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 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
               HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
                          APO San Francisco  96225


AVDCS[T-C                                                                                                                                                 6 April, 1967

SUBJECT:     After Action Report (Logistical) on Operation Junction City I

TO:          Commanding General
          25th Infantry Division
          ATTN:   AVDCMHD
          APO  96225


1.  Mission:  To provide logistical support to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade;  3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and elements of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

2.  General:  The 15th Support Brigade provided the majority of the logistical support for this operation by establishing and operating two Forward Support Areas, (FSA's);  FSA #1, Trai Bi (XT1270) and FSA #2 French Fort (XT28--).  Supply point distribution of Class I, Class III and Class V was provided from the FSA.  Units submitted Class II & Class III, and Class V was provided from the FSA.  Units submitted Class II & IV requirements to 25th Division Support Command LNO located at FSA's.  Supply point distribution from FSA's was utilized for barrier material, and supply point distribution at Cu Chi was used for other II & IV requirements.  Maintenance and repair parts back-up support was provided in the form of track and armament maintenance contact teams. 25th Infantry Division Support Command provided additional logistical support as required from the Cu Chi base camp.

3.  Specific Areas:

a.  25th Supply and Transport Battalion

          (1)   The following personnel and equipment supported this operation.

               (a)   Personnel:  Nine (9) officers and (14) enlisted.

               (b)   Vehicles:   One (1) 1200 gallon water tanker was furnished during the entire period.  One (1) reefer was dispatched daily to transport ice and ice cream.  Two (2) 2 ½ ton trucks were utilized on a daily basis for re-supply of bread from Tay Ninh to Trai Bi.  In addition, two (2) ½ ton trucks with radio were furnished for communications and control.  

          (2)   The following support was provided:

               (a)   Class I - Ice, ice cream, and bread

               (b)    Class II & IV - Paper plates and paper cups as well as plastic eating utensils were required.  Concertina, 8' pickets, and sandbags were also needed.

               (c)    Class III was very limited.

               (d)   A complete list of items is furnished in Appendix A.
           (3)    Problems encountered and solutions applied:

(a)  No unusual problems were encountered

                    b.   725th Maintenance Battalion:

(1)  Support for this operation involved nine (9) officers and eighty-five (85) enlisted men.

(2)  Services and support rendered:

               (a)   Co C, 725th Maintenance Battalion deployed to Trai Bi and supported all elements from that location.

               (b)   Maintenance and supply liaison personnel were operational at the SUPCOM forward position.

               (c)   Organic truck and air transportation was utilized to furnish emergency repair parts to the forward areas.
          (3)   Unique features of the operation:     None

Problems encountered and solutions applied:

               (a)   Some participating units failed to bring their PLL to the field.  Solution applied:  This is a recurring problem that requires command emphasis.

               (b)   One unit submitted parts requests for “as many as you can get” quantities.  Some were on tablet paper, some verbal and many were duplicate requirements.  Solution applied:  The situation improved after a liaison visit was made and supply support outlined in detail.

               (c)   Evacuation of battle losses was hampered by lack of transport and documentation.  Solution applied:  DSO and DMO agreed that a collection point should be established.  It should be mutually operated for control and safeguarding of equipment pending documentation, classification and evacuation.
               (d)   Support units and supported elements did not know their relationship in the field and extensive liaison had to be conducted in order to establish maintenance operations channels.  Solution Applied:  Maintenance support plan should be delineated, published in the OPORD and be given widest dissemination.    

 (p.2)

     c.   25th Medical Battalion

          (1)   Six (6) officers and fifty-three (53) enlisted men were directly involved in support of this operation.

          (2)   Services and Support rendered:  Delta Company, 25th Medical Battalion operated a forward clearing station during the period 19 Feb '67 to 14 Mar '67 at Trai Bi in support of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division;  3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division;  11th Armored Cavalry Regiment;  25th Division Medical support provided included treatment, hospitalization, evacuation and re-supply.  Two helicopters were utilized for evacuation of casualties.  Evacuation was accomplished primarily by “Dust-Off”.     

(3)   Unique features of this operation - None

(4)   Problems encountered - None

          (5)   Detailed statistical data is listed in Appendix  C.

d.   Division Ammunition Office:

          (1)   Three (3) officers and six (6) enlisted men were involved in this operation.
          (2)   Services and Support rendered:

               (a)   Class V supplies were provided from the 1st Log. Command Supply Point at Tay Ninh.

               (b)   1st Log. Command also provided Class V support from its forward Supply Areas located at Trai Bi and Dau Tieng.

          (3)   Unique features of this operation:  Aerial re-supply was attempted by 1st Log. Command resulting in damage to 1568 rounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition.

          (4)   Problems encountered - None

          (5)   Statistical data is in Appendix D.

 e,   Division Transportation Section:

          (1)   During Operation Junction City I, the Division Transportation functioned in three locations:  Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, and Trai Bi.  The staffing was as follows:

               (a)   Cu chi                  2 Officer
                                                   2  Enlisted men

               (b)   Tay Ninh               2 Officers
                                                    1 Enlisted man

               (c)  Trai Bi                    1 Officer (from S & T Bn)

          (2)   Services and Support

               (a)   The Cu Chi element maintained the installation and transportation effort while controlling the re-supply convoys from Saigon to Cu Chi and Tay Ninh.  The mission of flying Command and Control helicopter missions over MSR route was handled by the two officers manning the section.  Supervision over CV-2 flight #422, the 25th Division Caribou shuttle flight between Tan Son Nhut, Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, Trai Bi, and Dau Tiang was effected from Cu Chi

               (b)   The Tay Ninh element, operating under Support Command Forward, provided the focal point for direct support transportation for the Division.  The proportion of supplies carried by highway transport during Operation Junction City exceeded that of similarly sized operations conducted during the past six months.  Routes operated were:  
                    1.   Rte 1-22;  (Saigon - Tay Ninh)  the  MSR over which all logistical vehicles traveled.  Two convoys were operated daily.
                    2.   Rte 22:  (Tay Ninh - Trai Bi) the route over which resupply convoys to FSA-1 traveled.  This FSA supported the largest number of troops and received the heavier traffic of the two FSA routes.
                    3.   Rte 4: (Tay Nihn - French Fort) the route servicing FSA-2.  This route operated daily.
                    4.  Rte 26 - 239:  (Tay Ninh - Dau Tieng)  Re-supply route for the Dau Tieng base camp.  Although this route did not enter directly into Junction City, vehicular control, and security elements had to be made available from the same pool of assets that supported Junction City.  Two convoys operated daily.   

               (c)    The Trai Bi element provided traffic control, convoy marshalling and aircraft backing services at FSA -1.

               (d)   Throughout the operation, the Tay Ninh and Trai Bi areas were supported by a platoon from the 720th Military Police Battalion.  The platoon (-) controlled traffic at Tay Ninh, while one squad supported Trai Bi.  By bringing direct support Military Police under control of the Division Transportation Officer, this enabled him to effectively enforce traffic control in an environment in which units from various commands were required to operate under a coordinated convoy system.
               (e)   Fixed-wing Air Transportation :  The use of Air Force aviation was primarily for the transportation of personnel.  Air Lift was used for the movement of the non-mechanized battalions of the 3rd Brigade between Dau Tieng and Trai Bi; for the movement of the 2/14th Infantry between Cu Chi and Dau Tieng;  and for the lifts of two RVN Marine Battalions to and from Tan Son Nhut.  Priority cargoes were transported by CV-2 aircraft on a schedule between Cu Chi and Tay Ninh, Dau Tieng, and Trai Bi.  Occasional use of C-123 lift for logistical support

          (3)  Problems encountered and solutions applied:

               (a)   The only problem area encountered was over priority of route use, and this was quickly solved.  The presence of the NFFORCEV Highway Regulating Center at Tay Ninh was primarily to act as an inter-divisional coordinating agency, but the high level of cooperation achieved by the participating units obviated the need for such an operation in the forward area, and it displaced to the rear on March 4th.

               (b)   The single problem area that requires resolution in future operations, is the scheduling of multiple large unit moves over the Rte 1-22 SR on a single day.  Experience has shown that this road can accommodate little more than 1000 vehicles on single lane operations if proper convoy separation is to be maintained.  To operate larger numbers of vehicles produces congestion in direct proportion to the magnitude of the over-load.  It is recommended that road capacities be taken into consideration when troop deployments are scheduled for future operations.

(4)  See Appendix E for statistical data.


FOR THE COMMANDER:               


                                   DONALD W. JOHNSON
                                   Major, QMC
                                   Adjutant       



                    APPENDIX  A  -  S  &  T  DATA

CLASS  I

 FSN                       NOUN                       UNIT OF ISSUE          QTY.

N / A                         Ice                                   lbs.                         259,500
8910-126-3400        Ice Cream                       gal.                            1,468
8970-577-4513        Meal Cbt, Indiv                 ml                          16,476
8920-753-5776          Bread                               lb.                         43,550

CLASS  II &  IV

7340-170-8374          Spoons, plastic          hd                  455
7340-205-3187          Knife, plastic               hd                  920
7340-205-3342          Forks, plastic              hd               1,000
7350-162-3006          Cups, paper                hd               1,060
7350-633-9743          Plates, paper              hd                  218

BARRIER MATERIAL

5660-262-9914          Fence Post  8'         ea               1,150
5660-271-9494          Concertina               cl                    416
8105-285-4744          Sand Bags               hd               2,275

CLASS   IIIA

9150-753-5060          Lube oil Acft               pl               20


Appendix  I

                       APPENDIX  B  -  725th MAINTENANCE  DATA

1.     Repair parts furnished                              2,150

2.      Job orders completed                                  112

3.     Major items evacuated                                   12

4.      Utilization of maintenance float                      9





               APPENDIX  C - MEDICAL STATISTICAL DATA

1.     Treatment and hospitalization

     a.   Admissions          410

          (1)   IRHA                245
          (2)   DIS                     20
          (3)   NBI                     85

     b.   Dispositions          410

          (1)   To duty             80
          (2)   Evacuation     301
          (3)   Transferred      22

     c.   Other                      630

          (1)   Sick Call          221
          (2)   Dental              156
          (3)    Lab                  253

     d.   KIA's - CRO          ?

2.   Evacuation

     a.   Number of requests                              127

     b.   Patients received via “Dust Off”            265

“D”  Co Forward Clearing Station Received:
     Medical Supplies

     a.   317  line items

     b.   3  short tons                                 

  (p8)

               APPENDIX  D  -  AMMUNITION STATISTICAL DATA

1.   Daily tonnage issued                    48.5

2.   Tonnage  - Artillery ammo issued          1,456.8

3.   Tonnage  - Small arms issued               242.1

4.   Total tonnage  (Arty. & Small Arms)          1,698.9        

  (p9)
               APPENDIX  E  -  TRANSPORTATION

1.   Highway Operations

     ROUTE     CONVOYS     VEHICLES       CL. I         II & IV     III              V

     *Saigon - TN          42              6217          2946          2741        7863    10148
       TN - TB                 92             2582             611            211         1439      1522
       TN  - FF                32               732             137           148            554      1021
       TN - DT                 40             1452             338           244            800        129     

All cargo utilized was delivered via the Saigon - Tay Ninh route,  All other tonnage represents second lifts.

Fixed - wing  Air Transportation
Personnel transported:

          (1)   C-123/C-130  mission lift     4,068
          (2)   CV-2  Scheduled lifts           1,610

Cargo Transported

114 tons



TN - Tay Ninh
TB - Trai Bi
FF - French Fort
DT - Dau Tieng