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After Action Reports 50
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268
AVBMCO 28 April 1971
SUBJECT: After Action Report - OPERATION KEYSTONE ROBIN (CHARLIE)
SEE DISTRIBUTION
The attached After Action Report describes the “Warrior” Brigade's pre-planning, preparation, and execution of its redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam. The period covered by the report is from 8 November 1970, when the Brigade was formed as a separate unit, until the completion of redeployment, 28 April 1971.
.This redeployment marks the end of a combat record spanning more than five years in Vietnam. The 2nd Brigade Task Force came ashore with the “Tropic Lightning” Division on 5 January 1966. Since that time the Brigade has compiled an outstanding record in Vietnam. The “Warrior” Brigade has operated throughout MR III and was part of the 25th drive into Cambodia to disrupt the enemy's sanctuaries there. Since becoming a separate unit, the 2nd Brigade continued its counterinsurgency operations in the area east of Long Binh. For its combat role in Vietnam, the 2nd Brigade received the United States Army Valorous Unit Award and two awards of the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Gold Palm. The Brigade's contributions in the critical area of civic actions have been recognized by the award of the Vietnamese Civic Actions Award.
This After Action Report encompasses the last five and a half months that the “Warrior” Brigade remained in Vietnam. It is a detailed report of the activities necessary for the withdrawal of a tactical unit whose mission changed from combat to one of redeployment. Details are given regarding the areas of equipment turn-in and the out-processing of the Brigade's 6000 men. Most of the problems that could develop during redeployment were avoided due to the fact that many key members of this Brigade had been directly involved in the 25th Infantry Division's redeployment. Their insight greatly aided the 2nd Brigade in the planning and preparati9n for redeployment and in the redeployment operation. This report was made with the objective of aiding other units which will become involved in redeployment operations in the future.
JOSEPH R. ULATOSKI
1 Incl. Colonel, Infantry
as Commanding
DISTRIBUTION:
10- DA, Washington, D.C., ATTN: ACSFOR
5 DA, Washington, D.C., ATTN: OCMH
5- DA, Washington, D.C., ATTN: AGCP (TAGO)
5- DA, Washington, D.C., ATTN: COPO Chief, Plans and Programs
5- C&GSC Ft Leavenworth, Kansas
5 - SAWC. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
5 -USAGS. Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis, Ind.
5 - Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Wash., D.C.
5 - Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
5 - USAIS, Fort Benning, Ga.
5 - USAAS, Fort Knox, Ky.
5 - USAFS, Fort Sill, Ok.
5 - USAQS, Fort Lee, Va.
5 - USCONARC, Fort Monroe, Va.
5 - CG, USARHAW, Schofield Barracks, Hi.
3 - CINC, USAREUR, Heidelberg, Germany
3 - CINC, USARPAC, ATTN: AVGPOP - DT
3 - CINC, USARPAC, ATTN: DCG
3 - COMUS MACV, ATTN: J3
3 - COMMAVFORV, ATTN: Operations
3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO
3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCS - MH
5 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO - P
3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: G4
3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: 17th MHD
3 - CG, I FFORCEV, ATTN: G3
3 - CG, II FFORCEV, ATTN: G3
3 - CG, XXIV Corps, ATTN: G3
3 - CG, CMAC, ATTN: G3
3 - CG, DMAC, ATTN: G3
5 - CO, 3rd Bde., 1st Cav Div (AM), ATTN: S3
8 - CG, 101st Abn Div (AM), ATTN: G3
8 - CG, 23rd Inf Div, ATTN: G3
3 - CMDR, 1st ATF, ATTN: G3
3 - CG, RTAVF, ATTN: G3
3 - CG, 18th ARVN Div, ATTN: G3
5 - CG, 173rd Inf Bde (Abn), ATTN: S3
5 - CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), ATTN: S3
3 - CO, 2nd Sqdn, 11th ACR, ATTN: S3
3 - CO, 23rd ARTY Gp, ATTN: S3
5 - CO, 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
3 - CG, 1st Sig Bde, ATTN: S3
3 - CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: S3
3 - CG, 44th Med Bde, ATTN: S3
3 - CG, 18th Engr Bde, ATTN: S3
3 - CG, 20th Engr Bde, ATTN: S3
3 - CG, 18th MP Bde, ATTN: S3
3 - CG, Saigon Support Command, ATTN: AVCS - GP
Table of Contents
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Title
PURPOSE
MISSION
SITUATION
Tactical
Planning
CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT
Administration / Personnel
Intelligence
Tactical Concept
Logistics Concept
CA / PSYOPS Operations
Communications / Electronics
Engineering Concept
Public Information
Base Camp Transfer
Battalion and Separate
Unit Problems
Historical Synopsis
Area of Operations
Fig 1 - 4
Keystone Information Center
Redeployment Planning Group
Redeployment Activities
Brigade Strength
Unit Redeployment Status
Personnel Out-processing Status
Personnel Processing
Cumulative Pieces Turned In
Property Turn-In (Brigade)
Property Turn-In (Units)
Personnel and Administration
Out-processing
Out-processing Roster
Out-processing Station Check
Check List - Out-processing
Administrative Services
Postal
Special Services
Funds
Chaplain Activities
Provost Marshal
Finance
Civilian Personnel
Staff Judge Advocate
Intelligence
Operations
Sequence of Events
Ceremonies
Battalion Awards Ceremonies
Separate Unit Awards Ceremonies
Brigade Farewell Ceremony
Schedule of Awards Ceremonies
Logistics
Unit Inventory / Disposition Report
Reports Within the Brigade
Daily Turn-In Report Format
Selected items Turn-In Chart
Documentation
Documentation Required for Turn-in
USARV Form 562
USARV Form 563
USARV Form 593
Closing of Property Books
Letter of Relief from Responsibility
Transportation
Maintenance Support and PLL
Problems and Recommendations
CA / PSYOP
Chronology of Events
Leaflet-Give Your Support to the GVN
Leaflet-Redeployment of American troops
Leaflet-RF/PF Resolved to Protect Country
Enemy Propaganda
Signal
VHF Systems Diagram
HF RTT Net
FM Command Net
Teletype Nets
Engineer
Information
MACOI Official Announcement
MACOI Guidance
Press Kit Contents
Command Information Fact Sheet
Base Camp Transfer
Chronology
Battalion and Separate Unit Problems
Historical Synopsis
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268
KEYSTONE ROBIN (CHARLIE)
AFTER ACTION REPORT
1. PURPOSE: This report reflects the actions taken to accomplish the redeployment of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Hopefully it will be of assistance to any unit which has to plan and execute a similar redeployment mission.
2. MISSION: On 20 December 1970, the 2nd Brigade was notified that it was a Keystone Robin (Charlie) unit and that it would redeploy from the Republic of Vietnam not later than 28 April 1971. The 2nd Brigade immediately formed a Redeployment Planning Group and published the operation plan to commence stand-down by phasing of units starting on 1 March 1971. The brigade colors and subordinate unit colors would return to Hawaii with the exception of 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry and 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry whose colors would return to Ft. Lewis, Washington. Appropriate inactivation ceremonies would be conducted at each location in conjunction with the selected Honor Guards. The majority of the “Warrior“ Brigade personnel were to be reassigned in United States Army Vietnam (USARV) and the equipment was to be issued by USARV throughout army supply channels.
3. SITUATION:
A. Tactical: The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was reorganized as a separate brigade on 8 November 1970, and placed under operational control of II Field Force, Vietnam. The 2nd Brigade's area of operations (AO) encompassed Bien Hoa, southern Long Khanh and northern Phuoc Tuy Provinces with the forward operations center located at Xuan Loc in Long Khanh Province, and the rear base camp at Camp Frenzell-Jones in the Long Binh complex. Allied units operating in the area were the 18th ARVN Division, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, 1st Australian Task Force, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 3rd Brigade 1st Australian Task Force, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 3rd Brigade 1st Cav (Airmobile). In addition to conducting combined operations, the up-grading of Territorial Forces within the AO was a primary mission of the brigade. This effort was accomplished by forming mobile training teams from the 2nd Brigade's maneuver battalions which conducted tactics classes and patrols during the day and combined ambush patrols at night. The Regional and Popular Force (RF / PF) units improved their operational capability during this program. Numerous joint RF and PF operations were conducted with emphasis placed on giving allied leaders experience in employing US support assets, including helicopter, artillery and USAF support. This ability to use US support assets was of critical importance due to the implementation of the Vietnamization Program which called for an increased combat role by the Vietnamese. In general, the RF and PF forces increased their military skills under the tutelage of 2nd Brigade units and became more effective in protecting their villages and hamlets from the VC tax collecting, proselytizing and supply gathering activities. Denial of the villages to the VC/NVA insured the continued success of the Republic of Vietnam's pacification program. The experience and confidence gained from these operations led to separate offensive operations and allowed 2nd Brigade units to concentrate operations in those areas of increased enemy activity. Enemy units opposing allied forces in the 2nd Brigade's AO were the 274th NVA Regiment, 74th NVA Artillery Regiment, 3rd Battalion, 33rd NVA Regiment, elements from SR-4 Headquarters, 84th Rear Service Group and local VC guerilla units. Operations were designed to deny enemy access to villages and hamlets in the three province areas in order to cut off food sources, prevent consolidation of enemy units and to prevent the infiltration of men and supplies from War Zone D. Continuous operations by the brigade and allied units inflicted heavy damage on the enemy by destroying base areas and caches south and west of Xuan Loc and interdicting the enemy's “shadow supply” system along Highway QL-1. An indication of the success of these operations was the enemy's inability to launch any significant offensive during the 1971 Tet Holiday period.
With the coming of the Tet Holiday period, the 2nd Brigade went on an increased alert status in preparation for any enemy offensive activity. A mechanized maneuver battalion was sent to the vicinity of Long Thanh and Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province to give added support to allied units and installations in that area. Continuous defensive patrols and monitoring of enemy activity by 2nd Brigade maneuver battalion prevented enemy offensive activity during Tet.
The month of February found the enemy shifting his supply operations north of Highway QL-1 due to the preemptive operations undertaken by 2nd Brigade forces south of QL-1. An increasing number of contacts with small groups of VC/NVA were reported along the commo-liaison routes which linked War Zone D with the Brigade's AO. In March, 2nd Brigade units began the withdrawal process, slowly moving personnel and equipment westward from Xuan Loc to Camp Frenzell-Jones. The resultant vacuum left by 2nd Brigade withdrawals was filled by RF and PF, ARVN and Free World Forces who handled their new AI responsibilities with an increasing degree of professionalism. The 2nd Brigade continued to put pressure on the enemy during the withdrawal period in order to preempt any enemy offensive activity against the Bien Hoa / Long Binh complex as well as US and allied units in the three province area.
(p2)
B. Planning: To plan and organize the “Warrior” Brigade's redeployment, a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) was formed on 27 December 19770. The RPG consisted of representatives from each primary and special staff section, headed by the Deputy Brigade Commander for Operations. The combined efforts produced the 2nd Brigade's Operations Plan 183-70 (U) issued on 20 January 1971. The plan was issued in two volumes. Volume I, classified Secret, contained specific dates, suspenses, concept of tactical withdrawal, and significant milestones which were to be accomplished. Volume II was unclassified, and instructed the units within the brigade on specific functions, proper techniques and rules of the game to be followed to efficiently and professionally redeploy their elements.
Once the OPLAN was completed, an officer was designated as the Brigade Keystone Redeployment Coordinator. The coordinator and selected members of the RPG formed the Keystone Information Center (KIC) to coordinate redeployment activities at all staff levels. The KIC continuously displayed and up-dated a series of progress charts within each staff area, and provided the management tools necessary for commanders to continuously monitor the phases of redeployment. Annex A (Keystone Information Center).
The planning for and implementation of transfer of the areas of operations was eased by efficient prior planning on the part of II Field Force, Vietnam. On 12 March 1971, all areas of responsibility were transferred to Free World Forces and the 2nd Brigade requested areas of operations from responsible units to continue the tactical employment of the brigade until 6 April 1971.
4. CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT:
A. Personnel and Administration: The primary function of the AC/S1 operations during redeployment was the reassignment of approximately 6000 brigade personnel. Activities of the Chaplain, Provost Marshal, and Finance had to be concluded; all non-appropriated funds had to be transferred or closed; and records disposition had to be completed. Careful perceptive planning pertinent to the reassignment of brigade personnel was one of the major factors contributing to the successful inactivation of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. For details of all AG/S1 activities in connection with redeployment, see Annex B (Personnel and Administration).
B. Intelligence: The Brigade S2 section was required to dispose of all intelligence material and sensor strings. Details of these activities are at Annex C (Intelligence).
C. Tactical Concept: As withdrawal plans were being formulated, it was not known which units would assume responsibility for the area of operations. Several different possibilities existed. Plans were made to allow for the orderly withdrawal on 12 March of one battalion followed by each of the other battalions as forces became available to assume the areas of operations.
The order of withdrawal was based upon which units presented the largest logistical problem and which units were necessary to keep routes of communication open into the brigade area.
(p3)
As the withdrawal date drew near, it was determined that on 12 March, Long Khanh Province, 1 ACD, RTAVF, and the 1st ATF would assume portions of the brigade area of operations. The 2nd Brigade was to then request areas of operation from the responsible units to continue the tactical mission.
On 12 March, the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry and C Battery, 1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery commenced their withdrawal from the eastern portion of Long Khanh Province. On 23 March, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and D Battery, 1st Battalion , 8th Field Artillery commenced their withdrawal from an AO the battalion had requested from Long Khanh Province. Simultaneously on 23 March, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry assumed responsibility for the negotiated area of operations of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. On 26 March, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry assumed responsibility for the negotiated area of operations of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. On 26 March, the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry and A Battery, 1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, turned over their temporary area of operations to Long Khanh Province, and commenced their withdrawal. On 6 April, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and B Battery, 1st Battalion, 8th Field artillery withdrew in force, completing the turn-over of all temporary areas of operation, and terminated the tactical mission of the 2nd Brigade. See Annex D (Operations) and figures 1,2,3 and 4.
D. Logistics Concept and Preparation: The problem facing the “Warrior Brigade{ S4, was to move a separate brigade and its equipment from a field combat configuration to Camp Frenzell-Jones, clear and turn-in all real property and bulk supplies in the area, billet and feed almost 6000 members of the brigade, and prepare and turn-in all TO&E and PC&S equipment in the brigade. The accomplishment of these and the numerous related tasks called for prior planning, close monitoring and continuous supervision of the brigade activities throughout the total logistical spectrum. The details of this planning and the execution of the logistic effort are fully analyzed at Annex E (Logistics).
E. CA/ PSYOPS: During redeployment, the Brigade S5 section was required to complete, terminate, or transfer civic action projects and programs within the brigade area of operations. In addition, a psychological operation was conducted to explain the brigade's departure to the Vietnamese. Details of these activities with a discussion of problems encountered and their solutions are included in Annex F (CA/ PSYOPS).
F. Communications / Electronics: The 532nd Signal Company was responsible for the phased turn-in of their organic communications equipment while they maintained essential communications facilities in support of the brigade during the redeployment period. Details of the turn-in, problem areas, and the phase down of communications are discussed in Annex G (Signal).
(p4)
G. Engineering Concept: Engineer efforts were required to continue normal combat support of those maneuver elements still committed to combat operations, to prepare three base camps and six fire support bases for closure or turn-over to allied units, and to prepare all organic engineer equipment and recoverable engineer material for turn-in. To accomplish this, a platoon with selected equipment was formed from the organic engineer company to provide the combat support during the final stages of combat operations, and to do the necessary engineer work preparing base camps and fire support bases for closure or turnover. The Engineer Company (-) was then able to concentrated on its own stand-down in the final stages of the Engineer Company stand-down period. See Annex II (Engineer).
H. Public Information: The 20th Public Information Detachment was required to prepare press packets and release for the announcement of re-deployment and stand-down of individual units throughout the brigade. The actual monitoring and edition of releases and specific times for release were determined by the USARV Information Office. Problems encountered and recommendations of the Public Information Officer are found in Annex I (Information).
I. Base Camp Transfer: The “Warrior Brigade” redeployment required the development of detailed plans for the orderly transfer of responsibility for base camp functions and real property accountability. Details of this will be found in Annex J (Base Camp Transfer).
J. Battalion and Separate Unit Problems: For future redeploying units, the requirement was placed on battalions and separate units to submit an after action report which stated their problems and their recommended solutions to these problem areas. All the reports were consolidated and edited and the results are found in Annex K (Battalion and Separate Unit Problems).
5. HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS:
The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division accomplished its mission in SVN. The dedication to duty, professionalism, sacrifices and valor of its soldiers will be favorably reflected in the military history of our nation, and will be a highlight in a proud chapter in the military heritage of the 25th Infantry Division. See Annex L (Historical Synopsis). (p 5) (pp 7,8,9,10 maps)
ANNEX A (keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie).
1. BACKGROUND: The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division envisioned its redeployment in three phases: Phase I being the initial planning phase; Phase II, the detailed planning phase; and Phase III, the execution phase.
2. DEVELOPMENT: Upon receipt of redeployment notification, a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) as outlined in Appendix 1 was established. This group's primary task was to develop a plan for disengagement and a stand-down schedule. The group further wrote and published the 2nd Brigade's operation order 183-70 and made the necessary changes to the basic order as required. In addition, it was determined that due to the magnitude and complexity of the redeployment task, there was a requirement for a centralized control and information center. This requirement was fulfilled by the establishment of the Keystone Information Center (KIC), located in the Brigade conference room and manned by members of the original Redeployment Planning Group.
3. IMPLEMENTATION: Once the KIC was activated, a series of charts displaying redeployment status were displayed on the walls, arranged by functional areas. These charts were briefed to the Commander on a daily basis and were also available for unit commanders' inspection on a 24-hour basis. Examples of a few of the more important charts are: Redeployment Activities at Appendix 2; Brigade Strength at Appendix 3; Unit Redeployment Status at Appendix 4; Personnel Out-processing Status at Appendix 5; Personnel Processing at Appendix 6; Cumulative Keystone Pieces Turned In at Appendix 7; Keystone Property Turn-In (for each of the ten major categories) at Appendix 8; Keystone Property Turn-In (by each unit in each of the ten major categories) at Appendix 9.
4. FUNCTIONS: The Brigade Keystone Information Center performed the following functions:
A. The center was manned by personnel from the RPG on a daily basis and provided a focal point to which units could turn in daily reports, and from which they could gain information and answers to their questions.
B. Since the center was manned by the original Redeployment Planning Group personnel, the center carried out individual redeployment briefings for each unit prior to stand-down. This procedure had the advantage that the center personnel, being intimately acquainted with current unit problems, could bring these to the attention of units to stand-down later.
C. Personnel from the KIC formed the nucleus of the briefing team which presented all the briefings concerned with redeployment of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
(p11)
D. The KIC further was tasked with collating and publishing all changes to the brigade's operations order. These changes were published by means of conference notes.
E. Personnel from the KIC were responsible for writing, editing, collating, and publishing the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's Redeployment After Action Report.
APPENDICES:
1 - Redeployment Planning Group 6 - Personnel Processing
2 - Redeployment Activities 7 - Cumulative Keystone Pieces Turned In
3. - Brigade Strength 8 - Keystone Property Turn-In (Brigade)
4 - Unit Redeployment Status 9 - Keystone Property Turn-In (Units)
5 - Personnel Out-processing Status
(p.12)
APPENDIX 1 (Redeployment Planning Group) to ANNEX A (Keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie) (Chart p 13)
APPENDIX 2 (Redeployment Activities) to ANNEX A (Keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report, Keystone Robin (Charlie) (Graph p 14)
APPENDIX 3 (Brigade Strength) to ANNEX A (Keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie) (Graph p 15)
APPENDIX 4 (Unit Redeployment Status) to ANNEX A (Keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie) (Chart p 16)
APPENDIX 5 (Personnel Out-processing Status) to ANNEX A ( Keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie)(Chart p 17)
APPENDIX 6 (Personnel Processing) to ANNEX A (Keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 256h Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie) (Tally p 18)
APPENDIX 7 (Cumulative Keystone Pieces Turned In) to ANNEX A (Keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie) (Graph p. 19)
APPENDIX 8 (Keystone Property Turn-In (Brigade)) to ANNEX A (Keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie) (Graph p. 20)
APPENDIX 9 (Keystone Property Turn-In (Units)) to ANNEX A (Keystone Information Center) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie) (Chart p.21)
ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration ) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie)
1. GENERAL: This annex covers all personnel aspects of the brigade's redeployment (Appendices 1 - 4). In addition, the disposition of non-appropriated funds and activities of the Chaplain, Provost Marshal, Finance, Civilian Personnel Office, and Staff Judge Advocate are covered in detail (Appendices 5 - 10).
2. PERSONNEL PLANNING:
A. Careful, perceptive and thorough planning was the key to the highly successful personnel redeployment of the 2nd Brigade. In anticipation of redeployment instructions, planning began in early December 1970 while the brigade was still in the formulative stages. It was recognized that 100% accuracy of personnel accountability had to be achieved prior to redeployment, and immediate action was taken to purify personnel rosters. Without automatic data processing capability, it was necessary to do most of the work manually. With only a key punch, verifier, and sorter, it became necessary to use machine time at other US units in the same general vicinity. This approach resulted in only minor difficulties and rosters were purified prior to the stand-down date.
B. Non-receipt of firm personnel redeployment criteria and overall classification of information delayed completion of redeployment plans. However, emphasis was placed upon eliminating backlogs in routine work areas, intensifying efforts to purify morning reports, making plans and preparations for out-processing facilities, requisitioning blank forms, certificates, and citations, identifying personnel on TDY and those in CONUS pending the outcome of requests for compassionate reassignment or hardship discharge, and for reviewing other areas of operations to determine the impact of redeployment.
C. In order to meet the increased clerical requirements of typing special orders and awards, it was necessary to obtain clerks from the various maneuver battalions. In addition, the PSNCO's of all maneuver battalions were assigned to the 225th Support Battalion prior to stand-down, and attached to their battalion so that they would be able to resolve any personnel matters not completed prior to the end of their unit's stand-down.
3. PERSONNEL SERVICES REDEPLOYMENT CONTROL: The AG Personnel Services Division provided overall coordination, control and guidance for the redeployment of all personnel, including transportation, financial and postal service, a patch-sewing facility, and medical areas. Additionally, it was responsible for scheduling and coordinating out-processing activities with units as they proceeded through stand-down and served as a central source of personnel redeployment information.
4. APPLICATION OF THE PERSONNEL CRITERIA:
(p.23)
A. The Brigade was severely handicapped because the official criteria was not published prior to the first unit's stand-down. When the criteria was finally published, further changes were made, creating a feeling of uncertainty in the minds of brigade personnel. Basic information was obtained through personal visits and telephone contact with responsible personnel at USARV Headquarters. This enabled the brigade to go ahead with redeployment on schedule. Generally speaking, tour curtailments up to 90 days were available to all personnel who completed nine months in-country, or who were within ninety days of ETS. Additionally, personnel who completed ten months in country were permitted to DEROS and ETS if they were within 150 days of ETS. Personnel who completed twelve months in country were permitted to DEROS and ETS if they were within 179 days of ETS, and had extended their tours to receive the 150-day early release.
B. The personnel redeployment planning provided for normal attrition in all units throughout the redeployment period with intra-brigade assignments made from early deploying units to later deploying units only to fill critical duty positions and to man the 115-man security guard force for base camp defense. It was established policy that men would not be transferred from an early stand-down unit to a later unit for the sole purpose of receiving a curtailment. The policy had the support of the Brigade Commander and was, overall, quite successful. The following fact were considered and resulted from a careful analysis of the current and projected strength postures of all units:
(1) Commanders were interested in personnel with critical skills rather than just “bodies”. This was especially true in the movement of men from the first stand-down battalion to the last battalion in order to maintain the last battalion's combat strength. This involved the transfer of approximately 180 men from the first redeploying maneuver battalion to the last maneuver battalion. In selecting these personnel, every effort was made to assign personnel who would receive a curtailment under the DEROS criteria.
(2) One officer and 19 enlisted men were assigned from the various stand-down units to the 225th Support Battalion. These men were used by the 79th Maintenance Battalion at the Keystone Turn-in Point at Long Binh Post for turn in of equipment and material as units of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division proceeded into stand-down.
(3) The general redeployment criteria was listed in paragraph. 4A above. Specifically, all personnel assigned to Keystone Robin units (increment VI) programmed for redeployment or inactivation, who had 90 days or less remaining on the FST upon completion of unit stand-down, were curtailed with the following exceptions:
a. Personnel who had extended their FST for the purpose of early release from active duty, unless the individual involved elected in writing to negate the extension. (p24)
b. Personnel serving on a tour extension who had taken the 30-day special leave.
c. Personnel who had extended for 180 days, and who had not commenced travel in conjunction with the 30-day special leave were afforded the opportunity to:
1. Transfer to a unit remaining in Vietnam to complete the extended tour with the new unit and utilize the 30-day special leave.
2. Terminate the extension and DEROS in accordance with existing criteria.
d. The FST for court reporters remained twelve months.
e. An exception to AR 613-30 was granted so that individuals reassigned from RVN who had completed nine or more months o f their FST received credit for normal tour completion.
(4) An additional source of curtailments was announced in early March with the announcement of an early release program for OBV II officers. In general, under this program, it became possible for these officers to be released up to sixty days prior to their normal ETS and also be granted a 90 day curtailment of their FST. These two contingencies made it possible for certain OBV II officers to be released from active duty up to 150 days prior to their normal ETS.
C. To execute this plan and insure equitable treatment was afforded all members of the brigade, machine rosters were initially sent to each unit. The unit corrected any errors on the roster and annotated availability dates for release of each man. Individuals were also given the opportunity to indicate their preference for one in-country unit if they were not eligible for a curtailment. From the ”availability roster”, other rosters were then prepared and broken down as to junior enlisted, senior enlisted, and officers. These were sent to USARV where assignments were obtained for those personnel being reassigned in-country. The rosters were returned to PSD where appropriate orders were cut reflecting in-country reassignment, PCS, or ETS. These orders were returned to the units about fifteen days prior to the unit's first day of stand-down. Despite an extremely small number of intra-brigade transfers, more than 450 officer efficiency reports were prepared, numerous orders were cut, and more than 6,000 soldiers were completely and accurately out-processed and shipped to new stations. These actions, which normally would have been completed in 12 months, were completed in 50 days.
5. REDEPLOYMENT DOCUMENTS: 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division OPLAN 183-70 covered all personnel and administrative aspects of redeployment. It remained the basic reference throughout redeployment and was based on the USARV AG Redeployment / Inactivation Manual 600-1 and experience gained in standing-down the Division. (p25)
6. OUTPROCESSING: The Records Section was in charge of the out-processing operations. Personnel due for out-processing “in-country” were brought to the initial assembly area at 0730 hours by the losing unit with all baggage after having completely cleared their unit. After an initial briefing in the staging area, small groups were moved to the processing area. After being processed through checking stations for finance, shots, personnel management, records assembly, postal, and ID cards and tags, personnel being reassigned up-country were moved to the 8th Aerial Port at Bien Hoa for shipment under the control of a Brigade Transportation NCO. DEROS personnel underwent the same out-processing, only it was conducted in the afternoon, prior to movement to the 90th Replacement Battalion. All individuals, except those who had been flagged, were permitted to hand carry their records to their new unit of assignment. Records of those personnel under a flagging action were sent to the new unit via registered mail. For more detailed information on out-processing, see Appendix
7. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: The area of awards and decorations was a constant source of problems throughout the brigade's period of stand-down. The basic problem was not receiving the approved awards back in time for unit awards ceremonies. The brigade did not have approval authority for awards above the Purple Heart. Approval authority rested with II Field Force Vietnam. They were not able to react to our requirements and priorities with the urgency dictated by the situation. Late changes in personnel redeployment criteria from 60 to 90 days significantly increased the number of service awards which had to be written and justified.
A. Units were required to submit their recommendations for achievement and service awards not later than fifteen days before the unit's first day of stand-down. This requirement was not adhered to and resulted in many valor and achievement awards being submitted late. When the unit commanders realized they were not going to get all of their awards back in time for awards ceremonies, additional clerical help was provided by the brigade to II Field Forces in an effort to get all awards presented.
B. Units were provided general guidelines governing the requirements for presentation of service and achievement awards. An individual could not normally be awarded more than two achievement awards during this FST; an individual could only be awarded one service medal for a normal FST, and that could not be recommended unless the individual was within sixty days of DEROS or adjusted DEROS. Despite the tight control on recommendations for awards, numerous recommendations were received which had incorrect information or lacked essential information. These incorrect recommendations were returned to the units or corrected in the Awards Section. This further hampered and delayed their approval and presentation.
C. It is strongly recommended that approval authority for awards higher than the Purple Heart be given to brigade-sized units authorized a commanding officer in the grade of Brigadier General.
(p26)
8. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES: Normal administrative services continued throughout the redeployment of the brigade. Records management inspections, reproduction of orders, closing of publication accounts, and control of classified documents were of particular significance. For additional information see Appendix 2.
9. POSTAL: Postal operations continued at approximately the same rate throughout the period of redeployment. However, additional emphasis was placed on insuring that postal locator cards were completed for proper disposition of personal mail. Unit mailrooms were inspected and closed, and drop-boxes sealed. Detailed information is contained in Appendix 3.
10. SPECIAL SERVICES: Special Service functions are particularly valuable to the morale and esprit de corps of troops while units are being redeployed. Though emphasis should be placed on this area of activity at every echelon of command, it must be given special consideration during stand-down. For information concerning Brigade Special Services activities, see Appendix 4.
11. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. Changes in Assignments: Changes of in-country assignments were reluctantly made throughout the redeployment phase. Many of these changes were a result of individuals obtaining a job in a specific unit on his own. These changes resulted in numerous telephone calls and amendments and revocations of orders.
RECOMMENDATION: That once assignment instructions are issued, changes be kept to the absolute minimum. That HQ USARV try to grant initial requests for assignment based on individual preferences shown on the assignment rosters.
B. Immunizations: In many cases individuals reported to the final out-processing area without required immunizations. This periodically created a backlog in the processing line and hindered the entire out-processing activity.
RECOMMENDATION: That immunizations be up-dated prior to arrival of personnel at the out-processing activity. Additionally, individuals being reassigned in-country should have their teeth checked prior to departing their unit. If necessary, additional dental support should be requested from higher HQ.
(p27)
C. ID Card and Tags: Several personnel were missing ID cards and tags during out-processing.
RECOMMENDATION: That units be instructed to submit names and pertinent information for all personnel needing ID tags. This should be accomplished as soon as redeployment is known. Replacement of ID cards should be accomplished prior to out-processing.
D. Postal Locator Cards: In many instances personnel reported to the pit=processing area without properly completed postal locator cards.
RECOMMENDATION: That the number and types of locator cards required for out-processing be emphasized by the Postal Officer and in the AG Contact Team Briefing.
E. Redeployment Criteria. Late notification of the redeployment criteria and subsequent changes, coupled with the USARV mandatory drop, caused significant personnel turbulence. Additionally, changes in redeployment criteria have significant effects on eligibility for appropriate awards for service. The change from a 60 to a 90 day criteria greatly increased the awards workload.
RECOMMENDATION: That one single curtailment criteria be applied to Keystone Robin units within the same increment and that this criteria not be changed once it has been announced.
F. Cutting of Orders: Much valuable time was used in cutting stencils or orders with the same format.
RECOMMENDATION: Action should be initiated immediately upon notification of stand-down to make flex-o-writers available to stand-down units. This service should also include arrangements for repair of inoperable flex-o-writers
G Awards: Awards were not processed quickly enough by II Field Force to enable them to be presented prior to the personnel departures.
RECOMMENDATION: That authority to approve awards up to and including Bronze Stars be delegated to brigade-size units authorized a commander of general officer grade. Otherwise, awards recommendations must be submitted at least 30 days prior to a unit's awards ceremony.
H. Canceling of Publication Accounts: Due to the security classification of Keystone Robin information, publication accounts were not cancelled until the stand-down announcement was made public on the first day of the brigade's stand down period.
RECOMMENDATION: That publication accounts be cancelled sixty days prior ;to a unit's first stand-down date. A classified message or code can be pre-arranged to effect implementation by Publication Centers in Baltimore and St. Louis.
(p28)
APPENDIX 1 (Out-processing) to ANNEX B (Personnel and Administration) to 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's After Action Report “Keystone Robin” (Charlie)/
1. OUT-PROCESSING SCHEDULES::
A. Availability dates were established on each individual by the losing unit and were used to schedule personnel for out-processing and to project transportation requirements. Units were allowed to give up to 200 availability dates on any one day. Each unit was instructed to schedule their personnel for out-processing on any date within their scheduled stand-down period.
B. Minor changes to out-processing schedules were announced as they occurred/ Every evening all units were required to verify their out-processing schedule for the following day.
C. Experience in processing the first units showed that the correct amount of time had been allocated to unit stand-down periods. While operational, redeploying units had made many preparations; however, if necessary, experience showed that it would have been possible to increase the flow of personnel without adversely affecting the operation of the Personnel Services Division.
D. Although many availability dates for personnel being reassigned in-country were changed by accelerated out-processing, reassignment orders were not amended unless the availability date was changed more than seven days. The amendment of so many orders would have been highly impractical and would have resulted in unnecessary confusion for the individual and the gaining and losing commands. Accelerated out-processing for some DEROS personnel was accomplished, and orders were amended in each case.
2. OUT-PROCESSING OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES:
A. The Adjutant General Section was assigned overall responsibility for the coordination of all out-processing activities. The losing unit was responsible for scheduling transportation to the out-processing site, and the Brigade Transportation Officer was responsible for scheduling transportation to the gaining unit.
B. For out-processing, an existing facility was modified specifically for that purpose. It was centrally located with easy access to personn