After Action Report 58

2. Enclosed please find an information copy of an After Action Report involving an action of C Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech.) on 21 August 1968. The original copy of this report with interview taps, battlefield sketches and photographs was forwarded to OCMH this date.

7. TASK ORGANIZATION: The US force involved in the contact covered in this report consisted of C Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mechanized) with its First, Second, Third and Fourth Platoons, the Scout Platoon, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mechanized); the Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP) of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; and a 40mm SP (Duster) gun section of B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 5th Artillery.

8. SUPPORTING FORCES: Supporting artillery for the contact were provided by 105mm Howitzers of the 7th Battalion 11th Artillery and 155mm Howitzer of the 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery and the 1st Battalion 27th Artillery. These guns fired from Fire Support Base Rawlings (XT2948) and the DAU TIENG Base Camp (XT4947).

9. INTELLIGENCE: Concluding a battlefield lull within the 25th Infantry Division tactical area of interest, which commenced in mid June, main force NVAVC units had launched major attacks into the areas surrounding TAY NINH City and DAU TIENG on 17 August. These attacks were conducted by the 5th and 9th VC/NVA Divisions. Towards DAU TIENG, the enemy concentrated his forces in the BEN CUI Rubber Plantation where the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mechanized) made initial contact on the morning of 18 August. This battle was followed by major contacts on 19 and 20 August. The reasoned objective of the enemy in staging the attacks in the DAU TIENG-TAY NINH areas was to draw Free World Forces away from SAIGON-CHOLON. The BEN CUI Rubber Plantation lies directly west of DAU TIENG. The main supply routs (MSR) between DAU TIENG and TAY NINH runs east and west directly through the plantation. The rubber trees are 25 - 30 feet in height and the underbrush has been cleared in most sections of the plantation. The terrain is generally flat. To the north of the plantation lies WAR ZONE C. The enemy have used the plantation extensively as a major line of communication for the infiltration of men and supplies from WAR ZONE C into the Saigon area to the south.

10. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mechanized) had been operating out of DAU TIENG Base Camp since late July under the operational control of the 1st Brigade. The battalion had concentrated on company size daylight reconnaissance in force and night platoon size ambushes in the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation to the east of DAU TIENG and the BEN CUI Rubber Plantation to the west. It also assisted in the daily opening and clearing of the main supply route between DAU TIENG and TAY NINH. On 18 August the enemy launched heavy attacks in the vicinity of TAY NINH and in the BEN CUI. The battalion had experienced heavy contact with battalion size enemy forces moving through the BEN CUI on 18 and 19 August. The 1st Brigade with headquarters in TAY NINH was responsible for the defense of that city and DAU TIENG, and its units had been in heavy contact on 18, 19 and 20 August along the TAY NINH - DAU TIENG axis.

1. At 210640 August 1968, Company C, 1st En. (Mech), 5th Infantry departed Dau Tieng base camp with the mission of sweeping from Dau Tieng to XT420445, staying approximately 1000 meters to the south of Route 239. The scout platoon with the 3rd brigade equip. and two twin 40mm self propelled weapons attached, departed Dau Tieng at 210640 August 1968 to secure and outpost the MSR from Dau Tieng to XT------. The plan was to move abreast on parallel routes in order to provide additional security for the units.

2. At 0813 hours the Scout Platoon was located at XT463468. Company C had moved to the south and at XT473456, both units reported no enemy contact. Company C was moving with two rifle platoons abreast. The 1st platoon on the right was led by SSG Lang, while the 3rd platoon on the left was led by 1st Lt. Cook. Each platoon personnel carriers followed the dismounted elements of the platoon. The company commander, 1LT. Snodgrass, moved on foot, and alternated his position between the lead platoons. Enclosure 1 shows the detailed formation of the unit.

3. At 0831 hours the scout dog with the point element of the company alerted. The handler stated that he thought that there might be a large number of personnel to the southeast. The battalion S-3 in an OM-23 helicopter made a low VR of the area reported, but could find nothing unusual. It was concluded that the dog had probably alerted to the presence of the civilians in the village at XT464448. The company commander then adjusted 81mm mortar fire into the rubber plantation to ----------- with negative results.

5. At 0913 hours the scout platoon was located at checkpoint 180 and was conducting a search of the village at XT464448. This search netted nothing except for the information that three buildings in the southern edge of the village had been used by the enemy---------------------------------

6. Company C located and destroyed a mine at XT15---------. The company then shifted to the west to move out of the open area into the rubber. The company continued moving south until it made a turn to the west astride the trail leading from XT4704-to XT46044. The company then moved to the west with one lead platoon on each side of the trail. The scout dog with its security element was moving ahead of the platoon security by approximately 30 meters. The weapons platoon and 2nd platoon shifted to the left as shown on Enclosure 2.

7. At 1012 hours, the combat platoon and the-------cluster in the vicinity of the village at XT-460. The Scout Platoon continued searching the village at XT473448. At 1055 hours company C called in a negative situation report and gave XT462440 as the current location of the unit.

8. At 1110 hours, company C reported receiving sniper fire at XT462444 and reported one US KIA and one US WIA. The report stated that the fire was coming from the west and southwest. The unit requested gunship support. At this time the ---int and security elements were approximately 40 meters west of the road which extends south from route 239 to XT463440. At this point, the lead platoons were crossing the road while the personnel carriers were still approximately 30 meters east of the road. The second platoon and the mortar platoon were following the 3rd platoon, south of the east-west trail.

9. As the enemy increased their volume of fire, the lead elements returned fire and remained west of the north-south road for approximately ten minutes. The enemy continued to advance, with elements attempting to move along the south flank of Company C. The enemy advanced from the west on the dismounted elements of company C. Most of the enemy soldiers were wearing green and camouflaged uniforms, and were moving from tree to tree in short rushes, and advancing rapidly toward the north-south road, while some of the enemy were occupying camouflaged positions. The volume of fire initially was low, but soon reached an extremely high rate. During this period, SSG Lang, the 1st platoon leader was killed.

10. The company commander, realizing he could not effectively employ his cal. 50 machineguns over his own troops, withdrew his troops to the line of personnel carriers, now dispersed along the east side of the north side road. Further, since enemy soldiers had been observed while attempting to envelop his right flank, the company commander ordered his reserve, the 2nd platoon to displace to the right rear of his 1st platoon. He then displaced his mortars to the rear to obtain overhead clearance in order that they could be employed. During this period the unit employed all available weapons to include M-72 laws to break up the enemy attack.

11. At 1135 hours the battalion S-3 urgently requested the gun-ships which had been previously requested, but had not arrived. The artillery Sgt. On the ground was attempting to get required clearances to employ artillery. At this time company C marked the unit position with purple smoke, and a few minutes later with yellow smoke. The unit at this time was still defending along the road with the troops deployed with the ----eps personnel carriers. The company continued to fire in this position for approximately 30 minutes.

12. During this 30 minute period, the Scout Platoon deployed along MS239 with the lead element at XT461448. The Scout Platoon leader engaged enemy troops moving to the southeast in the vicinity of XT58446, and took these units under fire with cal.50 machine-guns and lt. arms. Shortly he moved a twin 40mm weapons into a firing position and this weapon fired in excess of 500 rounds. The scout leader was engaged by small arms and RPG fire. At the scout leader observed and reported at least an enemy company moving west out of the village at XT450450.

13. Company C continued to remain in position along the north =-south until approximately 1150 hours, at which time 3 personnel carriers on the left side of the company position were hit by RPG weapons. The weapons were apparently fired from extremely short range. The company commander then decided to withdraw approximately 150 meters and organize another defensive position. The unit withdrew taking with it the wounded personnel and the body of SSG Lang. During this period, 2 more men were killed.

14. Upon order, the 1st and 3rd platoons withdrew. This movement disposed the company with three platoons abreast, since the 2nd platoon held in place. At this time eight personnel carriers were on line, and all 50 cal. Machineguns were operating. In addition, dismounted personnel were firing with their rounds impacting near the 2nd platoon. The artillery forward observer, Lt. Ramsy, was adjusting the artillery which was impacting 200 meters west of the friendly elements. At this time, the rest of the personnel carriers sustained RPG hits. These ----------killed the 4.2 mortar forward observer and one of the company radios.

15. At 1154 hours the forward air controller reported an estimated time arrival of 20 to 25 minutes for the first air-strike, and the 1st brigade announced an ETA of 15 minutes for a light fire team . This light fire team arrived at 1201 hours and was immediately employed along the ---ern flank of the unit.

16. Now commanded by Lt. Cook, Company C reported at 1200 hours that the situation was extremely critical and that he planned to withdraw. All wounded were loaded on personnel carriers and the unit withdrew over the same route taken on the advance. The last element to withdraw was the 2nd platoon. The company moved into and secured a landing zone at XT473455.

17. At 1200 hours the scout platoon was heavily engaged from the south and observed an estimated enemy platoon maneuvering to block route 239 to the north of the scout platoon. At this time the scout platoon was engaged to move east through the village of XT463448 and to link up with company C at the landing zone. This movement resulted in a lost advantage by the enemy, followed by a halt of his advance Following the additional evacuation of casualties, all units were ordered by its commanding officer. 1st brigade to return to Dau Tiang to regroup, repair and to return to the Ben Cui plantation to continue the contact. The scout platoon was subsequently ordered to return to the eastern side of the rubber plantation. At 1600 hours, 12 elements were ordered to

For the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry “Manchus”… This journal was assembled to recount our perilous days in the Republic of South Vietnam during the month of May 1968. Like most of you, my memory of those days has faded. But subconsciously, Vietnam, and having been a Manchu, is very much a part of our history. We are bound by it, so I wanted to share what I had found with my Manchu family of friends.

Not long ago, Al Baker shared the following with the 4/9 Manchus here at our website. What Al shared was for another purpose, but it struck me as being appropriate in remembering those who had fallen in battle and those who returned home safely or wounded-and to recall their feats today and forever more-for they brought honor onto themselves and to their families:

“Whoever does not have the stomach for this fight, let him depart. Give him money to speed his departure, since we wish not to die in that man's company. Whoever lives past today and comes home safely will roust himself every year on this day, show his neighbors his scars, and tell embellished stories of all their great feats of battle. These stories he will teach his son, and from this day to the end of the world, we shall all be remembered. We few, we happy few, we band of brothers. For whoever has shed his blood with me shall be my brother. And those men afraid to go will think themselves lesser men, as they hear of how we fought and died together.”

Note: Prior to Operation Toan Thang, from March 11th to April 8th, the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry “Manchus” were on Operation Wilderness (except for Charlie Company who was on OPCON to the 3rd Brigade in Dau Tieng, on Operation Quyet Thang, from March 31st to April 8th). The Manchus were enjoying a much-needed stand-down, and they were re-equipping for future operations, receiving new recruits, conducting refresher training and pulling one-day missions out of the 1st Brigade's main base camp at Tay Ninh.

Until then the Manchus had been in continuous combat. They had been out in the field, and on the move, since early December 1967-a total of 94 days without a break while on Operation Yellowstone (08-Dec-67 to 24-Feb-68) and Operation Saratoga (25-Feb-68 to 11-Mar-68). The Manchus had incurred heavy losses (approximately 115 soldiers killed and 475 wounded), and the start of Operation Toan Thang marked the beginnings of a new phase of operations.

Alerted in late April by intelligence sources of an impending enemy attack into the Saigon Capital Military Region, the 25th Infantry Division maneuvered the bulk of its combat forces into the southeastern quadrant of its tactical area of operational interest (TAOI) to establish a screen beyond the western environs of the Saigon-Cholon region.

During the first few days of May, the Division executed its mobile defense plan to block the enemy's avenues of approach from the north, northwest, west and southwest, by deploying its combat forces in depth in southern Bing Duong Province, western Gia Dinh Province, eastern Hau Nghia Province and northern Long An Province. Beginning on May 2nd when the enemy units committed themselves to these approaches, the Division moved in force to intercept and destroy the advancing enemy before it could reach its assault positions into the Saigon-Cholon area.

On May 4th and 5th a new wave of attacks, less severe than those of the Tet Offensive, hit 109 cities, towns and bases all across South Vietnam. This was the start of the Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA) “2nd Phase Offensive”-the 1st Phase Offensive being the 1968 Tet Offensive of January 31st to February 18th.

On May 1st, contact with enemy forces was relatively light and scattered throughout the 25th Division's Tact Area of Operational Interest (TAOI). The Division had established a virtual 24-hour a day screen, by mounting intensive daytime battalion- and company-size reconnaissance in force missions, airmobile combat assault operations, and at night dispatching platoon-size and squad-size night ambush patrols-both stationary and roving.

Despite these blanketing maneuvers, only the 3rd Squadron 17th Air Cavalry “The Red Horse” ran up against significant contact with the enemy. Flying armed-aerial reconnaissance east of the Oriental River (between the “00” east-west grid line and the town of Duc Hoa) and flying similar missions in the southern Boi Loi Woods and northeast of Trang Bang (along Route 237), Troops B and C detected and engaged small groups of enemy forces on five separate occasions during the day. The Cavalrymen's armed helicopters put an end to 15 VC and destroyed one sampan.

Troop-B, continuing its aerial reconnaissance of the area it had flown the previous day, caught sight of the enemy moving north of Duc Hoa in the vicinity of XT5310. In the process of engaging the area with machine gun and rocket fire, the Cavalry's gunships drew intense ground fire from enemy gun emplacements. Supporting artillery and jet fighter strikes were placed into the area. Afterwards the air cavalrymen flew back into the area on low-level reconnaissance and counted 25 dead enemy bodies and four destroyed .50 caliber machine guns. Intelligence sources later identified the enemy force as being elements of the 271st VC Regiment.

Meanwhile, Troop-C turned its attention to reconnaissance of the Iron Triangle and the Ho Bo Woods in Bing Duong Province. At 1700 hours, the Troop caught approximately 60 VC positioned in a tree line along a canal. The armed gunships engaged the enemy force with machine gun and rocket fire, and called in artillery and air strikes. A subsequent search of the target area turned up 23 VC killed in action (KIA) and numerous blood trails leading out of the area to the north. The dead were identified as elements of the 101st NVA Regiment.

CU CHI-Two troops of the 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav, flying in support of the 25th Inf. Div, killed a total of forty-eight Viet Cong in two separate engagements late in the afternoon of the same day. The Red Horse troopers, flying armed, aerial reconnaissance southwest of the 25th Div's base camp at Cu Chi, utilized rockets, mini-guns, artillery and tactical air strikes to assault the enemy positions.

“I was flying recon toward a tree line when I saw a .50 caliber barrel poking out of the undergrowth,” Ingraham related. “There was something about that `stick' that didn't look right. When I realized what it was I started looking for, Charlies, but didn't see any at the time,” he added.

“The VC anti-aircraft positions look almost like doughnuts from the air,” Ingraham explained. “Charlie digs a circular trench and mounts a machinegun on a dirt pedestal in the center. That way,” he continued, “Charlie can walk around the trench and fire the machinegun in a 360 degree arc.”

“We dove straight into those guns,” said Mills. “There were fifty caliber slugs snapping by on both sides. I couldn't ziz-zag. We had to go straight in to fire the rockets and just a few feet to either side and the slugs would have cut my ship in half,” he observed. “Those tracers looked as big as footballs as they came up at us.”

After several more gunship passes, Ingraham went down to assess the damage and counted 15 enemy bodies in the tree line and around the destroyed machineguns. The 3.75-inch gunship rockets also destroyed a 1.27mm gun that was disassembled and concealed in the tree line.

A “Hunter-Killer” team supported by a light fire element of C Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav, supported by artillery and tactical aircraft, engaged an enemy force estimated at 60 Viet Cong and killed 23 VC before darkness and bad weather forced the UH-1C gunships to break contact.

On May 3rd, enemy movement within the Division's TAOI became more apparent. At 1000 hours, a large VC force (of approximately 200) was spotted by Troop-B of the 17th Air Cavalry while flying reconnaissance over an area east of the Oriental River. The Troop promptly radioed for additional gunship and artillery support.

The 4th Battalion 23rd Mechanized Infantry “Tomahawks”, which was on a search mission a short distance to the south of the enemy's position, was directed to engage the VC force. By 1040 hours, the battalion had moved into blocking positions along an axis from XT5904 to XT5906, which fixed the enemy's position-trapping them in place. By 1520 hours, the 2nd Battalion 34th Armor “Centurions” and the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry “Manchus” reinforced the 4th of the 23rd Infantry. This combined force was designated TASK FORCE DUNLOP-and was later changed to TASK FORCE DAEMS.

The armored Centurion tank battalion took up blocking positions along an axis in the vicinity of XT5807 and the Manchu infantrymen occupied blocking positions from XT6005 to XT6105 to XT6206. In addition, Troop I of the 3rd Squadron 11th Armored “Blackhorse” Cavalry Regiment, who had earlier been placed under the operational control of the 25th Division, was operating in the vicinity of XT607148 and joined forces with the task force. The enemy was thus surrounded on three sides against a vast 5-mile wide swamp to its rear. The multi-battalion task force had 400 to 500 Viet Cong soldiers pinned down 8 kms southwest of the 25th Division's Cu Chi Base Camp. Fires of four artillery batteries and eight air strikes were placed on the enemy throughout the day. By nightfall, 35 enemy bodies and one prisoner of war were confirmed. Throughout the night a barrage of 5,000 rounds of artillery and four tactical air strikes pounded the illuminated enemy positions, as helicopter gunships patrolled the swamp to prevent the enemy from escaping.

CU CHI-More than 350 enemy soldiers were killed in three days of heavy fighting when elements of four 25th Inf Div battalions and one troop of the 11th Armored Cav Regt supported by helicopter gunships, artillery, and tactical aircraft drove a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) battalion against a swamp.

As the gunships and artillery began devastating the enemy, a multi-battalion task force consisting of elements of the 4th Bn, 9th Inf; 4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf.; 2nd Bn, 34th Armor; 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf.; and 11th Armored Cav Regt moved into a semi-circular blocking position pinning an estimated 500 enemy soldiers against a large open swamp.

Elsewhere in the Division's TAOI: (a) The 2nd Battalion 27th Infantry “Wolfhounds” caught sight of a platoon of Viet Cong in bunkers. At 1045 hours, the target was attacked by gunships and a subsequent assault on the bunkers turned up 6 VC KIA bodies. (b) At 2215 hours, Company F of the 50th Infantry's Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol launched an attack on several sampans at coordinates XT783105. The following morning 6 VC KIA was discovered in the vicinity of the ambush.

Fog rising off the swampy water made visibility very poor. “About 10:30 p.m. we heard a woman's voice chattering from an approaching sampan,” continued Tavares. “When the boat got to the center of our kill zone we opened up with automatic weapons and hand grenades.”

On May 4th, the Task Force continued its mission of vanquishing the enemy force, which it had backed up against the swamp. The ground units slowly tightened its vice on the besieged VC, while artillery, gunship and air strikes pounded the enemy position. By the end of the daylight activities, the task force recovered an additional 26 dead enemy bodies and 3 prisoners of war. Elements of the task force remained in their blocking positions during the night, as supporting fires continued hammering the enemy.

At 1730 hours, as Company A of the 4th Battalion 23rd Mechanized Infantry was sweeping 4 kms northeast of Duc Hoa, it received fire from an unknown number of VC at coordinates XS623987. The Company's armored personnel carriers (APCs) attacked into the enemy's position, killing and recovering 15 dead bodies and securing one POW (prisoner of war). The enemy force was determined to be an element of the 273rd VC Regiment.

Letter dated May 4, 1968, written by PFC David Young (4/9 INF, Alpha Company, 2nd Platoon) to his parents: “…We moved for the sixth time since this operation (Complete Victory) started. I guess it's been extended a month too! Darn! This is the roughest we've had it! Our Bravo and Charlie Company have a regiment of VC surrounded about 2,000 meters [1.24 miles] from this base camp. They are putting in an air strike to my left right now and [our base camp has] been mortared two nights in a row. A few have been killed right here in the base camp. We received about 40 mortars last night and about 50 the night before. It's really exciting around here! Today is my “day off!” The rest of the company is being used as a blocking force against a possible VC attack on the camp….”

As the task force was continuing its mission, other units of the 25th Division encountered light and widely scattered contact with the enemy. Earlier during the day, gunships from Company B “Diamondhead” of the 25th Aviation Battalion-flying area reconnaissance along the Oriental River between Go Dau Hau and Tay Ninh-engaged an unknown size force. This action resulted in 33 VC KIA and 2 VC POW. This enemy force was later identified as a Local Force VC Company from Tay Ninh Province.

At 1222 hours, TASK FORCE DUNLOP was re-designated TASK FORCE DAEMS and continued its operations in the vicinity of XT5905 to XT5906. COL Leonard R. Daems, Jr., commanding officer of the 25th Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade, now headed-up the newly named task force. As the Task Force's ground units swept into the enemy positions, they found 40 dead enemy bodies, most of who had been killed by artillery and air strikes. Large numbers of abandoned individual and crew served weapons, along with ammunition, supplies and food, were discovered. Contact with the enemy was kept alive by continually using supporting helicopter and artillery fire, and tactical air strikes, in heavy volume.

At 1245 hours, Company C of the 2nd Battalion 22nd Mechanized Infantry “The Regulars” engaged a platoon of VC while sweeping the road along Route 1 approximately 3 kms southeast of Cu Chi Base Camp. The contact lasted until 1800 hours, at which time the Company with the aid of gunships killed 22 VC of the 7th VC Local Force Battalion.

Elsewhere that afternoon while searching an area 3 kms southwest of Phu Cong, Company B of the 2nd Battalion 27th Infantry discovered a large ammunition cache, in addition to finding a large number of RPG (rocket propelled grenade) rounds and hand grenades, seventy-two 122mm rocket launchers and 21,500 rounds of small arms ammunition.

On May 6th, the Task Force completed its operations in the general vicinity of XT6005, XT6006, XT6105 and XT5907. The total enemy body count, in four days of engagement, was 213 dead. From five prisoners taken in battle it was learned that a battalion of the 271st VC Regiment was intercepted and blocked by Task Force Daems, and that the survivors were fleeing north through the swamp.

Letter dated May 6, 1968, written by PFC Richard “Craig” Stevens (4/9 INF, Charlie Company, 2nd Platoon, 2nd Squad): “…I've been here in Nam for 8 whole days now! A long ways from 365 isn't it? I don't mind it too bad. I was at Cam Rahn Bay for 5 days because I missed my flight out of there. When I finally left there, the plane stopped in Saigon and spent the night there. The next day I came to Cu Chi, main base camp for the 25th [Infantry Division], where I am now. Tomorrow I'll draw a new M16, canteen, helmet, etc., and start a 5-day training course. When that is over with, I have to report to the 4th BN of the 9th brigade [4/9 INF Regiment]. Their main base camp is about 60 miles north of Cu Chi. It is called Tay Ninh. The company I'm going to was completely wiped out during the TET offensive [Craig is referring to the March 2, 1968 ambush of Charlie Company at the Hoc Mon bridges, a short distance south of Cu Chi].

Cu Chi is a pretty hot spot right now. They [VC] throw rockets and mortars in frequently. They haven't killed anyone yet. There has been injuries however. There has supposedly been a dead body count of VC and NVA in the amount of 400 since yesterday. I saw some jets really laying the air strikes into them about an hour ago. All day and night you can hear our artillery and feel them shake the ground. I was sitting with an MP in his jeep talking to him. A copter radioed in and said he was bringing in 3 prisoners, and the MP was to pick them up. About 5 minutes later they called in and said they only had one. When they got in, they said that 2 of the VC kept griping and rattling on. So they just shoved them overboard!…”

As the 4th of the 9th Infantry “Manchus” and the 1st of the 5th Mechanized Infantry “Bobcats” prepared for their mopping up activities, the 4th of the 23rd Infantry “Tomahawks” and the 2nd of the 34th Armor “Centurion” tank battalion was sent south into the vicinity of Bao Trai to reinforce the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) garrison of that town. In the early morning hours, a three-battalion sized enemy force was attacking the garrison and the town. At 0730 hours, the Tomahawks closed in on an enemy unit. Supported by gunship and artillery fires, the battalion cut-down and accounted for 44 VC KIA and captured one prisoner in an all day running battle to the west of Bao Trai.

The advancing unit had moved only 20 meters into the wood line before the enemy opened up with a heavy volume of automatic weapons and RPG fire. The .50 caliber machine guns barking and elements dispersing on line between the armored personnel carriers, the determined Tomahawks overran the poorly dug in enemy.

At 1435 hours, Troop-B of the 3rd Squadron 17th Air Cavalry-while following up on the Tomahawk's earlier contact-spotted 50 VC soldiers moving west away from the area of contact. The Cavalry's “Red Horse” gunships intercepted the fleeing soldiers and cut-down an additional 15 VC, trampling them with mini-gun and rocket fire.

Elsewhere in the 25th Division's TAOI, two of its combat battalions made contact. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 22nd Infantry “The Regulars” claimed 30 VC KIA in two separate battles: (1) near Cu Chi and (2), the other, one-kilometer north of Route 1 midway between Cu Chi and Trang Bang.

On a reconnaissance flight near the village of Bao Tre, COL Daems and crewmembers of his command ship spotted the enemy force. The door gunners of the “Little Bear” chopper of Co A, 25th Aviation Bn, opened fire on the enemy, as the pilot, WO Clay Maxwell of Midland, Mich. and aircraft commander WO Alan E. Gould of Stroudsburg, Pa., maneuvered the ship into position.

The VC answered with volleys of small arms fire and RPG rockets, while racing toward jungle cover nearby. Numerous tracers whizzed by the command chopper. While the enemy force fled in the direction of the jungle, COL Daems called in a cut-off force from the 4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf., in an effort to head off the VC.

In the predawn hours, Company A and B of the 1st Battalion 27th Infantry “Wolfhounds” and Troop C of the ¾ Cavalry “Mackenzie Raiders” kicked-off a reconnaissance in force operation approximately 10 kms northwest of Saigon-Cholon. At 1115 hours, the combined US force came up against a large NVA unit-later identified as the 3rd Battalion 88th NVA Regiment. After a heated knock-down-and-drag-out battle, lasting throughout the day and night and into the following day, the US forces (supported by gunship, artillery and air strikes) mauled and reduced the size of the NVA battalion by slaying 199 of their soldiers. Afterwards the survivors, along with their wounded, fled for their lives to the west of their location.

On May 8th, at 0936 hours, Company C of the 1st Battalion 27th Infantry “Wolfhounds” was sweeping the area at coordinates XS743925, when it ran into an unknown size VC force. Engaging the enemy in battle with only organic weapons, the Wolfhounds mauled 32 VC (KIA) and captured two prisoners before contact was lost.

Later in the day, at 1155 hours, the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry's night defensive position (NDP) engaged an unknown size VC force that had moved into its location. In the firefight that took place, another 32 VC were killed and two prisoners of war were captured. The two actions were believed to have involved the same battalion of the 271st VC Regiment-the later fight, taking place as the VC sought to evade the Wolfhounds.

Meanwhile a short distance away, to the northeast of there, the VC battalion was fighting its third battle of the day. Company D of the 2nd Battalion 27th Infantry was engaging a VC company. With the support of gunships, the Wolfhound's again drove off the enemy who left 24 dead and two prisoners behind.

Further to the north, the 2nd of 34th Armor tank battalion was sweeping Route 1, south of Hoc Mon, in an area where it had light contract the previous day. At 1245 hours, the tankers came under enemy gunfire. Returning fire, and supported by gunship, artillery and air strikes, the Armor unit chased the enemy all day and into the night. Contact was lost at 0200 hours on May 9th. Forty-four enemy KIA bodies were recovered and one prisoner was taken.

Throughout the first week of May, many of 25th Division's base camps, artillery fire support bases and battalion night defensive positions had come under light (but harassing) mortar and rocket attacks. In the darkness of the early morning hours of May 9th, this tactic was intensified with two heavy ground assaults.

At 0100 hours, 30 rounds of mixed 122mm and 107mm rockets struck the 25th Division's Headquarters at Cu Chi Base Camp. All the rockets fell into the camp within a span of two minutes, resulting in 7 US soldiers killed and 48 being wounded. Damages to the base camp installations were light.

An hour later, at 0200 hours, Fire Support Base Maury came under heavy mortar and rocket attack, which was followed by a battalion-sized human-wave ground assault. Company A and the Scout Platoon of the 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry were securing the three artillery batteries of the 7th Battalion 11th “Dragons” Artillery and 3rd Battalion 13th “Clan” Artillery. All artillery beehive ammunition was expended in defense of the firebase. Enemy RPG fire destroyed three 105mm and one 155mm howitzer(s), along with two M548 ammunition vehicles. Enemy sappers also breached the perimeter defenses and destroyed two other 155mm howitzers including two 105mm howitzers. Because of the speed and accuracy of the ground assault, less than ten rounds of 155mm ammunition had been fired before the howitzers were destroyed. Flare and gunships arrived by 0330 hours, and Air Force fighter jets by 0500 hours. At 0530 hours, two relief elements (B Company of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry and Troop I of the 3rd Squadron 11th “Blackhorse” Cavalry) arrived and battered their way into the beleaguered base. The attack was finally repulsed. In the fight that lasted until 0600 hours, US casualties were 11 KIA and 66 WIA. Eighteen enemy bodies were counted the following morning and one POW prisoner was taken.

1ST BDE-While securing a fire support base 14 kms south of Cu Chi, 25th Inf. Div forces repelled a determined enemy ground attack. It was through the sheer courage and the combined efforts of the 4th Bn (Mech) 23rd Inf, three batteries from the 7th Bn 11th Arty, and a battery from the 3rd Bn 13th Arty, that the fire support base was saved.

With the mortars still dropping, now at a heavier rate, the “Tomahawks” still remained on line and countered with a heavy volume of fire. The 50 calibers on the armored personnel carriers glowed in the night along with muzzle flashes from the other weapons, a shield of lead was established with interlocking fire.

MAJ Jeff M. Tuten, the Tomahawk XO, realizing the precarious situation of the fire support base, directed artillery pieces to be put on line where the enemy concentration was the greatest. With their tubes lowered to point blank range, rounds were fired at the charging enemy.

When Bravo Co arrived at the besieged fire support base, they came under heavy automatic weapons and RPG fire. Realizing how badly they were needed inside the perimeter, CPT James P. Hales organized the company on line and charged through a hail of fire over the enemy positions into the perimeter.

A morning sweep of the area outside the perimeter revealed nine enemy bodies but speculation was that many more were killed because of the blood-stained ropes that were found outside the perimeter. These ropes were fashioned in such a way that they were probably used to drag away the dead. In addition to the many blood trails, numerous RPG and expended recoilless rifle rounds were found.

On the same day, at 1450 hours, Company A and B and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Battalion 27th Infantry made an airmobile combat assault into a swamp 5 kms east of Duc Hoa. Intelligence sources reported that a large concentration of enemy forces were in the area. Immediately making contact upon landing, the Wolfhound infantrymen swept through the area with the support of gunships. The ensuing battle lasted into the night, until 2100 hours. The infantrymen and gunships killed 66 NVA soldiers and captured three prisoners. Three 122mm rocket launchers and numerous weapons, ammunition and other war materiel were recovered. The prisoners identified their unit as being the 208th NVA Rocket Regiment.

The action began about 3 p.m. when helicopters of the 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav spotted movement in a suspected rocket site. Soon after the helicopters began exchanging fire with the enemy troops, the Wolfhounds recon platoon airlifted into the battleground to secure an observation chopper downed in the fight.

PFC Dan V. Lindholm, 19, of Lindsborg, Kan., also saw his share of enemy playing dead. “I saw one NVA officer lying in the bushes. I noticed he had a pistol belt and holster, but no pistol. Just then he turned over and I shot him. He had that pistol pointed right at me.”

Continuing the widespread search and pursuit of enemy units west of Saigon, the 25th Division's maneuvering battalions established numerous small contacts on May 10th. The most significant of these involved Company C of the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry. At 1035 hours, the Company located elements of the 271st VC Regiment approximately 9 kms west of Saigon (XS700914). Pursuing the enemy to the north, the Manchu infantrymen claimed 26 VC KIA and captured one POW in an all day fight that broke off at 2118 hours.

The Manchus of the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry's pursuit of the VC took us west and northwest of Saigon to the Duc Hoa and Hoc Mon area, chasing them across the two provinces of Hau Nghia and Gia Dinh. The following account contains the collective recollections of four Alpha Company Manchu soldiers: SGT Willie Gin, PFC David Amatore, PFC Jim Howarth and PFC David Young.

Thirty-six years ago our paths touched, intertwined in many battles for however short of time that it was. This one firefight, on May 11th, wasn't a major battle by any means. It was only a small one-one of many perilous firefights that we had encountered. Most likely you will not find any official after action report, mention of, or reference to this day. But the time, place and people are real.

It's a bright sunny morning. Days before, contact with the enemy was brief and scattered throughout the Battalion's area of operation (AO). Our AO was flat open grassland interspersed with patches of woodlands, thickets, narrowly brushed tree lines, rice paddy fields, swamps and semi-drier areas. The battalion had been conducting company-size, and battalion-size, reconnaissance in force sweeps from a temporary base camp.

Shortly after sunrise, Alpha and Delta Company left its night operating position (NOP) for their day's mission: a two-company reconnaissance in force patrol. Less than two hours into it, Delta was pinned down by VC gunfire and a tall M60 machine gunner was killed by a fatal shot to the face or upper body.

Alpha Company-three platoons commanded by CPT Elcie Adams, an African American who had recently replaced CPT Jerry Weigand-was approximately 100 yards away on lower ground. It was moving in two staggered columns, and maneuvered around to the left of Delta to flank the enemy's location. Along the way, Alpha's 3rd Platoon went into a hedgerow and started receiving gunfire. Alpha Company now had a fight of its own. Both of the companies had walked into a box of bunkers.

The Alpha Company's 1st and 2nd Platoons (the 2nd commanded by platoon leader 2LT Herbert Robinson) moved out to help the 3rd Platoon by flanking the VC's position. The 2nd Platoon was in the lead, followed by the 1st. The two platoons were in a semi-dry grassy wooded area; interspersed with narrow thickets, hedgerows, rice paddy fields and scattered bodies of water.

It was shortly before 0900 hours. The 2nd Platoon's lead element was midway through a rice paddy field, pointing the way in, in a flanking maneuver to help out the 3rd Platoon. PVT David Young and an M79er were ordered to move out ahead of the group. The M79er was visibly upset about having to go forward and PVT Young was afraid they were getting themselves into a mess. His senses were right.

Suddenly the VC opened-fire. Their AK rifles spitting fire and hot lead from their concealed lair of bunkers dug into the thicketed rice patty embankments. The men quickly hit the ground seeking cover and began returning the gunfire to suppress the attack, while others maneuvered into position to counter the attack.

PVT Young and the M79er quickly moved out of the center of the rice paddy field. Making their way safely to a low-lying dike, they found cover for themselves in the wet grass of the rice paddy field immersed in surface water. Some areas were knee-high deep, other places deeper. PVT Young remained in position near a machine gunner as his M79 companion moved off to another dike approximately 30 feet in front of them. There were no other Manchu soldiers in front or to the right of them-they were in a precarious position-their right-flank was unprotected, they were it. As Young rose-up out of the water to fire his weapon in the direction of the enemy, his M16 exploded. Water had entered the barrel of his weapon and the explosion opened the M16's receiver-lacerating his hand, burning his face, temporarily blinding his left eye and breaking his left eardrum. He was now without an operative weapon and feeling helpless. The VC, armed with semi-automatic weapons, fired in his direction. Their bullets kicked-up the water's surface, seeking him out as the Private tried to sink deeper beneath the water's surface for protection and to conceal his location.

When the VC opened fire, SP4 Pete “The Machine Gunner” Roberge and SGT Willie Gin immediately hit the ground, dropping in-place on slightly higher ground, seeking the cover of the high grass and moving behind the protection of a dike. Quickly recovering from the surprise attack, Pete swung his M60 machine gun into position and started blasting away at the concealed VC positions on the platoon's left flank-firing across a wide pool of water in front of a low-lying embankment covered with slim trees and thick underbrush.

In the meanwhile SGT Gin kept a watchful eye on a similar looking area to the front-right of them. Running perpendicular to the embankment that Pete was firing along, Gin thought gunfire had come from there. Seeing no movement or gunfire in that area, he crawled up alongside of Pete's machine gun. This move turned out to be a big mistake, then again maybe not. He had mistakenly positioned himself on the wrong side of the machine gun. Hot M60 bullet casings were being ejected at him at a steady rate-striking his face, neck and arms. Before Pete had gone through a belt of ammo, Gin rolled away from him to avoid being struck any longer by the hot casings. At that very moment, Pete was hit by a long burst of enemy gunfire. Wounded, Pete let out a yell and started cussing about being hit in the hand. The bullet(s) that hit Pete's hand also knocked out his M60-damaging the weapon's trigger handle and firing mechanism. Luckily, SGT Gin hadn't positioned himself on the other side of Pete. By chance he could have been wounded as well, or worst yet, killed by the burst of gunfire.

At the sound of the shots, Gin briefly noticed Pete rolling over and yelling, holding his wounded hand and cussing up a storm. Thinking that Pete was okay, and not seriously wounded, he returned the VC's fire with his M16 to suppress the shooting coming in their direction. Until then he hadn't fired his weapon yet; his full attention was now directed at the VC. That was the last he saw of Pete-thinking he was attending to himself or trying to make it out on his own.

A short while later the exchange of gunfire temporarily subsided. Gin caught a glimpse of another wounded soldier laying struggling beneath the high grass just a short distance to his rear less than 30 feet away. He turned and crawled off in the direction of the wounded man.

Sensing or hearing that Pete is in need of help, the M79er came back from his forward position at another dike to cover and assist PVT Young with getting Pete pulled out to a safer place. Pete fought them as they were pulling him, yelling, “Just cut it off!”-Referring to his hand. All around them bullets were striking the water as they pulled him away from the rice paddy dike, through knee-deep water, towards the rear. The M79er, feeling that they were too close to an enemy bunker to fire his M79 grenade launcher, used his .45-caliber pistol to cover their retreat as they pulled Pete back through the paddy. Pete was out of control; struggling with his rescuers; and not wanting to be pulled out of the fight. They kept saying “Pete, we just want to get you out of here.”

By then everyone had pulled back leaving the three soldiers on their own, at the most forward section of the rice paddy. Eventually they reached a dike at the rear of the same field, where a medic and others took Pete off their hands. Both were lucky; they had escaped from getting killed out here. They discovered that three others were wounded as well. Not being out of the fight yet, PVT Young secured another operative weapon, and him and his M79 companion were directed further to the rear of the platoon.

It was shortly before 9:00 AM that the 2nd Platoon's point had made contact. A Lieutenant from the 1st Platoon told his medic, PVT David “Doc” Amatore, that the lead platoon's medic was pinned down and could not reach their point man that was hit in the wrist.

Doc Amatore dropped his gear (other than his rifle and medical kit) and went to find the wounded point man. Moving cautiously, Doc could not see the wounded man due to the thick grass. After moving a short distance (10 to 20 feet) from the Lieutenant, he was hit.

It wasn't until after SGT Gin reached the wounded soldier that he discovered it was a medic with a M16. It was Doc Amatore. He recognized the medic's face as being one of the fresh new guys in the Company. Unknown to Gin, the medic was coming to the aid of Pete the Machine Gunner.

The medic was lying motionless in the high grass. He didn't appear to be in any pain, other than he was not able to move any longer. When SGT Gin examined the medic, he found a small bullet hole (the diameter of a M16 round) in his lower back, located approximately waist-high and slightly below belt-level. There were no visible signs of blood or bleeding-either on the back or front of him, where Gin expected to see a large exit wound. At that moment Gin thought the medic was accidentally shot by one of their own guys while returning fire on the VC. He came to this conclusion based on the direction the medic's body was lying in, in the grass. His body (head to foot) was in direct line with the guys behind him. The medic was not lying toward or away from the VC gunfire coming from the left flank. Being of little help and thinking that this guy was seriously wounded, another soldier appeared on the scene. SGT Gin left the medic in the other soldier's care and returned to the fight.

It's thirty-six years later, December 17, 2003. To Willie Gin's surprise he meets David Amatore, the wounded medic. David had found the Manchu's Website at www.manchu.org and registered his name, company unit, MOS and tour date. Willie often wondered if that medic had made it out alive or dead; he found his answer. Doc switched careers and is now a school psychologist, semi-retired, and living near Portland, OR [where Willie resides] in the township of Lake Oswego. Here is part of what Amatore recalls after being wounded:

“…I think I was with Alpha for a week before being wounded… I was hit. I remember being immediately aided by an American, but I also remember a Vietnamese scout [he mistook Willie's identity, who is Chinese-American]. My watch stopped due to being submerged in the water at about 9:10 AM. I think I was evacuated about two to three hours later. It may have been a much shorter time, but it seemed like a long time. I would not let anyone administer morphine because I knew I had an abdominal wound and I was in shock. While my wounds were severe, I came out of it relatively okay. If I had to be shot in the back, the bullet placement was perfect. I was not paralyzed and the bullet missed reproductive organs as it tumbled through my abdominal cavity. I have some residual back and abdominal problems but nothing compared to what might have been.

An American soldier helped drag me out to the evacuation area…he was hit in the arm with a piece of shrapnel that also hit me in the thigh. I vaguely remember gun ships making runs that seemed to be over my head. I also think I remember on one of the gunship runs something falling from the gunship like a helmet. The American who helped drag me out was also evacuated to Cu Chi….”

After the platoons regrouped from the VC's attack, the Manchu-men tried to knock out the VC positions with LAWs that didn't work. A powerful weapon, the LAW was designed as a one-time use, one-gunner rocket launcher for uses as a light anti-tank weapon. However, in Vietnam it was used to destroy bunkers or for attacking an entrenched enemy.

Several guys were online firing the shoulder-held LAWs, across a deep pool of water, at the VC's concealed low-lying fighting positions. They were trying to hit the sides of the embankment; hoping to get a direct hit on a bunker or fighting hole. As the roar of the 66mm rocket warheads hit the water's surface and the thicketed areas-and striking no hard surfaces-the high-explosive rockets didn't explode. The rockets caused no damage whatsoever, other than a splash in the water or an unheard rustle through the brush. At least six were fired-all coming up short with the same result: no explosion. SGT Gin was pissed off about that and almost got up and walked off the battlefield because he was disgusted with the two LAWs he had fired. It's doubtful the LAWs were faulty; maybe the rocket projectiles were equipped with a distance mechanism for safety reasons, which prevented them from exploding within a certain range upon impact.

Eventually, all “Bloopers” (M79 grenade launchers, also referred to as “Thumpers”) were called forward to bring fire on the enemy's location. The M79 grenadiers were lobbing in high-explosive 40mm grenade rounds when the Light Fire Team (two gunships) arrived on station, and started their air attack on the wood-lined embankments. The gunship attacks were at close quarters to Alpha Company's men-firing off their rockets, mini-guns and M60 door guns. The attacks were coordinated, so that one gunship covered the other as it finished its gun run and turned outbound from its target. Then the other gunship began its concentrated attack on the bunkered wood lines-cutting a path of destruction through the trees and the undergrowth, and disrupting the VC's attack on the men in the field.

Just as PVT Jim Howarth (from the 1st Platoon) looked down to grab another M79 grenade round, a piece of shrapnel from a rocket fired by a gunship hit his steel helmet sharply. If he hadn't looked down in that instant, the hot shrapnel would have struck him in the face. It was during one of the gunship runs that Howarth looked up and he saw a helmet falling from a gunship. Its door-gunner had been struck in the face by an enemy bullet, knocking his flight-type helmet off of his head. Shortly after that, the gunship left the area with its wounded, or dead, door-gunner aboard.

After the gunships broke off their attack and left the area, in came an artillery strike. A massive barrage of artillery pounded the same brushed, tree-lined embankments. The artillery rounds penetrated deeply into the ground, and the delayed explosions up-rooted trees and underbrush, tossing aside dirt, branches and debris mixed in with muddy water in every direction. The pounding cleared the concealment of the hidden bunkers and fighting holes, inflicting a heavy toll upon the enemy.

Picking up from where the artillery left off, the gunships returned to finish off any VC in the target area. After the second gunship run was over, the Manchu-men cautiously approached the area of attack to assess the damages and to eliminate any remaining resistance. In the patch of area where SGT Gin had previously suspected that gunfire had come from, the Manchu-men were picking through exposed bunkers. Several dead bodies were discovered and dragged out into the clearing. They had been killed by the artillery and gunship strikes. PVT Young remembers one VC being in parts.

Having secured the area against a counterattack by the VC, it was policed for weapons, gear and other war materiel, and the injured evacuated to Cu Chi. Though wounded PVT Young was not evacuated with the rest of the wounded men. He had been checked out by a medic, but for some reason they wouldn't let him climb aboard the EVAC chopper. He went in the next day for medical attention. Not to Cu Chi, but to an aid station in Trang Bang or Trung Lap.

To the right of Alpha Company's position there was a roll of trees and undergrowth-a strip of woodlands-barely obscuring several large fields on the other side. Delta Company was in the closest field, and possibly a second company: Charlie Company who had come to the scene after Delta and Alpha's fight was over. They had moved into the area to link-up, as part of a larger reconnaissance in force mission.

After policing the area of contact and evacuating the wounded, the companies moved out. Now a much larger force, the men of the Manchu Battalion spread themselves out across the wide-open grassland. They hadn't gone far when SGT Gin heard an explosion and caught a quick glimpse of the ground erupt into a tall cloud of smoke, dirt and debris. A guy in the other company tripped a buried booby-trapped artillery round. It practically cut the soldier in half below the torso.

After a malady of discontent, the men of the Battalion moved out again, with artillery supporting their advance. Coming from their rear from a great distance away, an intermittent cadence of muffled booms could be heard. Then, shortly, the rumbling sound of arty rounds roaring overhead through low-lying clouds gave SGT Gin an eerie feeling as they marched toward the exploding shells in the distance, peppering the landscape