After Action Reports 38

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Operation Kahaia

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS 2ND BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO US Forces 96225

AVTLBOB-T 14 May 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (RCS/ D3/32

To: Commanding General

25th Infantry Divison

ATTN: G3

APO US Forces 96225

1. (Operation KAHAIA) 21 - 66

2. 160700 April - 211510 April 66

3. 2nd Bde, 25th Infantry Division conducted search and destroy operations in the northeastern portion of Hau Nghia Province in area bounded by coordinates XT5430, XT5012, XT15712, XT6028. The operation was a three battalion sized operation reinforced with an Armored company and Cavalry troops.

4. Control Headquarters: 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

5. Reporting Officer: Colonel L.M. Johnson, Jr.

6. Task Organization and Commanders were as follows:

Phase I and II: (16 - 19 April)

TF 1/27 Inf (Lt Col Mooney Cmdg) Bde Control

1/27 Inf (-) 1/8 Arty (-)

B Trp (-) 3/ 4 Cav Plat (-) B/65

1 Sqd B/65 MP Plat

Plat B Trp 3/ 4 Cav

TF 2/27 Inf (Lt Col Bashore Cmdg)

2/27 Inf (-)

A Co (-) 69th Armor

1 Sqd B/65

TF 1/5 (M) Inf (Lt Col Grear Cmdg)

1/5 (M) Inf (-)

Plat A 1/69 Armor

1 Sqd B/65

Phase III: (20 - 21 April)

TF 1/27 Inf (Lt Col Moony Cmdg.) Bde Control

1/27 Inf (-) A Co (-) 1/69 Armor

Plat A 1/69 Armor Trp B 3/ 4 Cav

1 Sqd B/65 Plat (M) B/65

MP Plat

TF 2/27 Inf (Lt Col Bashore Cmdg)

2/27 Inf (-)

Plat A 1/69 Armor

1 Sqd B/65

TF 1/5 (M) Inf. (Lt Col Grear Cmdg.

1/5 (M) (-)

1 Sqd B/65

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support

(1) Organization for Combat

(a) 1/8 Arty

1. 1/8 Arty (-) GS 2nd Bde

2. B 1/8 Arty: GS 25th Inf Div.

(b) 3/13 Arty:

1. 3/13 Arty (-) GS 25th Inf Div

2. B 3/13 Arty: GSR 1/ 2 Arty (-)

3. Plat (8” How) D 3/13: GSR 1/8 Arty (-)

(2) How and when artillery employed:

(a) Artillery supported from two locations during the operation. 16 - 19 April, base was located vic XT585215. 20 - 21 April, Artillery base was located vic XT577181.

(b) Fires were utilized primarily to suppress sniper fire and soften areas in front of advancing infantrymen.

(d) Artillery was used to maximize advantage in protection of downed CH-47 on 20 April.

(e) On-call artillery fires were available throughout the operation.

(f) A total 747 missions using 3197 105rds were fired in support of the operation.

(3) Results, Effectiveness, and Timeliness:

(a) As a results of artillery fire, there were 21 VC KIA,

(BC), 12 Poss, 7 structures destroyed, 11 damaged.

(b) Reinforcing fire provided by elements of 3/13 Artillery enabled the Brigade to employ fire power on targets at greater ranges, and, in addition, increase the effectiveness of artillery fires on close in targets.

(d) Fires placed on the objective during Phase III of the operation were both accurate and timely.

(e) H&I fires again denied the VC freedom of movement during the hours of darkness.

b. US Air Force:

(1) Four airstrikes were flown in support of the operation. One was immediate, three were pre-planned

(a) Reaction time for the immediate strikes was twenty-five minutes.

(b) All air strikes were requested by telephone (Not Item) through 25th Infantry Division G3.

(c) A napalm strike was placed in vicinity of LZ's at 201220 April. The strike proved to be effective in suppressing VC sniper fire.

(2) Results of Air Strikes:

(a) An immediate strike effectively suppressed heavy mortar fires being placed on 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry 201700 April and also destroyed 10 structures in the area.

(b) There were 6 KBA (BC), 18 (POSS), 4 structures destroyed, 2 damaged as a result of air strikes.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Army Aviation flew a total of 520 sorties and moved 160 tons of supplies during the operation.

(2) 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Aviation Section provided CH23 supplies during the operation.

(3) On160900 April, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry (-) and 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry (-) were airlifted by 40 UH 1D's and 4 CH47's from the Avn Bn to LZ's vic XT500228 and XT385265.

(4) On 201240 April, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry (-) and 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry (-) were airlifted to LZ's vic XT498157 and XT503145 by 20 UH1D's and 4 CH47's from the 11 Avn Bn.

(5) All lifts were conducted as planned with no significant problems except as follows:

(a) Initial loading zone in base camp was not large enough to adequately out-load 40 UH1D's and CH47's simultaneously.

(b) On 20 April one CH47 was disabled by heavy ground fire and forced to land vic XT540216 during lift of 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry.

8. Intelligence:

a. Analysis of terrain in this operation was requested:

The terrain in the area of operations was generally flat to very gently

Rolling with very few relief features or high ground. Ground cover and vegetation varied from extensive rice paddies and small crop fields, to various types of scrub. Also interspersed among the agricultural fields were small areas of woodland both natural and cultivated. Numerous dams and ditches crisscrossed the cultivated portion of the area. Cross-country movement for-------------------------and woodland areas, and fair to impossible in the wet paddies, swamps, and marshes. Movement for foot troops was fair to good in most areas traversed. Tanks encountered difficulty in crossing streams and marshy areas.

b. Intelligence Prior to Operation.

VC activity within the operational area had been light. The VC

Incidents were concentrated along the LOC's. A Red Haze mission flown on 12 April disclosed 14 emissions from the area coord XT510285 to XT550270. The VC units operating in the area included one Local Force Company and one guerrilla platoon. The Trung Bang Company with a strength of 70, was unlocated but it usually operated within a radius of approximately 5 kilometers north of Trang Bang. The Quyot Chion Platoon #5 with an attached squad had been reported in the vic of coord XT575230 on 8 April 1966.

c. Enemy Situation During Operation.

As the Brigade Task Force moved into the operational area, the VC

dispersed into hiding areas and exfiltrated from the area. Enemy activity consisted mainly of sniper and mortar fires, booby traps, AT and AP mines (command detonated and pressure types). Although enemy contact was not intense, a successful search of the operational area disclosed caches of rice, documents, and a medical training area.

9. Mission: The 2nd Bde, 25th Infantry Division was to conduct search and destroy operations commencing 16 April in Trang Bang District vic XT4436, XT5012, XT5712, XT6028, to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps.

10. Concept of the Operation: The 2nd Bde, 25th Infantry Division conducted airmobile and ground move to AO commencing 160700 April to conduct search and destroy operations. The operation was conducted in four phases.

Phase I: (16 - 18 April) TF 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and TF 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry moved to AO GREEN employing airmobile and ground elements to conduct search and destroy operations. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations along their axis of advance and established blocking psns along PL NASH.

Phase II: (18 - 20 April) TF 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and TF 2nd Bn, 27th

Infantry continued search and destroy operations in their respective AO's. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry continued to block and conduct search and destroy opns along PL NASH.

Phase III: (20 - 21 April) TF 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and TF 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry conducted airmobile move to LZ's vic XT498157 and XT503145 respectively. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry, Co A (-) 1st Bn, 69th Armor, Trp B 3 /4 Cavalry moved overland to establish blocking psns. around objective. Subsequently all units conducted search and destroy operations in their assign areas.

Phase IV: (21 April) All units returned to base camp on order. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry and Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor, conducted sweeps outside Highway 1 on return to base camp.

11. Operation: 2nd Brigade received OPCON 6 -06 -------1966

D - Day (16 April 1966)

At 0815 the Battalion minus Company B, and reinforced with a platoon of tanks, began their move to AO BLUE. The Bn TF swept north, then due west along three areas. Company C on the east, the reconnaissance platoon reinforced with tanks in the center, and Co A on the west. The units established blocking positions ------------

bag cache in the same area. The rice was extracted by helicopter. Two AP mines were detonated by APC's. The APC's were not damaged. However, 1 friendly KIA, and 2 WIA were sustained vic XT601266, when an APC hit a mine. No significant contact was made during the day. At dusk, the Bn TF established blocking psns east of PL HASH vic XT548148. Four ambushes were established with no contact. MEDCAP was conducted during the day for approximately 20 women and children in the vicinity of the Battalion CP.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry (Trp B (-), 3/ 4 Cav)

At 0752, Trp B (-), 3 /4 Cav with the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry 1 and tail moved to vic XT505252 where the Battalion CP was established. Several dirt road blocks were by-passed during the move. By 0850 Companies A and B had begun their airmobile move to AO GREEN. The airmobile and ground forces linked up at 1015. Trp B (-), 3 /4 Cav screened the western edge of the AO while Companies A and B moved abreast to the east conducting thorough search and destroy operations. Company B apprehended 11 VCS vic XT505258. At 1533 Company B engaged a VC squad vic XT524246 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), two US carbines, and one Chicom 7.62 rifle captures. Airborne gunships were utilized against VC during the engagement. The TF, minus Co B, established a perimeter around the Bn CP vic -------. Company B coiled vic XT521245. At 2343, Company B was attacked from three sides by approximately 20 VC. At the same time, two of the Company's ambushes were sprung. As a result of the attack, there were four VC KIA (BC) including a woman squad leader armed with a 7.92 Mauser rifle. The company continued to receive harassing sniper fire throughout the night. MEDCAP was conducted for 20 civilians at the village of X Rung Cay (XT5026) during the day.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Companies B and C conducted airmobile assaults into LZ IRON (XT500226) and LZ ----- (XT500243) at ------------. The Battalion Command Group and land tail moved overland arriving in the AO by 1035. Companies B and C attacked east conducting search and destroy operations in zone. Light VC sniper fire was encountered during the morning hours, but was suppressed by tanks and artillery. A large peanut and rice cache was located vic XT509248. In addition an extensive tunnel system was located in the area and destroyed. The Bn TF continued to receive sniper fire. At 1315 Company C captured a wounded VC with a weapon vic XT5---20. Company C continued to maneuver against the VC and upon overrunning the area, found 3 VC KIA (BC) and captured two VC. At 1500, while continuing to search the area, another fire fight ensued resulting in an additional 3 VC KIA (BC). Later, at 1630, Co B apprehended six VC's vic XT510847. The Bn Task Force established a perimeter vic XT500226 for the night. Three ambushes were established, none having contact

D+1 (17 April 1966)

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

During the day the Battalion Task Force conducted detailed search and destroy operations along PL NASH. Co A moved south, XT575235 - XT580228. Co C with one tank platoon attached, moved north XT575255 - XT575283. What appeared to be a VC rest area was located vic XT574235. The hut contained many pictures, signs, and directional arrows pointing at the various trails in the area. At 1330 Co C (+) made initial contact vic XT580287 with a reinforced VC squad utilizing MG's, 57RR, and automatic weapons vic XT580287. One tank and one APC were damaged in the area by AT mines. The vehicles were repaired on site however and returned to action. Artillery and mortar fires were called on suspected VC locations. There were 4 VC KIA (POSS) during the action. At 2233 the ambush vic XT568278 was sprung killing five VC (BC) and estimating 3 KIA.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

At 0830 the Company-----------------At 0700 the Battalion continued their methodical and detailed search of the AO. The Battalion Surgeon conducted MEDCAP at the village of Ap Cha Ray (XT5125) for seventeen civilians. Large caches of rice were lifted to Trang Bang for redistribution. At 1330 Co B located and destroyed four tunnels vic XT512249. At 1407 Trp B, 3 /4 Cav apprehended 2 VCS vic XT525242. The Task Force coiled for the night vic XT523253.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

The Battalion continued to move east conducting detailed search and destroy operations with Company C on the north and Co B on the south. The Battalion Command Group received sniper fire during the morning. One Command and Control ship received several hits, but remained operational. At 0843 an oxcart hit a mine vicinity of XT505228. At 1135 the Battalion Command Group began its displacement. At 1138 the third vehicle in the convoy, a tank, was severely damaged by a command detonated mine. Two friendly WIA were sustained and the tank was declared a total loss. A ¾ ton truck dispatched to assist the injured personnel in the disabled vehicle struck a land mine. At the same time, small arms fire was placed on the convoy from the wood-line to the west of the road. This fire was returned by small arms, machineguns, tanks firing canister and mortar fires. A VC mortar harassing Company C was silenced by gunships in the area. As the convoy displacing the Battalion CP continued, it was engaged with small arms vic XT527207. A brief fire fight resulted in one VC KIA (BC) two KIA (poss). The new OP became operational at 1840 in vicinity of XT538217. Several mortar rds were fired into the Battalion perimeter during the night. One WIA was sustained. Counter mortar fires were immediately called, silencing the VC mortars.

D+2 (18 April 1966)

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

The Battalion TF continued to blocking psn along PL NASH. Company A established a series of squad sized blocking positions along that line. One squad vicinity XT574237 captured a VCS who revealed after interrogation that he was a VC messenger and worked in conjunction with three other VC's. He also reported five VC's with carbines were located hiding in a tunnel vicinity XT575236. No VC's were found in this location, however. Co C continued to conduct search and destroy operations and screen the northern portion of PL NASH. A small rice cache located vicinity XT584296 proved to be booby trapped. The cache was destroyed. In addition, a medical training area was located in the same general area. The training center contained text books and documents, some with publication dates as late as 20 March 1966. The Battalion Reconnaissance platoon operated in grid squares XT5626 and XT5627. 10 bunkers, 10 tunnels, and 15 freshly built shelters were located and destroyed in the area. Also the platoon found twenty copies of the “Tropic Lightning News” dated 15 April 1966 in a house vicinity XT567277. The Battalion AO was enlarged as shown in enclosure 1. The Battalion then moved to new location vic XT547257 where a perimeter was established.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

During the day the Battalion Task Force conducted detailed and thorough searches of their AO vic XT5027, XT5023, XT5323, XT4527. Numerous rice caches were discovered. Large caches were found at XT526246, XT525248, XT525245. At 1300 Company B found a group of fortifications with MG emplacements and an under-ground room 6' by 4½' at XT509245. Defensive positions for the night were centered around XT523257. The Battalion defensive psns were probed by small VC units throughout the night. Company B killed one VC probing the perimeter vic XT525747.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

At 0716 Companies B and C and Co A (-) 1st Bn, 69th Armor commenced search and destroy operations with emphasis on a methodical search of their AO. Co B apprehended one VCS in the vicinity of the Battalion perimeter XT532220. Co A (-) 1st Bn, 69th Armor dispersed several VC snipers vic XT539200 with canister. Also several trenches and tunnels in the vicinity of XT534195 were destroyed. Throughout the morning Company C engaged VC who used harassing and evasive tactics. Four VC were flushed and fired upon vic XT530196, with unknown results. One tank hit a mine at XT533189 causing minor damage. All units continued their operations returning to the battalion perimeter by 1600. During the afternoon twenty civilians in the area were treated during MEDCAP. During the evening, mortar fire was placed on suspected VC positions throughout the area.

D+3 (19 April 1966)

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

The Battalion began its move to new area of operations to search the village in vicinity of XT570176. The heavy mortar platoon, Recon Platoon, and company weapons platoon established blocks around the village. A total of 9 VCS and one VCC were apprehended during the search. Also a cache containing three 155 duds, one 75lb bomb and seven steel helmets was located vicinity XT576173. The duds were blown in place, the helmets recovered. The thorough search was terminated at 1733 and a battalion perimeter was established vic XT583187. Also ambushes were established in the area to prevent VC mining the road and establishing ambushes along it.

1st Bn. 27th Infantry

During the night, the Battalion perimeter was probed periodically by small number of VC. VC were engaged with small arms, M-79's and mortars with unknown results. Numerous trenches and bunker complexes were located and destroyed during the day's searches. A tunnel vicinity XT519241 was approximately 30 meters long with a room large enough to accommodate four to six people. An active civil affairs program was continued in the Battalion AO. “Helping Hand” items of soap, toothbrushes, and toothpaste were distributed to the villagers of X Rung Cay (XT5026). Preparations were made for the following day's airmobile operations. At 2215 a claymore killed one VC vic XT523251. Also at 2300 Co B's ambush vicinity XT51724 was sprung killing 2 VC.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

During the morning Companies B (+) and C(+) conducted search and destroy operations south of the Battalion CP to the vicinity of Highway 1. Canisters were effectively employed to neutralize VC snipers in the area. Company C evacuated 1500 lbs of rice from the area and apprehended 11 VCS during the sweep. In the afternoon hours the Battalion Reconnaissance and Security platoons conducted search and destroy operations southwest of the Battalion CP. No contact was made. AT 1915 automatic weapons fire was received in the Battalion perimeter from XT532215. Fire was immediately returned and tanks aggressively searched the area with no results.

D+4 (20 April 1966)

Phase III of the operation was initiated and in accordance with F&G ORD 1 to OPORD 21 - 66 an airmobile and ground assault consisting of mechanized, armored, and cavalry units was launched into AO PINK. At 1220 a napalm strike was placed vic XT505158 to suppress VC fire on the LZ's. At 1220 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry and Trp B, 3/ 4 Cav crossed Highway 1 to establish blocking positions and prevent VC exfiltration from the area. Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor followed these units, moving to Objective D to conduct search and destroy operations.

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

The Battalion moved quickly to establish blocking psns along PL YELLOW. The block had been established by 1300. At 1400 Company A initiated search and destroy operation in Objective C moving from north to south. Company C moved abreast of Company A searching the western portion of the objective. Three civilians who had been wounded by a VC AT mine were evacuated from the area. At 1520 the company killed a VC sniper vic XT524143 and captured his carbine. The search of Objective C was completed by 1540 and the search of Objective E was subsequently initiated. A thorough search of Objective E was terminated at 1815 without contact. Company A was ordered to return to Base camp upon completion of the search in Objective E. The Company (+) cleared base camp at 1915. Company C remained in Objective C, and established numerous night ambushes. The ambush located at XT523147 was sprung at 1945 killing 5 VC. A team of tracks dispatched to reinforce the ambush engaged and killed another VC and captured his carbine.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

At 0200 approximately 13 rounds of 81 and 82mm mortar rounds were received in the Battalion perimeter resulting in 2 US KIA and 2 WIA. Immediate counter-mortar fires were placed on the VC position and the mortars silenced. At 1240 the Battalion (-) conducted an airmobile assault into LZ -------. Co B established a blocking position along the western edge of Objective A. Trp B, 3/ 4 Cav maintained their blocking positions north of Objective A. At the same time Co A conducted a slow methodical search of the Objective. 22 VCS were apprehended during the search. 34 structures and three tunnels were destroyed in the area. No VC contacts were made during the night.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

At 1832 the Battalion Task Force commenced their airmobile assault into LZ vic XT581-6. While making an approach into the loading zone vic XT-----, the CH-47 was disabled by ground fire. The Battalion Reconnaissance platoon remained with the disabled aircraft as security. In addition an ---23 carrying the Battalion sergeant major on a reconnaissance was fired on by VC snipers. The pilot was hit but managed to land the helicopter safely. He was immediately evacuated. Throughout the day, Companies B and C conducted search and destroy operations in Objective B, from west to east. 20 VCS were detained in the operational area. Approximately 120 women and children were detained for further questioning. Concurrently, the platoon securing the Chinook was brought under small arms and mortar fire. Gunships and artillery were used in an attempt to disrupt VC fire. The Battalion Commander's command and control ship was utilized to evacuate wounded from the area and in addition moved elements of the command group to the new operational area. At 1750 an airstrike was flown to suppress VC fire being placed on the downed Chinook and its security force. Finally at 1920 the CH-47 was repaired and departed the area. The Reconnaissance platoon was immediately evacuated from the area. The Battalion (-) coiled in Objective B for the night. At2040 a Co B ambush killed 2 VC and captured a Chinese carbine in the vicinity of XY506145. Also a VCS was apprehended in the area at 2215.

D+5 (21 April 1966)

1ST Bn (M), 5th Infantry

During the morning the Battalion (-) swept through Objective C again. 86 women and children were evacuated from the area and relocated in the Thai My new Life Hamlet (XT5314). On VCS apprehended was turned over to the National Police. Based on an intelligence report of VC tax collecting activities in a village, vic XT585155, the Battalion (-) sealed of the village and conducted a thorough search of the area. No evidence of VC activities could be found. Company C and the Battalion CP returned to base camp by 1345. The Battalion reconnaissance platoon remained in the AO to secure the civilians until evacuation had been completed. By 1212, evacuation was complete and the reconnaissance platoon commenced move to base camp. The platoon had two contacts during their return, killing 2 VC vicinity XT553153. One platoon from Company A provided security for a VIP returning a disabled 1st Bn, 27th Infantry vehicle. All elements of the Battalion closed base camp by 1800.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The Battalion continued their aggressive search of Objective A. Emphasis was placed on maximum destruction of tunnels and trenches in the area. At 1200 Companies A and B commenced their airlift to base camp utilizing three UHID's. The land tail departed the operational area at 1436. At XT497172 the convoy was engaged with sniper fire. Troops immediately dismounted, and deployed against suspected VC positions. VC mortars fired into the area resulting in 6 friendly WIA's and damage to one 2½ ton truck. The truck was towed back to base camp. By 1710 all Task Force elements had closed base camp.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Search and destroy operations continued in Objective B with emphasis on destruction of VC tunnels and fortifications in the area. Upon completion of operations, Companies B and C marched to vic XT553166, where trucks returned the units to base camp by 1800. The Battalion CP was airlifted to base camp.

12. Results:

Friendly Losses Enemy Losses

KIA: 3 VC KIA (BC) 47

WIA: 45 VC KIA (Poss) 44

VC KBA (BC) 6

VC KBA (Poss) 18

VCC 22

VCS 105

Rice: 1.1 ton destroyed

15.1 ton evacuated

Enemy Losses (cont.)

Peanuts 700 lbs evacuated

S/A 16 evacuated

Hvy Wpns 1 mortar destroyed

Documents 15 lbs evacuated

Bldgs 125 destroyed

Tunnels 4 destroyed

Bunkers 51 destroyed

Booby traps 40 destroyed

Mines 5 destroyed

Steel Helmets 7 evacuated

Medical Supplies 1 box evacuated

Tape Recorder 1 evacuated

Radio 1 evacuated

Bombs and Duds 75 lb - destroyed

250 lb - destroyed

500 lb - destroyed

175 lb - destroyed

The following is a recapitulation of combat damage to vehicles and aircraft:

1st Bn, 27th Infantry: 1 - 2 ½ ton truck damaged and evacuated.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry: 2 - ¾ ton trucks damaged:

1 evacuated

1 repaired in the field

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry: 4 APC's damaged and repaired in the field

Troop B, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cavalry 5 tanks damaged,

3 evacuated

2 repaired in the field

Company A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor 4 tanks damaged

2 repaired in the field,

2 evacuated (1 beyond repair)

HHC, 2nd Brigade 1 helicopter damaged and evacuated

13. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply:

(1) All resupply of Class I, V and water was effected by air except for

for two overland convoys in support of the artillery at Trung Lap.

(2) A forward trains element was located at Trung Lap within the lst Bn, 8th Artillery area. The following comprised this element:

(a) Maintenance and POL personnel

(b) Selected vehicles - VTR's, wreckers and a service unit for flame APC's.

(d) A contact maintenance team from Support Command

(3) Support Command spotted a 5000 gallon water tanker, and a drum stockage of 30 diesel, 30 Mogas, and 20 Avgas drums at the resupply pad in base camp.

(4) POL consumption by units is as follows:

1st Bm. (M), 5th Infantry Company A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor

3610 gallons Mogas 450 gallons Mogas

810 gallons Diesel 1960 gallons Diesel

Troop B, 3rd Sqdn, 45h Cavalry

1450 gallons Mogas

2600 gallons Diesel

(5) A total of 359 resupply missions were flown airlifting 160 tons. The following is a breakdown by class of supply:

Class I - 30.6 tons POL - 22.2 tons

Class V -37.2 tons Misc - 38.0 tons

Water - 33.0 tons

b. Combat loads: Upon departing base camp personnel carried two canteens of water and two C-Rations meals. Ammunition loads were as follows:

M-14 - 200 rds M60 - 1600 rds 5 AW's per platoon

M-16 - 300 rds M79 - 36 rds 4 claymores per platoon

2 hand grenades per man M14B2 - 300 rds

5 AW's per platoon 4 claymores per platoon

2 OS/CN grenades per fire team

c. Maintenance:

(1) A Maintenance contact team was established as indicated previously.

(2) 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry had twenty-one vehicles inoperative because of mechanical failure. Only four APC's had to be returned to base camp for these deficiencies: all of these on the last day of the operation.

(3) Maintenance was stressed throughout the operation. Maintenance inspections were conducted by unit commanders upon return to base camp.

d. Treatment of casualties and evacuation:

(1) Battalion aid stations accompanied the Battalion Forward Command Posts.

(2) The Brigade Surgeon remained at the Brigade Forward Op.

(3) Resupply and Command and Control ships were used whenever possible, depending on the seriousness of the casualty, for medical evacuation.

e. Communications:

(1) Types utilized:

(a) FM radio

(b) AM radio

1. Point to point (Net ---) telephone

2. Switchboard to switchboard (---near telephone)

3. Teletype (on line typing)

(d) Wire

2. Because of initial over-lap on the Brigade Command Est 1st Bn AO, 7th Infantry had to switch to the alternate frequency.

3. Courier remains the fastest, simplest method of transmitting classified, time deadline reports over short distances. These include the UNISOM and the SIIEEP.

4. Incorporation and use of the new family of radios is the Brigade Command Net was accomplished satisfactorily.

14. Special Equipment and ------

Starlight devices were carried by all units and utilized during night operations.

15. Commander's Analysis

a. TAOR boundaries must no be placed too close to the actual area of

Operation. When such is the case and targets are outside the TAOR, the delay associated by fire coordinates results in the loss of the quick reaction of supporting fires.

b. Too many vehicles were taken by the --- Bn, ---- Infantry team, causing movement problems.

c. When tanks cannot be utilized by units due to terrain. They should be returned to Brigade Control as soon as possible.

d. Units must thoroughly and quickly clear their brigade reserve perimeter. This will prevent VC from emplacing claymores and launching surprise attacks. In the daytime, smaller ambushes or outposts must be used to prevent sniping at choppers coming in to land. Once fire is received, aggressive action must be initiated to suppress fires.

e. Different routes must be used when leaving areas. Suspected routes of movement are always mined and booby trapped.

f. Units should anticipate VC mortar fire at any time. Dispersion must always be maintained to prevent unnecessary losses. Night offensive positions should include overhead cover whenever possible. Soil covered bags should be placed so as to provide the individual with maximum cover from the flanks as well as the front and rear.

g. In VC infested areas double or mutually supporting ambushes should be employed. This technique may prove to be better than a large platoon sized ambush. When ambushes mutually support one another, they must be a minimum of 200 yards apart in order to effectively employ claymore mines in all directions. When small ambushes are employed consideration should be given to employing claymore mines in depth, i.e., 40 meters, 20 meters.

h. Just prior to an airmobile extraction, a sweep around the loading zone should be conducted. This will not eliminate the need for blade security throughout the extraction, but will assist in elimination of some of the snipers in nearby areas.

i. Whenever an area is to be destroyed, arrangements must be made to accommodate civilians and refugees, even though none may be expected. Women and children can create a big problem. ARVN assistance with the civilians is a must. Arrangements should be made to have a stand-by team from the province in which operations are conducted so that the team can be airlifted into the area very quickly when needed.

j. The tail-end of a march column, whether foot, mobile or motorized, must be especially watchful since the VC will habitually fire at the last troops leaving an area. Instant reaction is a must.

k. When selecting assembly areas, consideration should be given to including roads if they are in the area, and if the area is in an open field, remaining in the center of it.

l. Numerous strong ambushes must be located surrounding defensive positions, particularly on the first night of occupation since results obtained have been excellent.

m. Continuous reconnaissance must be made to locate routes which vehicles may use to avoid wet areas and link-up with infantry.

n. Units must emphasize shell reps when VC's mortar our positions.

o. Before moving on a highway, units must insure that both sides of the Highway have been cleared.

p. Although fire must be returned immediately, indiscriminate firing into the village must cease.

q. Firing at is an operational necessity, no excess attachments should be

made at night.

r. During the third phase of the operation Trang Bang, officials should have been brought up to date soon enough for them to effectively halt civilians leaving the operational area.

s. A vigorous Civil Affairs Program was conducted throughout Operation KAHAIA.

(1) Approximately 200 civil ------------------------.

(2) Helping Hand supplies were distributed throughout the operational areas. Demonstrations were given on the proper use of the health items distributed.

(3) 12 tons of rice were evacuated from the operational area. The rice was turned over to the Trang Bang sub-sector advisor to be given to needy families.

(4) 89 civilians were evacuated from VC controlled areas during the third phase of the operation to the Dac Ha #2 New Life Hamlet (XT6413).

(5) A Psy/Ops loudspeaker mission was flown over the village of X Rung Cay to exploit the VC mortar attack on that village the previous day.

t. VC will mine the sides of roads adjacent to road blocks. Before bypassing road blocks, units must thoroughly check the area for mines.

u. According to reliable reports, Trang Lap is used as a refuge for the VC curing operations in that area.

v. Landing zones should be planned closer to objectives.

w. Plans for operations must be rigidly adhered to.

x. Only necessary traffic should be transmitted over radios. All radio operators should know exactly what they are going to say prior to transmitting.

y. In general, all units participating in Operation KAHAIA performed in an outstanding manner throughout the exercise. The final phase of the operation was particularly complex due to the numerous elements and agencies involved. Nevertheless, each element executed its movements and mission exactly as planned. Consequently, 119 valid VCS were apprehended, 14 of which were confirmed VC and the remainder primarily draft dodgers.

16. Recommendations:

a. Division should place a “Recovery Reaction Force” on a JC ---- standby at Base Camp to respond to evacuation and recovery missions on a mission basis only.

(1) Composition - Equipment

2 VIP's 1 Lowboy

1 Wrecker 1 Escort Platoon

(2) Composition - Personnel

Maintenance Warrant Officer

Necessary Drivers

Recovery Personnel

(3) Procedures:

(a) Brigade S-4 contacts G-4 outlining mission and requirements

(b) G-4 contact Support Command which informs the basic standby element to accomplish the mission.

(c) ----and Escort report to Division formation area and meet with the Brigade Representative and ---suce frequency and call signs.

(4) Prior planning should provide for evacuation of civilians at the earliest possible time in order to release those combat troops used to control the civilians.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Hambit L. Bragos

Captain Infantry

Asst Adjutant

Toan Thang II

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS 2ND BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 96225

AVDCSB-C 10 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3 K-1)

Commanding General

25th Infantry Division

ATTN: Division Historian

APO 96225

1. (U) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II

2. (U) Dates of Operation: 010001 June 1968 - 162400 February 1969

3. (U) Location: Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Tay Ninh Provinces, RVN

4. (U) Control Headquarters: 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

5. (U) Reporting Officer: Colonel H.S. Long Jr.

6. (C) Task Organization:

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry

3rd Battalion, 34th Cavalry

3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry

3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry

3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry

4th Battalion, 9th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry

3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry

65th Engineer Battalion

GROUP - 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

AVDCSB-C 10 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3 K-1)

1st Battalion, 8th Artillery

C Battery, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery

3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery

C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery

38th Scout Dog Platoon

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support.

(1) Units.

(a) Direct support: 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery fired in direct support of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

(b) General support:

C Battery, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery

A, B, C and D Batteries, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery

C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery

(2) Artillery was employed in Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II to provide:

(a) Landing zone preparations.

(b) Suppressive fires.

(d) Suppression of sniper fire.

(e) Destruction of attacking enemy forces (direct fire).

(f) H and I fires.

(g) Smoke and screening fires.

(h) Marking rounds for location

(i) Illumination.

(3) 309,744 rounds of 105mm, 155mm and 8 inch artillery were

fired in support of 2nd Brigade operations and Vietnamese units within the Brigade TAOI.

b. Army Aviation: The four (4) organic OH-23's were exchanged for four (4) OH-6A's. The aircraft were used on a daily basis by the battalions for command and control, liaison and reconnaissance missions. During the period, the aircraft flew a total of 3855 hours, consisting of 8040 tasks, 14,071 sorties and 14,018 passengers carried. The 25th Aviation Battalion provided a UH-1D command and control helicopter to the Brigade Commander. The Brigade Commander used the C&C extensively for controlling multi-battalion operations, making command visits, and observing tactical operations. The Brigade utilized one or more assault helicopter companies on 211 days of Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II. The helicopter companies were normally furnished by the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. The assault helicopter companies were used primarily to conduct combat assault and eagle flights. CH-47's allocated daily by II Field Force, resupplied the battalion during Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II. A total of 1681 CH-47 sorties were utilized during the operation to move 1944 tons of Class I through V supplies, personnel and mail to the forward areas. UH-1D's performed several emergency resupply missions on a quick and timely basis.

c. Air Support (USAF)

(1) General:

(a) Tactical fighter bombers from the 7th Tactical Air Force were

used to support 2nd Brigade operations. The Forward Air Controllers were from the 19th Tactical Air support Squadron. Night operations were supported by Spooky, Shadow and Moonshine of Bien Hoa Air Force Base.

(b) 2019 fighter sorties were flown by tactical fighters within the Brigade TAOI: 1569 of these strikes were pre-planned sorties. 450 of the strikes were immediate request sorties in support of troops in contact.

(2) The following is the results of the tactical fighter strikes:

	Destroyed	Damaged	Uncovered
Bunkers	3056	456	328
Trenches (meters)	3980	1402	2836
Fighting Positions	1304	384
Structures	337	96
Secondary Explosions	248
Secondary Fires	132
Killed by Air	303 VC (BC)	493 VC (Poss)

d. Chemical Operations:

(1) Chemical operations in support of Operation TOAN THANG II, included

tactical and persistent CS drops, defoliation missions, and “Sniffer” missions flown by the 9th Chemical Detachment in support of the 2nd Bde Operations.

(2) Defoliation missions have been flown in 2nd Bde areas of operations to clear vegetation bordering roads, paths, trails and water-ways (Oriental and Saigon Rivers), thus reducing possible sites from which friendly forces may be ambushed; revealing enemy trails, supply route or installations in forested areas; clearing vegetation from fields of fire and avenues of approach; clearing vegetation surrounding Cu Chi Base Camp and ;other critical installations.

(3) Persistent CS drops from CH-47's have been made in areas of the lower Boi Loi, upper HoBo Woods, and the Cape Canaveral area. Enemy routes of infiltration, trails, LOC's, suspected tunnels and bunker complexes, and suspected rocket launching sites, have been the primary targets of CS drops made in support of 2nd Bde.

(4) Of particular interest was the use of CS in tunnel device operations. The 1 - 5 Infantry (M) encountered large tunnel complexes which were considered too large to be effectively flushed by the Mity-Mite blower. On this situation, 55 gallon drums of CS were made available to the 2nd Bde. The 10 pound sacks of CS were placed inside the tunnel complex spaced about 20 meters apart. All charges and sacks were connected simultaneously. This method sealed the tunnel, trapping the CS inside, effectively denying the tunnel to the enemy.

8. (C) Intelligence:

a. Enemy units during the initial stage of Operation TOAN THANG II were scattered and in a general phase of regrouping. There was sporadic contact, but no indication that he had the ability or resources to launch a major offensive.

b. As the brigade AO enlarged toward the northwest, the movement and positions of the enemy forces became more canalized into the areas of the Filhol, HoBo Woods and the Citadel. Contact with small elements continued, and harassing tactics in the form of mortaring and hit and run attacks were prevalent.

c. During the month of September, stronger, better armed forces were encountered. The majority of contacts were made with local VC forces. There was continuous evidence of resupplying and construction of defensive positions by the enemy. In October, FSB KEENE received a ground attack though not by a force large enough to over-run it. In the Citadel area, there was a coordinated attack on A & D 2 - 12 Inf. between 101800 and 111800. In both cases the enemy did not commit himself in a decisive way. There was evidence of more NVA soldiers making contact, though no main force NVA units could be pin-pointed.<