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 Quarterly Report Ending 31 July 67

                         DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                    HEADQUARTERS  25TH  INFANTRY DIVISION
                               APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCDH                                                                                                                                 19 August 1967

SUBJECT:     Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
          (RCS  CSFOR - 65)  (BC)

TO:          SEE DISTRIBUTION

          Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS CSFOR-65)
          Location:  Vicinity CU CHI,  CU CHI Base Camp (XT647153), RVN
          Reporting Officer:  Major General John C.F. Tillson III
          Prepared by:   Captain Howard C. Hanning,  CO,  18th Military History Detachment

     1.   (C)     Significant Organizational Activities.
A     .Operations:

          (1)   General.  There were 11 major (Bn or higher) operations and 1405 small unit actions
Conducted by the 25th Infantry Division (-) during this quarter.  All major and 109 small unit actions resulted in enemy contact.

          (2)   Operation FORT NISQUALLY (28 Nov 66 - 14 May 1967).  The mission of the operation was to conduct operations to secure the area adjacent to the base camp of the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div at DAU TIENG and to eliminate VC influence in the unit's Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).  Operations from 1 - 14 May 1967 primarily consisted of daylight reconnaissance and night ambush patrols within 3000 meters of the DAU TIENG base camp.  There was no significant contact.

     Results of Operation FORT NISQUALLY were as follows:  28 VC killed in Action (KIA), verified by Body Count (BC), 23 VC KIA possible (poss), 26 VC Prisoners (PW), 58 detainees.  Captured and evacuated were:  23 individual weapons, 2 LMG, 1 claymore mine, 1 CHICOM RPG-2,  1695 rds ammo, 100 expended .30 cal links, 1 bayonet, 3 grenades, 30 punji stakes, 36 tons of rice, 105 lbs pork, 325 lbs sugar, 41 lbs tea, 20 lbs shrimp, 6 kg assorted food;  10 bicycles, 5 new bicycle frames, 3 bags bicycle parts;  1 pair jungle boots, 1 roll black material, 100 lbs assorted clothing;  300 ft electric wire, 2 FM radios, 4 batteries; 1 US gas mask, 1 large roll mosquito netting, 111 lbs documents, 11 rolls corrugated tin, 20 gal kerosene, 30,000 Piasters, 150 lbs assorted medical supplies, 21 lbs epsom salts.  
     Destroyed were:  10 AT mines, 32 AP mines, 29 hand grenades, 3  105mm casings, 3  155mm projectiles, 1  105mm projectile,  3  81mm rds, 1 M-79 rd, 3 rds CHICOM RPG-2,  33 CBU bomblets, 4  200lb bombs, 1  750 lb bomb,  39 ½ tons rice,  1000 lbs beans,  1700 lbs peas,  3 lbs sugar,  1 gal grease,  2 canteens whiskey,  1600 lbs mullett;  7 sampans,  6 bicycles;  1 Bn size hospital,  11 VC base camps, 309 bunkers,  3 buildings,  115 foxholes,  32 huts;  310 ft electric wire,  5 rolls barbed wire,  250- sheets tin,  1 grinding mill.

          (3)   ALA MOANA  (1 Dec 66 - 14 May 1967).  This operation was conducted in HAU NGHIA and BINH DUONG Provinces to destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps near the division base camp at CU CHI, and in the FILHOL Plantation, and to provide security for the CU CHI base camp and surrounding area.  1st and 2nd  Brigades, 25th Infantry Division continued participation in Operation ALA MOANA, employing local security operations, without significant contact until the termination of the operation on 14 May 1967.
 Results of Operation ALA MOANA were as follows:  381 VC KIA (BC),  558 vc kia (POSS),  25VC PW,  652 DETAINEES.  Enemy equipment losses were:  94 small arms weapons, 5 crew served weapons, 56 artillery shells, 133 mines, 406 grenades, 7 mortar rounds, 12 bombs, 21n499 rounds of small arms ammunition, 181 booby traps,  87 cluster bomb units (CBU), 188 blasting caps, 17 anti-tank weapon rds, 289 sampans, 4 outboard (sampan) motors, 55 lbs medical supplies, 14 bicycles, 162 lbs documents, 2 oxcarts, 15 sticks TNT, 4 lbs clothing and 57 lbs explosives;  5 punji pits, 2,395 meters of trenches and 57 foxholes;  120,092 tons of rice, 2 tons of salt and 5 tons of food stuffs other than rice.

          (4)   JUNCTION CITY:  (22 Feb - 16 May 1967).  This operation concluded using the Mobile Brigade Concept to continue offensive operations in War Zone “C” begun by the forces of the entire division.  Operations from 1 May through 16 May were conducted by the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, which had been placed under operational control (OPCON) of the 25th Infantry Division.  Significant contact occurred on 13 May when Fire Support Base (FSB) 11, at XT305495 was attacked by an unknown size VC unit and received over 100 rounds of 81mm and 82mm mortar fire with small arms (SA) and automatic weapons (AW) fire, resulting in one tank and one M151 ¼ ton truck being destroyed, 8 US Killed by Hostile Action (KHA) and 30 more US Wounded in Hostile Action (WHA).  The operation concluded on 16 May without further significant contact.  
Results of Operation JUNCTION CITY were as follows:  947 VC KIA (BC),  423 VC KIA (poss),  183 HOI CHANH (rallier under the CHIEU HOI program),  18 VC PW, and 61 detainees, of whom 35 were civil defendants and 26 were innocent civilians.
Enemy Equipment losses were:  314 small arms weapons, 30 crew served weapons, 1,193 artillery shells, 156 mortar rds, 60 anti-tank weapon rounds, 331 mines, 559 grenades and booby traps,   41,482 rds of small arms ammunition, 120 bicycles, 25 sampans, 5,098 lbs of clothing, 1,058 lbs medical supplies, 8 radios, 4 telephones, 2,500 feet of communication wire, 50 batteries, 1 head set, 1 Morse key, 1 mulimeter, 2 tape recorders, 7 audio tapes, 1 antenna, 9 oxcarts, 2 printing presses, 10 generators, 12,643 gallons of fuel and 1,495 lbs of documents.  
     Enemy facility losses were as follows:  3,471 fortifications, 1,060 structures, 25 tunnels, 250 foxholes and 249 trenches.   
Enemy food losses were as follows:  528 tons of rice, 15 tons of other foodstuffs (except rice), and 460 lbs of salt.

          (5)   MANHATTAN (23 April - 17 June 1967).  The 25th Infantry Division as a part of IIFFORCEV, began Operation MANHATAN on 23 April with the objective of destroying VC forces and installations in the HO BO - BOI LOI - BEN CUI areas, and along the SAIGON River in conjunction with other IIFFORCEV units.  After IIFFORCEV concluded the operation on 11 May, the 25th Infantry Division continued Operation MANHATTAN as a division operation until 07 June 1967, employing the 1st and 2nd Brigades, 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.  Search and destroy operations commenced in April continued.  On 9 May, 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division completed its participation in Operation MANHATTAN and returned to CU CHI Base Camp in preparation for the forthcoming Operation KOLEKOLE.  On 10 May, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division completed its participation in Operation MANHATTAN and returned to the DAU TIENG Base Camp in preparation for the forthcoming Operation AHINA and DIAMOND HEAD.  First Brigade, 25th Infantry Division continued operations and provided necessary security for extensive clearing operations conducted by the 65th Engineer Battalion, which employed the ROME PLOW, a modified bulldozer with a sharpened blade used for clearing densely vegetated areas.  In addition, necessary roads were constructed in the Area of Operations (AO).  The clearing of the vegetation in the AO deprived the VC; of the sanctuary they had long established throughout the area, especially in the HO BO and BOI LOI Woods .
 Significant results of Operation MANHATTAN were:   74 VC KIA (BC),  99 VC KIA (poss),  3 HOI CHANH and 19 PW.  Enemy weapons and munitions losses were:  201 small arms weapons, 18 crew served weapons, 42 artillery rounds of ammunition, 671 mortar rounds of ammunition, 214 anti-tank weapons rds of ammunition,  293 mines, 901 grenades and booby traps, 400,543 rds of small arms ammunition, 168 cluster bomb units, 3200 blasting caps, 2300 feet of detonating cord, 1800 lbs of TNT and 2278 lbs of black powder.
Enemy equipment  losses:  34 sampans,  400 pounds of clothing, 443 pounds of medical supplies, 250 tons of rice, 5.5 tons of other foodstuffs,  398 pounds of documents, 12,760 feet of communication wire, 7 radios, 30 pounds of punji stakes, 17 pounds of tools, one telephone, 7 protective masks, 2 plows, 108 bicycles, 1 oxcart, 6 generators, 25 gals of CS agent and 6 outboard motors.
     Enemy facility losses:  461 structures, 1594 meters of tunnels, 1163 bunkers, 421 foxholes, 5634 meters of trenches, 7 base camps, 1 radio repair ship, 1 bicycle repair shop and 2 hospitals.
(p3)

          (6)   AHINA  (13 - 18 May 1967).  This operation was a search and destroy operation conducted in the east central portion of War Zone “C”, bounded by XT6490, XT6450, XT5450 and XT6440.  Its purpose was to engage and destroy VC/NVA forces known to be operating in the AO, and to destroy VC/NVA base camps and facilities throughout the area.  Operations conducted in the AO from 1 -5 April during Operation JUNCTION CITY indicated that further enemy facilities and forces would be located there if the AO were re-occupied.  Therefore Operation AHINA was planned to exploit this intelligence.  Enemy contact during the operation was limited to sniper fire and occasional contact with squad size VC forces.  Extensive weapons, foodstuffs, and supplies were uncovered and destroyed which made the operation a success.  Supplies captured included three trucks known to have been employed by the VC for resupply purposes.  Operation AHINA was also significant for its employment of a light tactical raft for an unopposed crossing of the SAIGON River at XT459562 by  mechanized infantry in conjunction with a heliborne assault by other infantry forces.
     Results of Operation AHINA were:  9 VC KIA (BC),  2VC Killed by Air Force (KBAF) (poss).  Enemy equipment evacuated included:  3 AK-47, 1 SKS carbine,  1 RPG-2 rocket launcher,  1 CHICOM LMG-type 56 w/magazine and 100 rds ammunition, 1 M1 rifle barrel - receiver group, 8000 brass mine adapters, 8000 detonator components, 100 feet electrical cord, 200 smooth metal cylinders (believed to be pistol barrels);  7650 lbs polished rice, 330 bags unpolished rice (200 lb bags), 7 cows;  1 truck-Willys- panel, 1 truck-Landrover type, 70 lbs clothing, misc machine parts - weapons molds, 1 fire extinguisher w/DDT spray, 1 single cylinder gas engine, 20 springs -3” in diameter 10” long, 1 outboard engine - 9HP Briggs & Stratton w/misc tools and spare parts.
     Enemy Equipment Destroyed:  90 rifle grenades, 63 frag grenades, 11 anti-tank mines,  1 RPG-2 rd w/2 fuses, 18 howitzer rds - believed to be Japanese pack-howitzer rds, 1- 81mm rd,  100rds .30 cal, 150 rds 5.56mm, 4600  7.62 rds (short) for AK-47,  1400  7.62 rds misc size,  15 rifle stocks, 12 magazines - 30 rd “banana clip” for AK-47, 1 shotgun, 8 lbs black powder, 4 M-79 rds, 1 trip flare (US), 1 anti-personnel mine 8” diameter, 6 CBU bomblets, 300 lbs cordite, 5 casings for shape charge, 9  60mm mtr rds, 1 shape charge - 10 lb, 15 lbs batteries, 1 metal lathe, 1 drum - 55 gal;  54 huts (includes 4 kitchens & 4 classrooms), 42 bunkers w/overhead cover, 1200 meters trench w/foxholes;  10 tons rice,  9 lbs peas,  50 lbs peanuts,  1 hog (killed by Airstrike),   3 quarts cooking oil,  12 cans (5 gal ea) coconut oil,  30 cans (2 gal ea) beans;  1 truck 3/4T Dodge - WWII type (damaged from previous airstrike),  numerous ports and pans, cooking utensils, 2 fish nets, 8 bicycles w/misc repair parts, 2 sampans, 1 winch w/30' cable, 2 hammocks, 2 gal gasoline, 1 gal kerosene.
                                                  (p4)
          (7)  KAWELA  (11 June - 25 June 1967).  This operation was begun by the 25th Infantry Division as a follow-up to Operation MANHATTAN, to exploit intelligence reports of VC activity along the upper SAIGON River (vic XT5632) and in the TRI TAM District (XT5836).  It employed the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry to search and destroy VC forces and installations in an AO thought to house elements of Military Region (MR) IV, and that contained supply routes that continued to the FILHOL Plantation immediately north of the Division base camp at CU CHI, and to the HO BO Woods beyond them.  During the operation no main force units were encountered.  Contact was limited to sporadic sniper activity from local guerrillas.  The operation was begun with two crossings of the Saigon River.  One a non-illuminated, non-support crossing using aluminum foot bridges and light tactical rafts.  It was unopposed while another diversionary crossing was made by mechanized units to the south.  Although contact was negligible, extensive amounts of enemy munitions and equipment were seized.
     Results of Operation KAWELA were:  38 VC KIA (BC),  26 VC KIA (poss),  VC  killed by Air-strikes (KBA) 2 (BC), VC KBA (poss) 25.  Enemy equipment captured :  58 rds of SA ammo, 2 RPG-2 launchers,  22 lbs of medical supplies,  12 lbs of documents,  42 rds of SA ammo, 5 AK-47 rifles, 1 pistol belt,  1 combat pack, 5 bags of CS-1,  9 tape recordings,  1 CHICOM carbine,  7 RPG-2 rds,  9.2 tons of rice,  1 CHICOM carbine,`1 cannon barrel,  2 bicycles,  1  82mm mortar w/base plate,  1 grinding machine,  2 grenades,  1 dairy.   
     Equipment destroyed:  9 sampans, 6 AT mines,  305 bunkers,  82 military structures,  12 bicycles,  29 tons of rice,  1,257 rds of SA ammo,  3 claymores,  2 VC protective masks,  55 AP mines,  1  500 lb bomb,  23 CBU's,  66 trenches,  29 tunnels,  54 grenades,  14 sampans,  1  60mm rd,  1  500 lb bomb,  1  .50 cal breech,  1  .30 cal pistol w/o barrel,  1  .50 cal MG tripod,  3 ¼ lbs of explosives,  3 booby traps,  3 stoves,  1 RPG-2 rd,  1 raft,  6  CBU's detonators.

          (8)   SABER THRUST:  (22-20 April,  22 May-2 June,  5-8 June,  2-10 July 1967)  This operation was conducted by the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry as an intermittent security operation.  SABER THRUST was begun on 7 April and conducted in five phases as separate security and patrolling operations in the vicinity of the CU CHI base camp, and along the Main Supply Route (MSR).  During this reporting period it was expanded to include engineer security, night ambushes, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and employment of a base camp reaction force.  Operation SABER THRUST VI was conducted from 22 May through 2 June throughout the CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts of HAU NGHIA Province, to include the FILHOL Plantation and the HO BO Woods.  SABER THRUST VII was conducted from 5-8 June in an AO centered on XT2839 northwest of GO DAU HA.  SABER THRUST VIII was conducted from 2-10 July 1967 again throughout the CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts of HAU NGHIA Province.  For the extent of enemy contact see paragraph 1-e, Intelligence.  
     Results of the three phases of Operation SABER THRUST were:  17 VC KIA (BC),  28 VC KIA (poss),  1 VC WIA,  and 9 VC PW.
Enemy equipment captured was: 10 SA weapons,  10 ½ lbs of documents,  800 lbs fish,  $200 in SVN currency,  1-.50 cal mount, 1-4.2mm mortar tube,  1 carbine,  1 grenade.
     Enemy equipment and foodstuffs destroyed were:  22,400 lbs rice,  500 lbs fish,  51 fortifications,  34 tunnels,  27 structures,  1 sampan,  15 BT's,  2 AP mines,  19 grenades,  2500 rounds of assorted SA ammo,  5 road blocks.
                                                  (p5)
          (9)   AKUMU (08 July 67 - 26 July 67).  Purpose of the operation was to conduct a cordon and search and pacification operation in PHU HOA DONG Village (XT715195), BINH DUONG Province.  This village is located five kilometers to the northeast of the division's base camp at CU CHI, and at the eastern edge of the FILHOL Plantation.  The cordon and search and pacification operations were conducted jointly with the 7th ARVN Regiment located in PHU HOA DONG.  
     First Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, with 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) under its operational control (OPCON), was the control headquarters for the execution and continuation of the cordon while 7th ARVN Regiment controlled the execution of the search and clearing of the village interior.   Intelligence prior to the operation indicated the presence of elements of the 1st Bn, Military Region IV (MR IV), the 7th Bn, CU CHI District and the 2nd Bn, CO MON District in the area.  The strength of each battalion was 200 - 300 men.  In addition a VC local force platoon of 25 men was known to operate in the area.  Considerable VC activity in the adjacent FILHOL Plantation and HO BO Woods was known to be influential in the activities in the village and surrounding areas.  VC fortifications, installations, booby traps and mines were found throughout the operation.  Contact with VC forces was light for the first days of the operation, consisting of sporadic sniper fire from groups of 2 or 3 VC.
     Then on 13 July contact increased marked 130148 hours, Co B, 4th Bn (mech), 23rd Inf received 10 rds of RPG-2 fire vic XT686216, damaging 2 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC), and resulting in 1 US KHA, 8 US WHA, 3 VC KIA(BC), 2 VC KIA (poss) and the capture of 1 RPG-2 launcher with two rounds.  At 130142 hours a four man Listening Post (LP) from Co B, 4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf engaged 3 VC at XT687212, resulting in 3 US WHA and unknown VC losses.  Finally, at 130225 hours, Co A, 4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Ind received sniper fire at XT702208, resulting in 1 US WHA.  At 131440 hours, Companies B and C engaged an unknown VC force at XT664218 resulting in 2 US WHA.  There was light contact until 18 July when Co B, 4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf received 23 RPG-2 rounds and 82mm mortar rounds at XT669198.  Fire was returned resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (poss), 1 US KHA and 15 US WHA.  Contact was believed to be with 2nd Co, 1st Bn,  MR IV.

     There was no further significant contact until 22 July, when 2nd Bn, 14th Inf Recon Platoon engaged 2 VC at XT749159 after they were spotted by a Forward Air Controller (FAC).  Two VC were KIA (BC) and an AK-47 rifle and a caliber .45 pistol captured.  Further contact was again negligible until the termination of the operation.
                                                       (p6)
     At the start of the operation a hamlet festival was conducted by Civil Affairs team which explained the purpose of the US presence in the village to over 19,000 persons.  MEDCAPS and Catholic services (in the village church) were held throughout the operation.  Operation AKUMU challenged the VC in a formerly secure stronghold, and greatly diminished VC influence “at the back door” of Camp CU CHI.
In addition, VC  In addition, VC supply and movement routes through the FILHOL Plantation to the HO BO Woods were severely disrupted.  
Results of the operation were:  VC KIA (BC) 15,  VC KIA (poss) 11, HOI CHANH 1.
Enemy equipment destroyed:  237 bunkers, 74 tunnels, 49 foxholes, 970 meters of trench, 55 punji pits, 43 military structures, 22 AT mines, 27 AP mines,  15 sampans, 4  82mm mortar rds,  2  60mm mortar rds, 16 CHICOM grenades, 5 rifle grenades, 2 US claymores, 9 US hand grenades, 2 docking sites, 2 misc. drums, 57 rds CHICOM carbine ammo, 1 rd M16 ammo, 2 stick mines, 2 lbs clothing, Misc , 15 lbs rice, 2  105 canister, 1 hat.
     Enemy equipment captured:  1,198 rds SA ammo, 3 pistol belts, 1 lb documents, 1 sign-minefield, 1 flashlight, 1 compass, 1 pr black gloves, 1 poncho (VC), 3 RPG-2 rocket launchers, 1 RPG-2 booster, 12 pr sandals, 1 hammock, 1 pr trousers, 1 M1 rifle - cal .30, 1 canteen with cup, 2 protective masks, 2 57 RR containers, 1 canvas bag, 15 M79 rds, 2 belts with clip for AK-47 rifles, 1  82mm mortar tube and elevating mechanism,. 2  .45 cal pistols, 1 magazine - AK-47, ½ lb med supplies, 1 lb clothing, 560 piastres, 1 holster - .45 cal, 1 canteen cover, 1 magazine .45 cal, 1 CHICOM rifle, 1 CHICOM 7.6mm red stock carbine.

          (10)   The 25th Infantry Division MONSOON CAMPAIGN began on 14 May 1967.  Within the division TAOR, three operations are being conducted:  Operation KOLEKOLE,  BARKING SANDS  and  DIAMOND HEAD.  The mission of the division in the MONSOON CAMPAIGN is to conduct offensive operations with emphasis in populated areas, to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, to secure major lines of communication (LOC's) to support the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Revolutionary Development Program, and to reinforce Free World Military Assistance Forces and FVN forces as directed.

               (a)     KOLEKOLE  (14 May 1967 - continuing).  This operation is a search and destroy operation conducted by 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in the DUC HOA, BAO TRAI, HIEP HOA and LOC GIANG Areas, and along the ORIENTAL River.  (SONG VAM CO DONG).  The brigade conducts EAGLE FLIGHTS and airmobile operations based on current intelligence.  Cordon and search out-posting, and County Fair operations are conducted in conjunction with 25th ARVN Division, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), Regional and Popular Forces.  Significant actions were the relief of an 80 man CIDG force encircled by a VC company on 16 May west of the ORIENTAL River (XT4402), by elements of the 1st and 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry.  Airmobile assaults into the area resulted in prolonged contact from 1600 to 0130 hours 17 May.  Results were 27 VC KIA (BC) and 36 more VC KIA (poss) with only 2 US KHA and 9 more WHA.  There was intermittent contact throughout June and July, particularly along the AN HA Canal, and at LOC GIANG (XT428155) along the ORIENTAL River.  Engineer operations in conjunction with KOLEKOLE have reopened Highway 10 from DUC HOA to BAO TRAI, the HAU NGHIA Province capital.  This improved the GVN's authority and control, and assisted the 25th Infantry Division's overland reaction capability, as well as allowing civilians to move local products to new markets.  Engineer operations continue to improve Highway 10 and the bridge west of TRANG BANG (XT4519).                                                    (p7)
     Results of Operation KOLEKOLE to date are as follows::  338 VC KIA (BC),  226 VC KIA (poss), 45 VC PW,  21 HOI CHANH and 290 detainees.  Enemy material captured was:  168 lbs documents, 2 Russian rifles, 3  105mm rds,  20 M-1 carbines, 1 .38 pistol, 4 shotguns, 16 CHICOM carbines, 2 VC pack-boards, 3 . 55 gal drums of CS, 4- .45 cal pistols, 19 M1 rifles, 5 M3 SMGs, 2 BARs, 1 French LMG,  8 AK-47s, 114 batteries, 5 PRC-10 radios,  2 RPC-2 rds, 7 AT mines, 52 lbs medical supplies, 127 lbs of clothing, 1  20mm cannon,  2255 SA rds,  1  57mm recoilless rifle, 227 SA magazines, 1 sniper rifle, 1 Mauser rifle, 2 grenade launcher adapters, 12 claymores, 17 CHICOM grenades, 1 M79 launcher,  150 US blasting caps,  3 claymore generators,  30 yds of bandages,  5 SMG magazines, 1 Thompson SMG,  420 meters of wire,  92 grenades,  50  .50 cal rds,  45 prs of black uniforms,  60 hammocks, 1 commercial radio, 1  60mm mortar rd,  1-lb C-4,  2  20mm rds,  100ft  claymore wire,  1 M2 carbine,  2  M14 rifles,  1  75mm RR rd,  2  M16 rifles,  2 bolt action rifles,  3 homemade rifles,  1 wallet,  1 VC flag,  1 gasoline generator,  400 pcs chinaware,  1 BAR,  1 AK47,  2 US carbines,  4500 lbs of rice,  2 M2 carbines,  
Enemy material destroyed:  2633 bunkers,  483 military structures,  203 tunnels,  14 trenches,  226 sampans,  187 AP mines,  72 AT mines,  51 booby traps,  60  81mm rds,  58  60mm rds,  11  57mm rds,  3  175mm rds,  17  M79 rds,  60  155mm rds,  30  105mm rds,  635 grenades,  923 RPG-2 rds,  5305 lbs of rice,  66 CBUs,  2 lbs clothing,  4 small rockets,  2 ponchos,  2 oxcarts,  7622 SA rds,  8  4.2” rds,  1 typewriter,  1  500 lb bomb,  4 VC protective masks,  75 lbs TNT,  12 rifle grenades,  1 foot bridge,  2 LAWs ,  2 motorized sampans,  1 claymore,  100 lbs nitrates,  800 lbs cement,  7000 chopsticks,  1 commercial radio,  200 blasting caps,  5 cans assorted fuses,  14 AT mine casings,  50  2.75” rockets,  7 bicycles,  1 flare device,  3 grenade detonators,  5  250 lb bombs,  2  75mm rds,  10  82mm rds,  2  2.5” rockets,  1 homemade carbine,  50 lbs black powder,  8 AT mine fuses,  87 grenade casings,  48 grenade fuses,  32 SA magazines,  6 CHICOM rifle bolts,  100 AT mine plungers,  3 AT mine detonators,  1  3.5” rocket,  1 micrometer,  1 shaped charge,  1  60mm mortar tube,  4  20mm rds,  4 trip flares,  8  2.75” rocket warheads,  16 .50 cal rds,  500 ft claymore wire,  200 booby trap springs,  9 claymore adapters,  3 rifle stocks,  1 knife,  5 mine molds,  1 VC pack,  1 bangalore torpedo,  2 rifle grenade launcher adapters,  200 lbs of fertilizer,  3 fuses,  4 hand grenade threaders,  1000 lbs of charcoal,  200 lbs of salt.

(b)  BARKING SANDS  (May 1967 - continuing).  This operation is being  
Conducted by the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division for the pacification of CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts in HAU NGHIA Province, and in PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province.  Counter guerrilla warfare techniques are bing employed to include saturation patrolling, “Checkmates” (road blocks in unannounced locations to check for VC personnel or supplies being moved by surface transportation), bushmaster and cordon and search operations in cooperation with Regional and Popular Forces, and with ARVN units.   Engineer units up-graded Highway PA, leading from CU CHI to PHU CUONG, the capital of adjacent BINH DUONG Province.  Daily convoys now run between these locations.          (p8).
     In addition to pacification missions, numerous small unit operations have been staged from dispersed battalion or company size bases throughout the district which have allowed the US units to limit VC capability to move freely during night or day.  Therefore, VC control of the AO has been reduced.  A “Buddy” operation conducted with the PHU DUC PF and the 494th RF Co, that illustrates the type of operations employed, was conducted 19 June after intelligence was received through the Combined Operation Center (COC) at TRANG BANG, that a VC squad was operating vic XT5130.  Through three contacts that day, the squad was eliminated, resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC),  3 VC KIA (poss),  9 VC PW.  These operations are continuing.
     Results of Operation BARKING SANDS to date are as follows:  115 VC KIA (BC),  294 VC KIA (poss),  9 VC PW,  1 HOI CHANH and 12,346 detainees.   
     Enemy Material captured was:   48 lbs documents,  6 CHICOM rifles,  6 AK47s, 7 CHICOM carbines, 1 pistol,  4 RPG-2 rds,  12,000 lbs rice,  2 M1 carbines,  15 lbs clothing, 1 can of 16mm film,  925 SA rds,  2  57lmm RR containers,  2 Russian carbines,  2 batteries,  2 claymores,  2 sampans,  1 commercial radio,  2 Mauser rifles,  300 meters claymore wire,  1 US protective mask,  1 LAW,  5 homemade blasting caps,  23 ½ lbs medical supplies,  30 M79 rds,  2 vials penicillin,  4 signs,  unknown amt medical records & medical booklets,  1 tunnel complex map, unk amt bottles & medicine vials,  1 Thompson SMG,  1 Russian semi-automatic rifle,  1 RPG-2 booster,  1 notebook,  3 wallets, 1 M1 rifle,  1 M79 protective mask,  1 M60 MG,  2  .45 cal pistols,  2 homemade rifles,  1  9mm CHICOM pistol,  1 VC protective mask,  560 piasters,  1 holster,  1  4.2” tube w/elevating mechanism,  24 VC flags,  1 canvas bag,  380 gals of fuel,  700 CHIUE HOI pamphlets.
     Enemy material destroyed was:   1157 bunkers,  576 military structures,  236 tunnels,  19 trenches,  74 AT mines,  58 booby traps,  46 AP mines,  8 claymores,  25  81mm rds,  8  82mm rds,  18  60mm rds,  3  75mm rds,  3  175mm rds,  12  105mm rds,  13  155mm rds,  10  RPG-2 rds,  272 grenades,  2  4.2” rds,  42 sampans,  3 bicycles,  19 CBU's,  23 bombs,  504 lbs clothing,  3150 lbs rice,  1  8” rd,  17,411 SA rds,  1 shaped charge,  14 M79 rds,  145 lbs TNT,  50 lbs propaganda,  1 CHICOM claymore,  2 lbs  bandages  (soiled),  1000 ft commo wire,  2 RPG-2 chargers,  20 stick mine fuses,  3 PPS41 Soviet SMGs,  2 unk mines,  1  81mm firing table,  200 sandbags,  2 concertina (rolls),  1  750 lb bomb casing,  1 Arty flare.
                                                       (p9)
               (c)   DIAMOND HEAD  (18 May 1967 - continuing).  This operation is being conducted by the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division from its base camp at TAY NINH.  Its mission is to conduct search and destroy operations in TAY NINH Province, cordon and search operations in the MICHELIN Plantation,  and security and reinforcement missions in the TAY NINH and PREK KLOK areas.  An additional mission is to provide necessary security to its base camp at DAU TIENG.  Search and destroy operations have resulted in the discovery of supply caches, and  intelligence reports indicate the local VC in the TAY NINH and DAU TIENG areas are finding it increasingly difficult to effect resupply.  However, terrorist incidents of assassination and kidnapping in and around DAU TIENG, and the mortaring of DAU TIENG base camp have increased.  This is due, in part at least, to the detachment of one battalion of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division to operate in Operation UNION TOWN outside the 25th Infantry Division's TAOR, as well as other times the brigade has left DAU TIENG.  One battalion conducted security operations for the DAU TIENG and TAY NINH base camps exclusively throughout the month of July.  Buddy operations were also conducted during July with eight companies of RF, PF and CIDG forces.  Engineer units are up-grading the road from TAY NINHJ to SUOI DA leading to War Zone “C”, which will increase the reaction capability of the 3rd Brigade (particularly its mechanized units) and make the road available for civilian use.
Results of Operation DIAMOND HEAD to date are:  40 VC KIA (BC),  92 VC KIA (poss),  4 VC PW,  1 HOI CHANH and 174 detainees.
Enemy material captured was:   2 P38 PISTOLS,  2 CHICOM carbines,  43 ½ lbs documents,  58,030 lbs rice,  1 unk weapon,  1 shotgun,  2 Mauser rifles,  10 AK47s,  1 tractor,  1 RPG-2 rd,  1 AT mine,  75 lbs medical supplies,  463 SA rds,  1 CHICOM rifle,  6 bicycles,  230 lbs food,  8 cans cabbage,  2 cans oil,  2000 lbs fertilizer,  2 notebooks,  1 M1 rifle,  1 commercial radio,  2 packs assorted medical supplies,  6 CBUs,  1 claymore,  1 VC training schedule,  1 book,  1 M79 launcher,  several signal instruction manuals,  10 cases of cream.
Enemy material destroyed was:   1152 bunkers,  650 military structures,  18 trenches,  9 tunnels,  6 bridges,  16 AT mines,  7 AP mines,  62 booby traps,  10  60mm rds,  9  57mm rds,  2  75mm rds,  3  105mm rds,  4  155mm rds,  2 RPG-2 rds,  1  250 lb bomb,  7 oxcarts,  40 lbs clothing,  30 lbs black powder explosives,  6 mines,  16  82mm rds,  16 sampans,  1 ammo casting,  1  500lb bomb,  7 large storage tanks,  1  lb propaganda,  47 grenades,  902 SA rds,  46,250 lbs rice,  1 rice polishing machine, 3 VC protective masks,  18 bicycles,  900 lbs of cement,  3 CBUs,  7  81mm rds,  1100 lbs fertilizer,  301 trip flares,  6 claymores,  1 hand flare,  17 M79 rds,  1 voltage converter (200amp),  2 blasting boxes,  20 gal cooking oil,  1 LAW, 55 gals diesel fuel,  1  8” rd,  2 metal silhouette targets,  1 RPG-2 fuse.

     B..   Artillery Support:  During the quarter Division Artillery fired 105,551 rounds in support and 139,871 rounds on Harassment and Interdiction (H&I).  Included in these totals were rounds fired in support of ARVN operations and/or outposts under attack.

      C..   Air Support:   There were 2,684 sorties during the quarter flown in support of 1,254 missions with the following results:  67 VC killed by Air Force (KBAF)  (BC),  373 VC KBAF (poss).  In addition, 295 VC structures, 1740 bunkers,  59 sampans,  3 tunnels,  55 caches and 11 bridges were destroyed.  There were 42 secondary explosions and 196 secondary fires.
                                                       (p10)
      D..   Army Aviation:  During the period 1 May to 31 July 1967 there were 3,846 sorties, 1,577 combat missions, 1,896 passengers carried and a total of 1,655 hours flown.  Armed Helicopters expended 549,970 rounds of 7.62mm machine gun ammunition,  4,305 rounds of .50 cal machine gun ammunition,  90 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition,  3,853 rounds of 40mm grenades, and 1,975 aerial rockets in support of combat operations.  In addition, 138 sorties and 90 hours were flown using the Man-packed Personnel Detector E63”  (commonly called the “People Sniffer”, modified for use in the UH1D helicopter), accompanied by another UH1D with spotlights ("Firefly"), and a Light Fire Team (two more armed UH1B).  These flights scouted for VC, detecting them by the ammonia produced in human perspiration, and by the carbon produced by their camp fires.  These missions resulted in the destruction of 24 structures,  13 sampans,  29 VC Killed by Army Air (KBAA) (BC),  65 VC KBAA (poss),  2 VC PW and 2 VC WIA.

E.  Intelligence:

(1)  VC Activity:

(a)   General:  VC activity consisted primarily of low level incidents directed toward
delaying security operations in support of Revolutionary Development, and acts of terrorism aimed toward intimidating the civilian population to resist pacification and the up-coming elections.  No significant contacts with NVA units have occurred since the withdrawal of Division elements from War Zone “C”.

                (b)   VC Tactics:

               1.   The VC have chosen to separate into smaller groups and conduct harassing attacks against RF, PF and RD activities rather than concentrating large forces.  However, they may concentrate forces if the likelihood of a quick victory exists.  An example was an attack on PHOUC HIEP by elements of the 1st and 7th Bn's MR IV on the night of 18 July.  A force of approximately Bn (-) size launched a coordinated ground and mortar attack on PHOUC HIEP (vic XT563167) with a blocking force in the vicinity of TRUNG LAP (XT5921).  Reaction by US artillery and air power suppressed the mortars and broke up the attackers before they had an opportunity to exploit their initial momentum.  Another attack occurred on the morning of 15 July when a platoon of the 2nd Bn,  22nd Inf was attacked in conjunction with a coordinated attack on PHUOC HOA (RF) outpost.  Mortars and recoilless rifles were fired on the outpost immediately prior to an assault by approximately two companies.  The VC over-ran the outpost resulting in 16 ARVN KIA,  30 ARVN WIA and 30 ARVN MIA, as well as capturing a 60mm mortar and many small arms.  Known VC losses were 2 KIA (BC).  During their withdrawal, the VC engaged the 1st platoon, A Co, 2nd Bn,  22nd Inf (M).  On making contact, the VC engaged the platoon with mortars, recoilless rifles, RPG-2s and small arms.  Results:  2 US KIA and 16 US WIA.  VC losses from this contact are unknown.  

               2.   Frequent incidents of assassination, kidnapping, mining and psychological warfare directed toward the civilian population were noted during the period.  The effort appears to be directed toward intimidation rather than for political or geographical gains.               (p11)

               3.   The primary enemy initiated incidents involving U.S. Forces were the mortar attacks on CU CHI and DAU TIENG base camps.  At 2328H  24 July, the DAU TIENG base camp received  an attack by 82mm mortars which lasted about 11 minutes, resulting in approximately 70 rounds of 82mm HE ammunition impacting inside the base camp, and 30 rounds outside the perimeter.  The primary target appeared to be the airstrip.  This attack resulted in 50 WHAs (7 of which required dust-off) and 1 civilian WHA.  One aircraft was destroyed and 24 received substantial damage.  Other damage included a fire truck, a wheeled wrecker, 8  ¾ ton trucks, an RTT Van, and a 15 kilowatt generator.  In addition, numerous tents had to be salvaged as a result of damage received during the attack.  A sweep of the suspected mortar position on 25 June located four mortar positions in the vicinity of a village approximately 2 kilometers northwest of the base camp.  Another incident involving U.S. Forces was the mortar attack on CU Chi base camp at 2135H, 13 July.  Sixteen rounds of 82mm mortar HE ammunition were received, resulting in 15 US WHA.  All rounds impacted in less than one minute.  No contact with the attacking force was made.

               4.   During friendly operations, the VC avoided contact or conducted delaying actions.  An example occurred on 12 July when the 1st  Bn, 27th Inf and 2nd Bn,  27th Inf made contact with an unknown size force vic XT405145 during heliborne assault operations.  The VC conducted a strong defense against the assaulting force from dug in and covered positions causing moderate casualties among the US troops, and damaging five helicopters during the first day.  Under cover of darkness, the VC exfiltrated and escaped.

          (2)   Conclusions:

               (a)   The VC continue to be forced from base camps and supply areas by friendly operations resulting in an increase in the amounts of supplies denied the enemy.  Because of continued military pressure, a greater number of the VC have chosen to rally under the CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.  This has been particularly true in HAU NGHIA Province where 556 HOI CHANHs were received during May, June and July.  

               (b)   The presence of US Forces in the Division TAOR will continue to give the population confidence in GVN's ability to protect them.  Additional construction, improvement, and repair of LOC's will allow a greater number of civilians access to areas under government control.  Conversely, areas under VC control are more readily accessible to allied troops and supporting forces.
                                                       (p12)
                 (c)   Enemy losses in manpower, facilities and equipment are expected to reduce the effectiveness of VC units in the FILHOL Plantation, the LOC GIANG area, and the HORSESHOE area of the ORIENTAL River.

          F.   Logistics:

          (1)  Class I Supply - (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)

(a)  Status.
“A” Rations     “C” Rations
 1.   Stockage objectives (days)          5          10
               2.   On hand (days)               3          10

(b)  Fresh fruits and vegetable were received from Class I point, SAIGON.

      (c)   Ice Cream

               1.   Cycle of Issue, 3 times per week.
               2.   Gallons per week from SAIGON     1,200
               3.   Gallons per week from CU CHI          1,000

               (d)   Average amount of ice issued daily:

               1.   Potable                    131,920
               2.   Non-Potable                    None

          (2)   Class II & IV (25th Supply and Transportation Bn)

               (a)   Additions to ASL during quarter          159
               (b)   Total lines on ALS               949

   (3)   Class III  (25th  S&T Bn)

(a)   Consumption rate.
                                   DAILY              QUARTERLY     
               1.   Mogas               15,000          1,365,465
               2.   Diesel               17,000          1,576,456
               3.   JP4                    19,000              1,735,765
               4.   Avgas                 1,300                120,370
               (b)   In the Class III Yard, a covered storage area for packaged products has been completed.  Work is scheduled to begin soon on conversion of two square berms to rectangular to accommodate two new JPA.

               (c)   Class III supply  remained fairly constant during the quarter.  Average daily issue increased from 11,794 gallons to 15,000 gallons for Mogas from 14,347 to 19,000 gallons for JP4.  Daily decreases in issue was noted for diesel and Avgas from 23,504 to 17,000, and from 1,505 to 1,300 gallons respectively.                                                  (p13)
          (4)   Services (25th  S&T Bn)

                (a)   Contract Laundry               9,505 bundles
                (b)     QM Bath unit:  Extensive support was given to the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech) and to the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry during field operations during the quarter.

               1.   Total showers for quarter          44,513
               2.   Average number of showers daily     1,464
                     (c)  Graves Registration:

1.   Deceased US personnel processed during the quarter     150
2.   Deceased RVN personnel processed during the quarter       32

          (5)   Transportation  (25th S&T Bn)

                (a)   Mileage driven:

               1.   Total          221,604
               2.   Average Daily         2,462

                (b)   Tonnage moved:

               1.   Total              8,906
               2.   Average Daily           98.6

                (c)   Troops moved by convoy:

               1.    Total                  308
               2.    Average Daily              3.4

                (d)     Personnel moved locally by bus:

               1.    Total               5,188
               2.    Average Daily             56.2

                (e)   Troops hauled (Pass Truck)

               1.    Total                3,368
               2.    Average daily             56.2

          (6)   Maintenance  (725th Maintenance Battalion)
                                                  (p14)
               (a)   The following maintenance requests were completed by this battalion during the reporting period.
     ITEM               MAY          JUNE          JULY          TOTAL

Wheel Vehicles          174          325          392          891
     Track Vehicles          115          184          114          413
     Small Arms          2622          561          628          3811
     Artillery               118          159          248          525
     Chemical          24          18          16          48
     Refrigeration          40          85          49          174
     Engineer          279          314          259          842
     Signal               1970          2484          2418          6872
     Fire control          229          331          342          902
     Office machines          146          213          197          556
     Aircraft               146          139       ``     146          431

               (b)   During this reporting period, the maintenance and supply mission of this battalion has been influenced by the following factors:
.       
               1.   Repair parts availability
               2.   Geographical location (to include weather land terrain characteristics
               3.   Introduction of new equipment and obsolescence of others.
               4.   Facilities.

(7)  Medical Support.  25th Medical Battalion  (This unit supported Division  and new Divisional units with medical service and supplies.)
               (a)   Medical totals:

               1.  Patients seen               10,543

                    a.   Disease                    5,723
                    b.   Non-battle injuries               1,781
                    c.   IRHA                    437
                    d.   Other (ARVN, VC, VN, Transfers)     2,602               

               2.   Lab tests                             3,723
               3.    Immunizations                    5,567
               4.    Prescriptions filled            9,936               

               (b)   Dental patients seen          2,430
               1.   Dental Examinations           1,764
               2.   Other (extractions, etc.)          666

               (c)   Supply and Service.                         (p15)

               1.   Line Items issued               5,027
                     Short tonnage total               11

               2.   MEDCAP line items issued          2,176
                     Short tonnage total               4.5

               3.   Bulk pharmacy items issued          9,072
4.   Prescriptions filled (to 30 June.  After this date all prescriptions were filled      
       by A & D)                    6,575  
               5.   Eyeglasses ordered (pairs)          622
               6.   Maintenance work orders received     84

                    a.   Work orders completed          78
                    b.   Work orders at 32 Medical Depot     3
                    c.   Work order awaiting parts          2
                    d.   Work orders not completed          1

          (8)   Transportation Office  (25th DISCOM)

               (a)   Highway continues to be the primary mode of transportation for the resupply of CU CHI,  TAY NINH  and DAU TIENG base camps.  Following is a breakout of regular resupply convoys operated in the division area:

               (1)   CU CHI - SAIGON convoys

                    a.   Total convoys               202
                    b.   Number of convoys per day          2
                    c.  Total vehicles               8,176
                    d.   Number of vehicles involved in unit
                          distribution               3,224
               (2)   On 1 May, Route 1 between SAIGON and CU CHI was reclassified GREEN.  During the reporting period, 20,837 vehicles moved over the MSR south, individually or in groups smaller than convoy size.

               (3)   Convoys from SAIGON / CU CHI to TAY NINH.

                      a.   Total convoys               176
                      b.   Number of convoys per day        2
                      c.   Total vehicles               22,975
                      d.   Vehicles by unit:               

                    1.   1st Log Command          12,296
                    2.   25th Div & attached units     6,908
                    3.   1st  Inf Div               57
                    4.   4th  Inf Div               1,226
                    5.   9th  Inf Div               224
                    6.   PHILCAG               910
                    7.   Other               4          (p16)

               (4)   During the reporting period, 2,893 vehicles from the 25th Inf Div moved over the MSR to TRANG BANG and GO DAU HA in support of operations north of CU CHI.

               (5)   TAY NINH and DAU TIENG convoys:

                     a.   Total convoys          176
                     b.   Number of convoys per day     2
                     c.   Total vehicles                 7,931

               (b)   Special airlift dates for the quarter is as follows:

MISSION     ACFT           PRIORITY     SORTIES     PASSENGERS     CARGO (lbs)

       1          C-7A                 1                     7                          130              10,000
       2          C-7A/C-123     1                     4                          153                -    -
       3          C-123          CE                     16                         420               18,000
       4          C-123/C-130     1                   5                          336                 -    -
       5          C-130          CE                      2                               -                30,000
       6          C-130          CE                    17                         535                26,400
       7          C-130          CE                      2                         162                 -     -
       8          C-130          1                         2                          210                 -     -
       9          C-130          1                        1                              -                  28,000
      10          C-130          2                       7                              -                195,000

     TOTALS:                                             63                       1946              407,400

               (c)   The volume of business in the Division Baggage Section decreased this quarter due to a reduction in the number of personnel rotating.  The section served 922 customers and shipped 1,435 pieces of personnel baggage weighing a total of 112,590 pounds.

          (9)   Ammunition Office  (25th DISCOM)

               (a)   Stockage objectives:

               1.  Status at end of quarter          806
               2.   On hand               1068 tons

               (b)   Issues:

                    PERIOD              AMOUNT (Tons/Day)

               16  Apr  - 15  May          65.58
               16  May - 15 Jun               62.59
               16 Jun -    15 Jul               45.32

               (c)   Average for quarter (Tons / Day)     57.83               (p17)

          G.   Administration:

          (1)   Personnel:  During the past quarter the personnel posture of the division has been excellent.  Assigned strength (approximately 104%) exceeded the authorized strength.  This average has been maintained in an attempt to keep the present for duty strength above 100%.  There continues to be la shortage of approximately 50%; of the authorized Infantry NCO's in grades E-5 and E-6.  There are also shortages of MOSs  O5C40, 11B40,  11C40 (E-5), 11F40 and 91B10 (E-5).  These shortages have occurred primarily as a result of a lack of fill action against requisitions, or in some cases, personnel in lower grades have been used to fill requisitions in NCOs.  

          (2)   Key Losses/Gains:

(a)     1 May 67 - Col Kenneth E. Buell assumed command of 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.  Col Marshall B. Garth departed.

               (b)     4 May 67 - LTC George E. Webb Jr. departed.

(c)     8 May 67 - LTC Alan M.R. Dean assigned as 25th Infantry Division Fire Support Coordinator.

 (d)  11 May 67 - LTC Joe R. Salcedo departed.

      (e)  13 May 67 - LTC James V. Ladd assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, 14th  
                                      Infantry

  (f)   16 May 67 - LTC Felix Salvador departed.

      (g)   19 May 67 - LTC Charles A Gillis departed.  LTC Chandler Goodnow assumed  
                                      command of the 1st Battalion,  5th Infantry

(h)   23 May 67 -Col Francis Conaty Jr. departed.
(i)   28 May 67 - LTC Murt F. Kelty assumed command of the TAY NINH base    camp

                (j)   31 May 67 - LTC John M. Shea assumed command of 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry.
                      Col Doniphan Carter assumed command of the 1st Bde,  35th Inf Div.

                (k)   16 Jun 67 - LTC Thomas A. Ware Jr. assumed command of the 4th Battalion,
                        23rd  Infantry

                (l)   28 Jun 67 - LTC David R. Hughes assumed command of the 1st Battalion,
                       23rd Infantry

               (m)   1 July 67 - LTC John M. Henchman assigned as Executive Officer,  1st Brigade
                        25th Infantry Division                                   (p18)

               (n)   3 July 67 - Col Marvin D. Fuller departed.

               (o)   3 July 67 - Col Leonard R. Deems Jr. assumed command of DISCOM

               (p)   6 July 67 - LTC  Harvey H. Perritt Jr. departed.

               (q)   14 July 67 - LTC Raphael D. Tice assigned as Deputy Brigade Commander
                        of the 3rd Brigade,  4th Infantry Division

               (r)   16 July 67 - BG Robert C. Shaw departed.

               (s)   20 July 67 - LTC Allen t. Lindholm assigned as 25th Infantry Division
                      Artillery Fire Support Coordinator.

               (t)   22 July 67 - LTC Louis S. Jennings departed

               (u)   24 July 67 - LTC John M. Holko Jr. departed

               (v)   26 July 67 - LTC Walter Adams assigned as Special Assistant to the Chief
                       of Staff

               (w)   31 July  67 - LTC Joseph H. Devins Jr. departed

          (3)   The division PX remains in operation with 8,000 square feet of floor space and 7,700 feet of storage space.  Total sales for the Division Exchange was $2,764,076.28 for the quarter ending  31 July 1967.

          (4)   Strengths:     Division (-) as of 31 July 1967.
                    OFF     WO     FM          AGG
               Auth          734     114     10,724          11,592
               Asgd         757     115     11,063          11,935
               PFD          708     113     10,781          11,602

          (5)   Losses:  (1 May - 31 Jul 67)

                       OFF     WO     EM          AGG
               KIA     4           0     119          123
               WI    90           5     1,236    1,331
               MIA     0          0          0          0
               DOW  3          0        12          15
               NBO   1          1          6             8
               NBI     4           0     898          93

          (6)   Gains  (1 May - 31 July)

                    OFF     WO     EM          AGG
                    187     34     1,803          2,024          (p19)

          (7)   Provost Marshall Activities:

               (a)   Eight Military Policemen were attached to the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div for military police support of Operation MANHATTAN and Operation KAWELA.  The 1st Bde utilized the MP's from 28 Apr 67 until 8 Jun 67 in support of Operation MANHATTAN and upon its completion, went directly into Operation KAWELA which was completed on 16 June.  The military police responsibilities were considered successful.  Normal police support was provided by the eight MPs.
               (b)   On 8 July 1967 a platoon of Military Police from the 25th MP Company provided Military Police support and acted in an advisory capacity to the VN national police, ARVN and Popular Forces, during Operation AKUMA.  The platoon had the responsibility for screening civilians for identification and family birth papers within the village of PHU HOA DONG.  The commitment ended on 13 July 67.   During the operation, 4,197 Vietnamese were screened.

               (c)   From 30 July to 2 Aug 67, the 25th MP Company provided nine Military Policemen for support to the 1st Inf Div during Operation CORONADO II.  Normal Military Police support was provided.

          H.   Revolutionary Development Support:

               (1)   An increased number of liaison visits were made during the reporting period because of changes in personnel in the Office of the ACof S, G5 and also because of the formation of the Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support throughout the Division TAOI.  Regular visits were made to the Provinces of HAU NGHIA, BINH DUONG and TAY NINH as well as to each District Headquarters.

               (2)   The new Corps Office at Province Headquarters will improve the division's support of Revolutionary Development by reducing the number of representatives requiring coordination in Civic Action.

                    (3)   The MACV Hamlet Evaluation Summary (MES) continued to be a valuable tool.  The report has been modified to show a more accurate status of the hamlets.

               (4)   There were no changes in the locations of Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams.  Teams fluctuated in strength throughout the period causing the GVN to replace missing members with personnel initially programmed to form new teams.  This has resulted in fewer teams being formed and current teams have remained at their present locations longer than planned.

               (5)   Village and Hamlet elections are held during this period.  Little VC interference was noted.  The election in TAN AN HOI was canceled on 28 May because candidates had not filed properly.  Election was held the following week.
                                                       (p20)
               (6)   On 2 June the division moved 221 VN Nationals from unauthorized areas in the vicinity of the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation to the refugee center at DAU TIENG (XT4946).

               (7)   The latest change in the HES showing the Security Status of hamlets is an improvement, and is of value to a tactical unit.

     I.   Civic Action:

               (1)   There are presently 5 AA Platoons from the 2nd Civil Affairs Company attached to the 25th Infantry Division.  During this reporting period, an additional AA Platoon was attached to the division.  This platoon, designated the 15th AA Platoon, is further attached to the 1st Brigade, and is performing civic action missions in PHU HOA DONG.

               (2)   Statistical Summary:
                                                             MAY - JULY          SINCE 1 FEB 67

          Helping Hand Recipients               48,053                   76,620
          MEDCAP Patients                         47,552                    69,080
          MEDCAPS                                           333                         546
          Construction Projects                          246                         441
          Education and Training                         10                         180
          Community Relations                            21                         838
               (3)   MEDCAPS during this period showed a sharp increase from 237 to 333 conducted.  The number of patients more than doubled from 21,528 to 47,552.  Additional projects of training GVN medical personnel and conducting maternity clinics continued with approximately 58l people receiving On -Job-Training  (OJT).  

                     (4)   The Helping Hand program provided additional tents and commodities to the Refugee Center in DAU TIENG in addition to clothing and such necessities as carpenter kits, mason kits, family and individual refugee kits, and midwife kits.  Approximately 325 refugees from in and around the DIAMOND HEAD Operation are affected.  The following is a summary of helping Hand issues during the quarter”

               ITEM               QUANTITY
               Books               1290  each
               Candy                     4  boxes
               Solatium Boxes               60  each
               Clothing                 10.2  tons
               Canned Foods            30.5  tons
               Family Refugee kits          30  each
               Ind Refugee kits               25  each
               Midwife kits                 6  each                    (p21)
               Mushroom Soup               23  cases
               Paint                   167  gals
               School kits            4560  each
               Sewing Machine                  4  each
               Soap               39,809  bars
               Shoe Tongs                 32  sets
               Towels                      41  each
               Toys                      64  each
               Toothpaste             2336  each
               Tooth brushes              1481 each
               Keen Mix                   3  cases
               Saws                        4  each
               Pick Axes                   3  each
               Shovels                        8  each
               Tin                    183  sheets
               Cooking Oil             2084  gals
               Baby Foods               500  jars
               Corn meal          14,000  lbs
               Lumber (scrap)          35,350  board feet (est)
               Carpenter kits                   1  each
               Blacksmith kits                   1  each
               Brick machines                   2  each
               Friendship kits                 72  each
               Instructor kits                   5  each
               Maternity Kits               101  each
               Textile kits               110  each
               Television Sets                   1  each
               Goodwill bags                 65  each
                (5)   Construction:

                   a.   Roads repaired         12  (39 km)
                   b.   Bridges constructed        3
                   c.   Fences            6  (2.3 km)
                  d.   Playgrounds            5
                   e.   Classrooms          30
                f.   :Latrines                6
                g.   Wells               1
                h.   Dispensaries          4
                i.   Miscellaneous:
               1.   Culverts  -            5  (61 meters)
               2.   Dwelling          10
               3.   Irrigation ditches -      2  (4 km)
                (6)   Participation in civic action effort by  local RF/PF has been enthusiastic.  Self Help projects have a 95% participation by Vietnamese and 5% by US personnel.  Projects undertaken by RF/Pf and civilians on a self help basis has reached the point where such projects are willingly assumed.  Emphasis has been placed on short term high impact projects.  Self Help projects have been stressed except when it is impossible or impractical to utilize RF/PF units, or in instances where the local officials and populations have not been previously introduced to FWAF Civic Action.
                                                       (p22)
                 (7)   During the reporting period numerous Friendship Councils were held throughout the Division TAOI.  Problems have been brought to light and the majority resolved.  These meetings have been and will continue to be a yardstick in measuring where we stand and where more assistance can be stressed.

                 (8)  This reporting period observed Operation MANHATTAN ending and the Monsoon
Campaign get into full swing.  The Monsoon Campaign has pushed Civic Action to a new high throughout the Division TAOI.

                 (9)    The willingness of the Vietnamese people to participate and encourage self help projects throughout the Division Area has greatly increased the assistance given.
          J.   Psychological Operations  (PSYOPS)

               (1)   PSYOP activities were directed primarily in support of operations conducted in HAU NGHIA, TAY NINH and BINH DUONG Provinces.

               (2)   A total of 21,213,184 leaflets were air-dropped and hand disseminated throughout the division TAOI.  Thirty leaflets were originated by G5 PSYOPS and produced by the 246th PSYOP Co to exploit PSYOP opportunities.

               (3)   Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts conducted during the quarter totaled 75 hours, 35 minutes broadcast time.  Ground loudspeaker time totaled 55 hours.  An aerial loudspeaker set has been developed to be mounted on a UH1D.  This has greatly improved our loudspeaker capability for standard broadcasts, and decreased our reaction time for exploiting PSYOP incidents.
               (4)   During the quarter, the G5 PSYOP section supported the following division operations:

a.  Operation  BARKING SANDS
b.  Operation  KOLEKOLE
c.  Operation  DIAMOND HEAD
d.  Operation  AKUMU
e.  Operation  SABER THRUST
f.  Operation  MANHATTAN
g.  Operation  KAWELA
h.  Operation  JUNCTION CITY
i.  Operation  ALA MOANA
j.  Operation  FORT NISQUALLY                         (p23)




         (5)   During the month of June the ARVN PSYOP teams attached to 1st Brigade and G5
ordered back to the 30th POLWAR Bn due to a reorganization.  This loss has severely hampered our PSYOP program.  The ARVN PSYOP teams are the most effective means available for disseminating credible propaganda.

                (6)   A PSYOP campaign along the major LOCs within the 25th Inf Div TAOI has resulted in an increasing number of civilians providing information on VC mines and other activities.

                (7)   Requisitions for PSYOP equipment have been filled in some cases.

              (a)   Items received so far are:

                     1.   Megaphones
                     2.   Polaroid Cameras
               (b)   Items still outstanding are:

                     1.   Multilith presses w/components
                     2.   Loudspeaker sets

                (8)   A combination of increased military activity and corresponding increase in PSYOPs has shown definite results in the CHIEU HOI Program, particularly in HAU NGHIA Province.  CHIEU HOI totals for this province in February, March and April were 313.  In May, June and July, they increased to 556.
                (9)   Availability of U-10 aircraft has greatly improved our PSYOP capability.  We receive an average of 9 missions per week, thereby allowing us to cover more targets with greater frequency.

               (10)  Two HOI CHANH's have been assigned to the G5 for the purpose of evaluating our present leaflets and for developing new leaflets.  They have so far proved to be a definite benefit to the PSYOPS Program.

               (11)   The increased number of leaflets dropped and loudspeaker time continues to increase.  One indicator of the effectiveness of the PSYOP Program is the increasing number of HOI CHANH.  The 246th PSYOP Co has filled all our leaflet requirements on a timely basis, thereby giving us a large number of standard and special leaflets to exploit PSYOP opportunities.
           K.   Medical

                 (1)   Personnel and Supporting Medical Units.                         (p24))

               (a)   At the end of the reporting period, the division was short four medical officers and three medical service corps officers.  Replacements have been requested and are programmed for early August.

               (b)  Primary medical support to the division still remains more than adequate and
And of the highest caliber.  Specialized treatment for all injuries is immediately available or within twenty minutes flying distance of the 25th Medical Battalion and the 12th Evacuation Hospital.

               (c)   Primary medical care at TAY NINH is provided by the 45th MUST.  DAU TIENG obtains primary medical support from “D” Co, 4th Medical Battalion.  All specialty treatment is readily available or within twenty minutes flying time of each primary medical facility mentioned.
               (2)   Training:

               (a)   Cross training in the preparation of medical records and reports has been given emphasis because of the anticipated turn over in these particular clerical  specialties.

               (b)   Two 25th Division Regulations 40-19 (MEDCAP II)  and 40-10 MEDICAL REPORTS were revised.   Circular 40-4 Light Duty Status was instituted after staffing.

               (c)   Field sanitation classes were conducted at DAU TIENG for one day.

               (3)   The health of the command has been good.  The malaria rate remains constant;  the venereal disease rate has dropped.  Infectious Hepatitis is on the increase and is being reckoned with accordingly.

               (4)   Environmental Situation.

              (a)   Water Supply.  A new water point W.P. VI, was opened for amplifying the quantity of potable water at Camp CU CHI.

              (b)   The drainage problem remains the same because of the lay of the land, the increased rains of the monsoon season, the level of the water table, and the nature of the soil.  

              (c)   The problem of illegal use of non-potable ice has been reckoned with through command channels due to the increase of infectious hepatitis traced probably to this source.

                (5)   Conclusion:   Medical support, even with the influx of new personnel and the annual turn-over of medical personnel, remains adequate in quantity and excellent in quality.  Each medical problem has quickly been resolved with consideration of eliminating the cause of each through active command and control measures.
                                                       (p25)
          L.   Signal:   See separate ORLL 125th Signal Battalion, Attached.

          M.  Training:   

          (1)   During the period of May, June and July 1967, the following number of personnel attended the division schools listed below:

     Small Arms Inspection          40          Mess Management           46
     Generator Operator              75          Company Aidman              37
     Projectionist                          35          Mines and Booby Traps    1,943
     Explosives & Demolitions   402        Tunnel Destruction            40

          (2)   In addition, the following number of personnel attended courses given in May and June 1967:

     Combat Leaders                            30          NCO Academy                26
     Replacement Training              1,322          Ambush Academy          194

          (3)   On 1 July 1967, the NCO Academy and Ambush Academy courses were discontinued and a new combined course for Lightning Combat Leaders offered in their place.   Courses held in July 1967 were:

     Lightning Combat Leaders          160             Replacement Training Course     617
                                   (For all incoming E-1 through E-7
                                   Warrant Officers, and Lieutenants)

          (4)   Instruction was also given at non-divisional schools during the reporting period to the following personnel:



     COURSE          INSTRUCTOR                    NUMBER ATTENDED

Jungle  Survival          Fleet Airborne Electronic Training Unit          2
                    (US Navy)
     JUSPAO / USAID     Military Assistance Command, Vietnam          9
     Orientation

     Aviation Avionics     34th General Support Group,  USARV          18
     Maintenance Training
     Program

     Cable Splicing          40th Signal Bn,  USARV                    5
     XM-21  Armament     34th General Support Group  USARV          2

     Eiffel Bridge           ARVNAF  Engr School                    4
     Classification and repair
                                                       (p26)
     Leaflet Dissemination     50th Political Warfare Bn, MACV               4

     ARC-131  FM Radio     198th Sig Detachment,       USARV               3

     AN/PRC-74,  AN/PRR-9     198th Sig Detachment,  USARV               24
 and AN / PRT -4     79TH Maintenance Bn
                    Saigon Support Command

     AN / GRC - 160          Mr. George H. Schmeer                    25
                    General Dynamics Corporation
                    (on TDY to Cu Chi Base Camp from CONUS)
                                   (p27)

2.   (C)   Commanders Observations and Recommendations:

     A.   Observations:  (Lessons Learned)

           (1)   Personnel.

ITEM:   The continued lack of NCOs particularly in the grade of E-6

OBSERVATION:   The 25th Infantry Division Leaders School for junior enlisted leaders should be continued and increase its capability to instruct a larger number.

          (2)   Operations

ITEM:   Increased hazards of mines during monsoon season,.

DISCUSSION:  Because of heavy rains, trafficability of the terrain has become extremely difficult and as a result, existing trails and roads must be used.  The VC have increased their employment of mines along roads and trails.  In many instances they have employed mines behind passing vehicles, especially in areas where they feel that the same routes will be used by US Forces when they withdraw from an area.

OBSERVATION:  Units should when possible avoid using the same road or trail to leave an area they have entered.  When this is not possible units should employ mine detectors to sweep ahead of column.  A continuous training program for newly assigned personnel on identification and detection of mines must be conducted..

ITEM:   Determination of terrain trafficability for tracked vehicles during the rainy season…

DISCUSSION:   The recent advent of the rainy season in this area has limited tank travel to hard surface roads.  Cross-country mobility has been very poor to impossible in the Division TAOR.  Aerial reconnaissance of an area can usually determine whether the terrain is trafficable for track vehicles by closely observing bomb craters, shell holes or large wells.  If the water level in these holes  s no higher than one foot from the ground level, tank traffic is generally possible with extreme caution.  No sudden or sharp turns and no tracking is permissible, under these conditions.  In addition, care must be exercised to avoid crossing obstacles such as rice paddy dikes where at some time during the crossing the majority of the weight of the tank is concentrated on a small surface area (such as three road wheels).  When observing water levels in holes, personnel must be cautioned to determine the distance between water levels and true ground level, not the hole's edge.  Bomb and shell craters give a false measure of distance.  Determination of trafficability based on dryness of ground surface is not valid due to the high water table and intense heat at the surface caused by the sun.
                                                       (p28)
OBSERVATION:  Aerial observation can assist in determining trafficability of an area, but due to misleading conditions, only a ground reconnaissance of some detail can provide accurate information.

ITEM:   Need for additional personnel for Cavalry operations in dense terrain and during rainy season.

DISCUSSION:  When operating in dense foliage, it has become essential to employ dismounted personnel to the front and flank of the armored vehicles.  The loss of tanks due to wet terrain has drastically cut the speed by which this type unit can move through dense foliage.  Any sudden maneuvering of personnel carriers in such terrain generally results in a thrown track, thereby disabling the vehicle for a period of time and causing additional security requirements.  Constant movement through heavy woods and jungle places strain upon the power train and suspension system of the personnel carriers, which will result in a higher deadline rate and increased down time.  The tactical considerations involved in the movement of armored vehicles in dense foliage are as follows:

          a.   Loss of tanks (due to terrain) slows movement.

          b.   Attempts at maneuver results in down vehicles as a result of thrown or broken tracks.

          c.   Recon by fire has negligible effects.

          d.   Observation and fields of fire are limited.

          e.   VC are able to make and break contact at will due to greater maneuverability and speed of dismounted personnel.

           f.   Personnel carriers provide protections against small arms fire but little protection against high arching grenades or RPG-2s.  The TOE for an Armored Cavalry unit provides for a dismounted capability of one infantry squad within each platoon.  This squad is not capable of providing the necessary protection to 7 personnel carriers.  Internal augmentation of this force can be accomplished by dismounting all but a minimum crew from the remaining vehicles.  This would provide an additional 12 men.  However, there is no provision for additional communications equipment.  The addition of twelve men to the dismount capability of the platoon would provide sufficient security provided the unit is stationary.  This force however is not sufficient for tactical movement through dense foliage.

OBSERVATION:   When an Armored Cavalry unit must be employed in dense vegetation, additional dismounted troops and communications equipment must be attached for successful employment.
                                                       (p29)
ITEM:   Use of MAD System (B1 Mortar Air Delivery System).

DISCUSSION:   This system was tried on several occasions and proved to be highly unsatisfactory.  The round will not detonate in water.  Secondly, for a pin-point type target, there are too many factors to consider in order to hit a target: i.e., airspeed, altitude, moving targets.  In most cases, artillery can cover any target discovered, and once the initial adjustment has been made, Fuse VT can be employed and give devastating target coverage.  The target initially must be pinned down by use of helicopter-borne machine guns, and the area covered by door gunners.

OBSERVATION:   That the use of the MAD was ineffective in our areas of operations, and that the use of such system should be discontinued in future operations.

ITEM:   Use of the AT-912 as an elevated antenna.

DISCUSSION:  Due to the limited number of RC-292 antennas authorized a unit, it is necessary to employ field expedients in order to provide additional elevated antennas.

OBSERVATION:   Experience has shown that the AT-912, when elevated, is at least as effective as the RC-292.  The only problem involved is causing the matching unit to properly match the frequency in as much as matching unit power cables are not available in sufficient lengths.  For situations where frequencies will be relatively static, the matching unit can be pre-tuned with the MX-6707/VRC.  The antenna must first be attached to the radio using the short matching unit power cable, the radio turned on and the proper frequency set.  The antenna matching unit can be disconnected and the antenna elevated.

ITEM:   Use of AN/GRA 39, remote control unit for read-back during fire missions.

DISCUSSION:   The continuous requirement for accurate transmission and receipt of firing data, necessitates a number of checks in the gunnery chain in a minimum amount of time.  A good communications system is therefore an important factor in firing.

OBSERVATION:   The remote control component of the AN/GRA 39 radio set control group is used in place of field telephones at each howitzer position and in the Fire Direction Center (FDC).  Wire lines are laid from each howitzer to the MX155 switching kit, and through the exec post telephone to the FDC.  This procedure accomplishes the following:

          a.   All personnel in each firing section hear all commands from the exec post.

          b.   All personnel in the FDC hear all commands sent from the exec post to the firing sections, and all read-backs data from guns to exec post.

          c.   Maximum number of firing battery personnel are able to monitor commands and read-back, providing more efficient gunnery performance and accuracy of firing data.
                                                       (p30)
ITEM:   Use of CS Gas to expose the enemy.

DISCUSSION:  The use of CS gas has proven successful on many operations.  Once a VC unit, personnel, or a suspected hiding site has been spotted, one gun ship saturates the area with CS gas.  Once the VC move out of the area, the other gunships roll in on the target.

OBSERVATION:  All gun ships and C&C helicopters are now carrying CS gas to employ against targets of opportunity.

ITEM:  Joint operations with US Air Force Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and Gun Team to stop and destroy the VC.

DISCUSSION:  On several occasions, one gun team has worked with FAC in spotting enemy activity.  The FAC aircraft usually orbits above 6000 feet, and by the use of binoculars and an observer, detect enemy movement or activity.  The gun team orbiting a pre-designated area out of the area of operation, and on call, are directed in low level on to the target by the FAC.  If the enemy takes evasive action, CS gas is used in an attempt to drive the VC out of hiding.

OBSERVATION:   These joint operations have proven highly successful, and on several occasions have caught the VC off guard.  It has further proven that joint operations between services can be accomplished in an excellent and efficient manner.

ITEM:   Firing charts with 6400 mils capability.

DISCUSSION:  It has been found that in setting out deflection indices for a 6400 mil firing chart, a five to ten mil arc was left over in one quadrant, thus leaving one quadrant's deflection indices that much in error.

OBSERVATION:   Firing charts are constructed with the primary direction of lay 6400 mils at deflection 2800.  An exact 6400, 1600, 3200, and 4800 azimuth index is established for each battery on the firing chart.  Placing the arm of the RDP on the 6400 mil index, and working in a clockwise direction, a deflection index is placed at scribe mark number 8 on the RDP.  Number it 2 and label it with the appropriate battery designation.  Next, place the arm of the RDP on the 1600 mil index and place a deflection index out at the scribe mark numbered 2.  Number this index 1 and label it with the appropriate battery designation.  Place another index out from number 1 at 1000 mils using the arm of the RDP.  Number it 0 and label it with the appropriate battery designation.  The index at 3200 and 6400 will be numbered 3 and labeled with the appropriate battery designation.
     Repeat the above procedures beginning at the 3200 index.
By modifying the Artillery School's recommended method, the error is taken up throughout the firing chart.  Inaccuracies in the deflection indices are no more than one or two mils.
                                                       (p31)
ITEM:   Daylight H&I's

DISCUSSION:   H&I's are normally scheduled during the hours of darkness.  Past experience and intelligence reports indicate that the VC often move during daylight when aircraft are out of the area of movement.

OBSERVATION:   H&I's are planned in areas of known VC activity, making use of past experience and current intelligence.  These H&I's are fired from early morning until dusk, at which time the normal H&I program is initiated.  Volume of fire is dependent upon whether harassment or interdiction of a particular terrain feature is the objective.

ITEM:   Pre-planned Blocking Fires.

DISCUSSION;   After a preparation has been fired on an LZ, routes of withdrawal often permit the VC to escape.  These routes are normally canals or trails in the general area of operations.

OBSERVATION:   Pre-planned, on-call groups of targets are assigned to likely avenues of escape or withdrawal routes to insure rapid response by artillery elements in providing blocking firs.

ITEM:   Preparation of Landing Zone.

DISCUSSION:   It has been found that scheduled preparation, planned from picto and photo maps, have sometimes left a critical area, hedgerow, or bunker relatively uncovered by artillery fires.  Moreover, with several batteries firing a given preparation, it is difficult for an air observer to adjust additional fires into the critical area from a target included in the scheduled preparation fires.

OBSERVATION:   It has proved useful to pre-designate a target, not a part of the regular scheduled preparation, in the landing zone.  This target is used as an adjusting point by the air observer for adjusting additional coverage of a LZ when necessary.

ITEM:   Shifting Fires:

DISCUSSION:   It has been a general practice to prepare landing zones per a given schedule of fires and to terminate firing on schedule just prior to arrival of armed or troop aircraft at the LZ.

OBSERVATION:   When shifted according to a schedule of fires, artillery fires can effectively block routes of VC withdrawal from a prepared LZ.  Close coordination must be effected between artillery firing units, artillery LNO's with command control ships, armed helicopter pilots, and troop aircraft pilots.  Elements of information to be coordinated are:

     a.   Areas into which fires are to be shifted.
     b.   Colored smoke or other signal to indicate termination of preparation of LZ.         
 (p32)
     c.   Orientation of gun-target lines,
     d.   Other pre-planned control measures.

ITEM:   Computing of firing data for air observer missions.

DISCUSSION:   Battery Fire Direction Centers have experienced difficulty in controlling the subsequent adjustments of multiple missions with the TOE equipment and personnel available.

OBSERVATION:   When aerial observers adjust using the gun-target line, the initial chart data is computed and checked.  Subsequent corrections are then computed using 100/R for deflection, and the C factor for quadrants, using two computers for independent checks.  This system has proven to be more rapid and as accurate as the chart procedures.

ITEM:   FADAC metro message.

DISCUSSION;   In order for the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC) to be used as effectively as possible, accurate data must be programmed into the computer as rapidly as possible upon receipt of the data.  In programming weather data, the fastest way is to prepare a teletype tape of the data and feed it into the machine automatically.

OBSERVATION:   It was found that the teletype operator could prepare a tape and transmit it faster if it was given to him in the exact format that the computer would accept.  The metro and radio sections prepared a form which showed exactly how the tape should be prepared.  The metro section puts the data on the form, showing where a space or carriage return (symbol) should be.  The computer will accept only 16 numbers to a line.  It will accept a corrected mistake if the correct number is covered by the letters character (symbol #).  It will not accept a random key or a line feed.  Using this form,the teletype operators were able to punch a tape much faster and consequently transmit it to the units much faster.

ITEM:   Striking Targets Acquired by the Man-packed Personnel Detector D63 (People Sniffer).

DISCUSSION:   The “People Sniffer” device mounted on a UH-1 helicopter has been very effective in acquiring targets.  The device has been employed with a LFT, to provide cover for the “Sniffer Helicopter”, and to strike targets.  Most sensings have occurred over jungles or dense foliage.  This type terrain limits the effectiveness of aerial fire power delivered by the LFT.  Targets acquired by the “People Sniffer” could be more effectively engaged by TAC AIR or artillery fire.

OBSERVATION:   Heavy volume artillery fire or large ordnance deliveries by TAC AIR provides more effective engagement of acquired targets.

ITEM:   Supplementing Firefly Missions with the “People Sniffer”.                    (p33)

DISCUSSION:   The “Firefly Mission” employs starlight scope, flares, and searchlights to acquire targets during the hours of darkness.  Target acquisition using these devices has been very effective on rivers and open terrain, but has been ineffective over dense foliage along rivers and streams.  By augmenting the firefly aircraft with “People Sniffer” in another aircraft, targets that would have gone unnoticed are now acquired and engaged.

OBSERVATION:   The “People Sniffer” device has proven to be very effective in target acquisition, and is now being employed regularly to increase the success of Firefly missions.

ITEM:   Control of Artillery fire during combat operations.

DISCUSSION:  On a recent operation, the artillery preparatory fire was directed by the airmobile force and air mission commanders from the command and control aircraft orbiting the objective area.

OBSERVATION:   Fire support is required as close to the lift element as possible during the approach and landing in the landing zone in order to decrease and possibly neutralize the amount of enemy fire received.  Artillery should be continued until the assault element is only minutes away from the landing zone.  Gunships should prepare the landing zone by suppressive fires as soon as artillery fire has stopped.  This technique is very effective in giving the flight element continuous support and is preferable to the much used time on target method.

ITEM:   Eagle Flight Operations.

DISCUSSION:   The 25th Aviation Battalion conducted several “Eagle Flights” operations with divisional ground forces.  A normal operation requires eight aircraft, one command and control aircraft, one utility aircraft, and a minimum of four gunships.
     Once in the area of operation, two gunships descend to low level to fix VC positions.  When an enemy position is located, normally by receiving ground fire, the lead aircraft marks it with smoke and climbs to join the remaining lift aircraft who begin descending out of an orbit over a predetermined reference point.
     The gunships escorting the lead aircraft will engage the VC while the flight joins and lands in a landing zone selected in close proximity to the enemy position.  From the time the VC are found until troops are on the ground is normally less than four minutes.  The lift aircraft can then lead a reinforcing unit and orbit for immediate employment, or go to strip alert in a selected staging area.
                                                       (p34)
OBSERVATION:   A normal operation utilizes eight lift aircraft.  However, use of five ship eagle flights in areas where intelligence sources indicate a relatively small VC force is desirable.  With good intelligence information, these small Eagle Flights are effective and have produced numerous POWs and detainees.  A utility aircraft is a great asset.  This aircraft should have a medic and a maintenance team on board.  It can be used to replace a downed aircraft while the maintenance team render assistance, evacuate WIAs, KIAs POWs and detainees, perform command and control during absence of the normal C&C aircraft (refueling, etc.), and provide emergency re-supply.

ITEM:   Screening assault element with smoke.

DISCUSSION;   On several operations Co B, 25th Avn Bn was called upon to provide a smoke screen for the purposes of obscuring the lift element from enemy observation.  This is accomplished by installation of an integral Smoke Generator, (53E 00-62A,) on UH-1 helicopter.  Wind must be considered when using smoke, from the aviation stand-point, and to insure that the smoke does not interfere with the ground tactical  plan.

OBSERVATION:   Under proper wind conditions, the smoke screen is very effective in obscuring the flight element from likely enemy positions.

ITEM:   Use of Smoke.

DISCUSSION:   The use of smoke in Landing Zones (LZ) and Pickup Zones (PZ) has been found to be very helpful to pilots.  Pathfinders should use smoke at both ends of the LZ or PZ.  When the lead pilot calls for smoke, the Pathfinders pop smoke at the first touch down point.  Five seconds later, smoke is popped just beyond the last touch down point.

OBSERVATION;  This system enables the flight leaders to align the flight on the long axis of the PZ or LZ, far enough out to preclude last minute adjustments.

ITEM:   XM 172 Panel.

DISCUSSION:   It has been found that the XM 172 Panel is excellent for marking friendly positions at night.  The illuminating panel can only be seen from the air, and not by the enemy when it is laid out flat on the ground.

OBSERVATION:  Utilization of the illuminating panel will assist friendly troops in the employment of attack helicopters at night.

ITEM:   Use of High Voltage Generators and Electrical Line.

DISCUSSION:   Recently power lines were knocked down into a water soaked field causing a direct short to ground,.  A crowd soon gathered around the mishap.  One individual in the crowd received a burn and severe shock which could have been fatal.
                                                       (p35)
OBSERVATION:   When power lines are downed or shorted, unqualified personnel should not work on lines.  If possible, turn generator off.

ITEM:  “People Sniffer”.

OBSERVATION:   This instrument has proven successful in locating individuals in heavily vegetated areas.  Large areas of this nature can be covered by employing the “People Sniffer” in a UH1D (traveling at tree top level) accompanied by a light fire team (two gunships).  Upon detection, a smoke grenade is dropped to pinpoint location identified.  The light fire team can cover the area until an orbiting Eagle Flight element is available to conduct a ground search.

ITEM:  Cordon and Search Operations.

OBSERVATION:  When establishing a cordon by airmobile means, always maintain an airmobile reserve for employment against VC ex-filtration not observed by those forces already on the ground.,

ITEM:   Employment of CS.

OBSERVATION:  Prior to destruction of bunkers and tunnels, seed with CS.

ITEM:  Employment of 90mm Recoilless Rifles in the Attack.

DISCUSSION:  The canister round employed by the 90mm rifle gunner in conjunction with M60 teams provides the terrain clearing capability and the automatic fire power needed to make effective fields of fire, and suppress enemy small arms fire simultaneously.

OBSERVATION:   When enemy small arms fire is encountered from a heavily foliated area, targets must be identified as soon as possible.  Effective firing with .50 cal. or M60 machine guns is not always possible when observation is limited.  However, 90mm canister rounds may be used to open fields of fire and to permit the automatic weapons to effectively engage point targets.

ITEM:   Use of foot Patrols with Mech. Operations.

DISCUSSION:   Often when a mech. unit operates in the field, the individual soldier is not employed on the ground, rather the mech. unit conducts the S&D operations mounted.  The VC soon anticipate this and expect to hear the APCs coming toward them.

OBSERVATION:   When Mech. Is used in an area, separate dismounted operations should be conducted.  It has been found that these foot mounted troops will surprise the enemy who is listening for the sound of APCs.
                                                       (p36)
ITEM:   Use of 81mm Mortar Aiming Stake Lights.

DISCUSSION:   The aiming stake lights when turned on during the hours of darkness, present a very marked target and is easily seen from a great distance at certain locations from outside the perimeter.  When under attack, or prior to attack, the VC are able to sight in on the aiming stake lights.  The lights cannot be turned off unless personnel go to each stake and flip the switch.  During a heavy ground attack, this is not always possible.

OBSERVATION:   Aiming lights should be rigged with WD-1 commo. wire and dry cell batteries with the control switch near the mortar for control by the gun crew, thus enabling the crew to turn the lights on and off at will..

ITEM:   Tents, Lean-to Shelters, etc.

DISCUSSION:  On a bright night, the starlight and moonlight causes a very bright reflection from personnel shelters that are damp or wet from dew or rain.  This glow or shimmering effect of the wet water proof lean-to's is easily seen from a great distance, and are perfect targets during night attacks on the perimeter.

OBSERVATION:  Personnel shelters, lean-to or tent, should not be erected be erected in forward areas.  Those shelters which must be erected should be well camouflaged to prevent “shine”.  Individuals should rely on a poncho pulled over and laying on the individual rather than a tent.

ITEM:   Distinctive Outline of Tracked Vehicles during the Hours of Darkness.

DISCUSSION:  Tracked vehicles have a very distinctive outline and are easily “sky lighted” from the ground by the square shape of the vehicle, the cupola and guard inside the cupola, and the large .50 caliber machine gun sticking out.

OBSERVATION:   The outline can be broken up by strategic emplacement of vines, brush and trees.  If possible the armored personnel carrier should be parked in or near scrub growth and additional brush placed near all four corners and behind the machine gunner.  Caution should be exercised so as not to block the observation of the guard in the cupola.

ITEM:   Radio Call Lights and Dash Oil Lights illuminating inside the track.

DISCUSSION:   On the large radio sets, each time a transmission is incoming, the radio call light illuminates the inside of a vehicle.  The dash light (oil light, master switch-light, etc.,) are on continually and present a good target from across the perimeter.

OBSERVATION:   Radio call lights should be turned off in forward areas, or taped so as to allow only a pin point of light to shine directly to the front of the radio.  Dash lights should be completely covered with sand bags.  A poncho should be draped over the rear of the track to block all possible illumination (in lieu of the track ramp being closed).
                                                       (p37)
ITEM:   Smoking inside of Tracks and in Cupola while on Guard.

DISCUSSION:   Cigarettes, lighters and flame producing devices when used inside of tracks and in cupolas, provide the VC with excellent targets.

OBSERVATION:  No smoking should be permitted anywhere except in a covered hole or a closed Armored Personnel Carrier.  There should be no smoking in a cupola of an Armored Personnel Carrier.

ITEM:   Situation Report through the Rifle Company chain of Command.

DISCUSSION:   Experience proves that a situation report must be given more often than once per h our at unit level to insure that personnel are fully awake and alert on the machine gun while on guard.

OBSERVTION:   Situation reports should be given from each track to the platoon leader's track every 15 minutes.  Platoon Leaders should make situation reports to company every 30 minutes during the hours of darkness.

ITEM:   Return of Fire and Fire Control

DISCUSSION:   Training of the people and force of habit prevents the personnel on guard from firing on movement, trip flares that have been illuminated etc. by the VC.  In most cases, fire control is held at too high a level in the chain of command.  By the time the guard receives permission to fire, the attack has been launched by the VC.

OBSERVATION:   Fire Control should be at the lowest level practical.  All personnel should be fully aware of locations of friendly elements, types of fire that can be returned initially.  (i.e. small arms only on squad leaders order; .50 caliber or larger on Company Commander's order only), and location of LP's and ambush patrols.  Certain types of probing fires should be returned with certain and selected weapons from the perimeter.

ITEM:   Depressions, Holes and Berms outside the protective wire used to launch assaults.

DISCUSSION:   Any depression or hole near the outside of the perimeter wire, is used, is a perfect covered position from which to launch a RPG attack.

OBSERVATION:   Each hole or depression should be booby trapped, illuminated, land have punji stakes emplaced in them.  Trip flares in holes, claymore mines emplaced in the walls of holes with detonating wire buried and aiming , and elevation stakes on the perimeter to place accurate M79 fire in the hole should be employed.
                                                       (p38)
ITEM:   Battlefield illumination usage to illuminate the VC and outside the perimeter without illuminating the friendly elements.

DISCUSSION;   Illumination over head, not only illuminates the VC but also the friendly forces.  A technique is needed to illuminate only that portion of the battle field occupied by the VC.

OBSERVATION:   One in every four 81mm defensive concentrations should be white phosphorous.  81mm “defcons” should be within 15-20 meters of the protective wire.  81mm illumination rounds should be fired so as to burn on the ground at a distance of 200 - 300 meters from the protective wire depending on the terrain.  This sky lights the attacking VC without completely illuminating the friendly position.  Consideration should be given to trip flares with pull wires running back to the perimeter.  Flood lights may also be emplaced 50 - 100 meters from the perimeter, and placed to shine across the front of the platoon position.  The spot light should be booby trapped to prevent removal.  Lights so employed must be controlled from the platoon leader's vehicle.

ITEM:   Maximum effect from grazing fire with ground mounted weapons.

DISCUSSION:   More grazing fire is required at ground level to repel the attack and prevent VC from crawling into the wire where he can do more damage.

OBSERVATION:   All M60 machine guns should be mounted on tripods with T&E mechanism for effective grazing fire.  M60 not mounted on a tripod during the hours of darkness tend to be fired too high or into the ground in front of the gun.  The tripod insures accurate grazing fire.  Additional firepower can be brought to bear by placing additional .50 caliber machine guns in ground mounted positions.  These may be obtained from destroyed tracks or from some other source rather than removing them from the track vehicles.  If necessary, some .50 cal MGs can be dismounted at night, from HQ and Mortar APCs.

ITEM;   Routine of placing command post tracks in the center of a circular perimeter for forward rifle companies.

DISCUSSION;   RON perimeters should be frequently changed as to design, shape and location (open field or in wood-line).

OBSERVATION:   The VC are well aware of the mechanized concept of the Headquarters group being in the center of the circular perimeter.  Different techniques should be employed, i.e., command group vehicles may be placed away from the center and behind the line platoon tracks..  The unit perimeter may be emplaced in the edge of a wood-line allowing a helipad for aerial resupply etc., or within a finger of trees extending into an open field.

ITEM:   Injuries to personnel sleeping in open, unprotected areas or inside of tracked vehicles.    (p39)

DISCUSSION:  Most casualties come from personnel in or near tracked vehicles or sleeping exposed above ground.

OBSERVATION:   No more than two men per ground position, and no one should be allowed to sleep in tracks.  Everyone not sleeping in a hole or gun position should be laying flat on the ground, (no cots) and the sleeping area should be sand-bagged above the line of the body..

ITEM:   Effect of River Tides upon Search Operations.

DISCUSSION:  Numerous VC caches have been discovered along rivers and their tributaries.  In most cases the caches were discovered at low tide.  Apparently the VC bury their equipment/ammunition in the river bank at low tide, thus obtaining additional concealment during periods of high tide.  Caches concealed in this manner are easier to detect at low tide.  Accurate tidal information has not been available, consequently search operations frequently have not been fully effective in tidal areas.

OBSERVATION:  Accurate information concerning tides should be developed for all areas affected by tide changes.

ITEM:  Light Machine Gun Mounted on OH-23 Aircraft.

DISCUSSION:   The use of OH-23 Aircraft for C&C during mechanized operations has been effective in detecting VC movement ahead of the mechanized forces.  In some cases VC have escaped before maneuver elements/or light fire teams could reach the objective area due to lack of organic fire power on the OH-23 aircraft.

OBSERVATION:  A light machine gun mounted on the OH-23 could engage the VC and restrict his movement until maneuver elements or light fire teams reach the scene.

ITEM:  Use of Hand Grenades during Search Operations along Canals and Rivers.

DISCUSSION:   VC hide under water when US Forces approach a canal or river line.  Single grenades tossed along the water frequently are not effective due to insufficient area coverage.

OBSERVATION:   An effective technique is to line several men along the canal/river bank and have these men throw grenades on command.  This procedure saturates the area and will normally force the VC to the surface.

ITEM:   Increased Booby-trapping of Ambush Patrol Exits.

DISCUSSION:   Due to the increased number of VC mines and booby-traps employed in and near the tactical wire, departing ambush patrols have incurred several casualties.

OBSERVATION:   To counteract booby-traps, the exit gates were relocated and mine-sweeps employed prior to the departure of the patrols.
                                                       (p40)
ITEM:   Return Route.

DISCUSSION:   On a recent combat ambush patrol, a member of the patrol was wounded when he detonated an enemy booby-trap.  The individual was returning to his position after emplacing his claymore mine, but did not return the same way he had departed.

OBSERVATION:   The patrol member could have lessened his chances of becoming a casualty by returning to his position via the same route he had departed.

ITEM:   Overhead Trip-wires.

DISCUSSION:   The Viet Cong are constantly changing their methods of employing booby-trap tripwires.  Tripwires have been encountered which are several feet above the eye level.  These wires are tripped by the unsuspecting RTO who walks under them carrying his PRC-25 and long antennae.

OBSERVATION:   The unit commander must remind their subordinates to be constantly alert for new methods of VC booby-traps and tripwire employment.

ITEM:   Chicom Grenade Booby-traps in Open Terrain.

DISCUSSION:   Many Chicom grenades boob-traps have been encountered recently in grassy open terrain away from hedgerows.  These grenades are generally painted green and tied or wired to stakes approximately 6” off the ground with pins removed.  As a soldier knocks the stake, the grenade handle falls to the ground and the grenade explodes instantly.

OBSERVATION:   Care should be used in moving through open grassy areas, personnel should move widely separated from each other and leaders should choose routes with low grass rather than high grass when possible.

ITEM:   VC Sniper Fire.

DISCUSSION:   Recently VC sniper teams working in pairs have been encountered probing night defense perimeters.  Two or three snipers open fire from one side of the perimeter, after friendly attention is concentrated on this initial fire, a second sniper team open up from the opposite side of the perimeter.

OBSERVATION:   Use indirect fire as primary means of countering snipers harassing a defensive perimeter and do not move defenders to other positions to counter sniper fire.

ITEM:   Searching Hedgerows.

DISCUSSION:   Thick vegetation and the danger of booby traps made it impractical for an entire squad or platoon to search hedgerows.
                                                       (p41)
OBSERVATION:  Two or three men should remove all gear and check the hedgerow while the rest of the element secures the area.  Men unencumbered by gear can make a more thorough search in thick vegetation, and the danger of loose gear detonating booby-traps by hanging up in bamboo is reduced.

ITEM:  Jungle Clearing I.

DISCUSSION:   During Operation JUNCTION CITY and MANHATAN, the Engineer Battalion was involved in jungle clearing operations.  To accomplish this mission, Rome Plows were employed.  These plows are mounted on standard bulldozers with specially constructed blades and operator cabs attached.  The blade has a knife edge and is set on an angle.  During Operation JUNCTION CITY, the clearing consisted of making 100 meter wide right-of-ways along roads in the operational area.  To accomplish this, Rome Plow-Bulldozer teams were created utilizing two Rome Plows with each bulldozer.  The plows would knock down the brush and trees followed by the bulldozers wind-rowing the fallen vegetation.  In War Zone C, the operational area for JUNCTION CITY, the jungle is extremely heavy and the trees range from 100 - 200 feet in height.  In many cases it was necessary to use demolition to remove the larger trees.

     During Operation MANHATTAN, Rome Plows were used to clear road right-of-ways and large scale jungle clearing.  With as many as eight plows working at a single time, it was necessary to devise a system whereby all the plows could be operated in an area restricted by the availability of security.  This operation was conducted in the lower BOI LOI Woods area.  During clearing, Rome Plows were employed separately from the bulldozers, with the bulldozers used only to wind-row relatively small areas for helicopter landing pads.  This was done because the dozers could not wind-row at the same rate as the plows.  In order to provide security for the dozers, it was necessary to work them in a small area.

OBSERVATION:  As a result of these two clearing operations, many techniques have been evolved for jungle clearing.  The most significant being that the productivity of each plow is dependent upon the number of plows operating.  It was found during Operation MANHATAN, that by placing the plows in an echelon-left formation, with the jungle to be cleared on the left, five plows operating for 8 hours could clear 100 acres of jungle in one day.  By keeping the jungle on the left, the angled blade of the plow pushes the overflow to the right and out of the way of the plow and the following plows.  Mechanized infantry moved with the plows to provide security.

     Maintenance played a large role in the success of the operation.  Without continued maintenance support, these plows could not keep running.  In the vicinity of each clearing area, a maintenance point was established with an air-compressor and two contact maintenance teams.  Once every two hours a plow would stop to be checked, refueled, and have branches and leaves blown out of the engine compartment.  It also gave the operators a chance to take a `15 minute break.
                                                       (p42)
     Another problem encountered was the control and guidance of the leading plow when cutting through a new section of jungle.  This was alleviated by painting large numbers on the top of the cabs, and providing a HRC-25 Radio to the assistant operator.  A light observation helicopter, in direct contact with the lead plow, provided necessary control and guidance for initial cutting.

ITEM:   Jungle Clearing II

DISCUSSION:        A new concept in land clearing has been put to the test near CU CHI,Vietnam by Co C, 65th Engr Bn.  The operation consists of dragging a large anchor chain behind two vehicles, spaced so that the vegetation which passes between them will come into contact with the chain.  The links of the chain are 9 inches wide and 12 inches long.  Each link weighs approximately 28 pounds.

     The very nature of the equipment employed in the operation dictates the type of clearing that can be accomplished.  Basically, the weight of the chain and the pulling force of the vehicle are the principle clearing factors.  It is easily understood then, that vegetation which can withstand a swift blow from a heavy object is not effectively cleared by this operation.  This is especially found to be true in areas of undergrowth, where the diameters of the trees and shrubs are appreciably smaller than four inches.  The chain passes over vegetation of this size, after which the vegetation springs up.  Somewhat different, much more gratifying and useful results are obtained when the chain is used to clear trees with diameters greater than four inches.  The chain has been used to clear rubber trees up to three feet in the base diameter.  The chain catches around the base of the tree, rides up on the trunk, causes the tree to lean, and eventually weighs it down; uprooting and laying it on the ground.

The chain was found to be most effective in clearing rubber trees rather than any other type of vegetation.   In the plantation, it was possible to drive the vehicle down the paths between the trees, since the trees are planted in straight rows and side by side.  Trees in the Filhol Plantation where the cutting was done, are planted in rows running generally Northwest to Southwest.  The rows are approximately 8 meters apart, and the trees are approximately 6 meters apart within the rows.

     The selection of direction in which to clear is a relatively simple matter.  The important factor to remember is that the most effective cuts are long and straight.  The width of the cut will depend on the size of the trees.  It was found that the trees in the Filhol, which averaged about twenty inches in diameter,  were most effectively cleared in cuts of two rows each.  The length of the chain is a factor here also, since the strain on the vehicle varies directly with the angle between the chain.  The chain is made of 90 feet sections which can be joined or separated.  Through experiment, a length of  360 feet, or 4 sections, was found to be optimal, since this length of chain was sufficient to reduce strain on the vehicles when clearing the rows of trees, and at the same time was not so lengthy as to greatly impede maneuverability.
                                                       (p43)
     Careful briefing of both vehicle operators and vehicle commanders is a must before beginning the operation.  It should be emphasized that staying in the clear paths is important.  Also drivers should try to coordinate with one another during the operation.  The vehicles should “glide” during periods of little resistance, and then accelerate as soon as the chain catches on the trees.  This prevents damage to pintles, stalling, and in general, makes for a smoother operation.  In addition, one vehicle should remain slightly ahead of the other, so that if one hits a mine, personnel on the other vehicle are not likely to be affected.

     Reversing direction when clearing can be a very tricky operation.  If at all possible, cuts should be made between two open areas to facilitate turning.  The turns should be very deliberate, especially when there are obstacles present.  One method is to make a half circle with both vehicles.  Another method is for one vehicle to make a very tight neutral steer while the other makes a somewhat broader turn.  Still another method is for both vehicles to back over the chain, make a tight turn, and head in the reverse direction for another cut.  Many variations are possible.  The vehicle drivers should not hesitate to drive over the chain if it is necessary, and must only be careful not to get so far apart as to be pulling against each other.  In most cases, the condition of soil will dictate the type of turn.  This is because the maneuverability of the vehicles with the chain is quite hampered in boggy or even damp terrain.  Also, it is important to cut in such a manner that the fallen trees will not be in the path of the vehicles on future cuts.  A minimum of planning is required to accomplish this since the chains pull the trees inward and stacks them in very neat rows.

     Once the operation begins, it is necessary to assert aggressive control.  The control element must direct the entire operation and be constantly alert.  It must react quickly to obstacles and be quick in formulating a plan for reversing for direction after each cut.  The controller should be on one of the two vehicles pulling the chain, and should have ready contact with all elements of the operation so that the operation will run as quickly as possible instead of bogging down due to some unforeseen situation.

     The mechanical considerations in an operation of this type are many and play an important role.  The weak areas soon present themselves as a matter of course during operations.  There are some areas in which preventive maintenance can save time and enhance the operation in general.  The weakest part of the installation is the pintles to which the chain is attached.  It is found that the constant strain against the pintles soon wears the threads on the four bolts which hold them in place.  It is not uncommon for these bolts to fail.  One solution to this problem is to carry extra bolts for quick repairs.  An even better solution is to reinforce them with 1” or 1-1/8” wire cable.  The cable is threaded through the two hook brackets to form a complete loop through the third link from the end of the chain.  This reinforcement takes a great deal of strain off the pintles and reduces pintle failure by about 90%.  
                                                       (p44)
     The transmission of the vehicles suffer since low-gear only must be used during the actual clearing.  Sometimes it becomes necessary to stop for cooling off periods of 30 to 40 minutes.  A loss of power is also a common phenomenon.  This is attributed to the over-working of the transmission.  It is necessary to check the oil frequently and to have an ample supply of oil on hand at all times.  If there are any oil leaks in the vehicle, or if a leak develops, the vehicle should not be used for this operation until such time that the leak has been repaired completely.  The nature of the strain is such that even a tiny oil leak will soon  become a serious maintenance problem.

     Another problem is the final drive of the vehicles.  Pulling the chain causes considerable strain on this assembly.  A vehicle with faulty final drive should not be used in this operation.  Particular attention should be paid to the final drive during operations so that serious damage can be avoided.  The probability of throwing a track on an operation of this type is much greater than other operations.  The extra burden of pulling the chain makes even the slightest obstacle such as a log or small trench harbingers of nearly certain tack failure.  Tight track and very selective driving are a necessity if the operation is to run unhampered.  Clearly, maintenance considerations play an important role in this operation, as in more clearing operations.

     A tactical consideration of the anchor chain clearing operation merit special attention.  The types of security and employment thereof should be an integral part of the planning phase.  The optimum security is a force of five personnel carriers, two preceding the chain pullers, two following, and one on the flank which is exposed to the uncut wood-line.  This all around mobile security makes up for the inherently vulnerable cumbersome chain set-up.  The security elements should be close enough to provide adequate support, yet for enough away to allow the cutting to run smoothly.  Tanks also can be used to provide security for the operation.  An added benefit of using tanks would be that they can pull the chain if something went wrong with one of the prime movers.

     The most important tactical concept to keep in mind is alertness.  The fact that the operation covers so much area places a tremendous responsibility on all concerned to be especially watchful.  To effect unity of command, the control element must direct not only the clearing, but concurrently, the security.

     A comparison of performance of three types of prime movers was made on two different days.  On 10 July 1967, M48A3 tanks were compared to D-7 Dozers.  On 14 July 1967, M-88 recovery vehicles were tested.  All three types of vehicles were employed in the same manner: clearing two rows of trees in the Filhol Plantation.  The dozers had the slowest clearing rate of 5.28 acres / hour.  The M-88s were most effective, with 28.9 acres / hour.  The tanks had the second fastest rate of 15.1 acres/hour.  Thus, with an effectiveness of 1 for dozers, the tanks would be rated at 15.1 /5.28-2.86, and the M-88s would be rated at 28.9/5.28-5.49                                                  (p45)

     The greatest difference in performance, other than in clearing rates, was the amount of time the vehicles were down for repairs.  The dozers, even though they worked slower, did not have to make even one stop for maintenance.  The tanks and M-88s however, were frequently stopping to repair pintles, check the oil, cool off the transmission, or replace tracks.   The greatest single stopping factor was pintle failure.  As mentioned above, this problem has been solved by using a reinforcing cable.  The other maintenance drawbacks of M-88s and M-40s, although numerous, are not sufficient to warrant choice of D-7s for pulling the chain in lieu of M88s or M48A3s.

     If the choice is between M-88s and M48A3s, the greater horsepower and weight, and hence momentum of the M-88s make them the logical selection.  When properly employed and maintained, the M-88 can clear nearly twice as effectively as M48A3.  The extra power makes them more maneuverable than the tanks.  Also, the M-88 transmission is designed to pull heavier loads, and there is less tendency to run the M-88 to stall out when the chain comes in contact with unusually large trees.  In areas of smaller trees, it is possible to run the M-88 in second gear, speeding up the operation, and reducing transmission strain.

     If necessary, a tank and an M-88 may be employed in the same operation.  The rate of clearing however, would be governed by the tank since it would be the weaker of the two.

During the 15 days of operations with the chain, C Company was able to clear approximately 1500 acres of the Filhol Plantation.  The Operation now raised from guess work to a science, has been placed in the hands of a sister company to the 65th Engr. Bn.  A second, somewhat smaller chain has been acquired, and the operations are continuing with M-88s as prime movers.  The smaller chain links are 5” wide and 9” long.  They weight approximately 60% as much as the larger links.  This chain was doubled and attached to one section of the larger chain.

Before the original chain was acquired, a 1-1/8” cable, weighted by  wrapped cable, was tested to determine effectiveness in clearing.  The cable has a tendency to slip over small vegetation, and was relatively ineffective.  If the cable was used to clear large trees, the strain encountered would make it necessary to replace the cable often, making the operation logistically and economically unfeasible.  The operation as considered unfruitful, and no data concerning effectiveness was collected or analyzed

On 10 July 1967, two D-7 Dozers were used to windrow the rubber trees which had been cleared y the anchor chain.  It was found that the dozers averaged windrowing 1.1 acres/hour/dozer.  At this rate, it would take 23.9/1.1 or at least 26, D-7 Dozers windrowing in support of two M-88s clearing rubber trees.  This is clearly not feasible, obviously the gains of windrowing are not equivalent to the required equipment density.
                                                  (p46)
On 10 July 1967, napalm disbursed from flame tracks was used in an attempt to burn rubber trees which had been cut down for a period of six months.  Briefly, the timber would not ignite.  The fallen timber in the rubber plantation is spread out so that the spaces between rows form natural fire barriers.  As mentioned above, windrowing is not feasible.  The conclusion is, that it is not feasible to dispose of the fallen timber by fire.

OBSERVATIONS:   

     1.     The following are observations and recommendations on anchor chain clearing operations.  Some are taken from the preceding text, and serve as a summary thereof.  Others are merely hints emanating from observation.
a.  That M-88s be used in lieu of M48A3s for this operation.
b.  That the pintles on the M-99 be reinforced with wire cable prior to each day's operation.
c.  That two 30 minute maintenance stops be made each normal working day.
d.  That clevis, pintles, and reinforcing cables be checked often for wear and tear.
e.  That the day's clearing be carefully pre-planned, and that track commandeers and drivers be thoroughly briefed prior to starting the operation.  This should include a fly over when possible.
f.   That extra lengths of reinforcement cable be taken each day to replace any that may wear out.
g.  That a “quick-release” device for the reinforcing cable be employed.  This consists of two clevis attached through the tow-hook brackets.
h.  That the clearing be done between two unobstructed areas whenever possible.

2.   In conclusion:  The anchor chain, when properly employed, is highly effective in clearing
rubber plantations.  As any other type of clearing operation, this one denies concealment and cover to the enemy.  The large scale nature of the operation suggests that it merits special attention, and that it should be given careful consideration.
                                                       (p47)
ITEM:   Rafting Operations:

DISCUSSION:   On 10 June 1967, Co E, 65th Engr Bn, was tasked to provide bridging in support of Operation BARKING SANDS, in the vicinity of XT564325.  The mission called for the use of the 15man assault boats, an aluminum foot bridge, LTTR, and a Class 60, M4T6 raft.  The crossing site was relatively inaccessible to wheeled vehicles and engineer equipment other than dozers, due to the absence of roads and steep bank approaches.  It was decided therefore, that all bridging equipment be air-transported to the crossing site with the exception of the assault boats and foot bridge.  They were transported by vehicles as close to the site as possible, then hand-carried the rest of the way.  This done in order to achieve the element of surprise and secure a crossing site.  Air-transporting (by CH-47) the LTR, the 27' bridge erection boats, and pre-assembled M4T6 floats was a novel method of transporting this equipment for the 65th Engr Bn within the 25th Inf Div Operational area.  The equipment was a great success with minimum of time and without any difficulties.  The operation was a great success and it provided valuable information and experience for similar future operations.

OBSERVATION:   As a result of this operation the following techniques were adopted:

     a.   Bridging and rafting support can be provided by any crossing site required by tactical units by transporting equipment with CH-47s.  Rafting support can be provided and extracted with a matter of a few hours.  This is highly important where the tactical situation calls for a quick crossing or emergency extraction.

     b.   The M4T6 Float Bridge can be air-transported in pre-assembled packages.  This is particularly important since it eliminates the need for bridge trucks and cranes at the crossing site.  It releases this equipment for other missions.

     c.   The aluminum corduroy tread-way was utilized for the first time and it proved to be a very valuable piece of equipment.  It was used on the far shore approach which was marshy and muddy.  This tread-way provided enough stability to cross tanks and even an AVLB.  Without it, extensive fill and equipment work would have been required.

     d.   Due to the tremendous rotor down-wash created by the CH-47, it was found necessary to secure all pontoons and floats in order to prevent capsizing or drifting of this equipment.  On LTR half pontoon was capsized and sunk as a result of rotor wash.

     e.   This operation also pointed out the importance of prearranging and briefing of personnel emplacing the equipment and the pilots transporting it.  It is recommended that in future operations, liaison visits be made by engineer units and aviation personnel to make sure that the best procedures are used and any problem areas straightened out prior to the operation.

ITEM:   Phu Cuong River Crossing:                                   (p48)

DISCUSSION:   The mission at the Phu Cuong River Crossing called for two each, five float reinforced rafts, two each LTRs, seven 27' bridge erection boats, and a complete 38' dry span.  All the equipment and personnel required to accomplish the mission were air-transported in forty three CH-47 (Chinook) sorties.  The whole operation was completed within eight hours, and the construction of the rafts completed within the same day.

OBSERVATIONS:   The following are some of the problem areas and lessons learned during the operation:

     a.   One of the M4T6 floats was capsized as it was set down by the Chinook.  Several bridge components were lost as a result.  This can be avoided in future operations by instructing the pilots to hover over the landing zone for a short period of time in order to decrease the oscillation of the float and then gently place it in the water.  Also, all component parts placed in the float should be adequately secured to the float during transportation.

     b.   The far shore pier was not adequate nor sufficiently strong to accommodate high class vehicles or wide loads.  To overcome this problem, a 38'4” dry span was constructed on top of the existing, and all efforts were made to locate the load bearing stiffeners over the structurely sound piles.  A tapered balk ramp was also used to connect that pier to the shore.  This arrangement proved very satisfactory and all vehicles were crossed without any difficulty.

     c.   Another problem area noted during the operation was that the pontoons had a tendency to shift off center from the saddle panels.  After a closer inspection and observation, it was determined that this was caused during air-lifting.  This problem was solved by tightening the straps from the pontoons to the center beams as tight as possible before airlifting.  Also, retainer lugs to the saddle adapters should be checked to male sure that they are secured in place and safety pinned.

     d.   One of the major problems during the operation occurred when an M4T6 float was dropped during airlift back to CU CHI.  Upon recovery, the float was found to be beyond repair.  During investigation, it was found that the retainer lugs had failed in bending, thus causing the float to drop.  This can be attributed to the fact that the total load of the float and the rotor down-wash of the aircraft were supported by the retainer lugs.  This problem has been eliminated by slinging the floats differently.  The slings will be placed on the notched portion of the center beam where it connects with the beam extension.  This will eliminate the stress concentration on the retainer lugs.

     e.   It has been proven by this operation that small river crossing operations can be totally supported by “E” Company, thus releasing line companies to perform other missions.
                                                       (p49)
     f.   This type of an operation increases the capability of the bridge company and adds to the support of the Division.  It can be used in relatively inaccessible areas and it eliminates the need for engineer equipment to emplace the rafts.

ITEM:   Two Fixed Spans (38'4”) Supported by a Trestle at Midspan.

DISCUSSION:   The mission called for two complete 38'4! Dry spans and a 50 ton trestle for midspan support.  This was an emergency mission and had to be completed within the shortest period in order to open the MSR to SOUI DA.  All required personnel and equipment were air-lifted to the site.  Dry spans and trestle were emplaced by Chinook with very few problems.

OBSERVATION:   When the bridge was assembled it was possible to span a larger span than is possible  with standard spans.  The classification of the bridge, however, was reduced to Class 30.  Classification can be increased by providing additional trestles and diagonal cross bracing.  This technique provides emergency support for MSR repairs and can be accomplished within a short period of time.

ITEM:   Employment of ¼ Ton Truck-Mounted Searchlights.

DISCUSSION:  The employment of searchlights in support of perimeter defense is new to many artillery units.

OBSERVATION:   Searchlights should be accurately located and laid for direction.  To illuminate a given area, an azimuth should be given to the searchlight.  When the searchlight detects a target, the azimuth and estimated range can be reported.  Searchlights should be collocated or have direct communications with the automatic weapons on the perimeter so that rapid fire can be brought to bear on the target.  Lights should have alternate position and be repositioned nightly.

          (3)  Training and Organization.

ITEM:  Search Techniques: There is a definite lack of knowledge in conducting a search of villages.  

OBSERVATION:   Each infantry squad should be organized so that each member has a particular job to perform when searching a house.

DISCUSSION:   Instruction is required to point out possible and likely hiding places when conducting searches.  Use of an VN RF/PF instructor would be ideal because of their first hand knowledge of Vietnamese village life.  The ideal training area would be a vacated house in a pacified or secured area.

ITEM:   Weapons Familiarization.
                                                       (p50)
DISCUSSION:  It was found that newly arriving personnel were in most cases unfamiliar with the various weapons organic to an Armored Cavalry Troop, especially the M16 rifle and the crew served weapons.  This resulted in unnecessary malfunctions of weapons because of inadequate maintenance.  There also were instances of personnel being injured by Cal. 50 MGs due to the fact that personnel were inadequately trained in care and cleaning, and assembly and disassembly of crew served weapons.

OBSERVATION:   Institution of a training program at platoon level in which all personnel were given instructions on all weapons organic to the platoon resulted in a substantial decrease in malfunctioning of weapons.  Injuries due to improper assembly of, or inadequate maintenance of weapons have also ceased.

ITEM:   Reorganization of Aero-Rifles and LRRP.

DISCUSSSION:  Due to the deactivation of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) as a separate unit of the Division Cavalry Squadron, there is a need for personnel trained for the type missions previously performed by the LRRP.

OBSERVATION:   Personnel assigned to the Aero-Rifle Platoon of D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry will receive training to enable them to perform LRRP missions.

ITEM:   Training and use of Light Scout Aircraft.

DISCUSSION:   The Division Cavalry Squadron has been successful in employment of OH-23 armed with the M-2 Gun Kit when used in conjunction with ground operations and give the ground commander valuable means of collecting intelligence on his area of operations.  The Light Scout aircraft also provides the commander a means to assist him in controlling movement of his ground forces.

OBSERVATION:   Aviators from D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry were sent to the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry to observe employment techniques of the Light Scout Helicopter and obtain knowledge on training requirements for use of the OH-23 in a light scout role.  The OH-23 Helicopters of D Troop have been armed with the MG Gun Kit, and are presently being employed in a light scout role.  The only problem encountered thus far is a lack of TOE aerial observers and a lack of aviators trained in the techniques of employment of light aircraft.

ITEM:   Training Radar Operators.

DISCUSSION:  The Cavalry Squadron has been hindered in employment of its organic radar equipment because of a lack of qualified personnel.

OBSERVATION:  In order to overcome this problem, personnel from HQ, A&B Troops as  presently undergoing training at TRA CU Special Forces Camp.  Under this program the personnel are getting practical training in the employment of the AN/TPS 33H and AN/PPS-4 Radar Sets.
                                                       (p51)

ITEM:   Control of Fires During Contact.

DISCUSSION:   VC initiated incidents in heavily wooded areas are generally at close range and from spider holes or trench lines.  In such incidents fire must be returned but it must be controlled and be directed at the enemy.  Indiscriminate firing hinders the situation because if makes it more difficult to determine where the enemy is located.  Suppressive fire, when employed, must be placed on the ground and must be walked into the enemy position.

OBSERVATION:   Squad leaders must train their personnel in reaction to close contact situations.  Personnel must be designated to observe for the enemy positions and employ aimed fire at identified or suspected positions.

ITEM:  Supervision and control of personnel.

DISCUSSION:   Supervision and control of personnel is difficult because of the nature of operations over wide areas or in areas of thick vegetation.  The problem is also increased by the fact that a large number of operations require use of small units i.e., platoon or squad.  Therefore the mater of control and supervision must be designated to the lowest practical level..

OBSERVATION:   Small unit leaders must continually be reminded of the importance of their duties,.  Commanders must train these leaders to a point of proficiency that will permit mission accomplishment with minimum supervision.

(4)    Intelligence.

ITEM:   Use of Polaroid Camera for Aerial Photographs..

DISCUSSION:   Because of the usefulness of aerial photos and the need for them on short notice, use of the polaroid camera is ideal.  Those photos can greatly aid unit and patrol leaders in accomplishing the mission by providing up-to-the-minute coverage.  The user can choose the specific area of desired coverage and can obtain any number of photos desired.

OBSERVATION:   Companies/Sections should request coverage telephonically from the Battalion S2.  When the photos are no longer required by the unit, they should be returned to the S2 for filing for possible future requirements.

ITEM:   MEDCAP Used to Obtain Information.

DISCUSSION:   The use of Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP) is good means of making contact and provides an excellent means of obtaining enemy information.  A unit recently exploited this in the following manner:  A VN individual appeared at a Bn perimeter seeking medical attention for an alleged injury.  He actually had information concerning AT mine locations.  The unit was able to dress him in fatigues and fly him over the area where he successfully located the mines by dropping flour sacks near them.  Then they returned him to the base camp and bandaged his fake leg injury prior to releasing him 20 minutes from the time he arrive.  His identity was safe guarded and the mines located.
                                                       (p52)
OBSERVATION:   Be aware of all benefits available to a unit through the use of MEDCAPS and exploit completely through hand dissemination of weapon reward leaflets and national safe conduct passes.

ITEM:   Necessity to furnish Hoi Chanhs with a Certificate for weapons turned in at time of rallying.

DISCUSSION:   ARVN authorities have requested the assistance of US units in assuring that Hoi Chanhs are given credit for weapons turned in at the time of rallying.  Rewards are paid by local Chiou Hoi Cadre for weapons turned in, but the absence of a certificate by the unit to which the individual rallied makes payment impossible.

OBSERVATION:   Units receiving ralliers with weapons should furnish a certificate with the rallier when he is brought to Division.  Units should not pay a Hoi Chanh in the field for his weapon turned in at time of rallying.  This does not preclude payment to the Hoi  Chanh for information leading to location of arms and material caches.

ITEM:   Use of the same interrogator while exploiting a source builds confidence of Source for the interrogator.

ITEM:   Interrogation of Returnees.

DISCUSSSION:  Interrogation of Returnees reveals that their willingness to cooperate with intelligence personnel and lead US Forces to the Viet Cong Troop locations and caches, decreases as he is exposed to the reeducation techniques and the security of a GVN “Chieu Hoi” Center.  As he feels more secure, the Returnee is less willing to take the risks involved in leading US Forces to the Viet Cong locations and caches.

OBSERVATION:   Exploit intelligence gained from the interrogation of a returnee as soon as possible.

ITEM;   Analysis of Charts and Maps.                                   (p53)

DISCUSSION:  Past experience has shown that a detailed analysis of captured charts and maps reveals much information of intelligence value.  All too often a rapid scanning of a document fails to disclose any data of significance.  In order to fully exploit captured charts or maps, every portion of the map must be studied and analyzed with great care.  Partially erased lines, rotations and trail traces may not be detected at first glance.  Indentations in the paper or acetate, which have been caused by the pressure of a pen or pencil, are difficult to detect.  A method found to be useful in detecting these indentations is the slant light technique.  In this technique, the person examining the map holds a flashlight or some other light source at an angle of approximately 15 degrees to the surface of the map or acetate covering.  The light strikes the surface of the map in such a manner as to cause a shadow to be formed in the slight indentation.  A grease pencil is then used to highlight the shadow area.  Charts and maps captured in recent months confirm that VC cadre are often careless in their map security.  Every effort should be made to capitalize on this VC weakness.

OBSERVATION:   (1)   All captured maps and charts should be carefully screened and analyzed to insure that this source of intelligence information does not go unexploited.

              (2)   The slant light technique can be a valuable tool in discovering information that would otherwise go undetected.

ITEM:   Perishability of Intelligence.

DISCUSSION;   The platoon leader of the Security  Platoon of a Viet Cong Military Region headquarters rallied to a district office of the government of Viet Nam one morning at approximately 0700 hours.  He was interviewed at that location all that day.  The next day Military Intelligence personnel of the 25th Infantry Division were notified that he had rallied and arrangements were made to have him brought to the Base Camp Friendship House at that time.  During his interview at the base camp, it was determined that he was willing to lead US troops to the headquarters which he had been guarding   A plan was drawn and the next morning, the Hoi Chanh led the troops to the headquarters.  However, the only things remaining were the building of the headquarters which were destroyed.

OBSERVATION;   If even as little as forty-eight hours elapse after the Viet Cong have reason to believe that an important cadre has rallied to the government, they have time to minimize the value of any information he may furnish.

(5)  Logistics:

ITEM:   Class V  Stockage Levels at TAY NINH.

DISCUSSION:   The division's position has been that Class V stockage levels at the 1st Log Comd Class V ASP at TAY NINH  have been excessive for several months.  Stockage objectives exceeded any realistic anticipated usage factors.  The large amounts of Class V unnecessarily produced a significant target.
                                                           (p54)
OBSERVATION:   The division position was stated during briefings to CG IIFFORCEV and Deputy CG, USARV.  Result was the reduction of stockage objectives by approximately 40%.

ITEM:   Resupply of Forward Units.

OBSERVATION:   Resupply by CH-47 continues to be the most profitable means of resupply.  This is particularly true with perishable food items required for immediate consumption.  Ice is transported externally and easily delivered to individual company locations.  Other items can then be carried internally without the possibility of spoilage by the melting of ice.

ITEM:   Aircraft Refueling Point.

OBSERVATION:   The capability for refueling would be highly advantageous at semi-permanent Fire Support and Patrol Bases.  This would be used primarily for C&C aircraft during combat operations to cut down on turn-around time to distant refueling points (i.e., CU CHI, DAU TIENG).  

ITEM:   Brake Lining and Components.

DISCUSSION;   Brakes are being worn at a high rate.  This is basically due to the extreme mud conditions and the high abrasive action of sand and laterite  Brake drums have also been reported packed with dirt which makes mechanism impossible to operate.

OBSERVATION:   Brake linings and components are seasonal items in RVN and the stockage objectives should be programmed before the rainy season.  Organizations who programmed to pull wheels and clear brake components experienced a much lower deadline rate than units who merely performed routine maintenance service.

ITEM:   Time Change Components.

DISCUSSION:  Some time change components are not on hand in supply channels and have to be requisitioned as an 02 priority to prevent excessive down time.

OBSERVATION:   That organizations forecast these requirements at least 150 flying hours prior to expected component time change to insure that the components are available when needed.

ITEM:   K16 Rifle.

DISCUSSION:   The M16 Rifle has been the subject of concern by commanders of units equipped with this weapon.  The problem stems from inadequate operator maintenance.  Due to the construction of the weapon and its tolerances, a build up of carbon in the chamber plus wear on the extractor results in extraction difficulties.  Dirty ammunition and chambers causes ruptured cartridges.
                                                       (p55)
OBSERVATION:   Emphasis has been placed on proper cleaning and lubrication procedures.  Small arms specialists conducted training classes and presented proper operators maintenance techniques to organizational personnel.  The receipt of additional bore and chamber brushes has helped to reduce the problem.

ITEM:   10KW Generator.

DISCUSSION:   Considerable difficulty has been experienced due to premature engine failure on the 10KW generators, FSN 2805-872-5972.  This engine operates at a high rate of speed and has a high oil consumption rate.  If the oil level gets too low, the engine will either throw a rod or burn out a bearing.

OBSERVATION:   Particular emphasis should be placed on changing of oil and filters to include adequate lubrication.  Organizational maintenance personnel and operators must check oil level every four (4) hours of operation.

ITEM:   Underwood Typewriters.

DISCUSSION:   Underwood Typewriters, the standard model, are being turned in to field maintenance at an alarming rate.  Basic reason for repair is due to slow reaction of the keys and numerous carriage problems.  Inspection of those typewriters turned in, reveals that they are wet, dirty and rusty.  Top covers are missing.

OBSERVATION:   Emphasis has been placed on all using units on proper cleaning and lubricating procedures.  In addition, all typewriters leaving the repair shop will have a decal fixed to the body at a noticeable location stating “Cover typewriter when not in use.”

ITEM:   Efficient Aerial Resupply.

DISCUSSION:   During the past quarters the Division Cavalry Squadron has participated in several missions.  One such mission resulted in an expedient means of resupply which previously was not employed.  The A-22 cargo sling bags were incorporated and used to the best advantage.  Result from using these containers were:  Less man hours spent in preparation of resupply,  less handling of resupply items,  increased flights in a minimum amount of time, and less spoilage of food stuffs due to insulating capability of the cargo bag.

OBSERVATION:   This method of resupply is far superior to methods previously used.

ITEM:   Container for 105mm Beehive Ammunition.
                                                       (p56)
DISCUSSION;   Beehive ammunition is normally kept on hand in firing positions for extended periods of time.  Because it is packed in the conventional fiber and wooden box, prolonged exposure to the weather and frequent handling caused by battery moves often results in the fiber containers becoming unserviceable, providing no protection to the round.  Fibers from other 105mm ammunition can not be used because of the greater length of the beehive round.  To overcome this, a metal container has been constructed from two (2) 105mm jungle packs.  The complete round and fiber are placed inside the container with the top portion of the fiber removed for easy access to the projectile.  If the beehive fiber is unserviceable, a regular HE fiber can be used.  The metal ring nut on the metal container cap must be oiled frequently to prevent rusting.

OBSERVATION:   The container has proven to be satisfactory.  It provides an air tight, sturdy container in which the round can be maintained for an indefinite period of time without being damaged.

ITEM:   Necessity for skilled carpenters for construction of bunkers and modern buildings.

DISCUSSION:   The need for an enormous amount of bunker construction for artillery units and the need to build mess halls and living quarters in base camp positions, require that the unit must have skilled carpenters.

OBSERVATION:   It is imperative that all units deploying to Vietnam screen personnel to determine those with specific skills and also to place increased emphasis on field fortification when outlining training programs.  Classes on field fortifications should have a maximum amount of practical application.

ITEM:   Scarcity of RC-292 Antennas.

DISCUSSION;   The antenna RC-292 is used extensively in the theater with the AN/VRC-12 series of FM radio to increase the relatively decreased transmission range caused by atmospheric conditions.  Most units are not authorized a sufficient amount of these antennas to operate simultaneously in field and fixed locations as is required in RVN.

OBSERVATION:   Unit should insure that authorizations are increased by use of MTOE prior to deployment.

ITEM:   Medication Deterioration.

DISCUSSION;   Coated and uncoated tablets deteriorate rapidly in humid tropical climate unless they are stored in air tight containers.

OBSERVATION:   Medications should be stored and dispensed in glass or plastic containers.

ITEM:   Storage of military and personnel clothing and equipment on displacement from base camp
                                                       (p57)
DISCUSSION:   Movement orders are often given on short notice and weight limitations are necessary in order to pack all the required combat equipment in accordance with the available transportation.  As a result, many items of both military and personal equipment are left in base camp.  This becomes a problem if the equipment is not properly secured, as other units often occupy temporarily vacated base camp positions.

OBSERVATION:   Handy foot lockers can be constructed from the 105mm ammunition boxes by removing the top from one box and the bottom from another, and then nailing the boxes together.  The boxes can then be locked with inexpensive locks purchased from the PX and stored in CONEX containers by section.

ITEM:   Ear Infections.

DISCUSSION:   A prominent problem among personnel in RVN, especially aviators, is infection in the ear canal.  This is attributable to allowing non-potable shower water to get into the ears.  Also, perspiration may accumulate inside the earphones of the flight helmet and drain into the ear.

OBSERVATION:   Make a conscious effort to keep non-potable water out of ears.  Clean ears often with Q-tips and alcohol.  Use nylon net covers over the earphones in the flight helmet and clean these regularly.  Report to a medical facility at first signs of pain, itching or discharge from ears.

ITEM:   Rashes on Body.

DISCUSSION:   Many people ignore rashes on various areas of the body and consider them insignificant.  In the humid climate of Vietnam, there is a likelihood of developing fungal rashes, which can be complicated if not treated early.

OBSERVATION:   When any rash appears on your body, go to a medical facility at once.  The use of powder in underwear and socks helps to control rashes.  Rashes will not usually disappear without treatment.

ITEM:   Tail Boom Attaching Point (Helicopter UH1C and D).

DISCUSSION AND OBSERVATION:   During this quarter over fifty percent of our aircraft have been found to have loose high shear rivets in the tail boom attaching point.  For easier inspection by the pilots and crew, the above mentioned area has been cleaned and painted white.  Much emphasis has been placed on this area in the daily and flight readiness inspection.

ITEM:   90 degree Gear Box Attaching Point.

DISCUSSION AND OBSERVATION:   During this quarter over fifty percent of our aircraft have been found to have loose rivets and skin cracks at and around the 909 degree gear box attaching point.  The above mentioned area has also been cleaned and painted white for easier inspection by the pilot and crew.
                                                       (p58)
ITEM:   Pulling of Rivets on the Vertical Fin.

DISCUSSION:   During normal operations, rivets at the trailing edge of the vertical fin have been found to be loose , and in some cases, missing.

OBSERVATION:   The rivets at the trailing edge of the vertical fin should be closely checked during daily inspections, and each rivet should be checked individually.

ITEM;   Premature 540 Bearing Failures.

DISCUSSION;   During the preceding quarter it was found that numerous bearings throughout the 540 Rotor System were failing prematurely because of insufficient lubrication.

OBSERVATION:   The bearings of the 540 Rotor System should be lubricated at least every five flying hours or whenever the helicopters have been operating in extremely dusty conditions.

ITEM:   Lubrication of Vehicles.

DISCUSSION;   The rainy season has proven again that mud and sand can destroy bearings, both roller and needle.  It will enter the bearings in one or two days, either around the seals, or forced thru the fitting when it is not cleaned prior to being lubricated.

OBSERVATION:   When adverse conditions exist, vehicles should be lubricated more often, fittings should be cleaned prior to lubing, and all of the old grease should be forced out to rid the bearing of dirt.

ITEM:   Main Rotor Damper Push-Pull Tubes.

DISCUSSION AND OBSERVATION:   Lubrication requirements for main rotor damper push-pull tubes in TM 55-1520-210-20 call for lubricating every twenty-five hours.  Because of existing conditions, these tubes must be lubricated daily to insure a minimum wear and a life of one hundred hours or more.  Due to the rapid wear of the damper tubes, they have fallen into the category of “Hard to get Items.”

ITEM:   Starter - Generator Cooling Fan.

DISCUSSION AND OBSERVATION:   This unit has had three starter-generator cooling fans fail during this quarter.  Due to metal from worn bearings contaminating engine oil system, all three engines had to be replaced.  It has become the policy of this command to remove the above mentioned item during periodic inspection for detailed inspection.

(6)  Civic Action and PSYOPS.

ITEM:   News Media.                                             (p59)

OBSERVATION:   The establishment of a local newspaper in the hamlet of CAO PHU, KHIEM HANH District has been highly effective in disseminating news items, agricultural tips and GVN-US policy.  This paper is written by the hamlet officials and published by US resources.

ITEM:   Food and Wage Supplement.

OBSERVATION:  An experiment is presently being conducted in the KHIEM HANH District to supplement the food and wages of the local civilian population.  This is being accomplished by the establishment of a rabbit farm and fish hatchery.  If these pilot tests succeed, other farms and hatcheries will be initiated.

ITEM:   Civic Programs need a Secure area from which to Expand.

DISCUSSION:   A consistency of effort with primary emphasis on hamlet security in early states on civic action is imperative.

OBSERVATION:   When security requirements have been met, further more sophisticated projects can be conducted with maximum success.

ITEM:   Civic Action in New Area.

DISCUSSION:   To be successful in an area that has not had civic action projects, advance coordination with appropriate GVN officials is a must.  Advance planning is required to overcome the support and logistical problems resulting from increased distances and communications difficulties.

OBSERVATION:   There is no substitute for extensive prior planning and maximum coordination with local GVN officials to insure their cooperation.

ITEM:   Areas where MEDCAPS are held on an irregular, infrequent basis.

DISCUSSION;   Poor or partial success has been shown to MEDCAPS  where they are only able to be held on an infrequent basis.  Advance advertisement is necessary to support of MEDCAP activities.

OBSERVATION:   The use of VIS to advertise benefits has increased the participation and a more active response of the people has resulted.

ITEM:   Use of VC Wives for Civic Action Projects.

DISCUSSION:   VN military wives can, if properly encouraged and guided, be interested and useful in helping others thus bringing prestige to their husband's units.  A few material resources provided by a US element and enthusiasm on the part of US can get a program off to a good start.  The VN women obviously get a great deal of satisfaction out of being a part of an organized service project.
                                                       (p60)
OBSERVATION:   Don't overlook the resources available in the wives and dependents of local VN military units.  The needed rapport with the people is readily available thru this channel.

ITEM:   Self Help Program.

DISCUSSION:   In many cases, VN people show little interest or desire to better themselves, and perform physical labor only when they receive supplies, material and equipment from US Forces.  Some have the attitude that the US Forces should not only supply them, but also do the physical labor to complete the project.

OBSERVATION:   Use of US personnel to do physical labor must be kept to a minimum.  GVN officials and energetic S-5's are the key to developing and maintaining the people's support.

ITEM:   PSYOP loudspeaker usage more effective against VC and NVA units.

DISCUSSION:   Many Hoi Chanh have indicated that they were made aware of the Chieu Hoi program by loudspeaker broadcasts even though the area had been subjected to numerous leaflet drops.  It is further indicated in the VC main forces, the NVA cadre and leaders took great precautions to police up leaflets and destroy them, and issued instructions to the soldiers to not read the leaflets.

OBSERVATION:   Use of loudspeaker appeals is most effective against known hard core VC or NVA units and should be used extensively when intelligence indicates presence of this type unit.

ITEM:  Frequent personal contact should be maintained between unit CA personnel and local GVN authorities in the unit's area of CA responsibility.

DISCUSSION:   Due to distances between base camps and outlying hamlets, the degree of road “insecurity” and lack of land line communications, direct liaison with Vietnamese officials at district and lower levels is often difficult to accomplish with the frequency desired.  A major determent is the requirement for security in areas lacking 100% GVN control.  The security requirement also deters, to a certain degree, from the unit's current tactical mission strength.

OBSERVATION:   Maintenance of frequent personal contact is best accomplished by recognizing the necessity of it, and by allowing S-5 personnel greater freedom of movement than would normally be permitted.

ITEM:   Local PF units should be employed for control purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the security considerations during the conduct of MEDCAPs.

DISCUSSION:   During conduct of MEDCAPs, a recurring problem is control of civilians, particularly children whose enthusiasm and numbers often hamper effectiveness of the surgeon and medic team.  US personnel are often limited in number, and do not speak Vietnamese.  If local PF are available, their use for control purpose leaves US Personnel free to conduct the MEDCAP, and give the PF an active role in the operation, thus enhancing their image in the eyes of the people.  The principle of mutual support is strengthened by US Forces and PF working together.  It should be noted, however, that outpost security is not to be compromised in favor of control requirements,.

OBSERVATION:   Use of local PF for MEDCAP control purposes, aside from the obvious benefits, produces secondary benefits consistent with GVN-US policy and procedure.

ITEM:   Main Supply Route (MSR) Security mission and convoy escort involve a civilian traffic control problem.  PSYOPS can be easily and effectively integrated into the measures taken to reduce this particular problem.

DISCUSSION:  In addition to distribution of check-point leaflets and civilian traffic control regulations, a “letter” type leaflet which expresses decreased accident rate and concern for the safety of children serves the dual purpose of regulatory device and a PSYOP vehicle.  The “letter” emphasizes the personal concern a unit has for civilians affected by heavy military traffic, and solicits cooperation that is accepted more readily than regulatory posters or leaflets.  Unit identification in the letter adds to the credibility of personal concern.

OBSERVATION:   Units using this “letter” form of leaflet, are actively conducting PSYOPS in the accomplishment of a primary civilian traffic control problem.

ITEM:   Evacuation of Civilian Remains.

DISCUSSION:   A continual problem area during this reporting period was the evacuation of civilian remains.  Civilians within the tactical area of interest, are often brought to US Medical facilities within base camps for medical care if the seriousness of the case so warrants.  If the individual expires while in a US base camp hospital, the requirement exists to evacuate the remains.  Destinations vary in each case.  Security requirements vary with the destination the route to the destination and the time of day, (movement is naturally restricted at night).  Doctrinally, responsibilities for evacuation of civilian remains are vague.

OBSERVATION:   A procedure has been implemented by which civilian remains are evacuated by the division's organic medical battalion using the most expeditious and appropriate means of transportation possible,  based on the destination of the remains.

          B.   Recommendations.                                        (p62)

          (1)   Command emphasis at all levels must be given to regular vehicular maintenance.  This also applies to proper maintenance and accountability of organic weapons, tools, and equipment.  Squad leaders must insure that each day in the field, the drivers perform proper before and after operation checks, and correct or report all deficiencies.  Companies must also be periodically rotated to base camp for a thorough battalion level Technical Inspection, Inventory, Maintenance and Training Program.

          (2)   The VC have developed a very effective method of attacking mechanized units in a hasty perimeter at night.  The close-in firing of RPCs under the cover of automatic weapons, and mortars can cause considerable casualties among both personnel and vehicles.  Proper positioning and camouflage of tracks and ground mounted weapons, when coupled with good fighting and sleeping holes, plus employment of other basic defensive measures (trip flares, concertina wire, claymores, LPs/OPs, etc.) will significantly reduce our casualties and increase the price the enemy must pay.  Frequent change of positions and patterns of establishing defensive perimeters are also effective counters.  Tactics must be developed for establishing defensible positions in the windrows of trees knocked down by Rome Plows, and in the less dense rubber or wooded areas.  Common sense, imagination, employment of all available resources, hard work, and continuous command supervision will defeat this current VC tactic.

          (3)   On the other hand, it is possible for units to become too defensive minded.  To properly dig in and fortify a position that will be employed only one or two nights takes an inordinate amount of time and effort that might better be used for offensive operations.  This handicap can be overcome or mitigated in several ways.

               a.   Establishment, over a period of time, of a number of temporary base areas in a given AO.  These can then be reoccupied, on a random basis, with a minimum amount of time required to check for mines, booby traps, VC aiming stakes, etc.  Each time such a position was used, the fighting/sleeping holes would be improved and alternate positions prepared.

      b.   Preparation of a strong position and “invite” the VC to attack.  This concept is
based on the fact that it is easier for the VC to find us than vice versa.  Such a position should have at least a triple concertina wire around the perimeter, and if at all possible, the APCs should be dug in to gun defilade level by bulldozers.  Effective warning system, fire plans, and counter attack plans by properly located reaction forces are essential ingredients of this tactic.

               c.   Movement of the entire unit after dusk for several hundred or more meters.  Although the VC will hear tracks moving, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact range and azimuth of movement.  This tactic will hinder the VC's penchant for thorough reconnaissance and minute planning.  The new position may be secured beforehand by a stay behind patrol.  Proper security must be taken during the displacement to preclude an ambush.  A hasty defense should be set up in new positions to include a single strand of concertina, trip flares, claymores, and a combination fighting/sleeping prone shelters dug; some of them may be provided overhead cover by the APC itself.  No more than one man should be in a APC at any one time.
                                                       (p63)
          (4)   All fruits and vegetables must be inspected by Class I Supply personnel and the assigned Veterinarian.

          (5)   The ice cream issues from SAIGON should continue so that issues to units can be made in accordance with the “A” ration cyclic menu.  There was a higher bacteria count in the “Formost” Ice Cream, however, some improvement has been made during the quarter.

          (6)   Continued close monitoring of the unit's periodic logistics report together with liaison in SAIGON is essential in limiting critical shortages.



     FOR THE COMMANDER:

4   Appendices Incld:
     1.   Task Organization                         JASPER J. WILSON
     2.   ORLL,  125th Sig Bn                         Colonel, GS
     3.   COAAR  AKUMU                         Chief of Staff
     4.   Pictures

Combat Operations, After Action Reports (COAAR) of the operations completed during the reporting period have already been forwarded under separate cover.

DISTRIBUTION:

     1 - ACSFOR,  DA  (Thru CG,  IIFFORCEV and CG,  USARV)
     2 -ACSFOR,  DA  (Thru  CG,  IIFFORCEV)
     2  -  CG,  USARPAC,  ATTN: L  GIOF - MH
     3  -  CG,  USARV,  ATTN:  AVHGC - DH
     1  -  CG,. US  Army Inf Sch,  Ft Benning,  Ga.
     1  -  CG,  US  Army Armor Sch,  Ft Knox,  Ky.
     1  -  CG,  US  Army Human Rach Unit,  Ft. Benning, Ga.
     1  -  CG,l  USAAMS,  Ft Sill,  Okla.
     1  -  CG,  C&GSC,  Ft Leavenworth,  Kan.
     1  -  US    Military Academy,  West Point,  NT  10996   
                     ATTN:  Librarian   PLUS:  Special 30 copies.               (p64)



AVFBC - H   (19 Aug 67)                    1st  Ind
SUBJECT:     Operational Report - Lessons Learned,  25th Infantry Division,
              31  July  1967  (RCS  CSFOR -65)  (U)

DA, L HQ  II FFORCEV,  APO San Francisco  96266               26 Aug 1967

THRU:     Commanding General,  USARV,  ATTN:   AVHGC - DH,  APO  96375

     Commander in Chief,  US  Army  Pacific,  ATTN:  GPOP - MH,  APO  96558

TO:     Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  Dept of the Army,
     Washington,  D>C>  20310

1.   Subject report is forwarded.
2.   This headquarters concurs with the comments and recommendations in the report.  
No action is required by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

                         R.E. WAMBSCANSS
                         CPT.  ACG
                         Asst   AG               (p65)








AVHGC - DST           (19 Aug  67)               2d  Ind
SUBJECT:          Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July  1967  9RCS  CSFOR - 65)

HEADQUARTERS,  UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM,  APO San Francisco  96375

TO:     Commander in Chief,  United States Army,  Pacific,  ATTN:  GPOP - OT
     APO  96558

     1.   (U)   This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (WALXAT) as endorsed.

     2.   (C)   Pertinent comments follow:

          a.   Reference item concerning evacuation of civilian remains, page 62:L  Non-concur with the observation since evacuation of remains by a medical unit is contrary to medical doctrine.  The II Field Force Surgeon's Office has been contacted and is taking appropriate action.

          b.   Reference item concerning use of the Mortar Aerial Delivery System (MADS), paragraph 2A (2),  page 30:  USARV  LTR,  subject:  Mortar Aerial Delivery System (MADS), dated 4 September 1966,  authorized USARV Aviation Units to fabricate and employ MADS at the discretion of the unit commander.  This authorization was derived from approval by DA, OACSFOR, without safety certification for local fabrication and use in RVN.  Although CG, 25th Infantry Division has determined the system to be ineffective for use in his division, the CG, 1st Cavalry (Airmobile), has recently completed an extensive study dated 19 July 1967, in which he concludes that the system is effective and recommends the study be forwarded to Combat Developments Command.  The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in its study, arrived at means of overcoming the factors which decrease the accuracy of the system, e.g., air speed, altitude, moving targets, etc.  The 1st Cavalry study on MADS is presently being staffed at this headquarters.

          c.   Reference item concerning PSYOPS equipment, paragraph 1j (7) (b), page 24.  All multi-lith presses have been issued.  The plate makers have been shipped via surface transportation from Hawaii.  Loudspeaker sets are arriving at the rate of 12 per month.  The 25th Infantry Division is scheduled to receive three sets o/a 30 October 1967.

          d.   Reference item concerning effect of river tides upon search operations, paage 40:  Concur with recommendation.  The Naval Oceanographic Office is presently compiling and analyzing data to improve prediction of tidal effects on rivers in South Vietnam.  The most accurate information currently available is contained in the Tide Tables for 1967 published by COMNAVFORV, APO 96214.  Tables of expected arrival time of tides for September and October at four locations are in the process of being distributed.
                                                       (p66)
          e.   Reference item concerning vehicular maintenance, paragraph b (1), page 62:  Concur.  Daily before and after operations checks, and periodic stand downs for supply and maintenance should be held whenever the tactical situation permits.

          f.   Reference item concerning vegetable, paragraph 4, page 64.  Concur.  Perishable subsistence is inspected by Class I Supply Point personnel.  Items of a questionable quality are inspected by a veterinarian who determines suitability for consumption.

          3.   (U)  Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine endorsement which returns this report.
          FOR THE COMMANDER:

                                        E.L. KENNEDY
1 Encl.                                   CPT  AGC
    nc                                   Asst  AG                                        
                                                       (p67)








GPOP - DT     (19  Aug  67)                    3rd Ind  (U)
SUBJECT:     Operational Report for the Quarterly period Ending 31 July 1967
          From HQ,  25th Inf Div  (UIC:  WALXAT)  (RCS  CSFOR - 65)  (U)

HQ,  US ARMY,  PACIFIC,  APO San Francisco 96558                    27 Oct 1967

TO:     Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  Department of the Army,
     Washington,  D.C.  20310

     1.   This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as endorsed.

     2.   Reference Pat I,  page 12,  paragraph 15,  Air conditioning:

           a.   The following communication assemblages have been authorized air conditioning when deployed in Vietnam:
          AN/GRC - 26          AN/MRR - 8           AN/TCC - 61
          AN/MCC - 3           AN/MSC - 29         AN/TRC - 108
          AN/MCC - 6           AN/MSC - 31         AN/TRC - 109
          AN/MCC - 9           AN/MSC - 19         AN/TRC - 110
          AN/MCC - 17        AN/MSC - 32          AN/TRC - 117
          AN/MRC - 54         AN/MTC - 1            SB/611
          AN/MRC - 69         AN/MTC - 3             SB/675
          AN/MRC - 73         AN/MTC - 7
          AN/MRC - 102       AN/TCC - 60

           b.   USAMC  has provided the following shipping dates for air conditioner FSN 4120-930-5700.  This is an 18,000 BTU unit, generator powered, ¾ ton trailer mounted, and includes ducts, fire extinguishers, ground rods and spare parts.

               September  -  146          January l -  300
               November  -    300          February  -  300
               December  -   294          March  -      242

           c.   Additionally, all new shelter-mounted communication assemblages being deployed to Vietnam as replacements for out-moded equipment, will have air conditioning equipment.

     FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

                                        K.F. OSBOURN
                                        Maj.  AGC
1  Encl.                                        Asst  AG
     nc                                                       (p68)


                              INDEX

PART  I         Narrative
PART II                Tabs

               TAB          SUBJECT
Withdrawn,  Hqs          *  A          Personnel Resources by TOE
     “        “                       *  B          Reorganization Charts
                                          C         FM Radio for VHF System Engineering
                                       *  D         Radio Relay Diagram  -  JUNCTION CITY
Withdrawn,  Hqs           *  E         Radio Relay Diagram  -  MANHATTAN
                                       *  F          Radio Relay Diagram  -  MONSOON CAMPAIGN
                                          G          Quick Erect VHF Antenna
                                       *  H          VHP Relay - Nui Ba Den
                                        *  I          Lightweight VHF
                                      *  J          Airlift of AN/MRC - 69 by CH-47
                                     *  K          Cmd Control Airborne Consoles
..           *  L          Retrans Station
                                      *M          RWI Station
                                      *N          AN/PRC - 25  in O-1 Birdog
                                      *O          Base Camp Tactical Telephone Subscribers
                                      *P          Common User Telephone Trunks
                                     *Q          Sole Use Circuits  -  Division Headquarters
                                     *R          DTOG/FSOG  Sole User Facilities
                                     *S          SOLE User Circuits  -  Division Artillery /Bde
Withdrawn,                  *T          Base Camp Cable System
Hqs.,  DA                    *U          MACV  and SF Common User Telephone Diagram
                                     *V          MACV  and ARVN  Sole User Telephone Diagram
                                    *W          25th  Inf Div Opns - Intel RATT Diagram
                                    *X          Air Conditioner Requirements for Communication Shelters
                                    *Y          Protection for Signal Sites

     (* NOTE:  All entries marked * “Withdrawn, Hqs, DA”  only C & G unmarked)
                                                       (p69)


                         TASK ORGANIZATION

1st  Brigade,  25th  Infantry Division               2nd  Brigade,  25th  Infantry Division

     4th Bn,  9th  Inf                                         1st  Bn,  5th  Inf  (Mech)
     2nd Bn,  14th  Inf                                      1st  Bn,  27th  Inf
     4th  Bn,  23rd  Inf  (Mech)                        2nd  Bn,  27th  Inf
     7th  Bn,  11th  Arty  (DS)                         1st  Bn,  8thi  Arty  (DS)

3rd  Brigade,  4th  Infantry Division               1st  Brigade,  9th  Infantry Division

     2nd  Bn,  12th  Inf                    (OPCON to 25th Inf Div from 1 - 18 May)
     2nd  Bn,  22nd  Inf  (Mech)                    
     3rd  Bn,  22nd  Inf                         4th  Bn,  39thl  Inf
     2nd  Bn,  77th  Arty  (DS)            2nd  Bn,  47th  Inf  (Mech)
     Trp C,  1st Sqdn,  10th  Cav       1st  Bn,  11th  Arty  (DS)
     Co C,  4th  Engr  Bn                    Btry B & C,  2nd Bn,  13th Arty (Atach)
                                                           Btry D,  5th Bn,  2nd Arty  (Atch)
25th  Division Artillery
25th  Division Support Command
3rd  Sqdn,  4th Cavalry (-)
25th   Aviation  Bn
65th  Engineer  Bn  (-)
125th  Signal  Bn  (-)
588th  Engr  Bn  (DS)
25th  MP  Company
25th  MI  Detachment


Appendix  1 to quarterly report ending 31 Jul 67                              (p70)


 OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

From 125th Signal Battalion

25th Infantry Division

For the Period 1 May - 31 July 1967

1.  GENERAL:

Probably the most important lesson to be learned by a Division Signal Battalion Commander and
his staff when operating in an Internal Defense (ID) environment is, that there is an increased need for flexibility and ingenuity, and that “fixed” ideas on missions, tasks, and unit employment “by the book” should be avoided.  The desire to maintain normal internal command relationships and tactical integrity for ease of administration and logistics within the signal battalion, must not be allowed to hinder re-adjustment and / or realignment of missions, functions, and even organization and equipment when there are clear gains to be made operationally by so doing.  A Division Signal Battalion Commander will be faced with tasks that are not stated or even implied on any TOE mission statement, land on the other hand, there will be a number of tasks normal to the battalion mission which will be non-existent in the ID environment.  Just as any other tactical command tailors its combat force to the specific tasks to be accomplished, so must the Division Signal Battalion tailor and allocate its combat support resources to produce signal communication elements appropriate to the differing or additional tasks peculiar to the ID environment.  It is, more often than not, unrealistic to attempt deployment or utilization of the signal battalion in strict accordance with standard TOE organization.  The standard company, platoon and section structure of a division signal battalion is designed to provide the optimum organization for signal support of the division when deployed on a conventional or nuclear battlefield.  In an ID environment, the division rarely assumes the standard headquarters configurations or the normal deployment of subordinate units, and when the organization for combat of the tactical unit being supported is altered significantly, it follows that the signal battalion must be prepared to alter its structure and employment accordingly.

     2.   SIGNAL  BATTALION  EMPLOYMENT:

           The most significant factor having a direct bearing on the division signal battalion employment is the typical posture of division headquarters and subordinate elements in the ID environment.

           a.   Division Headquarters - The conventional doctrine of two or three echelons (command posts) of the division headquarters moving at frequent intervals, does not normally apply.  In the 25th Division, all Headquarters elements are consolidated in a base camp at Cu Chi to obtain security and economy of force against insurgent activity.  This base has grown into a complex requiring utilization, at least initially, of a good percentage of the signal battalion's resources.  The base is a field CP as well as a camp, post, or station, and looked at from either aspect, has communications requirements far over and above those normally associated with the capabilities of a division signal battalion.  When the Division Headquarters does move out to a forward location, little if any of the communications support at Cu Chi can be turned off.
                                                       (p71)
     While area type signal support furnished by Signal Brigade troops is quite extensive and fully capable now of handling the internal administrative and logistics communication needs of the base camp, to include both divisions and tenant units, the division signal battalion remains highly committed at the base camp.. The internal base camp command control, fire support, and combat support communications must all be maintained by the signal battalion for the security of the base.  The division headquarters as well as all of the subordinate units retain and continue to operate Tactical Operation Centers (TOC) and Fire Support Elements (FSE) at their base camps when they move their CP's out for an operation.  In effect then, all tactical communications are “duplicated” rather than “moved” when headquarters more to forward locations.

           b.   Subordinate Elements - In the ID environment the “typical” employment of subordinate elements is to establish battalion or reinforced company-sized fire support bases from which the maneuver elements operate.  These bases, normally battalion size, are relatively widely dispersed, and must be tied together with a completely reliable and responsive communications network in order to insure quick reaction in response to enemy activity.  This “quick reaction” is the key to all offensive-defensive actions in this type environment.  It requires essentially that all resources, infantry, artillery, mechanized units, Army Air, tactical USAF, etc., be brought together quickly in a coordinated effort to meet a threat or take advantage of enemy activity.  This can only be done through a comprehensive communication system.  We have learned that, while the organic signal channel radio is highly effective for immediate tactical control below brigade level, it is not sufficient for the complex planning and coordination needed to tie in all the different and varying command and fire support elements involved in an area of operations.  We have found it expedient and extremely worthwhile to provide signal support teams down to battalion and fire support base rather than “cutting off” Signal Battalion support at the brigade headquarters level.

          c.   It is the policy in this battalion that neither equipment nor personnel are kept in reserve when they can be profitably employed.  A piece of equipment standing idle in the motor pool can not
be relied upon to be ready for commitment.  The only way to insure electronic equipment is operable, is to operate it.  At all multi-channel VHF sites, the reserve or back-up equipment is put on the air to provide secondary links or alternate routes.  This serves a double purpose: not only do we have immediate back-up to all of our primary links, but also we know the actual status of our equipment and personnel.  We spot weak areas in new people while they are operating on the back-up circuits, and can bring up their proficiency to insure they are able to handle their job.  This same approach is used for our RATT teams, comm. center personnel, and switchboard teams.  The personnel and equipment which will be supporting units which are not in the field today, such as the Division Fwd CP, the Support Command, Division Artillery, etc, are operational today either at Cu Chi or in support of other units to insure that they are, in reality, ready to go if we move to the field tomorrow.

     3.   SIGNAL BATTALION REORGANIZATION:

          Shortly after joining the division, I recognized the fact that keeping tactical integrity according to TOE breakout of equipment and personnel in the signal battalion could lead to equipment and personnel of certain elements lying idle while other elements were over-committed, or while a requirement for added communication was not being met.  It was for this purpose, to get the maximum use out of all available resources, that shortly after assuming command, I caused the 125th Signal Battalion to be reorganized along functional lines by communication mission rather than in accordance with the “unit support” concept upon which our current TOE  is based.
          a.   In essence what has been done is to consolidate all like communication resources in men and material in the following functional categories regardless of TOE company:
(1)  Communications systems, technical control
(2)  AM and FM radio
(3)  Communication Center
(4)  Teletypewriter terminals
(5)  Messengers
(6)  VHF radio and carrier terminals
(7)  VHF radio relays
(8)  Telephone switchboards
(9)  Telephone installation and repair
(10)  Cable installation and maintenance

b.  This reorganization has enabled me and the battalion S-3 to have complete cognizance at
all times of all resources committed and available.  The chart attached at Tab A indicates the total resources of this battalion, how they have been organized functionally, and status of employment.  I believe this chart, with accompanying remarks, explains fully the utilization of every man of my command.  Tailored forces made up of the particular type teams required are provided or each specific mission.  In this way, ful use is made of all our capability, regardless of TOE stated mission, to provide the most reliable and dependable communications possible.  Use of resources in this manner has enabled the battalion to do many things which are necessary in this environment, but which are not called for in any specific mission statement.

          c.   At Tab B are the organization charts that show the new reorganization.  To the maximum extent possible, reorganization was accomplished by attachment of personnel and equipment, by TOE paragraph number, from one company to another.  It should be noted that this battalion can quickly revert to normal TOE organization simply be rescinding attachment orders.  Only in three cases were personnel and equipment within paragraphs split up.  They were paragraph 01 in TOE 11-37E and 11-39E and paragraph 09 in TOE 11-39E.  This was necessary in order to attach 13 additional power-men to “B” Company (VHF Carrier) which acquired all the VN/MRC-69's, each containing power units.  This permitted equitable distribution of power-men in the units where the majority of generators were located.  Paragraph 09 TOE  11-39E had to be split up in order to separate the switchboard personnel and equipment from the comm. center personnel and equipment which were placed in “A” Company.

           d.   Consolidated R&M:   By combining all organizational signal maintenance teams at battalion level (HHD), greater flexibility and utilization of signal repairmen and equipment have been achieved.  We have more flexibility because signal maintenance teams can be tailored to fill specific needs during tactical operations without impairing the maintenance operation at base camp.  We get maximum utilization of men and equipment by pooling our resources so that more experienced men can guide and train new men, and all repair and test equipment is available to be used to the maximum extent possible in support of all elements of the battalion.  The capability to provide maintenance contact teams consisting of the number and type repairmen needed is retained in this reorganization.

           e.   Consolidation of teletypewriter and cryptographic repairmen:   Teletypewriter and cryptographic repairmen have been detailed for duty in the division comm. center and distribution authority respectively.  This practice provides on-site repair and maintenance thereby reducing equipment “downtime” and also reduces the amount of equipment handling necessary for repair.  As the comm. center facility is expanded, the teletype repair facility will be shifted to the immediate vicinity of the communication center since that section has the great majority of the battalion's teletypewriter capability under the new reorganization.

           f.   Consolidated PLL:   This battalion has asked for and received permission to retain its consolidated PLL.  All electronics, automotive, small arms, quartermaster, chemical and engineer PLL items are maintained under the supervision of the battalion S-4.  Here again we feel we have made more efficient use of personnel and materiel resources.  The battalion maintains approximately 950 line items in its PLL section.   PLL stockage is determined by equipment density and demand data for the whole battalion in keeping with the provisions of AR 735-35.  The PLL section is located in close proximity to maintenance facilities and unit supply sections, and is readily accessible to all maintenance and supply personnel.  Authorized running spares are carried on equipment as directed.  

4.   SYSTEMS CONTROL (SYSCON):                              (p74)

            Great emphasis is placed on systems control by the 125th Signal Battalion.  All communications are planned, directed and coordinated by a central systems control element operating under the battalion S-3.  The systems control is located normally with the main command post.  All directives concerning communication operations pass from the SYSCON to operating elements for implementation through one or more technical control centers (formally called facilities control).  Technical control centers are established as required at hubs of communications.  The primary tool of the technical control centers is the SB-611 patching control which permits limited testing of circuits as well as routing or re0-routing of circuits in accordance with directives of the SYSCON.  In order to man and train personnel to work together as a cohesive, well coordinated controlling element, all of the technical control personnel of the battalion are consolidated in one unit, and they are a separate entity not a part of another element, such as VHF, comm. center, or radio, etc.  They are a “neutral” directing group under the direct control of the S-3 through his SYSCON.  Good solid control communications have been found to be  essential for maximum performance of the communication control mission.  While the 125th Signal Battalion uses the standard “channel 12” as the primary SYSCON - TECHCON control system, we have found it essential to also utilize an FM radio net as well.  We have established as SOP that all signal elements in direct support of divisional elements have FM radio communications via the battalion FM command net to the technical control center coordinating their operations.  This system has paid high dividends on those many occasions when pre-planned locations have been changed at the last minute or when pre-planned frequencies have not been satisfactory.  An FM radio is sent with each VHF team.  See Tab C.

     5.   MULTICHANNEL  VHF:

      The 125th Signal Battalion employs a very extensive multi-channel VHF network.  Echelon of command is not the guide for employment.  Rather the criteria for deployment is “will use of multi-channel VHF give better reliability and responsiveness?”   It is standard practice to employ VHF at virtually all fire support bases to permit direct telephone links for fire support coordination rather than relying solely upon single channel FM radio.  Diagrams depicting typical multi-channel VHF networks for operations Junction City, Manhattan and the Monsoon Campaign are attached at Tab D through F.  It should be noted that since operation Junction City, we have increasingly made use of at least one secondary or alternate link in addition to the primary link.  These secondary routings not only increase the reliability and survival of the network in event of equipment loss, but also give us built in flexibility to meet additional or new circuit requirements to almost any point in the system by means of “strap-throughs”.  Some technical lessons learned or, in some case, re-learned follow:

        a.   A modification of the old standby “quick-mount” or “gun erect” antenna erection system has proved invaluable especially when operating with maneuver battalions, and/or fire support bases where movement is necessitated relatively often.  By using a base plate mounted on top of the shelter S-141, a fifteen foot antenna mast can be erected and the system put on the air in 15 to 20 minutes.  With few exceptions, due to the relatively flat terrain in which this unit is operating, this height of approximately 26 feet (shelter roof is 11 feet) is more than adequate for high quality transmission.  Attached at Tab G is a photograph of a typical installation.

       b.   The use of “D” band frequencies and equipment has proven to be more satisfactory than “B” or “C” bands.  While the tuning of “D” band appears to be more critical, once lined up, “D” band has proven to be better over short distances in flat terrain, and does not appear to be as susceptible to interference from helicopters flying through the beam.

            c.   Operating VHF in heavy jungle areas presents special problems.  We have found only one successful answer, and that is to get the fly swatter above the canopy.  This is not always as easy as it may sound.  Maximum training must be given to all VHF teams in the erection of 60 foot masts in difficult, close terrain and in field expedients to raise antennas above the tree line.  Getting even one end of the link well above the tree line increases chances for. success.  During the first phases of operation JUNCTION CITY, FHF to units operating in Northern Tay Ninh Province (War Zone “C”) were either non-existent, or very marginal even with 60 foot antennas on both ends.  During the second phase of JUNCTION CITY , a radio relay site was established on Nui Ba Den Mountain at an altitude of approximately 2300 feet.  Activation of this relay site resulted in obtaining circuits of excellent quality to all units in the northern zone.  In order to establish a site at Nui Ba Den which is inaccessible except by helicopter, equipment from two AN/MRC-54's was dismounted and installed in a bunker.  See Tab M.

           d.   We have found that establishing a standard height for antenna masts is not always wise.  Whereas height was an extreme asset when operating in the Northern Tay Ninh Province, it proved to be a detriment when operating in other areas.  In Hau Nghia Province, as an example, where the terrain is extremely flat and there are few heavily wooded areas, we found that the lower we kept the antenna, the better.  Links operating on a 45 or 60 foot antenna mast picked up excessive noise and interference.  When 15 foot masts were substituted, circuit quality improved measurably.  The lesson relearned is that there is no set guide for antenna height.  It depends on the situation and the terrain.

           e.   It has been found that the location of VHF rigs within a CP location is very critical.  The locating of VHF rigs near helipads has resulted in noisy and unreliable VHF communications each time a helicopter lands or takes off.  For best results, the sites should b relocated away from the helipad on the edge of the CP nearest the distant VHF terminal.

           f.   The overheating of VHF and teletype equipment in communication shelters is a continuing serious problem within the Battalion.  This excessive heat reduces the operating efficiency of the VHF equipment, especially in the power supply section of the ANTRC-24, in the TA-182s, and in the AN/TCC-7's .   This results in reduced telephone and teletype circuit quality and in increased equipment maintenance problems.  Air-conditioners for communication shelters are vitally needed and should be standard equipment for this theater of operations.

           g.   The AN/MRC-112 (4 channel radio relay set mounted in a ¼ ton vehicle and trailer) has proven to be a very useful piece of equipment, due to its air-transportability.  The set proved highly reliable during MANHATTAN for employment in support of artillery fire support bases.  While more light air-transportable VHF equipment is highly desirable, the AN/MRC-1132 is not the final answer.  Due to its conflict with the frequency band of the new VRC-12 series radios, employment of any great number of these sets would give serious frequency interference problems.  To meet the continuing requirement for light equipment, a twelve- channel VHF terminal in a ¾ ton trailer (AN/MRC-34.5) has been locally configured and has proved invaluable  (Tab I).   We have also found that the AN/MRC-65 can be easily transported by the CH-47 helicopter  (Tab J).

           h.   Training must include a great deal of practice and drill in lowering and erecting antennas, including 45' and 60' masts, during hours of darkness.  Enemy mortar and recoilless rifle attacks are invariably made during hours of darkness and destroyed or damaged antennas must be replaced or repaired immediately after cessation of hostile fire.  We can not afford to wait until morning.
                                                       (p76)
     6.   AM RADIO.

           a.   The only lesson learned in this area is that there is normally no need for a number of division RATT nets in this environment.  The increased range of FM radio, and the more extensive use of teletype via VHF may have some bearing on this, but regardless of the reason, we have found that one RATT net is adequate to handle the traffic generated and to give us a reliable back-up for our VHF teletype.  In this regard, workable HF frequencies are difficult to come by in this part of the world, and it is better to have one net operating well for the major portion of the 24 hour period, than to attempt to have two or three nets operating, none of which are very efficient.

     7.   FM RADIO.

           FM radio is the primary means of communication used by commanders for immediate command and control.  Some lessons learned in this area are:

           a.   Nets:       FM nets are more or less standard.  We have, however, found it very worthwhile to place a station, operated by our division AAE element, into the secure FM net with II Force AAE and all aviation Battalions in our area.  This net is actually an aviation group net.  Coordination of aerial moves and requests for aviation support have been greatly expedited by this net.

           b.    Command and Control Aircraft:        In this environment, commanders of necessity must travel by air, and if they are to be “commanders” they must have sufficient communications to allow them to influence the action while in flight.  This division utilizes UH1D as a command-control aircraft for the principal commanders.  The distribution of these ships and the radio equipment contained in each are shown on Tab K.  These commanders are habitually required to communicate with units two and at times three command levels below.  For example, the division Commander and ADC's communicate as much with battalion commanders as with brigade commanders, and in the course of a single operation, with as many as six or seven different units extensively.  We have found it expedient to mount RT-246's in addition to the ASC-6, 10's, or 11's normally found in the command and control chips to give commanders the flexibility required.  One of the radios in the ASC console is normally kept on the command net of the commander in the aircraft at all times, while the second set is kept on the command net of the next higher command.  The RT-246 is then free to be used to switch to any other unit frequency as required.

           c.   Retransmission:         The AN/VRC-29 has proven to be highly valuable for retransmission.  Retransmission with this set is highly reliable yet simple to operate.  This division operates four (4) retransmission stations: the division command net, the division artillery command net, the 3/ 4 Cavalry Squadron command net, and the 3/ 4 Infantry Brigade command net.   The Infantry Brigades normally operate their own retransmission stations, however, in the case of the 3/ 4 Inf which operates in northern province, the signal battalion operates a station for them from our location on Nui Ba Den mountain.  We also provide this support for the 3/ 4 Cavalry Squadron to enable them to communicate with their long- range patrol elements operating in the jungle area to the north.  The 125th Signal Battalion retransmission station and FM control station are located on the only piece of high ground in the area, Nui Ba Den.  All equipment, supplies, water, rations and POL must be air-lifted in.  The battalion has fabricated a compact communications package by modifying a CONEX container.  This container has racks for four AN/VRC-49's and a VRC-46, and mounts for whip antennae, and RC-292 antennae fixed to the sides.  Generators, batteries and rectifiers to provide sufficient power are also included.  The photographs attached as Tab I show the retransmission station and also give an idea of the ruggedness of the terrain of Nui Ba Den.

            d.   Radio Wire Integration:     Excellent results have been obtained utilizing FM radio wire integration (RWI) in the past two months.  It has been found to be exceptionally useful for the G-5 people who travel consistently to villages and hamlets where no communications other than their own radio exist.  A locally fabricated electronic “box” utilized by the 121st Signal Battalion in place of the AN/GSA-7 has been adopted by the 125th as standard for RWI use.  See Tab M.

            e.   FM Radio in Jungle Terrain:        The problems of transmission with FM radio in jungle terrain are not as serious when using the AN/PRC-25 or VRC-12 series radios as they were when the PRC-10 and AN/GRC-3 through 8 series radios were employed.  It is, however, still prudent to get the antenna above the jungle canopy when possible.  RC-292 antenna heads mounted on a 60' VHF must were used very effectively during Operation JUNCTION CITY.

             f.     Forward Air Control (FAC) Air-Ground Communications:       
The FM radio AN/ARC-44 installed in the Air Force owned  0-1 “Birddog” aircraft used by Forward Air Controllers (FAC) as observation and fire control aircraft, does not have the frequency or channelization range of the AN/VRC-12 series or AN/PRC-25 radios.  As a result, it is often difficult and sometimes impossible for the FAC to communicate with a tactical unit being provided close air support.  To solve this problem, the 125th Signal Battalion has mounted an AN/PRC-25 in the plane to supplement the existing VHF and UHF communications.  The following requirements were made by the Air Force before the final product was acceptable to them:

                (1)   The power must be derived from the plane's electrical system.

                (2)   The pilot's existing helmet with headset and microphone must be compatible with both the plane's communication system and the new PRC-25 system.

                (3)   The pilot must be able to monitor both systems at the same time, keying one system or the other at will.   Using a 24-volt wet cell for power, a two-way switch and a 180 ohm resistor to match the impedance, a system has been created to integrate the two systems.  i.e.  The AN/PRC-25 with the existing radio system.   Tab N depicts the arrangement photographically.


     8.   SWITCHBOARD:

           The 25th Infantry Division, as it is employed tactically in a counter-insurgency environment, has established a large base camp at Cu Chi to support combat operations.  Experience at Cu Chi Base Camp shows that the Division has, for all intents and purposes, developed a need for a post signal type cable system and requires comparable switchboard service.

          a.   Initially, the 125th Signal Battalion operated the Lightning Main switchboard, handling 100 local telephones and 50 to 80 trunk circuits.  It was quickly apparent that the TOE Division  Main switchboard, the MTC-3, could not handle the load, and a AN/MTC-1 was “found” to do the job.  Establishment by the 86th Signal Battalion of a AN/MTC-9 has relieved the division signal battalion of most of the administrative load.  At present, Lightning Main switchboard has 55 local lines, and 81 trunk lines.  The total trunks expand to over 100 circuits when all major subordinate units displace from Base Camp.  The lesson learned is that the division requires one AN/MTC-1 switchboard.  A list of subscribers normally handled at Division Base Camp is attached as Tab O.  Tab P shows the trunks handled by the division board.

          b.   A major lesson learned has been that even with heavy support from “Army” signal troops at base camps, there is still an inordinately high requirement placed upon the division signal battalion's switchboard capability both in equipment and manpower.  We have found that when we displace Division Headquarters to a forward CP location, when Division Arty and Support Command move out to forward locations, and when all brigades are out of base camp, we still have an extremely heavy base camp requirement which can not be handled by the “area” switchboard.  This is due to the fact that all these units leave sizable elements in the base camp, and all continue to require their tactical communication for security and administration of the base.  In addition, they all require extensive tie-in to the forward location of their units.

     9.   SOLE-USER CIRCUITS:

          The need for quick response has increased considerably the requirement for sole-user (point-to-point) circuits.  More people are now directly involved in operations on an immediate basis.  That is, the need for sole-use circuits is no longer limited to the G-2/3 and FSE types.  Here in the 25th Division, the G-3 Air, the Army Aviation Element (AAE) and the USAF Air Liaison Officer (SLO) all require extensive point-to-point communications.  Tab Q depicts a typical sole-user telephone chart for circuits terminated at division.  It should be noted that the type of termination utilized by elements of division headquarters varies not only in accordance with the number of sole-users terminated, but also with the desire of the user.  For example, the G-2/3 operating the DTOC prefers that the signal battalion operate the DTOC switchboard, and we therefore provide an SB-86 and operators to handle his 28 sole-use lines.  The only line not terminating in this board is the sole-user to II Force TOC (equivalent to Corps).                (p79)
 The Artillery people of the FSE and the aviation personnel of the AAE prefer to have a switchboard operated by their own people.  We have therefore provided them with a SN-22, and in addition, given both a means of utilizing power ring on their phones for convenience.  
The G-3 Air and the USAF ALO prefer to have their sole-users terminated on telephones.  We have provided them with locally fabricated consoles which incorporate power ring and a visual signaling device for each phone.  The varied type installations are depicted at Tab R.  It should be noted that each of these installations is duplicated in a hardened command bunker and a building here at Cu Chi, as well as in vans for use at forward CP locations.  In addition to sole-use circuits from division headquarters, there are considerable sole-user requirements within division artillery and brigades.  Typical requirements are shown on the chart at Tab S.
-                                                        
     10. COMMON - USER CIRCUITS:

           The common-user telephone network continues to be quite an extensive one in this environment.  A lesson learned is that we must be careful to avoid down-grading the common-user system to an unacceptable degree due to the heavy need for sole-user circuits.  Unless he plans and installs enough VHF links to satisfy all requirements, a signal officer may very well find himself “out of circuits” for an effective common-user network.  It should be noted that for units below brigade, one or two common-user trunks are normally provided between that unit and its parent unit switchboard.  This is normally provided via cable when in base camp, and over VHF when units establish combat base camps that can be supported by signal battalion teams.

     11.   CABLE AND WIRE INSTALLATION:

            The Cu Chi Base Camp cable system was installed in three distinct phases.  Phases I and II were carried out by the 125th Signal Battalion with some assistance from a cable platoon of the 39th Signal Battalion.  Phase III was installed by the 2nd Signal Group.

            a.   Phase I construction initially involved 26 pair cable in the DTOC area and 5 pair cable to outlying units.  Spiral 4 cable was also installed to all units that required sole-user circuits to the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC).

            b.   Growth requirements made expansion of the 5 pair cable system necessary.  Phase II construction was initially a 26 pair tactical cable system designed to provide sole-user and common-user trunks and locals to all units in Cu Chi Base Camp.  The Phase I and II system installed is depicted on the diagram attached as Tab T.  A cable platoon from the 39th Signal Battalion assisted by setting cement poles and installing 25 pair commercial cable from the DTOC to the Division Wire Head.  The platoon departed Cu Chi leaving several thousand feet of 25 pair commercial cable which the 125th Signal Battalion installed to major subordinate units of the Division .  The Division Signal Battalion also installed a small amount of 100 and 200 pair cable underground.  At the end of Phase II the Signal Battalion had installed the following cable within base camp in support of the 25th Infantry Division:
                                                       (p80)
                    Spiral 4          15 Miles
                    26/25 Pr.     22 Miles
                    50 Pr          ¾  Mile     
                    100 Pr          1   Mile
                    200 Pr          1/3 Mile

           c.   Phase III is a sophisticated fixed plant cable system.  It is designed to provide facilities for sole-user and common -user trunk circuits and a dial central office in support of the 25th Infantry Division.  This cable system, constructed by the 267th Signal Company of the 2nd Signal Group, was finished 3 May 1967 and the cut-over of Division circuits is now in the final stages.

           d.   The lesson learned in cable and wire installation is that a requirement exists for more, not less cable and wire construction in this environment, and the type of construction required is more sophisticated and semi-permanent.  At one point in time, this battalion found itself with almost all of its wire and cable resources in material installed - and no sizable amount of cable on hand.  Had it been necessary at that time to install a forward division CP, we would have been hard pressed to find the required cable.  Reliance can not be placed completely on the “Army” signal support units.  Their construction does not take into account enemy action, nor do they have the necessary “quick rehabilitation” capability needed for the tactical circuits.  For this reason, the signal battalion must continue to install and maintain cable in base camps which are hardened (underground), and they must maintain the capability to rehabilitate these lines in good time when they are damaged due to any cause.

     12.   COMMUNICATION WITH ARVN AND OTHER RVN FORCES:

             A major requirement in the ID environment is the ability to communicate effectively with a number of other forces in the division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI).  This includes US advisors at province and sector headquarters, ARVN units, and CIDG camps in the TAOI.  A great deal of coordination is required not only to establish lines of communication, but to keep up with the many changes constantly being made by these various outfits.  Due to differing types of equipment at each place, tying in of all the necessary links so that all of the units can exchange information, and more importantly, call for assistance from each other in the way of artillery support, light fire support teams, USAF tactical air, and ground reaction forces, is not an easy task.  Tabs U through W show the primary communications provided in the 25th Division TAOI.  In addition, all units are kept up to date on the FM nets of all other units, and current SOI items to include authentication charts are interchanged.
                                                       (p81)
     13.    MILITARY AFFILIATED RADIO STATION (MARS):

             An added requirement not normally handled by a division signal battalion in the field, is the operation of a MARS Station for the welfare and morale of the command.

          a.   The 25th Infantry Division MARS Station, AB8AJ, has been operating over the last year and one half.  The station comes under the operation control of the 125th Signal Battalion.  The battalion provides the station with operating personnel and provides the maintenance capability for the radio equipment.   Money to buy necessary radio equipment that cannot be obtained through military supply system is provided by non-appropriated welfare funds, and equipment is purchased out of country.

          b.   The 25th Infantry Division MARS Station is a 24 hour per day operation under the control of the Division MARS Director, and NCOIC, and five operators.  These personnel assigned to HHD of the Signal Battalion, are drawn primarily from the MOD  O5C personnel or other battalion personnel with previous HAM experience.

          c.   The Division MARS Station averages over 1000 phone patches in a month to CONUS, which is more than any other MARS Station in RVN.  The 25th Infantry Division MARS Station serves not only the Division, but all personnel in the area.

          d.   During Operation JUNCTION CITY, the MARS facility was carried to the forward CP area to serve troops in the field simply by providing a direct circuit from the forward location to the MARS Station at Cu Chi for phone patches.  The high quality of our VHF is attested to by the fact that several hundred calls were made over this line with excellent results.

     14.   SECURE LAND LINES:

             It is believed that the 125th Signal Battalion is the first to have installed a secure land line circuit at a division level.  Such a circuit was engineered and installed in order to expedite spot reports between the 372nd RR Company and the Division G-2.  The TSEC/KY-8 has been employed for this purpose utilizing spiral four cable as the media of transmission.  Essentially, both TSEC/KY-8 sets are operated in the back-to-back (test) mode.  The short back-to-back cable is replaced with spiral four of the required length.  This system has proved to be virtually trouble free, and produces an extremely high quality, secure voice line.

     15.   AIR - CONDITIONING:

             One lesson which we continue to learn over and over, but which no one does anything about officially, is that we need air-conditioning for our communication shelters.  The problem we are experiencing is not new.  We have been experiencing it in Vietnam for years.  It is simply that our communications system is down-graded to a very great extent by the climatic conditions encountered here.  Our carrier equipment, ringers, TH-5's, teletypewriter, etc., just will not give optimum performance under the heat and dust conditions existing here.  The only acceptable answer is to reduce the temperature and keep the shelters closed.  This means air-conditioning.
                                                       (p82)
          a.   Where it is needed:   In a division signal battalion, a number of critical assemblages contained in shelters require air-conditioning.  A list of these assemblages is attached as Tab X.

          b.   What type:  I am not a climate control engineer and therefore can not claim to have a technical answer as far as BTU rating requirements are concerned.  I'm sure it would vary considerably for each different type shelter.  However, it should be quite obvious that we need a relatively light, self-contained unit that can be mounted externally on the shelters with a reasonable power consumption rating in line with the generator power normally available.  It appears to me that a standard commercial air-conditioner of approximately 18,500 BTU operating on 110 or 220 volts at 12 to 15 amps would do the job very well.  What we do not want is a separate large unit requiring a trailer to haul it.  We do not have the prime movers to haul extra trailers, nor would we have the driver, mechanics, etc. that would be needed if extra prime movers were made available.  The guide line on this should be - keep it simple.

     16.   PROTECTION FOR SIGNAL SITES:     

            The insurgents capability to bring indirect and direct fire upon any of our signal sites has been demonstrated on numerous occasions.  Maximum digging-in, bunkering of equipment, and provision of personnel bunkers are essential.  Typical protected sites employed by this battalion are depicted by the photographs attached as Tab Y.  It is SOP in this battalion to send a good size wire and cable team with each direct support signal team.  These teams are utilized, after the wire/cable system is installed, to assist VHF, radio, and comm. center teams in the construction of equipment and personnel bunkers.

                                   LOUIS G. MATHERN,  JR.
                                   LTC,  Sig C
                                   Commanding

                                                       (p83)

 Operation Camden  II

 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3RD BATTAION,  22ND INFANTRY
APO  San Francisco 96268


AVDCTD - H - 3                                                                                                    22 January  1968

SUBJECT:     Combat After Action Report  Operation Camden)(U)

THRU:          Commanding Officer
          3rd Brigade,  25th Infantry Division
          ATTN:  S-3
          APO San Francisco 96268

TO:          Commanding General
          25th Infantry Division
          ATTN:  G-3
          APO San Francisco 96225


1.  (U)     NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION:  Operation Camden, a 25th Infantry Division offensive operations conducted in its Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI).  

2.  (U)     PURPOSE:   Operation Camden was initiated to locate and destroy the 101st NVA Regiment.

3.  (U)      DATES OF OPERATION:   180400 December 1967 to  261409 December 1967.

4.  (C)    GENERAL:  Operation Camden was conducted in one phase.  On 18 December 1967, 3-22 Infantry conducted a combat assault into LZ vicinity of XT585419.  Thereafter, the Battalion  conducted search and destroy operations in the assigned area to locate, fix and destroy the 101st NVA Regiment.

a.  Reporting Officer:  LTC Thomas H Harrold, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry.

b.  Task Organization:

(1)  Phase I:  (180400 December 1967 - 261409 December 1967)

(a)  Company A, 3-22 Infantry:   Cpt. Herbert C. Chancy, Commanding
(b)  Company B, 3-22 Infantry:   Cpt. Robert L. Hemphill, Commanding.
(c)  Company D, 3-22 Infantry:   Cpt. Bob L. Culbreath,  Commanding  (18 - 20 Dec. 67)
      Cpt. William A Curtis,  Commanding, (20 - 26 Dec. 67)
(d)  Reconnaissance Platoon,  3-22 Infantry
(e)  Demolition Team,  (3),  Company C,  44th Engr. Battalion
(f)  Company C,  3 -22 Infantry:  Cpt. Elliot Fishburne, Commanding,
          Detached OPCON to 1 - 5 (Mech) Infantry.

5.   (C)  INTELLIGENCE:

       a.     Information:   Intelligence concerning the Battalion TOAR for Operation Camden was obtained from 25th Infantry Division G-2, 3rd Brigade S-2, 25th MI Detachment, and past operations in that area.

       b.      Enemy Forces:   Enemy units believed to be operating in the area include the 1st Battalion, MR4 Battalion, and D16 Battalion, all elements of the 101st NVA Regiment.  Elements of the 83rd Rear Service Group, 8th MR4 Artillery Battalion and local guerrillas were believed to be present throughout the area.

c.        Significant Incidents:  Total  25:

(1)     191505 Dec 67:  Co D had contact with estimated VC squad at XT596406.  VC used AK-47,
while US employed M-16 and M-79.,  Contact broken at 1510 hours resulting in one (1) US WIA.  Enemy casualties unknown.

     (2)     191535 Dec 67:   Co D renewed contact, employing same weapons.,  Contact broken at once with negative results.

     (3)      191638  Dec. 67:   After Artillery and LFT were called into area of contact, Co D attempted to maneuver back into area employing same weapons.  Results were one (1) US WIA.

     (4)     191945  Dec. 67:   At XT509491 C-46 AP sprung ambush on 1 VC.  Fired claymore and S/A resulting in 1 VC KIA (poss).

     (5)     211145  Dec. 67:   At XT487407, Co A engaged 4 VC with S/A.  No fire returned and VC fled in general direction of proposed laager (XT588399).

     (6)     211435  Dec  67:    At XT585395, Co A lead element received sniper fire.  Pursued and called artillery with negative results.

     (7)     211920  Dec. 67:   At XT597393, Co D AP took 1 VC under fire while enroute to AP site.  Negative results.

     (8)     220900  Dec. 67:   At XT597392, Co D had contact.  VC opened fire with a claymore then S/A fire.  Co D returned fire.

     (9)     220925  Dec.  67:   At XT594393, Co D made heavy contact with unknown VC force in bunkers.  All of D elements pinned down with intense AK-47 and carbine fire from front and flanks.

     (10)   220930  Dec.  67:   ---- element moved to right flank of Co D to give support.  Co D put down suppressing fire while Co B maneuvered.  Co D still continued to receive heavy fire.

     (11)   221000  Dec.  67:   Co D remains in contact.  Fire dies down then comes in heavy volume when movement is attempted.

     (12)   221035  De.  67:   At XT564391, Co A received heavy volume of fire from unknown number of VC.  Returned fire.

     (13)   221100  Dec.  67:   Co A pulled back from contact to attempt to extract ten (10) WIA.  

     (14)   221115  Dec.  67:   Co A continues to receive sporadic fire, cannot extract wounded as of yet.
     (15)   221245  Dec.  67:   Co A called in air strides and artillery in area of contact.

     (16)   221400  Dec.  67:   Command Group received fire between their position (XT593396) and Co D location.  Fire ceased at 1495 hours, resulting in one (1) ARVN WIA  from Recon.

     (17)   221410  Dec.  67:   Artillery firing from Co A but they are still receiving sporadic fire.

     (!8)   221500  Dec. l 67:  At XT584391, Co B and D renewed contact.  Co A also renewed contact but pulled back for gunships with 20mm.  Co B and D broke contact at 1505 hours.

     (19)   221530  Dec.  67:   Co A moved back into the base camp and received sniper fire.  Called in an air strike.
     (20)   221700  Dec.  67:   Co A back in contact receiving heavy fire.  Called in napalm strike and pulled back at 1710 hours.
     (21)   222010  Dec.  67:   Results from the day's contact, 3 VC KIA (BC), 14 US KIA, and 40 WIA.  
     (22)   231430   Dec.  67:   2 - 12 Infantry found 1 VC KIA (BC) in base camp from Co A contact yesterday.
     (23)   241435  Dec.  6 7:   Light Fire Team over Recon spotted and engaged 5 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).  At XT609356 Recon engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

     (24)   250447  Dec.  67:  At XT608353, Recon received approximately 8 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and RPG.  Falcon (-) received A/W fire and 2 RPG rounds.  Negative casualties in action.

     (25)   3-22 Infantry forward base received 12 - 20 rounds 60mm mortar fire.  All rounds short of perimeter.  Fired counter - mortar with unknown results.

6.   (C)   MISSION:   3-22 Infantry (-), on 18 December 1967, conducts a combat assault into LZ vicinity XT585419.   Establish a Battalion (-) laager position, and conduct search and destroy operations in assigned area to locate, fix, and destroy the 101st NVA Regiment.

7.   (C)   CONCEPT OF OPERATION:   Operation Camden:  On 180900 December 1967, 3-22 Infantry (-) conducted a combat assault into LZ vicinity XT585419, utilizing UH-1D aircraft.  Following the combat assault, Companies A and B conducted patrol operations, while Company B secured Battalion (-) laager position and conducted local search and destroy operations.  On 19 December 1967, 3 - 22 Infantry (-) begins movement south along the watershed to locate and destroy the 101st NVA Regiment.  On 24 December 1967, 3 - 22 Infantry (-) will set up a Battalion (-) laager vicinity XT603358 and remain in position.  On 26 December 1967, 3 - 22 Infantry (-) began airlift by UH-1D to Dau Tieng Base Camp and remained until the termination of Operation Camden.

8.   (C)   EXECUTION:    

18 Dec 67 -      3-22Infantry (-) conducts combat assault into LZ (XT586418) and established a Battalion (-) laager (XT587417) at 1039 hours.  At 1100 hours Companies A and B departed on search and destroy operations, Company D remained at Battalion (-) laager for LZ and perimeter security.  At 1330 hours Company B at coordinates XT587409 found one (1) hootch (8x10) with tin roof which was destroyed.  At 1425 hours Company B at coordinates XT586406 found one (1) hootch below ground with a tin roof (8x8x6), a time fuse and one )1) notebook, the hootch and fuse were destroyed.  Companies A and B returned to Battalion (-) laager position at approximately 1700 hours.                                                         (p4)

19 Dec 67 -      3-22 Infantry (-) continues search and destroy operation to the southeast.  At 1050 hours, Company D, at coordinates XT493410, found three (3) ammo boxes and one (1) 55 gallon drum of oil which was destroyed.  At 1300 hours, Company D, at coordinates XT592403, found 40 --50 pounds of polished rice which was destroyed.  At 1505 hours, Company D, at coordinates XT596406, had contact with estimated VC squad resulting in one (1) US WIA.  Contact was broken at 1510 hours and renewed at 1528 hours and broken at 1535 hours.  At 1550 hours artillery was employed in area of contact.  At 1750 hours, Company D joined the remainder of the Battalion (-) to establish a Battalion (-) laager at coordinates XT598412.

20 Dec 67 -     3-22 Infantry (-) continues to conduct search and destroy operations in area of operation.  At 1040 hours, Company A at coordinates XT598413 found one (1) telegraph key with head set, 15 feet commo wire and one (1) flashlight, all in a grass covered hootch (8x10).  At 1150 hours, Company A at coordinates XT599416, found three (3) bunkers (15x8x6) with 1-1/2 foot OHC, one (1) dining area (8x5) with grass roof, 100 rds 50 cal ammo, ten (10) flashlight batteries and one (1) old sub-machine-gun.  At 1245 hours, Company D at coordinates XT600402 found four (4) bunkers, two (2) were (4x6x8) with tin roof, one (1) mess hall (4x8x4) with tin roof, one (1) (8x20x5), with 2' OHC, two (2) foxholes (4x2x2), eleven (11) AK-47 magazines, 1800 rds AK-47, five (5) 6oz oil cans, 30 rds 45 cal ammo, one (1) US stretcher, one (1) Chicom grenade, 15 pounds TNT, one (1) anti-tank mine, assorted clothing, 15 blasting caps, twelve (12) NVA belts, three (3) Butterfly bombs, one (1) bicycle, three (3) pounds documents.  At 1610 hours, Company A at coordinates XT606415, found a VC base camp containing two (2) bunkers (20x30x4) with 2' OHC and a 40 foot escape tunnel, one (1) cooking hole (5x6x6), three (3) foxholes (3x5x2), 30 pounds of papers, five (5) tons unpolished rice, one (1) transmitter, one (1) speaker, one (1) rice grinder.  The Battalion (-) remained in the same laager position XT598413.

21 Dec 67 -      3-22 Infantry (-) continues to conduct search and destroy operations in the area of operations.  At 1145 hours, Company A at coordinates XT587407, engaged four (4) VC with S/A, no return of fire, unknown results.  At 1435 hours, Company A at coordinates XT58-3-5, received sniper fire, returned fire with S/A, A/W and artillery with negative results.  At 1330 hours, C Company at coordinates XT58-4-4 found and destroyed one (1) ton of unpolished rice.  The Battalion (-) established a laager position at coordinates XT58-399.  Company A established a laager position at coordinates XT585395 and Company D established a laager position at coordinates XT595396.

22 Dec 67 -     3-22 Infantry (-) continues to conduct search and destroy operations in A/O.  At 1825 hours, Company A at coordinates XT584391, reported seven (7) bunkers (8x6x4) with 2' OHC.  Company A established laager position at coordinates XT585394.  The Battalion (-) established a laager position at coordinates XT593397.
                                                       (p5)
23 Dec 67 -     3-22 Infantry (-) continues to conduct search and destroy operations in A/O.  At 1420 hours, Recon Platoon at coordinates XT604378 found two (2) bicycles which were destroyed.  The Battalion (-) laagered at coordinates XT604380.

24 Dec. 67 -     3-22 Infantry (-) continues to conduct search and destroy operations in A/O.  At 1435 hours Recon Platoon at XT609356, engaged one (1) VC resulting in one (1) VC KIA and one (1) AK-47 weapon captured.  The Battalion (-) and Recon Platoon established a laager position at coordinates XT603356.

25 Dec 67 -     3-22 Infantry (-) remains in laager position and conducts defensive recon patrols.  At 0750 hours, Recon Platoon at XT608353, found two (2) AK-47 magazines, one (1) RPG round, one (1) booster for RPG.  At 0800 hours, Company A conducted a perimeter sweep and found three (3) tons of rice, six (6) chopsticks, and one (1) rice grinder in vicinity XT603355.  At 0943 hour Recon Platoon conducted a perimeter sweep and located four (4) bunkers (4x12x5) with 2' OHC in vicinity XT609355.

26 Dec 67 -     3-22 Infantry (-) remains at established laager position XT603356, and prepares for airlift to Dau Tieng Base Camp.  The airlift by UH-1D was completed at 1409 hours and 3-22 Infantry(-) remained at Dau Tieng Base Camp in preparation for future operations.

9.  (C)     SUPPORTING FORCES:

a.   Artillery

(1)   General:  Artillery support for 3 - 22 Infantry (-) during Operation Camden was provided
Primarily by C Btry, 2 - 77 Artillery.  At various times during the operation  the following batteries provided support for the Battalion:

(a)  A Battery,  2 - 77 Artillery  (105mm)
(b)  B Battery,  2 - 77 Artillery  (105mm)
(c)  C Battery,  2 - 77 Artillery  (105mm)
(d)  1 - 12 Artillery  (155mm)
(e)  2 - 32  Artillery  (175mm and 8 inch)
(f)  Additional fire support was provided by the Battalion Heavy Weapons Platoon in
General support while weapons provided direct support at company level.  All supporting artillery fires were extremely responsive and accurate.    
                                 (p6)
(2)  Table of Rounds Fired:         81mm     105mm      155mm     8”   175mm    Total

Number of Contact Missions         0           10                0        2          0          12
Number of Contact Rounds           0         294                0      44          0        338
Number of Support Missions         0          60                 0         0         0          60
Number of Support Rounds           0      1206                 0         0         0      1206
Number of H&I Missions              60        870                 0         0         0        930
Number of H&I Rounds              324      1071                 0         0         0      1395
Number of Preparations                0             1                 1         1         0             1
Number of Preparation Rounds    0         360             240       40        0         640
Illumination                                      0              0                 0         0         0             0

       b.   Air Force:  Tactical air support was available through the 7th US Air Force and directed by FACs assigned to the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division,  During Operation Camden, 3 -22 Infantry (-) utilized three (3) air strikes.  Additionally, FACs provided aerial surveillance and visual reconnaissance support for the maneuver elements.

      c.    Army Aviation:  On 18 December 1967, two (2) Assault Helicopter Companies, initially, phasing down to one (1), were required to move the Battalion (-) from Dau Tieng to LX vicinity XT585419.  The 118th and 188th Combat Assault Companies flew one (1) sortie of 17 UH-1Ds, thereafter the 188th flew 6 sorties of 8 UH-1Bs.  On 26 December 1967, 3-22 Infantry (-) was airlifted from XT693356 to Dau Tieng by one (1) company of UH-1Ds.  The UH-1Ds flew five (5) sorties.

10.  (C)     RESULTS:

a.  Friendly Losses

     US KIA               15
     US KIA (NHA)          0
     US WIA               40
     US WIA (NHA)          3

b.  Enemy Losses:

VC KIA  (BC)          6
VC KIA  (poss)          1
VC WIA (cnfmd)          0
VC WIA  (poss)          0
Chieu Hoi          0
Detainees          0                              (p7)
Refugees          0
Draft Dodgers          0
VC POW          0
Civil Defendants          0

c.  Weapons Captured

RPG booster          1
AK-47               1
Sub - machine gun     1
Grenade launcher adapter  3

d.  Munitions Captured / Destroyed

RPG round                         1
.50 caliber ammo          100 rds
                  AK-47 ammo               1800  rds
.45 caliber ammo            30  rds
Chicom grenade              1
TNT                            1 box,  3 blocks
Anti - tank mine               1
Blasting caps               15
Butterfly bombs              3

e.  Miscellaneous Items Destroyed

AK-47 magazine          11
Rice (polished)          6,500 lbs,  55 gal. drum
Rice (unpolished)          12,100 lbs
Chopsticks          6
OD shirt               1
Black pants          1 pr.
Pack               1                              (p8)
Tunnel complex          1
Bunkers               25
Grass hootch          1
Flashlight batteries     10
Foxholes          5
Oil cans (6oz. ea.)     5
US stretcher          1
NVA web bolt          12
Bicycles               11
Tunnel               40  ft.
Oil               55 gal. drum
Ammo boxes filled with
         Cossaline          3
Time fuse          1400 ft.
Hootch with tin roof     2  (1 underground)
Personal letter          2     

f.  Miscellaneous Items Evacuated:

Rice grinder          2
Telegraph key w/ headset  1
Commo wire          15 ft.
Flashlight          1
Documents          3 lbs.
Transmitter          1
Speaker               1
Papers               30  lbs.

(C)  COMMUNICATIONS:

a.  Personnel:  Communications Officer,  3 radio operators                     (p9)

b.  A Retrans. Station was set up at FSB MARYLEN,  this was moved to  FSB LAFAYETE on 23 December 1967.  Communications utilized were confined to radios due to the jungle terrain and movement of the Battalion.

        c.    All difficulties encountered during this operation were of a routine nature, i.e., defective hand sets and broken antennas caused by the jungle terrain.  Replacement items were brought in with daily resupply items.

12.   (C)   ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a.  Administration:

(1)  General:  Administrative communication between the Battalion forward base camps and the
Battalion forward base camps and the Battalion rear elements at Dau Tieng were maintained by courier, FH radio, and periodic Liaison runs.

(2)  Maintenance and Unit Strength:  Average daily strength for the mime (9) day period (18 December 1967 - 26 December 1967) were:

ORGANIZATION          REAR AREA          FORWARD AREA     

     HHC               227                      49
     Co A                 37                    102
     Co B                 25                    120
     Co C                 31                    115
     Co D                 33                    106

  Battalion Total   353                    494

(3)  Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(a)  During the duration of this operation, the Battalion “Regulars Club” was able to provide
An adequate supply of comfort items.  This was accomplished by aerial resupply whenever the situation permitted.  There were very few occasions throughout the entire operation that free beer and  soda could not be supplied to the units from the rear area.

             (b)   Incoming mail was transported daily from Dau Tieng to the forward area by air during resupply.  Outgoing mail was transported daily from the forward areas during extraction.

             (c)    On 24 December, Catholic and Protestant religious services were conducted in the forward areas by (CPT) Chaplain Shaub and (CPT) Chaplain Tobin, of 3rd Brigade.

b.  Logistics:

(1)  General:  Operation Camden was conducted during the period 18 December 1967 through 26
December 1967.  The logistical support for this operation came from Dau Tieng with all resupply conducted by helicopter CH-47.
                                                       (p10)
(2)  Supporting Agencies:  The principal sources of resupply and services are as follows:

(a)  Battalion S-4,  Dau Tieng
(b)  Support Battalion (Prov)  Dau  Tieng

1.  Company A,  25th S&T Battalion
2.  Company B.   725th Maintenance Battalion
3.  125th Signal Company

(c)  228th Service & Supply Battalion,  Dau Tieng
(d)  Company C. 588th Engineer Battalion,  Dau Tieng
(e)  Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion,  Dau Tieng
(3)  Supplies and Materials:  The following supplies and materials were issued during the period
Of 18 December to 26 December 1967 are listed below:  The majority8 of these items were consumed during Operation Camden:

(a)  Class I

Combat Rations                    7,835
“A” Rations                                10, 883
Sundry Packs                         36
Ice                         3,000  lbs
Dog Food                          10  cases
(b)  Class II

Trousers, Jungle                        78
Shirt, Jungle                        24
Poncho Liners                        12
Socks                             60  pr.
Boots,  Jungle                        12  pr
Paper Plates                    4,000
Knives, Forks & Spoons (plastic)                  11,000
Paper Cups                         4,000
Batteries  BA - 30                      1  case
Batteries  BA - 386                     14 cases
Batteries  BA - 1100/U                       1  box
Batteries  BA -  42                       1  box
Insect Repellent,  4oz. plastic              400
Foot Powder                             3  cases
Cleaning Patches                           15  boxes
Sand Bags                      9,000

(c)  Class III

Oil GP  4 oz.                            30  cans
LSA Lube Oil,  ------                         2  cases
Diesel                                397  gals          (p11)
Mogas                              1069   gals
GP Oil, 30 weight                          4  barrels

(d)  Class V

Claymores                             33
7.62 mm                           51,000  rds
Trip Flares                             32
5.56mm                           61,920  rds
M - 79                             2,074  rds
White Star Clusters                          6  rds
81mm HE                           324  rds
M - 72 LAW                             75  rds
Smoke Grenades                           177
Frag. Grenades                             92

Total Vehicle Mileage                 12,047  Miles

      c.   During Operation Camden, medical treatment facility was arranged in three (3) steps.  Although a serious shortage of medical personnel did exist, it did not hamper the effectiveness of medical treatment.
     (1)   Phase one included treatment by a company line medic.  During this operation two line medics and a senior medic were assigned to each of the line companies.

     (2)   If it is believed that the individual cannot receive proper treatment at company level, he is referred to a senior medical specialist who gives him the necessary treatment or arranges the evacuation to the aid station.  The senior specialist also acts as supply coordinator and Command Group Medic.  The functions of the senior medical specialist comprise phase two.

     (3)   The final phase of medical treatment is the aid station maintained at Dau Tieng Base Camp where all patients with moderate to severe illness are treated or referred to a higher medical facility.  The aid station continued to be a source of medical supplies for all field medics.

            The medical treatment facility did not encounter any unusual operational difficulties.  The continued use of the three phase medical treatment concept should be continued.  All evidence points favorably at this effective arrangement.  

13.   (C)   COMMANDER ANALYSIS:   During Operation Camden, the Battalion made contact with small VC forces who seemingly possessed a stronger will to stand and fight than average VC forces.  In one instance, an estimated VC squad, after having had their position thoroughly saturated with artillery and 750 pound bombs, returned a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire, forcing a platoon of US troops to break contact so that additional air and artillery support could be called in.  Enemy forces who decide to stand and fight can be eliminated with heavy artillery and tactical air support prior to troops fire and maneuver.  Small unit commanders must insist upon cautious pursuit to contact, wide dispersion of forces, and full utilization of air and artillery support.
                                                       (p12)
     Particularly, artillery and air support must respond rapidly to requests from infantrymen in contact with the enemy.  In this connection, it is recommended that marking rounds be fired periodically during the operation so that fire supporters may have a more correct location of friendly troops at all times.  Also, this will enable them to be more effective with the first round that is called in when enemy contact is made.

     The Battalion continued its policy of inserting “Night Kits: during resupply.  The additional fire power provided by those kits contributed immensely to the improvement of our night defensive positions.

14.   (C)   LESSONS LEARNED:

a.  Use sufficient artillery or tactical air support to destroy prepared positions before an assault is attempted.

b.  When entering base camps, security should be established and a thorough sweep should be made prior to commencing operations.

c.  Continued emphasis must be placed on firing the m-16 weapon as a semi-automatic weapon.  Accuracy is lost and malfunctions increase when the weapon is fired fully automatic.

FROM THE COMANDER:

                                        GERALD T. BROWN
Incl  1                                        CPT.  INF
    Operations Overlay                              Adjutant


 Pacification Hau Nghai Province

                         HEADQUARTERS
                        25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
                     Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,  G2
                                APO 96225
AVDCIN                                                                                                                       7 August 1966

SUBJECT:      25th Division Pacification Operations in HAU NGHIA Province (U)

TO:          See Distribution

     1.  (U)  Purpose.   The purpose of this study is to provide the reader with background information concerning the joint pacification efforts of the South Vietnamese Government and the 25th Infantry Division (US) in HAU NGHIA Province.  An abbreviated sketch of the physical characteristics of the province as well as a brief historical summary of the area are also discussed to in order to provide a full appreciation of the inherent problems in any pacification endeavor in this area.  The data and information contained herein represent a distillation of studies and after action reports recently prepared by USAID, Advisory Team 43, BAO TRAI, the 2nd Bde, 25th Division and the 25th Division , G2 Section.
     2.  (C)  General:

      a.    Physical description:  HAU NGHIA province is located west - northwest of Saigon and extends from Gia Dinh province on the east to the Cambodian Border on the west.  Its other neighbors are BINH DUONG province to the south.  Most portions on the province boundary are ill defined and artificial, and even those stretches demarcated by streams or canals constitute no meaningful obstacle to passage.  The 27 kilometer frontier with Cambodia is particularly hard to distinguish for almost of its entire length.  Most of the province is extremely flat and low lying and typically upper Mekong Delta in appearance.  In the extreme west and in southwest, the land table is fairly close to sea level and dominated by an expanse of swampy terrain generally referred to as the Plain of Reeds.  The central portion of the province is slightly higher and better drained, and moving to the north the terrain rises imperceptibly to a maximum elevation of approximately 30 meters.  Vegetation covers virtually the entire land surface of the province with most of the natural cover replaced by rice.  Indigenous forest remain only in the extreme northern and northeastern portions such as the BOI LOI Woods area, and in the FILHOL Rubber Plantation and the HO BO Woods complex situated in PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province.  Vegetation throughout HAU NGHIA generally does not appear to be as dense or lush as in neighboring BINH DUONG.     

      b.   History:   HAU NGHIA was one of the final creations of the Diem Regime and established as a province on 15 October 1963 by Presidential Order.  The province was made up of 4 districts contributed by the neighboring provinces as follows:  DUC HOA and DUC HUE Districts formerly of LONG AN Province, TRANG BANG of TAY NINH Province, and CU CHI of BINH DUONG Province.  The province was created primarily to coordinate military activities on both sides of the old boundary between LONG AN and TAY NINH.  This boundary ran lengthwise through the KINH TAY Swamp and VC units operating on either side of this swamp could conduct military operations in one province and then flee across the border with almost sure knowledge that there would be neither pursuit nor meaningful coordinated response from the neighboring province.  HAU NGHIA, although not recognized by the VC as a province, continues to be of` great importance to them.  Communication, supply and liaison routes between the Delta and VC redoubts in War Zones C and D and the Iron Triangle, pass through HAU NGHIA Province.  HAU NGHIA is also a prime source of paddy rice and much needed manpower for VC forces.  BAO TRAI, the province capital was selected because of its theoretical capacity to maintain liaison with and render tactical resistance to each of the district towns, and secondarily to avoid selecting one of the existing district capitals, thereby offending the other three.

3.  (C)  Background:

a.   Prior to arrival of the 25th Infantry Division, effective government control
in HAU NGHIA province extended only to the maximum range of supporting weapons located in the Vietnamese military installations immediately surrounding the 4 district capitals and the province capital.  This security umbrella encompassed about 25 per cent of the population with 60 per cent under VC control and another 15 per cent living in contested areas.

                 b.     Even during the days of the French Administration the area that is now HAU NGHIA Province was considered politically unstable because of its long history of rebel activity.  CU CHI district, then a part of BINH DUONG Province, was notoriously anti-administration even before 1961 when it developed into an overt trouble spot.  By 1962, most of DUC HUE District, much of upper DUC HOA, and portions of CU CHI and TRANG BANG were under VC control.  In many other areas not actually under de facto VC control, there never was an effective political presence to begin with, and the government's position was precarious at best.

               c.     In 1962 and early 1963, the government made a concentrated effort to clear and pacify much of the area astride Route 1 in connection with Operation SUNRISE, the original Strategic Hamlet Program.  A considerable amount of time and expense was devoted to relocating thousands of people to areas which could theoretically be more logically defended and supported.  In spite of the impressive statistics complied during these operations, there was in fact little genuine pacification in terms of rooting out the VC infrastructure and replacing it with a viable local governmental mechanism.  During late 1963, the situation in HAU NGHIA province became critical and by early 1964 military reversals were commonplace, and proceeding at an alarming rate.  In June 1964, DUC HOA was attacked and partially overrun, and the DUC HUE District capital of MY QUI, located west of the Oriental River, was evacuated since virtually all of the district was then under VC control.  The capital was transferred to the HIEP HOA Sugar Mill with 3 villages of DUC HOA District located east of the river being ceded to DUC HUE, and the district boundaries realigned accordingly.   The situation continued to deteriorate until October 1964 when the 25th ARVN Div. was transferred to HAU NGHIA  province from II Corps.  With the arrival of the 25th, the overall military decline was temporarily arrested, and the immediate DUC HOA Area re-secured.  In the Spring of 1965, the VC renewed their heavy pressure throughout the province, gaining steadily until the arrival of the 2nd Bde, 25th Infantry Division in the CU CHI area in January 1966.  At the time the Brigade arrived, government control in CU CHI district outside the district capital, TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center and a few other isolated outposts, was tenuous even in daylight hours, and all areas were subject to constant harassment.  Two Popular Forces posts, THAI MY and VINH CU were little more than prisons in basically VC controlled hamlets.  Guerrillas and sappers operating along Route 1 in the CAY TROM - PHUOC HIEP - SUOI SAU area were particularly active and prone to ambush not only military traffic, but civilian vehicles of opportunity as well.

             d.   During the first three months in-country, the 2nd Brigade concentrated on securing the CU CHI base area and conducting search and destroy operations designed to destroy main and local Viet Cong forces, and relieve the pressure on the base camp.  Subsequent to the arrival of the Division Headquarters and as a result of the increasing coordination with ARVN and province officials, it was decided to increase the Division's contribution to the Revolutionary Development Program (RDP).  This program, properly supported by social, political, economic and military action, was felt to be the logical blue print for the restoration of order and stability to HAU NGHIA province.  The concept behind the RDP calls for the gradual extension of the full spectrum of the government's influence outward from secure or pacified areas.

          e.   In response to a request by the HAU NGHIA Province Chief, the Commanding General, 25th Division, directed that planning begin for the first pacification operation.  The operation was called MAILI, and the unit selected was the 1st Battalion 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds).  Although this operation was the pilot project of this nature, it will be discussed in relative detail since in encompasses all the techniques and lessons learned applied to later operations.

3.  (C)  Operation MAILI:

a.   Background:  One of the critical areas of HAU NGHIA Province
scheduled for securing in 1966 was the area astride Provincial Route 8 between BAO TRAI (XT5204) and CU CHI (XT6212) encompassing new life hamlets AP CHO (XT5505), DUC CHANH (XT5505), DUC HANH “A” (XT5606) and DUC HANH “B” (XT5707).  AP CHO and CUC CHANH are usually referred to collectively as DUC LAP.  Provincial Route 8 is the only usable road leading into the province capital from Saigon via Route 1 through CU CHI.  It was essential that the hamlets along this road be secured in order to insure the maintenance and security of this key route.  Route 8 also cuts across a major Viet Cong supply and communication corridor leading from LONG AN Province to VC base areas in TAY NINH and BINH DUONG Provinces.  Since October 1965, ARVN forces had been repeatedly attacked and driven away from their positions along the route by the Viet Cong.  The result had been that the previously thriving hamlets had been almost completely evacuated by the residents.  The road had been mined or interdicted with roadblocks almost daily during the seven months prior to MAILI, making travel difficult and hazardous.  The hamlets in the area up to 6 kilometers to the northwest and southeast of the road had been unmolested sanctuaries for Viet Cong local guerillas for months.  Except during an occasional ineffective sweep by ARVN forces stationed at BAO TRAI, the people of these hamlets had experienced no contact with the GVN.  Although not considered to be active Viet Cong sympathizers, they had nevertheless been forced to make accommodations with the VC in order to survive.

               b.   Preparations:   Prior to the operation, the CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf and the Sector Advisor discussed in detail the objectives of the operation, the area of operation, and the tactics to be employed.  The area of operations was divided into sections generally following hamlet boundaries.  Each day the battalion would clear one of the sections of Viet Cong guerrillas and provide security for the employment of a composite Vietnamese “GO TEAM” consisting of National Police (NP), psychological warfare troops, intelligence troops, and medical personnel.  The NP would search each dwelling and check the credentials of the residents.  The psywar team, equipped with bull horns and leaflets, would discuss various GVN aid programs with the people.  The intelligence team would attempt to identify the Viet Cong infrastructure and also recruit agents among the villagers.  The medical group would provide rudimentary medical treatment to the sick and inform.  An officer and an NCO from the American sector advisory team would accompany the Vietnamese team to provide liaison between the Vietnamese and the US company and platoon commanders.  Additional NP would be assigned to the companies for the duration of the operation to serve as guides and to assist in the identification of VC suspects.  Vietnamese Counter Terror troops would be assigned to the battalion to assist in night ambushes which would be used extensively throughout the area.

c.   Operations:

(1)  Operations got under way on 27 April and initially the US troops
appeared to be uneasy when working in close contact with the Vietnamese, and this in turn reflected in the performance of the Vietnamese.  However, as the daily operations continued, both the US and Vietnamese troops began to work more effectively together.  By the end of two weeks, the combined forces had evolved a highly efficient “modus operandi”, and a true sense of camaraderie had developed.  One reason for the improvement was due to the critique and planning conference conducted each evening at 1700 hours in a provisional Joint Operations Center at BAO TRAI.  At this conference, which was attended by the CG and staff of the 1st Bn, 27th Inf, the Province Chief and his staff, and the Sector Advisor and his staff, the current day`s operation was reviewed and critiqued, and plans made for the next day`s operation.

                (2)   The Vietnamese and their American advisors participated in every phase of operation MAILI and accompanied the 25th Division companies and platoons into every hamlet in the area of operations.  They proceeded by helicopter, tank, personnel carriers, trucks, or on foot.  On one occasion, in response to hard intelligence of a Viet Cong location, US and Vietnamese troops were transported from one objective area to another by a collection of USAID, National Police, and Vietnamese Regional Force trucks driven by US advisors.  On five occasions, battalions from the ARVN 25th Infantry Division conducted operations designed to support and compliment the efforts of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.  On three occasions, these ARVN battalions were under sector command while on two other cases, they were under ARVN 25th Division command.

               (3)   During MAILI,  sufficient security was provided to DUC HANH “B” to allow province to construct a new outpost near that hamlet.  Fields of fire were cleared for the new outpost by the engineer platoon attached to the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry.  Barrier materials for the new outpost were salvaged from two abandoned outposts in a nearby area which were leveled by the engineer platoon at the request of the Province Chief.

               (4)   Results:  The success of Operation MAILI is more appropriately measured by the results listed below:

               (a)   Control of the area of operation was wrested from the Viet Cong for the duration of the operation.  Commercial and private traffic was heavier and moved much more freely on Provincial Route 8 and other feeder trails in the area.

               (b)   The Viet Cong were discredited in the eyes of the people living in the area of influence of the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry task force.

               (c)   The US soldiers demonstrated that, contrary to Viet Cong propaganda, they are not unfeeling blood-thirsty brutes.

               (d)   GVN influence was extended to each of the hamlets in the area of the operation.  Many of these had not been ventured into for several years by province officials.

               (e)   Medical treatment was administered to 833 adults and children in the area during the 19 MEDCAPS performed in the various hamlets.

               (f)   The new life hamlets along the ;route between BAO TRAI and CU CHI began showing definite signs of life.  In DUC HANH “B” alone, the population approximately tripled by the end of the operation, indicating restored confidence and a desire to live under GVN control.

               (g)   The efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. troops provided an excellent example for the members of the Sector Staff.  After twice being embarrassed by the late arrival of his forces at their appointed locations, the Province Chief cracked down and required a higher standard of performance by his subordinates.

               (h)   The concept of the composite Vietnamese “GO TEAM” consisting of intelligence, psywar, medical and national police troops, was perfected and its effectiveness demonstrated.  (This twenty-man team is to be kept intact and will, it is hoped, accompany ARVN battalions on future search and clear operations.)
               (i)   The value of close coordination between the US battalion staff and the Sector Staff (with its US advisors) was readily apparent.  The late afternoon daily conferences in the provisional Operations Center at BAO TRAI made possible an extremely close cooperation between the various participants.  Problems were worked out and mistakes were discussed in an atmosphere of genuine understanding.  Toward the end of the period, the Province Chief stated that he would order his two attached ARVN battalions to conduct operations in coordination with the Americans in any way recommended by the US Battalion Commander.  Thus the operation provided an effective vehicle for the development of integrated, combined operations at the small unit level.

     4.  (C)   Other Pacification Operations:  The experiences and lessons learned from Operation MAILI were applied to the strategy and techniques of three other pacification operations:  FT. SMITH, SANTA FE, and FRESNO.  (See Enclosure 1 for Areas of Operation).  Tactics were refined and coordinated with Sector and Sub-sector officials and improved through daily contact.  Because of the multi-battalion aspect of FRESNO and SANTA FE, a Brigade Liaison team was maintained at Sector Headquarters to facilitate the two way information flow between the battalions in the field and province officials.  In addition to the results previously enumerated for MAILI, during SANTA FE and FRESNO several incidents transpired which were indicative of the growing success of our pacification effort.

          a.   During the last week in June, on five separate occasions, village children led members of the 1st and 2nd Bns, 27th Infantry to small ammunition caches in the vicinity of their hamlets.  These children demonstrated a wide range of area knowledge and in one instance led troops to a cache 2 kilometers away from their homes.  The more important items recovered included 31 60mm mortar rounds, 39 grenades, 1  155mm arty round, and over 2100 rounds of miscellaneous small arms ammunition.

          b.   On 30 June, a VC platoon leader took advantage of the Division's presence in his area to arrange with local officials, through his wife, for US Forces to capture him at his house.  Once apprehended, the platoon leader turned over his weapon and led a platoon to the hiding places of nine other members of his platoon who were captured on the spot.  The key item in this action was the response of province officials upon hearing of the defector's wish.  Within 30 minutes, US Forces had been notified and reacted to exploit the information.

          c.   Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses for all four pacification operations are shown in Enclosure 2.

     5.  (C)  Associated Pacification Activities:   In addition to the activities enumerated previously, the following operations have also been carried out in support of, and in conjunction with the main pacification effort.

           a.   MEDCAP:   A MEDCAP team consisting normally of a doctor and four aid-men, provided medical treatment to inhabitants o hamlets as part of the “GO TEAM” or during “COUNTY FAIR” operations.   When a hamlet was secured by US Forces, the MEDCAP team would enter and provide treatment for periods of three or four hours.  The team was always warmly accepted and the enormous flow of inhabitants both from that hamlet and nearby hamlets was encouraging.  The total number of inhabitants treated during SANTA FE and FRESNO alone was 6,686.
          b.     COUNTY FAIR:   County Fair operations incorporating civic action and psychological warfare measures, were conducted in all areas during the pacification operations.  The primary objective was to identify and neutralize the existing VC ;infrastructure in the hamlets and villages.  County Fair operations in all hamlets were quite similar.  Therefore, the following description of the activities of the SO DO County Fair will illustrate a typical operation.
     The operation began at 230400 Jun 66 when two companies of the 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry surrounded the hamlet.  Two checkpoints were established, one at each end of the hamlet, and all personnel attempting to leave the area were checked by the National Police stationed at the checkpoints.  At approximately 0700 hours, the infantry with assistance of three Vietnamese search teams began a house to house search of the hamlet.  These teams consisted of one National Policeman, one ARVN intelligence NCO and one US Advisor from Sector.  A thorough search was made, not only for intelligence information, but also from a population control aspect.  The school was chosen as a collection and processing center, and all available inhabitants were moved to that area where a complete census was conducted.  As soon as the census was completed, and the inhabitants had been screened to determine their true status, the GO TEAM set up the Psywar and MEDCAP teams at the school.  The MEDCAP team treated a total of 94 villagers for various illnesses, and was warmly received by the villagers.  A mobile identification card team was also provided from Sector to assist in processing inhabitants without identification cards.  A cultural team consisting of three men and two women not only provided entertainment, but also gave a very subtle psychological message to the people through that medium of entertainment.  The 2nd Brigade Band then gave a band concert, and the Province Civil Affair Officer drove a Lambretta equipped with a loudspeaker through the hamlet playing recorder music, thus adding to the overall relaxed atmosphere of the operations.  Major NHA, the Province Chief, arrived from BAO TRAI, mingled with the inhabitants, and gave an inspiring pro-government speech.  A noon meal was prepared by US Forces and served to 350 villagers.  After the noon meal, 25th Division Helping Hand items donated by the people of Hawaii were issued.  The remainder of the afternoon was used by the civic action tam to distribute USAID, CARE, and CRS commodities and supplies to the people.  Literature concerning province agricultural programs and public health services was also distributed.  In short, all resources were used in an attempt to influence the people in the hamlet to start thinking in terms of GVN control rather than VC domination.  Information received during this operation led to an operation in a nearby area resulting in numerous VC tunnels and fortifications destroyed.

          c.   Checkmate:  On 6 July 1966, the Division initiated a program of establishing traffic check points at random locations along major highways in HAU NGHIA and TAY NINH Provinces.  The purpose of this operation called CHECKMATE, is to deny the VC the use of land LOC's to covertly move personnel and supplies through our TAOR.  Checkpoints are manned by elements of the 3/ 4 Cav., National Police, and CI agents of the 25th MI Det.  An average of four APC's are employed to furnish security in the area of operation.  Two checkpoints are then established, approximately 150 meters apart, enabling traffic checks tin two directions.  Three National Policemen and one CI agent are located at each checkpoint.  The Cav's Aero rifle platoon is also prepared to assist the roadblock element if necessary and aerial scouts search out the surrounding area for any other targets of opportunity.

          d.   Roadrunner:  Concurrent with the conduct of the pacification operations, the division also employed tailored task forces traversing main and secondary roads in HAU NGHIA province to demonstrate our intention to use and keep open these LOC's.  During June, the division conducted 86 of these “roadrunners” traveling a total of 1540 kilometers and clearing 35 road obstacles.

     6. (C)   Evaluation:   The HAU NGHIA Province Advisory Team in the Special Report on Revolutionary Development, dated 1 July 1966, stated the following concerning our pacification efforts:  “As a result of continued operations by the US 25th Division in VC controlled areas, and the prodigious effort being made by the US in pacification work, a positive change in the attitude of the people in VC controlled areas is being made.  In the operational areas of “FRESNO” and “SANTA FE” the people are freely providing the forces with information concerning the locations of mines, booby traps, small caches of ammunition, and the names and homes of local Viet Cong.  The US is countering the VC propaganda by their extensive MEDCAP program, by improving roads made impassable by the VC, and by being able to live and operate with relative impunity in VC controlled areas.  The continued pacification operations provided the US forces with an understanding of the problems in rural construction and also the use of measured force when dealing with the guerrilla who is among the people, i.e., refusal to shoot artillery salvos on a sniper, thus preventing the destruction of local houses and the killing of innocent people.  The daily meetings and continual contact between the US and VN forces provides for a closer working relationship which is essential in combined operations.  These meetings also provide an opportunity to point out the advantages of US methods of operation, which are characterized by their flexibility and rapid reaction time.”

     7.  (C)  Conclusion:   Through pacification efforts such as those discussed above lies perhaps the most logical approach to the MACV “Healing and Minds Program”  Although results are never dramatic and occasional reversals are to be expected, these operations are critical to ultimate victory of ARVN and FWMAF in South Vietnam.  VC Main Forces an their base areas must obviously be constantly sought and destroyed concurrent with these pacification efforts in order to prevent these forces from exerting their influence in the pacified areas.  With proper distribution of military forces and assets, pacification and search and destroy operations can be undertaken simultaneously to win the war on both fronts.


                              H.F. MOONEY JR.
                              LTC,  GS
                              AC of S,  G2
2 Encl.

DISTRIBUTION:   Special

Addendum:


PACIFICATION OPERATIONS

Operation MAILI:                             KIA (BC)     KIA(Poss)     VCC     VCS      WPNS     CAPTURED grain
  27 Apr - 12 May                                47                  51                3          26             2                2.7

 Operation  FORT SMITH
  ?  June - 6 July                                  19                  51                6           32             2               3.6

 Operation FRESNO
  3 June - 14 July                                20                   30             18            41             6             2.55

 Operation SANTA FE
  3 June - 4 July                                     3                  17             14            74             0              .75
TOTAL                                                89                149              41          173           10            9.60          


 Operation EWA     

                    HEADQUARTERS
                 FIRST BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY
                         (THE WOLFHOUNS)
                       APO US FORCES 96225
AVTISBB-T                                                                                                                2 August 1966

SUBJECT:     Combat Operations After Action Report           (RCS:  MACV  J3-32)

THRU:     Commanding Officer
          2nd Brigade,  25th Infantry Division
          ATTN:  LBDB-T
          APO  US  FORCES  96225


          Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN:  AVTLIGA-MH
APO  US FORCES  96225

TO:    Commander
          US Military Assistance Command,  Vietnam
          ATTN:   J343
          APO  US  FORCES  96243

References:

A.  OPORD 28-66 (Revised) (Operation EWA) Headquarters, 2nd Brigade, 5 July 1966

B. OPORD 8-66  (Operation EWA),Headquarters,1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 7 July 1966

1.  NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION:

a.  Operation EWA
b.  Search and Destroy

     2.   DATES OF OPERATION:   8 - 13 July 1966

3.   LOCATION:   Hau Nghia Province, west of the Oriental River and east of the Cambodian Border.  
      (See Annex A, Operations Overleaf).

4.   CONTROL HEADQUATERS:   The control headquarters, 2nd Brigade, 25th
Infantry Division, directed that TF1/27 Inf. Conduct an airmobile assault on Obj 1 (XT3207), commencing 080630 hrs. July 1966 to establish a battalion base.  A second airmobile assault was directed on Obj 2 (XT2808) with one (1) company prepared, on order, to conduct a search and destroy mission on Obj 3 (XT2706).  Elements to be air-landed on Obj 2, and possibly Obj 3, were to be extracted NLT 081500 July.  Further, TF 1/27 Inf was directed to conduct eagle flights in the assigned AO from 9 - 12 July.

5.   REPORTING OFFICER:  Lt Col.  Alvin L. O'Neal

6.   TASK ORGANIZATION:

a.   A1/27  Inf  (Capt. Mayone)

Demo Team,  B/65 Engr.
     1 National Police
 1 Interpreter
b.   B1/27  Inf  (Capt Garrett)

Demo Team,  B/65 Engr.
     1 National Police
 1 Interpreter

c.   C1/27  Inf  (Capt Laski)

Demo Team,  B/65  Engr.
1 National Police
1 Interpreter

d.   Battalion Control

Recon Platoon
AT Platoon
Hvy Mortar Platoon
Elem, 125  Sig.
Elem, 25 MID
Btry A (-)  1/8 Arty

7.   SUPPORTING FORCES:

a.  Artillery Support:  1/8 Arty with attachments, { C (-) 3/13 Arty, D (-) 3/13 Arty}  DS to 1/27 Inf.

     b.   How and when artillery employed:  On 7 July the 1/8 Arty (-), consisting of a control element, HQ J/8,  C1/8, C3/13, (Three (3) 155mm howitzers), and D3/13 (two (2) 8” howitzers), were pre-positioned vicinity Ap Dong Hoa, (XT444087).  On 7 July Btry A (-) 1/8 Arty, was attached to TF 1/27 Inf and established a fire support base within the TF 1/27 Inf Bn defense perimeter on 8 July.  The arty. A battery accompanied the Bn into the AO by airlift, remained within the battalion defense perimeter throughout the operation, and was airlifted back to its Cu Chi perimeter base upon termination of the operation.  Throughout the operation, 1/8 Arty supported with pre-planned and on-call fires.

c.   Results of Artillery:

    (1)Artillery defensive concentrations were plotted to the
Battalion defense perimeter.

         (2)   After completing a precision registration, the registration piece
was adjusted by an aerial observer onto three (3) different targets.  The data for re-plot established by the adjustments aided in identifying landmarks by coordinates on an aerial photo that were not portrayed on the battle map.

              (3)   Co-location of the 4.2” mortar section and 105mm How. Battery FDC's, provided a mutual control in the processing of firing data.  This close working gunnery resulted in economy of fire support and massing of fires as the situation dictated.

              (4)   Artillery preparations on landing zones and objectives gave the helicopter assault force the advantage of moving into areas that were partially neutralized by the fires.

               (5)   H&I fires were employed throughout the AO, and were delivered by all caliber, from both fire support bases into areas formally inaccessible to artillery due to range.

                (6)   The use of WP marking rounds assisted patrols in land navigation to and from ambush sites during the hours of darkness.

                (7)   Concentrations plotted in support of ambushes were employed with success.  On 10 July 1966, artillery and 4.2” mortar fires served as an effective blocking force when a US ambush engaged a ten-man VC patrol.  The VC were engaged with small arms.  The 81mm mortars were called close-in and howitzer and mortar fires sealed off escape routes for the Viet Cong.  This action proved extremely rewarding and netted a total of 6 VC KIA (BC), 2 DIS (poss) and one captured VC (WIA).

                 (8)   Enemy automatic weapons firing hampered free movement of the C&C helicopter during a two (2) company sweep along the densely foliated area near the Oriental River.  The firing was silenced after artillery was employed against it.  

d.   Army Aviation:

(1)   How and When Army Aircraft used:

(a)   Command and Control aircraft for ground operations.
(b)   Airlift of troops and equipment to and from the AO/
 (c)   All re-supply

(2)   Results of Army aviation:  Army air support was a decisive factor in
accomplishing the mission in operation EWA.  The helicopter support provided TF1/27 Inf. with a high degree of flexibility and mobility.  The 116th Aviation Company (Airmobile) was in direct support of TF 1/27 Inf throughout the operation, and presented the battalion with a quick reaction capability.  The availability of choppers also enabled TF 1/27 Inf to execute a maximum number of missions throughout the operation over a very large assigned AO.  As a result, the VC were continually harassed throughout the day by forces ranging from rifle fire teams to company sized elements.

8.   INTELLIGENCE:

a.   Enemy situation prior to operation:  The assigned area of operation has
long been the operational area of the 267th and 269th Main Force Battalion of the Dong Than 2 (DT2) Regiment, the 506th Local Force Battalion, the C2 Local Force Company, and the C120 Local Force Company.  Numerous platoon and squad sized guerrilla forces were also known to be located in the area.  The 267th and 269th Battalion had established a pattern of operating in close proximity to the Oriental River unless forced to withdraw to the Cambodian Border area due to the pressure of US or ARVN operations.  The 506th Battalion has generally operated in and around the “Horseshoe Area” of the Oriental River (XS5693).  The C2 Company had a past history of operating along the west side of the Oriental River and it has been a generally believed that this company has provided security for movement of VC supplies into a location vic XS5493.  The C120 Company generally operated in the vic of the HIEP HOA Sugar Mill located vic XT540072.  Numerous platoon and squad sized guerrilla forces operated out of the many villages and hamlets in the area.  Numerous VC supply and infiltration routes were reported to traverse the entire AO.  Secret VC bases were reported within and in close proximity to the area.  
          On 25 June 1966, two SPAR reports originated vic XS568923.  The area in vic XS490970 revealed intense SPAR activity during the early part of June.  A VC headquarters was believed to have been situated in this area.  During the month of April, a VCC declared to his captors that four ammunition caches belonging to the LONG AN Provincial Force were located west of the Oriental River vic XT548013, XS460889, and XS550960.  These caches were supposed to be located in graveyards and measured 1 - 5 meters deep and 4.5m on each side.  Supposedly, wooden covers were placed over the graves with a layer of sand and cement on top.  The cache was camouflaged to appear as a grave.  A VC captive reported in early July that THO MO (XT2808) was the site of a VC camp where four US and several ARVN POW's were being held.`  Other recent reports of VC activity in the area were sixty (60) VC reported to have moved on 8 June from vic XS545382 to XS538923, evaluation F-3;  VC platoon reported to be located vic XT480015 on 16 June, evaluation F-2;  AR fire received on 18 June from vic XT505025 and XT484018;  VC ammunition point with forty (40) cases located vic XS548923 on 19 June, evaluation F-3;  unidentified VC battalion reported on 20 June to be located vic XS538910, evaluation F-3;  506th battalion supply section reported moving five sampans of rice and ammo on 21 June to location vic XS537910.  On 22 June, a 5th SFG agent reported a VC inter-zone committee had established a supply base near the Oriental River with an economics and finance office location vic XS484962 and a food storage area located vic XS1949.

     b.   Enemy Situation During the Operation:   The VC evaded US forces during the period the operation was conducted.  Usual guerrilla tactic (employment of booby traps, mines, harassing/sniper fire) were not used extensively.  Information from a male detainee indicated that the US and ARVN POW's reported to be at THO MO vic XT2808, were taken to BA THU vic XT265035 on 30 June 1966.  The THO MO (XT2808) and COC RING (XT2806) areas were confirmed as being VC bases or rest areas along a reported supply and liaison route as evidenced by: (1) documents and medical supplies indicating a medical facility, and (2) the large number of fortified bunkers, foxholes, trenches, tunnels, hasty lean-to's, outdoor fire pits, and camouflaged huts.  The many bunkers found had no firing ports, could house 5 - 10 men each, and had an overhead mud cover approximately 1½ feet thick.  The bunkers and tunnels were located on small wooded and elevated areas of land throughout the rice and reed fields.  Numerous bunkers were also found at DUC HUE vic XT3208.  The 269th Bn, DT2 Regt, also reported located at THO MO-Coc Ring area, was reported to have moved to HOA KHANH near canal 3 vic XS498975 on the same day US operations commenced.
     On 10 July an ambush patrol from Co B1/27 Inf made contact with 10 VC.  Interrogation of VC WIA from this engagement revealed that the 10 VC were from the C120 Company located at DUC HUE.  The VC left their company at MY THUAN hamlet (XT375098), for the 1/27 Inf Base Camp.  Their mission was to find the 1/27 Inf CP, locate possible VC mortar positions, and determine US defenses in the area.  After completing their mission, the 10 VC were directed to join the company at MY THUAN DONG (XT450048).  The C120 Company was reported to be composed of 120 men divided into three platoons and armed with 1 - 60mm mortar, 1 - 81mm mortar, 2 - B40's, 1 - 57mm RR, 3 - 30 Cal MG and assorted rifles.  Also, on 10 July, section officials reported that the 506th Local Force Bn and the 269th Bn DT2 Regt were located in vic XT4503.  An operation conducted on 11 July in the area where the 2 battalions and the C120 Company were reported to be located produced no significant contact.  
     On 11 July, documents found at DUC HUE (XT327079), indicated a VC induction and recruiting facility in that vicinity for the entire DUC HUE District.  On 12 July, a VC medic captured by B1/27 Inf, disclosed that the BINH HOA TAY village (XT4300) guerrilla unit, consisting of 70 men, was located vic XT4300, and that a VC medical training center was reported to be located at XS3896.  An operation on 12 July along the RACH TRAN River from XT394138 to the Cambodian Border vic XT320133, a reported VC infiltration and supply route, uncovered a large number of sampans indicating a well utilized waterway.  However, no trenches, bunkers, or foxholes were discovered along the river.  After the operation, an interrogation of VC captured revealed that a VC Labor Force Platoon composed of 3 squads and one guerrilla squad operated in GIONG NHO (XS4099), and that a 30 man VC militia platoon was located at GIONG GANG hamlet, vic XT3614.

     c.   Terrain and Weather:  The terrain is typical of the Delta Region of South Vietnam.  There are numerous canals, rivers, streams, and flat rice fields.  Many of the rice fields are presently overgrown with weeds, and where the water level is higher, fields of reeds predominate.  The water level in the rice fields varies from a few inches to waist deep.  Elevated areas of land are dispersed throughout the rice and reed fields.  The water level in the eastern portion of the AO is lower, and large areas are devoted to farm crops.  However, due to the constant afternoon and evening rains, even the elevated areas of land are wet and muddy.
     d.   Civic Action /Psywar Evaluation of the Population:  Civic action conducted during this operation consisted primarily of the evacuation of refugees.  Throughout the operational area, units of 1/27 Inf. found civilians who desired to be evacuated to areas under GVN control.  A total of 264 such personnel were evacuated to Duc Hue (XT4307), where control and responsibility for the refugees passed to GVN authorities.  A small number, approximately 20, requested evacuation, but only if their water buffalo were also evacuated.  Due to tactical requirements and a lack of suitable transportation for these water buffalo, it was not possible to meet this requirement and the people remained in the area.  The attitude displayed by this small group of civilians was considerably different from the vast majority of refugees, who were quite willing to leave all their possessions in order to reach the security of GVN control.  Leaflet drops were executed throughout the AO.

       9.   MISSION:   TF1/27 conducts airmobile assault into Ob.1, WAIKIKI (XT3208), commencing 080630 July 1966 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies, and base areas in AO.  Operation will include eagle flights, reconnaissance, patrolling, and heliborne reaction forces to locate and destroy elements of the 267th , 269th, and 506th VC battalions.

 10.   CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a.   PHASE I:   B1/27 Inf conducts an airmobile assault into Obj I (LZ WAIKIKI)
at 080630 Jul to seize the old French fort area vic XT326079, and to establish a security perimeter for the artillery battery firing position.  At 080645 Jul, Btry A, 1/8 Arty, will be air-landed by Chinnok helicopter to Obj I (WAIKIKI), and will quickly prepare to support TF1/27 Inf units in the conduct of combat operations.  Obj. WAIKIKI will become the battalion base.

     b.   PHASE II:   C1/27 Inf conducts airmobile assault into Obj 2 (TRIPLER) vic  XT285085 AT 080715 July.  Company forces will conduct S&D operations in Obj 2 (TRIPLER) to locate and destroy VC forces, installations, and supplies.  Company forces will be extricated by heliborne lift NLT 081500 July and moved to Bn base (WAIKIKI).

     c.   PHASE III:   A1/27 Inf will be airlifted from Cu Chi base at 080715 to WAIKIKI - TRIPLER Objective area.  Company will be prepared to be air-landed on Obj TRIPLER to assist C1/27 Inf in its mission, or be air-landed to Obj 3 (SUNSET) to conduct S&D operations against VC forces.  If A1/27 Inf is airlifted to an objective area other than WAIKIKI, the company will be extracted and airlifted to WAIKIKI NLT 081500 July.

     d.   PHASE IV:   HHC 1/27 Inf will be airlifted from Cu Chi base to Obj WAIKIKI.  LZ time 080800 July.  HHC 1/27 Inf will assist in the establishment of battalion defense base.

     e.   PHASE V:  TF1/27 Inf. conducts daily eagle flights, reconnaissance patrols, S&D operations, and fast reaction force operations in assigned AO to locate and destroy VC forces.

     f.   PHASE VI:   Operation EWA terminates and 1/27 Inf is returned by heliborne lift.

11.   EXECUTION:
8  July  1966

TF1/27 Inf began OPERATION EWA.  All elements of TF1/27 Inf were airlifted
From Cu Chi to the operational area during the early morning.  B1/27 Inf and HHC 1/27 Inf were airlifted into Obj WAIKIKI (Obj 1) to clear the area and establish a base camp.  A1/27 Inf was airlifted into Obj TRIPLER (Obj 2) to conduct S&D operations.  They were later extracted by helicopter and airlifted to battalion base at WAIKIKI.  A Btry, 1/8 Arty, was airlifted into Obj WAIKIKI to provide fire support during the operation.

     At 0610 hours, B1/27 Inf, Bn Command Group, elements of HHC 1/27 Inf, and A1/8 Arty advance party, were airlifted from Base Camp Cu Chi to Obj WAIKIKI loc vic XT324081.  The base camp was established without enemy contact.  A1/8 Arty air-landed at Base Camp Waikiki at 0650 hrs and established an artillery fire support base.

     At 0700 hrs, C1/27 Inf was airlifted from Cu Chi to Obj TRIPPLER loc vic XT287076.  No enemy contact was encountered and C1/27 Inf began search and destroy operations in northern half of Obj TRIPLER.  During the sweep C1/27 Inf found a camp site for 12 - 15 VC which had been used 6 or 7 days before.  A small cache of medical supplies containing aspirin and penicillin were found.  One VCS was captured and evacuated to BAO TRAI.  Eleven refugees were evacuated to DUC HUE.  At 1502 hrs, C1/27 Inf was extracted by helicopter to battalion base at WAIKIKI.

     A 1/27 Inf was airlifted to Obj TRIPPLER at 0739 hrs, and began search and destroy operations in the southern half of the objective.  A1-27 Inf found two small camp sites containing two loose 50 cal. Rds, and two black pajama tops.  A family in the area related their belief that 65 VC were operating in the area.  One camouflaged sampan was found and destroyed.  Twenty-one (21) refugees were located and evacuated to DUC HUE.  A1/27 Inf called in a helicopter gunship team to investigate a report of several men in the area.  The gunships located several lean-to structures and fired several bursts of MG fire into them with negative results.  At 1520 hrs, A1/27 Inf was extracted by helicopters to battalion base at WAIKIKI.  The Recon platoon swept the battalion base area perimeter and located several holes which were marked to be destroyed the following day.

     At 1526 hrs, one platoon B1/27 Inf departed the battalion base by helicopter lift to investigate a suspected cache  located vic XT262060.  Recon platoon located the cache and destroyed the following:  four (4) tons of rice, 1800 lbs of fertilizer and one cart.  The helicopter gunships had made the original report of a suspected cache to the battalion command group.  The location of the cache was believed to be a VC stopover point.  Huts were of a temporary construction and were well camouflaged.

     TF1/27 Inf established six night ambushes within 500 meters of the outside perimeter of the battalion base.  All ambushes reported negative enemy contact.

     During the day's operations, helicopters were used extensively for aerial recon missions throughout the AO.  Constant surveillance was placed over all suspected VC locations in order to keep the VC on the run.  Additionally, the helicopter pilots were able to locate targets which were considered to be lucrative in future operations.

     The company and two platoon sized operations were conducted on 9 July.  A 1/27 Inf was ordered to return to Obj SUNSET, Obj 3, to continue searching for VC holdings while B 1/27 Inf was to conduct a series of eagle flights utilizing two platoons.  C 1/27 Inf conducted a platoon eagle flight into the area south of the battalion base during the early afternoon.  The Recon platoon continued to sweep selected areas close to the battalion base for the purpose of destroying VC tunnels, bunkers, and known VC houses.

     At 0825 hrs, A 1/27 Inf was airlifted to Obj SUNSET vic XT285056 by the 116th Avn Co (Airmobile).  Co A made a thorough search of the area.  No VC contact was made but A 1/27 Inf found numerous articles indicating the presence of the VC.  Medical supplies, VC documents, plastic gas masks, expended 30 and 50 cal rounds, and a clay model of a UH-1D helicopter were among the items found.

     While on Obj SUNSET, A 1/27 Inf destroyed twenty VC structures, one and a half tons of loose, unhusked rice, ten gallons of gasoline, and one large sampan loaded with a large supply of cooking sauce.  The sampan had been hidden and well camouflaged.  It was found near a location believed to be a food preparation area for the VC.  One woman and two children refugees were found on the objective.  These people were airlifted to the refugee center at DUC HUE.  Ten bags of rice were evacuated with the family.  A 1/27 Inf was extracted from Obj SUNSET and airlifted back to battalion base at 1440 hrs.
     B 1/27 Inf conducted two platoon sized eagle flights into objectives YANKEE loc. Vic XT3210, and X-RAY loc vic XT3311.  1B 1/27 Inf airlanded on Obj YANKEE at 0921 hrs.  No VC contact was made.  Forty refugees were found and evacuated to DUC HUE.  The platoon found and destroyed eighteen tons of rice on site and evacuated two tons of rice to battalion base.

     At 1258 hrs, both platoons were extracted from the two objectives and airlifted to the northeast to Obj ZULU loc vic XT2910.  Here B 1/27 Inf (-) swept across an area thought to be a VC route of march.  No contact was made, but the company found and destroyed 61 VC structures, one cart, four sampans, and two 105mm duds.  Twenty refugees were found and requested movement to government controlled territory.  This was accomplished by aircraft.  B 1/27 Inf was airlifted back to battalion base at 1535 hrs.

     C 1/27 Inf manned the base perimeter until 1530 hrs.  At that time a platoon eagle flight was conducted into an area south of the battalion base loc vic XT3305.  No contact was made on two landings in that vicinity.

     Recon platoon conducted a sweep in an area north to north-east of the battalion base.  They found and destroyed one sampan, twenty bunkers, eight VC structures, one tunnel and one AP mine.  This operation was concluded at 1300 hrs.

     The first VC contact of the operation was made at 2100 hrs by one of three ambushes which had been positioned outside the battalion base perimeter.  At that time, ambushing personnel observed nine VC moving in a group to their front.  The patrol leader waited until the VC were well within his designated killing zone at which time he proceeded to cut down the VC with devastating fire.  The leader had fired the first rounds into the VC group, one of which detonated a rifle grenade carried on the VC's belt.  In turn, two other grenades exploded.  While SA, AW, and M-79 rounds were being fired, mortar fire was called in on the group.  The VC were unable to return a single round of fire.  At first light, the patrol located two Chicom carbines, one US carbine, two US M-1 rifles, one US Thompson sub MG, two rifle grenade launchers, two cartridge belts and 300 rds of SA ammo.  The VC lost six KIA (BC) and two KIA (poss).  One VC (WIA) was captured by Recon the following morning.  The Commanding General of the 25th Inf Div personally decorated the patrol leader the following morning.

                    10 JULY

     Operations conducted on 10 July were executed as a result of intelligence gained from VC sources by higher headquarters.  Two VC battalions were reported to be located on the west side of the ORIENTAL RIVER vic XT445035.  This information was received on the afternoon of 9 July.  The Battalion Commander immediately began planning for the new mission.

     At 0830 hrs, the 116th Avn Co (Airmobile) lifted two platoons of B 1-27 Inf and two platoons of C 1/27 Inf into four platoon landing zones loc vic XT454034.  The two companies landed without enemy contact.  The helicopter fire teams received only sporadic small arms fire.  Platoons from B 1/27 Inf and C 1/27 Inf were on immediate “stand-by” at the battalion base as well as the helicopters to lift them.  In addition, platoons from A1/27 Inf were on thirty minute standby.  During the morning, B 1/27 Inf and C 1/27 Inf swept from the LZ's along the Oriental River, searching for VC forces.  No VC contact was made.  Gunships continued to conduct recon by fire over all canals in the area without contact.  The two companies destroyed thirty VC identified huts, four bunkers and two AP mines in the objective area.  Both companies were extracted by air and returned to battalion base at WAIKIKI.  Artillery preparatory fires and a preplanned  air strike hit the objective area prior to the airmobile assault.

     A 1/27 Inf remained at battalion base and served as the battalion security and reaction force.

     Recon platoon assumed the mission of maintaining surveillance over the VC bodies at site of ambush Tiger.  These were the VC killed the night of 9 July.  Recon platoon was also to conduct another search of the area for evidence of VC losses during the engagement of the previous night.  Recon platoon found one VC WIA from the ambush engagement.  Under interrogation, the VC revealed that at approximately 091800 Jul, he had led a ten man squad from MY THAN hamlet (XT375088) to the 1/27 Inf base to make a recon.  At approximately 2000 hrs, his squad was ambushed by US troops.  He stated he was the assistant platoon leader of the 1st Platoon, C1, Duc Hue Company.  Subsequently, much valuable intelligence information was obtained from this VC.  The VC stated that his company was located near XT450048, and that he was to have returned to that location after the recon of 1/27 Inf base.  This information was flashed to the battalion commander and B 1/27 Inf checked out the area prior to extraction.  No sign of the VC company was found.  Recon platoon continued to search ambush area and found and destroyed two sampans and five bunkers.

     TF 1/27 Inf conducted six night ambushes vicinity battalion base.  Two of the ambush patrols made enemy contact.  Ambush Dodge (XT324080) received some probing fire from an estimated 5 - 10 VC.  The patrol leader reported he believed the VC did not know of his location.  The leader called in 81mm mortar fire with unknown results.  Area was searched at first light on 11 July with negative results.  Ambush Coronet loc vic XT322080, detected noise to their front and observed an estimated 15 VC far to their front. Since the enemy was not in their ambush killing zone, 81mm and 4.2” mortar fire were called in.  A search of the area at first light revealed negative results.  Ambush Coronet destroyed two sampans when returning to base from ambush site.  Gunship teams of the 116th Avn Company continued to conduct recon and surveillance missions over the AO during the afternoon and evening.

     New eagle flight targets were located and ear-marked for operations on succeeding days.  At 2100 hours, a “starlight” mission was flown over the east-west river connecting the Cambodian Border and the Oriental River.  This river also marked the north boundary of the AO.  The mission involved battalion personnel and three helicopters from the direct support air-mobile company.  One ship was used as a control ship and carried two persons utilizing the M-16 rifle with starlight scope.  Two gunships followed behind.  During the one hour flight, the troopers using the starlight located and marked two VC sampans.  One sampan was sunk and one possibly sunk by the gunships.

                    11 JULY 1966

     A 1/27 Inf conducted three platoon sized combat assaults by helicopter into three objectives along the Rach Tram River.  The river connects the Cambodian Border (XT321133) and the Oriental River (XT394139).  LZ's were located at XT346138, XT324133, and XT372147.  The concept of this operation was to land the three rifle platoons at locations along the river and have each platoon sweep to the East covering both sides of the river.  Since there were numerous sampans and “lean-to” type huts along the bank, and the fact that virtually no people were seen in the area, substantiated the belief that this river was a major location for the VC.  Sampans were seen moving on the river at night, and the area had been hit virtually every night with H&I fires.

     The air landings began at 0825 hrs and were completed at 0818 hrs.  Troops made no enemy contact.  A thorough search of the river line was conducted.  Rubber boats were used to check inlets and under overhanging growth along the banks.  Gunships were used to provide constant surveillance over friendly troops and to locate suspicious ground positions.  At 0847 hrs, approximately thirty civilian personnel were noted moving north from the river.  They appeared to be heading for the village of Ap Chanh, loc vic XT3418.  At 0907 hrs, a stand-by platoon from C 1/27 Inf was airlifted to XT332147 where a snatch was executed.  Twelve of the fast moving civilians were grabbed, loaded aboard the aircraft and returned with the platoon to the battalion base WAIKIKI for interrogation.  A 1/27 Inf located and destroyed ninety-five (95) VC identified houses, ninety-two (92) sampans, nine CBU's and two Chicom grenade booby traps.  One sampan had a load of raw meat stored in it which was destroyed.  Several VC documents were found.  A 1/27 Inf was extracted by aircraft and returned to WAIKIKI at 1314 hrs.

     3B 1/27 Inf conducted a search and destroy operation several hundred meters to the south of WAIKIKI between 0830 and 1200 hrs.  At loc XT319084, eight shelter bunkers, four VC identified houses and one concrete bunker were destroyed.

     Recon platoon conducted a sweep East-Southeast of WAIKIKI between 0730 and 1100 hrs.  At XT327079, the platoon located and destroyed four VC identified houses.  Also found at that location were one US pistol belt, two ammo pouches (one contained VC documents and the other contained two hand grenades), one school bag of VC documents, one bag of medical supplies, one flashlight, and a bundle of bloody clothing.  At XT323088, the platoon destroyed eleven bunkers.  At XT321086, two tons of rice were found in an abandoned hut.  The rice was extracted.

     1C 1/27 Inf conducted a sweep due West of battalion base.  The platoon located and destroyed two bunkers, eight tunnels, three houses and three sampans.  This sweep began at 0800 and was completed at 1130 hrs.

     At 100 hrs, a “snipe hunt” was conducted vic XT280100.  A squad from the Recon platoon was mounted on two helicopters.  A C&C aircraft was used as control and spotter.  The concept of the “snipe hunt” was to conduct air surveillance over a rice paddy, locate suspicious people, and drop a squad down and snatch two to four individuals for interrogation.  At approximately 1610 hrs, four persons were seen running across a paddy.  The squad was landed and a total of four persons were snatched.  Gunships escorting the three helicopters flushed several VC in the paddies.  Most were armed.  Three VC, all armed, were killed (BC).  One body and a rifle were recovered.  The snatch was made at XT262073.  Prisoners were evacuated to rear area Cu Chi.

12 JULY  1966

One company and three platoon sized operations were conducted on 12 July.  A
1/27 and C 1/27 Inf manned the battalion base, and provided platoon reaction forces for the company sized eagle flights conducted by B 1/27 Inf in the SE section of the TAOR.  A 1/27 Inf and C 1/27 Inf also conducted platoon sized seeps from battalion base 2000 meters to the SE and N respectively.  The recon platoon swept the southern portion of the battalion base in search of VC tunnels, bunkers, and VC houses.  A 1/27 Inf (-) together with C 1/27 Inf (-) manned the battalion base, and 1 platoon from A 1/27 Inf was positioned at the battalion chopper pad on 15 minute alert in the event B 1/27 Inf eagle flight needed rapid reinforcement.

At 0805 hrs, 1A 1/27 Inf departed battalion base and swept 2000 meters along a
Trail to the SW.  A thorough search of the area was made and two empty sampans were destroyed.  The sampans had been well hidden and camouflaged, and it was obvious that they were being utilized to transport VC supplies.  No enemy contact was made during the sweep and the platoon returned to the battalion base at 1115 hrs.  At 1600 hrs, a squad from A 1/27 Inf conducted another “snipe hunt” utilizing the same technique which had proved so successful in the past.  At XT338142, “snipe hunt” noted a suspicious group of men crossing a rice paddy.  The UH-ID's swooped down on the surprised men and picked up a total of 5 individuals.  Upon interrogation, one turned out to be a VC, 3 were VCS detainees, and 1 was released.

     B 1/27 Inf conducted the major operation of the day.  The Bn S-3 and B company commander selected, in the SE portion of the TAOR, 3 objectives in close proximity to one another which appeared to be lucrative eagle flight objectives.  Shortly before lift-off, the entire area was hit by airstrikes and artillery.  At 0805 hrs, one platoon from B 1/27 Inf was airlifted into Obj 1, XS18962.  No enemy contact was made, but the platoon destroyed 3 bunkers and 14 VC houses.  A total of 47 refugees requested to be evacuated.  UH-ID helicopters from the 116th Avn Co (Airmobile) airlifted these people to Duc Hue - the GVN refugee collecting point.  At 0845 hrs, a second platoon, 2B 1/27, was airlifted into Obj 2, XS415985, and immediately encountered VC sniper fire.  A squad from the B1/27 Inf standby platoon was called to reinforce the element on Obj 2, and gunships peppered the entire area with devastating fire.  Enemy losses total 2 KIA (BC), 1 VCC, 14 VCS, 40 VC houses, 1 VC cart, 20 bunkers, and 2 bags of documents.  At 1124 hrs, the platoon at Obj 1 was airlifted into obj 3, XS399994, where 12 sampans, 3 bunkers, and 14 VC houses were destroyed.  23 refugees were evacuated to Duc Hue.  While the search was being conducted, the platoon received sniper fire from a position approximately 200 meters west of Obj 3.  The platoon deployed to the area, killed 3 VC (BC), captured 1 Mauser rifle, and 1 wallet with documents.  At the conclusion of the operation, all B 1/27 Inf elements were airlifted back to the battalion base, and closed at 1435 hrs.

     At 0832 hrs, 1 platoon C 1/27 Inf departed battalion base and conducted a 2000 meter sweep to the north, while the balance of the company, together with A 1/27 Inf (-), provided battalion base security and a platoon reaction force for the B 1/27 Inf operations.  At XT312104, the platoon found a plastic bag filled with VC documents, and at XT316101, 9 VC bunkers and two sampans were destroyed.  The platoon returned to battalion base at 1245 hrs.

     At 120800 hrs, Recon platoon departed the battalion base to make a thorough search of the southern portion of the perimeter.  Recon platoon was unable to locate any additional VC bunkers, sampans, or tunnels, and returned at 1110 hrs.

     A “Lightning Bug” operation was conducted in the AO between 111231 hrs and 120015 hrs.  One sampan was engaged and sunk at XT429072.  A secondary explosion was observed in the vicinity of the sampan.

     The operation conducted on 12 July is note-worthy in that the operation was controlled by the Company Commander himself.  The Company Commander was provided a C&C ship, and sufficient aircraft assets to move his platoon or reinforce as the tactical situation dictated.  This allowed the Company Commander to gain a great deal of experience in command and control and also provided the battalion command group with added depth in controlling assets.

13 JULY 1966

TF 1/27 Inf terminated Operation EWA on 13 July.  The airlift back to Cu Chi  
was to begin at 0730 hrs, but a low cloud ceiling prevented the helicopters from landing at WAIKIKI until 0830 hrs.  The first flight of helicopters to land at WAIKIKI reported receiving ground fire west of Cu Chi which slightly damaged one chopper.  The airlift began at 0830 hrs.  The order of extraction was supplies, HHC 1/27 Inf, B 1/27 Inf, A 1/27 Inf, and C 1/27 Inf.  The UH-ID helicopters extracted the personnel while the CH-47 helicopters extracted A Btry, 1/8 Arty, the Bn Heavy Mortar Platoon ammunition, and supplies.  No difficulties were encountered during the extraction, and the last element of TF 1/27 Inf closed Cu Chi perimeter at 1355 hrs.

12.   RESULTS:

a.   VC losses:  14 VC KIA (BC),  3 KIA (poss), 8 VCC, 17  VCS.
Captured and destroyed enemy equipment and material included the following:

Chicom carbines                   2     105mm duds                        2
US carbine                             1      gals. Gasoline                   10
M-1 rifles                                 2      flashlight                               1
1917 Winchester 303 rifle     1     wallet / papers                      1
Thompson Sub MG               1     bundles of documents          4
Rifle grenade launchers        2     bags of medical supplies     3
Rifle grenades                        6    houses                                338
Grenade booby traps            2    sampans                             134
CBU                                        3     bunkers                                 63
Cartridge belts                      2     outboard motors                     3
Pistol belt                              1      tons of rice                          27.5
Gasmasks                            2      lbs. of fertilizer                   1800
Foxholes                               8     carts                                           3
     b.   Friendly Losses:   2  WIA  (returned to duty)

13.   ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a.   Supply

          (1)   General - All resupply on Operation EWA was by air utilizing both CH-47 and UH-1D aircraft.

(a)  Class I

Breakfast and dinner - “C” rations
Supper - “A” rations

(b)  Class III

Battalion established a Class III refueling point for aircraft at
forward defense base.  Bladders were airlifted in by CH-47 on the third and fourth day of the operation.  Empty bladders were extracted by UH-ID.  The airmobile company supplied pumps, hoses, and personnel to operate the refueling point.  A total of 5000 gallons of JP-4 was expended.

                                    (c)  Class IV:  The battalion was re-supplied with the following items:                   
                    1.   Concertina - 1500 meters
                    2.   8ft. stakes
                    3.   Sandbags - 43,000
All Class IV items were extracted by helicopter on the last day of the operation

                                    (d)   Class V Expenditures:

Ctg. 5.56 Ball                              12,900     
Ctg. 7.62 Ball                                2,240                    Mine - Anti Per. Claymore M18A1        93
Ctg. 7.62 Ball  5/clip                     1,900                   Signal Illum, Red Star Preht                     4
Ctg. 40mm  HE                                240                   Signal Illum, White Star Cluster              16
Ctg. 81mm Mtr PH M43A1 2/pdf  421                     Eng Demo Block TNT (1 lb.block)      450
Ctg. 81mm Mtr Smoke WP W/pdf   68                    Caps, Blasting, non-elec.                    135   
Ctg. 4.2 Mtr HE W/PDF                  516                    Fuse Blasting Time (ft)                         250
Ctg. 4.2 Mtr Smoke WP W/pdf        84                     Igniter time fuse MP w/proof                  74
Grenade, Hand Frag                       225                    Flare Surface trip M49A1                     109
Grenade, Hand smoke green           84                   Ctg. 105mm HE                                   2201
Grenade, Hand smoke red M18       32                  Ctg. 105mm Smoke WP                       160

(e)   Water:

1.   Battalion was re-supplied at the rate of 2 gallons per man per day.
2.   Total re-supply of water - 5000 gallons

b. Maintenance - Normal maintenance of weapons and equipment was conducted prior to, during, and after the operation.

c.  Medical - There were no serious casualties during the operation.  All  
Medevac was by air.  Non-serious casualties were evacuated by resupply ships during normal operations.  There were no friendly battle casualties.

d.  Transportation - Movement of personnel and supplies was done by air.  The
DS 116th Avn Company (Airmobile) adequately met the transportation requirements of TF 1/27 Inf.

            e.   Communications:   During Operation  EWA, TF1/27 Inf utilized the normal FM communications available to the battalion as supplemented by AM and VHF means.  FM communications were effective within the AO.  However, it was necessary to establish a retransmission station at the Duc Hue Sugar Mill loc vic XT435072.  This retransmission station provided the battalion with the capability for communicating between the forward defense base and Cu Chi base camp, a distance of 30,000 meters.  AM communications were provided by the use of USAF radio, the AM/PRC 47.  This capability was utilized on several occasions at night when atmospheric conditions contributed to very poor FM communications over great distances.  A VHF capability was provided by the division 125th Signal Battalion.  The AN/PRC 69 was modified in number of channels and equipment provided the battalion with sole-user, common-user, and land-line teletype means.  By modifying the VHF equipment to the ¾ ton truck, the entire package was air transported to the objective area by the CH-47 helicopter.  In addition to radio communications, the normal land-lines were established within the battalion forward defense base.
14.   Special Equipment and Techniques:

a.   The battalion utilized the small man-packed three-man rubber boat extensively
during Operation EWA.  These boats weighed approximately fifteen pounds and were usually issued two per infantry squad for a given tactical operation.  The boats provided an excellent means for the infantrymen to gain access to deep canals where they could successfully conduct searches for hidden sampans and caches of VC supplies.  Small air tanks were carried in order that the boats could be inflated wherever needed.

     b.   The battalion, in close coordination with the supporting airmobile company, developed a method of “snatching” suspected personnel off the ground through the use of an infantry squad mounted aboard a UH-1D helicopter.  It was soon learned that shortly after the battalion began to close into the forward defense base, each afternoon that indigenous personnel began to roam the rice paddies in small groups.  These people gave the appearance of working in the paddies.  Since the area of activity was one of questionable loyalty, it was determined that those people, if caught, might be of some intelligence value.  A hunt was organized consisting of a command and control helicopter carrying the ground commander and the air team commander, and two UH-ID's, each carrying an infantry fire team and a helicopter fire team.  The concept of this operation was to have the C&C aircraft orbit the snatch area to locate suspects.  Once the suspects are located, the fire team lands on either side of the suspects.  The suspects are then brought aboard and returned to base.  The fire team provides surveillance and suppressing fire if necessary.  This concept was executed on two occasions at around 1700 hrs in the afternoon.  On the first attempt, four suspects were apprehended and three VC, all armed, were killed.  On another day, five suspects were apprehended.  Of these five, one confessed to being a VC, three were held as suspects and one individual was cleared and released.  The 1/27 Inf has coined the term “snipe hunt” to this concept.  The “snipe hunt” is extremely effective in the type of open country terrain found in the AO.  It is also imperative that the unit get to know the area well and that locations for “snipe hunts be carefully selected.

     c.   For the first time, the battalion utilized a Starlight scope from a helicopter.  The AO contained many streams and canals which were suspected locations for the VC.  The great number of sampans found in the area left no doubt that supplies were being moved throughout the area   The battalion and the direct support airmobile company executed two starlight missions at night.  The first was successful in that two large sampans were sighted, one destroyed, and one possibly destroyed.  The second mission on a succeeding night was not successful due to inclement weather conditions.  One UH-ID was utilized as a starlight ship.  1/27 Inf personnel used the starlight scope mounted on the M-16 rifle to locate the enemy, then opened fire to mark the target.  Trailing the starlight aircraft was a helicopter fire team that engaged the target after the marking was accomplished.   This concept is good and works well, especially in areas where there are numerous canals and rivers.

15.   COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

The provision of a direct support airmobile company to the Infantry battalion for
the entire period of an operation afforded the commander an unprecedented opportunity in developing his operations.  Having aircraft at his disposal enabled him to launch a maximum number of airmobile operations varying in size from fire team to company over a very large operational area.  Flexibility was also materially increased since the battalion was able to rapidly hit targets of opportunity throughout the AO, and reinforce rapidly as the situation dictated.  Aerial re-supply of the entire battalion task force was successfully integrated into the overall plan for effective usage of the airmobile company.  During the six days of actual operations, plus the planning time prior to the first day, the battalion commander, the staff, and personnel of the airmobile company were able to develop the finest professional working relationship.

16.   RECOMMENDATIONS:

a.   That whenever possible, consistent with available aviation assets, an airmobile company be placed in direct support of the infantry battalion when that battalion is operating in an isolated area and far removed from its home base.  The same airmobile company should remain in DS during the period.

b.  That an infantry battalion and preferably the 1/27 Inf. conduct future operations in the same area of operations from time to time.

c.  That a VHF radio mobile package, which is capable of being airlifted by available helicopter assets, be made available to the battalion when operating from a fire support base in an isolated area for several days.

d.  That GVN civic action teams be trained in the handling of refugees and made available during operations in isolated areas where GVN influence is virtually unknown.  These trained Vietnamese people would actually handle the evacuation of refugees utilizing US transport.  The entire effort would thus be less of a US show.

ALVIN L. O'NEAL
Lt. Col, Infantry
Commanding

Annexes:  A - Operations Overlay