After Action Report 57

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

Elements of the 25th Inf Div Artillery were actively engaged in combat operations throughout the reporting period in support of Operation Toan Thang II, which continued from the previous quarter. Greatest enemy activity continued to be centered in the Tay Ninh - Dau Tieng area. Enemy tactics varied throughout the reporting period from relatively long periods of avoiding contact with significant elements of US forces, to sudden violent ambushes of armed convoys and coordinated attacks against relatively well defended combined artillery - infantry positions, referred to as fire support bases (FSB).

Artillery direct fire against attacks on these fire support bases accounted for a significant number of the high casualties inflicted on the enemy while sustaining very light casualties themselves. Reinforcement training on Vietnam type operations for new artillery personnel who have not previously served in Vietnam continued to be conducted by the 25th Inf Div. Reinforcement Training School. Attendance is mandatory for officers 02 and below, WO and enlisted men E7 and below. Training lasts 5 days for Artillery personnel.

Artillery units continued on the job training to develop proficiency in all phases of artillery with emphasis on duties of the cannoneer and fire direction center techniques at battery level. Also, proficiency training in defense of base camps and fire support bases was conducted continually throughout the period with emphasis on proper planning of defensive fires, direct fires, counter-mortar/counter-battery fire, use of appropriate ammunition such as beehive, or charge 1 fuse time set for minimum range (referred to in Sec 2 as Killer Junior), and immediate pre-planned reaction to enemy attack (including predetermined direction for each gun).

(2) On 4 Aug C/1/8 deployed to FSB Keeno II (XT6502) from FSB Meade (XT6011) to support the 2/14th Infantry. Operations continued in the area throughout August. The following day A/1/C moved from FSB Stuart III (XT4919) and C/3/13 moved from Cu Chi into FSB Butler III (XT5404) to support elements of the 3/101st Air Cav in combat assault (CA) and reconnaissance in force (RIF) operations north of Bao Trai. On 7 August these batteries returned to the FSB's from which they had come.

(5) Between 9 and 17 August, several moves were made to maintain artillery support for the fast moving maneuver elements, but no significant action developed. On one occasion the artillery virtually out-ran the infantry. During the evening of 15 August, a civilian Irregular Do---- Group (CIDG) platoon of 30 men was reported surrounded by an NVA force of 100 or more in the vicinity of XT3377. Immediately, B/7/11 Arty was alerted for a possible move to support the beleaguered force. By midnight, 15 - 16 August, a scheme of maneuver and fire support had been developed to relieve the surrounded platoon. At first light 16 August, A/3/13 Arty followed a road sweeping team from FSB Buell II to FSB St. Barbara (XT2768) and by 0900 was ready to fire a ten minute Landing Zone (LZ) preparation for 2/27 Infantry as it went to the relief of the CIDG platoon. At 0915 and again at 1135 the operation was delayed as G3 and other divisional elements reassessed the situation and coordinated air assets with the needs for both the infantry combat assault (CA) and the artillery air mobile emplacement. The CIDG platoon was extracted at 1200 hrs. Finally at 1310 the relief operation - now a follow-up operation - began with the artillery preparation of the LZ in the vicinity of XT2877. At 1435H C/7/11 began the air-mobile move it had prepared for at 0900. The next day, 17 Aug, A/3/13 returned to FSB Buell II (XT2256) and C/7/11 returned to FSB Rawlins III.

(6) The long expected VC/NVA Third Offensive began in the early morning hours of 18 Aug 68, with an attack on FSB Buell II. At 0120 hrs the position was attacked with mortars, rockets, small arms, and foot troops. At 0225 hrs, the Nui Ba Den signal facility came under ground attack. A total of 83 NVA (body count) were killed during the attack at FSB Buell II. During the daylight hours, continuous contact was made with enemy forces in the Tay Ninh area. As darkness fell, it became apparent the enemy would renew his efforts against Tay Ninh, Buell II, Dau Tieng, and Tay Ninh East. An estimated two NVA battalions occupied Tay Ninh East. C/2/13 arrived in Cu Chi from Phu Loi (23rd Arty Group) to assume a General Support Reinforcing mission. This 105mm howitzer battery was moved to Tay Ninh by air on 19 Aug. 68.

(7) The following two days the enemy continued sporadic attacks by fie on Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh base camps and fire support bases in the area. Div Arty units provided continuous close fire support of the maneuver elements seeking him out. On 21 August, A/2/13 moved from Tay Ninh to Rawlins III (XT2848) to support 4/23 Mech Inf and A/1/8 moved to Dau Tieng from Cu Chi to support 1/5 Mech Inf.

(8) FSB Schofield III (XT4144) was occupied on 22 August by A/1/8 Arty from Dau Tieng and C/7/11 Arty from Rawlins III Two days later, at approximately 0015 hrs, 24 August, this new position received a heavy ground attack. The more than 2000 rounds of artillery fired in defense accounted for a major part of the 62 enemy body count. Schofield III was vacated on 25 August and both batteries returned to the bases from which they came. Also, on 25 Aug, A/2/13 Arty road-marched to Cu Chi from FSB Rawlins III. During the early morning hours of 22 August, FSB's Buell II (AT2256) Rawlins III (XT2948), and Stuart III (XT4919) all received attacks by fire and light ground probes. Light friendly casualties and unknown enemy casualties resulted.

(9) On 27 August, the enemy lost another 34 men killed in a pre-dawn attack on FSB Rawlins III (occupied by C/7/11 and two companies of 4/23 Mechanized Infantry). The following day, three artillery moves were completed in response to a shift of division maneuver elements: Hq and A/1/8 Arty returned to Cu Chi from Dau Tieng, A/3/13 Arty moved into Cu Chi from FSB Buell II, and C/3/13 Arty moved from Cu Chi to FSB Meade (XT6011), where it remained for the rest of the quarter. The 2/31st Arty (Airborne) relieved its A Battery at FSB Davis, XT48221, then returned to the 101st Airborne Division base camp at Phuoc Vinh (XT9548), with its C battery from Phuoc Vinh. In other action on 27 - 28 August, artillery fires were concentrated in grid XT5227 to help the 2/506 Infantry kill 40 NVA soldiers. On 29 August C/2/319 Arty moved from FSB Davis to FSB Pershing (vic XT5025)

(11) The lull in activity continued until 3 September when the Tay Ninh - Dau Tieng convoy was ambushed. There were some artillery relocations during the lull. On 1 September A/2/13, from 23nd Artillery Group, assigned the mission of General Support Re-enforcing the 25th Inf Dib Arty, returned to its parent battalion at Phu Loi (XT8415) and was replaced at Cu Chi by its sister battery------------------C/2/13 at Tat Ninh exchanged positions with B/7/11 at FSB Buell III (XT2153). The tempo of ground action increased on 3 September, and the artillery was again on the move to maintain its support of the infantry: C Battery 2/77 Arty returned to Cu Chi and Div Arty control from operational control of the Capital Military Assistance Commandant FSB Danford (XS7799). Other Div. arty elements fanned out from Cu Chi to the northwest (A/3/13 plus one section of D/3/13 to FSB Patton) and to the north (A/1/8 to FSB Rogers, XT6827). A 101st Airborne Battery, B/2/319, moved from Patton to FSB Shafter (XT6525) to add its support to that of A/1/8 for infantry operating in that vicinity. The next day, 4 September, artillery movement continued as D/3/13 displaced from Cu Chi to FSB Lincoln II (XT3825) and A/1/8 made a short relocation from FSB Rogers to FSB Darby (XT6432). C/2/77 and a fire direction center from 1/8 moved from Cu Chi to FSB Hodges (XT6232) to support the 1/27 Infantry.

(13) After three days of relatively light contact, enemy activity began to increase. Once again the threat was in the Tay Ninh - Dau Tieng area, and on 11 September C/2/77 conducted an airmobile move from FSB Hodges (XT6232) to Tay Ninh. The fire direction element from 1/8 Arty located with C/2/77 returned to Cu Chi. The enemy's activity reached a climax at 0200 hours on 13 September when he launched a massive attack against FSB Buell III (XT2153). This well dug-in position, manned by C/2/13 Arty and 3/22 Infantry, received 1000 mortar and rocket propelled grenade rounds, and a heavy ground attack. The attackers left behind 76 dead, but wounded only 17 US defenders. On the 14th B/3/13 Arty displaced to Cu Chi after almost nine months at FSB Harrison (XT7304). The same day, B/2/319 Arty displaced from FSB Shafter (XT6525) to FSB Pope (XT5430). On 16 September 23nd Arty Group replaced C/2/13 at Buell III with B/2/13. C/2/13 went to Cu Chi and on the 18th was exchanged fro A/2/13 from Phu Loi. On 16 and 17 September, the enemy lost 104 KIA in ground assaults on B/2/319 at FSB Pope. On 17 September D/3/13 at FSB Lincoln II (XT3825 and B/3/13 at Cu Chi both were displaced to FSB Hampton (XT4123)II (XT3825) and B/3/13 at Cu Chi both were displaced to FSB Hampton (XT4123) to weight the action against enemy elements engaged in the Trung Lap area.

On this same date, Colonel Gordon Summer Jr, CO, 25th Inf Div Arty, was reassigned as Chief of Staff,25th Inf Div. He was succeeded in command of the 25th Inf Div Arty by Colonel Lucius G. Hill. On 19 September a/1/8, which had been at FSB Sage (XT 5734) since the 15th, relieved B/1/8 at FSB Crockett II (XT7416). Bravo Battery returned to Cu Chi. Alpha Battery remained at Crockett II through the end of the quarter. On the 20th B/2/319 Arty displaced from FSB Pope to FSB Patton II (XT5819).

(14) During the last ten days of September, 25th Division elements had only minor contact with the enemy. The most significant artillery development was the return of 2/77 Arty to Division Artillery control after eleven weeks under Capital Military Assistance. Command (CMAC) control in the vicinity of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The 2/319 Arty (Abn) and its supported unit, 3rd BDE/101st bn Div, returned to their parent organization's control at Phuoc Vinh on 25 September. Also, during this period, a number of short duration artillery moves were made in the vicinity of the MSR between Tay Ninh and FSB St Barbara (XT2768) to support the 1st Brigade in opening the MSR and securing the St. Barbara FSB, which had been the target of frequent attacks by fire. One of these moves brought B/1/27 from FSB Stuart III (XT4919) to FSB Bragg II (XT3958) on 25 September. On 30 September C/2/77 moved from Tay Ninh to FSB McNair (XT4256) to provide direct support for the 2/22 Inf (Mech), as the 3rd Brigade began operations in that area. The lull in enemy action begun on 20 September continued until 3 October when sporadic contacts began to occur.

(15) Early in the morning hours of 3 October, MSB Keene III was attacked with mortars and RPG's. US casualties were minor, while 15 enemy soldiers were killed by counter-mortar fire. The attack was repeated the following morning and evening with no significant casualties. On 3 October, B/1/27 ended a week long stay at Bragg II (XT3958) and moved to Rawlins III (XT2948). The next day A/2/77 at Tay Ninh and A/7/11 at Dau Tieng base camps exchanged positions in order to rejoin their parent units. Further redistribution of artillery assets took place on 6 October as B and D/3/13 departed FSB Hampton (XT4123): Bravo Battery moving to FSB Wood (AT4434), and Delt. Battery returning to Cu Chi. The redeployment of artillery to the “normal” pattern of direct support, i.e. 7/11 Arty DS to 1st Brigade at Tay Ninh, and 2/77 Arty US to 3rd Brigade at Dau Tieng was completed on 7 October when A/7/11 moved from Tay Ninh to replace B/2/13 at FSB Buell III (XT2-5-) and B/2/77 moved into FSB McNair (XT4526) from Cu Chi. Enroute to Tay Ninh B/2/13 went to FSB Hull (XT2638), and enroute to McNair B/2/77 went to FS Austin (XT3731) to support 3/22 Infantry operations in the vicinity of XT2930, during which a nine-ton rice cache was located. The following day B/2/13 returned to Cu Chi from Tay Ninh, and its sister battery, Alpha, moved by helicopter from Cu Chi to FSB Ware (XT5926) in support of 2nd Brigade operations. A significant contact developed on 10 October when the 1/12 Inf received sniper fire in grid XT5322. During the day, 3,107 rounds of artillery were fired into the target areas despite frequent and prolonged check-fires for gun-ships and air-strikes. During the night, 3000 more rounds were fired. When maneuver elements swept the area on 11 October, 26 enemy bodies were located; 13 of these were officially credited to artillery.

Meanwhile, on 10 October, Division Artillery received from 23rd Arty Group an additional General Support Reinforcing medium battery. C/1/27 which moved into Cu Chi. On 11 October, D/3/13 (8” Howitzer) moved from Cu Chi to FSB Stuart III (XT4919) which it continued to occupy at the close of the quarter. The following night B/1/27 Arty at FSB Rawlins III reacted to intelligence indicating an attack on Tay Ninh base camp by making a night march into the camp to provide additional fire power. On the 13th C/1/27 moved from Cu Chi to replace its sister battery at Rawlins III where it remained as the quarter ended.

(16) On 14 October C/2/77 was displaced from FSB NcNair (XT4526) to Tay Ninh West (base camp), where it was attached to the 7/11 to support 1st Brigade operations. Second Brigade operations were supported by A/2/13 which moved from FSB Ware (XT5926) to Cu Chi on 15 October, and then to FSB Jackson III (XT4316) on the following day. Also on 16 October, B/7/11 moved from Tay Ninh to FSB Hines (XT0151) where it remained until 21 October when it returned to base camp. Deep mud at FSB Jackson III caused by recent heavy rains prevented A/2/13 from returning to Cu Chi on 22 October as planned. The battery was bogged down until the following day when a CH 54 (Flying Crane) helicopter lifted five trucks out of the mud. The battery closed into Cu Chi late on the afternoon of 23 October. The same day C/7/11, which had gone to FSB St. Barbara (XT2768) on the 17th, returned to its parent battalion at Dau Tieng. The following day C/2/77 moved to FSB Mahone (XT5337) to support the 1/27 Infantry, as the Wolfhounds and other 3rd Brigade elements spent the last week of October rooting out enemy troops and Viet Cong Infrastructure personnel in the Than An area (XT5338).

(17) The 23rd Arty Group's 2/13 Arty Battalion again rotated two of its light batteries on 26 October. A/2/13 went to Phu Loi from Cu Chi and was replaced by C/2/13 which road-marched to Tay Ninh. Also on the 26th, C/7/11 moved from Rawlins III to FSB Bragg II (XT3958) from which it supported 1st Brigade operations through the end of the month. An outstanding example of the close fire support given to the smallest infantry element occurred on the night of 25-26 October. Two ambush patrols from the 2/27 Infantry became engaged with enemy forces in the vicinity of XT7615. 1/8 Arty fired in support and the infantry battalion commander credited the artillery support with saving these patrols from being overrun. As First Brigade operations pushed into the southern edge of War Zone C on 27 October, B/7/11 moved to FSB Grant II (XT3862) from Tay Ninh and remained there as the month ended.

(1) The S-1 maintained coordination of the personnel needs of Div. Arty with G-1 throughout the quarter. The one major personnel problem was a shortage of artillery captains. This shortage has been pointed out to G-1 and is being attacked appropriately. Div Arty units lost 11 men killed in action, and had 166 men wounded in action during the past quarter. Artillerymen received 188 Valor Awards, 361 Service Awards, 130 Purple Hearts and 75 Air Medals during August, September and October.

(2) During the past quarter, Div Arty S-4 operations consisted of coordinating re-supply activities in support of the firing units. The magnitude of the task reached a peak 7-8 September when elements of the 3rd Brigade 101st Airborne Division had heavy contact in the vicinity of XT5728. Div Arty fired 8400 rounds to support them during this one 24 hour period. All available means of transportation were used for the re-supply, including 26 Combat essential sorties of CH 47. Ammunition was re-supplied throughout the night and re-stocking was completed by 1800 the following day. The lack of sufficient vehicles and personnel in the combined headquarters and service battery organic to Division Artillery battalions made the re-supply task especially difficult. A separate service battery such as that organic to the non-divisional artillery battalion would provide the necessary vehicles and personnel. (Reference Operations Report Lessons Learned dated 18 May 1968, item 2.f.(1) Service Battery Requirement, page 10 and ORLL dated 15 Aug 68, item 2.e.(1) Class V Transportation, page 7.)

d. The Civil Affairs program realized some success during the quarter. There was increased popular cooperation with Government of Vietnam (GVN) agencies, and more voluntary intelligence reports were made to GVN, US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). School buildings in Trang Bang were repaired by the self-help efforts of the local population using materials provided by the Div Arty Civil Affairs section. A badly needed latrine facility was completed at the Loc Du Primary School (XT4920). The school has several hundred students and this sanitation facility will help improve the hygiene of the students. In Trang Bang proper, a much needed bunker for the maternity dispensary was completed. Psychological operations included distribution of leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts of tape recordings on the subjects: weapons rewards, safe conduct, diary of a Hoi Chan, and reporting of information on mines.

(b) Evaluation: For an infantry or mechanized unit in contact, artillery is the most responsive means of fire support. There is a tendency on the part of ground commanders, however, to call in tactical air strikes or gun-ships prior to firing artillery. This sequence denies the ground commander his immediate fire support. The proper procedure is to bring to bear the most responsive means first, and then to augment it with other available fire support. At no time should one means be allowed to eclipse another. All artillery officers, from the Assistant Fire Support Coordinator in the Division Fire Support Element to the Forward observer with the infantry company, have been trained to coordinate the various forms of fire support. Coordination in the target area can be effected if the ground commander properly uses his fire support coordinator.

(b) Evaluation: A previously little used 105mm howitzer technique of firing a short-time-fused projectile at a low quadrant with charge one has proved very effective. Data is computed from the TFT for a 5-20 meter height of burst at ranges of 200 - 1000 meters from the weapon. This technique was pioneered for the 25th Div Arty by the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery while commanded by LTC Robert A. Dean (in the battle of FSB Burt, vic XT4980, on 1-2 January 1968). The theory and practice of the technique were further developed between January and May. On 12 May it was again successfully employed at the battle of FSB Pike VI (vic XS7395). Since then, this method has been used extensively with great success indicated by secondary explosions and high enemy body counts after all subsequent ground attacks on fire support bases. The technique is known locally as “Killer Junior”, a name derived from the radio call sign, “Killer” (by which 1/8 Arty was formerly known). Killer Junior provides effective interdiction while the enemy is attempting to mass for an attack, and during the attack will annihilate his assault formations.

(b) Evaluation: The air-mobility used in Vietnam frequently requires aircraft to operate in close proximity to artillery trajectories. Air Observers are frequently required to adjust fires from more than one direction and under conditions that make gun-target line identification very difficult. A means of making the gun-target line visible would increase aircraft safety. Increase the accuracy and safety of close artillery support to the infantry, and reduce the traffic on radio nets.

9. INTELLIGENCE: The area in the vicinity of XT8504 has been the scene of numerous contacts between allied and VC/NVA forces since 1 January 1968. Situated on the west bank of the SAIGON River approximately eight kilometers north of the SAIGON city limits, the location lies within a main avenue of approach for enemy forces into the capitol city area. The heavy woods and thick underbrush in the vicinity of XT8504 offer excellent cover and concealment. Accordingly, the area is used extensively by the enemy as an assembly area for forces moving into the SAIGON area and as a dispersal area for units that had exfiltrated from the capital city to receive reinforcements and resupply. The terrain is generally flat, lightly populated and is dominated by heavy vegetation. The region is compartmented by dikes and east?west canals and streams flowing from the SAIGON River on the east. The lower levels of the region are subject to frequent, shallow flooding from tides on the SAIGON River. A north?south road (route 248) paralleling the river and the river itself however provide good trafficability through the region. The road forms a Y at XT851047 with one branch continuing north?south and the other swinging to the east to cross the river into the village of LAI THIEU.

Agent reports, interrogation of prisoners of war and other intelligence sources exploited prior to 6 June indicated that elements of the 101st NVA regiment were dispersed in this general area. This regiment had been active in the second phase offensive against SAIGON and ostensibly was receiving replacements and resupply as it hid in the heavy vegetation about XT8504. Interrogation of an NVA officer captured in the engagement covered by this report revealed that the U.S. forces had, in fact, moved directly into a battalion base camp of the 101st NVA Regiment.

10. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry had been maneuvering in an area of operations north of SAIGON and west of the SAIGON RIVER since 25 May. The general mission of the battalion was to screen the SAIGON?TAN SON NHUT complex on the north blocking enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the area and interdicting enemy units attempting to exfiltrate from the city. The battalion was executing this mission with daylight helicopter borne assaults and reconnaissance?in?force patrolling combined with extensive night ambushing along likely avenues of approach. Between 25 May and 6 June the battalion had engaged the enemy in several significant contacts in its assigned area of operations. Intelligence reports and previous contacts, however, clearly indicated that enemy units continued to be dispersed in the heavy woods and hedgerows in the vicinity of XT8504.

12. CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND EXECUTION: On the night of 5 June 1968, A Company occupied a night position at XT782058 and B Company was located at XT805050. The plan for the combined operation to sweep the area in the vicinity of XT8504 specified that A Company would be picked up at its night position bv helicopters of the 116th Assault Helicopter Company and moved to XT851047. Upon landing, A Company would deploy on line for approximately 500 meters along route 248 to establish a fixed blocking position. The helicopters would then pick up B Company at its night position and move the unit to a landing zone approximately 1500 meters to the west of the A Company block. After landing, B Company would attack to the east moving on line until it linked up with the A Company blocking position. The plan also provided that the area to be swept would he "preped" by artillery fire throughout the night and early morning of 5?6 June. (1LT STERRETT, 2LT THOMAS, 2LT WALKER and 2LT WILSON)

A Company was picked up at its night location and air lifted to XT851047 according to plan. At approximately 0900 the helicopter formation descended into the landing zone which was the north?south road. As the helicopters touched down, the formation came under heavy automatic weapons fire from the wooded area to the west and south of the landing zone. In departing the aircraft several A Company personnel became casualties. These personnel were immediately placed back on the helicopters for evacuation. As the aircraft lifted off under fire two collided and were forced back into the landing zone. After a few moments both helicopters were able to lift out of the landing zone under their own power. Many of the assault helicopters remained over the landing zone for approximately 30 minutes supporting the troops on the ground with automatic weapons fire. (2LT THOMAS, SGT ALLWIN, SGT GENTRY, SGT MILLER and SGT MAZUR)

When the enemy fire subsided at approximately 0930, the company commander, CPT ELCIE ADAMS, O******, moved his unit into a defensive perimater [sic] around a building located east of the road approximately 150 meters south of the Y in the highway. This action was coordinated with the battalion commander, LTC RICHARD R. SIMPSON, O*****, who was now orbiting the area in a command and control helicopter. When his A Company landed in a "hot LZ", LTC SIMPSON elected to change the concept of his operation in the area. (2LT THOMAS)

As the 2nd Platoon maneuvered to the southwest of the Company defensive position, it came under intense fire from concealed bunkers adjacent to an east?west canal and approximately 150 meters west of the road. The platoon leader, 1LT RICHARD J. RUDOLPH, *******, was killed by the initial burst of fire and several of his men fell within a few feet of the bunker position. Attempts by the platoon to recover these personnel was met by heavy enemy fire and resulted in additional casualties. The platoon then withdrew to the Company defensive position leaving many of its casualties in their exposed positions and adjacent to the enemy firing bunkers. (SGT MILLER and SGT MAZUR)

At approximately 1000 hours a medical evacuation helicopter landed on the road near the A Company defensive position. Several wounded personnel had been placed on the aircraft, and it was preparing to lift off when an RPG round struck the helicopter's tail boom. The force of the rocket spun the helicopter around and sheared off the boom. The wounded and crew were immediately removed from the aircraft and moved into the defensive position. The helicopter then burst into flames and exploded. (2LT THOMAS, SGT ALLWIN and SGT GENTRY)

The 1st Platoon which had maneuvered to the east of the defensive position had returned and reported that although it had discovered numerous bunker positions no enemy were to be found between the company and the SAIGON RIVER. CPT ADAMS then ordered the 1st Platoon to move into the area where the 2nd Platoon had come under fire and to recover the casualties that had been left behind. The platoon moved along the canal to where they were able to see the casualties. Each attempt to extract these personnel, however, was met with heavy fire from surrounding bunker positions. Several 1st Platoon personnel were wounded in the effort to reach the 2nd Platoon personnel. The 1st Platoon then withdrew back to the Company defensive position. (SGT ALLWIN and SGT GENTRY)

At approximately 1130 hours B Company arrived at its landing zone at XT853049. The landing was unopposed, and B Company moved west approximately 200 meters to cross route 248. The Company moved another 300 meters west and came into contact. It then pulled back to the road to allow artillery fires and air strikes to be placed on the enemy. B Company then established positions from which it could deliver fire to its west and south across A Company's front. B Company also established a secure landing zone to its rear and called in medical evacuation helicopters to take out wounded it had received as well as those of A Company who had been moved from the A Company position. The evacuation was accomplished at approximately 1130 hours. (1LT STERRETT, 2LT WALKER and 2LT WILSON)

Throughout the afternoon, extensive supporting fires from artillery, helicopter gun ships and Air Force air strikes were placed into the woods to the west and south of the A and B Company positions. These fires, however, were adjusted so as not to endanger the A Company casualties who were in an exposed position along the canal. Fire adjustment was accomplished by LTC SIMPSON and the and the battalion artillery liaison officer in the command and control helicopter above the battlefield and by the 2nd Brigade Air Force liaison officer flying above the scene. (1LT STERRETT and 2LT THOMAS)

Under cover of darkness, CPT ADAMS attempted to lead a patrol into the location of his 2nd Platoon's contact earlier in the day to extract the casualties remaining in the area. This patrol come [sic] under heavy fire as it neared the location of the casualties. CPT ADAMS and several other members of the patrol were wounded in the effort, and the patrol was forced to withdraw. (2LT THOMAS, SGT MILLER and SGT MAZUR)

Throughout the night and early morning hours, artillery fires continued to be placed into the area occupied by the enemy. At approximately 0100 hours two NVA soldeirs [sic] walked into the three company perimeter moving in from the east. Troops from B Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry tackled and captured one of the pair. The second individual dropped his weapon and ran off into the underbrush to the east. Interrogation of the prisoner revealed that he was an executive officer of a company assigned to the 101st NVA Regiment and that his battalion was bivouaced [sic] throughout the area. (1LT STERRETT, 2LT WALKER and 2LT WILSON)

A Company moved directly south 600 to 700 meters while B Company moved to the west 200 meters and then turned south on A Company's right flank to move for 600 to 700 meters. In its maneuvering; neither company experienced my opposition. Numerous enemy casualties, bunker positions and large amounts of equipment were found abandoned indicating that the enemy had hastely [sic] pulled out of the area under the cover of darkness. A Company was able to recover its casualties of the day before without difficulty. The remainder of the day was occupied policing the battlefield, collecting captured enemy gear and blowing up the many bunker positions. (1LT STERRETT, 2LT THOMAS, 2LT WALKER and 2LT WILSON)

We can determine from the context that these were group interviews and SGT Smith assembled his interviewees into two groups. This fact, however, should have been announced on the tape, as well as the names of everyone who was present, not just the names of the interviewees. A more appropriate first question would have required the interviewee to give his full name [with phonetic spelling] and rank, serial number, position [in this case forward observer], and unit. This is important because the interviewer could make a mistake while identifying his interviewees and the soldier may not corrected the error. A series of easy, straight-forward questions at the start of an interview will also help to calm the interviewee and give him confidence.

3. LT THOMAS: On 6 June approximately 0900 hours in the morning, Manchu Alpha [Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry] was PZed [PZ refers to Pick?up Zone. The expression "PZed" is used to indicated the removal of troops from their PZ.] from a base camp location into Go Vap Province [actually Go Vap District of Gia Dinh Province]. They were to set up a blocking force approximately 500 meters long on a north and south azimuth. When we LZed [a common Vietnam usage to indicate an airmobile insertion into an "LZ" or Landing Zone; in this case on helicopters of the 116th Aviation Company] into our position, we found out it was hot, and took two WIAs [Wounded In Action]. We also had two [UH?1D "Huey"] choppers shot down in the area. We set up a small perimeter within ourselves, and received fire from at least three different sides. We moved approximately 100 meters south and set up a new position, and from here Captain [Elcie] Adams, the CO [Commanding Officer] of Manchu Alpha, sent out a cloverleaf [a patrol formation shaped like a clover and used to locate and thwart enemy ambushes] to the east and one to the west.

4. The cloverleaf to the east went out and found negative findings of Victor Charlies [Viet Cong, although the term often was loosely applied as well to North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars]; however, they found a lot of bunkers and evidence there had been a large force in the area. The cloverleaf that moved out to the west moved approximately 150 meters along the area of a canal and ran into heavy automatic weapons fire and possible grenades. Near the cloverleaf the 2d Platoon received several casualties, and had to return, leaving some wounded personnel forward. This changed the whole outlook on our operation. Now the primary concern was to move forward and knock out the positions that we received fire from and recover our wounded personnel.

5. From the best of our knowledge, we were receiving fire possibly from three different directions. And also in this area we found large bunkers. One particular bunker was an area in which they were receiving fire. Captain Adams later sent the 1st Platoon up to recover personnel from the 2d Platoon who had been wounded. And before getting completely to wounded to personnel of the 2d Platoon, the 1st Platoon received several casualties. Later on it was just a match of tactics as far as moving into the area and throwing grenades and using smoke, CS [a disabling agent stronger than CN "tear gas"] gas which was dropped from choppers, several air strikes in close support, with gunships and artillery. We moved several air strikes into the area before returning. A lot of the area was covered on the south and west with artillery. Gunships supported us close on the east when we did move into the area. We found that the CS that we dropped was not too effective in some areas, and later on we found out that most of the Victor Charlies were well equipped with a mask which protected them quite well against any CS gas.

6. After recovering the personnel from the 1st Platoon and the WIAs received an initial contact that we had at our secured area, we called in for a dust?off [helicopter medical evacuation accomplished by either an aerial ambulance or any available utility helicopter]. A dust?off came in and while I was on the ground; we had all wounded personnel aboard and an RPG [rocket propelled grenade] struck the left rear side of the dust?off knocking the tail and rotor off and completely destroying the ship. Then we had a problem with moving out of the area. The dust?off ship, before it exploded-and we also had three additional personnel from Dust?Off 151 [the radio call sign of the specific shot?down helicopter, probably from the 159th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance)] crew in our area. We sent most of our wounded personnel forward north.

7. By this time Manchu Bravo [Company B, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry] had airlifted in to our east and maneuvered around to our north and set up a perimeter. And this is where we moved our wounded personnel up. We made a link between Manchu Bravo and Manchu Alpha, and sent wounded personnel to the Manchu Bravo area where they had a secured LZ to move in and bring a dust?off ship in.

8. At different times throughout the afternoon, we received some RPG fire from approximately 200 meters south of our location and also some sporadic rounds from an AK?47 [Soviet Kalashnikov 7.62?millimeter assault rifle; it could be identified easily in the field because of its distinctive sound] off to the west of our position. At times the AK?47 was firing at our light fire team [consisting of one OH?6 Cayuse light observation helicopter (LOH) and one helicopter gunship] which was above us at all times. By this time it was quite late in the afternoon, and we had several unsuccessful attempts at moving forward along the canal to recover the wounded personnel from our initial contact. We would move up a canal in such a manner so we could get down in it and not receive any sniper fire. However, as soon as we would get near a wounded personnel, we would receive fire from at least two different positions.

9. About 9:30 or 10 o'clock at night, Captain Adams finally recovered one person from an initial contact that morning-it was a KIA [Killed In Action]-and in doing this he received several injuries both to the legs and to one hand.2 We moved him back and moved him into the dust?off area of Manchu Bravo, and closed the perimeter in from Manchu Bravo, which was to the north of us, and Mustang Alpha [Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry] which was to the northeast of us. And Manchu Alpha closed in and completed a perimeter between Manchu Bravo and Mustang Alpha. Here we waited until the next day and moved into a sweep. From this position Manchu Alpha went directly south for about 600 to 700 meters. Manchu Bravo went west 200 to 300 meters and then south. We found a lot of Victor Charlie equipment, quite a bit of government?issue equipment that had not only been lost during the previous day but the VC had picked up in prior engagements with the U.S. troops. We found several Mike 16 [U.S. 5.56?millimeter M?16] rifles, several CBR [Chemical Biological?Radiological or "gas"] masks and some other equipment.

2. This passage reveals why SGT Smith began the interview with the forward observer rather than the company commander. It is quite probable that Captain Adams was sent to the 12th Evacuation Hospital, which was located at the 25th Infantry Division's base camp at Cu Chi. The 18th MHD was also located at Cu Chi and because of the critical position that he occupied an effort could have been made to conduct a follow up interview with Adams.

10. As Alpha Company moved south into the area they had made contact the previous day, we set up and maneuvered into an area to recover the rest of our personnel and equipment from our initial contact. We destroyed one bunker with a LAW [M?72 Light Antitank Weapon] and moved in and found that in this bunker was a Victor Charlie that we received most of our fire from the previous day. We knocked him out and found negative contact other than that, and moved in and picked up our equipment and personnel. From there we moved farther south and found several large bunkers and what looked like a base camp, or at least a company?sized unit. We checked most of the area out to the south and on both flanks. The demo[lition] personnel that were attached we had blow the bunkers. And the equipment which was found was sent back up through channels. Later on that afternoon we were LZed out of there into a base camp.

14. LT THOMAS: Okay, the mission of Manchu Alpha that day was to set up a blocking force from our LZ approximately 300 meters south and 200 meters north. This blocking force was to be moved in early that morning and established while Manchu Bravo was going to move in to our west and south and move on a sweep towards us to move any suspected Victor Charlies towards us, and we could clear the area by this.

17. LT THOMAS: No, we didn't. As soon as we moved into this area, we received enemy fire. Mostly from the west side of our LZ we received some AK?47 fire. After we got set up into the area and knew the LZ was hot, we received one hand grenade and some AK?47 rounds from our east and also seen a few personnel moving in this area. And as the day went through, we also received some RPG fire from our south. Later on the next day when we checked it out, we found some equipment and heavy bunkers that looked [like] a launch site for their RPGs.

3. These are important questions to ask during any after-action interview. Perhaps SGT Smith should have rephrased his questions concerning a normal load, because this type of question frequently leads to a yes or no response. Ask the men what they were carrying and have them explain what is part of a normal load or basic load. Loads varied from unit to unit and these terms will eventually lose their significance to future researchers. Notice that after LT Thomas responds we still do not have a complete picture of what the men were carrying.

19. LT THOMAS: Our basic load for ammunition and weapons was pretty much standard other than, because of our mission being a blocking force, we carried more ammunition for the M?60 machine gun, more Claymores [command?detonated antipersonnel mines], quite a few more grenades per man and some more smoke [grenades]. We also took some equipment in which to dig in after we moved into our blocking force. We were going to dig foxholes and set up a blocking force and get down so we would not receive any friendly fire if Manchu Bravo happened to make contact during their sweep towards us.

21. LT THOMAS: No. We didn't have any real big problem with our communications. Most of our platoon and company communications was by voice command. We were in such a small perimeter that the platoons were the size that they were easily controlled by the platoon leader or platoon sergeant just by verbal command. And also when they moved forward at any one time, the group was small and there was no problem here with just verbal communications. Communications between us and the Manchu element was real fine at all times. We had no difficulty here, nor did we have any difficulty with indirect support, either artillery or gunships or air strikes or anything. We had good communication with these at all times and we had no problem.

24. LT THOMAS: No. We had no weapon losses or equipment losses to the enemy. However, when we moved into the area, we found that Charlie was using some M?16 rifles and some gas masks that were government issue that he [had] picked up some time prior and was using them against us. When we moved through the area we found some AK?47s, an AK?50 [?] and some other equipment.

26. LT THOMAS: Actually I can't say as anything was unorthodox. Really Charlie never sets a pattern or standard he constantly follows. One of the biggest problems that we ran into here ? and it is often ran into by all units ?? is the problem when you get wounded personnel in front of you, it's the problem of recovering them and moving them back to a secured area. And here Charlie will usually wait on the patrol that is moving in the area to check it out. He will wait for these personnel to move within a matter of just a few feet before he opens fire. And this makes is very difficult after someone is hit three or four feet from a bunker to move up and retrieve these personnel.

29. LT THOMAS: No. I can't say as I had any difficulties considering everything. We couldn't see where the rounds were hitting because the vegetation was so high. And not only that, but the artillery moving in to where we could use it to retrieve our wounded personnel, we moved it in too close. And this was one big problem. We couldn't use our indirect fire support to knock out the area in which we had wounded people because it was just too close to friendly troops. Also, we received a lot of support from a[n artillery] liaison officer which was in the air with Manchu 6 [Commander, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry] that directed a lot of artillery and gunship support to our south and to the west at a greater distance to keep Charlie from either moving in the area or moving out and giving us a lot of flank protection, a little more distance.

32. SGT ALLWIN: As we moved into the area, we started receiving sniper fire and heavy small arms fire approximately 20 feet above the ground, and as our choppers landed, the pilots and the people got excited and, uh ... 4 The pilots tried to get out of the area as fast as possible. Two choppers collided and so we had two of them down on the ground. We got off, set up a perimeter around a hootch [hut or small building] and to secure an area for the downed helicopters (inaudible).5 (Inaudible) fire from at least two positions that we know of, and there could have been more. As we heard the small arms fire, we immediately lost contact-correction-radio contact with 26 as his RTO [radio?telephone operator; normally in this context carrying an AN/PRC?25 radio set] was hit.

4. On the actual interview tape, SGT Allwin is obviously very nervous and taking a break to compose himself. Although we don't know the cause of Allwin's concern, he is probably either nervous about the interview or the remembrance of landing under fire upsets him. It is often necessary for an interviewer to comment on the psychological status of his interviewees in the interview report.

35. Captain Adams immediately gave a command for 1st Platoon to move in and try and get 26's wounded personnel out of the area. Lieutenant [?] Woods, 1st Platoon Leader, immediately got my squad and we moved approximately 100 meters down the road where gunships brought in smoke as we crossed the road. We got to the other side and immediately started receiving small arms fire. There we met part of the 26 element. They had two wounded people back approximately 20 meters. And here we helped move those two wounded people to a dust off.

37. We tried going into the area where the 26's wounded personnel were located approximately three more times and from three various directions, and each time we were met with heavy small arms fire and could not recover these personnel. Later on that night, Captain Adams with two other personnel went into the area and retrieved one KIA, taking heavy wounds himself, and we had to pull him back. And they were also dusted off that night in Bravo Company's area. We then moved back and linked up with Bravo Company and Mustang Alpha in a perimeter which we [stayed] set up in all night.

38. The next morning we moved back in and Lieutenant Robinson moved up on the bunker and fired LAWs into it. I believe there was three LAWs fired on the bunker. We received no fire during the morning's activities. We then moved up on the bunker, got our personnel out; there were two KIAs in. We dusted them off and swept through the rest of the area finding various VC equipment including some M?16 rifles which they were using against us. They must have received these during prior action. We finished our sweep, moved back to our LZ which turned into our PZ and were picked up and eagle flighted [a Vietnam usage that indicates that the troops were moved by a group of helicopters] back to our base camp.

6. On the tape recording, the listener hears Sergeant Gentry say that the troops were moving "to the east, the west" with a pause between the two phrases. This could be interpreted as a correction made in mid?sentence or that men were actually moving in both directions at the same time. A common maneuver for American troops was called the cloverleaf (referred to by LT Thomas in his comments [P 3?4]) which involved sending men out in two opposite directions and having them to begin a circle and meet each other at a position in advance of their starting position. We can, therefore, insert our editorial notes with some certainty, but interviewers need to be aware of these potential problems and ask for clarification.

43. After this my squad was called on to move in. I only had four men left and I got them all together, and we moved over there with the platoon leader. And we got one body out and started receiving more fire, and we had to pull back with some more wounded people. Finally, after we got back, we all got together later on that night. The CO-Captain Adams-he went in and he got another man out, but was wounded pretty bad hisself. And we had to pull him back out, and we had to pull back to Bravo Company's secured area for a dust?off for him. And we pulled all the KIAs back there to get them out.

44. Later on next morning we went back in, got the rest of our KIAs, receiving a few rounds. And we finally got the rest of the men out by knocking a bunker out then with three M?72 LAWs. And we pulled them all back out, got them all dusted off, and conducted a sweep through the area in the morning, and with no contact. And we blowed [demolished using explosives] the bunkers we found and reconned by fire [i.e., conducted a reconnaissance by firing weapons into a suspicious area in an attempt to draw return fire] before we'd go through. And later on that afternoon, we PZed from our original LZ back to base camp.

51. SGT MILLER: Well, coming into the LZ we received a lot of fire and the ships were coming down so fast that people were getting out before they hit the ground. And the only way we figured we could get out was to go out the other side of the door. And so, consequently, we ended up on the wrong side of the road and the gunships might have mistaken us for VC landing there. And immediately, about one minute later, we crossed back to our own side.

52. After crossing back to the other side, we organized, waited around, and we had our artillery and air strikes come in and support. After the air strikes and everything was finished, we got up on line and moved into the woods where the Victor Charlies were. And my unit and myself had got about 50 to 75 meters into the wood line when I spotted one Victor Charlie in a bunker and immediately opened up on him with automatic fire killing the gook inside. Right after this happened, we got back about five feet, threw a few grenades in it to make sure. And after that a man stood up in front of me and shot up the bunker with his [M?60] machine gun and was hit in the leg from an AK?47 round coming from our left flank. Another man and myself immediately threw bandages on him, and we tried to get him out as fast as possible. One man was shot three or four times in the back pulling this man out, and myself and two other men stayed up front giving him cover as they pulled him back.

53. We stayed up in the front for about 15, 20 minutes trying to find out where the fire was coming from but could not see because of the brush. There was a few rounds fired they shot at us. I gathered it was from the trees because we were real low to the ground and there was brush around us-nobody-we could not see anywhere, and the only way I could figure they shot at us after that was from the trees from someplace else. After this happened, we jumped in a small canal big enough for about one man at a time, and we left what we couldn't carry out there, and got ourselves out and pulled back to where the Captain was and the woun