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 Operation Attleboro 2nd Brigade

                    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                        APO                93025

SUBJECT:     Combat After Action Report  (Mrs/23/72)

TO:          Commanding General
          27th Infantry Division
          ATTN:  AVIC-P
          APO  -- FORCES  96225

1.  Operation ATTLEBORO  (OPORD  AO-65)
2.  200008  Nov  660232400  November 1964
3.  Northern TAY NIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam  (MAR 20--  C)
4.  Central Headquarters:  2nd Brg, 25th Inf Div.
5.  Reporting Officer:  Coronal Thomas M. Tarpley
6.  Task Organization and Commanders:               Bde Ops.     

1/5  (M)   (PFC VICTOR F. DIAZ  Opin)          2nd Plat, Co B, 69th Eng. Bn
                                   VHF  Dpt, 125th Sig Bn
1/5  (M)     Helicopter                    LRRP,  3rd  Squadron, 4th Cav.
                                   Kln,  38th Inf (Scout Dog) Plat
                                        Kln,  25th KID
1/27 Inf (Maj Guy S. McLey III. Cmdr)               Combat Weather Team,  Det  32
                                        5th Weather Squadron
1/27 Inf          Helicopter

2/27 Inf (LTC William C. Barret / LTC Harry R. Phelton,  Cmdg)

2/27 Inf          Helicopter

2/16 Inf (LTC William E. Doyle, Cmdg)

2/16 Inf      Helicopter

1/22 (M)  (LTC Richard N. Clark,  D---)

2/27 (M)     Helicopter

1/8 Arty (LTC  James N. Clinton,  Cmdg)

1/8  Arty
Btry A  2/13  Arty
Btry A,  2/17 Arty
Btry B,  3/13  Arty

7.  Supporting:

(a.)  Air Support:
(1.)    General:  Both tactical fighter bombers and heavy bombers were used to support the operation.  A total of 209 pre-planned missions were used throughout the area of operation, five of these being flown by VHIP.  Twenty-four immediate strikes were delivered with an average reaction time of 20 minutes after the requests were submitted.  Pre-planned, as well as immediate strikes, were accurate and effective.

(2.)    All air-strikes were controlled by FAC's assigned to the 25th Infantry Division.

(3.)    Results:   3KBA (BC), 62 KBA (Poss), 33 structures destroyed, 3 structures damaged, 12 bunkers destroyed, 4 secondary explosions, 7 secondary fires, 4 tunnels destroyed, 1 cache destroyed, 1 bridge damaged.

(b.) Army Aviation:

(1.)  Supporting Aviation Units:

a.  25th Avn Bn
A Co
B Co

                                               b.   11th Avn Bn
                                                      116th Avn Co  (Lt)
                                                      149th Avn Co  (Ped)
                                                      175th Avn Co  (Med)
 c.    13th Avn Bn
        175th Avn Co (Lt)
 d.    52nd Avn Bn
        117th Avn Co (Lt)
  e.   145th Avn Bn
68th  Avn Co (Lt)
71st   Avn Co (Lt)
118th Avn Co (Lt)

                    (2)   Airmobile support included re-supply, gun-ships, air-mobile combat assaults, and airlift of artillery vehicles, and heavy equipment.  523 HB-47 sorties and 3,660 UH1D sorties were flown in support of 2nd Bde.

                    (3)   The 2nd Bde. 25th Infantry Division, provided CH-23 helicopters for command and control, daily reconnaissance, artillery fire adjustment, and liaison.

c.  Artillery Support:

(1)   General:  The extensive area of operation necessitated aid in dispersal
of firing batteries and frequent relocation of fire support bases to provide artillery support to the maneuver elements.  Fire support bases were manually supporting.  An extensive H and I program was executed and a sc---ter mortar plan established for each fire support base.

                                        (2).   Organization for Combat  
(a.)   1/8 Arty  ---2nd Bde
(b.)  Btry A,  2/13 Arty ----fied 1/8 Arty (15 ----)
(c.)  Btry A, 2/17  Arty  ----fied 1/--- (-----)
(d.)  Btry B, 3/13  Arty  ---- abed 1/8 Arty (5 New)                       


        (3). Position of Batteries:

                                                     (a)   Battery A, 1st Bn, 8th Artillery moved to DAU TIENG (XT995474) on 1 November with the mission to reinforce the fires of 3rd Bn, 82nd Artillery.  On 4 November it became attached to the 3rd Bn, 82nd Artillery, and on 5 November was further attached to the 1st Infantry Div. Arty on 12 November in Operation Attleboro.   Battery A rejoined the 1st Bn, 8th Arty on 12 November when it was air-lifted from DAU TIENG to TSAI MI (XT115704).  When the 2nd Brigade operation commenced on 12 November, Battery A was positioned (XT273785) and remained in that location until 24 November when it was air-lifted to TAY NIEN.  On 25 November, Battery A returned to base camp with the 1st Bn, 8th Arty.

                    (b)   Battery B, 1st Bn, 8th Arty moved to BAO TAM (XT2766) on 15 November to support the operation.  That afternoon it was air-lifted to (XT250280) and remained in that location until 25 November 1966.  On 25 November, Battery E was air-lifted to TAY NINH and was attached to the 3rd Eng. 82nd Arty.

                    (c)   Battery C, 1st Bn, 8th Arty began the operation at (XT270750) located in Brigade Fire Support Base I. It remained there until 5 November.  Battery  C was extracted to TAY NIEN and returned to CU CHI base camp on 25 November 66.

(d)   Battery A, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty began operation (XT----)  ---battalion (5 lines un-readable)

                                                           (e)   Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery became attached to the 1st Bn, 8th Artillery on 22 November when it was airlifted into Fire Support Base 1 (XT47769-).  It was detached on 24 November when it was air-lifted to Fire-Support Base 1.  It was detached on 24 November when it was air-lifted to SHAI DA.

    (f.)   Battery B, 3rd Bn, 13th Artillery was attached to the  
Battalion for Operation ATTLEBORO on 5 November 1966.  It was detached from the 1st Bn, 8th Arty and attached to the 1st Infantry Div Arty at 052400 November.

(4).   Artillery fire was used primarily for:

(a)  Suppression of Sniper fire
(b)  Softening areas in front of advancing infantry elements.
(c)  Firing preparations to mislead the Viet Cong as to intended or possible landing zones.
(d)  Locating units on the ground during the hours of darkness.
(e)  H & I fires
(f)  Landing zone preparation and suppressive fires during extractions.

(5).   Total missions and rounds fired by Types.

(a)  Missions - 28 Registrations, 417 Support, 3,660-----for a Total of 4,105.
(b)  (Totally blacked out)
(c)  (Totally blacked out)


(6).    Fire Coordination:

                          (a)   Daily coordination meetings enabled TAC Air, Army Aviation, and Artillery to deliver timely and effective fire support throughout the operation.
                              (b)   Closely coordinated flight couriers allowed uninterrupted air, artillery, and armed helicopter fire during air-mobile operations.

                               (c)   Fire support coordination during this operation was outstanding.


a.  Enemy situation prior to the operation:

               (1)   The capture of large quantities of food supplies vic (XT5136)  by elements of the 196th Inf Bde during 30-31 Oct 1966, and subsequent heavy contact with VC forces of the 9th VC Division from 3 -5 Nov, 1966 initiated the pursuant operation by the 1st Inf Div, and 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div.

               (2)   For the first time in several months, the VC elected to defend against US Forces, and results of fierce contact, left an estimated 1,000 VC KIA in TAY NINH Province.
               (3)   Intelligence reports from documents and captured VC indicated that contact was made with battalions of the 271, 272, and 273 Regts of the 9th VC Divisions, as well as the 101st RVA Regt, and that the VC would probably withdraw to safe haven areas in WAR ZONE C.
               (4)   Intelligence sources reported the 271st Regt vic (XT5062), the 272nd Regt vic (XT3737), the 293rd Regt vic (XT3376).

                               b.   Enemy situation during operation:

               (1)   During the period 10-25 Nov, VC activities in the 2nd Bde area were limited to sporadic fire and mine incidents.  On only two occasions the VC indicated an attempt to defend by fire from bunkers and trenches.

                    (a)   On 19 Nov, the 2/28 Inf engaged an estimated VC company vic (XT2231), resulting in 4 VC KIA(BC) and the destruction of a tunnel complex and capture of:  1 rifle, a pair of binoculars, 300 lbs of rice, and miscellaneous documents which were identified with a medical company of the 271st Regt.

                    (b)   On 19 Nov, vic (XT284956) the 1/3 Inf engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 11 VC KIA (BC), the capture of 4 automatic weapons, and a 60mm mortar complete with ammunition.

               (2)   Several caches and base camps were located during the operation.  Caches appeared to be unguarded, and for the most part, only sniper fire was received from these sites.  Although no resistance was met from the area of the base camps, there was evidence of recent use, such as fresh food and vegetables in the immediate area, signs of recent repairs on bunkers, and the presence of many booby traps.

(a).   Cache areas were found in the following locations:

11 Nov.  (XT270935)  
 1 ton rice, 14 grenades, 240lbs foods
                                                                        12 Nov  (XT----977)
  20 tons rice in heavily booby trapped areas
                                                                        13 Nov  (XT-------)
                                                                                      13 tons rice in shed 30x20 ft.     (p11)

 (b).   Base camps were located in the following areas:

11 Nov.  (XT2680)
              22 tons rice, 1 rice milling machine, area showed signs of recent habitation.
                                                                        17 - 18 Nov.  (XT2850)
                                                                                       2 classrooms, 3 huts, 3 bunkers
                                                                         21 Nov.  (XT349930)
Base camp large enough for 200 - 400 VC with showers, latrine, fresh food, 500 lbs rice, 180 lbs salt, 100 lbs peas, and 9 hand grenades

               (3)   During the course of the operation, numerous documents captured were identified with the 70th Regt, 00SVN, a medical and transportation company of the 271st Regt, 9th VC Division.

                (4)  Trafficability, terrain, and weather report:  See Annex A

  9.   Mission:  2nd Bde conducts reconnaissance in force in northern TAY NINH Province commencing 100600 Nov 66 to locate and destroy VC forces supplies and base camps.

10.   Concept of operation:  2nd Bde Task Force with two Mech. and 3 Inf Bn's conducted search and destroy, air-mobile and ground assaults, search patrols and-------------in force operations in WAR ZONE C to locate and destroy VC camps and supply locations.  The penetration of WAR ZONE C was ----------------series of fire support bases positioned along the axis of ------------disabled and “dried up” as movement north progressed while operational bases were suppressed.  Operations were accompanied by ----------assaults, mechanized thrusts and exhaustive foot patrols.  Maximum use was made of close air support, B-52 strikes and artillery fires.  

          a.   10 Nov - 14 Nov:  The 2nd Bde Task Force established an initial fire support base at the former FRENCH FORT (XT2868) on 10 Nov.  Extensive search and destroy and air-mobile operations were conducted to establish contact with elements of the 5th VC Division.

          b.   15 - 25 Nov:  The 2nd Bde Task Force conducted reconnaissance in force along axis BJ (XT---771) - KAWM (XT273960) - TJ (XT273560) to locate VC base camps, probe / test enemy defenses, check crossing sites on the Cambodian border and keep VC forces off balance.

               (1)  Maneuver:  Bde TF, with two mechanized and three infantry battalions, conducted reconnaissance in force along TL4 and RM 246.  Initially 1/5(M) secured fire support base FSB 2 (XT2986) (15 Nov) for air landing of 2/27 Inf and two arty. b'trys.  1/5(M) then conducted extensive reconnaissance operations in AO Red.  Upon relief by 2/22 (MO, 1/5 (M) secured FSB 3 (XT3390) for air-landing of 1/27 Inf and two additional arty b'trys (16 Nov.).  Subsequent operations involved reconnaissance/S&D operations in AO White.  2/22(M) conducted opns in AO Red.  

                (2)   Fire Support Bases:
(a)   FRENCH FORT          (XT2868)
(b)   FSB  1               (XT2778)
(c)   FSB  2               (XT2986)
(d)   FSB  3               (XT3390)
(e)   FSB  0               (XT1876)

                          (3)   Fires:  Maximum use of B-52 strikes, TAC Air, armed helicopter, and arty throughout the operation.  Arty and TAC Air preps were used on FSB area, LZ's and key terrain features along routes of advance.


       11.   Conditions:  Div OPORD 31-66 were received 092365 Nov 66

10 Nov  1966

Rd Bde Tac CF use established at the FENCH FORT (XT296680)

1st Bn (Mech)  5th Inf.
 (Including 2 Overlay for 10 Nov.)

     Bn commenced movements at 0830 hrs to secure the Bde forward combat abase at (XT2646850.  Local S&D operations were conducted in the base area.  Co C located and destroyed four VC structures and three bunkers at (XT248674).

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn continued preparations for air-lift to forward combat base commencing 110800 Nov 66.

 2nd Bn,  11th Infantry

 Bn was air-lifted to Bde forward combat base (XT284682).  All elements closed 1625 hrs

11 Nov  66

2md Bde forward combat base is located at the FRENCH FORT.

 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

     Bn conducted reconnaissance in force S&D ops. Along the road between (XT234652) and (---------), completing at 0730 hrs.  Co A located and destroyed 8 ox cats at (XT------22).   One steel helmet, one poncho, fifty tons rice and five huts were destroyed by Co A (XT267758) at 1005 hrs.  Two containers of acid (type unknown) and miscellaneous clothing were located at 1280 hrs (----).  Five Chi Com grenades, 200 lbs of rice, and 50 containers of acid were located in the cane area, all material was destroyed with the exception of a couple of acid.  Co A destroyed five bombes at 1220 hrs. (XT27-53).  At 1322 hrs, one Claymore wire was destroyed (XT279935).  Five ChiCom grenades, one concrete bunker, and 240 lbs of caned goods were destroyed at llll1350 hrs (XT227--).  At 1110 hrs, Co C destroyed one bunker complex (XT26---37).  Co B had negative contact.  Cop A established a combat base at (XT265835).  At the close of the reporting period Co B and Co C were returning to the Bde fed combat base.

 1st Bn,  27th Infantry

     Bn was air-lifted to the FRENCH FORT commencing at 1000 hrs.  All elements closed at 1230 hrs.  Co B commenced S&D operations (XT282699) at 1320 hrs.  The company returned at 1538 hrs with negative contact.  Bn prepared defensive positions on the Bde forward combat base perimeter.

2nd Bn.,  14th Infantry

     Bn(-) conducted S&D operations between (XT284682) and (XT315682) and established a combat base at (XT315681) at 1330 hrs.  Co A remained at the Bde fwd combat base and continued in the defense.

 12 Nov 66

2nd Bde forward combat base in location at the FRENCH FORT.  


1st Bn (Mech)  5th Infantry

     Bn secured a LZ (XT287780) for the 1/27 Inf air-lift at 1800 hrs.  Co A conducted reconnaissance operations commencing at 0750 hrs (XT2878).  Co B located and destroyed 7 bunkers (XT255286) and ten fox-holes (XT255794) at 1300 hrs.  Co C destroyed 12 CBU bombs at 1716 hrs (XT230772).  Co A returned to the Bde base at 1630 hrs.  Bn(-) established a fwd combat base at FSB 1.

1st Bn,  27th Infantry

     Bn was air-lifted to (XT287780) at 0817 hrs.  S&D operations resulted in 20 tons of rice destroyed (XT303777).  At 1630 hrs, a combat base was established at (XT302775).

2nd Bn,  27th Infantry

     Bn was air-lifted into FRENCH FORT at 0980 hrs.  Defensive positions were prepared and preparations made for future operations.

2nd Bn  14th Infantry      
(Enclosure 3 - Overlay for 11-12 Nov)

     Bn conducted reconnaissance in force/S&D operations from (XT315681) to (XT335677).  At 1010 hrs Co B located and destroyed one 100lb bomb (XT372681).  A fwd combat base was established at (XT336157).

13 Nov  66

2nd Bde fwd combat base is located at FRENCH FORT.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry
(Enclosure 4 - Overlay for 13 November)

     Co A & Co B exploited air-strike (XT1475) commencing 0912 hrs.  At 0548 hrs, Co  B located a roadblock (XT188768) consisting of one large tree.  During a search of the area, a Claymore Mine was detonated resulting in one WIA.  Three additional mines were located and destroyed by Co B (XT188768).  Co A destroyed 5 VC structures (XT155762).  An APC struck an AT mine at 1547 hrs resulting in extensive damage to the APC and 4 WIA.

 1st Bn,  27th Infntry

 Bn conducted “Cloverleaf” operations from the Bn combat base (XT275785).  At 1030 Hrs, Co B engaged 3 VC with SA and arty fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (Poss).  All elements were extracted and closed into 1/5(M) forward base (XT269788) at 1620 hrs.

2nd Bn.  27th Infantry

Bn conducted patrols and defended sector of 2nd Bde fwd combat base.

2nd Bn,  14th Infantry

     Bn conducted night combat patrols from Bn fwd combat base (XT316681).  Extraction of all units to Bde combat base was completed at 1200hrs.

14  Nov 66

2nd Bde forward combat base is located at FRENCH FORT.

1st Bn (Mech),  5th Infantry

     Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling southwest of FSN 2, to (XT257671, XT263811, and XT243806).  Co 4 located and destroyed 2,5000 lbs of rice.  1 VC structure and 1 rice mill,--------at 1116 hrs (XT263757).  At 0800hrs Co C found 300 ---o SA area===========================                       

1st Bn,  27th Infantry

     Bn conducted “CLOVERLEAF” operations east and northeast of FSB 2.  At 1600 hrs, Co A engaged 3 VC (XT239781) with SA and arty resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and one SMG captured.  All elements closed FSB 2 at 1740hrs.

     2nd Bn,  27th Infantry

     Bn continued aggressive combat patrolling and defense of 2nd Bde fwd combat base.

  2nd Bn,  11th Infantry

Bn conducted night combat patrols from Bde fwd combat base.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Attached effective 141200 Nov.  Bn completed movement from GO DO HA to SOUI  DA (XT535575) at 1681 hrs.

15 Nov  66
Bde Tac Op was airlifted to FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech) 5th Infantry

Bn moved from SFB 1 to ---to secure LZ for Bde OP, A Btry, 2/13 Arty, B Btry 1/8 Arty---------.

1st Bn,  27th Infantry

Bn remained at FSB 1 to continue reconnaissance patrolling.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn was air-lifted into FSB2.  All elements closed at 1320 hrs.

 2nd Bn,  14th Infantry

Bn remained at former combat base (XT274685) to conduct reconnaissance patrolling and to secure Btry 3/13 Arty.

 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry
(Enclosure Overlay for 15 Nov)

Bn conducted road march to FSB1 commencing at 0745 hrs.  At 1900 hrs, Co C encountered 2 VC (-----) resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 rocket launcher and 4 AT rounds captured.  Co A(-), Recon Plat, and the end group closed FSB 1 at 2100hrs.  Co B & Co C remained at (XT254761)

 16 Nov. 66

2nd Bde CP is located at FSB 2.  LRRP engaged 2 VC at 1640 hrs (XT274942) and (XT274905) resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling 3,000 meters from FSB 2.  At 0904 hrs, Co C destroyed 12 bunkers, (XT283864).  Recon platoon conducted reconnaissance for route trafficability from FSB 2 along probable routes for future operations.  All elements closed into FSB 2 at 1600 hrs.
1st Bn,  27th Infantry

Bn conducted patrolling from FSB 1 and secured perimeter of 2/22 (M).        


2nd Bn. 14th Infantry

Bn conducted patrolling and secured A Btry 3/13 Arty at (XT574685).  At 1230hrs, Co B engaged an estimated VC squad resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) (XT289684).

 2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

All elements closed FSB 1 at 1225 hrs.

17 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP is located at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech) 5th Infantry

Bn(-) conducted route reconnaissance operations northeast of FSB 2 to (XT279962).  Co C conducted local S&D operations.  29 VC emplacements were destroyed by Co C (XT285841).  At 1046 hrs, recon plat destroyed 3 VC structures, 3 bunkers, and 1 large classroom (XT285697).  At 1105 hrs, 4 WIA were sustained when the unit came under VC mortar fire (XT265897).  All elements returned to FSB 2 at 1700 hrs.

1st Bn,  27th Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling vicinity of FSB 1 with negative contact.

 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling west of FSB 2 to (XT265654) with negative contact.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Bn moved by convoy and airlift to Tay Ninh base camp to remain on stand-by alert for 2nd Bde.

 2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance in force opns to north and west of FSB 1 to (XT2277) and (XT2762).  Co B at 1220 hrs engaged 2 VC (XT253789) resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 SMG, 5 magazines, and miscellaneous documents captured.  All elements closed FSB 1 at 1625 hrs.

18 NOV 66

2nd Bde CP is located at FSB 2

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry
(Enclosure 9 - Overlay for 18-22 Nov)

Bn commenced an attack at 0700 hrs to seize FSB 3.  Co C, at 0945 hrs, found and destroyed a classroom and trench system with fighting positions (XT282893).  At 1020 hrs, Co B engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 US WIA (XT278508).  Co B also found protective mask and 1 first-aid packet in the area of contact.  Bn located for the night at (XT275925).

1st Bn 27th Infantry

Bn was air-lifted to FSB 2 at 0900 hrs.  All elements closed FSB 2 at 1140 hrs.

 2nd Bn 27th Infantry

Bn defended FSB 2.  Co A remained on a 30 min stand-by alert and the Bn on a 1hr alert.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Bn remained at Tay Ninh base camp on stand-by alert for 2nd Bde.              

 2nd Bn (Mech) 22nd Infantry

Bn continued to contact reconnaissance patrolling vicinity FSB 1.  Co B engaged an estimated 10 VC (XT257803) at 1343 hrs resulting in 2 US WIA.

19 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP remained at FSB 2

1st Bn (Mech) 5th Infantry
(Enclosure 9 - Overlay for 18-22 Nov.)

The Bn commenced opns at 0755 hrs, moving with all elements toward obj vic (XT274962).  The move progressed without contact until 1311 hrs.  At this time, Co A engaged a VC force of unknown size (XT274966) resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC), 2 BAR's and 2 Chicom assault rifles were captured.  Co A sustained 3 WIA's.  At 1350hrs Co A engaged 2 more VC (XT274956) resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 60mm mortar captured.  At 1615 hrs, the Bn CP was established at (XT274962).  Co C captured 2 VCs (XT277964) at 1630hrs.

2nd Bn,  14th Infantry

The Bn continued on one hour alert at Tay Ninh base camp until 1626 hrs when the Bn was air-lifted to FSB 1.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry
 (Enclosure 8 - Overlay for 19-20 Nov.)

Bn commenced a search of (XT225815) with Co A and Co C at 0746 hrs.  At 1045 hrs, Co C located a booby trapped bunker-tunnel complex at (XT231814).  At 1045 three WIA were sustained during a search of the tunnel when a booby trap was discovered.  Another tunnel was located by Co C containing 16 M-79 rds.(-----).  At 1200 hrs, Co C uncovered a cache (XT227811) containing 8A ----hand grenades, -----, 350 lbs of rice, one pair of binoculars, and miscellaneous documents.  At 1815 Co A and Co C engaged an estimated VC platoon at (XT----).  As the units deployed ----the VC, six air strikes were called in upon the enemy.  At 1559 hrs at (XT---7813) Co A located 5 huts and 2 VC bunkers.  At 1043 hrs Co A found 2 additional VC bodies, (XT227-13) and destroyed one  VC structure.  At 1430 hrs Co A located miscellaneous contents (XT----7813). All units returned to the combat base camp established at (XT274562).

 1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The Bn conducted patrolling vic FSB 2 at 1125 hrs, a patrol from Co C located and destroyed a bunker and 2 foxholes (XT283854).  All elements closed into FSB 2 at 1655 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

The Bn conducted patrolling vic FSB 2.  All patrols reported negative contact throughout the day.

20 NOV 66

2nd Bde CP remained at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech. 5th Infantry)
(Enclosure 9 - Overlay for 18-22 Nov.)

Bn conducted reconnaissance in force to FSB 3 commencing at 0900 hrs.  All elements closed FSB 3 by 1450 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn continued to defend FSB 2 and improve defensive positions.  Bn was on 30 min stand-by alert for 2/14 Inf and 2/22(M) opns.

 2nd Bn,  27th Infantry

----------------------------Co C destroyed a VC------------------------------------        


 2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Bn conducted an airmobile combat assault into (XT210800) commencing at 0945 hrs.  Two VC were engaged with Arty at 1130 hrs resulting in 2 VC KIA (poss).  At 1400 hrs Co B engaged an unknown number of VC (XT206812) resulting in 4 US WIA and 1 us KIA.  An immediate search of a bunker was conducted resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poss).  Extraction to FSB 1 was completed at 1805 hrs.

2nd Bn (Mech) 22nd Infantry
 (Enclosure 8 Overlay for 19-20 Nov)

Bn commenced an attack on obj.(XT230830) at 0741 hrs.  At 1700 hrs, 3 VC were engaged by Co B resulting in 1 VC KIA(poss) and one automatic rifle captured.  All elements returned to FSB 1.

 21 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP is located at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry
 (Enclosure 9 Overlay for 18-22 Nov.)

Bn conducted local security and reconnaissance operations vic FSB 3 with Co A and Co C.  Co B secured FSB 3.  At 1318 hrs, Co A located a VC base camp, 2 AT mines, and 2 CBU's (XT389919).  At 1413 hrs one APC was hit by an AT rd resulting in 2 WIA, (XT323907).  At 1535 hrs, Co C located 2 bunkers (XT349904) containing 9 Chicom hand grenades, 50 lbs of rice, 100 lbs of peas, and 100 lbs of salt.  All elements closed base camp at 1755 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an airmobile combat assault into (XT273937) in response to a special intelligence report.  Co A attacked obj (XT262946).  Co C secured the LZ.  No contact was made and the Bn commenced extraction at 1530 hrs to FSB 2, closing at 1630 hrs.

2nd Bn 27th Infantry

Bn conducted local patrols vic FSB 2 throughout the day with negative contact.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Bn conducted an airmobile assault into (XT275955) to secure an arty. fire support base for 1/5(M) opns.  Btry C 1/8 Arty was moved into position at 0830 hrs.  By 1500 hrs, the Arty Btry had been extracted back to FSB 3.  At 1520 hrs, the Bn had completed extraction to FSB 2.  By 1800 hrs, the Bn had returned to Tay Ninh base camp where it went on a one hour stand-by alert.

2nd Bn(Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn contacted patrols vic FSB 1, commencing at 1050 hrs, with negative contact.

22 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP is located at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry
 (Enclosure 9 Overlay for 18-22 Nov)

Bn commenced reconnaissance in force from FSB 3 southwest to (XT3291) at 0800 hrs.  At 1045 hrs, Co C sustained 1 KIA from sniper fire (XT358938).  Small arms and arty were returned with unknown results.  At 1150 hrs, an APC from Co A detonated an AT mine resulting in1 WIA and moderate vehicle damage.  Co C found 3 bunkers (XT358948) with wires leading to 1-20 lb bomb and 1 arty in a tree.  All elements closed FSB 3 at 1625 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry             

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an airmobile assault into (XT368856) at 0815 hrs.  Co C destroyed 900 lbs of rice (XT369945) at 1031 hrs.  Recon plat. patrolled south of  FSB 2 with negative contact.  All elements returned to FSB 2 prior to 1800 hrs.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Bn remained on stand-by-alert at Tay Ninh base camp.

2nd Bn (Mech) 22nd Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling vic FSB 1 commencing at 0828 hrs.  At 1225 hrs, Co A sustained 1 KIA and 5 WIA from two Claymore Mines.  At 1435 hrs, Co B engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) AND 1 Chicom SMG captured.  All units closed into FSB 1 at 1715 hrs.

23 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP remained at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry
 (Enclosure 18 Overlay for 23 Nov)

At 0733 hrs, Bn commenced a road-march from FSB 3 to FSB 1.  APC from Recon Plat hit an AP mine (XT-----) resulting in moderate damage.  At 1505 hrs, another Recon Plat  APC hit another mine resulting in extensive vehicle damage.  All elements closed into VSB 1 prior to 1800 hrs.

1st Bn,  27th Infantry

Bn conducted an airmobile combat assault (XT391867) at 0900 hrs. negative contact was made and all elements were extracted to FSB 2 at 1248 hrs.

 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn secured FSB 2 and conducted reconnaissance patrolling in sector.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Bn(-) conducted S&D opns (XT216814).  Co C was pre-positioned at FSB 1 as a reaction force.  All elements were extracted back to Tay Ninh base camp at 1545hrs.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling to southeast of FSB 1.

24 Nov. 66                                

2nd Bde CP relocated at 196th Bde Base Camp at Tay Ninh.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

Bn moved from FSB 1 to FSB 0.  At 0620 hrs, 2 APC's hit AT mines (XT184768 )  and (XT154765), resulting in 3 WIA and 1 APC moderately damaged.  At 0830 hrs Co C destroyed 1 AT mine (XT184765).  All elements closed into FSB O prior to 1800 hrs.

 1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an airmobile extraction from FSB 2, closing Tay Ninh Base at 0905 hrs.  Bn then moved by convoy to Cu Chi, closing at 0515 hrs.

 2nd Bn,  27th Infantry              


Bn commenced airmobile extraction from FSB 2 at 1245 hrs.  Elements were first lifted to Tay Ninh and then to Cu Chi, closing at 1742 hrs.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Bn moved to Cu Chi by convoy, closing at 1505 hrs.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn returned to Div control at 0800 hrs.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling vic FSB ), and south to (XT1669).  At 1405 hrs, an APC from the heavy sector plat hit an AT mine resulting in 3 WIAs and considerable vehicle damage.  The Bn established a night combat base at (XT---6687).

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn assumed responsibility for Cu Chi base camp sector at 1200 hrs.

 2nd Bn,  27th Infantry

Bn assumed responsibility for Cu Chi base camp sector at 1200 hrs.

252400 NOVEMBER 66

(Reference map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Source L7014, Sheets 6232 I,II,III,IV for all overlays included in this report.)


     a.   Enemy Losses:

          VC KIA (BC)          43          --------                    350
          VC KIA (POSS)     68          Documents            33 lbs
          VCC               1                     Canned Foods    240 lbs
          VCS               1                     C&U                        15
          Wire               575 mts          Rice Milling Mach.   1
          Small arms          9               60mm Mortar            1
          ---               47                        Maps                    100 lbs
          Mortars              64                Salt                      100 lbs
          AT ----               4                    F1G -Rocket Launcher    4
          Claymores          5                10 - 7 ---Barrel
          Hand Grenades     33          R----2 RD3                     4
          Rifle Grenades     4             H-T9  RDS                    20

b.  Friendly Losses:

               KIA               36
               WIA               220
               DGI               3
               APC M-113 combat loss  4


          a.   SUPPLY:  All requests of supply were available in sufficient quantities to meet operational demand.  Elements of the 1st Logistic Command provided supplies from their facilities at Tay Ninh.  25th Division Support Command provided a complete staff to meet all logistic requirements of th 2nd Bde. Task force.

          b.   MAINTENANCE:  Co C, 719th Maintenance Bd. Provided direct support during the operations.  No unusual problems were encountered.

          c.   SERVICES:   Laundry service provided by quartermaster facilities was inadequate.  Contractural services were provided, but were engaged far too late in the operation to be used.

          d.   TRANSPORTATION:   Courier from Cu Chi did not arrive daily in sufficient time to effect resupply of ice and mail to forward units.  Although scheduled to arrive at approximately 1300 hours daily, arrivals at times were later than 1700 and delivery of these items could not be made until the following day.

(a)  Troop haul requirements for infantry battalions were met by Support Command when requested.

(b)  With the exception of 2 convoys to the Brigade Forward Base on 13 and 14 Nov, all re-supply was accomplished by helicopter.  A total of 1,279 MF BG sorties and 26 CH47 sorties were flown in re-supplying.

14.   Special Equipment and Techniques:

               (a)   Greater use of -----------was made to isolate cutting, mark clearance for arty and mortars, b-gl-r material, clearing areas for head-quarters and indirect fire wagons, and cutting used for surfacing roads.  For planning purposes, an area/maneuver battalion are required.

`15.   Commander's Analysis:

               (a)    Alternate LZ's must be prepared during the context of an airmobile assault.  This action provides a certain amount of deception and also insures adequate preparation of alternate LZ's if the primary LZ is found to be “hot”.    

               (b)   The judicious use of the air and arty during air-mobile combat assaults is the key to the rapid introduction of an infantry force in a combat picture.  This support must continue during the actual landings and extractions.  Sufficient time must be allocated for detailed coordination between all support services involved is: the inf. unit making the assault, tac air, stray air, and arty.

               (c)   As maneuver battalions are extended from forward supply bases to areas not serviced by roads, the resulting more ground time for helicopter re-supply quickly became unacceptable.  Planning must include positioning of supply bases on usable roads as for forward as possible.  

               (d)   Engineer support for elements operating in War Zone C is definitely essential.  Aerial readiness cannot give an estimate of all trafficability.  Many  streams require preparation (log-laying) before landings can be made.  -------------------teams and usable roads are a scarcity and precautions must be made for immediate replacement when ---become as far forward as possible.                   

               (e)   Mired or disabled vehicles present a major problem to Mech. movement.  It can be expected that there will be an increase in mining in the future operations in WAR ZONE C.  Planning must include provisions for security, repair, evacuations and destruction.

               (f)   Mechanized infantry can operate in most heavily wooded areas in WAR ZONE C to a limited degree.  Capabilities include provisions for rapid movement to secure forward bases, probing and reinforcement.

               (g)   All helicopter support must be controlled by the Task Force headquarters.  This system permits rapid change of priorities as the tactical situation develops.  Planning must include adequate areas in the rear for the brigade teams to include a landing area for helicopters.

               (h)   Planning for extended operations must include provisions for direct exchange of Class III items.

               (i)   Major component replacement for disabled mech. Vehicles is essential.  Planning must include provisions for immediate replacement and maintenance assistance from division forward support bases.
               (j)  It appears that the VC do not desire to engage large US Forces in War Zone C.

16.   Recommendations:

          Where possible, aviation support units should station liaison officers at the brigade trains and the brigade tactical command post.  These representatives greatly assist in the initial planning of an operation and provide the commander with detailed information concerning the mission as they are prepared.

FOR THE COMMANDER:                    MAJOR L. COATS         




1.   General:   The terrain exploited by the 2nd Bde Task Force in WAR ZONE C was characterized by dense jungle and open marshlands.  Elevation ranged between 10 meters (XT2260) and 80 meters (XT1173), with the general average of 35-40 meters in the area of operations.  Relatively little land was cultivated;  the majority of agricultural efforts were small or individual garden plots.

2.   Roads and Trails:   Roads through the area reflect lack of cars and maintenance.  Portions of the major roads have been cratered by bombing and mines, and subsequent erosion has occurred.  Fallen trees in a few areas have blocked roadways making detours necessary.  The major road network from (XT284619) to KATUM (XT333898) to BO TUC (XT380857) were subjected to thorough air reconnaissance.  Road use of approximately 46 kilometers proved it to be adequate for tracked vehicles.  Major obstacles were found at (XT327893) where steep banks had to be leveled by demolitions to accommodate crossing.  Even after leveling had been accomplished, crossing was still reported to be difficult.  At (XT325886), craters and muddy conditions made trafficability extremely difficult.  

Trails and footpaths were observed throughout the entire area.  They appeared to occur at random, leading into dense jungles, (Appendix 1).  Due to the vegetation and the limits of advance, none of the trails could be explored completely.  LRRP reported that two trails (XT213879) were blocked at irregular intervals by cut trees and foliage.  The purpose of these blocks is unknown.  The LRRP also reported seeing several observation platforms built high in the trees at irregular intervals.  The patrol was unable to pinpoint the locations of these platforms.

3.   Bunkers and Fortifications:  In the area of operations, elements of the 2nd Bde Task Force encountered relatively few bunkers and trenches as compared with other areas: i.e., the HO BO WOODS, the BOI LOI WOODS, other known VC strongholds.  Bunkers which were manned and defended by fire were located at (XT224812) and (XT227813).  Other bunkers, as depicted in Appendix 1, were deserted, although most of them showed signs of recent repair.

4.   Base Camps:   There were nine base camp sites reported in the entire area of operations.  For the most part, the typical base camp found in WAR ZONE C consisted of several protective bunkers, a few small huts, a small cache of rice, garden plots, and evidence of recent use.  Base areas found during the operation are depicted in Appendix 1 and are listed below:

(XT303777)     Heavily booby trapped area with 20 tons of rice.
(XT243800)        Campsite for estimated 100 VC
(XT278828)     Campsite apparently used by 25 - 30 VC
(XT263757)     Campsite with 1500 lbs rice and a rice milling machine
(XT344919)     A series of cultivated garden plots and small huts
(XT383896)     Campsite with shower, latrine, and recently repaired bunkers.
(XT224810)     Five huts and extensive tunnel system:  defended briefly by VC    


(XT329919)     Small base camp appeared to have been used by 30 - 50 VC
(XT349940)     Base camp large enough for 200 VC with fresh food in area.

5.   Cross Country Trafficability:  The axis of advance of the mechanized infantry battalions, the 1/5(M) and the 2/22(M), are depicted in Appendix 2.

Although there were mine incidents experienced, the greatest barriers are caused by      terrain, specifically jungle and lowland marshes.  Generally, movement cross country was slow with the daily average advance of 10 kilometers.   Land elements of the mechanized infantry normally required an average of one hour to penetrate 400-500 meters of dense jungle.  Difficulty for trail elements was encountered in low spots; at elevations of less than 35 meters, the swath cut by lead elements became too muddy and consequently impassable to trail elements, necessitating the cutting of new routes through the jungle.  

Marsh lands provided the greatest single obstacle to progress of tracked vehicles.  Soft mud predominant in open areas at elevations of 35 meters or less continually bogged down vehicles.

6.   Land Zones:  Areas suitable for helicopter landing zones are depicted in Appendix 3.

7.   Weather:  Weather facilities were available to the 2nd Bde during the period 18-23 Nov.  During this period, the following data were compiled:

     Average maximum temperature          89
     Absolute maximum temperature          92
     Average minimum temperature          74          
     Absolute minimum temperature          70
     Total precipitation                    .32  inches
     Maximum precipitation               .32  inches

Except for occasional  early morning fog and evening showers, weather did not materially affect air or ground operations.