Logistics

a. Two major tracked vehicle weapons systems were incorporated into the division during the period. The 155mm towed howitzer was replaced by the self-propelled 155mm howitzer (M109) and the medium tank model M48A2 and the light tank M41A1 was replaced by the model M48A3. In addition, the authorized tracked recon vehicle, the M114, was replaced by the M113 APC in all applicable units of the division. Six M138 tracked vehicle flame throwers were issued to the division's engineer battalion for deployment.

b. During the period, division completed the conversion of 1/4 ton utility trucks (jeeps) from the M38A1 series to the M151 and M151A1C series. One hundred percent of the old model 2-1/2 ton cargo trucks were replaced by the new M35A1 multi-fuel series.

c. Two of the division's brigade task forces, the 2nd and the 3rd, underwent a conversion of communications equipment upon arrival in RVN. The new family radio series sets were shipped in specially prepared packages from CONUS to RVN for rapid conversion. All infantry battalions, the cavalry sqdn, and the armored battalion were issued the new M-16, 5.56mm rifle as a replacement for the rifle, 7.62mm, M-14.

e. The division submitted appropriate requisitions for the above items plus many other items of special equipment authorized by special messages. A major item which was not available for issue to division units was generators in sufficient quantities.

f. Headquarters USARPAC allowed units to deploy with many items of post, camp and station property. Major items included file cabinets, desks, chairs, tables, safes, tools, tentage, communications equipment and MHE. All of these items proved to be invaluable upon arrival in-country.

g. Elements of the 3/4 Cavalry and 69th Armor were deployed through Okinawa. USARYSIS provide many items of WABTOC equipment from on-hand depot stocks. This issue enabled these units to arrive RVN well prepared for quick establishment of excellent living facilities.

h. The division received sufficient quantities of fortification materials to accomplish construction of all fortification construction objectives. Additional quantities were available for operational requirements in the future.

i. The ACof3, G4 continued to process all reports of survey emanating in division units for submission to the Division Commander for final action. The Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, was appointed installation commander.

a. On 14 January 1966, a recommendation was received by Avn Section, Division Artillery, to fabricate metal seats for the OH23G. These seats offer greater protection to pilot and passenger. Work orders were given to G4 USARHA(illegible) and 33 seats were constructed to equip all OH23G's within the division.

b. On 2 February 1966, a letter was sent to 1st Brigade recommending that benches be constructed to fit within the cargo space of the 2-1/2 ton cargo truck - construction of benches so troops would be seated back to back facing out to offer greater security while in convoy or movements. 22 April - Generator classes started in 725th Maintenance Battalion. Classes were completed by 91 operators. 30 April - The metal protection fabricated for the gunner of the M113 has proved of great value - many lives have been saved because of this fabrication adapted in December 1965.

a. During the period, the G-4 plans officer wrote and coordinated six (6) movement orders, five of which concerned movement of division elements from Hawaii to RVN, and one which ordered movement of a division element within RVN. Close coordination was maintained with SUPCON on execution of all moves . . .(cut off by copier) . . . was not exercised of the embarkation as the Division Transportation officer was transferred to SUPCOM in December 1965.

b. The G4 Section coordinated and directly supervised debarcation and movement of all division elements to base camps in RVN. A special report of the division deployment is to be completed on closing of all elements in RVN. As of 30 April, cargo from the SUPCOM and 1st Brigade was still being off-loaded in Saigon. During debarcation of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, Lt Colonel Davis, G4 representative on the Division Advance Planning Group, coordinated debarcation at VUNG TAU, SAIGON and QUI NHON. Debarcation of the remaining division elements were coordinated by officers of the G4 Section stationed at each critical location - VUNG TAU for personnel off-loading, SAIGON PORT for cargo off-loading, and at Cu Chi, to coordinate reception of incoming personnel and cargo. No major difficulties were encountered in any of the debarcations.

c. During this period, the G4 Plans Office wrote and assembled Administrative Order 1-66, published 22 April 1966, to provide for administrative and logistical support of division operations conducted with Cu Chi as the logistical base. Convoy control procedures were published on 9 March 1966 by the G4 Section to adapt the Division Tactical SOP to conditions encountered in RVN.

d. A liaison visit was conducted by the Plans Officer to the 1st Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. These visits proved extremely valuable by providing an opportunity to obtain logistical experience data for ground and air supported operations. This data has since been corroborated by division experience in brigade-size operations.

a. Plans to develop and produce a wood tent frame and floor which began in October 1965 were executed with considerable success. A plan was devised that would provide a frame for tents, GP Medium, improving the working and living conditions of division personnel in the event of deployment. The Assistant Division Engineer was requested to formulate the plans and bill of materials for this tent frame. The plans contained in TM 5-302 for tent frames was modified to include rafters, thereby eliminating the need for upright and ridge poles. A design to provide frames for the tents, GP large and small was also devised.

b. In December 1965, after the division was alerted to deploy a two brigade task force to RVN, a request was submitted to CG, USARHAW to precut and package tent kits for 14 tents, BP large; 984 tents, GP medium; and 83 tents, GP small. Approval was received and the kits were precut and packaged by the Schofield Barracks Area Engineer.

c. In January 1966, an additional requirement was requested to provide additional tent kits for the remainder of the division. The following breakdown of tent kits ordered, precut, packaged and shipped to RVN for the 25th Infantry Division.

e. While the above requirements have generally proved adequate, shortages have developed as a result of unforeseen unit attachments, division wide over strength, and administrative requirements and as shelter for PX's, Civic Action material, barber shops and laundries.


	\| home Logistics Back to Index (HEADING MISSING) - LOGISTICS (1 Jan - 30 Apr 66) 1. Supply. a. Two major tracked vehicle weapons systems were incorporated into the division during the period. The 155mm towed howitzer was replaced by the self-propelled 155mm howitzer (M109) and the medium tank model M48A2 and the light tank M41A1 was replaced by the model M48A3. In addition, the authorized tracked recon vehicle, the M114, was replaced by the M113 APC in all applicable units of the division. Six M138 tracked vehicle flame throwers were issued to the division's engineer battalion for deployment. b. During the period, division completed the conversion of 1/4 ton utility trucks (jeeps) from the M38A1 series to the M151 and M151A1C series. One hundred percent of the old model 2-1/2 ton cargo trucks were replaced by the new M35A1 multi-fuel series. c. Two of the division's brigade task forces, the 2nd and the 3rd, underwent a conversion of communications equipment upon arrival in RVN. The new family radio series sets were shipped in specially prepared packages from CONUS to RVN for rapid conversion. All infantry battalions, the cavalry sqdn, and the armored battalion were issued the new M-16, 5.56mm rifle as a replacement for the rifle, 7.62mm, M-14. d. Prior to departure from Hawaii, Department of the Army authorized six major WABTOC items of supply, they were: (1) Tent, GP, medium which was to be utilized for troop living, mess, supply and administration. (2) Refrigerators, walk-in, 65 cu ft. (3) Ice machine plants, one per battalion. (4) Generator sets, 10KY, 60 cycle, one per company sized unit plus one per battalion. (5) Ice chests, 400 lb capacity. One per company sized unit. (6) Folding cots. e. The division submitted appropriate requisitions for the above items plus many other items of special equipment authorized by special messages. A major item which was not available for issue to division units was generators in sufficient quantities. f. Headquarters USARPAC allowed units to deploy with many items of post, camp and station property. Major items included file cabinets, desks, chairs, tables, safes, tools, tentage, communications equipment and MHE. All of these items proved to be invaluable upon arrival in-country. g. Elements of the 3/4 Cavalry and 69th Armor were deployed through Okinawa. USARYSIS provide many items of WABTOC equipment from on-hand depot stocks. This issue enabled these units to arrive RVN well prepared for quick establishment of excellent living facilities. h. The division received sufficient quantities of fortification materials to accomplish construction of all fortification construction objectives. Additional quantities were available for operational requirements in the future. i. The ACof3, G4 continued to process all reports of survey emanating in division units for submission to the Division Commander for final action. The Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, was appointed installation commander. 2. Maintenance. a. On 14 January 1966, a recommendation was received by Avn Section, Division Artillery, to fabricate metal seats for the OH23G. These seats offer greater protection to pilot and passenger. Work orders were given to G4 USARHA(illegible) and 33 seats were constructed to equip all OH23G's within the division. b. On 2 February 1966, a letter was sent to 1st Brigade recommending that benches be constructed to fit within the cargo space of the 2-1/2 ton cargo truck - construction of benches so troops would be seated back to back facing out to offer greater security while in convoy or movements. 22 April - Generator classes started in 725th Maintenance Battalion. Classes were completed by 91 operators. 30 April - The metal protection fabricated for the gunner of the M113 has proved of great value - many lives have been saved because of this fabrication adapted in December 1965. 3. Deployment and Plans. a. During the period, the G-4 plans officer wrote and coordinated six (6) movement orders, five of which concerned movement of division elements from Hawaii to RVN, and one which ordered movement of a division element within RVN. Close coordination was maintained with SUPCON on execution of all moves . . .(cut off by copier) . . . was not exercised of the embarkation as the Division Transportation officer was transferred to SUPCOM in December 1965. b. The G4 Section coordinated and directly supervised debarcation and movement of all division elements to base camps in RVN. A special report of the division deployment is to be completed on closing of all elements in RVN. As of 30 April, cargo from the SUPCOM and 1st Brigade was still being off-loaded in Saigon. During debarcation of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, Lt Colonel Davis, G4 representative on the Division Advance Planning Group, coordinated debarcation at VUNG TAU, SAIGON and QUI NHON. Debarcation of the remaining division elements were coordinated by officers of the G4 Section stationed at each critical location - VUNG TAU for personnel off-loading, SAIGON PORT for cargo off-loading, and at Cu Chi, to coordinate reception of incoming personnel and cargo. No major difficulties were encountered in any of the debarcations. c. During this period, the G4 Plans Office wrote and assembled Administrative Order 1-66, published 22 April 1966, to provide for administrative and logistical support of division operations conducted with Cu Chi as the logistical base. Convoy control procedures were published on 9 March 1966 by the G4 Section to adapt the Division Tactical SOP to conditions encountered in RVN. d. A liaison visit was conducted by the Plans Officer to the 1st Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. These visits proved extremely valuable by providing an opportunity to obtain logistical experience data for ground and air supported operations. This data has since been corroborated by division experience in brigade-size operations. 4. Installations and Projects. a. Plans to develop and produce a wood tent frame and floor which began in October 1965 were executed with considerable success. A plan was devised that would provide a frame for tents, GP Medium, improving the working and living conditions of division personnel in the event of deployment. The Assistant Division Engineer was requested to formulate the plans and bill of materials for this tent frame. The plans contained in TM 5-302 for tent frames was modified to include rafters, thereby eliminating the need for upright and ridge poles. A design to provide frames for the tents, GP large and small was also devised. b. In December 1965, after the division was alerted to deploy a two brigade task force to RVN, a request was submitted to CG, USARHAW to precut and package tent kits for 14 tents, BP large; 984 tents, GP medium; and 83 tents, GP small. Approval was received and the kits were precut and packaged by the Schofield Barracks Area Engineer. c. In January 1966, an additional requirement was requested to provide additional tent kits for the remainder of the division. The following breakdown of tent kits ordered, precut, packaged and shipped to RVN for the 25th Infantry Division. GP SMALL GP MEDIUM GP LARGE GP MED MOD Holokai XI 39 464 7 0 Holokai XII 39 459 7 0 69th Armor 5 61 0 0 Division (-) 194 890 18 21 Totals 277 1,874 32 21 d. The requirements for tent kits GP medium was computed as follows: (1) 1 kit per 12 persons - quarters. (2) 1 kit for TOE kitchen. (3) 1 kit per company for admin - storage. (4) 1 kit per TOE authorized tent. e. While the above requirements have generally proved adequate, shortages have developed as a result of unforeseen unit attachments, division wide over strength, and administrative requirements and as shelter for PX's, Civic Action material, barber shops and laundries.