After Action Reports 37

(2) Operation FORT NISQUALLY (28 Nov 66 - 14 May 1967). The mission of the operation was to conduct operations to secure the area adjacent to the base camp of the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div at DAU TIENG and to eliminate VC influence in the unit's Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Operations from 1 - 14 May 1967 primarily consisted of daylight reconnaissance and night ambush patrols within 3000 meters of the DAU TIENG base camp. There was no significant contact.

Results of Operation FORT NISQUALLY were as follows: 28 VC killed in Action (KIA), verified by Body Count (BC), 23 VC KIA possible (poss), 26 VC Prisoners (PW), 58 detainees. Captured and evacuated were: 23 individual weapons, 2 LMG, 1 claymore mine, 1 CHICOM RPG-2, 1695 rds ammo, 100 expended .30 cal links, 1 bayonet, 3 grenades, 30 punji stakes, 36 tons of rice, 105 lbs pork, 325 lbs sugar, 41 lbs tea, 20 lbs shrimp, 6 kg assorted food; 10 bicycles, 5 new bicycle frames, 3 bags bicycle parts; 1 pair jungle boots, 1 roll black material, 100 lbs assorted clothing; 300 ft electric wire, 2 FM radios, 4 batteries; 1 US gas mask, 1 large roll mosquito netting, 111 lbs documents, 11 rolls corrugated tin, 20 gal kerosene, 30,000 Piasters, 150 lbs assorted medical supplies, 21 lbs epsom salts.

Destroyed were: 10 AT mines, 32 AP mines, 29 hand grenades, 3 105mm casings, 3 155mm projectiles, 1 105mm projectile, 3 81mm rds, 1 M-79 rd, 3 rds CHICOM RPG-2, 33 CBU bomblets, 4 200lb bombs, 1 750 lb bomb, 39 ½ tons rice, 1000 lbs beans, 1700 lbs peas, 3 lbs sugar, 1 gal grease, 2 canteens whiskey, 1600 lbs mullett; 7 sampans, 6 bicycles; 1 Bn size hospital, 11 VC base camps, 309 bunkers, 3 buildings, 115 foxholes, 32 huts; 310 ft electric wire, 5 rolls barbed wire, 250- sheets tin, 1 grinding mill.

(3) ALA MOANA (1 Dec 66 - 14 May 1967). This operation was conducted in HAU NGHIA and BINH DUONG Provinces to destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps near the division base camp at CU CHI, and in the FILHOL Plantation, and to provide security for the CU CHI base camp and surrounding area. 1st and 2nd Brigades, 25th Infantry Division continued participation in Operation ALA MOANA, employing local security operations, without significant contact until the termination of the operation on 14 May 1967.

Results of Operation ALA MOANA were as follows: 381 VC KIA (BC), 558 vc kia (POSS), 25VC PW, 652 DETAINEES. Enemy equipment losses were: 94 small arms weapons, 5 crew served weapons, 56 artillery shells, 133 mines, 406 grenades, 7 mortar rounds, 12 bombs, 21n499 rounds of small arms ammunition, 181 booby traps, 87 cluster bomb units (CBU), 188 blasting caps, 17 anti-tank weapon rds, 289 sampans, 4 outboard (sampan) motors, 55 lbs medical supplies, 14 bicycles, 162 lbs documents, 2 oxcarts, 15 sticks TNT, 4 lbs clothing and 57 lbs explosives; 5 punji pits, 2,395 meters of trenches and 57 foxholes; 120,092 tons of rice, 2 tons of salt and 5 tons of food stuffs other than rice.

(4) JUNCTION CITY: (22 Feb - 16 May 1967). This operation concluded using the Mobile Brigade Concept to continue offensive operations in War Zone “C” begun by the forces of the entire division. Operations from 1 May through 16 May were conducted by the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, which had been placed under operational control (OPCON) of the 25th Infantry Division. Significant contact occurred on 13 May when Fire Support Base (FSB) 11, at XT305495 was attacked by an unknown size VC unit and received over 100 rounds of 81mm and 82mm mortar fire with small arms (SA) and automatic weapons (AW) fire, resulting in one tank and one M151 ¼ ton truck being destroyed, 8 US Killed by Hostile Action (KHA) and 30 more US Wounded in Hostile Action (WHA). The operation concluded on 16 May without further significant contact.

Enemy Equipment losses were: 314 small arms weapons, 30 crew served weapons, 1,193 artillery shells, 156 mortar rds, 60 anti-tank weapon rounds, 331 mines, 559 grenades and booby traps, 41,482 rds of small arms ammunition, 120 bicycles, 25 sampans, 5,098 lbs of clothing, 1,058 lbs medical supplies, 8 radios, 4 telephones, 2,500 feet of communication wire, 50 batteries, 1 head set, 1 Morse key, 1 mulimeter, 2 tape recorders, 7 audio tapes, 1 antenna, 9 oxcarts, 2 printing presses, 10 generators, 12,643 gallons of fuel and 1,495 lbs of documents.

(5) MANHATTAN (23 April - 17 June 1967). The 25th Infantry Division as a part of IIFFORCEV, began Operation MANHATAN on 23 April with the objective of destroying VC forces and installations in the HO BO - BOI LOI - BEN CUI areas, and along the SAIGON River in conjunction with other IIFFORCEV units. After IIFFORCEV concluded the operation on 11 May, the 25th Infantry Division continued Operation MANHATTAN as a division operation until 07 June 1967, employing the 1st and 2nd Brigades, 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Search and destroy operations commenced in April continued. On 9 May, 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division completed its participation in Operation MANHATTAN and returned to CU CHI Base Camp in preparation for the forthcoming Operation KOLEKOLE. On 10 May, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division completed its participation in Operation MANHATTAN and returned to the DAU TIENG Base Camp in preparation for the forthcoming Operation AHINA and DIAMOND HEAD. First Brigade, 25th Infantry Division continued operations and provided necessary security for extensive clearing operations conducted by the 65th Engineer Battalion, which employed the ROME PLOW, a modified bulldozer with a sharpened blade used for clearing densely vegetated areas. In addition, necessary roads were constructed in the Area of Operations (AO). The clearing of the vegetation in the AO deprived the VC; of the sanctuary they had long established throughout the area, especially in the HO BO and BOI LOI Woods .

Significant results of Operation MANHATTAN were: 74 VC KIA (BC), 99 VC KIA (poss), 3 HOI CHANH and 19 PW. Enemy weapons and munitions losses were: 201 small arms weapons, 18 crew served weapons, 42 artillery rounds of ammunition, 671 mortar rounds of ammunition, 214 anti-tank weapons rds of ammunition, 293 mines, 901 grenades and booby traps, 400,543 rds of small arms ammunition, 168 cluster bomb units, 3200 blasting caps, 2300 feet of detonating cord, 1800 lbs of TNT and 2278 lbs of black powder.

Enemy equipment losses: 34 sampans, 400 pounds of clothing, 443 pounds of medical supplies, 250 tons of rice, 5.5 tons of other foodstuffs, 398 pounds of documents, 12,760 feet of communication wire, 7 radios, 30 pounds of punji stakes, 17 pounds of tools, one telephone, 7 protective masks, 2 plows, 108 bicycles, 1 oxcart, 6 generators, 25 gals of CS agent and 6 outboard motors.

(6) AHINA (13 - 18 May 1967). This operation was a search and destroy operation conducted in the east central portion of War Zone “C”, bounded by XT6490, XT6450, XT5450 and XT6440. Its purpose was to engage and destroy VC/NVA forces known to be operating in the AO, and to destroy VC/NVA base camps and facilities throughout the area. Operations conducted in the AO from 1 -5 April during Operation JUNCTION CITY indicated that further enemy facilities and forces would be located there if the AO were re-occupied. Therefore Operation AHINA was planned to exploit this intelligence. Enemy contact during the operation was limited to sniper fire and occasional contact with squad size VC forces. Extensive weapons, foodstuffs, and supplies were uncovered and destroyed which made the operation a success. Supplies captured included three trucks known to have been employed by the VC for resupply purposes. Operation AHINA was also significant for its employment of a light tactical raft for an unopposed crossing of the SAIGON River at XT459562 by mechanized infantry in conjunction with a heliborne assault by other infantry forces.

Results of Operation AHINA were: 9 VC KIA (BC), 2VC Killed by Air Force (KBAF) (poss). Enemy equipment evacuated included: 3 AK-47, 1 SKS carbine, 1 RPG-2 rocket launcher, 1 CHICOM LMG-type 56 w/magazine and 100 rds ammunition, 1 M1 rifle barrel - receiver group, 8000 brass mine adapters, 8000 detonator components, 100 feet electrical cord, 200 smooth metal cylinders (believed to be pistol barrels); 7650 lbs polished rice, 330 bags unpolished rice (200 lb bags), 7 cows; 1 truck-Willys- panel, 1 truck-Landrover type, 70 lbs clothing, misc machine parts - weapons molds, 1 fire extinguisher w/DDT spray, 1 single cylinder gas engine, 20 springs -3” in diameter 10” long, 1 outboard engine - 9HP Briggs & Stratton w/misc tools and spare parts.

Enemy Equipment Destroyed: 90 rifle grenades, 63 frag grenades, 11 anti-tank mines, 1 RPG-2 rd w/2 fuses, 18 howitzer rds - believed to be Japanese pack-howitzer rds, 1- 81mm rd, 100rds .30 cal, 150 rds 5.56mm, 4600 7.62 rds (short) for AK-47, 1400 7.62 rds misc size, 15 rifle stocks, 12 magazines - 30 rd “banana clip” for AK-47, 1 shotgun, 8 lbs black powder, 4 M-79 rds, 1 trip flare (US), 1 anti-personnel mine 8” diameter, 6 CBU bomblets, 300 lbs cordite, 5 casings for shape charge, 9 60mm mtr rds, 1 shape charge - 10 lb, 15 lbs batteries, 1 metal lathe, 1 drum - 55 gal; 54 huts (includes 4 kitchens & 4 classrooms), 42 bunkers w/overhead cover, 1200 meters trench w/foxholes; 10 tons rice, 9 lbs peas, 50 lbs peanuts, 1 hog (killed by Airstrike), 3 quarts cooking oil, 12 cans (5 gal ea) coconut oil, 30 cans (2 gal ea) beans; 1 truck 3/4T Dodge - WWII type (damaged from previous airstrike), numerous ports and pans, cooking utensils, 2 fish nets, 8 bicycles w/misc repair parts, 2 sampans, 1 winch w/30' cable, 2 hammocks, 2 gal gasoline, 1 gal kerosene.

(7) KAWELA (11 June - 25 June 1967). This operation was begun by the 25th Infantry Division as a follow-up to Operation MANHATTAN, to exploit intelligence reports of VC activity along the upper SAIGON River (vic XT5632) and in the TRI TAM District (XT5836). It employed the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry to search and destroy VC forces and installations in an AO thought to house elements of Military Region (MR) IV, and that contained supply routes that continued to the FILHOL Plantation immediately north of the Division base camp at CU CHI, and to the HO BO Woods beyond them. During the operation no main force units were encountered. Contact was limited to sporadic sniper activity from local guerrillas. The operation was begun with two crossings of the Saigon River. One a non-illuminated, non-support crossing using aluminum foot bridges and light tactical rafts. It was unopposed while another diversionary crossing was made by mechanized units to the south. Although contact was negligible, extensive amounts of enemy munitions and equipment were seized.

Results of Operation KAWELA were: 38 VC KIA (BC), 26 VC KIA (poss), VC killed by Air-strikes (KBA) 2 (BC), VC KBA (poss) 25. Enemy equipment captured : 58 rds of SA ammo, 2 RPG-2 launchers, 22 lbs of medical supplies, 12 lbs of documents, 42 rds of SA ammo, 5 AK-47 rifles, 1 pistol belt, 1 combat pack, 5 bags of CS-1, 9 tape recordings, 1 CHICOM carbine, 7 RPG-2 rds, 9.2 tons of rice, 1 CHICOM carbine,`1 cannon barrel, 2 bicycles, 1 82mm mortar w/base plate, 1 grinding machine, 2 grenades, 1 dairy.

Equipment destroyed: 9 sampans, 6 AT mines, 305 bunkers, 82 military structures, 12 bicycles, 29 tons of rice, 1,257 rds of SA ammo, 3 claymores, 2 VC protective masks, 55 AP mines, 1 500 lb bomb, 23 CBU's, 66 trenches, 29 tunnels, 54 grenades, 14 sampans, 1 60mm rd, 1 500 lb bomb, 1 .50 cal breech, 1 .30 cal pistol w/o barrel, 1 .50 cal MG tripod, 3 ¼ lbs of explosives, 3 booby traps, 3 stoves, 1 RPG-2 rd, 1 raft, 6 CBU's detonators.

(8) SABER THRUST: (22-20 April, 22 May-2 June, 5-8 June, 2-10 July 1967) This operation was conducted by the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry as an intermittent security operation. SABER THRUST was begun on 7 April and conducted in five phases as separate security and patrolling operations in the vicinity of the CU CHI base camp, and along the Main Supply Route (MSR). During this reporting period it was expanded to include engineer security, night ambushes, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and employment of a base camp reaction force. Operation SABER THRUST VI was conducted from 22 May through 2 June throughout the CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts of HAU NGHIA Province, to include the FILHOL Plantation and the HO BO Woods. SABER THRUST VII was conducted from 5-8 June in an AO centered on XT2839 northwest of GO DAU HA. SABER THRUST VIII was conducted from 2-10 July 1967 again throughout the CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts of HAU NGHIA Province. For the extent of enemy contact see paragraph 1-e, Intelligence.

(9) AKUMU (08 July 67 - 26 July 67). Purpose of the operation was to conduct a cordon and search and pacification operation in PHU HOA DONG Village (XT715195), BINH DUONG Province. This village is located five kilometers to the northeast of the division's base camp at CU CHI, and at the eastern edge of the FILHOL Plantation. The cordon and search and pacification operations were conducted jointly with the 7th ARVN Regiment located in PHU HOA DONG.

First Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, with 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) under its operational control (OPCON), was the control headquarters for the execution and continuation of the cordon while 7th ARVN Regiment controlled the execution of the search and clearing of the village interior. Intelligence prior to the operation indicated the presence of elements of the 1st Bn, Military Region IV (MR IV), the 7th Bn, CU CHI District and the 2nd Bn, CO MON District in the area. The strength of each battalion was 200 - 300 men. In addition a VC local force platoon of 25 men was known to operate in the area. Considerable VC activity in the adjacent FILHOL Plantation and HO BO Woods was known to be influential in the activities in the village and surrounding areas. VC fortifications, installations, booby traps and mines were found throughout the operation. Contact with VC forces was light for the first days of the operation, consisting of sporadic sniper fire from groups of 2 or 3 VC.

Then on 13 July contact increased marked 130148 hours, Co B, 4th Bn (mech), 23rd Inf received 10 rds of RPG-2 fire vic XT686216, damaging 2 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC), and resulting in 1 US KHA, 8 US WHA, 3 VC KIA(BC), 2 VC KIA (poss) and the capture of 1 RPG-2 launcher with two rounds. At 130142 hours a four man Listening Post (LP) from Co B, 4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf engaged 3 VC at XT687212, resulting in 3 US WHA and unknown VC losses. Finally, at 130225 hours, Co A, 4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Ind received sniper fire at XT702208, resulting in 1 US WHA. At 131440 hours, Companies B and C engaged an unknown VC force at XT664218 resulting in 2 US WHA. There was light contact until 18 July when Co B, 4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf received 23 RPG-2 rounds and 82mm mortar rounds at XT669198. Fire was returned resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (poss), 1 US KHA and 15 US WHA. Contact was believed to be with 2nd Co, 1st Bn, MR IV.

There was no further significant contact until 22 July, when 2nd Bn, 14th Inf Recon Platoon engaged 2 VC at XT749159 after they were spotted by a Forward Air Controller (FAC). Two VC were KIA (BC) and an AK-47 rifle and a caliber .45 pistol captured. Further contact was again negligible until the termination of the operation.

At the start of the operation a hamlet festival was conducted by Civil Affairs team which explained the purpose of the US presence in the village to over 19,000 persons. MEDCAPS and Catholic services (in the village church) were held throughout the operation. Operation AKUMU challenged the VC in a formerly secure stronghold, and greatly diminished VC influence “at the back door” of Camp CU CHI.

Enemy equipment destroyed: 237 bunkers, 74 tunnels, 49 foxholes, 970 meters of trench, 55 punji pits, 43 military structures, 22 AT mines, 27 AP mines, 15 sampans, 4 82mm mortar rds, 2 60mm mortar rds, 16 CHICOM grenades, 5 rifle grenades, 2 US claymores, 9 US hand grenades, 2 docking sites, 2 misc. drums, 57 rds CHICOM carbine ammo, 1 rd M16 ammo, 2 stick mines, 2 lbs clothing, Misc , 15 lbs rice, 2 105 canister, 1 hat.

Enemy equipment captured: 1,198 rds SA ammo, 3 pistol belts, 1 lb documents, 1 sign-minefield, 1 flashlight, 1 compass, 1 pr black gloves, 1 poncho (VC), 3 RPG-2 rocket launchers, 1 RPG-2 booster, 12 pr sandals, 1 hammock, 1 pr trousers, 1 M1 rifle - cal .30, 1 canteen with cup, 2 protective masks, 2 57 RR containers, 1 canvas bag, 15 M79 rds, 2 belts with clip for AK-47 rifles, 1 82mm mortar tube and elevating mechanism,. 2 .45 cal pistols, 1 magazine - AK-47, ½ lb med supplies, 1 lb clothing, 560 piastres, 1 holster - .45 cal, 1 canteen cover, 1 magazine .45 cal, 1 CHICOM rifle, 1 CHICOM 7.6mm red stock carbine.

(10) The 25th Infantry Division MONSOON CAMPAIGN began on 14 May 1967. Within the division TAOR, three operations are being conducted: Operation KOLEKOLE, BARKING SANDS and DIAMOND HEAD. The mission of the division in the MONSOON CAMPAIGN is to conduct offensive operations with emphasis in populated areas, to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, to secure major lines of communication (LOC's) to support the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Revolutionary Development Program, and to reinforce Free World Military Assistance Forces and FVN forces as directed.

(a) KOLEKOLE (14 May 1967 - continuing). This operation is a search and destroy operation conducted by 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in the DUC HOA, BAO TRAI, HIEP HOA and LOC GIANG Areas, and along the ORIENTAL River. (SONG VAM CO DONG). The brigade conducts EAGLE FLIGHTS and airmobile operations based on current intelligence. Cordon and search out-posting, and County Fair operations are conducted in conjunction with 25th ARVN Division, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), Regional and Popular Forces. Significant actions were the relief of an 80 man CIDG force encircled by a VC company on 16 May west of the ORIENTAL River (XT4402), by elements of the 1st and 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry. Airmobile assaults into the area resulted in prolonged contact from 1600 to 0130 hours 17 May. Results were 27 VC KIA (BC) and 36 more VC KIA (poss) with only 2 US KHA and 9 more WHA. There was intermittent contact throughout June and July, particularly along the AN HA Canal, and at LOC GIANG (XT428155) along the ORIENTAL River. Engineer operations in conjunction with KOLEKOLE have reopened Highway 10 from DUC HOA to BAO TRAI, the HAU NGHIA Province capital. This improved the GVN's authority and control, and assisted the 25th Infantry Division's overland reaction capability, as well as allowing civilians to move local products to new markets. Engineer operations continue to improve Highway 10 and the bridge west of TRANG BANG (XT4519). (p7)

Results of Operation KOLEKOLE to date are as follows:: 338 VC KIA (BC), 226 VC KIA (poss), 45 VC PW, 21 HOI CHANH and 290 detainees. Enemy material captured was: 168 lbs documents, 2 Russian rifles, 3 105mm rds, 20 M-1 carbines, 1 .38 pistol, 4 shotguns, 16 CHICOM carbines, 2 VC pack-boards, 3 . 55 gal drums of CS, 4- .45 cal pistols, 19 M1 rifles, 5 M3 SMGs, 2 BARs, 1 French LMG, 8 AK-47s, 114 batteries, 5 PRC-10 radios, 2 RPC-2 rds, 7 AT mines, 52 lbs medical supplies, 127 lbs of clothing, 1 20mm cannon, 2255 SA rds, 1 57mm recoilless rifle, 227 SA magazines, 1 sniper rifle, 1 Mauser rifle, 2 grenade launcher adapters, 12 claymores, 17 CHICOM grenades, 1 M79 launcher, 150 US blasting caps, 3 claymore generators, 30 yds of bandages, 5 SMG magazines, 1 Thompson SMG, 420 meters of wire, 92 grenades, 50 .50 cal rds, 45 prs of black uniforms, 60 hammocks, 1 commercial radio, 1 60mm mortar rd, 1-lb C-4, 2 20mm rds, 100ft claymore wire, 1 M2 carbine, 2 M14 rifles, 1 75mm RR rd, 2 M16 rifles, 2 bolt action rifles, 3 homemade rifles, 1 wallet, 1 VC flag, 1 gasoline generator, 400 pcs chinaware, 1 BAR, 1 AK47, 2 US carbines, 4500 lbs of rice, 2 M2 carbines,

Enemy material destroyed: 2633 bunkers, 483 military structures, 203 tunnels, 14 trenches, 226 sampans, 187 AP mines, 72 AT mines, 51 booby traps, 60 81mm rds, 58 60mm rds, 11 57mm rds, 3 175mm rds, 17 M79 rds, 60 155mm rds, 30 105mm rds, 635 grenades, 923 RPG-2 rds, 5305 lbs of rice, 66 CBUs, 2 lbs clothing, 4 small rockets, 2 ponchos, 2 oxcarts, 7622 SA rds, 8 4.2” rds, 1 typewriter, 1 500 lb bomb, 4 VC protective masks, 75 lbs TNT, 12 rifle grenades, 1 foot bridge, 2 LAWs , 2 motorized sampans, 1 claymore, 100 lbs nitrates, 800 lbs cement, 7000 chopsticks, 1 commercial radio, 200 blasting caps, 5 cans assorted fuses, 14 AT mine casings, 50 2.75” rockets, 7 bicycles, 1 flare device, 3 grenade detonators, 5 250 lb bombs, 2 75mm rds, 10 82mm rds, 2 2.5” rockets, 1 homemade carbine, 50 lbs black powder, 8 AT mine fuses, 87 grenade casings, 48 grenade fuses, 32 SA magazines, 6 CHICOM rifle bolts, 100 AT mine plungers, 3 AT mine detonators, 1 3.5” rocket, 1 micrometer, 1 shaped charge, 1 60mm mortar tube, 4 20mm rds, 4 trip flares, 8 2.75” rocket warheads, 16 .50 cal rds, 500 ft claymore wire, 200 booby trap springs, 9 claymore adapters, 3 rifle stocks, 1 knife, 5 mine molds, 1 VC pack, 1 bangalore torpedo, 2 rifle grenade launcher adapters, 200 lbs of fertilizer, 3 fuses, 4 hand grenade threaders, 1000 lbs of charcoal, 200 lbs of salt.

Conducted by the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division for the pacification of CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts in HAU NGHIA Province, and in PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province. Counter guerrilla warfare techniques are bing employed to include saturation patrolling, “Checkmates” (road blocks in unannounced locations to check for VC personnel or supplies being moved by surface transportation), bushmaster and cordon and search operations in cooperation with Regional and Popular Forces, and with ARVN units. Engineer units up-graded Highway PA, leading from CU CHI to PHU CUONG, the capital of adjacent BINH DUONG Province. Daily convoys now run between these locations. (p8).

In addition to pacification missions, numerous small unit operations have been staged from dispersed battalion or company size bases throughout the district which have allowed the US units to limit VC capability to move freely during night or day. Therefore, VC control of the AO has been reduced. A “Buddy” operation conducted with the PHU DUC PF and the 494th RF Co, that illustrates the type of operations employed, was conducted 19 June after intelligence was received through the Combined Operation Center (COC) at TRANG BANG, that a VC squad was operating vic XT5130. Through three contacts that day, the squad was eliminated, resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (poss), 9 VC PW. These operations are continuing.

Enemy Material captured was: 48 lbs documents, 6 CHICOM rifles, 6 AK47s, 7 CHICOM carbines, 1 pistol, 4 RPG-2 rds, 12,000 lbs rice, 2 M1 carbines, 15 lbs clothing, 1 can of 16mm film, 925 SA rds, 2 57lmm RR containers, 2 Russian carbines, 2 batteries, 2 claymores, 2 sampans, 1 commercial radio, 2 Mauser rifles, 300 meters claymore wire, 1 US protective mask, 1 LAW, 5 homemade blasting caps, 23 ½ lbs medical supplies, 30 M79 rds, 2 vials penicillin, 4 signs, unknown amt medical records & medical booklets, 1 tunnel complex map, unk amt bottles & medicine vials, 1 Thompson SMG, 1 Russian semi-automatic rifle, 1 RPG-2 booster, 1 notebook, 3 wallets, 1 M1 rifle, 1 M79 protective mask, 1 M60 MG, 2 .45 cal pistols, 2 homemade rifles, 1 9mm CHICOM pistol, 1 VC protective mask, 560 piasters, 1 holster, 1 4.2” tube w/elevating mechanism, 24 VC flags, 1 canvas bag, 380 gals of fuel, 700 CHIUE HOI pamphlets.

Enemy material destroyed was: 1157 bunkers, 576 military structures, 236 tunnels, 19 trenches, 74 AT mines, 58 booby traps, 46 AP mines, 8 claymores, 25 81mm rds, 8 82mm rds, 18 60mm rds, 3 75mm rds, 3 175mm rds, 12 105mm rds, 13 155mm rds, 10 RPG-2 rds, 272 grenades, 2 4.2” rds, 42 sampans, 3 bicycles, 19 CBU's, 23 bombs, 504 lbs clothing, 3150 lbs rice, 1 8” rd, 17,411 SA rds, 1 shaped charge, 14 M79 rds, 145 lbs TNT, 50 lbs propaganda, 1 CHICOM claymore, 2 lbs bandages (soiled), 1000 ft commo wire, 2 RPG-2 chargers, 20 stick mine fuses, 3 PPS41 Soviet SMGs, 2 unk mines, 1 81mm firing table, 200 sandbags, 2 concertina (rolls), 1 750 lb bomb casing, 1 Arty flare.

(c) DIAMOND HEAD (18 May 1967 - continuing). This operation is being conducted by the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division from its base camp at TAY NINH. Its mission is to conduct search and destroy operations in TAY NINH Province, cordon and search operations in the MICHELIN Plantation, and security and reinforcement missions in the TAY NINH and PREK KLOK areas. An additional mission is to provide necessary security to its base camp at DAU TIENG. Search and destroy operations have resulted in the discovery of supply caches, and intelligence reports indicate the local VC in the TAY NINH and DAU TIENG areas are finding it increasingly difficult to effect resupply. However, terrorist incidents of assassination and kidnapping in and around DAU TIENG, and the mortaring of DAU TIENG base camp have increased. This is due, in part at least, to the detachment of one battalion of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division to operate in Operation UNION TOWN outside the 25th Infantry Division's TAOR, as well as other times the brigade has left DAU TIENG. One battalion conducted security operations for the DAU TIENG and TAY NINH base camps exclusively throughout the month of July. Buddy operations were also conducted during July with eight companies of RF, PF and CIDG forces. Engineer units are up-grading the road from TAY NINHJ to SUOI DA leading to War Zone “C”, which will increase the reaction capability of the 3rd Brigade (particularly its mechanized units) and make the road available for civilian use.

Enemy material captured was: 2 P38 PISTOLS, 2 CHICOM carbines, 43 ½ lbs documents, 58,030 lbs rice, 1 unk weapon, 1 shotgun, 2 Mauser rifles, 10 AK47s, 1 tractor, 1 RPG-2 rd, 1 AT mine, 75 lbs medical supplies, 463 SA rds, 1 CHICOM rifle, 6 bicycles, 230 lbs food, 8 cans cabbage, 2 cans oil, 2000 lbs fertilizer, 2 notebooks, 1 M1 rifle, 1 commercial radio, 2 packs assorted medical supplies, 6 CBUs, 1 claymore, 1 VC training schedule, 1 book, 1 M79 launcher, several signal instruction manuals, 10 cases of cream.

Enemy material destroyed was: 1152 bunkers, 650 military structures, 18 trenches, 9 tunnels, 6 bridges, 16 AT mines, 7 AP mines, 62 booby traps, 10 60mm rds, 9 57mm rds, 2 75mm rds, 3 105mm rds, 4 155mm rds, 2 RPG-2 rds, 1 250 lb bomb, 7 oxcarts, 40 lbs clothing, 30 lbs black powder explosives, 6 mines, 16 82mm rds, 16 sampans, 1 ammo casting, 1 500lb bomb, 7 large storage tanks, 1 lb propaganda, 47 grenades, 902 SA rds, 46,250 lbs rice, 1 rice polishing machine, 3 VC protective masks, 18 bicycles, 900 lbs of cement, 3 CBUs, 7 81mm rds, 1100 lbs fertilizer, 301 trip flares, 6 claymores, 1 hand flare, 17 M79 rds, 1 voltage converter (200amp), 2 blasting boxes, 20 gal cooking oil, 1 LAW, 55 gals diesel fuel, 1 8” rd, 2 metal silhouette targets, 1 RPG-2 fuse.

C.. Air Support: There were 2,684 sorties during the quarter flown in support of 1,254 missions with the following results: 67 VC killed by Air Force (KBAF) (BC), 373 VC KBAF (poss). In addition, 295 VC structures, 1740 bunkers, 59 sampans, 3 tunnels, 55 caches and 11 bridges were destroyed. There were 42 secondary explosions and 196 secondary fires.

D.. Army Aviation: During the period 1 May to 31 July 1967 there were 3,846 sorties, 1,577 combat missions, 1,896 passengers carried and a total of 1,655 hours flown. Armed Helicopters expended 549,970 rounds of 7.62mm machine gun ammunition, 4,305 rounds of .50 cal machine gun ammunition, 90 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition, 3,853 rounds of 40mm grenades, and 1,975 aerial rockets in support of combat operations. In addition, 138 sorties and 90 hours were flown using the Man-packed Personnel Detector E63” (commonly called the “People Sniffer”, modified for use in the UH1D helicopter), accompanied by another UH1D with spotlights ("Firefly"), and a Light Fire Team (two more armed UH1B). These flights scouted for VC, detecting them by the ammonia produced in human perspiration, and by the carbon produced by their camp fires. These missions resulted in the destruction of 24 structures, 13 sampans, 29 VC Killed by Army Air (KBAA) (BC), 65 VC KBAA (poss), 2 VC PW and 2 VC WIA.

delaying security operations in support of Revolutionary Development, and acts of terrorism aimed toward intimidating the civilian population to resist pacification and the up-coming elections. No significant contacts with NVA units have occurred since the withdrawal of Division elements from War Zone “C”.

1. The VC have chosen to separate into smaller groups and conduct harassing attacks against RF, PF and RD activities rather than concentrating large forces. However, they may concentrate forces if the likelihood of a quick victory exists. An example was an attack on PHOUC HIEP by elements of the 1st and 7th Bn's MR IV on the night of 18 July. A force of approximately Bn (-) size launched a coordinated ground and mortar attack on PHOUC HIEP (vic XT563167) with a blocking force in the vicinity of TRUNG LAP (XT5921). Reaction by US artillery and air power suppressed the mortars and broke up the attackers before they had an opportunity to exploit their initial momentum. Another attack occurred on the morning of 15 July when a platoon of the 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf was attacked in conjunction with a coordinated attack on PHUOC HOA (RF) outpost. Mortars and recoilless rifles were fired on the outpost immediately prior to an assault by approximately two companies. The VC over-ran the outpost resulting in 16 ARVN KIA, 30 ARVN WIA and 30 ARVN MIA, as well as capturing a 60mm mortar and many small arms. Known VC losses were 2 KIA (BC). During their withdrawal, the VC engaged the 1st platoon, A Co, 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (M). On making contact, the VC engaged the platoon with mortars, recoilless rifles, RPG-2s and small arms. Results: 2 US KIA and 16 US WIA. VC losses from this contact are unknown.

3. The primary enemy initiated incidents involving U.S. Forces were the mortar attacks on CU CHI and DAU TIENG base camps. At 2328H 24 July, the DAU TIENG base camp received an attack by 82mm mortars which lasted about 11 minutes, resulting in approximately 70 rounds of 82mm HE ammunition impacting inside the base camp, and 30 rounds outside the perimeter. The primary target appeared to be the airstrip. This attack resulted in 50 WHAs (7 of which required dust-off) and 1 civilian WHA. One aircraft was destroyed and 24 received substantial damage. Other damage included a fire truck, a wheeled wrecker, 8 ¾ ton trucks, an RTT Van, and a 15 kilowatt generator. In addition, numerous tents had to be salvaged as a result of damage received during the attack. A sweep of the suspected mortar position on 25 June located four mortar positions in the vicinity of a village approximately 2 kilometers northwest of the base camp. Another incident involving U.S. Forces was the mortar attack on CU Chi base camp at 2135H, 13 July. Sixteen rounds of 82mm mortar HE ammunition were received, resulting in 15 US WHA. All rounds impacted in less than one minute. No contact with the attacking force was made.

4. During friendly operations, the VC avoided contact or conducted delaying actions. An example occurred on 12 July when the 1st Bn, 27th Inf and 2nd Bn, 27th Inf made contact with an unknown size force vic XT405145 during heliborne assault operations. The VC conducted a strong defense against the assaulting force from dug in and covered positions causing moderate casualties among the US troops, and damaging five helicopters during the first day. Under cover of darkness, the VC exfiltrated and escaped.

(a) The VC continue to be forced from base camps and supply areas by friendly operations resulting in an increase in the amounts of supplies denied the enemy. Because of continued military pressure, a greater number of the VC have chosen to rally under the CHIEU HOI PROGRAM. This has been particularly true in HAU NGHIA Province where 556 HOI CHANHs were received during May, June and July.

(b) The presence of US Forces in the Division TAOR will continue to give the population confidence in GVN's ability to protect them. Additional construction, improvement, and repair of LOC's will allow a greater number of civilians access to areas under government control. Conversely, areas under VC control are more readily accessible to allied troops and supporting forces.

(c) Class III supply remained fairly constant during the quarter. Average daily issue increased from 11,794 gallons to 15,000 gallons for Mogas from 14,347 to 19,000 gallons for JP4. Daily decreases in issue was noted for diesel and Avgas from 23,504 to 17,000, and from 1,505 to 1,300 gallons respectively. (p13)

(1) Personnel: During the past quarter the personnel posture of the division has been excellent. Assigned strength (approximately 104%) exceeded the authorized strength. This average has been maintained in an attempt to keep the present for duty strength above 100%. There continues to be la shortage of approximately 50%; of the authorized Infantry NCO's in grades E-5 and E-6. There are also shortages of MOSs O5C40, 11B40, 11C40 (E-5), 11F40 and 91B10 (E-5). These shortages have occurred primarily as a result of a lack of fill action against requisitions, or in some cases, personnel in lower grades have been used to fill requisitions in NCOs.

(a) Eight Military Policemen were attached to the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div for military police support of Operation MANHATTAN and Operation KAWELA. The 1st Bde utilized the MP's from 28 Apr 67 until 8 Jun 67 in support of Operation MANHATTAN and upon its completion, went directly into Operation KAWELA which was completed on 16 June. The military police responsibilities were considered successful. Normal police support was provided by the eight MPs.

(b) On 8 July 1967 a platoon of Military Police from the 25th MP Company provided Military Police support and acted in an advisory capacity to the VN national police, ARVN and Popular Forces, during Operation AKUMA. The platoon had the responsibility for screening civilians for identification and family birth papers within the village of PHU HOA DONG. The commitment ended on 13 July 67. During the operation, 4,197 Vietnamese were screened.