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Viet Cong Repression
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Viet-Cong Repression
Control and Polarization of the Populace
Courtesy: Le, Thanh Nam
Source: Soc.Culture.VietNamese

Repression also serves as a means of establishing control in areas which the Viet Cong seek to "pacify," and as a major instrument in the consolidation of Communist control over already "liberated" areas.Captured documents often refer to this process as the "purifying" or "cleaning up" of an area (removing all "spies," "tyrants," and other GVN remnants), and "purging" the local hostile to the Revolution or whose loyalties are suspect). Consider, for example, the following captured plans and directives, all issued in 1968:

"Active plan prepared by the Dai Loc District Party Committee of Quang Da Province on May 25, 1968, directed subordinate units to "liberate all hamlets and villages in the vicinity of the District seat, seize political power, establish a revolutionary government, overthrow the enemy's village or hamlet administrations, eliminate hamlet spies and local administrative personnel, weed out undesirable elements among the people, and continuously pursue village and district local administrative personnel to liberate the masses from their grip and pressure." (14)

Another activity plan, dated December 22, 1968, and attributed to the Binh Dinh Province Party Committee, described the Communist mission in newly "liberated" areas in these terms: "We should immediately get down to consolidating and maintaining the areas just brought under our control as part of our expansion program. Reorganize the people, wipe out the last spies, and purge the people's ranks of elements held to be undesirable. . . (15)

A third activity plan, issued by an unidentified village security section in the spring of 1968, directed armed security elements to annihilate local government personnel and to clear the village of all suspects and reactionaries so as to make it safe for troops from higher headquarters.(16)

A directive dated October 5,  1968, and attributed to the Political Section of Gia Lai Province stated that "it is necessary to weed out undesirable elements in areas where the troops will stop . . . and in areas which are prepared as stepping stones and troop-advance corridors of the army." (17)

Once the Viet Cong establish a strong presence in an area, they try to seal off the local population both physically and psychologically from any further contact with the GVN. They are particularly intent on denying the government all intelligence on Communist troop movements, bivouac sites, supply caches, and information relating to those who serve in their local military and political infrastructures. To inhibit intelligence penetration and collection in Communist-controlled or contested areas, the Viet Cong not only systematically identify and neutralize anyone suspected of being a GVN spy or informant, but they also impose and enforce very stringent regulations governing travel within the villages and hamlets and proscribing all unauthorized contact with GVN persons, including immediate relatives. Any villager found violating these local regulations is subject to disciplinary action and runs the risk of being thought a GVN spy, a most serious charge, as even faintly "suspected agents often are incarcerated in thought-reform camps. Proven spies are harshly dealt with, and most are executed. Captured documents suggest that, in at least some localities, Communist security cadres have standing orders to "kill without mercy" any GVN intelligence or reconnaissance agents attempting to penetrate the area. (18)

From time to time, captured "spies" are given public trials before "People's Courts" as a way of impressing the local population with the Revolution's firm attitude in the face of such activity. (19)

The local people also are subjected to constant and intensive indoctrination by security cares regarding the importance of the "security maintenance mission," and are instructed to keep watch over the activities and contacts of their fellow villagers and to report immediately the presence of any strangers in their areas. (20) Part of this indoctrination is an attempt to imbue villagers with deep hatred of all GVN intelligence personnel. One plan urged local cadres to "motivate the people to engage in security maintenance activities arouse their hatred of enemy spies and intelligence personnel, and make them uncover the latter. (21) And a letter to local Security Section in the Saigon area said that the main purpose of this mission was "to unmask the enemy's cunning schemes to the people in  order to increase their deep hatred towards the enemy, especially the security agents, policemen, intelligence agents, spies and informants." (22)

The fomenting of hatred and vindictiveness is by no means limited to GVN intelligence personnel; indeed, all repressive activity is cloaked in a highly emotional propaganda designed to arouse the people to a deep hatred of, and a desire for revenge against, the military and civilian officials serving the government. According to captured documents, Communist cadres are called on to "deepen the people's hatred" toward the GVN, the "incite" their "wrath," to "arouse" their "hate against Thieu-Ky puppet government," and to "heighten their concept of revenge." (23) For example, in guidelines for a propaganda campaign in Ben Tre Province for the period  October 1968 to March 1969, the Viet Cong directed cadres to "make the people feel a profound hatred of [the] enemy's savage crimes and incite them to avenge their compatriots and
kinfolk by enthusiastically and actively taking part in combat activities to heroically annihilate the enemy and achieve great merits." (24) Another propaganda directive, covering the same period but issued by a Region headquarters, urged them to "intensify [the people's] deep hatred for the enemy, [and] strongly and continuously denounce the savage and brutal crimes committed by the Americans and their lackeys towards our people." (25)

Frequently, these hate campaigns focus on specific targets of repression, as evident from a security directive, captured in Mart 1968, which outlined the types of propaganda that should accompany the repression of "counterrevolutionary elements":

"While motivating the people to deepen their resentment of the enemy, we must so propagandize them that they can see the enemy's deceitful, demagogic, pacification schemes, and  that the hamlet and village [RVN] administrative personnel, pacification cadre and "people's aspiration" cadre, etc. . . . . are but traitors, henchmen of the US Imperialists. They entice the people with mellow words while trying to deceive and exploit them. The theme our daily propaganda must be based on is concrete on-the-spot examples of enemy crimes." (26)

In expounding the various crimes of government personnel, Viet Cong propagandists dwell on the many "inhuman" and barbaric atrocities" allegedly committed by the Americans and their "GVN henchmen," the wanton destruction of homes and property, and the "rape," "murder," and "torture" of innocent men and women. Government officials are characterized as "Vietnamese traitors" who fatten their lives on our blood." (27)

That the Communists have continued to give high priority to their "deep hatred for the enemy" movement is illustrated by this passage in a Secret directive concerning security activities issued by an agency of the Can Duoc District Unit, Subregion 3, on May 18, 1969:

"We must motivate the entire army and people to join the "deep hatred for the enemy" movement waged by us and be determined to sweep the enemy. We must seek all means to destroy people who surrender, traitors and pacification personnel." (28)

Such hate campaigns apparently have several objectives. One is to justify the most severe measures (assassinations and executions) taken against some government servants: indeed, the killings of "tyrants" is made to appears as a heroic act deserving special recognition and award. (29) The other is to warn any member of the general populace who might be tempted to treat with or join the GVN.

The central purpose of this hate propaganda is to polarize the population, to divide it irrevocably from the GVN, and to mobilize it for service and sacrifice in support of the Revolution. The people are to learn to view the war in black and white terms, to accept no coexistence with the GVN, and to fight the enemy without compromise. They must acquire "a clear-cut antagonistic attitude" toward the government, such as that described as follows in a report of the Military Affairs Party Committee of Area 3:

"Attitude of the population: The people did have a clear-cut antagonistic attitude toward the enemy. They only wished the Revolution could emerge victorious as quickly as possible. This attitude reflected itself in the fact that they gave us information about the enemy police and spies, guided us to destroy cruel elements, sheltered us in their houses or showed us good positions in which to station our troops, provided us with material supplies and fed us." (31)

The ultimate aim of hate campaigns is to raise popular animus to such a pitch that the people will themselves participate in the liquidation of "spies," "tyrants," and "reactionaries." This objective was pressed hard during the General Uprising and General Offensive phase, which began during Tet of 1968, when Viet Cong propagandists and other political cadres were repeatedly urged to "promote the people's determination and enthusiasm in killing and capturing the tyrants." (32) More will be said of this later.

(14) Doc. Log No. 10-1004-68 (Confidential), dated November 10, 1968 (emphasis added). Translation of a "Resolution" (activity plan) prepared at the Dai Loc District Party Committee Conference, Quang Da Province, which was held from May 24 to May 28, 1968. The Resolution was dated May 25, 1968, and was classified Secret. Captured by the 1st USMC Division on September 14, 1968.

(15) Doc. Log No. 01-2311-69 (Confidential), dated January 31, 1969 (emphasis added). Translation of a "Plan for Political Struggle and Armed Uprising. . .," dated December 22, 1968, and attributed to the Political Struggle by the Capital ROK Infantry Division on January 4,1969.

(16) Doc Log No. 05-1385-68 (Confidential), summarized in MAJ2 Bulletin No. 12,150, dated May 7,  1968 (emphasis added). Summary of an activity plan of an unidentified Village Security Section for the period of April 15 to June 30, 1968. Captured by the 7/1 Cavalry Squadron, II FFV, on April 24, 1968.

(17) Doc. Log No. 10-2095-68 (Confidential), dated October 31, 1968 (emphasis added). Translation of a "Directive on Political Tasks for Winter 1968," dated October 5, 1968, and attributed to the Political Section, Gia Lai Province Unit, B-3 Front. Captured by RF, 24th STZ, RVNAF II CTZ, between October 18 and 20, 1968. Similar statements may be found in numerous other captured documents, such as Doc. Log No. 01-1999-68 (Confidential), and Doc. Log No. 05-1947-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 12,415, dated May15, 1968.

(18) Example appears in Doc. Log No. 02-2050-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 9769, dated February 25, 1968,and Doc. Log No. 04-3157-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 11,901, dated April 30, 1968.

(19) Doc. Log No. 11-1520-68 (Confidential), dated December 26, 1968. Translation of a plan prepared by an unidentified enemy unit concerning military and political operations against Allied targets in Ben Tre Province in 1968. Captured by 5th U.S. SFGA on November 6, 1968.

(20) Doc. Log No. 01-2268-69 (Confidential), dated February 17, 1968. Translation of a "Directive" dated October 4, 1968, believed to have been issued by the Current Affairs Committee, COSVN, concerning the intelligence activities of the GVN's "Phuong Hoang" (Phoenix) program and the measures necessary to counter that organization. Captured by the C/K/RAR, 1st ATF, on January 19, 1969.

(21) Doc. Log No. 11-1520-68.

(22) Doc. Log No. 02-1076-69 (Confidential), dated February 20, 1069. Translation of a Secret letter, dated October 24, 1968, believed to have been prepared by an agency of Subregion 2 and addressed to the Security Section of Precinct 6 (Saigon) and five other districts in surrounding areas of Subregion 2. Captured by the 25th U.S. Infantry
Division on January 26, 1969.

(23) Examples were found in the following: Doc. Log No. 01-3001-67 (Confidential), dated December 12, 1967; Doc. Log No. 05-2047-67 (Confidential), dated February 12, 1968; Doc. Log No. 12-1739-67 (Confidential), dated December 29, 1967; Doc. Log No. 03-1120-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 9986, dated March 2, 1968; Doc. Log No. 04-1228-68 (Confidential), dated May 16, 1968; and Doc. Log No. 10-1399-68 (Confidential), dated October 27, 1968.

(24) Doc. Log No. 11-1020-68 (Confidential), dated January 15, 1969. Translation of a directive pertaining to a six-month propaganda campaign  (from October 1968 to March 1069), believed to have been issued by an agency of Ben Tre Province on October 17, 1968. Captured by the 9th U.S. Infantry Division on  October 29, 1968.

(25) Doc. Log No. 10-2137-68 (Confidential), dated November 17, 1968. Translation of a directive dated September 23, 1968, entitled "Policies, Subjects and Requirements of Propaganda Mission (from October 1968 to March 1069)" and attributed to the Political Staff of Military Region VII. Captured by the 1st RAR Battalion, 1st ATF, on
October 8, 1968.

(26) Doc. Log No. 04-2435-68 (Confidential), dated May 31, 1968. Translation of a letter which sets forth security procedures for the Security Section of an unidentified province in line with COSVN and Military Region resolutions. Captured by the C/3/RAR, 1st ATF, on March 30, 1068.

(27) Doc. Log No. 12-0503-67 (Confidential), dated January 23, 1968. Translation of a propaganda leaflet addressed to "all people of province," issued by the Saigon-Gia Dinh Region National Front for Liberation Committee in late 1967. Captured by the 5th ARVN Ranger Group, Gia Dinh Sector, on December 8 and 9, 1967.

(28) Doc. Log No. 06-1939-69.

(29) "Liberation Medals" are awarded to units or individuals who show outstanding courage in liquidating "tyrants." The Special Action element of the Quang Da City Unit, for example, was awarded a Third Class Liberation Medal for the high fighting spirit and courage displayed in killing three "tyrants" in Nhan Bien hamlet on August 3, 1967. Doc. Log No. 10-1915-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 17,356, dated October 19, 1968. Captured by the 1st U.S. Air Cavalry Division.
(30) An example is Doc. Log No. 01-1142-69 (Confidential) summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No.  19,243, dated January 3, 1969, which summarizes notes taken at a political reorientation training course held in Military Region V during December 1968. Captured by the Americal Division on December 18, 1968.

(31) Doc. Log No. 02-1922-68 (Confidential), dated February 29, 1968. Translation of minutes concerning a meeting of the Military Affairs Party Committee, Area 2, which reviewed the combat achievements of Area 3 during the Tet Offensive. Captured by CMD, RVNAF III CTZ, on February 12, 1968.

(32) Doc. Log No. 09-2102-68 (Confidential), dated October 15, 1968. Translations of a directive dated August 5, 1968, concerning "Political Struggle and Armed Uprising," believed to have been issued by the Current Affairs Committee of a district in Binh Dinh Province. Captured by the 5th U.S. SFGA on September 11, 1968.


Glossary
ARVN: Army Republic of Vietnam
CDEC: Combined Document Exploitation Center
CIO: Central Intelligence Organization
COSVN: Central Office of South Vietnam
GVN: Government of South Vietnam
MP: Military Police
MPS: Ministry of Public Security
MR: Military Region
MSS: Military Security Service
RVN: Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SVN: South Vietnam
USMC: United States Marines Corp.
VNQDD: Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang



 Viet-Cong Concept of The General Offensive

Courtesy: Le, Thanh Nam
Source: Soc.Culture.VietNamese

 Part 2 of 5

In the course of the offensive, a concerted effort was also made to induce the local populace to participate in the repressive process by
assisting the Viet Cong in tracking down "tyrants" and eliminating GVN officials. A high-level training document from this period emphasized
that "the substance of the present political struggle is not 'to stage demonstrations to present petitions' but to make use of violence to
overthrow the enemy government and to establish the people's revolutionary administration." It went to say:
"Therefore, the key problem is making preparations and motivating the masses to seethingly arise (in coordination with the military offensive) to annihilate cruel tyrants and wicked administrative personnel and spies, to smash the puppet government and the enemy reactionary machinery, to establish the revolutionary administration and to quickly develop the people's revolutionary forces.
To perform this task well, it is necessary to work out uprising plans for each local area (particularly for the villages) in a very concrete and
careful manner and make them thoroughly understood by all Party members and popular organizations and to ensure that offensive and
uprising plans, for local areas, will include offensives, uprising and also enemy troop proselytizing activities. In these plans, it is necessary to
specify the specific mission of each Party cell, each organization cell and each Party member concerning the annihilation of cruel tyrants, ring
leaders, spies and lackeys of the enemy in district seats, towns and cities as well as special mission agents, to eradicate all forms of oppressive enemy revolutionary administration; to develop popular organizations, which should be viewed as a decisive link I the motivation and leadership of the masses to arise and seize and hold the powers." (69)
An activity plan of February 5 outlined how the masses were to be motivated and organized to "annihilate" government persons, including
pacification cadres and to track down the "remnants of the enemy troops":
"We must continuously motivate the masses to track down and completely annihilate puppet government agents and installations in the
rural area (including all of the pacification forces). Then, we must track down and completely annihilate key personnel of the administration at
district and province levels and partially annihilate the central level (including the intelligence, espionage and security networks) to
completely break the enemy's oppressive control [over the population]. We must destroy the entire reactionary political forces in towns, cities
and district capitals and continue to liberate the remaining jails and prisons. We must also set up Liberation Committees in various wards,
districts, provinces, and cities which have been occupied by our forces. We must quickly consolidate and expand the [revolutionary]
government at its very foundation and formulate various policies.
We must quickly increase the number of efficient political agents among the masses on a broad and firm basis, and teach them how to master the situation in towns and cities. We must quickly organize the masses to make them participate in all tasks concerning town and city
administration such as: tracking down the remnants of the enemy troops; suppressing anti-revolutionary elements; maintaining order and security; organizing civil anti-aircraft defense, administering public services necessary for the livelihood of the people and combat activities of our troops, etc. [sic] . . . . " (70)
To precipitate local uprising, Communist front organizations disseminated appeals to the masses to annihilate their GVN oppressors.
One such appeal, issued by the Saigon-Gia Dinh United Liberation Youth Association, urged people and students in the Saigon area to
courageously stand up and suppress tyrants; punish the police and security agents, informants, and "wicked persons"; and accuse the chiefs
of city wards and interfamilies of cruelty. (71)
Despite such urging and efforts to foment popular uprising, the Communists' attempts to enlist the support of local populations in their
offensive apparently met with very little success. Indeed, Communist postmortems of the Tet Offensive mentioned this failure to spark popular
participation as one of the major shortcomings of the campaign. (71)

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References

(69) Doc. Log No. 05-2068-68 (Confidential), dated June 19, 1968
(emphasis added). Translation of an undated training document
pertaining to the implementation of the 6th COSVN Resolution by all
levels of the Party. The document was titled "Requirement and Purpose
of the Study of the Sixth Resolution of Nam Truong" and was
presumably prepared at a high level. Captured by the 1st U.S. Infantry
Division on May 6, 1968.

(70) Doc. Log No. 02-2083-68 (Confidential), dated February 28, 1968
(emphasis added). Translation of an activity plan which provides an
assessment of the progress achieved during the first seven days of the
Tet Offensive and outlines plans for the continuation of that offensive.
The document was entitled "Capitalize on Our Victories To Dash
Forward and Continuously Attack the Enemy, with a Strong
Determination To Gain Final Victory," and was prepared on February 5,
1968, at an otherwise unspecified Current Affairs Party Committee
meeting. (The contents of the document would suggest that the issuing
agency may have been the Current Affairs Committee of COSVN.)
Captured by the 25th U.S. Infantry Division on February 24, 1968.
(71) Doc. Log No. 04-2670-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2
Bulletin No. 11,665, dated April 22, 1968. Summary of an undated
"appeal" published by the Saigon-Gia Dinh United Liberation Youth
Association and addressed to the people and student so the Saigon-Gia
Dinh area. Captured by the combined MP Tm, CMD, RVNAF III CTZ,
on April 21, 1968.
(72) For example Doc. Log No. 05-2819-68 (Confidential), summarized
in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 12,883, dated May 30, 1968, published by the
Propaganda-Training Section of Subregion 1 as a training lesson for
cadres and Party members on how to master the main problems in the
motivation of the populace to revolt. Captured by the 1st U.S. Infantry
Division on may 21, 1968.

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Glossary
ARVN: Army Republic of Vietnam
CDEC: Combined Document Exploitation Center
CIO: Central Intelligence Organization
COSVN: Central Office of South Vietnam
GVN: Government of South Vietnam
MP: Military Police
MPS: Ministry of Public Security
MR: Military Region
MSS: Military Security Service
RVN: Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SVN: South Vietnam
USMC: United States Marines Corp.
VNQDD: Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang
 

 Part 3 of 5

Throughout 1968 and well into 1969, as the Communists sought to continue the General Offensive, destroying the "Puppet Government at
all levels" and liquidating "stubborn ringleaders and tyrants" remained high on the list of important missions. (73) Documents produced in the
fall and winter of 1968 continued to emphasized that "revolutionary violence" would determine the success of the political struggle and that
it was the most efficient means for advancing political movements in the cities and towns. (74) A directive of November 10, 1968, attributed
to the Political Department of MR V Headquarters stated that the main mission of guerrilla and self-defense forces was to cooperate with
district and city units in annihilating the GVN's structure in cities, towns, and surrounding areas; eliminating enemy administrative personnel, police, pacification cadres, and Popular Force cadres; and thus provoking civilian uprising. (75) A Top Secret plan dated December 12, 1968, believed to have been issued by an agency of Binh Dinh Province, directed that all government administrative and intelligence personnel who attempted to oppose the political struggles and uprising of the masses be killed at any price. (76)
In attacking on urban areas, some units were ordered to concentrate on senior GVN commanders and officials. For example, a June 1968
directive prepared by a unit of the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region stated that
"the selection of important and key targets has a great significance affecting our common victory. We should, according to each town and
city, select . . . targets such as the Puppet troops and government's ringleaders; Province Chiefs, Civil Guard Provincial Group
Commanders, Security Service Chiefs, Mayors, Army Corps Commanders, Division Commanders, etc . . . . with their (administrative) machinery. (77)
Other units were instructed to concentrate on the very lowest levels of the organizational structure and proceed on a street-by-street basis to
systematically root out and eliminate "reactionary" elements. Thus, a Viet Cong plan captured in November 1968, which outlined
forthcoming operations against the capital of Ben Tre Province, directed local armed reconnaissance units to "update" their blacklists of lower-
level GVN personnel I "each area inside and outside the city" and then proceed to eliminate these persons. Specifically,
"There must be  plan to kill from three to five [reactionary elements] and put out of action from five to ten others on each street, in each bloc of
houses. Loosen the enemy's oppressive control machinery, destroy 70% of the administrative personnel in the area. Tyrants are to be cut down
and warning notices sent to (undesirable) elements forcing them to resign their posts." (78)
The setting of quotas on the number of government persons to be eliminated by individual units was characteristic of the General Offensive period. A sapper unit in the Quang Da Special Zone, for example, was instructed to kill a total of 100 tyrants; (79) a district force in Thua Thien Province was ordered to "completely destroy . . . 200 tyrants." (80) A captured letter dated July 1968 concerning the conduct of security activities in Ben Tre Province called upon components of the Security Service to try to destroy 50 percent of the GVN's administrative, police, and public security agencies at provincial, city, and district levels during a forthcoming phase of the offensive. Key cadres from the police, security, military, intelligence, and psychological warfare agencies, along with village and hamlet administrative council members, were pinpointed as the main targets for liquidation. (81)

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References

(73) For example, Doc. Log No. 01-2766-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 20,197, dated January 20, 1969, and Doc. Log No. 01-2818-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 20,230, dated January 31, 1969.
(74) Doc. Log No. 11-1771-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 18,033, dated November 19, 1968. Summary of a
"Recapitulation Report" dated October 30, 1968, which reviews the political struggle movement in Binh Dinh Province during the months
prior to October 20, 1968, and provides lessons for future political struggles. Captured by the Capital ROK Infantry Division on November
6, 1968.
(75) Doc. Log No. 01-2762-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 20,195, dated January 30, 1969. Summary of a directive
dated November 10, 1968, which provides guidance to province units concerning the tasks of guerrilla and self-defense units during a
forthcoming campaign. This directive is attributed to the Political Department, Headquarters, Military Region V. Captured by the Capital
ROK Infantry Division on January 4, 1969.
(76) Doc. Log No. 01-2773-69 (Confidential),summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 20,203, dated January 30, 1969. Summary of a Top Secret
plan dated December 12, 1968, attributed to an agency of the Binh Dinh Province Unit, Military Region V, which provides guidance on military
proselytizing activities in a forthcoming campaign. Captured by the Capital ROK Infantry Division on January 4, 1969.

(77) Doc. Log No. 10-1003-68 (Confidential), dated November 23, 1968. Translation of directive (in draft form) dated June 19, 1968,
concerning the "Strategy and Tactics of Launching Permanent and  Continuous Attacks Against the Enemy During Military Campaigns and
Operations." This directive is believed to have been prepared by the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region. Captured by the 196th Light Infantry
Brigade, Americal Division, on September 9, 1968.

(78) Doc. Log No. 11-1520-68.

(79) Doc. Log No. 07-3297-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 15,030, dated July 31, 1968. Summary of an undated
attack plan prepared by an agency in the Quang Da Special Zone, with details for an attack to be launched against an unspecified city.
Captured by the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, on July 23, 1968.

(80) Doc. Log No. 08-1045-68 (Confidential), dated August 15, 1968. Translation of a notebook dated June 30, 1968, concerning the activities
of district agencies in Thua Thien Province. Captured by the 1st USMC Division, III MAF, on July 21, 1968.

(81) Doc. Log No. 02-5567-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 16, dated March 6, 1969. Summary of letter dated July
1968, and containing instructions on the conduct of security activities in Ben Tre city and its outskirts during a forthcoming phase of hostilities.
This letter is attributed to the Security Section, Ben Tre Province Unit, Military Region II. Captured by the 9th U.S. Infantry Division in
February 1969.



Glossary
ARVN: Army Republic of Vietnam
CDEC: Combined Document Exploitation Center
CIO: Central Intelligence Organization
COSVN: Central Office of South Vietnam
GVN: Government of South Vietnam
MP: Military Police
MPS: Ministry of Public Security
MR: Military Region
MSS: Military Security Service
RVN: Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SVN: South Vietnam
USMC: United States Marines Corp.
VNQDD: Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang