After Action Report 42

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HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY, HAWAII

APO San Francisco 96557

HCSU -P 29 September 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Deployment of the 25th Infantry Division to RVN

TO: See Distribution

1. Forwarded for information in subject report, a report which consolidates and condenses the large volume of data and information contained in the feeder reports submitted by the seventeen staff offices and commands associated with the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division. Subject report recapitulates the deployments, discusses the deployment actions, and extracts pertinent comments and recommendations from the feeder reports which may be applicable in the revision of USARHAW OPLAN 68-65 (Out-loading Plan).

2. Addresses are authorized to extract, reproduce, or otherwise convert for their use any material contained in subject report without reference to this headquarters for approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILFRED ARNOLD Je.

Colonel, ACC

Adjutant General

1 Incl:

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Staff

G2 / G3

Comptroller

Engineer

Transportation

Signal

FS Area

SB Area

USARHAW S&MC

TAMC

TOTAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Letter of Transmittal I

Table of Contents II

Deployment Summary - Map V

Section I INTRODUCTION

1. Scope 1

2. Emphasis by the Commander in Chief 1

3. Deployment planning responsibility 1

4. Deployment time frames 1

5. Orders 2

II PRELIMINARY PLANNING

6. Out-loading support mission 2

7. Concept of deployment support 2

8. Manpower augmentation from reserve components 3

9. The approaching deployments 3

III OPERATIONS

10. Embarkation operations 4

a. Preliminary actions 4

b. Cargo loading 4

c. Summary of cargo operations 4

d. Summary of troop loading operations 4

e. Loading of ammunition 4

f. Summary of entire lift operations 5

g. Operational notes 5

(1) Movement data 5

(2) Marking and documentation 5

(3) Security of in-transit cargo 5

(4) Conex supply 5

(5) Stevedore operations 6

(6) Terminal Facilities 6

(7) Personnel requirements 6

11. Land operations 7

a. Preliminary considerations 7

b. HOLOKAI XI 7

c. HOLOKAI XII 7

d. HOLOKAI XIII 8

12. Support teams, and services 8

a. PCS Clearance Team 8

(1) Qualification of inspectors 8

(2) Installed property 8

(3) Unit fund & CWF property 9

(4) Sundry funds 9

b. TOE Clearance Team 9

c. Contact maintenance & inspection teams 9

d. De-fueling and processing 9 (p ii)

e. Care & preservation demonstration teams 10

f. Forklift support 10

g. Labor support 10

h. Laundry support 10

i. Self Service Supply Center 10

j. Clothing Sales Store 11

k. Mess support 11

l. Communication support 11

13. Personnel and administrative support 11

a. Maintenance of unit strength 11

b. Personnel management 11

c. Dependent Processing Center 11

d. Central Clearance Center 12

e. Transportation for dependents 12

f. Personnel services 13

(1) Postal 13

(2) Finance 13

(3) Religious 13

(4) Non-appropriated fund property 13

(5) Legal 13

14. Program management 13

15. Deployment costs 14

16. Intelligence 14

17. USARHAW S&MC OPERATIONS 14

a. Stock control 14

b. Storage 14

c. Maintenance shop operations 14

(1) Refinishing of small arms weapons 15

(2) Fabrication of protective shields 15

(3) Organizational maintenance 15

d. Ammunition 15

e. Inspection 15

18. TAMC operations 16

a. Medical supply 16

b. Medical services 16

19. Issue of equipment & supplies 16

a. Equipping two additional inf. bns. 17

b. Rough terrain fork-lifts 17

c. EAM equipment 17

d. Radios 17

e. Re-issue of U-6 aircraft parts 18

f. Issues from DAFD 18

g. WABTOC items 18

h. Introduction of PUSH 18

i. Slow-down in VRR shipments 18

j. Base camp rqrmts. & fortifications mat 18 (p iii)

(1) Pre-cut tent frame kits 19

(2) Tents 19

(3) Fortification & construction mat. 19

k. Transhipments at army port 19

l. Sources of supply 19

20. Termination of supply support 19

IV. SUMMARY OF PROBLEM AREAS

21. Transportation 20

a. Absence of unit loading plans 20

b. Additional rqrmt. For land trans. 20

c. Tie-up of critical land transportation 20

22. Increase in post security violations 20

23. Unsanitary family housing 20

24. Unpaid telephone gills 21

25. Inadequate planning for re non-deployables 21

26. Insufficient MHE & no operators 21

27. Supply 21

a. Slow auth. For proc. Of WABTOC items 21

b. No time for formal advertising 21

c. A run on mess hall expendables 21

d. Damages to mess hall equipment 22

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

28. Inclusion of WABTOC items in USARPAC LP&P (U) 22

29. USARHAW assigned pers. for post security 22

30. Build-up of out-loading supplies 22

31. Additional requirements for plywood 23

32. Protection to prevent broken windshields 23

33. Treating of out-loading plans 23

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED` 23

EXHIBITS

A. Letter Gen. Waters to Gen. Darnell 24

B. Recapitulation of deployment orders 26

C. Organization out-loading support teams 27

D. Planned deployment configurations 28

E. Troop and cargo movement summary 30

F. Movement control points 31

G. Communications net. For movement control 32

H. Transportation movement control 33

I. POM technical inspection equipment summary 34

J. Special communications network 40

K. Recapitulation of O&MA costs 41

L. Before & after photograph of pistol 42

M. Protective shield 43

N. Recapitulation of local purchases 44

O. Extract from 22nd Air Force report 49

P. Letter from CG 25th Inf. Div. 50

DISTRIBUTION Inside back cover (p iv)

DEPLOYMENT SUMMARY

A portrayal of the deployments of the 25th Infantry Division by air and sea from Hawaii to RVN

(insert map)

The air movements also depict the primary routes of the three types of aircraft (totaling 231) used in the airlift of the 3rd Brigade Task Force into Pleiku. An airlift which is described in the 22nd Air Force report on Operation Blue Light as “what is now recorded in the annals of Air Force history as the most massive airlift of US troops and equipment into a combat zone.”

An additional 38 aircraft were used to airlift the various air elements of the remainder of the division. (p v)

Section I INTRODUCTION

1. Scope: This report covers the activities of all offices and agencies directly or indirectly associated with the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division, from receipt of CINCUSARPAC's advance warning order, dated 27 October 1965 (advising the division of the pending deployment of our brigade in early 1966), till completion of the deployment of Division (-) under the final movement directive issued by CINCUSARPAC on 28 February 1966.

2. Emphasis by the Commander in Chief: In a personal letter to CGUSARHAW in August 1965, CINCUSARPAC emphasized that “there can be no failure” on the part of the USARPC logistic system in providing adequate logistic and administrative support for operations in Vietnam (EXHIBIT A, page 24).

3. Deployment Planning Responsibility: Under contingency planning, one of USARHAW's major responsibilities is the deployment of the PACOM Reserve Force (i.e. the 25th Infantry Division) from Hawaii when a particular USARPAC operation plan is executed. This responsibility includes the accomplishment of actions to insure that the necessary supplies and equipment to accompany the division are on hand either in the division, or in depot stocks, and to provide the required in-put into the logistic system to assure the division of its re-supply, until re-supply becomes a routine function of the supply pipe-line. With the accelerated build-up of US Army forces in RVN, a major concern to USARHAW in 1965 was the planning criteria stipulating that the 25th Infantry Division should be ready for deployment within the time frame of a few hours for units of the alert brigade, to two weeks for the entire division.

4. Deployment Time Frames: The deployments of the brigade task forces of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii are summarized below. Of the 15,736 troops deployed, slightly over one-half deployed during the first month,

(23 Dec. 65 - 25 Jan 66). Division(-) being deployed over a span of two months.

(p 1)

Total Depart Hawaii

Troops Initial element Last element

3rd Bde Task Force 3,935 23 Dec 65 5 Jan 66

2nd Bde Task Force 3,982 2 Jan 66 6 Jan 66

1st Bn 69th Armor 571 25 Jan 66 -

Division (-) 7,248 15 Jan 66 16 Apr 66

5. Orders: Time permitting, warning orders are issued 75 days in advance of readiness dates, movement directives 60 days in advance of readiness dates. The movement directive is the authority for movement and is the basis for appropriate actions by all agencies. Subsequently Movement Orders are issued which specify the exact organizational structure of the deploying units. Although the CINCUSARPAC advance warning order to the 25th Infantry Division is dated 27 October 1965, USARHAW received the message two weeks later on 13 November 1965. Then came the subsequent change in the warning order which revised the deployments from a one-brigade task force to the immediate deployment of two brigades. The DA warning order for the two brigades issued on 14 December 1965, the USARPAC movement directive issued two days later. Deployment orders are recapitulated in EXHIBIT B, page 26.

Section II PRELIMINARY PLANNING

6. Out-loading Support Mission: To fulfill the need for fully coordinated out-loading actions, a USARHAW out-loading plan was developed to assure the best possible execution of deployment support tasks within planning time frames, and deployment requirements. This plan first published in October 1961. Thereafter, in coordination with the 25th Infantry Division, the plan was tested each quarter through practice out-loadings of brigade task forces, these practice out-loadings conducted under the code name HOLOKAI, the exercises having progressed through HOLOKAI X. When the 25th Infantry Division received its deployment orders, it continued its practice of assigning the code name HOLOKAI to its off-Hawaii deployment. Accordingly, the deployment of the 2nd Brigade Task Force was designated as HOLOKAI XI, the deployment of the 3rd Brigade Task Force as HOLOKA XII, and the deployment of Division (-) as HOLOKAI XIII. The out-loading plan, revised annually as a result of lessons learned in the HOLOKAI exercises, is currently designated as USARHAW OPLAN 68-65 (Out-loading Plan).

7. Concept of Deployment Support: Deployment of a single battalion or a one-brigade task force of the 25th Infantry Division does not normally present particular support problems to USARHAW. However, the deployment of the entire division in rapid, consecutive movements deprives the division of a large portion of its organic support capabilities. Therefore, the basic provisions of the out-loading plan call for USARHAW to provide this kind of support: support which consists of providing various clearance teams, the transportation to move personnel and cargo, and support in manufacturing or fabricating boxes, pallets, and WABTOC items. Local contracts are utilized whenever USARHAW facilities become over-burdened and are unable to produce the required items in time to meet deployment schedules. This support system is outlined in EXHIBIT C, page 27. p. 2

8. Manpower Augmentation from Reserve Components: In anticipation of the manpower load which would be imposed upon USARHAW should the 25th Infantry Division be deployed from Hawaii, CGUSARHAW proposed to the Adjutant General of the State of Hawaii that selected technician personnel from the Hawaii Army National Guard participate in the HOLOKAI exercises for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with the requirements and technique of out-loading, the proposal broached in March 1965. With the acceptance of the proposal by the Adjutant General, about 50 national Guard personnel participated in the planning for HOLOKAI X, planning which included step-by-step indoctrination in post clearance and materiel inspection requirements and procedures. US Army Reserve technician personnel also participated in the planning. Total reserve augmentation for HOLOKAI X was about 60 personnel. (HOLOKAI X was scheduled for May 1965 as an out-loading exercise, airlifting the 3rd Brigade Task Force to marry-up with the DA forward floating depot, the exercise subsequently cancelled due to other training requirements of the 25th Infantry Division.)

9. The Approaching Deployments: Beginning in August 1965, this command began receiving information copies of message traffic (classifications not higher than secret) between US Army Vietnam and Hq USARPAC concerning recommended supplies and equipment to accompany CONUS troop units deploying to RVN. Of special interest to C4 USARWAW were the recommendations on accessory and WABTOC items. Inasmuch as USARV's recommendations pertaining to CONUS units would appear to be equally applicable to the 25th Infantry Division, USARV's allowance factors (for CONUS units) were applied to the 25th Infantry Division to obtain some idea as to what the division requirements would be for accessory and WABTOC items under USARV's criteria. These planning requirements were then screened against available USARHAW assets. The next determination was that immediate supply actions would have to be initiated for such items as 168 walk-in refrigerators (none authorized or available in the division), 2,800 jugs, insulated / vacuum, several thousand barbed wire rolls, pickets, and other engineer items required for base camp construction. Most of these items not normally stocked in the local army supply system. Accordingly, discussions were initiated with Hq USARPAC to obtain authorizations for supply and procurement actions. Although this command was aware of the discussions being conducted between Hq USARPAC and the 25th Infantry division concerning the probably deployment of the division, USARWAW was not being addressed on these top secret messages. Lacking the basis for initiating specific support actions, representatives from this command held many discussions with Hq USARPAC during September and October in trying to “stay ahead of the game.” Finally, on 13 November, this command received a copy of the warning order which had been sent to the division on 27 October (see paragraph 5), and on 1 December, the first of many approvals for local procurement was received from Hq USARPAC, this first approval being an oral authority (subsequently confirmed) for local procurement of lumber. EXHIBIT D (page 28) list the major units of the 25th Infantry Division and their planned deployment configurations.

p. 3

10. Embarkation Operations: The Embarkation Control Center was opened at 0800 hours, 19 December, in Building 1027, Kapalama Military Reservation. The Chief of the Terminal Operations Division, Transportation Office, operates the control center for controlling and /or coordinating both sea and air movements.

a. Preliminary Actions: Upon receiving the oral alert in late October, actions were initiated to determine the number and type of vehicles and equipment assigned to divisional units, the amount of dunnage and lashing gear which would be required to secure such equipment, and the number and type vessels which would be required for movement. Wherever definitive data was not available, general planning factors from FM 101-10-1 (Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data) were used. Upon receipt of instructions on 16 December to out-load the first increment (HOLOKAI XI, 2nd Brigade Task Force), lift requirements for movement of 24,000 MTONs of unit impedimenta and equipment and personnel movement totaling 5,765 officers and men were placed on MSTS-Hono, with in-country arrival date of 20 January 1966.

b. Cargo Loading: Movement requirements for HOLOKAI XI were received from the 25th Infantry Division on 20 December, only 24 hours prior to the arrival of the first cargo vessel. Vehicles, equipment, unit impedimenta, and bulk accompanying supplies were programmed for loading so as to maintain unit integrity in accordance with the desires of the CG 25th Infantry Division. However, unit integrity was adversely influenced by limitations of ships characteristics and cargo handling gear, and the necessity for the most effective utilization of space available. Vehicles were stowed with fuel in tanks and batteries connected. Supplies were stowed in vehicle cargo compartments to top of side-boards. These loading factors applied to all three HOLOKAI movements.

c. Summary of Cargo Operations: A total 127,225 MTONs of cargo were loaded aboard 21 cargo vessels and one special purpose vessel (Comet) for discharge at five ports. Additionally, 4,749 STONs of cargo were airlifted in the deployment of the 3rd Brigade Task Force.

d. Summary of Troop Loading Operations: Of the 15,736 troops deployed, 22.3 per cent or 3,514 troops were airlifted. The 12,222 troops proceeding by sea were transported on eight troop ships. The deployment summary map on page 30 graphically portrays these sea and air movements.

P 4

e. Loading of Ammunition: Essentially, the on-man portions of the basic loads of small arms ammunition were combat loaded so that this ammunition would be immediately available to troops debarking at objective areas. The remainder of the basic load was bulk loaded. Bulk loaded ammunition was loaded at the Pearl Harbor West Lock ammunition piers (WL-2 and WL-4) following loading of bulk accompanying supplies at Kapalama.

f. Summary of Entire Lift Operation: EXHIBIT E (page 30) summarizes the entire movement of the 25th Infantry Division in order of deployment, and provides other pertinent deployment information.

g. Operational Notes: Items of major interest affecting operations at the surface embarkation point are summarized below:

(1) Movement Data: Movement data sheets submitted by the 25th Infantry Division contained numerous errors. These ranged from simple errors in arithmetic to failure to properly identify items to be shipped, and inaccurate computations of weights and cubes of vehicles and equipment. Only those errors affecting ship stowage were reconciled in the Embarkation Control Center by the division liaison officers and the terminal cargo planners.

(2) Marking and Documentation: In order to relieve deploying units of administrative details, the terminal prepared all Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD) for both vehicles and general cargo, documents which are normally prepared by deploying units. Personnel from the terminal and team members from USARHAW Supply and Maintenance Center (S&MC) applied all markings to wheel and track vehicles. Deploying units were required to apply markings to general cargo and to provide the cargo traffic section with a listing of non-vehicular items to be loaded. Unit commanders and liaison officers were briefed in the Embarkation Control Center on desired markings and listings, but in many instances failed to follow instructions.

(3) Security of In-transit Cargo: Due to the presence of a large volume of supplies and equipment spread over a wide area, and the fact that much of this equipment was in open areas on public facilities at Pier 39, an interior guard detail, normally consisting of 27 men, was furnished by the 25th Infantry Division.

(p5)

(4) Conex Supply: The army port normally maintained a strategic reserve stock of 400 type II Conex containers to support contingency missions of the 25th Infantry Division. Prior to the deployments, the terminal was engaged in a program of return of empty containers to CONUS, this program terminated upon receipt of the advance warning order. As the out-loading of HOLOKAI XI progressed, it was apparent that the 400 containers would not meet the requirements of the entire division. Therefore, all elements of USARHAW were asked to return containers to stock. Final division requirements for containers totaled 812. At the completion of the deployment of the last element of the division, the terminal had only 30 full size Conex containers on hand in serviceable condition.

(5) Stevedore Operations: It was apparent at the beginning of ship loading operations that requirements placed on the stevedore contractor would not fall within established “commodity” rates because vehicles loaded with cargo presented problems of stowage and lift which required shifting, use of heavy lift and double lift gear, and additional blocking and lashing. Also, many stowage units had to be moved from one hatch to another due to faulty cube and weight data provided by deploying units. Furthermore, all vehicles with fuel in tanks had to be “grounded” to deck or to the skin of the ship. After consultation with the Chief of Purchasing and Contracting Division, G4 Office, it was agreed that the stevedore contractor would be compensated on a man-hour basis as provided for in the technical provisions of the current stevedore contract.

(6) Terminal Facilities: In agreement with the State of Hawaii, the army assumed temporary operational control of Pier 39 and adjacent hard stand. Fourteen of the 30 ships were loaded at Pier 39 due to a superior configuration which permits the receipt and delivery of both inside and outside cargo simultaneously with the loading or discharging of four deep draft ships. However, stevedore labor was insufficient to simultaneously work both Piers 39 and 40 to their physical capacities. For HOLOKAI XII and XIII, the army used only that portion of Pier 39 for which labor were available. Pier 39 with its adjacent hard stand, and Pier 40 with hard stand between warehouses, provide sufficient space to assemble the vehicles and cargo of two brigades at one time. However, terminal actions were directed toward maintaining a smooth flow of cargo through the terminal areas rather than assembling cargo up to the maximum capacity of the holding areas.

(7) Personnel Requirements: Both contract and direct hire personnel which included supervisory, clerical, and unskilled labor were hired to augment terminal personnel requirements. The most serious shortages were in the cargo checker and cargo supervisor fields since these skills are not available among military personnel, and available only in limited numbers from stevedore contractors. This shortage caused regular terminal civilian employees to work shifts of from 12 to 18 hours, and around-the-clock in some instances. Due to mechanization of cargo handling on the Honolulu waterfront, only 48 stevedore gangs are now available to work conventional vessels, and all indications point to a continued reduction in the number of stevedore gangs. As one gang can work only one hatch-one shift in a 24 hour period, it requires 10 gangs to work a 5 hatch ship around the clock. Available gang hours are prorated among both military and commercial operators based on the number of hatches on berth at any one time.

(p6)

11. Land Operations: This portion of the report is concerned with land transportation, to include the movement of materials between USARHAW depot storage facilities and 25th Infantry Division “staging sites” and operations at the Lower Wheeler Field marshaling area. Land transportation is the responsibility of the Motor Transport Division, Transportation Office.

a. Preliminary Considerations: Upon receipt of the advance warning order, estimated transportation requirements vs. capabilities were analyzed, movement priorities determined, and allowances established providing for slippage of routine requirements for common use land transportation (CULT) in anticipation of out-loading operations saturating the land transportation capability. Also, instructions and schedules for movement were published for marshaling and movement of vehicle convoys, cargo movement requirements, and troop lift schedules. EXHIBIT F (page 31) is a schematic outline of areas involved in these transportation movements routes, and control points. Traffic control was a coordinated effort among all police departments - Division MP's, the Provost Marshals of Fort Shafter and Schofield Barracks, the Honolulu Police Department. The movements were monitored by the Motor Transport Division. Roadside emergency repair and wrecker service was provided. A communications system was established to control and maintain close monitorship of operations, this system portrayed in EXHIBIT G (page 32). EXHIBIT H (page 33) is a schematic outline depicting communications control for vehicle convoys and troop movements.

b. HOLOKAI XI: The transportation of empty Conex containers, crates, sundry packing and crating material, rations, supplies, and pre-positioning of ammunition was accomplished between 12 December and 21 December 1965. Initial convoy serials were moved during daylight hours (0900 - 1200 hours) but based on the desires of the division, subsequent convoy serials were moved at night (2000 - 2400 hours). Accompanying supplies and unit impedimenta moved during the period 22 December through 5 January totaled 6,496 STON's consisting of 699 STONs ammunition, 158 STONs rations, 311 STONs vehicles and equipment, 1,310 STONs tent kits, and 4,018 STONs miscellaneous general cargo. Concerning troop movements, all such movements from Schofield Barracks to port were accomplished during hours of darkness in accordance with desires of the CG25th Infantry Division. Buses were identified by conspicuous yet unclassified markings which provided ease of routing at shipside, these marking coinciding with gangplank designations. A total of 144 buses were required to transport troops departing on the USNS Walker, Sultan and Gordon.

(p 7)

c. HOLOKAI XII: Requirements for HOLOKAI XII differed somewhat from HOLOKAI XI in that requirements for motor transport was on a smaller scale, but at more frequent interval, spread over a longer period of time. Aircraft departure schedules were established at four hour intervals for C133 aircraft and 10 hour intervals for C141 aircraft. These schedules required that the Motor Transport Division establish a 24 hour a day operation beginning with the first flight on 23 December. Although the Motor Transport Division hauled 1,651 STON of cargo from Schofield Barracks to Hickam, the major portion of the unit supplies and impedimenta were loaded on organic vehicles of deploying units. Traffic control methods employed for HOLOKAI XII were similar to HOLOKAI XI, with Motor Transport Division personnel on duty around the clock to coordinate all movement requirements.

d. HOLOKAI XIII: Whereas troops for HOLOKAI XI embarked from Pier 39, troops for HOLOKAI XIII embarked from Pier 40. This change required a complete revision of traffic flow plans in pier areas. Also, transportation resources had to be re-allocated due to the deployment of the Marine Brigade from the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station during the period 14 - 22 February. Beginning with the marshaling of vehicles of 3 /4 Cav(-) on 11 February and continuing until the arrival of the last vehicles on 25 February, 46 convoy serials totaling 2,746 vehicles were moved from the marshaling area to the port. During the period 10 February - 15 April, accompanying supplies and unit impedimenta totaling 10,498 STON (21 STON ammunition, 856 STON vehicles and equipment, 9,621 STON miscellaneous general cargo) were moved from the various unit areas and USARHAW supply points to the army port. 186 buses were required to move troops of division (-).

12. Support Teams, and Services: This portion of the report summarizes actions of the support teams. It also summarizes services provided the deploying units.

a. PCS Clearance Team: This team is organized by the appropriate Area Commanders. The purpose of the PCS Clearance Team is to provide assistance to deploying units in the post clearance of unit supply records and buildings.

(1) Qualification of Inspectors: Many of the personnel assigned as inspectors to the teams were not technically qualified to determine condition or completeness of specialized items of equipment being turned in by the deploying units, the situation was over-come through close supervision and on-the-job training.

(2) Installed Property: In many cases, property records pertaining to office furniture were not up-dated to show proper stock numbers and nomenclature, and considerable time was expended in reconciling and consolidating these records. Also, attempts by deploying units to move station property to centralized locations for inventory purposes rather than leaving them in place, caused considerable damage to such property. Early during clearance operations it was noted that buildings had not been assigned to specific individuals within using units. As a result, deploying unit personnel charged with clearance were not, in all cases, aware of all buildings used by deploying units. Furthermore, records of installed property were not in all cases, available to the clearance team, and full dependence had to be placed on unit records.

(p8)

(3) Unit Fund and Central Welfare Fund Property: Inventory and turn-in of CWF property and unit fund property excess to needs of deploying units were initiated concurrently with installation clearance. Items were secured in place within the quads to facilitate storage. Approximately $137,000 worth of property, primarily day-room furniture, was turned in to CWF in this manner. There was little evidence that deploying units had prepared plans for disposing of CWF property and unit fund property as required by deployment plans.

(4) Sundry Funds: Of the 30 Sundry Funds in the division, 6 were officially dissolved prior to unit deployment, 9 were transferred, and of the 15 remaining funds, disposition instructions were not known at the time of the preparation of this report.

b. TOE Clearance Team: This team is organized by the USARHAW Supply and Maintenance Center. The turn in of excess TOE property and the replacement and exchange of equipment, handled largely through technical supply channels, created a large volume of work, but the work was accomplished without undue difficulty. One of the major items turned in by the division were the M48A2C tanks; newer model tanks being issued to the division in forward areas. The issue of M16 rifles in exchange for M14 rifles produced a large volume of turn-ins. Although six trailer loads of repair parts for U-6 aircraft were turned in, they were subsequently reissued (in the same configuration in which they were turned in) due to change in orders.

c. Contract Maintenance and Inspection Teams: On 14 December, plans were drawn to provide a 100 per cent maintenance inspection of all deployable equipment in the hands of deploying units. Two inspection and maintenance teams were organized by S&MC to provide round-the-clock operations under G4 supervision. Initially, teams were augmented by personnel of the Hawaii National Guard. However, this support was dropped when it became evident that deployments would be spread over a period of several months. Technical inspection teams were organized (by commodity groups) and equipped with the necessary tools, gauges and test equipment. EXHIBIT I (page 34) recapitulates the work involved in this major task. The heavy workloads were in small arms, fire control, artillery and instruments. Many means were utilized to meet the escalated equipment requirements - unserviceable equipment repaired, salvage equipment recouped, parts utilized from the bore-yard, and sets disassembled for components. Maintenance float items were issued to replace items which could not be readily repaired in units. Items requiring extensive repairs were evacuated to the direct or general support shops for repair and return.

d. De-fueling and Processing: De-fueling and processing teams performed final inspection on (p9) approximately 4,500 vehicles at the Wheeler Field marshaling area where each vehicle was inspected to assure that loads were properly stored, secured and strapped. Upon arrival at the sea or air embarkation points, vehicles were given final processing, protective radiator boards and windshield guards installed, shipping markings checked and adjusted as necessary, and vehicles de-fueled as required.

e. Care and Preservation Demonstration Teams: Deploying units were given assistance, including demonstrations, in the proper care and preservation of equipment for crating and movement.

f. Forklift Support: A problem encountered at deploying unit storage and loading areas was the non-availability of material handling equipment. To preclude delays in loading, the USARHAW transportation motor pools loaned their MHE equipment to deploying units and in many cases also provided the operators.

g. Labor Support: With the withdrawal of support requirements normally provided by divisional elements, requests were forwarded to CINCUSARPAC for increased staffing requirements for military police, religious services, and Signal Photo. Personnel augmentation requirements were filled to a large degree by use of non-deployables, temporary hires, transfer of functions from deploying units to USARHAW and TAMC or to non-deploying units (e.g., 2 /21st Arty), and by temporary relocation of civilian workforce from non-critical to critical operational areas. Requests for temporary hires totaled 54 (SB-34, Transportation - 10, S&MC - 10). Requirements of Schofield Barracks and SUMC were primarily for laborers. Transportation requirements were for journeyman and experienced travel clerks. Since experienced personnel were not readily available for temporary hire from the local labor market, attempts were made to secure personnel from other Federal agencies without success. Needs for skilled personnel were finally filled by personnel TDY from Sixth Army.

h. Labor Support: All articles of white goods (under-shorts, undershirts, handkerchiefs, towels, wash cloths, etc.) required dyeing to OG 109. The SB Area QM determined that the workload could be handled by its laundry without relying on commercial support, the capability predicated on availability on the commercial market of the required amounts of dye. The first bundles for dyeing were received on 13 December, a total of 15,833 bundles (334, 375 pieces) processed during the deployment period December through April.

i. Self Service Supply Center: Normal stockage levels were not adequate to meet the demands of crash buying for expendable cleaning and preserving material and administrative supplies. Purchase limits and close controls were effected to assure that each deploying unit received its fair share of available socks. (p10)

j. Clothing Sales Store: Many clothing items reached zero balance early in the deployment preparation state. Assistance was received from the other services in meeting the spiraling demands for such items as cotton drawers, T-shirts, boots and fatigues.

k. Mess Support: Adjustments were made with commercial vendors to assure that subsistence requirements were consistent with the rapidly declining troop strength. The SB Commissary absorbed the task of ration breakdown thereby relieving the division of this responsibility and concurrently affording a direct control over adjusted issues. Arrangements were made to provide deploying units with B rations, C rations, hospital aid station ration kits, and in-flight meals.

l. Communication Support: The Signal Office provided additional administrative telephone service and engineered and supervised the installation of special telephone service between all elements concerned in the deployments. EXHIBIT J (page 40) portrays the special communications network established. With the departure of troops, telephones in use dropped from 7,850 in December to 4,665 in February.

13. Personnel and Administrative Support:

a. Maintenance of Unit Strength: Upon receipt of deployment warning orders, personnel of the deploying

units on special duty with or providing services to USARHAW and subordinate agencies, were identified and released to their parent units. Non-deployable personnel were identified and transferred to the USARHAW Personnel Center. Personnel shortages remaining in deploying units were filled by a combination of requisitions and transfers of available USARPAC / USARHAW personnel assets compatible with grades and skills required.

b. Personnel Management (Personnel Procedures): The Adjutant General established procedures to effect approval or disapproval of command sponsored status of dependents to assure that all privileges due a dependent would be provided should the dependent choose to remain in the command, or to permit issuance of travel orders if the dependent chose to move to another location. There were two categories of dependents to be relocated. First, those who desired movement to a designated area within or outside of the United States, and second, individually sponsored dependents for whom command sponsored status was not authorized by regulations. (p11)

c. Dependent Processing Center: Although facilities and activities necessary to accomplish the movement of unaccompanied dependents were already in existence an immediate problem was the need for a central agency to coordinate the mass movement o dependents to CONUS and elsewhere. Accordingly, a Dependent Processing Center was established on 20 December under the supervision of the G1 Office. The Army Community Service Center was used as the base organization to which other necessary activities were added. USARHAW knew the number of dependents and dependent families involved, but needed more definitive information to determine the magnitude of the movement requirements. A questionnaire was prepared asking the families for their preferences concerning movement dates and mode of transportation, the kind of household goods to be shipped, and many other questions of this nature; questions intended to serve as a basis for providing the best service possible. The questionnaire was devised so that answers could be tabulated by automatic data processing. Policies for continued occupancy of quarters, and procedures for clearing quarters and the installation, were determined and the information disseminated. Arrangements were made for a liaison team to be stationed at San Francisco to assist dependents in their onward movement. A direct circuit teletype from Hawaii to Oakland Army Terminal was established to keep the liaison team informed of arrivals and itinerary of dependents. Messages were also transmitted through the regular communications system to all appropriate CONUS armies and overseas commands so that dependents could be provided en-route assistance.

d. Central Clearance Center: A Central Clearance Center was established under the Area Commander, Schofield Barracks, to assist families in quarters clearance. Normal quarters inspection procedures were suspended although occupants were enjoined to have quarters in satisfactory condition prior to departure. Families were authorized to remain in quarters until picked up by government transportation for movement to dockside or airports. The warehouse operation of the center was primarily concerned with the pick-up of furniture from civilian housing units. The center staff increased from its authorized strength of 33 to a peak of 50. Four to ten additional trucks were used as required, and military details averaged 700 man days per month. Pertinent actions accomplished: 1,489 government quarters terminated and 392 assigned; 537 off-post furniture pick-ups and 135 deliveries; 5,992 quarters inspected / re-inspected. Many dependent families decided to remain in Hawaii because of the availability of government quarters at Schofield Barracks to unaccompanied dependents. Additional families decided to remain in Hawaii when Hawaii was announced as R&R Center in May 1966. The number of dependent families remaining in Hawaii until sponsors next PCS constantly changes because of changes of individual desires. It is anticipated that about 700 will remain until sponsors next PCS. The following is a record of families relocated: 42 in December; 1,223 in January; 416 in February; 420 in March; 326 in April; 156 in May; 85 programmed for June.

(p12)

e. Transportation for Dependents: A total of 2,309 families (6,693 dependent individuals) were moved by air while 82 families (238 individuals) were moved by surface; families moved to the mainland, to Europe, South America, the Far East, Australia, and to the outer islands of Hawaii. Shipments of household goods, including shipment by local drayage to Honolulu addresses, totaled 3,000. Shipments of property of the deploying troops totaled 9,127 (10,711 pieces).

f. Personnel Services:

(1) Postal: Because of advance postal services provided to deploying personnel, the services available through the activated Embarkation Point Postal Unit were not utilized.

(2) Finance: Toll charges received subsequent to the termination of telephone service were reported to the 25th Infantry Division Finance Office for collection.

(3) Religious: Agreements were reached between USARHAW and the 25th Infantry Division for USARHAW to continue to fund for items furnished by the Schofield Barracks Chaplain Fund as long as any element of the division, with chaplains assigned, remained in the area, and that USARHAW would forward religious material to Vietnam until Division Chaplain's Fund was in full operation in-country.

(4) Non-appropriated Fund Dividends: As units began their deployment, CWF began paying dividends to include the period up to the departure date from this command. Units retained unit fund records and maintained bank accounts in Hawaii.

(5) Legal: The SJA office assisted in completing wills and powers of attorney for division personnel. With the deployment of the division, all claims for and against the government, of division assigned personnel, will continue to be processed through the SJA. Similarly, all legal assistance for division dependents will continue to be furnished by the SJA. There were 1,526 legal assistance cases handled during March 1966 compared to 423 for March 1965.

g. Records Administration: Since the authority for granting command sponsored status to dependents rests with USARWAW, the 25th Infantry Division had to determine those dependents who were not command sponsored, but who were eligible for such status. Other records administrative actions (processing applications for movement of dependents and station housing allowance, etc.) were handled in a routine manner.

14. Program Management: For the FY 66 command operating budget, the G2/G3 office had programmed $635,000 in Budget Program, 2000 (Operating Forces) to support the 25th Infantry Division in its assigned Southeast Asia activities. Upon receipt of deployment orders, USARHAW was directed to support the 25th Infantry Division with available resources from within the FY66 annual funding program, costs to be reported to Comptroller and recoupment to be effected later. (p13)

15. Deployment Costs: EXHIBIT K (page 41) is the Comptroller's recapitulation of the $14.8 million in O&MA (Operation and Maintenance Army) costs incurred in the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division.

16. Intelligence: There was a great workload increase in the G2/G3 office concerning personnel security investigations because of the 25th Infantry Division request that USARHAW assume control of all division personnel security investigations, and review, evaluate, and adjudicate the results of such investigations.

17. USARHAW Supply and Maintenance Center (S&MC) Operations: Prior portions of this report have touched upon many of the tasks performed by S&MC. This portion of the report recapitulates other significant performances within S&MC activities. An estimated 129.5 man years were expended by S&MC in its support of the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division, these man years including support provided S&MC by the SB Area Commander, 25th Infantry Division, and the reserve components.

a. Stock Control: Due to computer limitations in searching for assets, stock control personnel expended excessive man-hours in checking and screening for available assets. Over 200,000 Priority 2 requisitions were processed, utilizing Project Code VRR. (NOTE: The application of assets in the DA forward depots was a determination made by USARPAC.) Numerous dray tags and advance issues were made to expedite actions in order to meet up-dated departure dates or whenever premium air or surface transportation space became available.

b. Storage: 25th Infantry Division personnel were trained by storage personnel in the care and preservation of items to be packed for shipment, and in processing vehicles for out-loading. Storage personnel handled 217,653 issue documents and processed 130,563 receipts. There were not enough personnel trained to handle this large volume of paperwork, and although the 25th Infantry Division assisted in this problem area by providing personnel, this assistance was not too effective because of the need for constantly training new personnel to replace previously trained personnel deploying with their units. There were internal operating problems caused by inadequate quantities of material handling equipment to handle the increased workload. Another problem was the creation of peaks and valleys in workload caused by the fact that the hauling of supplies from the port to the storage warehouses was done mostly at night because of the ready availability of transportation during these hours, this transportation factor causing an uneven flow of supplies through the receiving and shipping operations. Storage activities operated initially on two 12 hour shifts, reverting to a single 12 hour shift as workload permitted and eventually returned to the normal eight hour work day.

c. Maintenance Shop Operations: The maintenance shops provide personnel for maintenance contact teams and port contact teams. Enumerated below are particular aspects of shop operations. (p14)

(1) Refinishing of Small Arms Weapons: Technical manuals which prescribe requirements and procedures for the repair of small arms weapons state that bright surfaces on weapons are objectionable “from the standpoint of visibility when they are capable of reflecting light.” Accordingly, all exposed metal surfaces are to have a phosphate finish, the finish color to range from black to medium gray. The division turned in for exchange 1,142 M14 rifles, 1,170 .45 caliber pistols and 218 M112 mounts because these weapons did not meet inspection criteria. It is estimated that 50% of the M14's, 65% of the pistols, and 75% of the mounts would have passed inspection except for refinishing. EXHIBIT L (page 42) is a photograph illustrating the finishing requirement. The process of refinishing requires that the weapon be completely disassembled, then sandblasted. The sudden influx of weapons for refinishing created a tremendous work backlog, a situation which could have been averted through the proper performance of normal maintenance.

(2) Fabrication of Protective Shields: Because of their exposed positions when firing their weapons, machine gunners on some of the tracked vehicles are particularly vulnerable to opposing fire. Based on a request by the CG 25th Infantry Division, 145 protective shields for machine gunners were fabricated in the maintenance shops. These armor plate shields were designed by shop personnel to division's specification, because there is no design available for the desired types of shields. Shields were fabricated for 117 APC's, 23 for self-propelled artillery vehicles, and 5 for helicopters. A photograph of the shield for the APC is at EXHIBIT M (page 43).

(3) Organizational Maintenance: Because of a mistaken impression by divisional units that the S&MC shops would correct all deficiencies noted by inspectors, many of the deploying units lost much time by sending their

equipment to S& MC shops for correction of organizational maintenance deficiencies.

d. Ammunition: Deploying units loaded ammunition on their vehicles in an area set aside for this purpose in Aliamanu Crater. Vehicles were then left in Aliamanu until called forward by the port. Late submission of requisitions and frequent changes in items and quantities desired were some of the problems encountered by the Ammunition Division of S&MC, these problems creating the need for some overtime work. Last minute changes also resulted in the shipment of items not required, e.g., 90mm tank ammunition and 5.56mm small arms ammunition shipped instead of , respectively, the 76mm and 7.62mm. (p15)

e. Inspection: The Inspection Division had the task of conducting a 100 per-cent technical inspection of deploying unit equipment. The inspection teams were augmented by personnel from the G1/G3 office and by personnel from the reserve components. Performance is discussed in paragraph 12c. Inspections were hampered by poor lighting in the motor pools and supply rooms, and further complicated because equipment to be inspected was not brought together in a central location, i.e., machine guns would be in supply rooms while the mounts and spare barrels would be in the motor pools. Without waiting for the inspection teams, some of the deploying units had packed their weapons and equipment while other units were slow in making their equipment available for inspection. A total of 115,965 items were inspected. This total includes major items as well as secondary items and compares with the 58,865 major items only summarized in the bar graph chart on page 38 of EXHIBIT I.

18. Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) Operations: Arrangements were made with the 25th Infantry Division Surgeon so that garrison medical support being furnished by division medical elements would be assumed by the subordinate elements of TAMC. The medical services furnished for many years by the 25th Infantry Division were difficult to adequately replace from resources available to TAMC. Several such difficulties are still being encountered, but actions are pending which should rectify these remaining problem areas. There was confusion in determining deployment increments being discussed because one person would identify a certain increment as GREENLIGHT, another would identify the same as HOLOKAI, while still another would identify the deploying increment by the deploying brigade.

a. Medical Supply: The requirements for medical supplies were determined and the information pre-punched on cards, this action coordinated with the 25th Medical Battalion. Initial rates of fill on requisitions were between 81% and 94%.

b. Medical Services: In December, certain clinics in the dispensary at Schofield Barracks were combined to enable the release of division personnel performing garrison duties. Then, in early February, 23 enlisted AMEDS personnel from Tripler General Hospital and other TAMC elements were transferred to the dispensary at Schofield. Concurrently, all division AMEDS personnel were released from dispensary duty except for five Medical Corps Officers (who were released on 1 March). TAMC then assumed complete responsibility for dispensary operations at Schofield Barracks, the ambulance coverage of Wheeler Air Force Base army aviation functions, and the required ambulance coverage at ranges, recreational beaches and other areas.

19. Issue of Equipment and Supplies: The deployment of Company C; of the 65th Engineer Battalion to Cam Ranh Bay in August 2965 gave a foretaste of the kind of equipment problems which could arise should the 25th Infantry Division be deployed. The company deployed with increased quantities in many of its TOE items as well as with additional equipment because of its mission assignment. The company was also given authorization by USARPAC to exchange 19 dump trucks for a like number of new dump trucks from USARHAW depot stocks. WABTOC items such as additional tentage, generators, cots, and lighting systems also were part of the equipment accompanying the unit to Cam Ranh Bay. This portion of the report recapitulates similar actions associated with the deployment of the division.

(p16)

a. Equipping of Two Additional Infantry Battalions: In early October, DA directed the reorganization of the 25th Infantry Division by the activation of two new infantry battalions, the 4th and 5th Battalions of the 21st Infantry, these battalions activated by USARPAC on 2 December, then inactivated on 20 December, after DA had designated two “Alaska” battalions, the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry and the 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry. By min-October, USARHAW had completed the preparation and submission of requisitions for TOE items required to equip the two battalions of the 21st Infantry, and by the last week of October, USARPAC ICP had completed its part in forwarding these requisitions to CONUS. Meanwhile, equipment available in USARHAW stocks, plus stocks made available through lateral transfers from USARHAW units, were being issued to the 25th Infantry Division for the two battalions of the 21st Infantry. Therefore, when DA designated the two “Alaska” battalions, indicating that these two battalions would close in Hawaii from Alaska by the end of January with individual clothing and equipment and individual and crew-served weapons, numerous adjustments and cancellations had to be effected on requisitions submitted to CONUS in October. Subsequently, DA authorized USARPAC to apply equipment pre-positioned in the DAFD (DA Forward Depot) to fill equipment shortages for the two “Alaska” battalions. Through a combination of these resources - issues from USARHAW, shipments from CONUS, and issues from DAFD stocks - the equipment requirements of the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry and the 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry were fully met (with the exception of certain DA-controlled items) when these two battalions, as part of the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, deployed from Hawaii in mid April.

b. Rough Terrain Forklifts: To meet the division's requirements, four of these forklifts in use by the Hawaii Army National Guard at its NIKE sites were withdrawn from these sites and transferred to the division.

c. RAM Equipment: The division had on requisition six keypunch and two verifier machines. Since CONUS had indicated that these pieces of equipment would not be available till March, similar types of equipment which had been received in October for use by USARHAW were transferred to the division. Division personnel were given training as machine operators, training being provided by the USARPAC Computer Service Center, and by the Stock Control Division of USARHAW S&MC.

d. Radios: The desires of the 25th Infantry Division for equipping all units with the “new family” radios became a problem early in the deployment discussions because DA had indicated that these new radios would not be available to the division prior to February. After many discussions extending through most of December, the division was advised by DA that the conversion of the old radios of the 2nd Brigade and the 3rd Brigade to the “new family” radios would be done in-country. In early January, the division made further urgent requests to permit the conversion (in Hawaii) prior to the deployment of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, but DA refused to consider these requests. However, DA did establish Project Codes ZTB (3rd Brigade conversion) and ZTO (2nd Brigade conversion) to assure priority supply of new radios to these two brigades. (p17)

e. Reissue of U-6 Aircraft Parts: Due to policy changes regarding the introduction in-country of the U-6 aircraft, six trailer loads of aircraft parts turned in by the division were subsequently reissued to the division, this transaction also noted in paragraph 12b discussing the work of the TOE Clearance Team.

f. Issues From DAFD: With DA's authorization to apply DAFD stocks to fill equipment shortages, (paragraph 19a), the question of back-hauling this equipment to Hawaii became an issue between the division and USARPAC. From the standpoint of training and familiarization, rationale decreed that this equipment should be back-hauled to Hawaii. However, after considering the criticality of shipping and the time remaining within the deployment time frames, the division reluctantly agreed to receive DAFD equipment in forward areas.

g. WABTOC Items: Only limited quantities of WABTOC items could be provided from USARHAW resources. Therefore, these requirements (walk-in refrigerators, jugs, insulated /vacuum, etc.) were mostly requisitioned on CONUS.

h. Introduction of PUSH: In late December, this command was queried by USARPAC on the feasibility of establishing the PUSH system of re-supply to replace the SPEEDBOAT system. (Under the PUSH system, the inventory control points in CONUS would have the responsibility for initiating re-supply actions. Under SPEEDBOAT, this responsibility is USARHAW's.) After agreements were reached between the division, USARPAC, and USARHAW, the division furnished a listing of weapons and equipment density, this listing hand-carried to DA to start the PUSH system going. Under PUSH, re-supply would begin arriving in-country 60 days after arrival of units.

i. Slow-down in VRR Shipments: In early January, the US Army Material Command dispatched a message to all its CONUS depots instructing them to take expeditions action on Project Code VRR requisitions submitted by USARPAC. The message noted that some installations were not shipping items promptly and were not using priority transportation to ship items to Sacramento by required dates. (p18)

j. Base Camp Requirements, and Fortification Material: The magnitude of division requirements for base camp construction and fortification materials is illustrated by a few citations: 168 walk-in refrigerators; 2,800 jugs, insulated vacuum; 2,100 tents and tent frame kits; almost 16,000 canvas cots; 2,500 rucksacks and more than 8,000 jungle hammocks; 40,000 coils of concertina wire in 50 lb coils and 40,000 rolls of barbed wire; 368,000 pickets of all sizes; 2 million sandbags; miles of signal wire. When USARPAC finally approved USARV's recommended list of items for base camp construction (paragraph 9) for the 25th Infantry Division, this approval started a flurry of requisitioning and local procurement actions. As note in paragraph 19g, WABTOC items were mostly placed on requisition to CONUS because these were items of supply not normally stocked in the local supply system.

(1) Pre-cut Tent Frame Kits: Division requirements for pre-cut tent frames (small, medium and large) totaled about 2,100 of which the Schofield Barracks Area Engineer manufactured about 1,200 in the engineer carpenter shops, while the balance was constructed through local contracts. Screening and hardware for these tent frames were purchased locally and from CONUS, bundled together with the tent frames, then shipped with units. EXHIBIT N (page 44) recapitulates local purchases of lumber and hardware for the tent frames, and other purchases.

(2) Tents: The major portion of the requirements for tents were placed on CONUS requisitions.

(3) Fortification and Construction Material: Timbers and similar fortification material are not available locally. Division requirements for these items were submitted to DA for approval. Because efforts to obtain these items were being pushed through several channels, requirements were being duplicated and triplicated. Part of the problem was that DA messages authorizing fortification and construction packages had not been passed to the division nor to USARHAW. Requisitions were finally submitted for 47 barriers and 47 construction packages.

k. Trans-shipments at Army Port: Throughout the deployment period, equipment items arriving from CONUS were being off-loaded from incoming vessels, then trucked over to the out-loading piers for out-shipment with deploying units. Dray tags were used (refer to paragraph 17a) in lieu of requisitions to expedite the movement of these trans-shipments.

l. Sources of Supply: In addition to supplies and equipment obtained through army supply sources, division personnel obtained supplies from property disposal yards and from supply sources of the other services.

20. Termination of Supply Support: Supply shipments against dues-out to the 25th Infantry Division continued for several months after the deployment of its last elements. By July, only minor items remained as dues-out; items which most likely had been filled by PUSH or supplied through the established RVN supply system. This command proposed to USARPAC that shipments against dues-out to the division be discontinued effective 1 August. The proposal was forwarded on 28 July and approved two days later; the approval terminating USARHAW's supply support of the 25th Infantry Division.

(p19)

21. Transportation:

a. Absence of Unit Loading Plans: Terminal personnel had to resort to the use of gross planning factors

for terminal planning because deploying units were unable to provide movement requirements data. The use of gross planning factors caused continuous adjustments in loading plans. Data, when finally submitted by deploying units, contained numerous errors concerning vehicle count, weights and measurements, and nomenclatures which did not accurately identify items to be loaded. Units added or subtracted items offered for shipment up until the time hatches were closed, and added or removed vehicles from cargo assembly lines without notifying terminal personnel. In many instances, items were added to cargo loads which changed loading and stowage characteristics without corresponding changes being made in movement data, this resulting in cargo not fitting in assigned location on vessels and requiring unnecessary shifting and re-stowing.

b. Creating Additional Requirements for Land Transportation: To expedite the transshipment of items from incoming vessel to the out-loading vessel (paragraph 19k), terminal personnel recommended to deploying unit commanders that they establish operations at the pier where deploying unit personnel could sort, mark and identify items being transshipped. The Supply and Transportation Battalion was the only unit which took up this recommendation. Other units created additional requirements for land transportation by hauling the transshipment items from the pier to Schofield (for sorting, marking, identification), then back to the pier for out-loading.

c. Tie-up of Critical Land Transportation: The Air Force required that cargo loads be at Hickam Field five hours prior to departure time; personnel to be at the air terminal two hours prior to plane departure time. Then, land transportation had to remain at the air terminals until the departure of aircraft in order that cargo or personnel could be back-hauled to their army bases immediately in case of aborted flight missions. These lead-time requirements tied up land transportation for excessive periods of time.

22. Increase in Post Security Violations: Unit deployments caused the withdrawal of personnel who provided much of the military police and interior guard support. The departure of these personnel created a temporary break in post security. Immediately, numerous break-ins, thefts, pilferages and car strippings occurred.

23. Unsanitary Family Housing: Before being issued quarters clearance, families occupying government quarters must see to it that quarters being vacated meet sanitary standards. Decisions to permit unaccompanied dependents to remain in government quarters until their day of departure resulted in the majority of such quarters failing to meet prescribed sanitary standards. (p20)

24. Unpaid Telephone Bills: Due to the large volume of terminations for telephone service, it was not possible to issue pay adjustment authorizations for all accounts involved. Consequently, many telephone accounts of deployed personnel remain unpaid.

25. Inadequate Planning for Receipt of Non-deployables: Non-deployable personnel were assigned to the US Army Personnel Center on short notice, causing the center to absorb these personnel without adequate planning for messing, billeting, and administration. The center is not staffed to handle the expanded requirements for personnel actions attendant to a sudden increase in personnel strength.

26. Insufficient Material Handling Equipment (MHE) and No Operators: There were delays in moving and loading of supplies within deploying unit areas due to the lack of MHE. When such equipment was made available to units, the non-availability of operators in the units caused an ensuing problem.

27. Supply:

a. Slow Authorizations for Procurement of WABTOC Items: Because firm information (authorizations, basis of issue, sources of supply) was not readily provided, supply planning actions for obtaining WABTOC items required continuing revisions. Although the 25th Infantry Division had considered USARV's recommendations for WABTOC items as being directive in nature, USARHAW had no authorizations to proceed with supply actions. Therefore, the period between the receipt of the first of USARV's many recommendations to the receipt of the first authorizations for the procurement of lumber, (August through early December) was a period of great vexation, a period when many supply and procurement actions could have been initiated. The volume of priority VRR shipments of supplies and equipment from CONUS to Hawaii would not have been so great if early supply actions had been authorized. Early authorizations would also have provided time for formal advertising for local procurements (see following item).

b. No Time For Formal Advertising: Deploying units submitted their requirements for lumber and packing and crating supplies as the actual needs arose. Therefore, almost every requirement for local procurement of such supplies had to be met on a crash action basis, there being little or no lead time to permit formal advertising. Under the circumstances, requirements for local procurements were negotiated. If the G4 Contracting Division had had time for formal advertising, the procurement lead time then available to local contractors and suppliers would have contributed to price quotations much more favorable than the prices quoted under negotiation. Formal advertising would have realized savings in cost of supplies.

c. A Run on Mess Hall Expendables: Anticipating the necessities required in base camp operations, units deployed with all available expendable mess hall items such as compartmented plastic trays, cups, bowls, etc. Although USARHAW will have to replace these expendables, many of these items could have been replaced in due time. (p21)

d. Damages to Mess Hall Equipment: Some walk-in and reach-in refrigerators and freezer cabinets were damaged because these pieces of equipment were not properly drained when unit mess halls were closed. These major pieces of kitchen equipment will have to be repaired or replaced. Improper care also caused damages to other pieces of equipment, e.g., coffee urns and upright mixers. Additionally, a few items of equipment (freezer cabinets, water cooler, meat-slicer) which were initially inventoried and accounted for, were subsequently missing when rechecks were made after deployed. Although the cost of repairs or replacement of damaged or missing equipment may be substantial, the problem is not severe, considering the fact that the division operated 63 mess halls.

Section V RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations submitted in the feeder reports which concern the internal operating procedures of the reporting units are not embodied in this report. The recommendations which follow are items of major interest which the G4 office will pursue further during the subsequent revision of the USARHAW Out-loading Plan.

28. Inclusion of WABTOC items in USARPAC Logistic Policies and Procedures for General and Limited War Planning (USARPAC LP&P) (U): The problem of obtaining information and authorization concerning WABTOC items is discussed in paragraph 27a, page 21. The USARPAC LP&P states that WABTOC item will be authorized as approved by the subordinate commanders (paragraph 4a (4), USARPAC LP&P). RECOMMEND that this policy statement be implemented by the inclusion of a listing of WABTOC items required by units deploying in support of USARPAC operations plans.

29. USARHAW Assigned Personnel for Post Security: The temporary break in post security discussed in paragraph 22, page 20, is a recognized problem. As such, RECOMMEND that the USARHAW out-loading Plan provide for a phase-down of functions normally requiring the posting of security personnel, and a close-down of facilities to reduce the requirement for security personnel.

30. Build-up of Out-loading Supplies: Operational Project USARHAW GEN-6-61 is the device used to stock supplies required to support out-loading operations. Most of the items in this operational project are items required by port operations. RECOMMEND that the project be expanded by increasing the quantities of port items currently authorized, by the addition of items required by supply operations in support of out-loading, and by the addition of items required in other phases of out-loading (see Recommendation which follows). (p22)

31. Additional Requirements for Plywood: Among the recommendations contained in the 22nd Air Force Report on Operation BLUE LIGHT, is a recommendation that “Army division should include, as part of this planning, a ready source for 3 /4” plywood sheets if combined cargo /troop loads are contemplated for the C-141.” The narrative which explains the background for the recommendation is at EXHIBIT O (page 49). In essence, placing a cargo pallet on a plywood sheet permits rapid plane loading and unloading because the plywood allows the cargo to be moved rapidly along the rollers installed in the plane. RECOMMEND that plywood for this purpose be stocked as part of the build-up of out-loading supplies in Operational Project USARHAW GEN-6-61.

32. Protection to prevent Broken Windshields: The 22nd Air Force Report also notes that while in flight, troops climbed over vehicles to reach the forward latrine and galley area, and in so doing, broke some of the lowered windshields; windshields which had been lowered to facilitate loading. The 22nd Air Force recommends that a piece of plywood be banded over the windshield before vehicles are loaded on planes. RECOMMEND that this protective procedure be adopted by units deploying from USARHAW.

33. Testing of Out-loading Plans: To test the validity of sea and air out-loading plans, and to assure that unit transportation requirements data are current, RECOMMEND that unit training programs of PACOM Army Reserve units include quarterly out-loading exercises, these exercises to be conducted jointly with USARHAW.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

A letter from the CG 25th Infantry Division expressing the division's appreciation

For the accomplishment of “a highly successful deployment: is at EXHIBIT P,

The last exhibit in this report.

(p23)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters United States Army, Pacific

APO San Francisco 96558

9 August, 1965

Dear Carl:

Recent events compel me to emphasize again that the President of the United States has given the highest priority to the successful accomplishment of our mission in Viet Nam.

As you know, United States Army, Pacific has the job of organizing, equipping, training and employing assigned forces to insure optimum readiness for combat operations. We are responsible for providing individual personnel and units to fulfill CINCPAC's operational requirements. One of our biggest and most difficult tasks is to provide adequate logistic and administrative support for operations in Viet Nam.

Pending the build-up of adequate personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities, many problems will arise. This means we must exercise a very special and intimate type of leadership which identifies and focuses quickly on problem areas which affect the deployment and support of our forces. Once identified, the problems must be solved with dispatch which in many cases may call for demanding and unusual solutions.

Each command should have meaningful programs and procedures. We must be capable at any given time to produce accurate and meaningful data which shows where we stand with respect to personnel, training and materiel readiness. Each one of us should take inventory now to determine exactly where we stand with respect to mission accomplishment. In this regard it may prove profitable to review carefully the “be prepared to” type missions assigned in USARPAC Operations Instructions No. 1-64(U) to insure that everything possible is being done to plan for effective support of our forces.

I know each of you realizes the sense of urgency that exists and is doing his part. However, I cannot over-emphasize how strongly I believe that upon the various elements of United States Army, Pacific, each in varying degrees of course, depends the success or failure of our logistical and administrative support effort. There can be no failure. Therefore, I call on you to take such actions as you deem necessary to see that we carry forward our mission to the highest effectiveness and perfection. My staff and I stand ready to back you in any way we can.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

JOHN K. WATERS

General, U.S. Army

Commander in Chief

Major General Carl Darnell, Jr.

Commanding General

U.S. Army, Hawaii

APO U.S. Forces 96557

Recapitulation of Deployment Orders

1. Division Msg. reference & classification

27 Oct. 65 - Advance Warning Order, advising USARPAC GPOP-PL 21583

Division of deployment of one brigade

Early 1866m Div(-) later in year

2. Two Brigades (1 by air to Pleiku, the other by sea to Saigon)

14 Dec 65 - Warning Order DA 743968

16 Dec 65 - Movement Directive USARPAC GPOP - Op 35007

16 Dec 65 - Movement Order CINCPAC 160159Z Dec

3. 69th Armor

9 Jan 65 - Advance Movement Directive USARPAC GPOP-OP 482

11 Jan 65 - Final Movement Directive USARPAC GPOP - OP 600

20 Feb 65 - Movement Order CINCPAC 200821Z - Feb

4. Division (-)

12 Jan 66 - Warning Order DA 746876

6 Feb 66 - Movement Order CINCPAC 060300Z Feb

12 Feb 66 - Movement Directive USARPAC GPOP - OP 3017

5. 3rd Sqdn 4th Cav (-)

5 Feb 66 - Advance Movement Directive USARPAC GPOP - OP 2568

22 Feb 66 - Final Movement Directive USARPAC GPOP - OP 3694

Note: JCS policy concerning classification of RVN deployment information (planning, alerting,

Deployment) is enunciated in JCS confidential message 8963, 24 Aug. 65.

Exhibit B (p26)

Oganization for Providing Out-loading Support Teams and OTHER SUPPORT

25TH Inf Div

Fwd info on deploying units;

Submit requests for support

Teams and OTHER SUPPORT AC of S, G4

P&C Div

Contracts for

OTHER SUPPORT

Area Cmdrs Cmdr S&MC TransO

PCS clearance team TOE clearance team Bulk cargo mvmts

Contact maint. Team CULT & TMPs

Labor support team Equip insp team (SB - FS)

Care & preservation

demonstration team Personnel mvmts

Defueling & deprocessing TMPs (SB - FS)

team

OTHER SUPPORT

Box making

Mfg shipping pallets

Fabrication of WABTOC items

(tent frame kits, latrine kits, etc.)

staff supervision

Exhibit C (p27)

(p28)

Major Units Planned Deployment Configuration

25th Infantry Division 3rd Bde TF 2nd Bde TF Div (-)

BLUELIGHT GREENLIGHT MOONLIGHT

Unit Auth str MOLOKAI XII `HOLOKAI XI HOLOKAI XII

HHC 25th Inf Div 152 1 1 150

25th MP Co 189 31 31 127

25th Avn Bn 313 2 2 350

125th Sig Bn 626 51 51 516

65th Engr Bn 932 221 222 319

HHC 1st Bde 125 _ _ 123

HHC 2nd Bde 125 _ 122 _

HHC 3rd Bde 125 122 _ _

3rd Sqdn 4th Cav 856 180 180 354

HHB Div Arty 217 _ _ 223

1st Bn 8th Arty 490 _ 489 _

2nd Bn 9th Arty 490 489 _ _

7th Bn 11th Arty 490 _ 489

3rd Bn 13th Arty 592 _ _ 592

2nd Bn 21st Arty 321 (Not Deployed)

HQ HQ & Band 97 _ _ 81

25th Admin Co 396 50 50 255

25th Med Bn 396 88 88 216

25th Sup & Trans Bn 485 134 134 248

725th Maint Bn 691 100 100 463

1st Bn 69th Arm 571 (Deployed separately, see below)

1st Bn 14th Inf 829 829 _ _

1st Bn 27th Inf 829 _ 829 _

1st Bn 35th Inf 829 829 _ _

2nd Bn 14th Inf 829 _ _ 829

2nd Bn 27th Inf 829 _ 829 _

2nd Bn 35th Inf 829 829 _ _

4th Bn 9th Inf 829 _ _ 829

4th Bn 23rd Inf 829 _ _ 829

1st Bn (M) 5th Inf 899 _ 901 _

16,210

Plus:

25th MI Det 15 15 36

18th Mil Hist Det _ _ 2

LO Sec 303rd ASA Bn _ _ 1

Red Cross (Civ) 1 1 1

3972 4045 7033

Deployed separately:

1st Bn 69th Arm

Exhibit D (p28)

NOTES:

Source of authorized strengths: USARPAC GO 332 (2 Dec 65) as changed per GO 344 (20 Dec 65),

GO 4 (6 Jan 66), GO 14 (25 Jan 66) and GO 33 (14 Feb 66).

2. 65th Engr Bn.: The 932 authorized strength includes Co C which deployed to Cam Ranh Bay in August 1965,

deployed strength 171.

3. 2nd Bn 21st Arty: This is the only unit which remained in Hawaii. Unit attached to USARHAW effective 1

Mar 66 (USARPAC GO 38, 25 Feb 66).

Deployment Code Names:

The code name GREENLIGHT first appeared in message USARV-AVC 037, 27 Nov 65; BLUELIGHT in message USARV-AVD-PO 041, 14 Dec 65; MOONLIGHT in 25th Infantry Division OPORD OPLAN HOLOKAI XIII, 1 Feb. 66.

b. The code name HOLOKAI in Hawaiian means, to “go to the sea”. This code name was first assigned by the 25th Infantry Division to its deployment exercise held in February 1961. These deployment exercises had progressed through HOLOKAI X at the time that the division received its actual deployment order. The continued use of the code name gave the division, and USARHAW, a means to circumscribe some security aspects of the deployment orders in preparing for the many actions required of deployment.

5. Deployment configurations: The strength figures listed for the brigade task forces and Div(-) are deployment planning figures only, derived from the following:

HOLOKAI XI and XII 25th Inf Div message TL 12-4582, 14 Dec 65

HOLOKAI XIII Annex A (Task organization to 25th Inf Div OPLAN HOLOKAI XIII, 1 Feb 66)

Summary of the various strength totals:

a. USARPAC General Orders 16,210

plus: 25th MI Det, etc. 70

16,280

minus: 2/21st Arty 321 Not deployed

Co C 65th Engr Bn 171 Previously deployed

15, 788

b. 25th Inf Div planning total 15,621

c. Actual deployment 15,745 See Exhibit E

(p29)

(Maps & Charts, (Exhibit E), p31 (Exhibit F), p 32 (Exhibit G). p 33 (Exhibit H)

POM Technical Inspection Equipment Summary (p34)

First line of figures - Total Inspected

Second line of figures ( ) - Total Faults

Small V (Veh)

HOLOKAI XI Arms CV (Cmbt V) Arty Engr Cal Sig CM Med

1/5th Mech 980 V 72 251 979 358 493 54

(501) (35) (115) (113) (167) (18) (0)

CV 55

(120)

1/27th Inf 865 V 157 54 950 163 116 73

(90) (200) (69) (47) (62) (13) (0)

2/27th Inf 863 V 157 45 981 307 309 79

(347) (227) (31) (23) (66) (52) (0)

1/8th Armor 504 V 150 40 49 199 40 37

(205) (203) (70) (21) (32) (13) (1)

1/69th Armor 690 V 64 46 591 363 89 60

(335) (40) (59) (13) (105) (18) (0)

CV 25

(71)

3 /4 Cav 176 V 14 17 124 28 310 13

(Troop A) (36) (34) (13) (1) (11) (125) (0)

CV 21

(78)

65th Engr 171 V 79 42 214 7 35 13

(Co B) (7) (98) (68) (3) (2) (23) (0)

HHC 2nd Bde 339 V 95 66 413 131 31 10

(209) (109) (72) (6) (40) (8) (0)

4588 V 802 40 570 4252 1556 1423 339

(1730) (946) (70) (448) (206) (485) (270) (1)

CV 101

(269)

NOTE: In addition to faults noted, 414 small arms were exchanged. (p34)

Exhibit I

Small V (Veh)

HOLOKAI XIII Arms CV(Cmbt V) Arty Engr Cal Sig QM Med (p35)

1/35th Inf 1139 V 178 12 195 183 82

(168) (73) (6) (105) (4) (1)

2/35th Inf 735 V 185 27 548 194 235 84

(400) (253) (73) (8) (109) (227) (0)

1/14th Inf 828 V 247 47 720 165 117 83

(413) (284) (69) (120) (68) (48) (0)

65th Engr 175 V 78 42 214 7 35 1

(81) (98) (68) (3) (2) (23) (0)

2/9th Arty 545 V 11 35 104 11 305 13

(204) (197)`(76) (50) (51) (9) (2)

3 /4 Cav 232 V 11 35 104 11 305 13

(114) (48) (0) (1) (13) (115) (0)

CV 11

(48)

HHC 3rd Bde 410 V 225 83 421 90 72

(312) (231) (113) (10) (27) (33)

4064 V 1078 43 283 2007 879 971 297

(1692) (1184) (76) (379) (142) (375) (459) (3)

CV 11

(48)

NOTE: In addition to faults noted, 295 small arms were exchanged. (p35)

Small V (Veh) Fire

HOLOKAI XIII arms CV (Combt V) Arty Engr Cml Sig QM Med Con

3 /4 Cav 728 V 92 9 171 507 129 1053 72 50

(311) (157) (22) (130) (11) (64) (326) (0) (2)

CV 7

(23)

65th Engr 372 V 139 75 168 20 325 39 11

(232) (292) (46) (7) (34) (11) (4) (8)

CV 4

(14)

Div Hq (-) 177 V 78 56 170 47 144

(63) (128) (17) (2) (20) (83)

25th Admin 343 V 52 72 285 1 53

(150) (57) (48) (10) (4) (112)

25th MI 37 5 37 12

(12) (0) (0) (5)

25th MP Co 272 V 68 27 171 145

(97) (95) (30) (0) (71)

125th Sig 469 V 126 80 294 411 571

(267) (272) (159) (1) (314) (38)

Adv Plang Gp V 16 17 47

(21) (7) (21)

Hq Sup Cmd V 27 106 17 18

(15) (0) (7) (26)

725th Maint 586 V 217 90 526 283 592 23

(185) (567) (114) (68) (88) (269) (3)

25th S&T 304 V 155 58 262 87

(157) (430) (44) (0) (4)

V 124*

(264)

25th Med 654 V 89 77 221 83 368

(399) (226) (109) (0) (4) (3)

25th Div Arty 296 4 13 1 123

(105) (9) (0) (0) (47) (p36)

3rd Arty 953 V 282 43 502 811 351 1341 258

(1026) (600) (76) (254) (9) (77) (261) (40)

5th Avn 354 V 131 127 246 125 41

(219) (227) (125) (1) (47) (0)

HHC 1st 265 V 107 51 138 144 283 17

(198) (164) (80) (2) (27) (161) (2)

4/9th Inf 1041 V 189 23 210 854 390 947 160

(735) (355) (14) (210) (12) (65) (165) (42)

2/14th Inf 1117 V 204 19 179 917 510 1021 86 265

(1206) (448) (82) (132) (67) (242) (237) (0) (73)

4/23rd Ind 1091 V 240 188 133 679 324 1184 10

(313) (279) (279) (148) (5) (89) (574) (25)

7/11 Arty 590 V 171 18 290 545 495 1005 183

(319) (459) (29) (177) (18) (77) (270) (20)

9649 V 2507 300 2207 6950 3579 3597 729 977

(5994) (5056) (502) (1832) (213) (1261) (2595) (54) (215)

CV 11

(37)

* Vehicles re-inspected

NOTE: In addition to faults noted, a total of 985 small arms were exchanged. (p37)

(p38 Graph)

COMPOSITION of INSPECTION TEAMS

Small Veh & Fire

Arms Cmbt V Arty Engr Cal Sig QM Med Cont Total

USARHAW *

Contact Team 8 8

Supervisors ** 2 2 1 1 1 7

Inspectors 2 14 1 6 2 7 3 4 39

HARNG *** 4 8 2 2 16

USAR 5 5

TAMC 2 2

25th Inf Div 6 6

Total 19 24 12 7 2 10 3 2 4 83

Contact teams under supervision of G4; personnel provided by G4, S&MC, and G2/G3

** These 7 supervisory inspector personnel were utilized during period 16-29 December 1965

*** HARNG also provide 2 aircraft inspectors (p39)

(Graph p 40)

RECAPITULATION of O&MA COSTS

The following is the comptroller's recapitulation of cumulative costs, as of 30 June 1966, in the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division. These amounts are O&MA (Operation and Maintenance, Army) costs incurred against funds allocated to USARHAW only.

BPA Activity Amount Note

2020 OPERATING FORCES $12,122,900 A

9010 LOCAL HEADQUARTERS COMMAND ADMINISTRATION 18,600 B

9020 LOCAL WELFARE SERVICES 20,200 C

9030 LOCAL MAINTENANCE & MANAGEMENT OF FACILITIES 824,700 D

9040 SUPPORT MAINTENANCE 525,800 E

9050 LOCAL LOGISTICS SERVICES 114,500 F

2220 OPERATION OF SUPPLY DEPOTS 716,900 G

2250 TRANSPORTATION SERVICES 36,300 H

2270 OPERATION OF PORT TERMINLS & FACILITIES 493,600 I

TOTAL $14,891,500

Note:

A Supplies and equipment (includes $1,035 million deferred billings for supplies shipped in June, but

billed in July.)

B Dependent processing assistance in CONUS

C Special Services supplies and equipment (mostly sporting goods).

D Fabrication of tent kits

E Repair of equipment (S&MC field maintenance shops)

F Personnel and cargo haul; laundry support (mostly for dyeing of whites to OD).

G Processing of supply requisitions by S&MC.

H Personnel and cargo haul (land transportation).

I Terminal operations (stevedoring).

Exhibit K (drawing) p. 41

Exhibit L (drawing) p. 42

Exhibit M (drawing) p. 43

Recapitulation of Local Purchases

(Dec 65 thru Apr 66)

LUMBER, SOFTWOOD ( * dunnage)

Date of

Board feet Cost Contract Delivery Schedule

Dec 964,768 $121,495 12-15-65 12-16-65 to 1 -3 -66

237,002 30,004 12-27-65

8,400 1,168 12-27-65

85,000 * 11,135 12-21-65

90,472 * 9,827 12-20-65 12-22-65

21,168 * 2,942 12-21-65

52.320 * 7,781 12-22-65

10,000 * 2,040 12-22-65

42,880 5,489 12-22-65 12-23-65 & 12-30-65

33,600 4,200 12-23-65 12-27-65

23,371 3,195

48,766 6,037 12-28-65 12-28-65

31,818 5,908

32,600 5,607

37,450 4,620 12-29-65 12-29-65

30,000 * 3,705 12-30-65 12-31-65

1,779,884 $229,107

Jan. 12,000 1,558 1-5-66 1 - 7 - 66 7,200 931 1 10 - 66

6,540 827 1 - 6 - 66

1,920 278 1 - 5 - 66

19,000 3,021 1-21-66 1 -24 - 66

34,812 4,902 1 -26 - 66

11,000 1,357 1 -24 - 66

4,000 476 1 - 21- 66

7,000 833 1 - 21 - 66

6,000 870

109,436 $15,053

Feb. 37,460 5,321 2 - 1- 66 2 - 4 - 66

12,800 1,664 2 - 7 - 66

68,117 8,687 2 - 4 - 66

4,267 640

64,800 8,855 2 - 3 - 66 2 - 4 - 66

12,000 1,482

5,000 610

42,000 6,036 2 - 4 - 66 2 - 5 - 66

34,450 6,139

15,750 1,890

3,800 475

23,000 3,073 2 - 11 - 66 2 - 11 - 66

27,200 4,216 2 - 18 - 66 2 - 19 - 66 (p44)

EXHIBIT N 8,000 1,520

3,000 372

18,000 3,045 2 - 21 - 66 2 - 23 - 66

28,000 4,916

1,000 135

3,000 384

5,500 699

2,000 252

2,000 270

47,848 * 7,136 2 - 24 - 66 2 - 25 - 66

30,976 * 5,463

30,160 * 3,649

21,104 * 4,168

183,600 32,743 2 - 28 - 66 2 - 28 - 66

31,900 3,988

766,900 $117,140

Mar 61,000 11,563 3 - 1 - 66 3 - 3 - 66

20,000 3,500

40,000 5,608

3,840 503 3 - 8 - 66 3 - 11 - 66

16,747 2,286

30,800 4,417 3 - 14 - 66 3 - 16 - 66

54,996 9,428

32,456 3,938

24,500 3,587

33,000 4,452

72,378 9,460 3 - 21 - 66 3 - 22 - 66

47,672 6,933

31,631 5,607

63,388 8,721

6,368 1,596

10,036 1,441

548,812 $83,140

Apr 24,100 3,477 4 - 6 - 66 4 - 7 - 66

42,164 5,292 4 - 12 - 66 4 - 12 -66

10,000 1,810

13,000 2,210

6,381 1,230

95,645 $14,019

SUMMARY

Dec 1,779,884 $229,107

Jan 109,436 15,053

Feb 766,732 117,828

Mar 548,812 83,140

Apr 95,645 14,019

3,300,509 $459,147 (p45)

B. PLYWOOD ( * Plyform - ** Wolmanized)

SHEET COST Date of Contract Delivery Schedule

Dec 1,800 15,800 12 -15 - 65 12 - 16 - 65 to 1 - 3 - 66

1,850 * 14,430

1,100 11,803 12 - 27 - 65

1,700 15,946 `1 - 29 - 65

396 3,497 12 - 27 - 65

350 * 2,727

860 8,940

3,000 * 22,860 12 - 22 - 65 12 - 23 - 65 & 12 - 30 - 65

2,000 * 14,260 12 - 23 - 65

13,029 $110,263

Jan 500 * 3,875 1 - 5 - 66 1 - 10 - 66

400 * 3,048

500 * 3,825

300 * 2,187

2,710 $12,935

Feb 900 ** 8,345 2 - 1 - 66 2 - 4 - 66

800 ** 8,345 2 - 7 - 66

360 ** 3,798 2 - 4 - 66

350 ** 3,623

300 ** 2,418

2,710 $26,529

Mar 320 * $ 2,438 3 - 8 - 66 3 - 11 - 66

Apr 280 $ 2,872 4 - 6 - 66 4 - 8 - 66

SUMMARY

Dec 13,029 $110,263

Jan 1,700 12,935

Feb 2,710 26,529

Mar 320 2,438

Apr 280 2,872

18,039 $155,037

C. BARRIER MATERIAL

Dec 105 rl $ 3,183 12 - 23 - 65 12 - 23 - 65

95 2,036 12 - 22 - 65 12 - 22 - 65

12 564 12 - 23 - 65 12 - 23 - 65

212 $ 5,783

Feb 189 4,449 2 - 18 - 66 2 - 18 - 66

12 479 2 - 17 - 66

201 $ 4,928

SUMMARY

413 $10,711 (p46)

D. SCREEN, FIBERGLASS Date of

Cost Contract Delivery Schedule

Dec 15 $ 3,995

12 -23 - 65 12 - 27 - 65

976 29,127 12 - 31 - 65

111 2,164 12 - 27 - 65

20 445 12 - 27 - 65 12 - 30 - 65

1258 $35,731

E. CORRUGATED ROOFING

Mar. 688 sht $ 3,808

Apr. 4,895 28,547 4 - 14 - 66 4 - 15 - 66

1,685 7,196

420 1,890

7,668 $ 41,441

F. WOODEN BOXES:

Apr 500 ea $16,680 4 - 12 - 66 4 - 20 - 66

G. TENT KITS.

Feb 400 $150,000 2 - 9 - 66 2 - 28 - 66

Mar 333 109,890 3 - 8 - 66 3 - 7 - 66

207 45,126 3 - 8 - 66 3 - 10 - 66

940 $305,016

H. KIT, HOSE & FITTING ASSEMBLY FOR TRUCK FORK LIFT:

Dec. 4 $ 4,640 12 - 21 - 65 12 - 22 - 65

Feb. 4 4,056 2 - 9 - 66 2 - 9 - 66

I. BATTERY, DRY CHARGED:

Jan 180 $ 4,158 1 - 31 - 66 2 - 3 - 66

Feb. 133 3,259 2 - 4 - 66 2 - 9 - 66

522 12,476 2 - 9 - 66 & 2 - 13 - 66

300 8,323 2 - 11 - 66 3 - 4 - 66

428 11,231 2 - 11 - 66 & 3 - 9 - 66

17 629 2 - 14 - 66 2 - 14 - 66

44 1,520

36 1,331

9 231

143 3 ,418 2 - 24 - 66 3 - 4 - 66

60 1,321 3 - 25 - 66

1,892 $43,739

SUMMARY

2,072 $ 47,897 (p47)

OTHER BUILDING MATERIALS;

Local purchases for nails, tacks, hinges, etc., are consolidated and summarized rather than being listed as individual contracts.

Feb. 20,935 ctn of nails $ 5,639

1,713 pr hinges 928

2,008 pr springs 643

452 tu tacks 54

301 lb tacks 495

1,594 ea holder pull chain 885

1,594 ea lamp, elec 230

13,250 lf cable, power elec 901

9,775

Apr. 148 rl wire, poultry $ 3,585

2,800 lb nails 487

47 ea door handle 6

$ 3,585 Total Feb & Apr $13,360

K. SUMMARY

a. Lumber, softwood $ 459,147

b. Plywood 155,037

c. Barrier material 10,711

d. Screen, fiberglass 35,731

e. Corrugated Roofing 41,441

f. Wooden Boxes 16,680

g. Tent Kits 305,016

h. Kit, hose & fitting assembly 8,696

i. Battery, dry charged 47,897

j. Other Bldg material 13,360

$1,093,716 (p48)

Extract from page 11 - 12,

22nd Air Force Report on

OPERATION BLUE LIGHT

ON LOAD

BULK CARGO HANDLING / C-141

DISCUSSION: In handling bulk cargo in a C141A Star-lifter, 463L pallets are normally utilized. On Operation BLUE LIGHT, combination troop / cargo configurations were required and the use of 463L pallets would have eliminated the adjacent troop seats. As a solution, the two lines of center rollers were turned up; warehouse pallets (40” x 48”) were placed on sheets of plywood and rolled forward in the cargo compartment. This procedure permitted rapid loading and off-loading, and the plywood also served as a load spreader for high density cargo. For pallet weights up to 2,000 lbs, ½” plywood was sufficient. Heavier loads required a ¾” thickness. As many pallets weighed about 3,000 lbs, ¾” plywood was used in the main and proved satisfactory for loads as heavy as 3,800 lbs. Standard 4'x 8' plywood sheets were cut in half to make pallets 40” x 48”, the same area as the warehouse pallets. Otherwise, one warehouse pallet ends up partially on two different plywood pallets when the loads are pushed together for the tie-down; off-loading is thus complicated. A word of caution: ¾” plywood is rather expensive and may not be readily available in large quantities. Requirement for this commodity during BLUE LIGHT was significant and seriously depleted both military and civilian resources.

(p49)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO San Francisco 96225

May 1966

Major General Carl Darnell

Commanding General

United States Army, Hawaii

APO U.S. Forces 96557

Dear Carl:

The last of the soldiers of the 1st Brigade have joined us in Cu Chi and the remaining cargo ships are in the Saigon harbor. In terms of distance involved, troops and cargo move, and types of transportation used, this was certainly a unique deployment of Army forces.

From the standpoint of the 25th Infantry Division, this was a highly successful deployment accomplished in an efficient and professional manner. As the commander of this division, I know, as do my staff and subordinate commanders, that the lion's share of the credit for this fine move properly rests with you and the officers, men and civilians of U.S. Army, Hawaii.

The statistics fail to reveal the long hours, effort, ingenuity and skill expended and applied by the military and civilian members of your command in preparing the 25th Division for its move, subsequent combat operations, and the establishment and operation of two base camps for over 17,000 men.

The tent kits, spare parts, generators, gun shields, the prompt repair or replacement of weapons, vehicles, and radios, and the many “extras” that you made available are to us evidence of the spirit and substance of your help. The consideration and attention given to our families has earned for all of you a special mark of gratitude from all of us in the division.

As this deployment comes to an end, I want to again convey the thanks and appreciation of the soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division for hour splendid support.

Sincerely,

FRED C. WEYAND

Major General, USA

Commanding

Exhibit P (p 50 & 51)

HEADQUAARTERS

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO San Francisco 96225

CIRCULAR

NUMBER 551-2 2 August 1966

Expires 1 August 1967

FOREIGN NATIONALS

Revolutionary Development Staff Section

1. Purpose: To establish a Revolutionary Development Staff section in the 25th Infantry Division, and prescribe its organization, functions, and responsibilities.

2. General:

a. Revolutionary Development encompasses those military, political, economic, social, and psychological activities which are designed to:

(1) Liberate the people from VC control.

(2) Restore local government.

(3) Maintain public security

(4) Win the support of the people to the national government.

b. Each province has a Revolutionary Development Office which supports

national development programs. Planning and coordination therefore must be made at the province level to direct military and civic action into areas which will be of greatest benefit to the GVN. To effect properly this planning and subsequent action, it is necessary to collect, record, and analyze data pertaining to the multitude of activities that are part of, or support the Revolutionary Development Program.

c. A Revolutionary Development section will be established as an element of the division staff, functioning under the supervision of the ACofS, G5.

3. Organization: The Revolutionary Development staff section will be organized as follows:

a. Branch Chief - This officer will supervise activities pertaining to:

(1) Liaison with other Revolutionary Development agencies of the GVN and those US agencies supporting or assisting the GVN effort.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL: THOMAS W. MELLEN

Colonel, GS

Chief of Staff

PHILIP U. BONDI

CPT, AGC

Asst. AG

DISTRIBUTION:

A; B

G5 (15 cys)

25th Aviation Battalion History Duppliment 1969

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 25Th AVIATION BATTALION (INF DIV)

APO San Francisco, 96225

AVDCAN 15 March 1970

SUBJECT: Annual Supplement to Unit History

TO: Chief of Military History Department of the Army

Washington D.C., 20315

1. The following Annual Supplement to Unit History is submitted in accordance

with AR 870-5, paragraph 61.

2. Reporting unit: 25th Aviation Battalion,.~ 25th. Infantry Division

3. Reporting period: 1 January~through 31:December 1969

4. Commanding officers during reporting period:

a. 1 January 1969 - 30 July 1969, LTC Kenneth J. Burton

b. 31 July 1969 - 31 December 1969, LTC Robert R. Gosney

5. The following is a narrative description of this unit's activities, accomplishments and major achievements.

During 1969, the 25th Aviation Battalion supported, the 25th' Infantry Division and all units operating within the Division TAOI. Units supported by the Battalion were: 49th ARVN Regt.5th ARVN Div. and the U.S.. Navy elements operating in the area. Support provided by the 25th Aviation Batta1ion consisted of: command and control, general support, AG courier, counter mortar,SYOPS, CS drops, flare ships defoliation, combat assau1ts,dustoff, flame bath, Night Hawk, and emergency resupply

In January, the 25th Aviation Battalion continued to support the 25th Div.

during Operation Toan Thang, Phase II. OperationToan Thang II continued into February at which time the 25th Aviation Battalion supported Division units at Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng when they came under heavy rocket and mortar attacks on the night of 22 February. The 25th Aviation Battalion reacted by alerting all crews and flyable ships, and supported the fighting with light fire teams, flare ships, counter mortar ships, and emergency resupplies. February also saw the inception of the Night Hawk”, concept which effectively restricted VC/NVA movement at night. The Night Hawk has evolved to a point that the system is now composed of a minigun, xenon light, night observation device coaxially mounted and 13 mk. 45 flares.

15 March 1970

AVDCAN: Annual Supplement to Unit History

Flame Bath is another mission that evolved during the year and was flown exclusively by the A Company “Little Bears” • The Flame Bath Concept consists of a sling load of three 55 gallon drums filled with aviation fuel and diesel fuel that is dropped on a known enemy position or booby trapped area. Trip flares ignite when the drums separate, then ignite the fuel when the drums rupture as they strike the ground.

During the sapper attack on Cu Chi on 25 February, B Company “Diamondheads” responded with all available fire teams to defend Cu Chi base Camp. The “Little Bears” from A company provided ships as necessary and evacuated all the remaining aircraft to Saigon and LongBinh.quick reaction by both companies helped to prevent the enemy from inflicting further damage to Cu Chi Ease Camp. Flame Bath and night hawk missions accounted for a significant number of enemy KIA during the months of April, May and June. During this period, maximum utilization of aircraft contributed immeasurably to the Division's missions.. Aircraft availability was mtaintained. At an extremely high level during this period.

A massive ground attack was waged against fire support base Crook in early June. The “Diamond Heads', utilizing their primary and secondary fire teams, placed effective fire on the enemy's charging ranks. The “Little Bears” from A Company, were also there to provide illumination via flares and a night light. This combination was very effective in helping defeat the enemy during the two successive nights he attacked Crook. minimal weather conditions hampered the Battalion's aircraft during this period, but they continued on their missions and successfully completed the missions.

In September, the 25th Aviation Battalion received the 0utstanding Aviation Unit Award presented by Hughes Tool Company annually for The aviation unit that, through organized effort, has demonstrated outstanding ability to employ its aircraft in furtherance of the Army mission. This award is given to the best aviation unit in the Army each year and presentation was the culmination of a year of hard work, heroism, and dedication, by the officers and men of the 25th Aviation Battalion.

In September, D Troop 3/4 Cav, became OPCON to the 25th Aviation Battalion, greatly facilitating the control and coordination of organic Division aviation assets. Continued cooperation and mutual respect between the Aviation Battalion and D Troop have resulted in the successful completion of many missions that would otherwise have been difficult if not impossible.

15 March 1970

AVDCAN: Annual Supplement to Unit History

A significant change in the operational concept of the division's air assets was affected during the last quarter of the year. It was desired to initiate a light war concept within the division by which small sized troop elements would be continually deployed on successive limited area sweeps. The air cavalry package provided by D Troop ¾ Cav, consist of two OH-6a “LOH” and one AH-1G “Cobra”. These “mini-cav” packages are supplied to the 2nd and 3d brigade and are on strip alert to react quickly to intelligence targets, light scout team sightings, security for downed aircraft, and to aide targets of opportunity.

Operation Toan Thang II terminated on 28 February 1969. Toan Thang III commenced on 1 March 1969andis continuing.

A statistical view of the more critical operational accomplishments involving direct combat support activities performed by the 25th Aviation Battalion in 1969 are listed below. (Included is D Troop ¾ Cav while OPCON)

Number of hours flown: 48,711

Number of passengers transported: 101,628

Pounds of cargo transported: 6,312,000

Number of VC/NVA killed (BC): 675

Enemy structures destroyed 283

Enemy Sampans destroyed: 70

For gallantry in action, in support of ground operations against a hostile force, 127 valor awards and decorations were awarded to members of the 25th Aviation Battalion.

Decoration	Number

Silver Star	6
DFC	53
BSM w/”V” Device?(not clear)	12
AM w/:V” Device ARCOM w/"V" Device	39 17
	Total
	127

FOR THE COMMANDER

Don W. Morgan

1LT. INF

Adjutant