.
ITEM: Handling National Policemen during field operations.
DISCUSSION: Field operations conducted by division units will invariable require National Policemen (NP). The proper utilization of these NPs will materially affect the degree of success a unit attains during field operations. The treatment they receive and the method by which they are used while attached to a unit will also be of major importance in maintaining the close relationship needed with the National Police authorities to carry on this joint effort. The following techniques should be followed when working with NPs.
(1) Keep a NP, with interpreter, near the commander at all times to enable the commander to properly transmit his instructions to the NPs.
(2) Keep NPs escorted at all times with US troops. The NPs have a tendency to wander and the unit may lose control of their activities.
(3) Maintain a roster of attached NPs with their respective Police Stations indicated. This will assist in returning them to their proper duty station after the operation.
(4) Muster NPs each morning and night for control and accountability.
(5) When the NPs are interrogating, keep everyone away.
(6) Rice is their staple food. Conditions permiting, feed them rice with a C-Ration.
(7) Give appropriate commendations to those NPs whom you believe have performed beyond their normal duties.
OBSERVATION: Every little effort made to assist these NPs will reflect directly or indirectly on the success of the operations, and enhance our relationship with the NP authorities for their constant support which we must have.
(5) (FOUO) Logistics.
ITEM: Logistical support for operations.
DISCUSSION; Normally, brigades operating more than 20 minutes in flight time from base camp should be supplemented by sufficient personnel from Support Command to operate a Forward Support Operations Center (FSOC). The FSOC should have the capability to receive, store and issue all classes of supplies for brigade operations. Maintenance and medical support should also be adequate for sustained field operations. The FSOC should be resupplied in bulk by base camp RSOC. Forward units are in turn resupplied from FSOC by air/ground as appropriate.
OBSERVATION: The resupply by aircraft from base camp is undesirable due to time consumed and refueling.
ITEM: The requirement for float helicopters.
DISCUSSION: Whenever there is extensive battle damage incurred by any of the units' helicopters, the divisions combat effectiveness is automatically reduced. Provisions should be made to replace these aircraft by float aircraft to maintain a high availability. The accepted availability criteria has been set at 80% within this theater. However, experience has shown that the armed helicopters fall below this level primarily because of battle damage. The present availability rate for armed helicopers runs at less the 60%. If a float were to be established to replace aircraft which require maintenance for a period in excess of one week, the effectiveness of the unit would be considerably increased.
OBSERVATION: That a maintenance float for armed helicopters be established and maintained at the division direct support unit for issue to the using unit whenever an aircraft is required to be grounded for an extensive period. It is felt that an acceptable increase in availability would be realized if the float criteria were established at 20% of the division aircraft authorization.
ITEM: High attrition of selected items due to environment
DISCUSISON: Weather, terrain and the requirements of operations in this area cause a high usage factor of certain items of supply. Item such as steel tow cables, tow pintles, tow pins, light tow bars and heavy tow bars are used extensively due to the soft areas in which heavy tacked vehicles must operate. These items are constantly breaking or in need of replacement. Suspension parts for track M113, and M88's are also in short supply because of continued heavy usage and mine damage.
OBSERVATION: That the high attrition rate of selected items be considered in order to keep the supply system responsive to user's demands at theater Army level.
ITEM: Helicopter loading and unloading crews.
DISCUSSION; When receiving and extracting equipment and supplies from forward areas by helicopters, sufficient personnel, organized as a team, should be immediately available to load and off-load aircraft with minimum loss of time. Teams should clear the helicopter pad quickly so as not to interfere with incoming ships.
OBSERVATION: Teams should be organized to load and off-load helicopters with minimum loss of time.
ITEM: Control of helicopters.
DISCUSSION; When more than one unit of a brigade is being resupplied by air, all helicopters should be controlled by the Brigade S4.
OBSERVATION: Coordination is required to appropriately redistribute helicopters in favor of the most demanding unit. A representative from the Brigade S4 stationed on the resupply pad is of great importance for maintaining control.
ITEM: Communication power units.
DISCUSSION; Adequate power units should be made available to units before deployment. This unit is critically short of adequate power units. 72 each, 5KW generators are being used with communications equipment that requires 10KW generators. Most of these generators have surpassed their life expectancy by 50 per cent. As expected, down-time is increasing rapidly. These unreliable generators are a serious threat to division communications.
OBSERVATION: Adequate power units should be made available to units before deployment.
ITEM: Artillery propelling charges.
DISCUSSION; Damp powder seriously affects the accuracy of artillery projectiles. Every effort should be made to keep powder dry. Canisters for 155/8 inch propelling charges must be securely sealed. Semi-fixed ammunition, once exposed to weather, will accumulate moisture rapidly and should be broken open only in small quantities. If repacked in fiber containers, the containers must be resealed. A system of ammunition rotation which provides for firing of opened rounds and firing of repacked rounds before breaking open additional ammunition will considerably reduce damp powder problems.
OBSERVATION: Storage of propelling charges and rotation of ammunition must be carefully planned and actively supervised, especially during the Vietnam monsoon season.
ITEM: Rotation of rations.
DISCUSSION: Rations are susceptible to deterioration due to climatic conditions and storage facilities.
OBSERVATIONS: Losses can be prevented by off ground storage and continual rotation. A cover should be provided which shields the rations from sun and rain without preventing adequate air circulation.
a. (FOUO) Civic Action.
ITEM: Immediate response to death, injury or property damage caused by US units during operations.
DISCUSSION: As soon as possible after learning that death, injury or property damage has been caused, an informal investigation is conducted in order to determine what immediate relief can be affected. MILCAP forms are distributed.
OBSERVATION: Monetary and material assistance should be channeled through local officials. The showing of interest in the people's problems by the GVN is a major step in strengthening the people's faith in their government.
ITEM: Effectiveness of Helping Hand, US Aid, and Catholic Relief Society commodities.
DISCUSSSION: Commodities from these organizations are used to support plans and objectives in conjunction with military operations and to initiate or support self-help projects.
OBSERVATION: The amount and type of aid should be determined by local officials. The commodities should also be distributed by local officials. Care should be exercised to insure that these commodities are not distributed to the extent of disrupting the local economy. The distribution has been effective when done properly. This has been evident by the changed attitude of the people towards the local officials and the US personnel.
ITEM: Effectiveness of English classes.
DISCUSSSION: Classes are being conducted with the local officials, businessmen, school teachers, nurses, and young children desiring to learn the English language.
OBSERVATION: The English classes seem to be achieving the main objective, i.e., teaching English to the Vietnamese, giving the Vietnamese people a better idea of the American way of life and why the American soldiers are in Vietnam. It also increases understanding between the Vietnamese people and the US soldier. The most effective classes do not have more than 10 people. It is better to adequately teach a few people than to have a large class learn relatively nothing.
ITEM: MEDCAP must be handled properly to insure maximum results.
DISCUSSION: There are several factors which a MEDCAP must include to be successful. Adequate security, working area with some degree of privacy, and one interpreter per each doctor as a minimum is required. Local health officials should establish a screening program so that the doctor's time is effectively used. Crowd control will require extra personnel. A portable shower unit can effectively be used to clean patients and draw any inquisitive children to another area. Any civic action distribution should be held in an area away the MEDCAP site.
OBSERVATION: All incoming S5s and surgeons should be briefed on proper steps for a successful MEDCAP.
b. Psychological Operations.
ITEM: Use of aircraft in psychological operations.
DISCUSSSION: Both the OH-23 and UH-1 helicopters have been successfully employed in support of psychological operations. Aircraft have been flown for leaflet drops and loudspeaker missions. The OH-23 has proven to be a more desirable vehicle for leaflet drops than the UH-1. The wind flow path around a UH-1 aircraft tends to pull the leaflets back in the open door and scatter them inside the helicopter.
OBSERVATION: The OH-23 is well suited for employment in support of PSYOPS when available. The following flight techniques are deemed advisable in the conduct of these missions:
Maintain an altitude of at least 1500 feet above the terrain.
Make trial leaflet drops to note wind direction and velocity.
Note speaker amplification and maintain an altitude of 2000 feet on speaker missions.
Do not hover over the drop area as helicopters are lucrative targets for the VC.
ITEM: Effect of psychological operations.
DISCUSSSION: Leaflets and loudspeakers used in various areas have a positive effect on the village people.
OBSERVATION: Local officials will furnish sound ideas for effective propaganda in their areas. They wish to counter the VC influence and are anxious for psy-war operations to be conducted. Due to lack of communication media (Radio, TV, Press) pamphlets and loudspeakers are an effective means to tell the people what is happening
b. (C) Commander's Recommendations:
Unlike previous operations in the TAOR in which the objective was the location and destruction
Of VC main and local force units, supplies, fortifications and base areas, three operations, Operations FORT SMITH east of TRANG BANG (XT4519), Operations FRESNO west of BAO TRAI (XT5204), and Operation SANTE FE east of BAO TRAI, were primarily intended as grass roots pacification ventures. These operations positioned an Inf Bn (+) in an insecure area and by a combination of joint civil affairs and limited combat operations, improved the security situation and made the Vietnamese government's presence and position understood by the local populace. The pilot pacification operation was MAILI conducted by the 1/27th Inf in the DUC LAP area during 27 April - 12 May. The experiences and lessons learned from this operation were applied to the three other operations. Obviously an operation of this nature, geared to winning over the local populace and undermining VC influence in a particular area, will not result in spectacular results or large VC losses. The effects are nonetheless impressive and in the long run perhaps even more critical to victory in Vietnam. Results that have been ascertained thus far include:
(a) Introduction of GVN officials into villages and hamlets which because of the existing security situation, has not been ventured into for several years.
(b) Marked increase in the commercial traffic along the main LOC's and tertiary trails in the
operational area. Particularly noteworthy is the current volume of traffic on the road between CU CHI and the province capitol BAO TRAI. Although previously considered under government control, this road was seldom traveled by government or military vehicles without escort.
(c) Amelioration of the US and Vietnamese government's image through the conduct of
“Country Fair”, MEDCAP, distribution of Helping Hand goods, and other civil affairs projects in the operational area.
(d) The breaching of the VC local political and military organization and long standing
infrastructure in the area. This is evidenced by the noticeable increase in voluntary informants, and the willingness of the VCC and VCS apprehended to implicate fellow cell committee members. In one case, a VC platoon leader through his wife indicated his desire to surrender to US forces in the area. Once apprehended, the platoon leader turned in his weapon and led a patrol to the hiding places of 9 other members of his platoon who were captured on the spot. On four separate occasion s village children also led patrols to VC arms caches containing numerous mortar rounds, grenades and booby taps.
(e) Improvement of the cooperation and rapport between the 25th Infantry Division and
Vietnamese Government and Military Authorities in HAU NGHIA Province, which in turn has resulted in a significant increase in military operations against the VC by the 25th Division.
(f) A bolstering of the spirit and substance of the RF and PF effectiveness in the operational area as a result of : (1) reaction forces, (2) fire support, to include gunships and illumination, and (3) physical improvement of outpost fortifications (For a more detailed analysis see App 14, 25th Div Pacification Operations in HAU NGHIA Province (U).)
(2) The use of attached personnel carriers on S&D operations as well as pacification operations has greatly enhanced the ability of a dismounted infantry battalion to rapidly close with and destroy the enemy. When an infantry battalion has attached personnel carriers, its movement is not as vulnerable to a few well positioned, well camouflaged enemy riflemen. Valuable time is often lost determining the location of a sniper. When track vehicles are a part of the maneuver element of an infantry battalion, this time is greatly reduced because the tracked maneuver element can close rapidly with the enemy to reduce or eliminate the sniper fire.
(3) During Operations FIREBALL I and COCO PALMS, single firing batteries, with security attachments, were deployed in a direct support role for battalion size maneuver elements. In each case, a command and control group was utilized. The group consisted of a field grade officer, a lieutenant, NCO representatives of the Battalion S2 and S3 sections, one clerk and two RTO's. The command group provided tactical fire control, the necessary command structure, insured that all personnel were briefed on the operation in progress and aware of the friendly and enemy situation, and aided in the coordination of supporting/reinforcing fires.
(4) Use of 155mm fires in direct support of infantry advancing in heavy undergrowth of semi-forested areas has proved effective.
(5) Adverse weather and bad road conditions during the monsoon season require units to load vehicles only to prescribed load limits
(6) When operating during the monsoon season, tracked vehicles are essential to insure emplacement and extraction of artillery pieces and vehicles.
(7) The capability of the aviation battalion to respond rapidly and effectively to a wide variety of combat aviation missions has resulted primarily from the development of combat experienced small unit leaders and flight crews. Perpetuation of this capability will be dependent upon the timely input of replacements for those personnel.
(8) Experience has proven that an infantry division operating in a counter insurgency environment requires a minimum of two organic airmobile companies. Airmobile companies in a direct support role are not responsive to the division. Planning is hampered by daily changing of direct support companies, and non-availability of support frequently requires radical changes in the ground tactical plan. An MTOE adding an additional airmobile company to the division has been submitted.
FOR THE COMMANDER
THOMAS W. MELLEN
Chief of Staff
1 thru 15
AcofS for Force Dev, DA (thru channels) (1)
fS for Force Dev, DA (thru IIFFORCEV) (2) (3)
CG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP - MH (direct) (4)
CG. USARV, ATTN: ANC-DH (direct) (5) (6) (7)
CG, IIFFORCEV, ATTN: AcofS G3 (8)
CG, U.S. Army Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga (9)
CG, U.S. Army Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky. (10)
CG. U.S. Army Human Rsh Unit, Ft Benning, Ga. (11)
USACDC Ln Off, APO 96558 (12)
APPENDIX 1 to 25th Inf Div Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending July 1966
POSITION GRADE NAME
General General Fred C. Weyand
Asst Div Brigadier
Commander General Edward de Saussuro
CofS Colonel Thomas W. Kellen
ACofS G1 Lt Colonel Duane W. Compton
ACofS G2 Lt Colonel James W. Cannon Thru 31 May 1966
Lt Colonel lMarley F. Meaney Eff 1 Jun 1966
ACofS G3 Lt Colonel Truman E. Boudinot
ACofS G4 Lt Colonel William E. Davis Thru 24 Jul 1966
Lt Colonel John L. Moffat Eff 25 Jul 1966
AcofS G5 Lt Colonel Robert R. Hicks
Div Surgeon Lt Colonel Robert D. Gamble Thru 24 Jul 1966
Major Kelly G. Gregory Eff 25 Jul 1966
Div Cml Off Lt Colonel Robert E. Bundy Thru 24 Jul 1966
Major Herbert C. Evans Eff 25 Jul 1966
IO Major William C. Shepard
AG Lt. Colonel Herbert L. Forsythe
SJA Lt Colonel David T. Bryant
Div Chaplain Lt Colonel Alexander L. Paxson
Div IG Lt Colonel Felix Salvador
Div Avn Off Lt Colonel Edwin P. Davis
Div Engr Off Lt Colonel Carroll D. Strider
Div Fin Off Major Dwight L. Groninger
Div Trans Off Lt Colonel Kenneth R. Haas
CO, 25th Div Artillery Colonel Daniel B. Williams
CO, 7/11th Arty Lt Colonel William D. Brown
CO, 1/8th Arty Lt Colonel Robert G. Walker Thru 31 May 1966
Lt Colonel James W. Cannon Eff 1 Jun 1966
CO, 3/113th Arty Lt Colonel Aaron E. Walker Thru 14 Jul 1966
Lt Colonel Billy B. Nicholas Eff 15 Jul 1966
CO, 25th Div Spt Comd Colonel Herbert S. Lowe
CO, 725th Maint Lt Colonel Robert S. Proudfoot
CO, 25th S&T Lt Colonel William S, Kittrell
CO, 25th Med Lt Colonel Jack Bakridge
CO, 1st Bde Colonel William B. Sandlin
CO, 2/14th Inf Lt Colonel John M. Schultz Thru 11 Jul 1966
Lt Colonel William E. Davis Eff 12 Jul 1966
CO, 4/9th Inf Lt Colonel Shepherd A. Booth Jr.
CO, 4.23rd Inf Lt Colonel Michael Beauzez Thru 4 Jul 1966
Lt Colonel Louis J. North Eff 5 Jul 1966
CO, 2nd Bde Colonel Lynnwood M. Johnson Thru 13 May 1966
Colonel Thomas M. Tarplay Eff 14 May 1966
CO, 1/27th Inf Lt Colonel Harley F. Meeney Jr. Thru 31 May 1966
Lt Colonel Alvin L. O'Neal Eff 1 Jun 1966
CO. 2/27th Inf Lt Colonel Boyd T. Bashere
Co, 1/5th (M) Inf Lt Colonel Thomas U. Greer
CO. 125th Sig Bn Lt Colonel Thomas S. Ferguson
CO, 25th Avn Bn. Lt Colonel Edward P. Davis
CO, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav Lt Colonel John R. Hendry
On 11 May 1968, an eighteen man killer team from 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry LRRP element was inserted by eagle flight 1500 meters from the Saigon River in the Hobo Woods. The team moved several hundred meters and was pinned down by intense fire from a large NVA force. We were receiving small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire. We took up a position in a large bomb crater and started to return the fire. It wasn't long before we realized the NVA force had our team surrounded. We then called for air support and a fire team from Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion came tour assistance. Diamondhead 10 coordinated with us and then told us to keep our heads down he was coming in close; this was necessary since the enemy was about 25 meters in front of us. The gunships worked their way around our position and killed about 6 Viet Cong on their first pass. Even though the gunships were receiving enemy ground fire they continued to pound the enemy around us with deadly and accurate fire. When the enemy fire ceased Diamondhead 10 told us to move to a clearing 100 meters away and to wait for the slicks to arrive. As we moved to the clearing the gunships dangerously exposed themselves as they flew over us at very low-level to make sure the Viet Cong didn't have an ambush set up for us. When we got to the pickup zone we secured the area and waited for the slicks. When the slicks arrived they started to receive heavy enemy fire. Even though it was dark the slicks covered by another fire team Diamondhead 30, without regard to their own safety came into the small landing zone. One of the slicks was heavily damaged but returned to Cu Chi safely. The bravery of every crewmember that day was directly responsible for many valuable lives being saved. The courage and skill displayed by all crewmembers is praiseworthy and deserving of any award bestowed upon them.
S/Sgt. Rodney Trevares
LRRP, ¾ Cavalry
A True Certified Copy
Ernest L. Newton
On 11 May 1968 at about 1830 the Diamondhead 10 light fire team was scrambled to coordinates XT647225 to provide close air support to the Cobra 23 element. Upon arrival in the area Diamondhead 10 contacted Cobra 23. Cobra 23 was located inside a large bomb crater with the rest of his element. He was surrounded by Viet Cong, and numerous attempts were made to overrun his position. The Diamondhead 10 light fire team was asked to concentrate on the area to his west about 25 meters out. The fire team expended half its ordinance on that area and neutralized the target area even though the fire team was receiving intense enemy fire during each firing pass from several locations. An attempt was made by the Viet cong to overrun the Cobra 23 element from the North but Diamondhead 10 immediately rolled in an ended the Viet cong effort by killing 6 Viet cong and wounding others. The East flank of Cobra 23 was threatened but the area was neutralized by Diamondhead 10. After forty five minutes of capping the area and killing many Viet Cong, cobra 23 was satisfied that he could move into a landing zone to the south for extraction. His element had reconned the area by fire and the Diamondhead 10 fire team made continuous low level passes ahead of the Cobra element to insure that no ambush had been prepared. The Cobra 23 element made it into the landing zone safely and were lined up for pickup. The Diamondhead 10 fire team helped coordinate with Clipper to arrange a team of slicks for pickup. Diamondhead 30 came on station and was briefed by the Diamondhead 10 team. When the briefing was complete the Diamondhead 10 team was forced to return to Cu Chi to rearm and refuel. They were then diverted to another mission.
DAVID E. HENARD
Captain, Signal Corp.
Fire Team Leader