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APO  San Francisco  96557

HCSU -P                                                                                                     29 September 1966

SUBJECT:     After Action Report - Deployment of the 25th Infantry Division to RVN

TO:          See Distribution

     1.  Forwarded for information in subject report, a report which consolidates and condenses the large volume of data and information contained in the feeder reports submitted by the seventeen staff offices and commands associated with the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division.  Subject report recapitulates the deployments, discusses the deployment actions, and extracts pertinent comments and recommendations from the feeder reports which may be applicable in the revision of USARHAW OPLAN 68-65  (Out-loading Plan).

     2.   Addresses are authorized to extract, reproduce, or otherwise convert for their use any material contained in subject report without reference to this headquarters for approval.


                                        WILFRED ARNOLD Je.
                                        Colonel, ACC
                                        Adjutant General

1 Incl:
Chief of Staff
G2 / G3
FS Area               
SB Area               




          Letter of Transmittal                                                          I
          Table of Contents                                                              II
          Deployment Summary  -  Map                                        V

Section     I     INTRODUCTION
               1.   Scope                                                                                                                 1
               2.   Emphasis by the Commander in Chief                                                           1
               3.   Deployment planning responsibility                                                                1
               4.   Deployment time frames                                                                                 1
               5.   Orders                                                                                                               2

               6.   Out-loading support mission                                                                          2
               7.   Concept of deployment support                                                                    2
               8.   Manpower augmentation from reserve components                                  3
               9.   The approaching deployments                                                                      3

               10.   Embarkation operations                                                                              4
                    a.   Preliminary actions                                                                                    4
                    b.   Cargo loading                                                                                            4
                    c.   Summary of cargo operations                                                                  4
                    d.   Summary of troop loading operations                                                     4
                    e.   Loading of ammunition                                                                             4
                    f.   Summary of entire lift operations                                                              5
                    g.   Operational notes                                                                                     5
                         (1)   Movement data                                                                                   5
                         (2)   Marking and documentation                                                             5
                         (3)   Security of in-transit cargo                                                                5
                         (4)   Conex supply                                                                                      5                                 
                         (5)   Stevedore operations                                                                       6
                         (6)   Terminal Facilities                                                                             6
                         (7)   Personnel requirements                                                                   6
               11.   Land operations                                                                                         7
                    a.   Preliminary considerations                                                                    7
                    b.   HOLOKAI  XI                                                                                           7
                    c.   HOLOKAI  XII                                                                                          7
                    d.   HOLOKAI  XIII                                                                                         8
               12.   Support teams, and services                                                                  8
                    a.   PCS Clearance Team                                                                           8
                         (1)   Qualification of inspectors                                                              8
                         (2)   Installed property                                                                             8
                         (3)   Unit fund & CWF property                                                              9
                         (4)   Sundry funds                                                                                    9
                    b.   TOE Clearance Team                                                                          9
                    c.   Contact maintenance & inspection teams                                        9
                    d.   De-fueling and processing                                                                 9       (p ii)
                    e.   Care & preservation demonstration teams                                   10
                    f.   Forklift support                                                                                   10
                    g.   Labor support                                                                                   10
                    h.   Laundry support                                                                                10
                    i.    Self Service Supply Center                                                             10
                    j.    Clothing Sales Store                                                                        11
                    k.   Mess support                                                                                    11
                    l.   Communication support                                                                   11
               13.   Personnel and administrative support                                              11
                    a.   Maintenance of unit strength                                                           11
                    b.   Personnel management                                                                  11
                    c.   Dependent Processing Center                                                       11
                    d.   Central Clearance Center                                                              12
                    e.   Transportation for dependents                                                      12
                    f.   Personnel services                                                                          13
                         (1)   Postal                                                                                        13
                         (2)   Finance                                                                                     13
                         (3)   Religious                                                                                  13
                         (4)   Non-appropriated fund property                                           13
                         (5)   Legal                                                                                       13
               14.   Program management                                                                   13
               15.   Deployment costs                                                                           14
               16.   Intelligence                                                                                      14
               17.   USARHAW  S&MC OPERATIONS                                             14          
                    a.   Stock control                                                                                14
                    b.   Storage                                                                                        14
                    c.   Maintenance shop operations                                                   14
                         (1)   Refinishing of small arms weapons                                   15
                         (2)   Fabrication of protective shields                                       15
                         (3)   Organizational maintenance                                              15
                    d.   Ammunition                                                                                15
                    e.   Inspection                                                                                   15
               18.   TAMC operations                                                                         16
                    a.   Medical supply                                                                           16
                    b.   Medical services                                                                       16
               19.   Issue of equipment & supplies                                                   16
                    a.   Equipping two additional inf. bns.                                           17
                    b.   Rough terrain fork-lifts                                                              17
                    c.   EAM equipment                                                                       17
                    d.   Radios                                                                                      17
                    e.   Re-issue of U-6 aircraft parts                                                 18
                    f.   Issues from DAFD                                                                    18
                    g.   WABTOC items                                                                       18
                    h.   Introduction of PUSH                                                               18
                    i.    Slow-down in VRR shipments                                                18
                    j.    Base camp rqrmts. & fortifications mat                                 18       (p iii)
                         (1)   Pre-cut tent frame kits                                                      19
                         (2)   Tents                                                                                  19
                         (3)   Fortification & construction mat.                                    19
                    k.   Transhipments at army port                                                  19
                    l.    Sources of supply                                                                   19
               20.   Termination of supply support                                                 19

          21.   Transportation                                                                         20
               a.   Absence of unit loading plans                                            20
               b.   Additional rqrmt. For land trans.                                        20
               c.   Tie-up of critical land transportation                                  20
          22.   Increase in post security violations                                      20
          23.   Unsanitary family housing                                                     20
          24.   Unpaid telephone gills                                                          21
          25.   Inadequate planning for re non-deployables                     21
          26.   Insufficient MHE & no operators                                        21
          27.   Supply                                                                                   21
               a.   Slow auth. For proc. Of WABTOC items                       21
               b.   No time for formal advertising                                        21
               c.   A run on mess hall expendables                                    21
               d.   Damages to mess hall equipment                                 22
          28.   Inclusion of WABTOC items in USARPAC  LP&P (U)   22     
          29.   USARHAW assigned pers. for post security                   22
          30.   Build-up of out-loading supplies                                       22
          31.   Additional requirements for plywood                               23
          32.   Protection to prevent broken windshields                       23
          33.   Treating of out-loading plans                                            23
            MISSION ACCOMPLISHED`                                                  23

          A.   Letter Gen. Waters to Gen. Darnell                                   24
          B.   Recapitulation of deployment orders                                26
          C.   Organization out-loading support teams                         27
          D.   Planned deployment configurations                                28
          E.   Troop and cargo movement summary                            30
          F.   Movement control points                                                   31
          G.   Communications net. For movement control                32
          H.   Transportation movement control                                   33
          I.     POM technical inspection equipment summary           34
          J.     Special communications network                                 40
          K.    Recapitulation of O&MA costs                                      41
          L.    Before & after photograph of pistol                               42
          M.   Protective shield                                                             43
          N.   Recapitulation of local purchases                                 44
          O.    Extract from 22nd Air Force report                             49
          P.    Letter from CG 25th Inf. Div.                                         50

     DISTRIBUTION                                                           Inside back cover       (p iv)


A portrayal of the deployments of the 25th Infantry Division by air and sea from Hawaii to RVN                              

(insert  map)

The air movements also depict the primary routes of the three types of aircraft (totaling 231) used in the airlift of the 3rd Brigade Task Force into Pleiku.  An airlift which is described in the 22nd Air Force report on Operation Blue Light as “what is now recorded in the annals of Air Force history as the most massive airlift of US troops and equipment into a combat zone.”

An additional 38 aircraft were used to airlift the various air elements of the remainder of the division.          (p v)


     1.   Scope:   This report covers the activities of all offices and agencies directly or indirectly associated with the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division, from receipt of CINCUSARPAC's advance warning order, dated 27 October 1965 (advising the division of the pending deployment of our brigade in early 1966), till completion of the deployment of Division (-) under the final movement directive issued by CINCUSARPAC on 28 February 1966.

     2.   Emphasis by the Commander in Chief:   In a personal letter to CGUSARHAW in August 1965,  CINCUSARPAC emphasized that “there can be no failure” on the part of the USARPC logistic system in providing adequate logistic and administrative support for operations in Vietnam (EXHIBIT A,  page 24).

     3.   Deployment Planning Responsibility:   Under contingency planning, one of USARHAW's major responsibilities is the deployment of the PACOM Reserve Force (i.e. the 25th Infantry Division) from Hawaii when a particular USARPAC operation plan is executed.  This responsibility includes the accomplishment of actions to insure that the necessary supplies and equipment to accompany the division are on hand either in the division, or in depot stocks, and to provide the required in-put into the logistic system to assure the division of its re-supply, until re-supply becomes a routine function of the supply pipe-line.  With the accelerated build-up of US Army forces in RVN, a major concern to USARHAW in 1965 was the planning criteria stipulating that the 25th Infantry Division should be ready for deployment within the time frame of a few hours for units of the alert brigade, to two weeks for the entire division.

     4.   Deployment Time Frames:    The deployments of the brigade task forces of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii are summarized below.  Of the 15,736 troops deployed, slightly over one-half deployed during the first month,  
(23 Dec. 65 - 25 Jan 66).  Division(-) being deployed over a span of two months.
                                                                (p 1)
                                                               Total               Depart Hawaii
                                                             Troops              Initial element     Last element        
               3rd Bde Task Force           3,935                   23 Dec 65          5 Jan 66
               2nd Bde Task Force          3,982                      2 Jan 66          6 Jan 66
               1st  Bn  69th Armor             571                      25 Jan 66                 -
               Division (-)                        7,248                      15 Jan 66          16 Apr 66

     5.   Orders:   Time permitting, warning orders are issued 75 days in advance of readiness dates, movement directives 60 days in advance of readiness dates.  The movement directive is the authority for movement and is the basis for appropriate actions by all agencies.  Subsequently Movement Orders are issued which specify the exact organizational structure of the deploying units.  Although the CINCUSARPAC advance warning order to the 25th Infantry Division is dated 27 October 1965, USARHAW received the message two weeks later on 13 November 1965.  Then came the subsequent change in the warning order which revised the deployments from a one-brigade task force to the immediate deployment of two brigades.  The DA warning order for the two brigades issued on 14 December 1965, the USARPAC movement directive issued two days later.  Deployment orders are recapitulated in EXHIBIT  B,  page 26.


     6.   Out-loading Support Mission:   To fulfill the need for fully coordinated out-loading actions, a USARHAW out-loading plan was developed to assure the best possible execution of deployment support tasks within planning time frames, and deployment requirements.  This plan first published in October 1961.  Thereafter, in coordination with the 25th Infantry Division, the plan was tested each quarter through practice out-loadings of brigade task forces, these practice out-loadings conducted under the code name HOLOKAI, the exercises having progressed through HOLOKAI  X.  When the 25th Infantry Division received its deployment orders, it continued its practice of assigning the code name HOLOKAI to its off-Hawaii deployment.  Accordingly, the deployment of the 2nd Brigade Task Force was designated as HOLOKAI  XI, the deployment of the 3rd Brigade Task Force as HOLOKA  XII, and the deployment of Division (-) as HOLOKAI  XIII.  The out-loading plan, revised annually as a result of lessons learned in the HOLOKAI exercises, is currently designated as USARHAW OPLAN 68-65 (Out-loading Plan).

     7.   Concept of Deployment Support:   Deployment of a single battalion or a one-brigade task force of the 25th Infantry Division does not normally present particular support problems to USARHAW.  However, the deployment of the entire division in rapid, consecutive movements deprives the division of a large portion of its organic support capabilities.  Therefore, the basic provisions of the out-loading plan call for USARHAW to provide this kind of support:  support which consists of providing various clearance teams, the transportation to move personnel and cargo, and support in manufacturing or fabricating boxes, pallets, and WABTOC items.  Local contracts are utilized whenever USARHAW facilities become over-burdened and are unable to produce the required items in time to meet deployment schedules.  This support system is outlined in EXHIBIT C,  page 27.                                                  p. 2

     8.   Manpower Augmentation from Reserve Components:   In anticipation of the manpower load which would be imposed upon USARHAW should the 25th Infantry Division be deployed from Hawaii, CGUSARHAW proposed to the Adjutant General of the State of Hawaii that selected technician personnel from the Hawaii Army National Guard participate in the HOLOKAI exercises for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with the requirements and technique of out-loading, the proposal broached in March 1965.  With the acceptance of the proposal by the Adjutant General, about 50 national Guard personnel participated in the planning for HOLOKAI  X, planning which included step-by-step indoctrination in post clearance and materiel inspection requirements and procedures.  US Army Reserve technician personnel also participated in the planning.  Total reserve augmentation for HOLOKAI  X was about 60 personnel.  (HOLOKAI  X was scheduled for May 1965 as an out-loading exercise, airlifting the 3rd Brigade Task Force to marry-up with the DA forward floating depot, the exercise subsequently cancelled due to other training requirements of the 25th Infantry Division.)

     9.   The Approaching Deployments:        Beginning in August 1965, this command began receiving information copies of message traffic (classifications not higher than secret) between US Army Vietnam and Hq USARPAC concerning recommended supplies and equipment to accompany CONUS troop units deploying to RVN.  Of special interest to C4 USARWAW were the recommendations on accessory and WABTOC items.  Inasmuch as USARV's recommendations pertaining to CONUS units would appear to be equally applicable to the 25th Infantry Division, USARV's allowance factors (for CONUS units) were applied to the 25th Infantry Division to obtain some idea as to what the division requirements would be for accessory and WABTOC items under USARV's criteria.  These planning requirements were then screened against available USARHAW assets.  The next determination was that immediate supply actions would have to be initiated for such items as 168 walk-in refrigerators (none authorized or available in the division), 2,800 jugs, insulated / vacuum, several thousand barbed wire rolls, pickets, and other engineer items required for base camp construction.  Most of these items not normally stocked in the local army supply system.  Accordingly, discussions were initiated with Hq USARPAC to obtain authorizations for supply and procurement actions.  Although this command was aware of the discussions being conducted between Hq USARPAC and the 25th Infantry division concerning the probably deployment of the division, USARWAW was not being addressed on these top secret messages.  Lacking the basis for initiating specific support actions, representatives from this command held many discussions with Hq USARPAC during September and October in trying to “stay ahead of the game.”  Finally, on 13 November, this command received a copy of the warning order which had been sent to the division on 27 October (see paragraph 5), and on 1 December, the first of many approvals for local procurement was received from Hq USARPAC, this first approval being an oral authority (subsequently confirmed) for local procurement of lumber.  EXHIBIT  D  (page 28)  list the major units of the 25th Infantry Division and their planned deployment configurations.           
                                                                 p. 3
     10. Embarkation Operations:   The Embarkation Control Center was opened at 0800 hours, 19 December, in Building 1027, Kapalama Military Reservation.  The Chief of the Terminal Operations Division, Transportation Office, operates the control center for controlling and /or coordinating both sea and air movements.

          a.   Preliminary Actions:   Upon receiving the oral alert in late October, actions were initiated to determine the number and type of vehicles and equipment assigned to divisional units, the amount of dunnage and lashing gear which would be required to secure such equipment, and the number and type vessels which would be required for movement.  Wherever definitive data was not available, general planning factors from FM 101-10-1 (Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data) were used.  Upon receipt of instructions on 16 December to out-load the first increment (HOLOKAI  XI, 2nd Brigade Task Force), lift requirements for movement of 24,000 MTONs of unit impedimenta and equipment and personnel movement totaling 5,765 officers and men were placed on MSTS-Hono, with in-country arrival date of 20 January 1966.

          b.   Cargo Loading:   Movement requirements for HOLOKAI  XI were received from the 25th Infantry Division on 20 December, only 24 hours prior to the arrival of the first cargo vessel.  Vehicles, equipment, unit impedimenta, and bulk accompanying supplies were programmed for loading so as to maintain unit integrity in accordance with the desires of the CG 25th Infantry Division.  However, unit integrity was adversely influenced by limitations of ships characteristics and cargo handling gear, and the necessity for the most effective utilization of space available.  Vehicles were stowed with fuel in tanks and batteries connected.  Supplies were stowed in vehicle cargo compartments to top of side-boards.  These loading factors applied to all three HOLOKAI movements.

          c.   Summary of Cargo Operations:   A total 127,225 MTONs of cargo were loaded aboard 21 cargo vessels and one special purpose vessel (Comet) for discharge at five ports.  Additionally, 4,749 STONs of cargo were airlifted in the deployment of the 3rd Brigade Task Force.

          d.   Summary of Troop Loading Operations:   Of the 15,736 troops deployed, 22.3 per cent or 3,514 troops were airlifted.  The 12,222 troops proceeding by sea were transported on eight troop ships.  The deployment summary map on page 30 graphically portrays these sea and air movements.
                                                                 P 4
          e.   Loading of Ammunition:   Essentially, the on-man portions of the basic loads of small arms ammunition were combat loaded so that this ammunition would be immediately available to troops debarking at objective areas.  The remainder of the basic load was bulk loaded.  Bulk loaded ammunition was loaded at the Pearl Harbor West Lock ammunition piers (WL-2 and WL-4) following loading of bulk accompanying supplies at Kapalama.

          f.   Summary of Entire Lift Operation:   EXHIBIT  E  (page 30) summarizes the entire movement of the 25th Infantry Division in order of deployment, and provides other pertinent deployment information.

          g.   Operational Notes:   Items of major interest affecting operations at the surface embarkation point are summarized below:
               (1)   Movement Data:  Movement data sheets submitted by the 25th Infantry Division contained numerous errors.  These ranged from simple errors in arithmetic to failure to properly identify items to be shipped, and inaccurate computations of weights and cubes of vehicles and equipment.  Only those errors affecting ship stowage were reconciled in the Embarkation Control Center by the division liaison officers and the terminal cargo planners.
               (2)   Marking and Documentation:   In order to relieve deploying units of administrative details, the terminal prepared all Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD) for both vehicles and general cargo, documents which are normally prepared by deploying units.  Personnel from the terminal and team members from USARHAW  Supply and Maintenance Center (S&MC) applied all markings to wheel and track vehicles.  Deploying units were required to apply markings to general cargo and to provide the cargo traffic section with a listing of non-vehicular items to be loaded.  Unit commanders and liaison officers were briefed in the Embarkation Control Center on desired markings and listings, but in many instances failed to follow instructions.

               (3)   Security of In-transit Cargo:   Due to the presence of a large volume of supplies and equipment spread over a wide area, and the fact that much of this equipment was in open areas on public facilities at Pier 39, an interior guard detail, normally consisting of 27 men, was furnished by the 25th Infantry Division.
                        (4)   Conex Supply:  The army port normally maintained a strategic reserve stock of 400 type II Conex containers to support contingency missions of the 25th Infantry Division.  Prior to the deployments, the terminal was engaged in a program of return of empty containers to CONUS, this program terminated upon receipt of the advance warning order.  As the out-loading of HOLOKAI  XI progressed, it was apparent that the 400 containers would not meet the requirements of the entire division.  Therefore, all elements of USARHAW were asked to return containers to stock.  Final division requirements for containers totaled 812.  At the completion of the deployment of the last element of the division, the terminal had only 30 full size Conex containers on hand in serviceable condition.                    

               (5)   Stevedore Operations:   It was apparent at the beginning of ship loading operations that requirements placed on the stevedore contractor would not fall within established “commodity” rates because vehicles loaded with cargo presented problems of stowage and lift which required shifting, use of heavy lift and double lift gear, and additional blocking and lashing. Also, many stowage units had to be moved from one hatch to another due to faulty cube and weight data provided by deploying units.  Furthermore, all vehicles with fuel in tanks had to be “grounded” to deck or to the skin of the ship.  After consultation with the Chief of Purchasing and Contracting Division, G4 Office, it was agreed that the stevedore contractor would be compensated on a man-hour basis as provided for in the technical provisions of the current stevedore contract.

               (6)   Terminal Facilities:   In agreement with the State of Hawaii, the army assumed temporary operational control of Pier 39 and adjacent hard stand.  Fourteen of the 30 ships were loaded at Pier 39 due to a superior configuration which permits the receipt and delivery of both inside and outside cargo simultaneously with the loading or discharging of four deep draft ships.  However, stevedore labor was insufficient to simultaneously work both Piers 39 and 40 to their physical capacities.  For HOLOKAI XII and XIII, the army used only that portion of Pier 39 for which labor were available.  Pier 39 with its adjacent hard stand, and Pier 40 with hard stand between warehouses, provide sufficient space to assemble the vehicles and cargo of two brigades at one time.  However, terminal actions were directed toward maintaining a smooth flow of cargo through the terminal areas rather than assembling cargo up to the maximum capacity of the holding areas.  

               (7)   Personnel Requirements:   Both contract and direct hire personnel which included supervisory, clerical, and unskilled labor were hired to augment terminal personnel requirements.  The most serious shortages were in the cargo checker and cargo supervisor fields since these skills are not available among military personnel, and available only in limited numbers from stevedore contractors.  This shortage caused regular terminal civilian employees to work shifts of from 12 to 18 hours, and around-the-clock in some instances.  Due to mechanization of cargo handling on the Honolulu waterfront, only 48 stevedore gangs are now available to work conventional vessels, and all indications point to a continued reduction in the number of stevedore gangs.  As one gang can work only one hatch-one shift in a 24 hour period, it requires 10 gangs to work a 5 hatch ship around the clock.  Available gang hours are prorated among both military and commercial operators based on the number of hatches on berth at any one time.
     11.   Land Operations:   This portion of the report is concerned with land transportation, to include the movement of materials between USARHAW depot storage facilities and 25th Infantry Division “staging sites” and operations at the Lower Wheeler Field marshaling area.  Land transportation is the responsibility of the Motor Transport Division, Transportation Office.

          a.   Preliminary Considerations:   Upon receipt of the advance warning order, estimated transportation requirements vs. capabilities were analyzed, movement priorities determined, and allowances established providing for slippage of routine requirements for common  use land transportation (CULT) in anticipation of out-loading operations saturating the land transportation capability.  Also, instructions and schedules for movement were published for marshaling and movement of vehicle convoys, cargo movement requirements, and troop lift schedules.  EXHIBIT F (page 31) is a schematic outline of areas involved in these transportation movements routes, and control points.  Traffic control was a coordinated effort among all police departments - Division MP's, the Provost Marshals of Fort Shafter and Schofield Barracks, the Honolulu Police Department.  The movements were monitored by the Motor Transport Division.  Roadside emergency repair and wrecker service was provided.  A communications system was established to control and maintain close monitorship of operations, this system portrayed in EXHIBIT G (page 32).  EXHIBIT H (page 33) is a schematic outline depicting communications control for vehicle convoys and troop movements.

          b.   HOLOKAI  XI:   The transportation of empty Conex containers, crates, sundry packing and crating material, rations, supplies, and pre-positioning of ammunition was accomplished between 12 December and 21 December 1965.  Initial convoy serials were moved during daylight hours (0900 - 1200 hours) but based on the desires of the division, subsequent convoy serials were moved at night (2000 - 2400 hours).  Accompanying supplies and unit impedimenta moved during the period 22 December through 5 January totaled 6,496 STON's consisting of 699 STONs ammunition, 158 STONs rations, 311 STONs vehicles and equipment, 1,310 STONs tent kits, and 4,018 STONs miscellaneous general cargo.  Concerning troop movements, all such movements from Schofield Barracks to port were accomplished during hours of darkness in accordance with desires of the CG25th Infantry Division.  Buses were identified by conspicuous yet unclassified markings which provided ease of routing at shipside, these marking coinciding with gangplank designations.  A total of 144 buses were required to transport troops departing on the USNS Walker, Sultan and Gordon.
                                                                 (p 7)
          c.   HOLOKAI  XII:   Requirements for HOLOKAI  XII differed somewhat from HOLOKAI  XI in that requirements for motor transport was on a smaller scale, but at more frequent interval, spread over a longer period of time.  Aircraft departure schedules were established at four hour intervals for C133 aircraft and 10 hour intervals for C141 aircraft.  These schedules required that the Motor Transport Division establish a 24 hour a day operation beginning with the first flight on 23 December.  Although the Motor Transport Division hauled 1,651 STON of cargo from Schofield Barracks to Hickam, the major portion of the unit supplies and impedimenta were loaded on organic vehicles of deploying units.  Traffic control methods employed for HOLOKAI  XII were similar to HOLOKAI  XI, with Motor Transport Division personnel on duty around the clock to coordinate all movement requirements.

          d.   HOLOKAI  XIII:   Whereas troops for HOLOKAI  XI embarked from Pier 39, troops for HOLOKAI  XIII embarked from Pier 40.  This change required a complete revision of traffic flow plans in pier areas.  Also, transportation resources had to be re-allocated due to the deployment of the Marine Brigade from the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station during the period 14 - 22 February.  Beginning with the marshaling of vehicles of 3 /4 Cav(-) on 11 February and continuing until the arrival of the last vehicles on 25 February, 46 convoy serials totaling 2,746 vehicles were moved from the marshaling area to the port.  During the period 10 February - 15 April, accompanying supplies and unit impedimenta totaling 10,498 STON (21 STON ammunition, 856 STON vehicles and equipment, 9,621 STON miscellaneous general cargo) were moved from the various unit areas and USARHAW supply points to the army port.  186 buses were required to move troops of division (-).

     12.   Support Teams, and Services:   This portion of the report summarizes actions of the support teams.  It also summarizes services provided the deploying units.

          a.   PCS Clearance Team:   This team is organized by the appropriate Area Commanders.  The purpose of the PCS Clearance Team is to provide assistance to deploying units in the post clearance of unit supply records and buildings.

               (1)   Qualification of Inspectors:   Many of the personnel assigned as inspectors to the teams were not technically qualified to determine condition or completeness of specialized items of equipment being turned in by the deploying units, the situation was over-come through close supervision and on-the-job training.

               (2)   Installed Property:   In many cases, property records pertaining to office furniture were not up-dated to show proper stock numbers and nomenclature, and considerable time was expended in reconciling and    consolidating these records.  Also, attempts by deploying units to move station property to centralized locations for inventory purposes rather than leaving them in place, caused considerable damage to such property.  Early during clearance operations it was noted that buildings had not been assigned to specific individuals within using units.  As a result, deploying unit personnel charged with clearance were not, in all cases, aware of all buildings used by deploying units.  Furthermore, records of installed property were not in all cases, available to the clearance team, and full dependence had to be placed on unit records.

               (3)   Unit Fund and Central Welfare Fund Property:   Inventory and turn-in of CWF property and unit fund property excess to needs of deploying units were initiated concurrently with installation clearance.  Items were secured in place within the quads to facilitate storage.  Approximately $137,000 worth of property, primarily day-room furniture, was turned in to CWF in this manner.  There was little evidence that deploying units had prepared plans for disposing of CWF property and unit fund property as required by deployment plans.

          (4)   Sundry Funds:  Of the 30 Sundry Funds in the division, 6 were officially dissolved prior to unit deployment, 9 were transferred, and of the 15 remaining funds, disposition instructions were not known at the time of the preparation of this report.

          b.   TOE Clearance Team:   This team is organized by the USARHAW Supply and Maintenance Center.  The turn in of excess TOE property and the replacement and exchange of equipment, handled largely through technical supply channels, created a large volume of work, but the work was accomplished without undue difficulty.  One of the major items turned in by the division were the M48A2C tanks; newer model tanks being issued to the division in forward areas.  The issue of M16 rifles in exchange for M14 rifles produced a large volume of turn-ins.  Although six trailer loads of repair parts for U-6 aircraft were turned in, they were subsequently reissued (in the same configuration in which they were turned in) due to change in orders.

          c.   Contract Maintenance and Inspection Teams:   On 14 December, plans were drawn to provide a 100 per cent maintenance inspection of all deployable equipment in the hands of deploying units.  Two inspection and maintenance teams were organized by S&MC to provide round-the-clock operations under G4 supervision.  Initially, teams were augmented by personnel of the Hawaii National Guard.  However, this support was dropped when it became evident that deployments would be spread over a period of several months.  Technical inspection teams were organized (by commodity groups) and equipped with the necessary tools, gauges and test equipment.  EXHIBIT  I (page 34) recapitulates the work involved in this major task.  The heavy workloads were in small arms, fire control, artillery and instruments.  Many means were utilized to meet the escalated equipment requirements - unserviceable equipment repaired, salvage equipment recouped, parts utilized from the bore-yard, and sets disassembled for components.  Maintenance float items were issued to replace items which could not be readily repaired in units.  Items requiring extensive repairs were evacuated to the direct or general support shops for repair and return.                                                  

          d.   De-fueling and Processing:  De-fueling and processing teams performed final inspection on     (p9) approximately 4,500 vehicles at the Wheeler Field marshaling area where each vehicle was inspected to assure that loads were properly stored, secured and strapped.  Upon arrival at the sea or air embarkation points, vehicles were given final processing, protective radiator boards and windshield guards installed, shipping markings checked and adjusted as necessary, and vehicles de-fueled as required.

          e.   Care and Preservation Demonstration Teams:   Deploying units were given assistance, including demonstrations, in the proper care and preservation of equipment for crating and movement.

          f.   Forklift Support:   A problem encountered at deploying unit storage and loading areas was the non-availability of material handling equipment.  To preclude delays in loading, the USARHAW transportation motor pools loaned their MHE equipment to deploying units and in many cases also provided the operators.

          g.   Labor Support:   With the withdrawal of support requirements normally provided by divisional elements, requests were forwarded to CINCUSARPAC for increased staffing requirements for military police, religious services, and Signal Photo.  Personnel augmentation requirements were filled to a large degree by use of non-deployables, temporary hires, transfer of functions from deploying units to USARHAW and TAMC or to non-deploying units (e.g., 2 /21st Arty), and by temporary relocation of civilian workforce from non-critical to critical operational areas.  Requests for temporary hires totaled 54 (SB-34, Transportation - 10, S&MC - 10).  Requirements of Schofield Barracks and SUMC were primarily for laborers.  Transportation requirements were for journeyman and experienced travel clerks.  Since experienced personnel were not readily available for temporary hire from the local labor market, attempts were made to secure personnel from other Federal agencies without success.  Needs for skilled personnel were finally filled by personnel TDY from Sixth Army.

          h.   Labor Support:   All articles of white goods (under-shorts, undershirts, handkerchiefs, towels, wash cloths, etc.) required dyeing to OG 109.  The SB Area QM determined that the workload could be handled by its laundry without relying on commercial support, the capability predicated on availability on the commercial market of the required amounts of dye.  The first bundles for dyeing were received on 13 December, a total of 15,833 bundles (334, 375 pieces) processed during the deployment period December through April.

          i.   Self Service Supply Center:   Normal stockage levels were not adequate to meet the demands of crash buying for expendable cleaning and preserving material and administrative supplies.  Purchase limits and close controls were   effected to assure that each deploying unit received its fair share of available socks.                    (p10)

          j.   Clothing Sales Store:   Many clothing items reached zero balance early in the deployment preparation state.  Assistance was received from the other services in meeting the spiraling demands for such items as cotton drawers, T-shirts, boots and fatigues.

          k.   Mess Support:   Adjustments were made with commercial vendors to assure that subsistence requirements were consistent with the rapidly declining troop strength.  The SB Commissary absorbed the task of ration breakdown thereby relieving the division of this responsibility and concurrently affording a direct control over adjusted issues.  Arrangements were made to provide deploying units with B rations, C rations, hospital aid station ration kits, and in-flight meals.

          l.   Communication Support:   The Signal Office provided additional administrative telephone service and engineered and supervised the installation of special telephone service between all elements concerned in the deployments.  EXHIBIT  J (page 40) portrays the special communications network established.  With the departure of troops, telephones in use dropped from 7,850 in December to 4,665 in February.

13. Personnel and Administrative Support:   

     a.   Maintenance of Unit Strength:   Upon receipt of deployment warning orders, personnel of the deploying
units on special duty with or providing services to USARHAW and subordinate agencies, were identified and released to their parent units.  Non-deployable personnel were identified and transferred to the USARHAW Personnel Center.  Personnel shortages remaining in deploying units were filled by a combination of requisitions and transfers of available USARPAC / USARHAW personnel assets compatible with grades and skills required.

          b.   Personnel Management (Personnel Procedures):   The Adjutant General established procedures to effect approval or disapproval of command sponsored status of dependents to assure that all privileges due a dependent would be provided should the dependent choose to remain in the command, or to permit issuance of travel orders if the dependent chose to move to another location.  There were two categories of dependents to be relocated.  First, those who desired movement to a designated area within or outside of the United States, and second, individually sponsored dependents for whom command sponsored status was not authorized by regulations.                              (p11)
          c.   Dependent Processing Center:   Although facilities and activities necessary to accomplish the movement of unaccompanied dependents were already in existence an immediate problem was the need for a central agency to coordinate the mass movement o dependents to CONUS and elsewhere.  Accordingly, a Dependent Processing Center was established on 20 December under the supervision of the G1 Office.  The Army Community Service Center was used as the base organization to which other necessary activities were added.  USARHAW knew the number of dependents and dependent families involved, but needed more definitive information to determine the magnitude of the movement requirements.  A questionnaire was prepared asking the families for their preferences concerning movement dates and mode of transportation, the kind of household goods to be shipped, and many other questions of this nature; questions intended to serve as a basis for providing the best service possible.  The questionnaire was devised so that answers could be tabulated by automatic data processing.  Policies for continued occupancy of quarters, and procedures for clearing quarters and the installation, were determined and the information disseminated.  Arrangements were made for a liaison team to be stationed at San Francisco to assist dependents in their onward movement.  A direct circuit teletype from Hawaii to Oakland Army Terminal was established to keep the liaison team informed of arrivals and itinerary of dependents.  Messages were also transmitted through the regular communications system to all appropriate CONUS armies and overseas commands so that dependents could be provided en-route assistance.

          d.   Central Clearance Center:   A Central Clearance Center was established under the Area Commander, Schofield Barracks, to assist families in quarters clearance.  Normal quarters inspection procedures were suspended although occupants were enjoined to have quarters in satisfactory condition prior to departure.  Families were authorized to remain in quarters until picked up by government transportation for movement to dockside or airports.  The warehouse operation of the center was primarily concerned with the pick-up of furniture from civilian housing units.  The center staff increased from its authorized strength of 33 to a peak of 50.  Four to ten additional trucks were used as required, and military details averaged 700 man days per month.  Pertinent actions accomplished:  1,489 government quarters terminated and 392 assigned;  537 off-post furniture pick-ups and 135 deliveries;  5,992 quarters inspected / re-inspected.  Many dependent families decided to remain in Hawaii because of the availability of government quarters at Schofield Barracks to unaccompanied dependents.   Additional families decided to remain in Hawaii when Hawaii was announced as R&R Center in May 1966.  The number of dependent families remaining in Hawaii until sponsors next PCS constantly changes because of changes of individual desires.  It is anticipated that about 700 will remain until sponsors next PCS.   The following is a record of families relocated:  42 in December;  1,223 in January;  416 in February;  420 in March;  326 in April;  156 in May;  85 programmed for June.
          e.   Transportation for Dependents:   A total of 2,309 families (6,693 dependent individuals) were moved by    air while 82 families (238 individuals) were moved by surface; families moved to the mainland, to Europe, South America, the Far East, Australia, and to the outer islands of Hawaii.  Shipments of household goods, including shipment by local drayage to Honolulu addresses, totaled 3,000.  Shipments of property of the deploying troops totaled 9,127 (10,711 pieces).

          f.    Personnel Services:   

               (1)   Postal:   Because of advance postal services provided to deploying personnel, the services available through the activated Embarkation Point Postal Unit were not utilized.

               (2)   Finance:   Toll charges received subsequent to the termination of telephone service were reported to the 25th Infantry Division Finance Office for collection.

               (3)   Religious:   Agreements were reached between USARHAW and the 25th Infantry Division for USARHAW to continue to fund for items furnished by the Schofield Barracks Chaplain Fund as long as any element of the division, with chaplains assigned, remained in the area, and that USARHAW would forward religious material to Vietnam until Division Chaplain's Fund was in full operation in-country.

               (4)   Non-appropriated Fund Dividends:   As units began their deployment, CWF began paying dividends to include the period up to the departure date from this command.  Units retained unit fund records and maintained bank accounts in Hawaii.

               (5)   Legal:   The SJA office assisted in completing wills and powers of attorney for division personnel.  With the deployment of the division, all claims for and against the government, of division assigned personnel, will continue to be processed through the SJA.  Similarly, all legal assistance for division dependents will continue to be furnished by the SJA.  There were 1,526 legal assistance cases handled during March 1966 compared to 423 for March 1965.

          g.   Records Administration:   Since the authority for granting command sponsored status to dependents rests with USARWAW, the 25th Infantry Division had to determine those dependents who were not command sponsored, but who were eligible for such status.  Other records administrative actions (processing applications for movement of dependents and station housing allowance, etc.) were handled in a routine manner.

     14.   Program Management:   For the FY 66 command operating budget, the G2/G3 office had programmed $635,000 in Budget Program, 2000 (Operating Forces) to support the 25th Infantry Division in its assigned Southeast Asia activities.  Upon receipt of deployment orders, USARHAW was directed to support the 25th Infantry Division with available resources from within the FY66 annual funding program, costs to be reported to Comptroller and recoupment to be effected later.                                                                 (p13)

     15.   Deployment Costs:   EXHIBIT  K  (page 41) is the Comptroller's recapitulation of the $14.8 million in O&MA (Operation and Maintenance Army) costs incurred in the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division.

     16.   Intelligence:   There was a great workload increase in the G2/G3 office concerning personnel security investigations because of the 25th Infantry Division request that USARHAW assume control of all division personnel security investigations, and review, evaluate, and adjudicate the results of such investigations.

     17.  USARHAW Supply and Maintenance Center (S&MC) Operations:   Prior portions of this report have touched upon many of the tasks performed by S&MC.  This portion of the report recapitulates other significant performances within S&MC activities.  An estimated 129.5 man years were expended by S&MC in its support of the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division, these man years including support provided S&MC by the SB Area Commander, 25th Infantry Division, and the reserve components.

          a.   Stock Control:   Due to computer limitations in searching for assets, stock control personnel expended excessive man-hours in checking and screening for available assets.  Over 200,000 Priority 2 requisitions were processed, utilizing Project Code VRR.  (NOTE:  The application of assets in the DA forward depots was a determination made by USARPAC.)  Numerous dray tags and advance issues were made to expedite actions in order to meet up-dated departure dates or whenever premium air or surface transportation space became available.

          b.   Storage:   25th Infantry Division personnel were trained by storage personnel in the care and preservation of items to be packed for shipment, and in processing vehicles for out-loading.  Storage personnel handled 217,653 issue documents and processed 130,563 receipts.  There were not enough personnel trained to handle this large volume of paperwork, and although the 25th Infantry Division assisted in this problem area by providing personnel, this assistance was not too effective because of the need for constantly training new personnel to replace previously trained personnel deploying with their units.  There were internal operating problems caused by inadequate quantities of material handling equipment to handle the increased workload.  Another problem was the creation of peaks and valleys in workload caused by the fact that the hauling of supplies from the port to the storage warehouses was done mostly at night because of the ready availability of transportation during these hours, this transportation factor causing an uneven flow of supplies through the receiving and shipping operations.  Storage activities operated initially on two 12 hour shifts, reverting to a single 12 hour shift as workload permitted and eventually returned to the normal eight hour work day.

          c.   Maintenance Shop Operations:   The maintenance shops provide personnel for maintenance contact teams and port contact teams.  Enumerated below are particular aspects of shop operations.               (p14)
               (1)   Refinishing of Small Arms Weapons:   Technical manuals which prescribe requirements and procedures for the repair of small arms weapons state that bright surfaces on weapons are objectionable “from the standpoint of visibility when they are capable of reflecting light.”  Accordingly, all exposed metal surfaces are to have a phosphate finish, the finish color to range from black to medium gray.  The division turned in for exchange 1,142 M14 rifles, 1,170  .45 caliber pistols and 218 M112 mounts because these weapons did not meet inspection criteria.  It is estimated that 50% of the M14's, 65% of the pistols, and 75% of the mounts would have passed inspection except for refinishing.  EXHIBIT  L  (page 42) is a photograph illustrating the finishing requirement.  The process of refinishing requires that the weapon be completely disassembled, then sandblasted.  The sudden influx of weapons for refinishing created a tremendous work backlog, a situation which could have been averted through the proper performance of normal maintenance.

               (2)   Fabrication of Protective Shields:   Because of their exposed positions when firing their weapons, machine gunners on some of the tracked vehicles are particularly vulnerable to opposing fire.  Based on a request by the CG 25th Infantry Division, 145 protective shields for machine gunners were fabricated in the maintenance shops.  These armor plate shields were designed by shop personnel to division's specification, because there is no design available for the desired types of shields.  Shields were fabricated for 117 APC's, 23 for self-propelled artillery vehicles, and 5 for helicopters.  A photograph of the shield for the APC is at EXHIBIT  M (page 43).

               (3)   Organizational Maintenance:   Because of a mistaken impression by divisional units that the S&MC shops would correct all deficiencies noted by inspectors, many of the deploying units lost much time by sending their
equipment to S& MC shops for correction of organizational maintenance deficiencies.

          d.   Ammunition:   Deploying units loaded ammunition on their vehicles in an area set aside for this purpose in Aliamanu Crater.  Vehicles were then left in Aliamanu until called forward by the port.  Late submission of requisitions and frequent changes in items and quantities desired were some of the problems encountered by the Ammunition Division of S&MC, these problems creating the need for some overtime work.  Last minute changes also resulted in the shipment of items not required, e.g., 90mm tank ammunition and 5.56mm small arms ammunition shipped instead of , respectively, the 76mm and 7.62mm.                                             (p15)

          e.   Inspection:   The Inspection Division had the task of conducting a 100 per-cent technical inspection of deploying unit equipment.  The inspection teams were augmented by personnel from the G1/G3 office and by personnel from the reserve components.  Performance is discussed in paragraph 12c.  Inspections were hampered by poor lighting in the motor pools and supply rooms, and further complicated because equipment to be inspected was not brought together in a central location, i.e., machine guns would be in supply rooms while the mounts and spare barrels would be in the motor pools.  Without waiting for the inspection teams, some of the deploying units had packed their weapons and equipment while other units were slow in making their equipment available for inspection.  A total of 115,965 items were inspected.  This total includes major items as well as secondary items and compares with the 58,865 major items only summarized in the bar graph chart on page 38 of EXHIBIT  I.

     18.   Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) Operations:   Arrangements were made with the 25th Infantry Division Surgeon so that garrison medical support being furnished by division medical elements would be assumed by the subordinate elements of TAMC.  The medical services furnished for many years by the 25th Infantry Division were difficult to adequately replace from resources available to TAMC.  Several such difficulties are still being encountered, but actions are pending which should rectify these remaining problem areas.  There was confusion in determining deployment increments being discussed because one person would identify a certain increment as GREENLIGHT, another would identify the same as HOLOKAI, while still another would identify the deploying increment by the deploying brigade.

          a.   Medical Supply:   The requirements for medical supplies were determined and the information pre-punched on cards, this action coordinated with the 25th Medical Battalion.  Initial rates of fill on requisitions were between 81% and 94%.

          b.   Medical Services:   In December, certain clinics in the dispensary at Schofield Barracks were combined   to enable the release of division personnel performing garrison duties.  Then, in early February, 23 enlisted AMEDS personnel from Tripler General Hospital and other TAMC elements were transferred to the dispensary at Schofield.  Concurrently, all division AMEDS personnel were released from dispensary duty except for five Medical Corps Officers (who were released on 1 March).  TAMC then assumed complete responsibility for dispensary operations at Schofield Barracks, the ambulance coverage of Wheeler Air Force Base army aviation functions, and the required ambulance coverage at ranges, recreational beaches and other areas.

     19.  Issue of Equipment and Supplies:    The deployment of Company C; of the 65th Engineer Battalion to Cam Ranh Bay in August 2965 gave a foretaste of the kind of equipment problems which could arise should the 25th Infantry Division be deployed.  The company deployed with increased quantities in many of its TOE items as well as with additional equipment because of its mission assignment.  The company was also given authorization by USARPAC to exchange 19 dump trucks for a like number of new dump trucks from USARHAW depot stocks.  WABTOC items such as additional tentage, generators, cots, and lighting systems also were part of the equipment accompanying the unit to Cam Ranh Bay.  This portion of the report recapitulates similar actions associated with the deployment of the division.
          a.   Equipping of Two Additional Infantry Battalions:   In early October, DA directed the reorganization of the 25th Infantry Division by the activation of two new infantry battalions, the 4th and 5th Battalions of the 21st Infantry,  these battalions activated by USARPAC on 2 December, then inactivated on 20 December, after DA had designated two “Alaska” battalions, the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry and the 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry.  By min-October, USARHAW had completed the preparation and submission of requisitions for TOE items required to equip the two battalions of the 21st Infantry, and by the last week of October, USARPAC  ICP had completed its part in forwarding these requisitions to CONUS.  Meanwhile, equipment available in USARHAW stocks, plus stocks made available through lateral transfers from USARHAW units, were being issued to the 25th Infantry Division for the two battalions of the 21st Infantry.  Therefore, when DA designated the two “Alaska” battalions, indicating that these two battalions would close in Hawaii from Alaska by the end of January with individual clothing and equipment and individual and crew-served weapons, numerous adjustments and cancellations had to be effected on requisitions submitted to CONUS in October.  Subsequently, DA authorized USARPAC to apply equipment pre-positioned in the DAFD (DA Forward Depot) to fill equipment shortages for the two “Alaska” battalions.  Through a combination of these resources - issues from USARHAW, shipments from CONUS, and issues from DAFD stocks - the equipment requirements of the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry and the 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry were fully met (with the exception of certain DA-controlled items) when these two battalions, as part of the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, deployed from Hawaii in mid April.

          b.   Rough Terrain Forklifts:   To meet the division's requirements, four of these forklifts in use by the    Hawaii Army National Guard at its NIKE sites were withdrawn from these sites and transferred to the division.

          c.   RAM Equipment:   The division had on requisition six keypunch and two verifier machines.  Since CONUS had indicated that these pieces of equipment would not be available till March, similar types of equipment which had been received in October for use by USARHAW were transferred to the division.  Division personnel were given training as machine operators, training being provided by the USARPAC  Computer Service Center, and by the Stock Control Division of USARHAW  S&MC.

          d.   Radios:  The desires of the 25th Infantry Division for equipping all units with the “new family” radios became a problem early in the deployment discussions because DA had indicated that these new radios would not be available to the division prior to February.  After many discussions extending through most of December, the division was advised by DA that the conversion of the old radios of the 2nd Brigade and the 3rd Brigade to the “new family” radios would be done in-country.  In early January, the division made further urgent requests to permit the conversion (in Hawaii) prior to the deployment of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, but DA refused to consider these requests.  However, DA did establish Project Codes ZTB (3rd Brigade conversion) and ZTO (2nd Brigade conversion) to assure priority supply of new radios to these two brigades.                                                            (p17)

          e.   Reissue of U-6 Aircraft Parts:   Due to policy changes regarding the introduction in-country of the U-6 aircraft, six trailer loads of aircraft parts turned in by the division were subsequently reissued to the division, this transaction also noted in paragraph 12b discussing the work of the TOE Clearance Team.

          f.   Issues From DAFD:   With DA's authorization to apply DAFD stocks to fill equipment shortages, (paragraph 19a), the question of back-hauling this equipment to Hawaii became an issue between the division and USARPAC.  From the standpoint of training and familiarization, rationale decreed that this equipment should be back-hauled to Hawaii.  However, after considering the criticality of shipping and the time remaining within the deployment time frames, the division reluctantly agreed to receive DAFD equipment in forward areas.

          g.   WABTOC Items:   Only limited quantities of WABTOC items could be provided from USARHAW resources.  Therefore, these requirements (walk-in refrigerators, jugs, insulated /vacuum, etc.) were mostly requisitioned on CONUS.

          h.   Introduction of PUSH:   In late December, this command was queried by USARPAC on the feasibility of establishing the PUSH system of re-supply to replace the SPEEDBOAT system.  (Under the PUSH system, the inventory control points in CONUS  would have the responsibility for initiating re-supply actions.  Under SPEEDBOAT, this responsibility is USARHAW's.)  After agreements were reached between the division, USARPAC, and USARHAW, the division furnished a listing of weapons and equipment density, this listing hand-carried to DA to start the PUSH system going.  Under PUSH, re-supply would begin arriving in-country 60 days after arrival of units.

          i.   Slow-down in VRR Shipments:   In early January, the US Army Material Command dispatched a message to all its CONUS depots instructing them to take expeditions action on Project Code VRR requisitions submitted by USARPAC.  The message noted that some installations were not shipping items promptly and were not using priority transportation to ship items to Sacramento by required dates.                                   (p18)

          j.   Base Camp Requirements, and Fortification Material:   The magnitude of division requirements for base camp construction and fortification materials is illustrated by a few citations:  168 walk-in refrigerators;  2,800 jugs,  insulated vacuum;  2,100 tents and tent frame kits;  almost 16,000 canvas cots;  2,500 rucksacks and more than 8,000 jungle hammocks;  40,000 coils of concertina wire in 50 lb coils and 40,000 rolls of barbed wire;  368,000 pickets of all sizes;  2 million sandbags;  miles of signal wire.  When USARPAC finally approved USARV's recommended list of items for base camp construction (paragraph 9) for the 25th Infantry Division, this approval started a flurry of requisitioning and local procurement actions.  As note in paragraph 19g, WABTOC items were mostly placed on requisition to CONUS because these were items of supply not normally stocked in the local supply system.  

               (1)   Pre-cut Tent Frame Kits:   Division requirements for pre-cut tent frames (small, medium and large) totaled about 2,100 of which the Schofield Barracks Area Engineer manufactured about 1,200 in the engineer carpenter shops, while the balance was constructed through local contracts.  Screening and hardware for these tent frames were purchased locally and from CONUS, bundled together with the tent frames, then shipped with units.  EXHIBIT  N  (page 44)  recapitulates local purchases of lumber and hardware for the tent frames, and other purchases.

               (2)   Tents:   The major portion of the requirements for tents were placed on CONUS requisitions.

               (3)   Fortification and Construction Material:   Timbers and similar fortification material are not available locally.  Division requirements for these items were submitted to DA for approval.  Because efforts to obtain these items were being pushed through several channels, requirements were being duplicated and triplicated.  Part of the problem was that DA messages authorizing fortification and construction packages had not been passed to the division nor to USARHAW.  Requisitions were finally submitted for 47 barriers and 47 construction packages.

          k.   Trans-shipments at Army Port:   Throughout the deployment period, equipment items arriving from CONUS were being off-loaded from incoming vessels, then trucked over to the out-loading piers for out-shipment with deploying units.  Dray tags were used (refer to paragraph 17a) in lieu of requisitions to expedite the movement of these trans-shipments.

          l.    Sources of Supply:   In addition to supplies and equipment obtained through army supply sources, division personnel obtained supplies from property disposal yards and from supply sources of the other services.

     20.   Termination of Supply Support:  Supply shipments against dues-out to the 25th Infantry Division continued for several months after the deployment of its last elements.  By July, only minor items remained as dues-out; items which most likely had been filled by PUSH or supplied through the established RVN supply system.  This command proposed to USARPAC that shipments against dues-out to the division be discontinued effective 1 August.  The proposal was forwarded on 28 July and approved two days later; the approval terminating USARHAW's supply support of the 25th Infantry Division.
     21.   Transportation:   

     a.   Absence of Unit Loading Plans:   Terminal personnel had to resort to the use of gross planning factors
for terminal planning because deploying units were unable to provide movement requirements data.  The use of gross planning factors caused continuous adjustments in loading plans.  Data, when finally submitted by deploying units, contained numerous errors concerning vehicle count, weights and measurements, and nomenclatures which did not accurately identify items to be loaded. Units added or subtracted items offered for shipment up until the time hatches were closed, and added or removed vehicles from cargo assembly lines without notifying terminal personnel.  In many instances, items were added to cargo loads which changed loading and stowage characteristics without corresponding changes being made in movement data, this resulting in cargo not fitting in assigned location on vessels and requiring unnecessary shifting and re-stowing.

          b.   Creating Additional Requirements for Land Transportation:   To expedite the transshipment of items from incoming vessel to the out-loading vessel (paragraph 19k),  terminal personnel recommended to deploying unit commanders that they establish operations at the pier where deploying unit personnel could sort, mark and identify items being transshipped.  The Supply and Transportation Battalion was the only unit which took up this recommendation.  Other units created additional requirements for land transportation by hauling the transshipment items from the pier to Schofield (for sorting, marking, identification), then back to the pier for out-loading.

          c.   Tie-up of Critical Land Transportation:   The Air Force required that cargo loads be at Hickam Field five hours prior to departure time; personnel to be at the air terminal two hours prior to plane departure time.  Then, land transportation had to remain at the air terminals until the departure of aircraft in order that cargo or personnel could be back-hauled to their army bases immediately in case of aborted flight missions.  These lead-time requirements tied up land transportation for excessive periods of time.

     22.   Increase in Post Security Violations:   Unit deployments caused the withdrawal of personnel who provided much of the military police and interior guard support.  The departure of these personnel created a temporary break in post security.  Immediately, numerous break-ins, thefts, pilferages and car strippings occurred.

     23.   Unsanitary Family Housing:   Before being issued quarters clearance, families occupying government quarters must see to it that quarters being vacated meet sanitary standards.  Decisions to permit unaccompanied dependents to remain in government quarters until their day of departure resulted in the majority of such quarters failing to meet prescribed sanitary standards.                                                            (p20)

     24.   Unpaid Telephone Bills:   Due to the large volume of terminations for telephone service, it was not possible to issue pay adjustment authorizations for all accounts involved.  Consequently, many telephone accounts of deployed personnel remain unpaid.

     25.   Inadequate Planning for Receipt of Non-deployables:   Non-deployable personnel were assigned to the US Army Personnel Center on short notice, causing the center to absorb these personnel without adequate planning for messing, billeting, and administration.  The center is not staffed to handle the expanded requirements for personnel actions attendant to a sudden increase in personnel strength.

     26.   Insufficient Material Handling Equipment (MHE) and No Operators:   There were delays in moving and loading of supplies within deploying unit areas due to the lack of MHE.  When such equipment was made available to units, the non-availability of operators in the units caused an ensuing problem.

27.   Supply:

          a.   Slow Authorizations for Procurement of WABTOC Items:   Because firm information (authorizations, basis of issue, sources of supply) was not readily provided, supply planning actions for obtaining WABTOC items required continuing revisions.  Although the 25th Infantry Division had considered USARV's recommendations for WABTOC items as being directive in nature, USARHAW had no authorizations to proceed with supply actions.  Therefore, the period between the receipt of the first of USARV's many recommendations to the receipt of the first authorizations for the procurement of lumber, (August through early December) was a period of great vexation, a period when many supply and procurement actions could have been initiated.  The volume of priority VRR shipments of supplies and equipment from CONUS to Hawaii would not have been so great if early supply actions had been authorized.  Early authorizations would also have provided time for formal advertising for local procurements (see following item).

          b.   No Time For Formal Advertising:   Deploying units submitted their requirements for lumber and packing and crating supplies as the actual needs arose.  Therefore, almost every requirement for local procurement of such supplies had to be met on a crash action basis, there being little or no lead time to permit formal advertising.  Under the circumstances, requirements for local procurements were negotiated.  If the G4 Contracting Division had had time for formal advertising, the procurement lead time then available to local contractors and suppliers would have contributed to price quotations much more favorable than the prices quoted under negotiation.  Formal advertising would have realized savings in cost of supplies.

          c.   A Run on Mess Hall Expendables:   Anticipating the necessities required in base camp operations, units deployed with all available expendable mess hall items such as compartmented plastic trays, cups, bowls, etc.   Although USARHAW will have to replace these expendables, many of these items could have been replaced in due time.          (p21)

          d.   Damages to Mess Hall Equipment:   Some walk-in and reach-in refrigerators and freezer cabinets were damaged because these pieces of equipment were not properly drained when unit mess halls were closed.  These major pieces of kitchen equipment will have to be repaired or replaced.  Improper care also caused damages to other pieces of equipment, e.g., coffee urns and upright mixers.  Additionally, a few items of equipment (freezer cabinets, water cooler, meat-slicer) which were initially inventoried and accounted for, were subsequently missing when rechecks were made after deployed.  Although the cost of repairs or replacement of damaged or missing equipment may be substantial, the problem is not severe, considering the fact that the division operated 63 mess halls.


     Recommendations submitted in the feeder reports which concern the internal operating procedures of the reporting units are not embodied in this report.  The recommendations which follow are items of major interest which the G4 office will pursue further during the subsequent revision of the USARHAW Out-loading Plan.

     28.   Inclusion of WABTOC items in USARPAC  Logistic Policies and Procedures for General and Limited War Planning  (USARPAC  LP&P)  (U):   The problem of obtaining information and authorization concerning WABTOC items is discussed in paragraph 27a, page 21.  The USARPAC  LP&P states that WABTOC item will be authorized as approved by the subordinate commanders (paragraph 4a (4),  USARPAC  LP&P).  RECOMMEND that this policy statement be implemented by the inclusion of a listing of WABTOC items required by units deploying in support of USARPAC operations plans.

     29.   USARHAW Assigned Personnel for Post Security:   The temporary break in post security discussed in paragraph 22, page 20, is a recognized problem.  As such, RECOMMEND that the USARHAW out-loading Plan provide for a phase-down of functions normally requiring the posting of security personnel, and a close-down of facilities to reduce the requirement for security personnel.

     30.   Build-up of Out-loading Supplies:   Operational Project USARHAW  GEN-6-61 is the device used to stock supplies required to support out-loading operations.  Most of the items in this operational project are items required by port operations.  RECOMMEND that the project be expanded by increasing the quantities of port items currently authorized, by the addition of items required by supply operations in support of out-loading, and by the addition of items required in other phases of out-loading (see Recommendation which follows).                                   (p22)

     31.   Additional Requirements for Plywood:   Among the recommendations contained in the 22nd Air Force Report on Operation BLUE LIGHT, is a recommendation that “Army division should include, as part of this planning, a ready source for 3 /4” plywood sheets if combined cargo /troop loads are contemplated for the C-141.”  The narrative which explains the background for the recommendation is at EXHIBIT  O  (page 49).  In essence, placing a cargo pallet on a plywood sheet permits rapid plane loading and unloading because the plywood allows the cargo to be moved rapidly along the rollers installed in the plane.  RECOMMEND that plywood for this purpose be stocked as part of the build-up of out-loading supplies in Operational Project USARHAW  GEN-6-61.

     32.   Protection to prevent Broken Windshields:   The 22nd Air Force Report also notes that while in flight, troops climbed over vehicles to reach the forward latrine and galley area, and in so doing, broke some of the lowered windshields; windshields which had been lowered to facilitate loading.  The 22nd Air Force recommends that a piece of plywood be banded over the windshield before vehicles are loaded on planes.  RECOMMEND that this protective procedure be adopted by units deploying from USARHAW.

     33.   Testing of Out-loading Plans:   To test the validity of sea and air out-loading plans, and to assure that unit transportation requirements data are current, RECOMMEND  that unit training programs of PACOM Army Reserve units include quarterly out-loading exercises, these exercises to be conducted jointly with USARHAW.


          A letter from the CG 25th Infantry Division expressing the division's appreciation
          For the accomplishment of “a highly successful deployment: is at EXHIBIT  P,
          The last exhibit in this report.


 Headquarters United States Army, Pacific
APO San Francisco  96558
                                                                              9  August, 1965

Dear Carl:

     Recent events compel me to emphasize again that the President of the United States has given the highest priority to the successful accomplishment of our mission in Viet Nam.

     As you know, United States Army, Pacific has the job of organizing, equipping, training and employing assigned forces to insure optimum readiness for combat operations.  We are responsible for providing individual personnel and units to fulfill CINCPAC's operational requirements.  One of our biggest and most difficult tasks is to provide adequate logistic and administrative support for operations in Viet Nam.

     Pending the build-up of adequate personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities, many problems will arise.  This means we must exercise a very special and intimate type of leadership which identifies and focuses quickly on problem areas which affect the deployment and support of our forces.  Once identified, the problems must be solved with dispatch which in many cases may call for demanding and unusual solutions.

     Each command should have meaningful programs and procedures.  We must be capable at any given time to produce accurate and meaningful data which shows where we stand with respect to personnel, training and materiel readiness.  Each one of us should take inventory now to determine exactly where we stand with respect to mission accomplishment.  In this regard it may prove profitable to review carefully the “be prepared to” type missions assigned in USARPAC Operations Instructions No. 1-64(U) to insure that everything possible is being done to plan for effective support of our forces.

     I know each of you realizes the sense of urgency that exists and is doing his part.  However, I cannot over-emphasize how strongly I believe that upon the various elements of United States Army, Pacific, each in varying degrees of course, depends the success or failure of our logistical and administrative support effort.  There can be no failure.  Therefore, I call on you to take such actions as you deem necessary to see that we carry forward our mission to the highest effectiveness and perfection.   My staff and I stand ready to back you in any way we can.

With best regards.


 General,  U.S. Army
 Commander in Chief

Major General Carl Darnell, Jr.
Commanding General
U.S. Army,  Hawaii
APO  U.S. Forces  96557

                    Recapitulation of Deployment Orders

1.   Division                                                                                         Msg. reference & classification

     27 Oct. 65  -     Advance Warning Order, advising                    USARPAC  GPOP-PL  21583
               Division of deployment of one brigade
               Early 1866m  Div(-) later in year

2.   Two Brigades (1 by air to Pleiku, the other by sea to Saigon)

     14  Dec  65  -  Warning Order                                                               DA  743968
     16  Dec  65  -  Movement Directive                                                     USARPAC  GPOP - Op 35007

     16  Dec  65  -  Movement Order                                                           CINCPAC  160159Z  Dec

3.   69th Armor
     9  Jan  65  -      Advance Movement Directive                                   USARPAC  GPOP-OP  482

     11  Jan  65  -    Final Movement Directive                                        USARPAC  GPOP - OP  600

     20  Feb  65  -   Movement Order                                                       CINCPAC  200821Z - Feb

4.   Division  (-)

     12  Jan  66  -   Warning Order                                                          DA  746876

     6  Feb  66  -    Movement Order                                                      CINCPAC  060300Z  Feb

     12  Feb  66  -  Movement Directive                                              USARPAC  GPOP - OP  3017

5.   3rd Sqdn  4th  Cav (-)                                        

     5  Feb  66  -    Advance Movement Directive                             USARPAC  GPOP - OP  2568

     22  Feb  66  -  Final Movement Directive                                   USARPAC  GPOP - OP  3694

     Note:      JCS policy concerning classification of RVN deployment information (planning, alerting,
          Deployment) is enunciated in JCS confidential message 8963, 24  Aug. 65.  

Exhibit  B                                                            (p26)

Oganization for Providing Out-loading Support Teams and OTHER SUPPORT  

          25TH Inf Div

Fwd info on deploying units;
Submit requests for support
Teams and OTHER SUPPORT               AC of S,  G4

                                                       P&C  Div
                                                       Contracts for
                                                       OTHER SUPPORT

     Area Cmdrs                                       Cmdr  S&MC                     TransO

     PCS clearance team                   TOE clearance team               Bulk cargo mvmts
                                                            Contact maint. Team               CULT  &  TMPs
     Labor support team                    Equip insp team                       (SB - FS)
                                                          Care & preservation
                                                          demonstration team               Personnel mvmts
                                                         Defueling & deprocessing                  TMPs  (SB - FS)

                    OTHER SUPPORT

     Box making
     Mfg shipping pallets
     Fabrication of WABTOC items
          (tent frame kits,  latrine kits,  etc.)

          staff supervision

Exhibit  C                                                        (p27)


               Major Units                                                      Planned Deployment Configuration
          25th Infantry Division                                          3rd Bde   TF     2nd  Bde TF     Div (-)
                                                                                      BLUELIGHT     GREENLIGHT     MOONLIGHT
Unit                              Auth str               MOLOKAI  XII `HOLOKAI  XI     HOLOKAI XII     

HHC  25th Inf Div          152                      1                           1             150
25th MP Co                   189                   31                         31             127
25th Avn Bn                   313                   2                             2             350
125th Sig Bn                 626                   51                        51              516
65th Engr Bn                 932                   221                   222              319

HHC 1st Bde               125                       _                       _                123
HHC 2nd Bde              125                       _                    122             _
HHC 3rd  Bde             125                    122                        _             _

3rd Sqdn 4th Cav       856                    180                    180          354

HHB Div  Arty             217                      _             _                      223
1st Bn  8th Arty          490                      _            489                       _
2nd Bn  9th  Arty        490                    489            _                        _
7th Bn  11th Arty        490                      _                                      489

3rd  Bn  13th  Arty     592                      _             _                       592

2nd Bn  21st  Arty        321                                  (Not Deployed)

HQ  HQ & Band             97                           _             _                81
25th Admin Co               396                      50            50            255
25th Med Bn                   396                      88            88            216
25th Sup & Trans Bn     485                    134          134            248
725th Maint Bn               691                    100          100            463

1st Bn  69th Arm             571                         (Deployed separately, see below)

1st Bn  14th  Inf               829                    829            _              _
1st Bn  27th  Inf               829                      _           829              _
1st  Bn  35th Inf               829                    829             _              _

2nd Bn  14th  Inf               829                      _             _             829
2nd Bn  27th  Inf               829                      _            829              _
2nd Bn  35th  Inf               829                    829             _              _

4th Bn  9th Inf                  829                      _             _              829
4th Bn  23rd Inf               829                      _             _              829

1st Bn (M) 5th Inf               899                      _       901                _
25th  MI  Det                                            15              15                36
18th Mil Hist Det                                       _               _                  2
LO Sec 303rd ASA Bn                                  _               _                  1
Red Cross  (Civ)                                        1                 1                  1
                                                              3972          4045            7033
     Deployed separately:
1st Bn  69th Arm

Exhibit  D                         (p28)


Source of authorized strengths:  USARPAC  GO  332  (2 Dec 65) as changed per GO 344 (20 Dec 65),
       GO 4 (6 Jan 66),  GO 14 (25 Jan 66) and GO 33  (14 Feb  66).

2.     65th Engr Bn.:   The 932 authorized strength includes Co C which deployed to Cam Ranh Bay in August 1965,     
        deployed strength 171.

3.     2nd Bn 21st Arty:   This is the only unit which remained in Hawaii.  Unit attached to USARHAW effective 1    
        Mar 66  (USARPAC  GO  38,  25 Feb 66).

Deployment Code Names:

The code name GREENLIGHT first appeared in message USARV-AVC  037, 27 Nov 65;  BLUELIGHT in message USARV-AVD-PO  041,  14 Dec 65;  MOONLIGHT in 25th Infantry Division OPORD OPLAN HOLOKAI XIII, 1 Feb. 66.

          b.    The code name HOLOKAI in Hawaiian means, to “go to the sea”.  This code name was first assigned by the 25th Infantry Division to its deployment exercise held in February 1961.  These deployment exercises had progressed through HOLOKAI  X at the time that the division received its actual deployment order.  The continued use of the code name gave the division, and USARHAW, a means to circumscribe some security aspects of the deployment orders in preparing for the many actions required of deployment.

     5.   Deployment configurations:   The strength figures listed for the brigade task forces and Div(-) are deployment planning figures only, derived from the following:

           HOLOKAI XI  and XII     25th Inf Div message TL 12-4582, 14 Dec 65

           HOLOKAI XIII          Annex A (Task organization to 25th Inf Div OPLAN HOLOKAI XIII, 1 Feb 66)

Summary of the various strength totals:     

          a.   USARPAC General Orders          16,210
                 plus:  25th MI Det, etc.                         70     

               minus:  2/21st Arty                     321     Not deployed
                   Co C 65th Engr Bn                171   Previously deployed
                                                              15, 788

          b.   25th Inf Div planning total          15,621

          c.   Actual deployment                15,745    See Exhibit   E

(Maps & Charts,   (Exhibit E),  p31 (Exhibit F), p 32  (Exhibit G). p 33  (Exhibit H)

                              POM  Technical Inspection Equipment Summary               (p34)
                        First line of figures    -    Total Inspected
                        Second line of figures ( )  -  Total Faults
                                   Small       V  (Veh)
HOLOKAI  XI           Arms     CV  (Cmbt V)     Arty     Engr     Cal     Sig     CM     Med

1/5th Mech                  980     V     72                           251     979     358     493     54
                                   (501)          (35)                         (115)   (113) (167)     (18)     (0)
                                              CV    55

1/27th Inf                    865     V     157                            54     950     163     116     73
                                    (90)          (200)                         (69)     (47)     (62)     (13)     (0)

2/27th Inf                    863     V     157                           45     981     307     309     79
                                 (347)          (227)          (31)         (23)    (66)    (52)        (0)

1/8th Armor             504    V     150                 40       49                  199        40     37
                                (205)          (203)             (70)     (21)                 (32)     (13)     (1)

1/69th Armor          690     V     64                               46     591     363         89     60
                              (335)          (40)                             (59)     (13)     (105)     (18)     (0)
                                        CV     25

3 /4 Cav               176     V     14          17     124     28     310     13
(Troop A)             (36)          (34)          (13)     (1)     (11)     (125)     (0)
                                      CV     21

65th Engr          171     V     79                       42     214     7     35     13
(Co B)               (7)          (98)                       (68)      (3)     (2)  (23)     (0)

HHC 2nd Bde 339     V     95                       66     413     131     31     10
                        (209)        (109)                    (72)     (6)     (40)     (8)     (0)

                       4588     V     802     40         570     4252   1556  1423  339
                     (1730)          (946)    (70)     (448)    (206)    (485)  (270)     (1)
                                 CV     101

NOTE:       In addition to faults noted, 414 small arms were exchanged.                         (p34)

Exhibit  I                                                                                                                   
                                     Small     V (Veh)
  HOLOKAI  XIII          Arms     CV(Cmbt V)     Arty     Engr      Cal        Sig     QM     Med        (p35)

1/35th Inf                      1139     V   178                          12                      195     183     82
                                     (168)          (73)                          (6)                     (105)      (4)     (1)

2/35th Inf                      735     V    185          27     548     194     235     84
               (400)          (253)          (73)     (8)     (109)     (227)     (0)

1/14th Inf          828     V     247          47     720     165     117     83
               (413)          (284)          (69)     (120)     (68)     (48)     (0)

65th Engr          175     V     78          42     214     7     35     1
               (81)          (98)          (68)     (3)     (2)     (23)     (0)

2/9th Arty          545     V     11          35     104     11     305     13
               (204)          (197)`(76)     (50)          (51)     (9)     (2)

3 /4 Cav               232     V     11          35     104     11     305     13
               (114)          (48)          (0)     (1)     (13)     (115)     (0)
                    CV     11

HHC 3rd Bde          410     V     225          83     421     90     72
               (312)          (231)          (113)     (10)     (27)     (33)          

               4064     V     1078     43     283     2007     879     971     297
               (1692)          (1184)     (76)     (379)     (142)     (375)     (459)     (3)
                    CV     11

NOTE:  In addition to faults noted, 295 small arms were exchanged.                         (p35)

                                    Small     V (Veh)                                        Fire
HOLOKAI  XIII          arms     CV (Combt V)     Arty     Engr     Cml     Sig     QM     Med     Con          

3 /4 Cav                      728     V     92     9     171     507     129     1053     72     50
                                   (311)          (157)     (22)     (130)     (11)     (64)     (326)     (0)     (2)
                                              CV     7

65th Engr          372     V     139          75     168     20     325     39     11
               (232)          (292)          (46)     (7)     (34)     (11)     (4)     (8)
                    CV     4

Div Hq (-)          177     V     78          56     170     47     144
               (63)          (128)          (17)     (2)     (20)     (83)

25th Admin          343     V     52          72     285     1     53
               (150)          (57)          (48)     (10)     (4)     (112)

25th MI               37                    5     37          12
               (12)                    (0)     (0)          (5)

25th MP Co          272     V     68          27     171     145
               (97)          (95)          (30)     (0)     (71)

125th Sig               469     V     126          80     294     411     571
               (267)          (272)          (159)     (1)     (314)     (38)

Adv Plang Gp               V     16                    17     47
                         (21)                    (7)     (21)

Hq Sup Cmd               V     27               106     17     18
                         (15)               (0)     (7)     (26)

725th Maint          586     V     217          90     526     283     592          23
               (185)          (567)          (114)     (68)     (88)     (269)          (3)

25th S&T          304     V     155          58     262     87
               (157)          (430)               (44)     (0)     (4)
                    V     124*

25th Med               654     V     89          77     221     83          368
               (399)          (226)          (109)     (0)     (4)          (3)

25th Div Arty          296                    4     13          1     123
               (105)                    (9)     (0)          (0)     (47)          (p36)

3rd Arty               953     V     282     43     502     811     351     1341          258
               (1026)          (600)     (76)     (254)     (9)     (77)     (261)          (40)

5th Avn               354     V     131          127     246     125          41
               (219)          (227)          (125)     (1)     (47)          (0)

HHC 1st               265     V     107          51     138     144     283          17
               (198)          (164)          (80)     (2)     (27)     (161)          (2)
4/9th Inf               1041     V     189     23     210     854     390     947          160
               (735)          (355)     (14)     (210)     (12)     (65)     (165)          (42)

2/14th Inf          1117     V     204     19     179     917     510     1021     86     265
               (1206)          (448)     (82)     (132)     (67)     (242)     (237)     (0)     (73)

4/23rd Ind          1091     V     240     188     133     679     324     1184          10
               (313)          (279)     (279)     (148)     (5)     (89)     (574)          (25)

7/11 Arty          590     V     171     18     290     545     495     1005          183
               (319)          (459)     (29)     (177)     (18)     (77)     (270)          (20)          

               9649     V     2507     300     2207     6950     3579     3597     729     977
               (5994)          (5056)     (502)     (1832)     (213)     (1261)     (2595)     (54)     (215)
                    CV     11
*  Vehicles re-inspected

NOTE:   In addition to faults noted, a total of 985 small arms were exchanged.                         (p37)

(p38  Graph)

                         COMPOSITION of INSPECTION TEAMS

               Small     Veh &                                        Fire
               Arms     Cmbt V          Arty     Engr     Cal     Sig     QM     Med      Cont     Total     

     Contact Team                    8                                   8

     Supervisors **     2     2          1     1          1                    7

     Inspectors     2     14          1     6     2     7     3          4     39

HARNG ***          4     8          2               2                    16

USAR               5                                                  5

TAMC                                                       2          2

25th Inf Div           6                                                  6     

     Total          19     24          12     7     2     10     3     2     4     83

Contact teams under supervision of G4;  personnel provided by G4, S&MC, and G2/G3

**            These 7 supervisory inspector personnel were utilized during period 16-29 December 1965

***         HARNG also provide 2 aircraft inspectors                                   (p39)

                                                               (Graph  p 40)

                         RECAPITULATION of O&MA COSTS  

     The following is the comptroller's recapitulation of cumulative costs, as of 30 June 1966, in the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division.  These amounts are O&MA (Operation and Maintenance, Army) costs incurred against funds allocated to USARHAW only.

BPA               Activity                              Amount          Note

2020     OPERATING FORCES                              $12,122,900     A
9020     LOCAL WELFARE SERVICES                                  20,200     C
9030     LOCAL MAINTENANCE & MANAGEMENT OF FACILITIES            824,700     D
9040     SUPPORT MAINTENANCE                                525,800     E
9050     LOCAL LOGISTICS SERVICES                                114,500     F
2220     OPERATION OF SUPPLY DEPOTS                           716,900     G
2250     TRANSPORTATION SERVICES                                  36,300     H
2270     OPERATION  OF PORT TERMINLS & FACILITIES                 493,600     I      
                                        TOTAL          $14,891,500

   A          Supplies and equipment (includes $1,035 million deferred billings for supplies shipped in June, but
          billed in July.)

   B          Dependent processing assistance in CONUS

   C          Special Services supplies and equipment (mostly sporting goods).

   D          Fabrication of tent kits

   E          Repair of equipment (S&MC field maintenance shops)

   F          Personnel and cargo haul;  laundry support (mostly for dyeing of whites to OD).

   G          Processing of supply requisitions by S&MC.

   H          Personnel and cargo haul  (land transportation).

   I          Terminal operations (stevedoring).

Exhibit  K          (drawing)                                             p. 41

Exhibit  L          (drawing)                                             p.  42

Exhibit  M          (drawing)                                             p.  43

                    Recapitulation of Local Purchases
                         (Dec 65 thru Apr 66)

LUMBER, SOFTWOOD ( * dunnage)
                                   Date  of
          Board feet         Cost               Contract               Delivery Schedule
Dec            964,768     $121,495          12-15-65          12-16-65 to 1 -3 -66
            237,002         30,004                         12-27-65
                8,400           1,168                         12-27-65
              85,000 *          11,135                         12-21-65
              90,472 *            9,827          12-20-65          12-22-65
              21,168 *            2,942                         12-21-65
              52.320 *            7,781                         12-22-65
              10,000 *            2,040                         12-22-65
              42,880            5,489          12-22-65          12-23-65 & 12-30-65
              33,600            4,200          12-23-65          12-27-65
              23,371            3,195          
              48,766            6,037          12-28-65          12-28-65
              31,818            5,908          
              32,600            5,607     
              37,450            4,620          12-29-65          12-29-65
              30,000 *            3,705          12-30-65          12-31-65
          1,779,884      $229,107

Jan.               12,000            1,558            1-5-66               1 - 7 - 66                                7,200               931                         1  10 - 66     
                 6,540               827                         1 - 6 - 66
                 1,920               278                         1 - 5 - 66
               19,000             3,021             1-21-66          1 -24 - 66
               34,812             4,902                         1 -26 - 66
               11,000             1,357                         1 -24 -  66
                 4,000                476                         1 - 21- 66
                 7,000                833                         1 - 21 - 66
                 6,000                870          
             109,436         $15,053

Feb.               37,460             5,321               2 - 1- 66          2 - 4 - 66
               12,800             1,664                         2 - 7 - 66
               68,117             8,687                         2 - 4 - 66
                 4,267                640                         
               64,800             8,855               2 - 3 - 66          2 - 4 -  66
               12,000             1,482
                 5,000               610
               42,000             6,036                2 - 4 - 66          2 - 5 - 66
               34,450             6,139
               15,750             1,890
                 3,800                475
               23,000             3,073                 2 - 11 - 66          2 - 11 - 66
               27,200             4,216                 2 - 18 - 66          2 - 19 - 66     (p44)
EXHIBIT N            8,000             1,520
                 3,000                372
               18,000             3,045                  2 - 21 - 66          2 - 23 - 66
               28,000             4,916
                 1,000                135
                 3,000                384
                 5,500                699
                 2,000                252
                 2,000                270
               47,848  *             7,136               2 - 24 - 66     2 - 25 - 66
               30,976  *             5,463
               30,160  *             3,649
               21,104  *             4,168
             183,600           32,743               2 - 28 - 66     2 - 28 - 66
               31,900             3,988
             766,900       $117,140

Mar               61,000           11,563               3 - 1 - 66     3 - 3 - 66
               20,000             3,500
               40,000             5,608
                 3,840                503               3 - 8 - 66     3 - 11 - 66
               16,747             2,286
               30,800             4,417               3 - 14 - 66     3 - 16 - 66
               54,996             9,428
               32,456             3,938
               24,500             3,587
               33,000             4,452
               72,378             9,460               3 - 21 - 66     3 - 22 - 66
               47,672             6,933
               31,631             5,607
               63,388             8,721
                 6,368             1,596
               10,036             1,441
             548,812         $83,140

Apr         24,100             3,477               4 - 6 - 66     4 - 7 - 66
               42,164             5,292               4 - 12 - 66     4 - 12 -66
               10,000             1,810
               13,000             2,210
                 6,381             1,230
               95,645         $14,019

Dec          1,779,884     $229,107
Jan             109,436         15,053
Feb             766,732       117,828
Mar             548,812         83,140
Apr               95,645         14,019
                 3,300,509     $459,147                                   (p45)

B.     PLYWOOD  ( * Plyform   -  ** Wolmanized)     

              SHEET                  COST          Date of Contract          Delivery Schedule
Dec   1,800             15,800               12 -15 - 65          12 - 16 - 65 to 1 - 3 - 66
          1,850 *          14,430
          1,100            11,803                              12 - 27 - 65
          1,700            15,946                              `1 -  29 - 65
             396               3,497                              12 - 27 - 65
             350 *            2,727
             860              8,940
          3,000 *         22,860               12 - 22 - 65          12 - 23 - 65 & 12 - 30 - 65
          2,000 *         14,260                              12 - 23 - 65
        13,029       $110,263     

Jan       500 *            3,875               1 - 5 - 66          1 - 10 - 66
             400 *            3,048
             500 *            3,825
             300 *            2,187
          2,710          $12,935

Feb      900 **             8,345               2 - 1 - 66          2 - 4 - 66
             800 **             8,345                              2 - 7 - 66
             360 **             3,798                              2 - 4 - 66
             350 **             3,623
             300 **             2,418
          2,710            $26,529

Mar              320 *          $  2,438               3 - 8 - 66          3 - 11 - 66

Apr              280          $  2,872               4 - 6 - 66          4 - 8 - 66

Dec           13,029          $110,263
Jan              1,700              12,935
Feb             2,710              26,529
Mar                 320                2,438
Apr                 280                2,872
                  18,039          $155,037


        Dec     105  rl          $  3,183               12 - 23 - 65          12 - 23 - 65
            95              2,036               12 - 22 - 65          12 - 22 - 65
            12                 564               12 - 23 - 65          12 - 23 - 65
          212          $  5,783

        Feb     189              4,449               2 - 18 - 66          2 - 18 - 66
                      12                 479               2 - 17 - 66          
                    201          $  4,928

                  413          $10,711                                        (p46)
D.               SCREEN,  FIBERGLASS                    Date of
                       Cost               Contract               Delivery Schedule               
Dec     15   $  3,995              
   12 -23 - 65      12 - 27 - 65
          976            29,127                              12 - 31 - 65
          111              2,164                              12 - 27 - 65
            20                 445               12 - 27 - 65          12 - 30 - 65
        1258          $35,731


     Mar.       688  sht     $  3,808

Apr.   4,895             28,547               4 - 14 - 66          4 - 15 - 66
          1,685               7,196
             420               1,890
          7,668          $ 41,441

     Apr     500 ea          $16,680               4 - 12 - 66          4 - 20 - 66

G.   TENT KITS.     

     Feb     400          $150,000          2 - 9 - 66          2 - 28 - 66

     Mar     333            109,890          3 - 8 - 66          3 - 7 - 66
                 207              45,126          3 - 8 - 66          3 - 10 - 66
                 940          $305,016


     Dec.         4          $   4,640               12 - 21 - 65          12 - 22 - 65

     Feb.         4               4,056                 2 - 9 - 66                2 - 9 - 66     


     Jan     180          $   4,158          1 - 31 - 66          2 - 3 - 66

     Feb.   133                3,259     2 - 4 - 66          2 - 9 - 66
          522              12,476                    2 - 9 - 66   &  2 - 13 - 66
          300                8,323     2 - 11 - 66          3 - 4 - 66
          428              11,231                    2 - 11 - 66  &  3 - 9 - 66
            17                   629     2 - 14 - 66          2 - 14 - 66
            44                1,520     
            36                1,331     
              9                   231
           143               3 ,418     2 - 24 - 66          3 - 4 - 66
             60                1,321                    3 - 25 - 66
        1,892            $43,739

          2,072          $  47,897                                   (p47)

          Local purchases for nails, tacks, hinges, etc., are consolidated and summarized rather than being listed as                 individual contracts.

     Feb.     20,935  ctn of nails          $  5,639
            1,713  pr  hinges                           928
            2,008  pr  springs                          643
               452  tu  tacks                                54
               301  lb  tacks                              495
            1,594  ea holder pull chain           885
            1,594  ea lamp, elec                     230
           13,250  lf cable, power elec          901

     Apr.           148  rl wire, poultry           $  3,585
             2,800  lb nails                                     487
                  47  ea door handle                            6
                                                                   $  3,585               Total Feb & Apr   $13,360

          a.     Lumber, softwood          $   459,147
          b.     Plywood                                155,037
          c.     Barrier material                      10,711
          d.     Screen, fiberglass                 35,731
          e.     Corrugated Roofing               41,441
          f.     Wooden Boxes                        16,680
          g.       Tent Kits                               305,016
          h.     Kit, hose & fitting assembly      8,696
          i.     Battery, dry charged                  47,897
          j.     Other Bldg material                   13,360     
                                                                    $1,093,716                    (p48)

Extract from page 11 - 12,
 22nd Air Force Report on



DISCUSSION:   In handling bulk cargo in a C141A Star-lifter, 463L pallets are normally utilized.  On Operation BLUE LIGHT, combination troop / cargo configurations were required and the use of 463L pallets would have eliminated the adjacent troop seats.  As a solution, the two lines of center rollers were turned up; warehouse pallets (40” x 48”) were placed on sheets of plywood and rolled forward in the cargo compartment.  This procedure permitted rapid loading and off-loading, and the plywood also served as a load spreader for high density cargo.  For pallet weights up to 2,000 lbs, ½” plywood was sufficient.  Heavier loads required a ¾” thickness. As many pallets weighed about 3,000 lbs, ¾” plywood was used in the main and proved satisfactory for loads as heavy as 3,800 lbs.  Standard 4'x 8' plywood sheets were cut in half to make pallets 40” x 48”, the same area as the warehouse pallets.  Otherwise, one warehouse pallet ends up partially on two different plywood pallets when the loads are pushed together for the tie-down; off-loading is thus complicated.  A word of caution:  ¾” plywood is rather expensive and may not be readily available in large quantities.  Requirement for this commodity during BLUE LIGHT was significant and seriously depleted both military and civilian resources.


APO  San Francisco  96225

May  1966

Major General Carl Darnell
Commanding  General
United States Army,  Hawaii
APO  U.S. Forces  96557

Dear Carl:

     The last of the soldiers of the 1st Brigade have joined us in Cu Chi and the remaining cargo ships are in the Saigon harbor.  In terms of distance involved, troops and cargo move, and types of transportation used, this was certainly a unique deployment of Army forces.

     From the standpoint of the 25th Infantry Division, this was a highly successful deployment accomplished in an efficient and professional manner.  As the commander of this division, I know, as do my staff and subordinate commanders, that the lion's share of the credit for this fine move properly rests with you and the officers, men and civilians of U.S. Army,  Hawaii.

     The statistics fail to reveal the long hours, effort, ingenuity and skill expended and applied by the military and civilian members of your command in preparing the 25th Division for its move, subsequent combat operations, and the establishment and operation of two base camps for over 17,000 men.

     The tent kits, spare parts, generators, gun shields, the prompt repair or replacement of weapons, vehicles, and radios, and the many “extras” that you made available are to us evidence of the spirit and substance of your help.  The consideration and attention given to our families has earned for all of you a special mark of gratitude from all of us in the division.

     As this deployment comes to an end, I want to again convey the thanks and appreciation of the soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division for hour splendid support.


                                                  FRED C. WEYAND
                                                  Major General,  USA

Exhibit   P                                                             (p 50 & 51)

APO  San Francisco  96225

NUMBER  551-2                                                                                              2  August 1966

Expires 1 August 1967


 Revolutionary Development Staff Section

1.   Purpose:  To establish a Revolutionary Development Staff section in the 25th Infantry Division, and prescribe its organization, functions, and responsibilities.

2.   General:

a.   Revolutionary Development encompasses those military, political, economic, social, and psychological activities which are designed to:

(1)  Liberate the people from VC control.
(2)  Restore local government.
(3)  Maintain public security
(4)  Win the support of the people to the national government.

b.  Each province has a Revolutionary Development Office which supports
national development programs.  Planning and coordination therefore must be made at the province level to direct military and civic action into areas which will be of greatest benefit to the GVN.  To effect properly this planning and subsequent action, it is necessary to collect, record, and analyze data pertaining to the multitude of activities that are part of, or support the Revolutionary Development Program.

                c.   A Revolutionary Development section will be established as an element of the division staff, functioning under the supervision of the ACofS, G5.

3.  Organization:  The Revolutionary Development staff section will be organized as follows:

a.  Branch Chief - This officer will supervise activities pertaining to:

(1)  Liaison with other Revolutionary Development agencies of the GVN and those US agencies supporting or assisting the GVN effort.


OFFICIAL:                                                                  THOMAS W. MELLEN
                                                                                    Colonel,  GS
                                                                                    Chief of Staff

Asst. AG

     A;  B     
     G5  (15 cys)

 25th Aviation Battalion History Duppliment 1969

APO San Francisco, 96225
     AVDCAN                                                                                                                15 March 1970
     SUBJECT:     Annual Supplement to Unit History

TO:     Chief of Military History Department of the Army
Washington D.C., 20315

1.     The following Annual Supplement to Unit History is submitted in accordance
with AR 870-5, paragraph 61.

2.    Reporting unit: 25th Aviation Battalion,.~ 25th. Infantry Division

3.     Reporting period: 1 January~through 31:December 1969

4.     Commanding officers during reporting period:

a.     1 January 1969 - 30 July 1969, LTC Kenneth J. Burton
b.     31 July 1969 - 31 December 1969, LTC Robert R. Gosney

5.     The following is a narrative description of this unit's activities, accomplishments and major achievements.

During 1969, the 25th Aviation Battalion supported, the 25th' Infantry Division and all units operating within the Division TAOI. Units supported by the Battalion were: 49th ARVN Regt.5th ARVN Div. and the U.S.. Navy elements operating in the area. Support provided by the 25th Aviation Batta1ion consisted of:  command and control, general support, AG courier, counter mortar,SYOPS, CS drops, flare ships defoliation, combat assau1ts,dustoff, flame bath, Night Hawk, and emergency resupply

In January, the 25th Aviation Battalion continued to support the 25th Div.
during Operation Toan Thang, Phase II. OperationToan Thang II  continued into February at which time the 25th Aviation Battalion supported Division units at Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng when they came under heavy rocket and mortar attacks on the night of 22 February. The 25th Aviation Battalion reacted by alerting all crews and flyable ships, and supported the fighting with light fire teams, flare ships, counter mortar ships, and emergency resupplies. February also saw the inception of the Night Hawk”, concept which effectively restricted VC/NVA movement at night. The Night Hawk has evolved to a point that the system is now composed of a minigun, xenon light, night observation device coaxially mounted and 13 mk. 45 flares.

15 March 1970
AVDCAN:     Annual Supplement to Unit History

Flame Bath is another mission that evolved during the year and was flown exclusively by the A Company “Little Bears” • The Flame Bath Concept consists of a sling load of three 55 gallon drums filled with aviation fuel and diesel fuel that is dropped on a known enemy position or booby trapped area. Trip flares ignite when the drums separate, then ignite the fuel when the drums rupture as they strike the ground.

During the sapper attack on Cu Chi on 25 February, B Company “Diamondheads” responded with all available fire teams to defend Cu Chi base Camp. The “Little Bears” from A company provided ships as necessary and evacuated all the remaining aircraft to Saigon and LongBinh.quick reaction by both companies helped to prevent the enemy from inflicting further damage to Cu Chi Ease Camp. Flame Bath and night hawk missions accounted for a significant number of enemy KIA during the months of April, May and June. During this period, maximum utilization of aircraft contributed immeasurably to the Division's missions.. Aircraft availability was mtaintained. At an extremely high level during this period.

A massive ground attack was waged against fire support base Crook in early June. The “Diamond Heads', utilizing their primary and secondary fire teams, placed effective fire on the enemy's charging ranks. The “Little Bears” from A Company, were also there to provide illumination via flares and a night light. This combination was very effective in helping defeat the enemy during the two successive nights he attacked Crook. minimal weather conditions hampered the Battalion's aircraft during this period, but they continued on their missions and successfully completed the missions.

In September, the 25th Aviation Battalion received the 0utstanding Aviation Unit Award presented by Hughes Tool Company annually for The aviation unit that, through organized effort, has demonstrated outstanding ability to employ its aircraft in furtherance of the Army mission. This award is given to the best aviation unit in the Army each year and  presentation was the culmination of a year of hard work, heroism, and dedication, by the officers and men of the 25th Aviation Battalion.

In September, D Troop 3/4 Cav, became OPCON to the 25th Aviation Battalion, greatly facilitating the control and coordination of organic Division aviation assets. Continued cooperation and mutual respect between the Aviation Battalion and D Troop have resulted in the successful completion of many missions that would otherwise have been difficult if not impossible.

15 March 1970
AVDCAN:     Annual Supplement to Unit History

     A significant change in the operational concept of the division's air assets was affected during the last quarter of the year. It was desired to initiate a light war concept within the division by which small sized troop elements would be continually deployed on successive limited area sweeps. The air cavalry package provided by D Troop ¾ Cav, consist of two OH-6a “LOH” and one AH-1G “Cobra”. These “mini-cav” packages are supplied to the 2nd and 3d brigade and are on strip alert to react quickly to intelligence targets, light scout team sightings, security for downed aircraft, and to aide targets of opportunity.

Operation Toan Thang II terminated on 28 February 1969. Toan Thang III commenced on 1 March 1969andis continuing.

     A statistical view of the more critical operational accomplishments involving direct combat support activities performed by the 25th Aviation Battalion in 1969 are listed below.  (Included is D Troop ¾ Cav while OPCON)

     Number of hours flown: 48,711
     Number of passengers transported: 101,628
     Pounds of cargo transported: 6,312,000
     Number of VC/NVA killed (BC): 675
     Enemy structures destroyed 283
     Enemy Sampans destroyed: 70

     For gallantry in action, in support of ground operations against a hostile force, 127 valor awards and decorations were awarded to members of the 25th Aviation Battalion.

Silver Star
BSM w/”V” Device?(not clear)
AM w/:V” Device
ARCOM w/"V" Device


                                        Don W. Morgan
                                        1LT. INF