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 HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, HAWAII
APO  San Francisco  96557

HCSU -P                                                                                                     29 September 1966

SUBJECT:     After Action Report - Deployment of the 25th Infantry Division to RVN

TO:          See Distribution


     1.  Forwarded for information in subject report, a report which consolidates and condenses the large volume of data and information contained in the feeder reports submitted by the seventeen staff offices and commands associated with the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division.  Subject report recapitulates the deployments, discusses the deployment actions, and extracts pertinent comments and recommendations from the feeder reports which may be applicable in the revision of USARHAW OPLAN 68-65  (Out-loading Plan).

     2.   Addresses are authorized to extract, reproduce, or otherwise convert for their use any material contained in subject report without reference to this headquarters for approval.

     FOR THE COMMANDER:

                                        WILFRED ARNOLD Je.
                                        Colonel, ACC
                                        Adjutant General

1 Incl:
DISTRIBUTION:
Chief of Staff
G1
G2 / G3
G4
Comptroller           
Engineer               
Transportation      
 Signal                   
FS Area               
SB Area               
USARHAW  S&MC    
TAMC                  

 TOTAL          
1
5
2
20
2
2
8
2
6
6
10
 2

66





 TABLE OF CONTENTS

          Letter of Transmittal                                                          I
          Table of Contents                                                              II
          Deployment Summary  -  Map                                        V

Section     I     INTRODUCTION
               1.   Scope                                                                                                                 1
               2.   Emphasis by the Commander in Chief                                                           1
               3.   Deployment planning responsibility                                                                1
               4.   Deployment time frames                                                                                 1
               5.   Orders                                                                                                               2

     II     PRELIMINARY PLANNING
               6.   Out-loading support mission                                                                          2
               7.   Concept of deployment support                                                                    2
               8.   Manpower augmentation from reserve components                                  3
               9.   The approaching deployments                                                                      3

     III     OPERATIONS
               10.   Embarkation operations                                                                              4
                    a.   Preliminary actions                                                                                    4
                    b.   Cargo loading                                                                                            4
                    c.   Summary of cargo operations                                                                  4
                    d.   Summary of troop loading operations                                                     4
                    e.   Loading of ammunition                                                                             4
                    f.   Summary of entire lift operations                                                              5
                    g.   Operational notes                                                                                     5
                         (1)   Movement data                                                                                   5
                         (2)   Marking and documentation                                                             5
                         (3)   Security of in-transit cargo                                                                5
                         (4)   Conex supply                                                                                      5                                 
                         (5)   Stevedore operations                                                                       6
                         (6)   Terminal Facilities                                                                             6
                         (7)   Personnel requirements                                                                   6
               11.   Land operations                                                                                         7
                    a.   Preliminary considerations                                                                    7
                    b.   HOLOKAI  XI                                                                                           7
                    c.   HOLOKAI  XII                                                                                          7
                    d.   HOLOKAI  XIII                                                                                         8
               12.   Support teams, and services                                                                  8
                    a.   PCS Clearance Team                                                                           8
                         (1)   Qualification of inspectors                                                              8
                         (2)   Installed property                                                                             8
                         (3)   Unit fund & CWF property                                                              9
                         (4)   Sundry funds                                                                                    9
                    b.   TOE Clearance Team                                                                          9
                    c.   Contact maintenance & inspection teams                                        9
                    d.   De-fueling and processing                                                                 9       (p ii)
                    e.   Care & preservation demonstration teams                                   10
                    f.   Forklift support                                                                                   10
                    g.   Labor support                                                                                   10
                    h.   Laundry support                                                                                10
                    i.    Self Service Supply Center                                                             10
                    j.    Clothing Sales Store                                                                        11
                    k.   Mess support                                                                                    11
                    l.   Communication support                                                                   11
               13.   Personnel and administrative support                                              11
                    a.   Maintenance of unit strength                                                           11
                    b.   Personnel management                                                                  11
                    c.   Dependent Processing Center                                                       11
                    d.   Central Clearance Center                                                              12
                    e.   Transportation for dependents                                                      12
                    f.   Personnel services                                                                          13
                         (1)   Postal                                                                                        13
                         (2)   Finance                                                                                     13
                         (3)   Religious                                                                                  13
                         (4)   Non-appropriated fund property                                           13
                         (5)   Legal                                                                                       13
               14.   Program management                                                                   13
               15.   Deployment costs                                                                           14
               16.   Intelligence                                                                                      14
               17.   USARHAW  S&MC OPERATIONS                                             14          
                    a.   Stock control                                                                                14
                    b.   Storage                                                                                        14
                    c.   Maintenance shop operations                                                   14
                         (1)   Refinishing of small arms weapons                                   15
                         (2)   Fabrication of protective shields                                       15
                         (3)   Organizational maintenance                                              15
                    d.   Ammunition                                                                                15
                    e.   Inspection                                                                                   15
               18.   TAMC operations                                                                         16
                    a.   Medical supply                                                                           16
                    b.   Medical services                                                                       16
               19.   Issue of equipment & supplies                                                   16
                    a.   Equipping two additional inf. bns.                                           17
                    b.   Rough terrain fork-lifts                                                              17
                    c.   EAM equipment                                                                       17
                    d.   Radios                                                                                      17
                    e.   Re-issue of U-6 aircraft parts                                                 18
                    f.   Issues from DAFD                                                                    18
                    g.   WABTOC items                                                                       18
                    h.   Introduction of PUSH                                                               18
                    i.    Slow-down in VRR shipments                                                18
                    j.    Base camp rqrmts. & fortifications mat                                 18       (p iii)
                         (1)   Pre-cut tent frame kits                                                      19
                         (2)   Tents                                                                                  19
                         (3)   Fortification & construction mat.                                    19
                    k.   Transhipments at army port                                                  19
                    l.    Sources of supply                                                                   19
               20.   Termination of supply support                                                 19

IV.         SUMMARY OF PROBLEM AREAS
          21.   Transportation                                                                         20
               a.   Absence of unit loading plans                                            20
               b.   Additional rqrmt. For land trans.                                        20
               c.   Tie-up of critical land transportation                                  20
          22.   Increase in post security violations                                      20
          23.   Unsanitary family housing                                                     20
          24.   Unpaid telephone gills                                                          21
          25.   Inadequate planning for re non-deployables                     21
          26.   Insufficient MHE & no operators                                        21
          27.   Supply                                                                                   21
               a.   Slow auth. For proc. Of WABTOC items                       21
               b.   No time for formal advertising                                        21
               c.   A run on mess hall expendables                                    21
               d.   Damages to mess hall equipment                                 22
V.          RECOMMENDATIONS
          28.   Inclusion of WABTOC items in USARPAC  LP&P (U)   22     
          29.   USARHAW assigned pers. for post security                   22
          30.   Build-up of out-loading supplies                                       22
          31.   Additional requirements for plywood                               23
          32.   Protection to prevent broken windshields                       23
          33.   Treating of out-loading plans                                            23
            MISSION ACCOMPLISHED`                                                  23

             EXHIBITS
          A.   Letter Gen. Waters to Gen. Darnell                                   24
          B.   Recapitulation of deployment orders                                26
          C.   Organization out-loading support teams                         27
          D.   Planned deployment configurations                                28
          E.   Troop and cargo movement summary                            30
          F.   Movement control points                                                   31
          G.   Communications net. For movement control                32
          H.   Transportation movement control                                   33
          I.     POM technical inspection equipment summary           34
          J.     Special communications network                                 40
          K.    Recapitulation of O&MA costs                                      41
          L.    Before & after photograph of pistol                               42
          M.   Protective shield                                                             43
          N.   Recapitulation of local purchases                                 44
          O.    Extract from 22nd Air Force report                             49
          P.    Letter from CG 25th Inf. Div.                                         50

     DISTRIBUTION                                                           Inside back cover       (p iv)




 DEPLOYMENT SUMMARY

A portrayal of the deployments of the 25th Infantry Division by air and sea from Hawaii to RVN                              

(insert  map)


The air movements also depict the primary routes of the three types of aircraft (totaling 231) used in the airlift of the 3rd Brigade Task Force into Pleiku.  An airlift which is described in the 22nd Air Force report on Operation Blue Light as “what is now recorded in the annals of Air Force history as the most massive airlift of US troops and equipment into a combat zone.”

An additional 38 aircraft were used to airlift the various air elements of the remainder of the division.          (p v)




 Section I   INTRODUCTION

     1.   Scope:   This report covers the activities of all offices and agencies directly or indirectly associated with the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division, from receipt of CINCUSARPAC's advance warning order, dated 27 October 1965 (advising the division of the pending deployment of our brigade in early 1966), till completion of the deployment of Division (-) under the final movement directive issued by CINCUSARPAC on 28 February 1966.

     2.   Emphasis by the Commander in Chief:   In a personal letter to CGUSARHAW in August 1965,  CINCUSARPAC emphasized that “there can be no failure” on the part of the USARPC logistic system in providing adequate logistic and administrative support for operations in Vietnam (EXHIBIT A,  page 24).

     3.   Deployment Planning Responsibility:   Under contingency planning, one of USARHAW's major responsibilities is the deployment of the PACOM Reserve Force (i.e. the 25th Infantry Division) from Hawaii when a particular USARPAC operation plan is executed.  This responsibility includes the accomplishment of actions to insure that the necessary supplies and equipment to accompany the division are on hand either in the division, or in depot stocks, and to provide the required in-put into the logistic system to assure the division of its re-supply, until re-supply becomes a routine function of the supply pipe-line.  With the accelerated build-up of US Army forces in RVN, a major concern to USARHAW in 1965 was the planning criteria stipulating that the 25th Infantry Division should be ready for deployment within the time frame of a few hours for units of the alert brigade, to two weeks for the entire division.

     4.   Deployment Time Frames:    The deployments of the brigade task forces of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii are summarized below.  Of the 15,736 troops deployed, slightly over one-half deployed during the first month,  
(23 Dec. 65 - 25 Jan 66).  Division(-) being deployed over a span of two months.
                                                                (p 1)
                                                               Total               Depart Hawaii
                                                             Troops              Initial element     Last element        
               3rd Bde Task Force           3,935                   23 Dec 65          5 Jan 66
               2nd Bde Task Force          3,982                      2 Jan 66          6 Jan 66
               1st  Bn  69th Armor             571                      25 Jan 66                 -
               Division (-)                        7,248                      15 Jan 66          16 Apr 66

     5.   Orders:   Time permitting, warning orders are issued 75 days in advance of readiness dates, movement directives 60 days in advance of readiness dates.  The movement directive is the authority for movement and is the basis for appropriate actions by all agencies.  Subsequently Movement Orders are issued which specify the exact organizational structure of the deploying units.  Although the CINCUSARPAC advance warning order to the 25th Infantry Division is dated 27 October 1965, USARHAW received the message two weeks later on 13 November 1965.  Then came the subsequent change in the warning order which revised the deployments from a one-brigade task force to the immediate deployment of two brigades.  The DA warning order for the two brigades issued on 14 December 1965, the USARPAC movement directive issued two days later.  Deployment orders are recapitulated in EXHIBIT  B,  page 26.

 Section  II     PRELIMINARY  PLANNING

     6.   Out-loading Support Mission:   To fulfill the need for fully coordinated out-loading actions, a USARHAW out-loading plan was developed to assure the best possible execution of deployment support tasks within planning time frames, and deployment requirements.  This plan first published in October 1961.  Thereafter, in coordination with the 25th Infantry Division, the plan was tested each quarter through practice out-loadings of brigade task forces, these practice out-loadings conducted under the code name HOLOKAI, the exercises having progressed through HOLOKAI  X.  When the 25th Infantry Division received its deployment orders, it continued its practice of assigning the code name HOLOKAI to its off-Hawaii deployment.  Accordingly, the deployment of the 2nd Brigade Task Force was designated as HOLOKAI  XI, the deployment of the 3rd Brigade Task Force as HOLOKA  XII, and the deployment of Division (-) as HOLOKAI  XIII.  The out-loading plan, revised annually as a result of lessons learned in the HOLOKAI exercises, is currently designated as USARHAW OPLAN 68-65 (Out-loading Plan).

     7.   Concept of Deployment Support:   Deployment of a single battalion or a one-brigade task force of the 25th Infantry Division does not normally present particular support problems to USARHAW.  However, the deployment of the entire division in rapid, consecutive movements deprives the division of a large portion of its organic support capabilities.  Therefore, the basic provisions of the out-loading plan call for USARHAW to provide this kind of support:  support which consists of providing various clearance teams, the transportation to move personnel and cargo, and support in manufacturing or fabricating boxes, pallets, and WABTOC items.  Local contracts are utilized whenever USARHAW facilities become over-burdened and are unable to produce the required items in time to meet deployment schedules.  This support system is outlined in EXHIBIT C,  page 27.                                                  p. 2

     8.   Manpower Augmentation from Reserve Components:   In anticipation of the manpower load which would be imposed upon USARHAW should the 25th Infantry Division be deployed from Hawaii, CGUSARHAW proposed to the Adjutant General of the State of Hawaii that selected technician personnel from the Hawaii Army National Guard participate in the HOLOKAI exercises for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with the requirements and technique of out-loading, the proposal broached in March 1965.  With the acceptance of the proposal by the Adjutant General, about 50 national Guard personnel participated in the planning for HOLOKAI  X, planning which included step-by-step indoctrination in post clearance and materiel inspection requirements and procedures.  US Army Reserve technician personnel also participated in the planning.  Total reserve augmentation for HOLOKAI  X was about 60 personnel.  (HOLOKAI  X was scheduled for May 1965 as an out-loading exercise, airlifting the 3rd Brigade Task Force to marry-up with the DA forward floating depot, the exercise subsequently cancelled due to other training requirements of the 25th Infantry Division.)

     9.   The Approaching Deployments:        Beginning in August 1965, this command began receiving information copies of message traffic (classifications not higher than secret) between US Army Vietnam and Hq USARPAC concerning recommended supplies and equipment to accompany CONUS troop units deploying to RVN.  Of special interest to C4 USARWAW were the recommendations on accessory and WABTOC items.  Inasmuch as USARV's recommendations pertaining to CONUS units would appear to be equally applicable to the 25th Infantry Division, USARV's allowance factors (for CONUS units) were applied to the 25th Infantry Division to obtain some idea as to what the division requirements would be for accessory and WABTOC items under USARV's criteria.  These planning requirements were then screened against available USARHAW assets.  The next determination was that immediate supply actions would have to be initiated for such items as 168 walk-in refrigerators (none authorized or available in the division), 2,800 jugs, insulated / vacuum, several thousand barbed wire rolls, pickets, and other engineer items required for base camp construction.  Most of these items not normally stocked in the local army supply system.  Accordingly, discussions were initiated with Hq USARPAC to obtain authorizations for supply and procurement actions.  Although this command was aware of the discussions being conducted between Hq USARPAC and the 25th Infantry division concerning the probably deployment of the division, USARWAW was not being addressed on these top secret messages.  Lacking the basis for initiating specific support actions, representatives from this command held many discussions with Hq USARPAC during September and October in trying to “stay ahead of the game.”  Finally, on 13 November, this command received a copy of the warning order which had been sent to the division on 27 October (see paragraph 5), and on 1 December, the first of many approvals for local procurement was received from Hq USARPAC, this first approval being an oral authority (subsequently confirmed) for local procurement of lumber.  EXHIBIT  D  (page 28)  list the major units of the 25th Infantry Division and their planned deployment configurations.           
                                                                 p. 3
     10. Embarkation Operations:   The Embarkation Control Center was opened at 0800 hours, 19 December, in Building 1027, Kapalama Military Reservation.  The Chief of the Terminal Operations Division, Transportation Office, operates the control center for controlling and /or coordinating both sea and air movements.

          a.   Preliminary Actions:   Upon receiving the oral alert in late October, actions were initiated to determine the number and type of vehicles and equipment assigned to divisional units, the amount of dunnage and lashing gear which would be required to secure such equipment, and the number and type vessels which would be required for movement.  Wherever definitive data was not available, general planning factors from FM 101-10-1 (Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data) were used.  Upon receipt of instructions on 16 December to out-load the first increment (HOLOKAI  XI, 2nd Brigade Task Force), lift requirements for movement of 24,000 MTONs of unit impedimenta and equipment and personnel movement totaling 5,765 officers and men were placed on MSTS-Hono, with in-country arrival date of 20 January 1966.

          b.   Cargo Loading:   Movement requirements for HOLOKAI  XI were received from the 25th Infantry Division on 20 December, only 24 hours prior to the arrival of the first cargo vessel.  Vehicles, equipment, unit impedimenta, and bulk accompanying supplies were programmed for loading so as to maintain unit integrity in accordance with the desires of the CG 25th Infantry Division.  However, unit integrity was adversely influenced by limitations of ships characteristics and cargo handling gear, and the necessity for the most effective utilization of space available.  Vehicles were stowed with fuel in tanks and batteries connected.  Supplies were stowed in vehicle cargo compartments to top of side-boards.  These loading factors applied to all three HOLOKAI movements.

          c.   Summary of Cargo Operations:   A total 127,225 MTONs of cargo were loaded aboard 21 cargo vessels and one special purpose vessel (Comet) for discharge at five ports.  Additionally, 4,749 STONs of cargo were airlifted in the deployment of the 3rd Brigade Task Force.

          d.   Summary of Troop Loading Operations:   Of the 15,736 troops deployed, 22.3 per cent or 3,514 troops were airlifted.  The 12,222 troops proceeding by sea were transported on eight troop ships.  The deployment summary map on page 30 graphically portrays these sea and air movements.
                                                                 P 4
          e.   Loading of Ammunition:   Essentially, the on-man portions of the basic loads of small arms ammunition were combat loaded so that this ammunition would be immediately available to troops debarking at objective areas.  The remainder of the basic load was bulk loaded.  Bulk loaded ammunition was loaded at the Pearl Harbor West Lock ammunition piers (WL-2 and WL-4) following loading of bulk accompanying supplies at Kapalama.

          f.   Summary of Entire Lift Operation:   EXHIBIT  E  (page 30) summarizes the entire movement of the 25th Infantry Division in order of deployment, and provides other pertinent deployment information.

          g.   Operational Notes:   Items of major interest affecting operations at the surface embarkation point are summarized below:
               (1)   Movement Data:  Movement data sheets submitted by the 25th Infantry Division contained numerous errors.  These ranged from simple errors in arithmetic to failure to properly identify items to be shipped, and inaccurate computations of weights and cubes of vehicles and equipment.  Only those errors affecting ship stowage were reconciled in the Embarkation Control Center by the division liaison officers and the terminal cargo planners.
               (2)   Marking and Documentation:   In order to relieve deploying units of administrative details, the terminal prepared all Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD) for both vehicles and general cargo, documents which are normally prepared by deploying units.  Personnel from the terminal and team members from USARHAW  Supply and Maintenance Center (S&MC) applied all markings to wheel and track vehicles.  Deploying units were required to apply markings to general cargo and to provide the cargo traffic section with a listing of non-vehicular items to be loaded.  Unit commanders and liaison officers were briefed in the Embarkation Control Center on desired markings and listings, but in many instances failed to follow instructions.

               (3)   Security of In-transit Cargo:   Due to the presence of a large volume of supplies and equipment spread over a wide area, and the fact that much of this equipment was in open areas on public facilities at Pier 39, an interior guard detail, normally consisting of 27 men, was furnished by the 25th Infantry Division.
                                                            (p5)
                        (4)   Conex Supply:  The army port normally maintained a strategic reserve stock of 400 type II Conex containers to support contingency missions of the 25th Infantry Division.  Prior to the deployments, the terminal was engaged in a program of return of empty containers to CONUS, this program terminated upon receipt of the advance warning order.  As the out-loading of HOLOKAI  XI progressed, it was apparent that the 400 containers would not meet the requirements of the entire division.  Therefore, all elements of USARHAW were asked to return containers to stock.  Final division requirements for containers totaled 812.  At the completion of the deployment of the last element of the division, the terminal had only 30 full size Conex containers on hand in serviceable condition.                    

               (5)   Stevedore Operations:   It was apparent at the beginning of ship loading operations that requirements placed on the stevedore contractor would not fall within established “commodity” rates because vehicles loaded with cargo presented problems of stowage and lift which required shifting, use of heavy lift and double lift gear, and additional blocking and lashing. Also, many stowage units had to be moved from one hatch to another due to faulty cube and weight data provided by deploying units.  Furthermore, all vehicles with fuel in tanks had to be “grounded” to deck or to the skin of the ship.  After consultation with the Chief of Purchasing and Contracting Division, G4 Office, it was agreed that the stevedore contractor would be compensated on a man-hour basis as provided for in the technical provisions of the current stevedore contract.

               (6)   Terminal Facilities:   In agreement with the State of Hawaii, the army assumed temporary operational control of Pier 39 and adjacent hard stand.  Fourteen of the 30 ships were loaded at Pier 39 due to a superior configuration which permits the receipt and delivery of both inside and outside cargo simultaneously with the loading or discharging of four deep draft ships.  However, stevedore labor was insufficient to simultaneously work both Piers 39 and 40 to their physical capacities.  For HOLOKAI XII and XIII, the army used only that portion of Pier 39 for which labor were available.  Pier 39 with its adjacent hard stand, and Pier 40 with hard stand between warehouses, provide sufficient space to assemble the vehicles and cargo of two brigades at one time.  However, terminal actions were directed toward maintaining a smooth flow of cargo through the terminal areas rather than assembling cargo up to the maximum capacity of the holding areas.  

               (7)   Personnel Requirements:   Both contract and direct hire personnel which included supervisory, clerical, and unskilled labor were hired to augment terminal personnel requirements.  The most serious shortages were in the cargo checker and cargo supervisor fields since these skills are not available among military personnel, and available only in limited numbers from stevedore contractors.  This shortage caused regular terminal civilian employees to work shifts of from 12 to 18 hours, and around-the-clock in some instances.  Due to mechanization of cargo handling on the Honolulu waterfront, only 48 stevedore gangs are now available to work conventional vessels, and all indications point to a continued reduction in the number of stevedore gangs.  As one gang can work only one hatch-one shift in a 24 hour period, it requires 10 gangs to work a 5 hatch ship around the clock.  Available gang hours are prorated among both military and commercial operators based on the number of hatches on berth at any one time.
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     11.   Land Operations:   This portion of the report is concerned with land transportation, to include the movement of materials between USARHAW depot storage facilities and 25th Infantry Division “staging sites” and operations at the Lower Wheeler Field marshaling area.  Land transportation is the responsibility of the Motor Transport Division, Transportation Office.

          a.   Preliminary Considerations:   Upon receipt of the advance warning order, estimated transportation requirements vs. capabilities were analyzed, movement priorities determined, and allowances established providing for slippage of routine requirements for common  use land transportation (CULT) in anticipation of out-loading operations saturating the land transportation capability.  Also, instructions and schedules for movement were published for marshaling and movement of vehicle convoys, cargo movement requirements, and troop lift schedules.  EXHIBIT F (page 31) is a schematic outline of areas involved in these transportation movements routes, and control points.  Traffic control was a coordinated effort among all police departments - Division MP's, the Provost Marshals of Fort Shafter and Schofield Barracks, the Honolulu Police Department.  The movements were monitored by the Motor Transport Division.  Roadside emergency repair and wrecker service was provided.  A communications system was established to control and maintain close monitorship of operations, this system portrayed in EXHIBIT G (page 32).  EXHIBIT H (page 33) is a schematic outline depicting communications control for vehicle convoys and troop movements.

          b.   HOLOKAI  XI:   The transportation of empty Conex containers, crates, sundry packing and crating material, rations, supplies, and pre-positioning of ammunition was accomplished between 12 December and 21 December 1965.  Initial convoy serials were moved during daylight hours (0900 - 1200 hours) but based on the desires of the division, subsequent convoy serials were moved at night (2000 - 2400 hours).  Accompanying supplies and unit impedimenta moved during the period 22 December through 5 January totaled 6,496 STON's consisting of 699 STONs ammunition, 158 STONs rations, 311 STONs vehicles and equipment, 1,310 STONs tent kits, and 4,018 STONs miscellaneous general cargo.  Concerning troop movements, all such movements from Schofield Barracks to port were accomplished during hours of darkness in accordance with desires of the CG25th Infantry Division.  Buses were identified by conspicuous yet unclassified markings which provided ease of routing at shipside, these marking coinciding with gangplank designations.  A total of 144 buses were required to transport troops departing on the USNS Walker, Sultan and Gordon.
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          c.   HOLOKAI  XII:   Requirements for HOLOKAI  XII differed somewhat from HOLOKAI  XI in that requirements for motor transport was on a smaller scale, but at more frequent interval, spread over a longer period of time.  Aircraft departure schedules were established at four hour intervals for C133 aircraft and 10 hour intervals for C141 aircraft.  These schedules required that the Motor Transport Division establish a 24 hour a day operation beginning with the first flight on 23 December.  Although the Motor Transport Division hauled 1,651 STON of cargo from Schofield Barracks to Hickam, the major portion of the unit supplies and impedimenta were loaded on organic vehicles of deploying units.  Traffic control methods employed for HOLOKAI  XII were similar to HOLOKAI  XI, with Motor Transport Division personnel on duty around the clock to coordinate all movement requirements.

          d.   HOLOKAI  XIII:   Whereas troops for HOLOKAI  XI embarked from Pier 39, troops for HOLOKAI  XIII embarked from Pier 40.  This change required a complete revision of traffic flow plans in pier areas.  Also, transportation resources had to be re-allocated due to the deployment of the Marine Brigade from the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station during the period 14 - 22 February.  Beginning with the marshaling of vehicles of 3 /4 Cav(-) on 11 February and continuing until the arrival of the last vehicles on 25 February, 46 convoy serials totaling 2,746 vehicles were moved from the marshaling area to the port.  Dur